In my last post about this book by Garrett DeWeese, I dealt with personal identity and time. As we learned, DeWeese is not impressed with the
project by Schlesinger to define time and make sense of personal identity, but what about how other thinkers approach the question of God in relation to time or time itself? And, most importantly, does the Bible help to resolve
these questions? These two questions are my focus in this last post about God and the Nature of Time.
Pages 212-213 discuss Nicholas Wolterstorff's argument for God being in time, that is, being infected by temporality. I will summarize Wolterstorff's line of reasoning this way:
(1) No one can know about some temporal event (E) that it is occurring except when it is occurring.
(2) Before E begins to occur, one cannot know that E is occurring, for it is not.
(3) After E ceases to occur, one cannot know that it is occurring, for it is not.
(4) Every case of knowing that E is occurring therefore seems to be infected by the temporality of E.
(5) Therefore, the act of knowing about E that it was occurring and that it is occurring and the act of knowing about E that it will be occurring are all infected by the temporality of E.
(6) God (according to Scripture) performs all of these acts of knowing since he knows what has happened, what is happening and what will happen. Hence, some of God's acts (his acts of knowing) are themselves temporal events. Consequently, God is not timeless.
DeWeese thinks Wolterstorff's argument is strongly plausible prima facie, but he suggests that an atemporalist (one who does not believe God is temporal) might counter with an offer to render the tensed propositions of Wolterstorff into tenseless statements. However, since this strategy might not work for reasons stated heretofore, DeWeese categorizes Wolterstorff's argument as "weak."
However, while characterizing Wolterstorff's argument as weak, he indicates that there might be a way to make it stronger. Maybe it is the case that God's redemptive acts are "infected with temporality." For instance, if God is first wrathful toward a sinner but then subsequently adopts the sinner as his child, Wolterstorff's argument might be salvaged. Such divine actions might be temporal and not merely relational changes (so-called Cambridge changes). It is possible that God likewise has a genuinely personal relationship with his rational creatures and being in a personal relationship with humans might necessitate that God be temporal. DeWeese concludes: "If such an argument from personality could be mounted, it would certainly be in the spirit of Wolterstorff's article" (page 213).
The book then turns toward another philosopher who thinks God is temporal, Stephen T. Davis.
He argues:
1. God creates x.
2. x first exists at T.
3. Therefore, God creates x at T.
DeWeese finds 3) to be ambiguous between 3a) God, at T, creates x and 3b) which is God creates x, and x first exists at T. I think it can readily be seen that 3b) is nothing more than the collocation of inferences from 1) and 2) above.
Ultimately, DeWeese decides that Davis' argument might need to be patched up before it's accepted, but he is basically sympathetic to the view of Davis regarding God's actions. However, any evaluative remarks directed toward Davis are postponed until later in the book.
On the other hand, Edward Wierenga launches some criticisms at Davis' argument in The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes, pages 196-198. Do his objections have probative force? The answer to that question will end up being in the beholder's eyes.
Pages 258-259 discuss the potential implications of affirming divine temporality. If God is temporal, then God is not absolutely simple: neither is God strongly immutable. DeWeese thinks these divine attributes owe much to Neoplatonism. Therefore, he does not think giving up these attributes for the sake of divine temporality fatally wounds Christian theology.
On page 273, three options concerning God's temporal status before creation are posited: 1) God's existence could have been one amorphous and temporal moment, 2) his existence could have been divided into a timeless and temporal existence (before and after creation) or 3) God could have existed from the infinite past sans creation. To really understand these distinctions, one must introduce the distinction between metaphysical and physical time. In any event, DeWeese professes that each one of these views have their own problems, but he rules in favor of divine temporality, mutatis mutandis by reckoning that it is possible for the divine temporalist to bite a smaller bullet than the divine atemporalist: DeWeese himself adopts omnitemporality which is a modification of other divine temporalist accounts.
Like William Lane Craig, DeWeese concludes that the Bible does not give a definitive answer to whether God is atemporal or temporal, and if so, in what way God might be temporal. He accordingly opts for omnitemporality, choosing to believe that God is present at all times but somehow transcends ordinary physical time. A book reviewer and academic, Marcel Sarot, summed up DeWeese's work this way though he highly praised it:
"While this book does not develop a major new theory, it is an excellent survey of the field. For a reviewer that is, in a sense, a pity: summarizing an excellent survey provides less opportunities for original arguments than criticizing a flawed survey or a highly original new theory. If, however, he has been able to convey that this is an outstanding introduction to the field, this particular reviewer is more than content."
See Sarot, M. (2007). "Review of the book God and the nature of time, G.J. DeWeese, 2004, 075463518X." Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 7(7).
Sporadic theological and historical musings by Edgar Foster (Ph.D. in Theology and Religious Studies and one of Jehovah's Witnesses).
Wonderful overview.
ReplyDeleteI have some questions.
How could a temporal moment be amorphous and singular (since I presume a temporal moment only attains its determination in relation to other moments)? What would distinguish that from an atemporal existence?
Also, if God exists from the infinite past sans creation, wouldn't that lead to the various paradoxes of an actual infinity that are often presented in versions of the Kalam cosmological argument?
Also, would Omnitemporality require the B theory of time? If so wouldn't that problematize a robust theory of libertarian free will? I.e. future human actions have a definite truth value logically prior to their temporal determination through human choice.
What applies to metaphysical time might not apply to physical time. Furthermore, while a B-theory (series) of time is relational, the A-theory is not necessarily relational but rather tensed. So one could have a temporal moment that is temporal in se and not in relation to another momement.
ReplyDeleteKeep in mind that DeWeese is just setting forth possibilities at that point in his study but some thinkers have posited an immeasurable type of time that is different from our time but yet it is not atemporal. See https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2010/05/interesting-quote-from-john-damascene.html
I don't think that metaphysical time is subject to the criticisms which the kalam argument uses. For why I say that, see https://iep.utm.edu/god-time/#SH7a
In the newer version of his book, DeWeese takes on the kalam argument on pages 175-176. He concludes that Helm's argument which uses this approach, "fails."
I think DeWeese believes the B-theory of time is false and entails/allows for God being timeless. So he affirms omnitemporality while rejecting the B-theory.
That link from the IEP was really helpful.
ReplyDeleteSo metaphysical time differs from physical time insofar as it does not depend on any physical laws or physical events (or is not measured by such); but rather, depends on the sequence of God's will and actions. In this sense the arguments against an actual infinity that the Kalam uses wouldn't apply to metaphysical time because an eternity of metaphysical time does not imply an actual infinite number of "moments," merely a potential infinite of actions and choices.
Given this, God could have literally had only four moments in metaphysical time (I'm assuming here no fall): 1) The creation of the Logos, 2)The creation of the heavenly beings through the Logos, 3) the creation of the physical universe through the Logos, 4) the fulfillment of creation with all rational beings united everlastingly with God in love. So these four moments would include a physical temporal beginning, and an perpetual ongoing of temporal becoming, but God in metaphysical time would remain eternal, yet metaphysically temporal, that metaphysical time consisting of four, non-temporally quantifiable, non-metric, moments the final two would would include a "now," which God experiences with mankind. Am I understanding this correctly?
At face value this kind of makes sense to me.
See https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2010/05/interesting-quote-from-john-damascene.html
I think Origen says something similar, i.e. an age before the age.
Roman, your comments seem to describe the view of DeWeese accurately. What sets his view apart from others is the omnitemporal approach. He also has a very detailed chapter that interacts with the findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. But I stress that you seem to characterize things accurately IMO.
ReplyDeleteWolterstorff’s argument hinges on a misunderstanding of classical theism, which holds that God’s knowledge is not contingent upon temporality. In classical theology, God’s knowledge of time-bound events doesn’t require Him to be subject to time. God’s eternal nature means He sees all moments (past, present, future) in a single eternal “now.” This concept is often misunderstood by those who assume that knowledge must operate in a temporal sequence.
ReplyDeleteWolterstorff’s point that God cannot know an event until it happens (temporal knowledge) is a misreading of the doctrine of divine omniscience. In God’s eternal perspective, He knows all events at once, without having to “wait” for events to unfold. God's knowledge transcends the limitations of time, so the argument that God’s knowledge is "infected" by temporality fails because it imposes human limitations on divine cognition. God does not experience events sequentially; rather, He knows them as they exist within His eternal, unchanging nature.
Wolterstorff’s idea that knowing temporal events necessitates God’s existence in time overlooks a critical point: God’s knowledge is qualitatively different from human knowledge. Human knowledge is indeed bound by time—we learn things as they happen—but God’s knowledge is immediate and eternal. Divine omniscience is not dependent on time in the way Wolterstorff suggests. Therefore, God’s knowledge of time-bound events does not imply temporality, but rather affirms His transcendence of time.
DeWeese’s suggestion that God’s relationship with humanity could be temporal is unnecessary. Divine actions, such as redemption, do not require God to experience change. God's relational actions (wrath, mercy, etc.) can be understood as Cambridge changes—changes in relation without a corresponding change in God’s nature. This preserves God’s immutability and simplicity.
Stephen T. Davis presents an argument that God creates temporal objects, and therefore, God Himself must be temporal. DeWeese finds Davis’ argument ambiguous, but ultimately sympathetic to the notion that God’s actions can take place in time. He entertains the idea that God’s redemptive acts might be temporal rather than atemporal. Davis' argument falls short because it misunderstands the relationship between God’s eternal nature and His interaction with time.
The classical view holds that God, while eternal, can create and interact with time without being bound by it. When God creates the universe or performs an action within time, this does not imply that God Himself is temporal. His action, which affects the temporal world, is executed from His eternal perspective. God's act of creation can occur at T, but it doesn't mean God enters time. The temporal act is for the benefit of creatures bound by time, while God remains outside the temporal order.
DeWeese's openness to divine temporality ignores the theological importance of God’s immutability and simplicity. If God were temporal, He would be subject to change and progression, which contradicts the doctrine that God is immutable and exists as ACTUS PURUS (pure actuality). The classical tradition insists that God is outside of time precisely because change would undermine His perfection.
DeWeese suggests that divine temporality wouldn’t “fatally wound” Christian theology, even though it would challenge the notions of divine simplicity and immutability. However, this is a problematic concession. DeWeese asserts that simplicity and immutability owe much to Neoplatonism. While it’s true that Neoplatonism influenced early Christian thought, these doctrines are not mere philosophical “imports”; they are grounded in biblical and theological reasoning. For instance, God’s simplicity ensures that His attributes (love, justice, omniscience) are identical with His essence. If God were complex (made of parts), He could change, thereby compromising His divine perfection. Simplicity safeguards God’s independence and self-sufficiency. Temporality would introduce complexity, contradicting this foundational theological principle.
ReplyDeleteThe Bible often speaks of God as being outside of time. For instance, Psalm 90:2 describes God as eternal—"from everlasting to everlasting." Isaiah 46:9-10 portrays God as one who declares “the end from the beginning,” further reinforcing His timeless nature. These passages suggest that God’s knowledge and being transcend the temporal limitations of creation.
Roman raises questions about metaphysical time and its distinction from physical time. He suggests that God’s actions could take place in metaphysical time, thus avoiding the paradoxes associated with an infinite temporal regress. While the distinction between metaphysical and physical time can be useful, it doesn’t fully resolve the problem. Even if we posit metaphysical time, introducing "moments" into God’s existence still implies that God is somehow bound by sequence or change, which contradicts the classical view of God's immutability and timelessness. God’s actions, even if considered in “metaphysical time,” cannot introduce temporal succession into His being. God's eternity must be understood as beyond any form of temporality, metaphysical or otherwise.
Roman suggests that metaphysical time avoids the problem of actual infinity. However, the classical view resolves the problem by denying that God experiences any succession of moments. God’s eternal nature means He is not subject to an infinite regress of events; rather, He exists in an eternal, unchanging present, which transcends the limitations of both physical and metaphysical time.
In summary, the arguments in favor of divine temporality, as presented in DeWeese's discussion and subsequent comments, misunderstand key theological principles. The doctrines of divine simplicity, immutability, and timelessness are not mere philosophical imports but are essential to preserving God’s perfection. The attempt to reconcile God’s actions with temporal reality does not require God to be temporal, but rather can be explained by His eternal nature acting within time without being bound by it.
The classical view of God as timeless, immutable, and simple remains the most coherent and theologically sound position, safeguarding the integrity of God's nature as revealed in Scripture and affirmed by Christian tradition.