Garrett J. DeWeese. God and the Nature of Time. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004.
One of my favorite books about God and time from the pre-Mullins days is the aforementioned work by DeWeese. I would like to discuss some aspects of his book without doing a formal review: if you ever get a chance to read the book, I strongly encourage it, but the work can be expensive in its latest iteration. That is a downside; moreover, DeWeese may not be everyone's cup of tea.
My comments are based on the 2004 edition of God and the Nature of Time.
On page 2, DeWeese considers some proposed solutions to the problem of God and time. Firstly, he surveys those who think God is atemporal before turning attention to the opposing position, that God is temporal. Some atemporal advocates reckon that God's mode of being is one of timeless duration whereas others think God has no duration at all. The major influence on early thinkers of the church was Neoplatonism. For example, DeWeese contends that the early church theologians derived their belief in divine simplicity through Neoplatonism. A metaphysically simple being is defined as "one of which its intrinsic attributes are identical with that entity's individual essence, so it has no parts" (3). For every intrinsic attribute (F), assuming that God is F, God would then be identical to the divine F-ness.
Some defenders of God's atemporality include Origen of Alexandria, Augustine, Boethius and later, Thomas Aquinas. Divine simplicity, a strong view of immutability, and divine atemporality seem to work in tandem et inter se: one apparently entails the other; additionally, divine timelessness has been used to resolve the intractable dilemmas connected with the divine foreknowledge and creaturely free will debate (3). If God is completely atemporal, then it would seem that God beholds all events as one complete whole: it's as though past, present, and future happen all at once in the eyes of God. Most theologians in the medieval and contemporary periods accordingly have favored divine atemporality. However, some thinkers understand God to be temporal.
The theologian-philosophers whom DeWeese places in the "God is temporal" category are John Duns Scotus (1266?-1308), and William of Ockham (1285-1347); Scotus evidently contends that God is temporal. He frames this idea within the context of his theory of contingency while Ockham posits God's endurance through time as he wrestles with the foreknowledge/freedom dilemma. Nevertheless, Ockham believes that God is immutable though possibly temporal. Developments since the middle ages and modernity have led many contemporary philosophers to favor the view that God is temporal ad intra se et ad extra creationem (3-4).
To facilitate the issue of God's relationship to time, DeWeese eventually turns to a discussion of language theory. Which thesis about language should we accept while seeking to illuminate God's relationship to time? Should we advocate the postmodern approach to language and texts? DeWeese believes that deconstructionism and other postmodern approaches are "self-defeating and unnecessary" (22). He insists that postmodernism entails a "radical relativism" which results in no place being found for metaphysics (theory of ultimate reality).
Refusing to be distracted by the rise and development of Continental philosophy and postmodernism, DeWeese opts for Anglo-American analytic philosophy as a possible tool for analyzing time and God's relation to it. One reason for the choice is that analytic philosophy is ostensibly more open to metaphysics than its alternative, Continental philosophy. Analytic philosophy likewise posits that language and reality are inextricably conjoined such that one can infer properties of the world from the properties of language (Bertrand Russell). This view has been tagged "the syntactic priority thesis" (22). Yet how does this thesis view fare under close scrutiny?
DeWeese maintains that the syntactic priority thesis must be incorrect (23). The reason is because language we use daily (no matter the language) admits of differing interpretations, and the ultimate determinate of these interpretations is the metaphysical theory that drives the hermeneutical approach. For example, if one is a Platonist, then that one will interpret ordinary language sentences differently than an Aristotelian or Fregean. Some language users quantify over concrete particulars while others quantify over abstract objects: metaphysics supposedly determines how syntax (word order) is to be understood. But what if reality could be derived from words instead of syntactical structures? That would mean the semantic priority thesis is correct. However, Deweese rejects this option too.
The reason why is because words have no meaning apart from their respective contexts. Despite the best efforts of W.V.O. Quine, who suggested that semantics could possibly bring about metaphysical conclusions, the semantic priority thesis seems as doomed to failure as syntactic priority. Yet DeWeese submits there is something potentially salvageable about linguistic theory: it may help to illuminate our understanding of time and ultimately, how time applies to God. I will deal with this issue in part II of my discussion about God and the Nature of Time.
Sporadic theological and historical musings by Edgar Foster (Ph.D. in Theology and Religious Studies and one of Jehovah's Witnesses).
"the pre-Mullins days"
ReplyDeleteHaha, Ryan surely rocked the Theological SpaceTime continuum :D
Another good writer is Alan Rhoda. He has a blog centered around similar questions.
I used to read Rhoda's blog but he doesn't post anything there anymore unless he got a new one. He is good. Thanks for reminding me of him :)
ReplyDeleteHe is posting good stuff again http://alanrhoda.net/wordpress/
ReplyDeleteThanks, I will check it out.
ReplyDeleteDeWeese claims that the early church theologians “derived” their belief in divine simplicity through Neoplatonism, and he suggests this as a reason to question the doctrine of divine simplicity. While Neoplatonic thought did influence early Christian theology, the concept of divine simplicity predates Neoplatonism and is rooted in both biblical and philosophical reasoning. For example, in the Old Testament, God is portrayed as wholly unique, without division or parts (Deut. 6:4; Ex. 3:14), which underpins the theological claim of simplicity.
ReplyDeleteFurther, simplicity is not just a byproduct of Neoplatonism; it is also a way of affirming God's absolute oneness and unchanging nature. A being with parts would be composite and subject to change, which is inconsistent with the theological understanding of God as immutable and eternal. Aquinas, for example, integrates simplicity into his understanding of God not because of Neoplatonic influences, but because it logically follows from God's immutability, eternity, and necessary existence. Therefore, divine simplicity is not contingent on a particular philosophical framework like Neoplatonism, but rather on theological and logical principles.
DeWeese discusses both atemporal and temporal views of God, highlighting figures like Aquinas, Boethius, and Augustine in favor of atemporality, and contrasting them with medieval thinkers like Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, who lean toward a temporal understanding of God. DeWeese presents the tension between these views, but the notion that God is temporal is problematic from both a philosophical and theological perspective.
If God is temporal, then He would be subject to change, aging, and other temporal limitations, which contradicts the classical understanding of God as immutable (unchanging) and perfect. Time, as we experience it, involves succession—one moment following another. For God to be subject to this would imply that He is not the ultimate, unchanging being but is instead part of the created order. This diminishes God's transcendence, reducing Him to a being within time rather than the creator of time.
Aquinas argues that God, as the cause of all things, exists outside time. Time is a measure of change, and since God is unchanging, He must exist beyond the limits of time. To say that God is temporal introduces contradictions into the nature of God as the necessary, independent being who upholds the universe. If He were temporal, He would be dependent on time for His existence, which is philosophically and theologically untenable.
DeWeese favors analytic philosophy over Continental philosophy, claiming that the former is more open to metaphysical discussions. While this preference is understandable given analytic philosophy's focus on logical clarity and precision, dismissing Continental philosophy outright as "self-defeating" is overly simplistic.
ReplyDeleteContinental philosophy, particularly in thinkers like Heidegger and Levinas, engages deeply with metaphysical questions about being, time, and existence. Although the language may be more abstract, it does not necessarily reject metaphysics. Instead, it approaches these issues from a different perspective, focusing on phenomenology, existence, and the human experience of time. Both traditions have their strengths and weaknesses, and engaging with both can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of metaphysical issues, including the nature of God and time.
DeWeese touches on the issue of God's relationship to time as a way to solve the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. He points out that if God is atemporal, He sees all events (past, present, and future) in one eternal "now," which seems to resolve the tension between God's foreknowledge and human free will.
However, critics of atemporality often argue that if God knows future events, then those events must necessarily happen, seemingly removing human freedom. This is a misunderstanding of how God's knowledge functions. God’s knowledge does not cause events to happen; rather, He knows them because they happen. His knowledge is like a spectator viewing a parade from above. He sees the beginning, middle, and end all at once, but His knowledge of the parade’s outcome does not cause the individual participants to act in the way they do. They are still acting freely within time, while God, being outside of time, knows their actions because they occur.
In conclusion, while DeWeese raises important points, particularly concerning the tension between divine atemporality and temporality, his arguments in favor of temporality face significant theological and philosophical challenges. The classical understanding of God as atemporal, simple, and immutable remains the most coherent way of addressing these issues. Time, as part of the created order, cannot bind or define God, who exists beyond the constraints of time while interacting with creation.