A question that crossed my mind today concerns ancient philosophical presuppositions about reality and change.
Aristotle contends that material objects constitute matter-form unities. For example, tables are made of some material (matter) like wood, but they table also has a form (tableness). The same principle applies to other material objects--whether chairs, houses or humans. But the story does not end there since Aristotle insists that God is "pure form," that is, pure actuality. Hence, God is a being with no potential because God is perfect (no room for change).
Looked at through this prism, here's my question to Trinitarians. Do you believe the preexistent Christ was actually human or potentially human? For if he was actually human (as God), then he did not become human. On the other hand, if he was potentially human, then it seems that he actualized that potency and thereby became human through a process of change. And if God cannot change, then how did Christ "assume" humanity (as Aquinas argues)? That point is also still unclear to me.
2 comments:
Thomas Aquinas, drawing heavily on Aristotelian thought, addresses this in his Summa Theologica (especially in the Tertia Pars, questions 1-12). Aquinas argues that the Logos did not undergo a change in essence or nature. Instead, in the Incarnation, the Logos “assumed” human nature without altering divine nature. According to Aquinas, this “assuming” did not entail any movement or change within God’s essence, as the divine nature remains immutable.
Aquinas would say the Logos was not “potentially” human in a way that implies change or imperfection. Instead, he proposes that God’s “assuming” of humanity occurred through divine will and did not imply any inherent deficiency or unrealized potential in the Logos.
In line with Aristotelian categories, some theologians argue that the Logos was neither actually nor potentially human prior to the Incarnation. Humanity was a new reality that came into existence without implying change in the divine essence. This understanding rests on the belief that the divine nature itself transcends material limitations, including change and potentiality in the Aristotelian sense.
When the Word “became flesh,” this is understood as the Word assuming a human nature, not transforming or actualizing a preexistent potential within God. This distinction allows theologians to maintain that the Word fully participates in the divine, changeless actuality, while also taking on human nature in time.
How the Word as God assumed human nature without changing will probably never make sense to me. I know it's premised on divine timelessness as well, which is another questionable concept and so is the uniting of two natures. I still like Christopher Hughes' analysis of these issues although he might have some gaps on his work.
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