Joseph Torchia (O.P.). Exploring Personhood: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Human Nature. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
Here are some things I observed about Torchia's text:
1) I do not believe there is any question
about Torchia's scholarly integrity since he seems to
handle the
data in a fair manner and offers comments that satisfactorily represent the proposed object of his
inquiry. I would also note that Torchia's approach generally is objective
although he makes clear his perspective from the outset (see his
Preface). A large portion of the book is historical.
2) There are a number of insights in Torchia's work. Particular
insights can be found in the concluding portion of his chapter on
postmodernism where he examines the role that incommensurability plays
in postmodernist dialogue. After discussing Thomas Kuhn and Alasdair
MacIntyre (inter alios), Torchia
offers an assessment of MacIntyre's Thomism, which entails lauding the
apparent success of his Enlightenment critique while simultaneously criticizing fundamental aspects
of MacIntyre's thought. The chapter on postmodernism additionally contains
information pertaining to debates on what constitutes a person or the
possibility of there being "non-human persons" or "human non-persons."
3) Torchia writes: "This work is broad in
scope, covering the Pre-Socratics to postmodernism, with an assessment
of what
transpired during the intervening 2,500 years. This volume is by no
means an exhaustive history of the philosophical understanding of human
nature, personhood, and the self. Rather, it uses the history of Western
philosophy as the framework in which to explore critical problems
pertinent to these three topics" (Preface, xiii).
4) Torchia arranges the chapters of his book as follows: The Pre-Socratics,
Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes,
David Hume, Postmodernism, Our Interpersonal Journey, Epilogue. Each
chapter contains a subtitle that helps the reader to focus and
there are discussion questions as well as end notes that accompany each
chapter. Torchia quotes a number of primary texts while offering full
explanations of what he thinks the primary literature is saying; furthermore, he gives sufficient historical background information within
the chapters. The book's content accentuates the thought of each philosopher
respecting human
nature and personhood. For example, Torchia supplies an adequate historical account of Hume's moral psychology and his concept of the self as a
"bundle of perceptions." The conceptual nexus between Sir Isaac Newton
and David Hume is also sufficiently explained.
Torchia's Exploring Personhood can be used to supplement
the Leslie Stevenson human nature text since Torchia's work provides more historical background and
fuller accounts of philosophical passages. Moreover, this book introduces beginning students to some of the primary
literature although it does not contain major sections from Plato or
Aristotle (etc.). Torchia's expositions or philosophical claims are
clear, and his observations are fair, yet incisive.
My criticism might be the somewhat "dull" manner in
which certain parts of the material is written. Furthermore, Torchia composed this book in an abstract manner: he does not supply simple explanations to popularize his topic.
There is no doubt in my mind about the value of the material; Torchia's chapter on postmodernism
especially appeared to strike a chord with students in terms of its
relevance. So did the chapter on Descartes and Aquinas. But I thought the
discussion questions at the end of each chapter were a bit labored at
times, the sentence
structure was hard to follow every now and again, and the book started
off rather slowly. I would add that the vocabulary often assumes a certain
erudition on the part of its reader. Nevertheless, I liked the overall
constitution of the chapters.
There is much to commend in this work, including its clarity and
objectivity. Most of the chapters remain focused on the subject matter
but there are times when Torchia seems to introduce subject matter that
should have been omitted or possibly introduced in another context. For example,
see the chapter on Plato.
I now leave you with a few sample sentences from this work:
"Aristotle
broadly defines substance as what is neither predicable of something
nor a property. The chief sense of Aristotelian substance, then, is the
notion of an underlying substratum of which everything else is
predicated but which is not itself predicated of anything else" (page
75).
"In its broadest terms, then, Aristotle
designates the soul as the principle of
the nutritive (or vegetative), sensitive, and rational (or
intellective) powers or faculties. Each faculty, in turn, finds it
psychic counterpart in a specific kind of soul (plant, animal, or human
souls, respectively). Plants, for example, are capable of movement
connected with nourishment, growth, decay, and reproduction; animals of
sense appetites, sense perception, and movement from place to place; and
humans of rational knowing and willing" (page 86).
"Humans occupy the hinterland of being, sharing in the aspect of
Soul that animates the material world. In this respect, they stand on
the periphery between being and nonbeing, between the eternal realm of
contemplation and a temporal world that bears but a faint imprint of the
higher intelligible order" (page 105).
Sporadic theological and historical musings by Edgar Foster (Ph.D. in Theology and Religious Studies and one of Jehovah's Witnesses).
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