Definition of resurrection: the act of raising the dead to life again: usually understood as a bodily exaltation from death to life.
1. N.T. Wright argues that resurrection in the ancient world [always] involves raising up a personal body to life again, which would include Christ's resurrection from the dead. He extensively lays out this argument in The Resurrection of the Son of God.
See also https://ntwrightpage.com/2016/07/12/christian-origins-and-the-resurrection-of-jesus-the-resurrection-of-jesus-as-a-historical-problem/
2. Specific Old Testament/Tanakh Texts-See Job 14:13-14; Isaiah 26:19; Daniel 12:1-2.
3.Christian Resurrection of the Body-1 Corinthians 15:3-58; Hebrews 6:2; 11:19, 35.
4. Christian Materialism-Representatives of this school of thought include Kevin Corcoran, Nancey Murphy, Peter van Inwagen, Lynne Rudder Baker, Joel Green.
Bibliography:
Wright, N T. The Resurrection of the Son of God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Print.
Corcoran, Kevin. Rethinking
Human Nature. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006. Print.
Murphy, Nancey. Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print.
Van Inwagen, Peter. Material Beings. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990. Print.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Print.
14 comments:
I love NT Wright's Christian Origins series (I'm sure I've said that many times here before :)). I think his argument for a bodily ressurection is solid, and his argument for the ressurection of Jesus is one of the best I've seen (measured by how bad the rebuttal attempts are).
I'm a little cautious about the Christian Materialist movement, Peter Van Inwagen is a very good philosopher, but I believe his position is that GOd would have to literally preserve, somewhere, a part of our brain, for the ressurection to work. I don't believe in an immortal soul by any stretch of the imagination, but I think the arguments that the mind cannot be material or cannot be reduced to physical processes, are good.
I know Gregory of Nyssa analogized the "soul" working with the body as someone playing an instrument, i.e. the music can't be made without the instrument, but it's the performer making the music.
I don't know if that's a good analogy, I've heard some theologians talk about the the mind being the "form of the body," I'm not sure how to make sense of that.
But Raymond Tallis and David Bentley Hart (and others like Stepehen R.L. Clark, Edward Feser, and Keith Ward) and pushed me into thinking the purely materialist (mechanical) model of the mind can't work.
I suppose one could have a materalist model, but one would have to change the concept of matter away from the mechanistic/Neutonian model of matter, perhaps back to a kind of Aristotilean teleological model.
However, I DO think that living creatures need bodies, I don't think there can be such a thing as a disembodied creature, and I'm also persuaded by N.T. Wright on the ressurection, although I don't think he takes into account the possibility of a "spiritual body," being a corporeal body, but just on a higher level, perhaps it's that he makes a too sharp distinction between "Jewish" thought and "Hellenistic" thought, the distinciton surely is there, but the two cultures intereacted and shared a lot.
Anyway, I'm rambling :). Hope you're hanging in there brother :).
I always appreciate your contributions, Roman. Things are going okay: life is challenging, but I'm hanging in there and can feel the comfort that Jehovah gives.
I love N.T. Wright's studies too, but his "transphysical" suggestion for the body of Jesus seems speculative and not faithful to Scripture. What do you think of that idea?
Speaking of Christian materialism, there are different approaches to the concept. For example, Nancey Murphy favors non-reductive materialism/physicalism. And while I like some of van Inwagen's suggestions, I part ways with him when it comes to mereology and the resurrection from the dead. Murphy's ideas seem more plausible to me and so does Kevin Corcoran. For the record, I identify as a Christian materialist, but my views are consonant with Witnesses beliefs about the nephesh or psyche.
Another thinker, who is not a Christian materialist/physicalist but I like some of his ideas, is John Searle. He argues for biological naturalism which contends that consciousness arises from neurobiological processes. I'm not sure how mentality works; however, I can't help but think it has something to do with neurobiological processes. Once we get away from physical explanations, it seems that science cannot help us to understand mind and consciousness. Granted, one can make a philosophical argument for an immaterial mind; yet at the end of the day, I see no scientific evidence for a mind that's not supervenient or somehow dependent on natural processes.
The mind as "form of the body" is mainly from Aristotle and Aquinas. To understand that concept, one must grasp Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, i.e., hylomorphism. Aquinas also writes that the "soul" is the "act of the organized body." Corcoran discusses these passages and so does Edward Feser, among others. As you probably know, hylomorphism posits a form for basically every material thing: trees, apples, cats, dogs, and humans, and distinguishes the form from the matter of a thing (hyle and morphe are the Greek terms at play here).
One thing I'll say about the spiritual body is that Wright, Green and these other writers define "spiritual body" differently than Witnesses do. It took me a while to wrap my head around what they were saying. Read Joel Green's book listed in the bibliography and you'll see what I mean. Anthony Thiselton also has a thick commentary on 1 Corinthians that's very informative.
Regarding hylomorphism, see https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2018/07/john-duns-scotus-and-universal.html
I never read in the bible that Jesus physical body was raised up, of course it does use the word body. There is a spiritual body as Paul says at 1Cor.15:44, so what body was raised up "a spiritual body" was raised up. I guess we could say that a "body" means it has for lack of betters words a location even though it is spirit. A spirit body is a body. It seems that some are unable to use the scriptures to explain their beliefs. Paul of course used a simple explanation because most everyone in the 1st century was in no way a scholar of scripture.
Can everyone in the early congregation grasp at what Paul is saying & does it make sense, yes, yes it does. Detail are not necessary, the resurrected Jesus was a spirit person so he had a spiritual body. A spirit body is invisible to humans but it is a body anyway. I think John says it best at 1John 3:2 it is not manifest to us what the anointed will become. Except the fact that they will be like Jesus. Find these expression in the insight publication under "body"
So I agree fully with what you say about Wright Edgar.
I'm glad you're hanging in their, and I thank Jehovah that he's comforting you.
I agree with you on NT Wright's concept of transphysicality, David Hart has, correctly in my view, critiqued Wright on this point, pointing out that the ancients, both 'pagan' and Jewish thought of the spiritual world as just as real as the physical world, and including coporeal spiritual beings, and he's correct in describing Jesus as having a spiritual body (as I said before), but I think he's trying to stay evangelical, and for evangelicals a physical ressurection of Jesus is necessary.
To be honest, and I know I'm biased here, but one cannot construct a eschatology that takes into account the full breadth of scriptural data, and do so seriously, without both an earthly physical and a spiritual ressurection, which requires some constructive work (like the two classes in JW eschatology), but otherwise you're just gonna end up having two ignore one set of data or the other.
Although I appreciate Wright's work and find it to be top notch, I do think his evangelical commitments, and his desire to be a theologian, taint his work a bit, and he often ends up saying things where you're not exactly sure what he's saying ... such as his "transphyscial" concept, I'm still not exactly sure what that means.
Just to clarify, I agree with the Witness explanation of the nephesh and psyche, and as far as I understand, that's the broad consensus in the scholarship, but I just don't think that can be reduced to purely physical. To put it another way: is the psyche JUST the soma? or is the psyche JUST the nous? I would say no, the psyche is a soma, brought to life by pneuma, and with a nous.
I'm doubtful that the physical sciences can know anything about free will or the mind in itself, I think the most they can do is show corrolations, I think this has to do with the very nature of the physical sciences, i.e. they only measure quantifiable, and testable phenomena, that can be repeated in a lab (theoretically), and this is done by removing the world of secondary qualities and only including primary qualities ... but if you try and use something which only works by ignoring secondary qualities, to explore the world of secondary qualities, you're kind of in a pickle. I think one can say certainly that the mind is dependent on the body, but I think that's a step or two away from saying the mind is redusable to the body.
An analogy might be a painting, the beauty and meaning of a painting, depends on the chemical make up and combinations/locations/volumes etc etc of the paint and canvis, but it's not redusable to those things, in otherwords if you give a scientific account of every atom on the painting, you still haven't accounted for the painting as a piece of art work.
When it comes to Aquinas's and Aristotles's "form of the body" view, I've read enough about it to be able to repeat the concepts, but I'm not sure if I fully grasp it ... I haven't had that "aha, I get it now" moment I've had with other concepts. I get it when it comes to other realities, (apples, trees, etc, etc) but when it comes to the mind/body issue I haven't quite gotten it.
I'll have to take a look at Joel Green, perhaps that'll clear up my confusion over Wright :).
Philip.
The term "body" is almost always underdetermined, so it's very difficult to say what that might mean exactly.
The problem is that "spiritual" is often "not physical", and since the only space we know is physical space, I don't know what it would mean to have a "non physical location," the only analogy I'm aware of is mathematical locations, i.e. abstract objects, or logical relations, or semantic relations, or something like that.
One way I've thought of it is in the physical world body implies being bounded, which means one has a limited sphere of influence in relation to other objects contingent on one's bounded location in relation to those objects, in the human sense it means that our perception is bounded by our body, and our action is bounded by our body.
What that means in the spiritual realm I don't know.
brother Foster has pointed me towards Tertullian (and the Stoic) notion of the body which is not the same as our modern notion, which essnecially means substantial, beyond that I'm not sure what more I can say about it :).
We get a sense of what a spiritual body is in that each angel or spirit being is it own separate self. They move around separately and they can even gather together. We know that they are spirit persons which include God. So someway they are bound and they even have their own personalities and desires. They simply are more than physical of another realm. The spirit realm.
NT Wright on transphysicality:
'Transphysical' is not meant to describe in detail what sort of a body it was that the early Christians supposed Jesus already had, and believed that they themselves would eventually have. Nor indeed does it claim to explain how such a thing can come to be. It merely, but I hope usefully, puts a label on the demonstrable fact that the early Christians envisaged a body which was still robustly physical but also significantly different from the present one. If anything - since the main difference they seem to have envisaged is that the new body will not be corruptible we might say not that it will be less physical, as though it were some kind of ghost or apparition, but more. 'Not unclothed, but more fully clothed.' As historians we may have difficulty imagining such a thing. But, equally as historians, we should not hold back from affirming that that is what the early Christians were talking about. They were not talking about a non-bodily, 'spiritual' survival. Had they wanted to do so, they had plenty of other language available to them, as indeed we do today.
Brother Roman, I think we could agree on the soul being soma + the breath of life (pneuma) and having nous. However, I want to avoid the implication--and I'm not saying you think this way--that something remains after death when we pass away or that we have a non-physical component to our existence like a soul/spirit or as the Hindus say, jiva. Solomon writes that humans and beast have the same ruach/ruah. As one dies, so the other one dies: they have the same eventuality. However, the difference for us is the resurrection.
I like your analogy about painting, and there is a sense in which I agree that learning about the atoms of a painting is not the same as accounting for the painting qua art. This could be a part/whole issue or it might be explained by Herman Dooyeweerd's theory of irreducible modalities. Either way, I am not sure that the analogy refutes Christian materialism. One could argue like Kevin Corcoran that the marble of a status constitutes the statue, but is not reducible to the statue. I recommend his book on human nature and to understand the form of the body idea, see also Eleonore Stump and Edward Feser. They both give lucid examples of how the soul might be the form of the body, but I must admit, it's hard for me to understand how an intermediate soul functions as the organized body's form. Leslie Stevenson likewise critiques the idea in his book about theories of human nature.
Finally, I want to avoid the implication that there is anything above and beyond our human body and its breath of life. The body and brain function as a holistic unit: if we start subtracting organs, in time we'll no longer have a living body or person IMO. I'm not a Buddhist, but they say nothing exists above or beyond the five aggregates (things like sensation and perception). My analogy (somewhat borrowed from Buddhism) involves a car. While the individual parts of the automobile don't explain the car as a whole, it's also seems reasonable to believe there is nothing above/beyond the parts of a car and their arrangement qua car. Take away the parts and we have no car: I would argue that the same principle applies to the human body.
I just heard about this book: Physical intelligence, by Scott Grafton/
And I thought it would fit within a Christian non-dualistic (or materialistic) view.
Many things to read though.
A Philosophy of Christian Materialism, by Christopher Baker, Thomas A. James, John Reader
Thanks for your careful and thoughtful engagements with my ramblings brother, I appreciate your patience with me.
I suppose one would need a theory of what matter is, I think if we take a mechanistic account, i.e. that matter if non-teleological and determined entirely by determinate or indeterminate laws of nature, then you'd have to posit something above. I agree with the analogy of a car, but the problem with the car analogy is that you can describe it completely mechanistically, i.e. a car is not "about" anything, it has no purpose in itself (save the purpose of those who create it and use it), it produces no pruposes itself, it doesn't relate to the outside world outside of it's physical mechanistic relations.
So when we get to human being, I can enjoy a sunset, and that enjoyment may be corollated, perhaps 100% corrolated, to brain activity, but if a scientist knows everything about that brain activity, he still doesn't have the intimate knowledge of the person enjoying the sunset.
There's a thought experiment, about a future scientist who can't see the color red, but she has perfect knoweldge about all the physical aspects of color, everything one can know scientifically about light, the eye, ect ect. But let's say she spontaneously gains the ability to see red, and she sees a rose, does she gain new knoweldge?
So back to the brain/body, if all parts of the body are non-teleological material entities that are determined by the laws of nature, then the sum is also a material entity determined by the laws of nature, but is matter is non-teleogical, non-conscious, non-intentional, either the sum of the body lives rise to something more ... or matter is, in some way, pre-teleological, pre-conscios, pre-intentional, you understand the issue?
Of course I do not believe in a kind of seperate "ghost in the machine," that survives death, but the fact that identity can survive the transferal of the physical body to a spiritual body implies that there is more to personhood than simply bodypart+bodypart+bodypart etc etc=person, or maybe it is that, but the scientific understanding of matter is lacking.
Anyway, I'm less well read than you are on this (and almost everything), and I will have to read Kevin Corcoran and some other of the authors you recommended .... my views often shift based on who I've read last :P.
Anonymous: thanks, those are some good suggestions. I especially want to look into that last one. As you say, so much to read.
Brother Roman, I believe you're well-versed in these subjects and that's why it's good talking with you. You're right that nothing compares to human beings insofar as humans are rational beings, and we're material, yet able to think conceptually and have a 1st-person perspective and form teloi. Even if someone doesn't believe we're only material, in some sense of the word, we are material beings. As you know, some people would input a soul or immaterial spirit to us.
Granted, cars are different from humans and nothing on earth is going to resemble our ability to form teloi: even animals (one writer insists) think perceptually, but not conceptually. If that's true, then any analogy will just be a faint comparison to illustrate human ontology. I still think John Searle is helpful here because he groups all the things you mention (1st-person and 3rd-person ontology) under conscious states produced by brain activity. Antonio Damasio argues that brain and body interaction account for our subjective experiences: he appeals to the famous story of Phineas Gage.You're probably familiar with that story.
There is another way to look at this issue: suppose that Jehovah God created us as material beings, but he then gave us a purpose and the ability to form teloi. Although consciousness is not fully understood by neuroscience yet, I believe that brain states generate conscious states. To illustrate, the reason that we get thirsty, hungry, depressed, happy, angry or fall in love can all be explained by brain states and, in principle, correlated to brain activity.
Lastly, yes I'm familiar with the thought experiment by Frank Jackson about Mary, the woman who's only experience black and white, not color, although she knows the color spectrum extensively. It's certainly a provocative and suggestive thought experiment, but I'm not sure that it refutes all kinds of materialism. Thanks for the interchange.
For Frank Jackson's knowledge argument about Mary, see also https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
Jaegwon Kim and John Searle write about this issue too.
Thanks brother, always enlightening :).
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