Most orthodox theologians affirm the eternity (i.e., atemporality) of God ex professo. For instance, Paul Helm claims: "it makes no sense to ask how long God has existed, or to divide up his life into periods of time." Helm believes that God is eternal; the adjective "eternal" (in this context) refers to a presumed intrinsic property of the omnipotent Christian God whereby this deity is supposed to be outside of time. He is purportedly a divine being that transcends duration of time and temporal location (tempus).
Additionally, Thomas Aquinas reasons that God's timelessness is a fundamental truth: “From what we have said it is further apparent that God is eternal. Everything that begins to be or ceases to be does so through motion or change. Since, however, we have shown that God is absolutely immutable [i.e., not experiencing motion or change], He is eternal, lacking all beginning or end.” So God’s immutability (unchangeableness) ostensibly entails divine atemporality and the objective absence of de re potentiality in God.
This study will briefly examine two theories of divine atemporality posited by Boethius (ca. 475-526 CE) and Aquinas (1225-1274 CE). Both of the theories have been influential and they continue to mold contemporary discourse pertaining to God and time. After reviewing how Boethius and Aquinas construe the doctrine of absolute divine timelessness, I will talk about the observations of contemporary philosopher, Stephen T. Davis, then offer a provisional answer to the question, is God's putative eternity (atemporality) logically possible? The first issue that merits attention, however, is the relationship between God’s atemporality, divine foreknowledge and our human freedom. The first heading of this study will discuss the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge before undertaking an exploration of the Boethian and Thomistic views of God’s atemporality followed by Davis’ critique, an examination of objections to Davis, then my considered thoughts on the debate.
Paul Helm and Thomas Aquinas argue that God’s eternity means He is outside of time, which implies that God does not experience time sequentially (i.e., past, present, and future) as humans do. Aquinas grounds this belief in God’s immutability: if God is unchanging, He cannot experience temporal change. As Aquinas states, everything that begins or ceases to be does so through motion or change, but because God is absolutely immutable, He is beyond all such change—therefore, eternal.
ReplyDeleteThis understanding of divine atemporality has been central to classical theism because it ensures that God’s nature is not subject to change, potentiality, or limitation. If God were bound by time, He would be subject to the same limitations of temporal beings—existing in the present while losing the past and anticipating the future. This would undermine God’s omnipotence and omniscience, as He would not have perfect knowledge of all events across time.
Boethius, in The Consolation of Philosophy, offers a profound reflection on divine eternity. He describes God's knowledge as "the complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of everlasting life." For Boethius, God's knowledge is not like human knowledge, which unfolds sequentially as events happen. Instead, God exists in an "eternal now," where all moments—past, present, and future—are equally present to Him.
Aquinas builds upon this idea, emphasizing that God's eternal nature means He knows all events in their contingency without causing them. From God's perspective, there is no "before" or "after." He does not foresee future events as if they are yet to happen. Instead, He sees all events in an eternal, unchanging present. This view preserves both God's omniscience and human freedom: God knows future free acts not because He determines them, but because He observes them eternally.
The challenge of reconciling divine foreknowledge with human free will is a longstanding issue in philosophy and theology. If God knows what we will do before we do it, are our actions truly free? Boethius and Aquinas argue that God’s knowledge of future contingents does not negate human freedom. God knows our actions because He observes them eternally, but His knowledge is not causal. This distinction is crucial: God's knowledge does not determine our actions, but rather, His eternal perspective allows Him to see them as they occur in time from His timeless vantage point.
In modern terms, this can be explained by distinguishing between two types of necessity:
1. Simple necessity: Something that must happen due to the nature of the event (e.g., a triangle must have three sides).
2. Conditional necessity: Something that is contingent, but once it happens, it is necessary that it happens (e.g., if I choose to eat breakfast, it is necessarily true that I ate breakfast).
Aquinas applies this distinction to divine foreknowledge and free will. God knows what free choices humans will make, but this knowledge is not the cause of those choices. The choices remain contingent in their nature. Therefore, God’s foreknowledge and human free will are compatible because God’s knowledge is not bound by temporal constraints.
Stephen T. Davis critiques the traditional view of divine timelessness by suggesting that God could be temporal—that is, He might exist within time in some way. Davis’s critique is rooted in the concern that if God is outside of time, He cannot truly engage with temporal events, respond to prayers, or interact meaningfully with human history.
ReplyDeleteWhile this critique raises valid concerns about how an atemporal God interacts with the world, it misunderstands the classical view. God’s atemporality does not mean He is detached from time; rather, it means He transcends it. From His eternal perspective, God can act within time and relate to temporal beings, while remaining unchanged in His essence. This is central to the doctrine of divine immutability: God can interact with the world without undergoing change or being subject to temporal progression.
Davis’s alternative—positing that God exists within time—introduces theological problems of its own. If God were temporal, He would be subject to the limitations of time and could no longer be considered fully omniscient or omnipotent. He would also be subject to change, which contradicts the classical understanding of God’s perfect being.
While Davis raises important questions, the classical understanding of divine atemporality—rooted in the teachings of Boethius and Aquinas—remains logically coherent and theologically sound. God's timeless nature preserves His immutability, omniscience, and sovereignty while maintaining the integrity of human free will. From God's eternal vantage point, He sees all events as they occur, without causing or determining them. This ensures that God’s knowledge of future free acts does not compromise human freedom.
In conclusion, while critiques of divine atemporality are important for philosophical and theological discourse, they do not ultimately undermine the classical view of God as timeless. The idea of divine atemporality remains a powerful and coherent explanation of how God can be omniscient, immutable, and sovereign, while still interacting with His creation in meaningful and personal ways.