Boethius writes that God is eternal insofar as God has a “complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life” (Aeternitas igitur est, interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio). He contrasts temporal and divine existence by arguing: "whatever lives in time exists in the present and progresses from the past to the future, and there is nothing set in time which can embrace simultaneously the whole extent of its life; it is in the position of not yet possessing tomorrow when it has already lost yesterday" (Nam quicquid vivet in tempore, id praesens a praeteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod totum vitae suae spatium pariter posit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit: hesternum vero jam perdidit).
This medieval thinker maintains that eternity refers to the unique quality of divine timelessness (the property of experiencing the past, present and future in one simultaneous moment). Divine eternity is supposedly atemporality or timelessness: it is viewed as the eternal present. Hence, Boethius insists that God is entirely outside of time, but still has some type of duration and the divine one evidently beholds what occurs in the past, present and future--all of which are tenses from a human standpoint--as though it happens in one durative present. William Lane Craig accordingly explains the Boethian view in these terms: “God's 'now' is a unity (unum) embracing past, present, and future, which never comes to be or passes away, in contrast to the fleeting ‘now’ of the temporal process.” Campenhausen also writes concerning the notion of divine atemporality found in Boethius:
We must be clear that God's Being exists in eternity, i.e. not in the dimension of the transient, earthly time in which our activity takes place. That which unfolds to us as past, present, and future, lies before his view as if it were eternally present. For that reason the decisions of his "providence" are not really prior to our free actions, but can correspond to them precisely at any given moment.When Boethius contrasts God’s eternity with the kind of eternality delineated in the writings of Plato, he reckons that embracing the whole of "everlasting life in one simultaneous present" (aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse praesentiam) is “clearly a property of the mind of God” (quod divinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est). This Boethian view presumably resolves (possibly eases) the dialectical tension between divine foreknowledge and human free will, for if God beholds future contingents as if they are presently taking place, then He does not thereby cause these contingent events to occur; God merely knows future contingents as presently instantiated events since he subsists in an eternal now:
Since, therefore, all judgment comprehends those things that are subject to it according to its own nature, and since the state of God is ever that of eternal presence, His knowledge, too, transcends all temporal change and abides in the immediacy of His presence. It embraces all the infinite recesses of past and future and views them in the immediacy of its knowing as though they were happening in the present (Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status, scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi jam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praeuidentiam pensare uelis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis).Boethius poses an objection to the use of such terms as "foreknowledge" or "prevision" wherein God's knowledge of future contingents is concerned. If God is completely outside of time, then his knowledge of the future is not technically speaking “a kind of foreknowledge of the future, but as the knowledge of a never ending presence.” God is above the temporal fray, beholding all events in one simultaneous moment. Craig explains that in the case of Boethius: "Hence, rightly considered God’s knowledge is not strictly knowledge of a thing to come, but of a never-failing instant. He overlooks, as it were, all things from the highest peak."
With God's atemporal omniscience in mind—Lady Philosophy asks Boethius and by extension all contemporary philosophers who have trouble reconciling God's foreknowledge with the free will of finite rational agents: "Why, then, do you insist that all that is scanned by the sight of God becomes necessary? Men see things but this certainly doesn’t make them necessary. And your seeing them doesn’t impose any necessity on the things you see present, does it?"
Boethius recons that God's knowledge of the future is comparable to a human spectator (s) observing a horse race (r). Necessarily in this case, if r is occurring at T1, then r is occurring in the presence of s at T1. However, s does not cause r to happen or bring it about that r necessarily occurs simply by watching r. The proposition, "Necessarily, if the race is occurring, then it is occurring" (hypothetical necessity) must not be confused with the proposition "Necessarily, the race is occurring" (simple necessity). Confusion between the two propositions results from a modal fallacy. Similarly, Boethius contends that God’s knowledge of future contingents does not bring about their actualization nor does God’s foreknowledge make future contingents necessary. Beholding events and causing them are two distinct actions even for an omnipotent deity.
The definition of eternity found in De Consolatione seems to be a precise concept in the writings of Boethius. He utilizes this definiens to illuminate how one might reconcile human freedom and divine foreknowledge. By invoking the Augustinian concept of divine atemporality (timelessness), Boethius attempts to offer a plausible and convincing response to one perennial question of philosophy, but whether his efforts are truly successful remains to be seen. Nevertheless, having reviewed the Boethian approach to God and time, I will now discuss Thomas Aquinas' view of God and time while noting how the "Angelic Doctor" clarifies Boethius' definition or concept of divine eternity.
Boethius’ view, as presented, asserts that God exists outside of time, experiencing the past, present, and future as one "eternal present." This conception is often used to solve the issue of God’s foreknowledge and human free will, by arguing that God does not foresee events in a temporal sequence, but rather knows them all in one single, timeless act.
ReplyDeleteThis is a profound philosophical insight that fits well within Catholic thought. The doctrine of ACTUS PURUS—God being pure actuality with no potentiality—supports this idea that God is not subject to time, change, or succession. However, it's important to emphasize that this doesn't mean God has "duration" in any sense. God’s eternity, according to Aquinas, is not simply endless time or a long-lasting existence, but a mode of existence that is completely outside time. In this sense, Boethius’ view aligns well with Thomistic thought.
However, while Boethius offers a solution to the foreknowledge dilemma, critics argue that this might create tension with the personal and relational nature of God as described in Scripture, where God appears to interact with humanity within time (e.g., covenant-making, answering prayers, sending Christ at a particular point in history). The challenge is to affirm both God’s atemporality and His involvement in temporal affairs without reducing His eternal nature to temporality or His involvement in the world to mere metaphors.
One of the key points in Boethius' view, as explained in your draft, is that God’s knowledge of future contingents does not cause these events to happen. Boethius uses the analogy of a spectator watching a race—just as the spectator’s knowledge doesn’t cause the race to happen, God’s foreknowledge doesn’t necessitate the future events He knows.
This analogy is helpful, but some have argued that it might oversimplify the complexity of divine knowledge and causality. Unlike a spectator, God is not merely a passive observer of human events. God is the primary cause of all being, and every contingent act ultimately depends on God’s sustaining power. Yet, Catholic theology maintains that this divine causality is compatible with human free will. Aquinas builds on Boethius’ insight by introducing the concept of God’s knowledge as eternal and simple, meaning that God’s knowledge of free acts doesn’t negate their contingency because He knows them from a timeless perspective.
However, critics of this view argue that if God’s knowledge is infallible and unchanging, then it seems to imply that future events are necessary. Aquinas answers this by distinguishing between necessity of consequence and necessity of the consequent. The fact that God knows something does not make it necessary in itself; it remains contingent, though known infallibly by God. For example, God’s knowledge that a person will freely choose X does not negate the freedom of that choice—it is contingent but known with certainty by God.
As you transition into discussing Aquinas' clarification of Boethius’ definition of eternity, it's essential to highlight that Aquinas builds upon Boethius but further refines the concept. Aquinas stresses that God’s eternity is not merely timeless in the sense of being outside of time, but that God’s eternal act is the cause of all temporal realities. For Aquinas, God’s knowledge of contingent events doesn’t impose necessity on them because God's knowledge is not limited by time. God knows contingents as contingents, and their being free or necessary depends on the nature of the act itself, not on God's knowing of it.
This distinction is crucial in understanding how Aquinas solves the tension between foreknowledge and free will. Aquinas teaches that God’s knowledge does not "force" events to happen; rather, He knows the outcome because He is outside of time and sees the entire sequence of events at once, but without determining them.
The Boethian and Thomistic synthesis offers a strong framework for reconciling divine foreknowledge and human free will. By affirming God’s timeless knowledge, Boethius and Aquinas ensure that God’s foreknowledge does not interfere with human freedom. However, some modern philosophers, such as William Lane Craig (as cited in the draft), have questioned whether this solution fully resolves the problem. Craig suggests that while this view explains how God knows future events, it doesn’t fully address how human free actions can remain contingent if God’s knowledge is infallible.
ReplyDeleteCatholic theology holds, nonetheless, that God’s knowledge doesn’t force actions but rather sees them as they are—free in their nature. This avoids both the pitfalls of determinism and an overly passive view of God’s involvement in the world.
In conlusion, Boethius and Aquinas provide a robust philosophical and theological account of how divine eternity and foreknowledge can coexist with human free will. Boethius’ model of God’s atemporal knowledge, combined with Aquinas’ further refinement of this view, helps to reconcile the apparent tension between God’s omniscience and human freedom. While critiques remain regarding whether this solution fully satisfies modern concerns about free will and divine omniscience, the Boethian-Thomistic view remains one of the most compelling attempts to resolve these issues within a classical Christian framework.
This view preserves both God’s sovereignty and humanity’s free agency, ensuring that God’s foreknowledge does not make future actions necessary, but rather knows them as they will freely occur.