Louis Berkhof (1873-1957) relates that the medieval Scholastics generally framed questions about God's Being in three primary ways, namely, An sit Deus? Quid sit Deus? and Qualis sit Deus? It is not important to concern ourselves with the first question since this post will assume that God exists. However, the second and third queries have more to do with our present discussion of theological language and religious episteme. (See Berkhof's Systematic Theology.)
Regarding the second and third questions, Berkhof explains that we apparently cannot fully understand God's innermost constitution (his quidditas), for it is impossible to fathom the Almighty as Zophar avers in the book of Job (Job 11:7-9). In this regard, Berkhof avers:
"Apart from the revelation of God in His attributes [Qualis sit Deus?], we have no knowledge of the Being of God whatsoever. But insofar as God reveals Himself in His attributes, we also have some knowledge of His Divine Being, though even so our knowledge is subject to human limitations" (Berkhof 43).
Berkhof appears to say that we can know God in the sense of qualis, but we cannot know God's quidditas, much less "comprehend" it. He then alludes to Martin Luther's distinction between Deus Revelatus who remains Deus Absconditus per essentiam and then Berkhof observes that Calvin believed the act of speculating on God's quiddity is futile, but we can have some knowledge of God's qualities or attributes. The systematic theologian concludes:
"While he [Calvin] feels that God cannot be known to perfection, he does not deny that we can know something of His Being or nature. But this knowledge cannot be obtained by a priori methods, but only in an a posteriori manner through the attributes, which he regards as real determinations of the nature of God. They convey to us at least some knowledge of what God is, but especially of what He is in relation to us" (43-44).
I have related Berkhof's comments and observations extensively, so I will not comment much further on the matter, but his account seems fairly clear and might even align with some things in the Bible. In other words, we humans evidently have some knowledge of God's attributes by virtue of His divine self-disclosure. However, if we are attuned to God's attributes, albeit imperfectly, then why can't we know "what God is" to a certain degree? Not utterly fathoming the Almighty is perfectly understandable, but to know nothing concerning God's whatness or quidditas seems highly problematic from a biblical standpoint.
Additionally, this view is seemingly at loggerheads with a divine revelation model that posits God disclosing himself in the act of special revelation. I admittedly need to do more work on God's simplicity and the implications that attend this doctrine. Nevertheless, I am not comfortable with equating God's essence and existence nor do I think that God and his attributes are all the same (i.e., that God is justice or mercy or that he is equivalent with patience). It seems that there is at least a "formal distinction" (distinctio formalis) between God and his attributes, then thinkers like Berkhof talk about the difference between God's communicable and incommunicable attributes..
I think the the essence of God will, in terms of natural theology, be largely determined by the argument for God's existance, the problem is the God being demonstrated by differenat natural theological arguments are sometimes, at least at face value, conflicting.
ReplyDeleteAnother problem is that many of these natural theological approaches assume a metaphysic, which itself needs to be defended, so often when it comes to natural theology, the theology proper will be downstream from one's metaphysics. Biblical metaphysics are undetermined, and somewhat varied, the very few times we get close to natural theology in the bible it's very limited: Job 26, 37, Psalm 19, Romans 1, Acts 17; what one can deduce from those small pieces is that some kind of teleology is assumed to be inherent in nature and it matches our knowledge of nature, Acts 17 is more interesting since it argues from our knowledge of ourselves as living, being and moving, to those aspects being participations in God, and thus in living, being and moving we already have knoweledge of God (reminds me of Michel Henry, and what I know of Maurice Blondel).
The issue I have with divine simplicity (in the Thomistic sense) is the negation of God's temporal becomming, the motivation for this critique is not metaphysical but theological and biblical (it's necessary for open theism). My thoughts on the Thomist equation with existence and essence is similar to what Augustine said about time, I understand it until I try and explain it. I get what it's trying to say, i.e. necessary existence is part of what it means to be God, and in the Thomistic metaphysic, where being is an act, God is essentially the act of existence. I'm not yet sure what I think about this.
When it comes to God's attributes, I think all God's attributes can be reduced to love, but perhaps one could say that there is a formal distinction, infact I think that from the creatures point of view these attributes are certainly distinct, I don't think that distinction is merely conceptual, but it might be made more sense of if one takes the essence energies distinction of Palamas on board, i.e. our distinguishing of God's attributes is a distinguishing of his energies, i.e. how is Love is manifest on fallen creation. Perhaps that's what Berkhov (I haven't read him) means by distinguishing between communicable and incommunicable attributes.
Always appreciate your thoughts, Roman. To find out more about the incommunicable and communicable attributes, see https://www.apuritansmind.com/the-attributes-of-god-by-c-matthew-mcmahon/the-attributes-of-god-by-louis-berkhof/#:~:text=God%20reveals%20Himself%20not%20only,of%20the%20latter%20there%20are.
ReplyDeleteHe's talking about the attributes that only God has versus attributes shared by God and creatures.
One thing that also gets me about divine simplicity is when Augustine and Aquinas insist that God is his attributes and the attributes are numerically identical with one another. It would also mean that God is existence itself. Like you said, actus essendi.
I believe it was Alvin Plantinga that also argued that divine simplicity would mean that God is an attribute.
ReplyDeleteWhether or not it makes sense to say God is existence itself would depend on what one thinks the term "existence" refers to.
I'm not sure how I feel about the incommunicable and communicable attributes, as though there were a strong distinction.
I mean on one hand you could go with Scotus, who would say that ALL God's attributes that we can know of are, in some sense, communicable (univocal), except incommunicable in their infinite "mode," or one could take Dionysius the Areopagite's view that all his attributes are incommmunicable, and therefore need to be denied, yet the denial itself needs to be denied, thus giving us a kind of dialectical approach.
I think Aquinas would say they are all communicable analogically, but incommunicable univocally.
I'm still slightly lost when it comes to these questions to be honest.
You're correct about Plantinga: his book on that subject is worth reading. I think it's Does God Have a Nature? Or something to that effect.
ReplyDeleteThomas Aquinas, as you know, famously argued that God is ipsum esse. Of course, this line of reasoning ultimately comes from Platonism and the premise that being itself (i.e., existence) is intrinsically good. Bonaventure also has a lot to say about God's diffusive goodness in Journey to the Mind of God.
The whole univocal and analogical debate is somewhat confusing and theoreticians still debate it. Even Scotus qualifies his univocity of being theory: “Univocatio enim non est nisi in generalibus rationibus” (Duns Scotus).