Sporadic theological and historical musings by Edgar Foster (Ph.D. in Theology and Religious Studies and one of Jehovah's Witnesses).
Sunday, November 17, 2024
Did God the Father Cause God the Son?
1) God is the uncaused cause of all things. 2) (According to numerous Trinitarians) God the Father is causally prior to God the Son. 3) However, nothing has caused or causes God. 4) Therefore, the Son is not God.
If the causation is non sequential, (not accidental) then the cause must have an essential difference from the effect such that it provides something to the effect which the effect does not itself have but depends on, which makes, ironically, eternal begetting inconsistent with the homoousion doctrine.
BTW, many monarchian trinitarians are basically gonna agree with you, however they will redefine the divine essence to mean something like omnipotence, or something like that. (which arguments going back to Ireneaus already shows doesn't work).
I hear more and more that the Father is LOGICALLY prior to the Son, but both exist from Eternity past, somehow. I suppose in an attempt to dodge the problems caused by inferring causality. I enjoyed researching Joshua Sijuwade’s model of monarchial trinitarianism, where he states only the Father is “ungrounded” by anyone or anything. Can and do any causes exist outside of time? I’ll wait for an example of a timeless cause or timeless result of a cause.
1. God Is the Uncaused Cause of All Things: The statement that God is the uncaused cause is correct and aligns with classical theism. However, this refers to God’s divine essence, which is shared equally by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Son, being God, is also uncaused in His divine essence. The distinction lies in the relationship within the Trinity: the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, which does not imply causation in the sense of a temporal or dependent act but rather an eternal relationship. "Uncaused cause" refers to the divine nature, not the relational distinctions within the Trinity. The Son's "begottenness" is not a temporal or causal event but an eternal reality within the Godhead.
2. God the Father Is Causally Prior to God the Son: This premise misrepresents Trinitarian theology. The relationship between the Father and the Son is one of eternal generation, not causation as we understand it in created terms. The Nicene Creed affirms that the Son is "begotten, not made," emphasizing that the Son's relationship to the Father is eternal and not dependent on temporal causality. Eternal generation is not equivalent to causality. The term "causally prior" is inappropriate because it introduces temporal and ontological hierarchy into the Trinity, which orthodox Trinitarian theology rejects. The theological term Eternal Generation describes the relationship of the Father to the Son. It is an eternal reality, not a temporal or causal event, and ensures that the Son is fully divine and co-eternal with the Father.
3. Nothing Has Caused or Causes God: This is true and remains consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. All three Persons of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—share the same divine essence, which is uncaused, eternal, and self-existent. The Son is God not because He was caused by the Father but because He shares the same uncaused divine essence. The Son is not "caused" by the Father. The eternal relationship of begetting is a relational distinction, not a causal or hierarchical one. The Father is unbegotten, the Son is eternally begotten, and the Spirit proceeds. These are not acts of causation but relational properties that describe how the Persons of the Trinity relate to one another. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial, meaning they share the same divine essence. There is no division or hierarchy in their essence or being.
4. Therefore, the Son Is Not God: This conclusion is a non sequitur because it depends on a misunderstanding of the terms "cause" and "begotten." The eternal generation of the Son does not imply that He is caused or created. Instead, it speaks to the relational order within the Trinity, where the Father is the "principle" or "source" within the Godhead but without any division of essence or being. The Son is fully God because He shares the same divine essence as the Father and the Spirit. The relational distinction of "begotten" does not imply ontological inferiority or dependence but describes the eternal and immutable relationship within the Trinity.
Nincsnevem, causally prior need not be understood temporally anymore than logically prior has to be construed that way. You criticize my use of the term "causation" for the eternal generation, but see https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P20/is-god-the-father-causally-prior-to-the-son
Admittedly, the western church prefers the language "principle" instead of cause, but some Trinitarians have no problem with cause as a way to describe the Father in relation to the Son.
Roman, I did mean for the cause to be understood in a non-sequential way.
Terence, I just finished listening to a discussion by Sijuwade and others about that subject. I also have a problem with atemporal causation and atemporal generation/spiration, etc. To me, logical priority does not stave off all difficulties.
"And He is always in the Father, unless the Father be not always Father, only that the Father also precedes Him — in a certain sense — since it is necessary — in some degree — that He should be before He is Father. Because it is essential that He who knows no beginning must go before Him who has a beginning; even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born, and of like nature with the Father in some measure by His nativity, although He has a beginning in that He is born, inasmuch as He is born of that Father who alone has no beginning. He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father — that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made."
Applying "causation" in any form to describe the relationship within the Trinity leads to confusion. The issue lies in the conflation of causal and relational terms. Classical Trinitarian theology emphasizes that the Father is the "principle" of the Son, not the "cause." This distinction is critical. A principle denotes origin or relationship without implying causation, dependence, or temporal priority. For example, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains, the Father "begets" the Son, but this begetting is an eternal and immanent act, not an efficient or external cause like the universe's creation. Aristotle and subsequent scholastics differentiate between principles (which establish order or relation) and causes (which imply dependency or change). The Father is a principle of the Son, meaning the Son proceeds from the Father relationally, but this does not entail ontological subordination.
Trinitarian theology reconciles eternal generation with the Son's aseity, which refers to self-existence, meaning God has no cause or dependence for His existence. This applies to the divine nature, which is shared fully and equally by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The divine essence is uncaused, eternal, and self-existent. The relational property of being "begotten" does not mean the Son’s existence is caused or derived in the same way as creation. The Father eternally communicates the divine essence to the Son. This communication is intrinsic to God's being and does not involve dependence or causation. As Aquinas states, the Father and Son share one undivided essence, which is inherently aseitous. The divine nature remains one and indivisible. The Son possesses aseity in His divine nature because that nature is uncaused and eternal. The relational term "begotten" refers to how the Son eternally proceeds from the Father within the Godhead, not to a temporal or ontological subordination.
Using "cause" risks implying dependency, which contradicts the shared divine essence. The Latin tradition avoids this term for good reason: it misrepresents the eternal and relational nature of the Trinity. Scholastic theology consistently prefers "principle" to "cause" to emphasize that the Father is not a source in the way a creator causes a creature. The divine processions (begetting and spiration) are acts of internal relation within the Godhead, not acts of external causation. In Summa Theologiae (I, q. 33, a. 1), Aquinas explicitly denies that the Father "causes" the Son. He writes, "The Father is called the principle of the Son, but not the cause... For in all kinds of causes there is always a distance of perfection or power, which is not the case in the divine persons."
The Nicene Creed explicitly affirms the Son is "begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father." This underscores that the Son is fully divine, sharing the same essence as the Father. The term "begotten" describes a relational distinction, not an ontological hierarchy or dependency. The Son has a principle of origin in the Father. However, this does not negate His aseity because the divine essence is one and uncaused. The Father begets the Son in an eternal act that communicates the same essence without division or dependence.
Eastern theologians sometimes use "cause" in a more relational sense, but even they clarify that this does not imply ontological subordination, the Cappadocian Fathers, for example, affirm the Son's full divinity and consubstantiality with the Father.
This premise correctly asserts God’s aseity, meaning that God is self-existent and uncaused. However, it conflates the divine essence (God as uncaused) with the internal relations of the Trinity. The divine essence is one and indivisible (homoousion), shared equally by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The distinction between the persons lies in their relational properties, not their essence.
1. The Father is unbegotten (no principle of origin).
2. The Son is begotten (from the Father but not caused).
3. The Holy Spirit proceeds (from the Father and the Son in the Latin tradition, or from the Father through the Son in the Eastern tradition).
This relational order does not compromise the shared divine essence. As St. Thomas Aquinas clarifies, the Father is the principle, not the cause, of the Son (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1). "Cause" implies dependence and inferiority, which are absent in the eternal relations of the Trinity.
Scholastic theologians like Aquinas, and later Honoré Tournely, distinguished between "principle" and "cause." The Father is the principle of the Son, meaning the Son proceeds from the Father as an eternal act of self-knowing. This procession does not involve efficient causality, which would imply a difference in substance, dependence, or temporal priority.
The Son’s generation is eternal and immanent within the divine essence. This is not a sequential or temporal act. As Augustine states, "From the instant that the fire begins to be, that instant it begets the shining" (Sermon to Catechumens). Thus, the Son is co-eternal with the Father and not posterior to Him in being or dignity.
Logical priority indicates relational order, not temporal succession. The Father is "prior" in relation, as the unbegotten principle, but not in time or essence. This aligns with the Nicene Creed: "Begotten of the Father before all ages."
All three persons of the Trinity share the same divine aseity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are uncaused in their essence (ens a se). However, personal relations (e.g., the Son is begotten of the Father) do not negate divine aseity because:
1. A principle of origin (Father begets Son) does not imply causation in the Aristotelian sense of efficient cause (Summa Theologiae I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1).
2. Divine processions (generation and spiration) are acts of immanent intellection and volition, which are internal to God and do not compromise His aseity (Aquinas, Sententia libri Metaphysicae).
The shared divine essence ensures the Son's full divinity. The Nicene Creed affirms the Son as "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God." Furthermore the Son is of the same substance as the Father (homoousios). Eternal generation signifies the communication of the Father’s essence to the Son, ensuring both possess the same divine essence. Causation, when applied to divine processions, must not be understood as efficient causality. The Son is FROM the Father as principle, not as effect. Ontological priority suggests dependence, which is not applicable to the Trinity. All three persons are co-eternal and co-equal in being and glory.
While the analogy of a timeless cause is challenging, eternal generation occurs within the eternal, atemporal life of God. The Son’s generation is an immanent act, not a transient one, and is identical to the divine essence. This concept is supported by both the Western (Latin) and Eastern (Greek) traditions, albeit with terminological differences. The Cappadocian Fathers and Augustine affirm that the Son’s generation involves no time, inferiority, or dependence.
Terence Yeah, that view is becoming more popular, however I honestly cannot see how it doesn't just fall into straight up Eunomianism/Arianism, his whole position depends on the view that Aseity is an extrinsic property, which (without getting into it too much here) is utter nonsense.
I personally am unsure about the right language to use with regards to the Logos and time, not because I think the Logos is eternal, but because I don't know how to speak of a first moment in temporal terms which brings eternity into temporality, this is an issue Origen struggled with, and a lot of people will say he believed in the pre-existence of souls, which it sounds like he did, but others (such as John Behr) say he's just threading the eternity of God's will with the temporality of creation.
BTW, I hear people say often that Arius believed that "there was a time when the son was not," as more careful scholarship has shown, that seems to be a misrepresentation, Arius was more subtle than that.
But either way, a nonsequential causal relation is necessarily one in which the cause and effect differ in essense.
Nincsnevem, does not begotten mean a kind of causation?
Your objection that John 6:57 ("I live because of the Father") implies a causal relationship between the Father and the Son, undermining the Son's divinity, reflects a misunderstanding of the biblical and theological context. The phrase "I live because of the Father" is often interpreted in a way that suggests causality in the sense of dependence or derivation. However, this interpretation fails to consider the theological context of Jesus' statement. The context of John 6 emphasizes Christ’s role as the Mediator and the source of eternal life for humanity. When Jesus speaks of living "because of the Father," He is referring to His mission as the one sent by the Father to bring life to the world. This is not a statement about His divine essence but about His incarnate and mediatorial role. As a Mediator, Jesus’ human nature is fully dependent on the Father, consistent with His submission to the Father’s will during His earthly mission.
In His divine nature, the Son shares the same essence (homoousios) as the Father. The Son’s life is not caused by the Father in a temporal or dependent sense but proceeds from the Father in eternal generation. Eternal generation is not causation in the sense of creation or efficient cause but signifies the relational distinction between the Father and the Son within the Trinity. Aquinas clarifies this distinction by emphasizing that the Father is the principle of the Son, not His cause (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1).
The Greek preposition διά (dia) in "I live because of the Father" is better understood as "by reason of" or "through." This aligns with the understanding that the Son’s life as the eternal Logos is fully aligned with and derived relationally from the Father without implying inferiority or temporal causation.
You argument that all causes exist in time is flawed for several reasons. The doctrine of eternal generation asserts that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, a reality that exists outside of time. This is not a temporal act but an eternal relationship intrinsic to the divine nature. The Nicene Creed affirms this: "Begotten of the Father before all ages." God exists beyond time and space (Psalm 90:2). Thus, any relational distinctions within the Trinity are timeless and do not correspond to temporal causality. The existence of the universe itself provides an example of a cause that transcends time. God created time itself (Genesis 1:1). As the uncaused cause, God’s act of creation demonstrates causation that is not bound by temporal constraints.
John 5:26 states: "For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself." This verse has been interpreted by some as indicating the Father’s causal priority over the Son. However John 5:26 speaks of the Son’s authority to give life, a role entrusted to Him as Mediator. This authority is given to the incarnate Son in the context of His mission to humanity. The verse does not imply that the Son lacks life in Himself in His divine nature. Rather, it emphasizes the relational dynamic between the Father and the Son within the economy of salvation. The Son, as God, possesses life in Himself, a quality intrinsic to the divine nature. This is not "given" in a temporal or dependent sense but reflects the eternal relationship within the Trinity. The Father’s "granting" the Son life refers to the relational distinction of eternal generation, not a deficiency in the Son.
You objection assumes that causality within the Trinity must function like causality in the created order. This is a category error. The Father generates the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as immanent acts, meaning they are internal to God’s essence. These processions are timeless and do not involve sequential causation or dependence. Augustine’s analogy of fire and its light clarifies that the generation of the Son from the Father is simultaneous and eternal. The Father is not temporally or causally prior to the Son but is the source of the Son’s eternal life in a relational sense.
Novatian explicitly affirms that the Son is "God proceeding from God" and possesses the divine substance ("cuius nomen est Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil" – "that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made"). This statement directly opposes Arianism, which denies the full divinity of the Son. Arian theology holds that the Son is a created being and not of the same divine substance as the Father. Novatian, however, insists on the Son's divine nature and the essential unity of substance between the Father and the Son.
Novatian emphasizes the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son: "He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time." This indicates that the Son’s existence is eternal and not bound by temporal beginnings, countering the Arian claim that the Son was created and thus had a beginning.
Novatian does mention that the Father "precedes" the Son in some (most likely logical) sense, but this is not a statement of temporal precedence. Rather, it reflects the relational distinction within the Trinity—what later theology would term the eternal generation of the Son. This generation does not imply inferiority or a beginning in time but a relational order within the Godhead.
Novatian carefully distinguishes between being begotten (as the Son is) and being created. He writes, "If He had not been born—compared with Him who was unborn, an equality being manifested in both—He would make two unborn beings, and thus would make two Gods." Here, Novatian defends the distinction between the Father (unbegotten) and the Son (begotten), emphasizing that this distinction preserves monotheism. For Novatian, the Son is begotten of the Father, not created, and shares in the Father's divine essence. Arianism, on the other hand, conflates being begotten with being created, a confusion that Novatian avoids.
Novatian repeatedly stresses the unity of God: "He gathered His beginning by being born of Him who is one God," and "He did not make two Gods, because He did not make two beginnings." This unity of God, despite the relational distinction between Father and Son, is incompatible with Arianism. Arians reject the unity of essence between the Father and the Son, positing instead a hierarchy that undermines monotheism by effectively introducing a second, subordinate deity.
Novatian is clear in his rejection of any theology that would introduce "two Gods." He argues that the Son’s subjection to the Father (a theme Arians often exploit) does not imply inequality but demonstrates the relational order within the Godhead. He writes, "The Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to the Father the whole authority of His divinity," emphasizing relational harmony rather than ontological inferiority.
Although Novatian predates the Nicene Creed, his theology aligns with its central tenets. He affirms the Son’s divine nature, eternal relationship with the Father, and unity of essence with the Father. The Nicene Creed’s declaration that the Son is "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father" echoes Novatian’s teaching.
Arian proponents often misinterpret Novatian’s language of "procession" and "subjection" to argue for the Son’s inferiority. However, Novatian uses these terms to describe the relational and functional dynamics within the Trinity, not to diminish the Son's divinity. His affirmation that the Son is "the divine substance" and his rejection of two Gods clearly place him within an orthodox framework, not an Arian one.
Eternal generation refers to the relational distinction within the Trinity, where the Son eternally proceeds from the Father, not in a temporal or sequential manner, but as an immanent and timeless act. The generation of the Son does not imply causality as understood in the created order. Instead, the Father is the principle of the Son, not His cause.
Your claim that "a nonsequential causal relation is necessarily one in which the cause and effect differ in essence" is incorrect when applied to divine processions. In the Trinity, the Father and the Son share the same essence (homoousios). The relational distinction between the Father and the Son arises from the eternal generation, not from an ontological or essential difference. The processions within the Godhead are unique because they do not involve division, dependency, or change.
The term "begotten" when applied to the Son is a relational term describing the Son’s eternal relationship to the Father. It does not signify causation in the sense of creation or dependence. In human language, "begotten" is analogous and reflects a unique divine reality that transcends human causality.
So eternal generation is not a form of causation that implies temporal or ontological dependency.
Aseity (self-existence) is not an extrinsic property but is intrinsic to the divine nature. All three persons of the Trinity share the same essence, and thus all three are ase (ens a se) in terms of essence. Aseity pertains to the divine essence, which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relational distinction (e.g., the Father as unbegotten) pertains to their personhood, not to the essence they share. To argue that aseity is extrinsic would imply that God’s self-existence depends on something external, contradicting the classical definition of God as “ipsum esse subsistens” (being itself subsisting).
The Son’s eternal generation is compatible with aseity because the procession is an immanent act within the Godhead. It does not imply a temporal or dependent existence. The Son is FROM the Father by eternal generation, but this procession does not negate His possession of the same divine essence, which is inherently ase.
So aseity is intrinsic to the divine essence and fully compatible with the relational distinctions within the Trinity.
Arius’s theology did, in essence, deny the co-eternity of the Son with the Father. While his language may have been nuanced, the core of his teaching was that the Son is a created being and thus not co-eternal with the Father. The Council of Nicaea explicitly rejected Arius’s view by affirming the “homoousios” of the Son with the Father, emphasizing that the Son is "begotten, not made," and "of one essence with the Father." While Arius may not have used the exact phrase "there was a time when the Son was not," his teaching effectively implied it by asserting that the Son was a created being. Any theology that denies the full co-eternity and co-equality of the Son risks falling into a similar subordinationist error.
God’s act of creation is an example of timeless causation. God, existing outside of time, brings time and the universe into being without Himself being subject to temporal constraints. Classical theism, as articulated by Aquinas, holds that God is the uncaused cause and the sustaining cause of all existence. This causation is not temporal but eternal. Within the Trinity, the processions (e.g., the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit) are eternal and timeless. They do not occur within time but reflect the relational distinctions within the Godhead.
So timeless causation is both theologically and philosophically coherent, as evidenced by God’s act of creation and the eternal processions within the Trinity.
Welcome back, matey, I have missed your one-sided, albeit android-like affirmative reasoning style.
I would not disagree that the statement at John 6:57 describes adequately Jesus’ role as a mediator for humankind. But a careful and non-biased, non-theologically motivated reading of the text states clearly that “JUST AS (kathos) the living Father” was the reason, means or cause by which the Son is LIVING (zao)” SO ALSO will his believers LIVE… beCAUSe of the Son.
Christians have not had life Co-existent with the Father from Eternity past in One hypostatic union, they receive it in response to their believing in and partaking (trogo) of the Christ’s saving power. They are given life. Sequentially. Causally. In time. As an effect. So was the Son. Otherwise his comparison falls apart and his use of (kathos - according to/ just as) is meaningless. Your interpretation fails to recognise basic Greek and English words and their meanings.
The term καθώς often emphasizes a pattern or analogy, not an identical relationship. In John 6:57, the Son's life being "by reason of" (διά) the Father is not sequential or causal in the sense of temporal creation but relational and eternal. The analogy is not about identical mechanics but analogous dependence:
Father → Son (eternal, relational, intrinsic within the Godhead)
Son → Believers (temporal, salvific, and external to the Godhead)
The Son’s eternal generation and the believers’ participation in Christ’s life are qualitatively distinct. The Son’s life is intrinsic to His divine nature, eternally derived from the Father, whereas believers receive life as a created gift through Christ’s mediatorial role. Conflating these relationships ignores the unique nature of divine processions versus created participation.
So the analogy between the Father-Son relationship and the Son-believer relationship highlights relational dependence, not identical mechanics.
The context of John 6:57 does not support the idea that Jesus’ life is a temporal effect of the Father. The Father is the source (principle) of the Son’s life through eternal generation, which is not causal or sequential in a temporal sense. Believers’ reception of life is contingent on time because they are finite beings. However, Christ is eternal (John 1:1-3) and shares the same divine essence with the Father, meaning His life is uncreated and timeless.To insist that the analogy requires temporal sequence for the Son is to project the limitations of creation onto the Creator, a categorical error.
John 5:26 explicitly states: "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself." This is not about sequential granting but the eternal relational dynamic of the Trinity. The Son possesses life inherently because of His eternal generation from the Father. This life is not derivative in a created sense but reflects the shared divine essence. Believers, by contrast, do not possess life inherently but receive it as a gift through union with Christ. The Son’s role as the source of believers’ life is part of His mediatorial mission, not a reflection of how He Himself possesses life.
As applied to the Son, διά does not suggest that the Son’s life is “caused” in a temporal or dependent sense. Instead, it reflects the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son. The Son’s life originates relationally (not causally) from the Father, consistent with the doctrine of eternal generation. For believers, διά indicates that their life is mediated through the Son as the incarnate Redeemer, not that the Son’s life is a temporal effect of the Father.
The Son’s life is eternally derived from the Father in a way that transcends temporal causality, while believers receive life as a temporal gift.
You conflate Christ’s incarnate mediatorial role with His eternal divine nature. As Mediator, the incarnate Son submits to the Father and depends on Him in His human nature. This dependence is not a reflection of His divine essence but of His role in salvation history. In His divine nature, the Son is co-eternal and consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father. The life He has "by reason of the Father" is an eternal, non-temporal reality.
"The Son’s life is eternally derived from the Father in a way that transcends temporal causality, while believers receive life as a temporal gift."
So it's not "just as" then? Jesus didn't really mean what he said.
"The life He has "by reason of the Father" is an eternal, non-temporal reality." So his believers don't gain life "just as" he received it, then?
The Father is the "reason" for The Son's life, but there was never a time this reason actually happened or occured in a measurable or discernible way according to the Aristotelian principles of causation. It was a non-event. It just always was. Am I stating that correctly? In what way is it a "reason", then? IMO, a better way of stating it would be that a Triunity of persons is the prime reality. But even then, some Trinitarians claim all of this is not in Reality, but by way of reason (logic). What a tangled web we weave...
"The truth alone is reasonable. It's true. It satisfies our longings as nothing else can do."
Nincsnevem, there is more than one way to look at the statements by Novatian of Rome as even other Catholics admit. But I will quote directly from Novatian's work:
For since that is the beginning to other creatures which is unborn — which God the Father only is, being beyond a beginning of whom He is who was born — while He who is born of Him reasonably comes from Him who has no beginning, proving that to be the beginning from which He Himself is, even although He is God who is born, yet He shows Him to be one God whom He who was born proved to be without a beginning. He therefore is God, but begotten for this special result, that He should be God. He is also the Lord, but born for this very purpose of the Father, that He might be Lord. He is also an Angel, but He was destined of the Father as an Angel to announce the Great Counsel of God. And His divinity is thus declared, that it may not appear by any dissonance or inequality of divinity to have caused two Gods. For all things being subjected to Him as the Son by the Father, while He Himself, with those things which are subjected to Him, is subjected to His Father, He is indeed proved to be Son of His Father; but He is found to be both Lord and God of all else. Whence, while all things put under Him are delivered to Him who is God, and all things are subjected to Him, the Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to the Father the whole authority of His divinity. The true and eternal Father is manifested as the one God, from whom alone this power of divinity is sent forth, and also given and directed upon the Son, and is again returned by the communion of substance to the Father. God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and extended. And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in reciprocal transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by the Son Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is God of all, and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord. Moreover, the Son is God of all else, because God the Father put before all Him whom He begot. Thus the Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God; with every creature subdued to Him, found at one with His Father God, has, by abiding in that condition that He moreover "was heard," briefly proved God His Father to be one and only and true God.
"Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God" - was Novation written orignally in Greek or latin? - is this last instance of "God" translated correctly - or Did Novatoin observe Origens. because based on the last sentence this doesnt make much sense unless indefinite (and other catholics) - credible answers please (so any one that is not named: Nincsnevem (or does not write 60 billion paragraphs for a single question that requires 5 words to answer ))
I see, I understand that the trinitarian theology rules out temporal or sequential causation, but I have heard many theologians talk about the begetting of the Son as a causal act (again, not temporal or sequential, but causal), however that might be something more common in eastern traditions than Latin ones.
As far as my claim, my claim just follows from the meatphysics of causation, of course this would not apply to your model as you deny that it's a kind of causation.
Just to clarify (I'm not debating here, just wanting to understand your model), when you say processions, would you say that this is a kind of emanation? If so, what is the shared essence, and is the distinction a real distinction or a conceptual or a formal?
I agree with you that Aseity is intrinsic, so me and you agree against Joshua Sijuwade and the monarchian trinitarians.
Unfortunately however, the repeating of the doctrinal language doesn't make the doctrine any clearer, I have to say this is something that can get annoying with certain theologians, they use language to make distinctions without ever defining the language clearly. I.e. what is meant by procession (if it is not a kind of causation), what is meant by personhood, what is the shared essence, etc etc. I mean i don't know if I can assent to, or deny, the language if I don't know what it means.
About Arius, Arius believed the Son was created, but, like Origen, believed he was created atemporally, so perhaps this does mean that Arius didn't believe the Son was eternal in the same sense as you mean it (I'm not sure in what sense you mean it to be honest), but for Arius the Son always existed in the sense that there was no time in which the Son did not exist, even though the Son is brought into being by the Father. Does this mean that the son isn't eternal? Perhaps depending on the sense of "eternal" you mean, but my point is just that the phrase "there was a time when the Son was not" misrepresents Arius's position.
The term KATHŌS ("just as") in this context does not demand strict equivalence but rather an analogy. In Scripture, analogies are often used to explain divine realities in ways that are comprehensible to human beings, see Mt. 5:48. The relationship between the Father and the Son is not identical to the relationship between the Son and believers because the former is eternal and intrinsic to the Godhead, while the latter is temporal and external, based on salvation. Jesus is highlighting a relational pattern: the Son receives life from the Father in an eternal relationship, and believers receive life from the Son in a salvific relationship. The "just as" emphasizes that both involve dependence and union, not identical mechanisms. Your interpretation incorrectly assumes that "just as" must mean that the nature of the life-giving relationship between the Father and the Son is the same as that between the Son and believers. This conflates divine and created realities, which are categorically distinct.
Believers do not gain life in the same way the Son has life from the Father because believers are finite creatures, while the Son is God. The analogy functions within the framework of relational dependence, not identical processes. Believers receive eternal life as a gift through faith in Christ, starting at a specific point in time. This life is contingent upon the salvific work of Christ, mediated by grace and faith (John 3:16, 6:40). The Son’s life is derived from the Father in an eternal, timeless generation. This is not a temporal "receiving" but an eternal relational reality within the Trinity. The comparison does not suggest sameness but rather an analogous structure of relational dependence: the Son derives life from the Father eternally, while believers derive life from the Son temporally.
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father, meaning that His existence as the Son is relationally derived from the Father without beginning or end. This is not a "reason" in the sense of a temporal or sequential cause, but rather a timeless relational dynamic intrinsic to God’s nature. The Father is the principle (ἀρχή, principium) of the Son’s life, not in a causal or temporal sense but in the eternal relational structure of the Trinity. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, a principle does not necessarily imply temporal priority or external causation (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1). The Father is the source of the Son’s life in the sense of eternal origin, not as a temporal event or measurable process.
Your suggestion that this relationship is a "non-event" misunderstands the nature of eternal realities, which exist outside time and space. The term "reason" here does not imply sequential causation but reflects the Father as the relational source of the Son within the eternal unity of the Godhead.
The Trinity is indeed the prime reality, with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit existing in a relationship of perfect unity and distinction. However, describing the Trinity as a "Triunity of persons" without acknowledging the eternal relational roles of Father, Son, and Spirit risks flattening the distinctions between the persons. The doctrine of eternal generation (the Son from the Father) and eternal procession (the Spirit from the Father and the Son) ensures that the distinctions within the Godhead are preserved without compromising unity. Orthodox Trinitarian theology avoids reducing the Trinity to a mere logical construct ("by way of reason"). Instead, it affirms that the relational distinctions are intrinsic to God’s very being.
The Trinity is not a purely philosophical construct but is revealed in Scripture (e.g., John 1:1-3, 5:26, 14:9-11, Mt. 28:19). While human logic can help clarify and articulate the doctrine, it cannot fully comprehend the divine mystery. The language of eternal generation and relational distinctions reflects careful theological work to preserve both the unity of God and the personal distinctions within the Godhead. The complexity arises from the depth of the subject, not from incoherence.
Novatian’s work, De Trinitate, explicitly asserts the divinity of the Son while carefully maintaining the distinction between the Father and the Son. Novatian describes the Son as “born” and “proceeding from the Father,” and emphasizes that the Son is of the same divine substance as the Father:
"God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and extended... by the communion of substance (per substantiae communionem) to the Father."
This communion of substance is critical. While Novatian discusses the relational distinction between the Father and the Son, he firmly places the Son within the divine nature. This is in direct contradiction to Arian theology, which denies the Son’s co-equal divinity with the Father. Novatian’s assertion that the Son is God "by the communion of substance" aligns with the later Nicene Creed’s declaration of homoousios (of the same substance). Furthermore Novatian explicitly denies that the Son is a creature:
"Cujus sacrae et divinae nativitatis arcana nec Apostolus didicit, nec Prophetes comperit, nec Angelus scivit, nec creatura cognovit." (“The mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended.”)
By stating that the Son’s divine nativity is unknown even to creatures, Novatian distinguishes the Son’s generation from any kind of creaturely origin. The Son’s "beginning" refers to the eternal relational order between the Father and the Son, not a temporal creation. Novatian emphasizes that the Father is unbegotten and the source of the Son’s being, but this does not diminish the Son’s divinity.
Novatian uses terms like “lesser” and “subject” in describing the Son’s relationship to the Father. However, these terms do not indicate ontological inferiority but rather the relational dynamics within the Trinity. Novatian is clear that the Son’s submission is functional and reflects his role in the economy of salvation:
"Thus making Himself obedient to His Father in all things, although He also is God."
This obedience underscores the relational order but does not imply a difference in divine essence. Novatian explicitly affirms that the Son is God, fully divine, and not a second, lesser god:
"Thus Christ would have been the cause of two Gods... but now, whatever He is, He is not of Himself, because He is not unborn; but He is of the Father, because He is begotten."
Novatian’s careful language avoids the pitfalls of both Arianism (denying the Son’s divinity) and modalism (denying the distinction between persons).
Not my logic my friend, just letting the Bible speak for itself.
@Nincs
Architect vs Neo.
“You haven’t answered my question.”
But I take your point on analogies with (kata/kathos). Good use of Matthew 5 to substantiate your point. However Matthew isn’t talking about causes or reasons for the outcome desired. It’s a command. John 6 is a statement of fact.
Nincs, what is your view on Monarchial Trinitarianism? Just curious. You seem like a traditional “upper case C” Catholic.
I’d also be curious to understand your views on numerical identity within the supposed Triune Godhead. Is the Father numerically identical with the homousia/divine essence? Is the Son?
It's true that Eastern theologians also use the term "cause" (αἰτία), as well as "source/principle" (ἀρχή) to describe the Father’s relation to the Son and the Spirit, emphasizing His role as the unoriginate principle of the Trinity. This "causation," however, is not analogous to temporal or efficient causation in the created order. It refers to a unique, eternal mode of existence within the Godhead—what the Eastern tradition often terms "eternal generation" for the Son and "eternal procession" for the Spirit. In Western theology, terms like "principle" (principium) or "source" are preferred over "cause" to avoid the connotations of ontological dependency or inferiority. The Father is not the efficient cause of the Son but the relational principle from whom the Son is eternally generated. While "cause" can be used in Eastern theology, it does not imply the kind of dependency or derivation found in created realities. The distinction lies in understanding causality in an eternal and non-temporal framework, where "causation" is relational rather than ontological or sequential.
The term "emanation" can be helpful if carefully qualified, but it carries risks of misunderstanding. The processions (generation and spiration) do not divide or multiply the essence; rather, they distinguish the persons relationally. The distinctions between the persons of the Trinity are real, not merely conceptual or formal. The Father is not the Son; the Son is not the Spirit. These distinctions are grounded in relational opposition (e.g., the Father begets, the Son is begotten, the Spirit proceeds), not in any division of essence. Unlike Neoplatonic emanation, where beings flow outward from a higher principle and diminish in perfection, the processions in the Trinity involve no ontological degradation. The Son and Spirit are fully God, equal in essence and perfection with the Father. "Procession" refers to an eternal and relational act intrinsic to the Godhead. The Son "proceeds" from the Father as eternally begotten, and the Spirit "proceeds" from the Father and the Son (in Western theology) or "from the Father through the Son" (in Eastern theology). These terms describe relations of origin, not causation in the created sense.
Arius indeed believed that the Son was created "before time" (before all the AIONs) and so it would logically follow that there was no "time" in which the Son did not exist. However, he still asserted that the Son was a created being, ontologically separate and subordinate to the Father. This makes the Son a contingent being, not co-eternal or consubstantial with the Father. In orthodox Trinitarian theology, "eternal" means without beginning or end, fully sharing in the divine essence. The Son is not created but eternally begotten, meaning that His existence is intrinsic to the divine nature. This is fundamentally different from Arius's view, even if Arius denied temporal sequentiality. While Arius may not have meant the phrase "there was a time when the Son was not" in a strictly temporal sense, it accurately reflects his claim that the Son's existence is derived and contingent, not intrinsic to the Godhead. The phrase captures the theological error of denying the Son’s co-eternity and "homoousios" with the Father. Orthodox Trinitarian theology rejects Arianism because it compromises the full divinity of the Son, reducing Him to a creature and undermining the unity of the Godhead.
While terms like "procession" and "personhood" may seem unclear, they aim to preserve the biblical revelation of God’s triune nature. For example, "procession" safeguards the relational distinctions within the Trinity, while "personhood" emphasizes the individuality of the Father, Son, and Spirit without dividing the essence. Theologians walk a fine line between clarity and preserving the mystery of God. The language is necessarily analogical because finite human concepts cannot fully capture the infinite reality of God.
Nincsnevem, Novatian's language seems anything but clear and I've never read where he said the Son was eternally born. "Born," yes but he does not use the adjective "eternal." Novatian's thought is far from being transparent about the Son and the Father. See Edmund Fortman, The Triune God, pages 121-123.
In On the Trinity 27, Novatian writes
"In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is inferior to the Father. Now, consequently, He who is inferior to the Father, is not the Father, but the Son; for had He been the Father, He would have given, and not received, sanctification."
In this translation of On the Trinity 31 by Novatian, the word "cause" comes into play:
"And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made. Assuredly God proceeding from God, causing a person second to the Father as being the Son, but not taking from the Father that characteristic that He is one God."
It's important to note that the Father wills this birth, according to Novatian.
Even if John 6:57 is a declarative statement, it employs analogical reasoning to make the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son comprehensible to a human audience. While Matthew 5:48 does contain an imperative, the underlying structure of analogical reasoning applies to both texts. The comparison between the Father’s perfection and the believer’s striving for perfection in Matthew 5:48 operates on a similar principle as the analogy between the Son's eternal life and the believer’s salvific life in John 6:57. Both reveal relational truths through analogy, not absolute equivalence. In John 6:57, the phrase "just as" indicates a relational parallel (pattern, model), not an identical mechanism. To expect strict numerical or causal equivalence conflates analogical and univocal uses of language, which is contrary to the scholastic understanding of divine language (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 5). The analogy conveys proportional similarity while respecting the categorical distinction between the eternal Godhead and created beings.
Monarchial Trinitarianism, especially in its Eastern form, emphasizes the Father as the sole source (αἰτία) of the Son and Spirit. While this is consistent with Nicene orthodoxy when properly articulated, certain interpretations veer dangerously close to subordinationism. Thomistic theology aligns with the Nicene affirmation that the Father is the "principle" (principium) of the Son and the Spirit, but avoids framing this in terms of causality that would imply subordination. The Son is begotten, not created, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father (and, in Western theology, the Son), both as co-equal and co-eternal persons. While the Father is the "arche" of the Trinity, His monarchy does not entail ontological priority. To imply that the Father has a superiority in essence or existence would contradict the doctrine of homoousios—the shared, singular divine essence. Thomism emphasizes the inseparability of divine action (opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt), ensuring that the monarchy of the Father does not undermine the co-equality of the Son and Spirit. This is why Catholic theology holds to the “Filioque”, affirming that the Spirit proceeds from the Father AND the Son, safeguarding the unity of essence and will. Thus, while Monarchial Trinitarianism preserves some important relational truths, it must avoid interpretations that diminish the full co-equality and consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit with the Father.
Yes, in the sense that the Father is the divine essence fully and without division. However, the Father is not numerically identical to the Son or Spirit. The divine essence is numerically one and indivisible, but the relations between the persons constitute real distinctions. According to Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28, a. 2), the distinctions within the Trinity are relational, not essential. The Father, Son, and Spirit each fully possess the one divine essence, but they are distinct by their relations of origin (Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten, Spirit as proceeding). Numerical identity refers to the essence, not the persons. If the persons were numerically identical, it would collapse the distinctions between Father, Son, and Spirit into a single person, leading to modalism.
Regarding the Trinity the term “procession” refers to the eternal relational origin of one person from another within the Trinity. For example the Son proceeds from the Father by way of intellectual generation: the Father’s perfect self-knowledge generates the Word (Logos), and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son by way of love: the perfect love between Father and Son spirates the Spirit. Procession does not imply a chronological or causal sequence but describes relational distinctions that are eternally present within the divine nature. The shared essence is the one, undivided divine nature (homoousios). The distinctions between the persons are real, grounded in relational opposition (Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten, Spirit as proceeding).
It is true that Novatian does not explicitly use the phrase “eternally born” in modern terminology, but his description of the Son’s relationship to the Father makes it clear that he understands the Son’s generation as timeless and eternal. For example, Novatian writes:
"He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This statement affirms the timelessness of the Son’s generation. Novatian explicitly rejects the idea that the Son’s begetting involves temporal succession. The language of “always in the Father” directly refutes Arianism, which posits that “there was a time when the Son was not.” Moreover, Novatian emphasizes that the Son’s relationship to the Father is rooted in an eternal relational order, not a temporal act. His use of terms like “proceeded” reflects this theological framework. The absence of the word "eternal" does not undermine this doctrine; instead, Novatian uses theological concepts consistent with later orthodox formulations of eternal generation.
Your quote from Chapter 27:
“In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is INFERIOR to the Father…” “um ergo accipit sanctificationem a Patre, MINOR Patre est”
In Latin, MINOR rather means "lesser" or "smaller", not (ontologically) "inferior." In this theological context, MINOR refers to a relational distinction, not an ontological one. Novatian uses this term to describe the relational order within the Trinity rather than suggesting any inferiority of essence or nature. Novatian affirms that the Son shares the same divine essence as the Father. His description of the Son as "minor" pertains to the relational roles within the Trinity, emphasizing the Father as the source of the Son's being. This relational subordination (seen in the economia, or divine economy) does not imply ontological inequality.
The Son is described as "minor" in His role of obedience and functional submission, but Novatian repeatedly affirms the unity of substance between the Father and the Son. The phrase "minor autem Patre consequenter est" must be understood within the broader framework of Novatian’s argument, which rejects both Arian subordinationism and modalism. This is consistent with biblical language where Christ, in His human nature, is obedient to the Father. For example, Philippians 2:6–8 describes Christ as “emptying Himself” and taking the form of a servant, yet being in the form of God. Novatian’s theology mirrors the biblical and patristic tradition that the Son’s obedience does not imply an inferior divine nature but rather a relational distinction within the Godhead. The Son’s functional subordination highlights the order within the Trinity without compromising the unity of essence.
It is true that Novatian states:
"He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This has been misunderstood as suggesting that the Father’s will caused the Son’s existence. However, Novatian’s language is better understood within the framework of eternal generation: the Son is eternally and naturally begotten of the Father, not created. The Father’s “will” here does not imply a temporal or contingent act but reflects the eternal harmony of the Father’s nature and will with the Son’s generation. Moreover, Novatian contrasts the Son’s generation with creation, clearly distinguishing the Son’s divine nature from that of creatures:
“The mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended.” (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This language makes it evident that the Son’s generation is unique, divine, and eternal, unlike the act of creating creatures, which occurs in time and by divine fiat.
In De Trinitate, Chapter 31, the English translation uses the term "causing a person second to the Father." To analyze the Latin text and verify what word corresponds to "causing," let’s see the relevant portion of the Latin original:
"Deus utique procedens ex Deo, secundam personam EFFICIENS post Patrem qua Filius; sed non eripiens illud Patri, quod unus est Deus."
The Latin word translated as "causing" is "efficiens." The Latin verb "efficiens" (present participle of "efficere") can be translated as: "producing", "bringing about", "effecting", or "accomplishing." In this context, "efficiens" does not imply a causal or creative act in the sense of creating something "ex nihilo" (as in the creation of the world). Rather, it emphasizes the relational aspect of the Son being "produced" or "brought forth" as a second person from the Father. This aligns with the doctrine of eternal generation, where the Son's existence derives from the Father, but not as a temporal or contingent act.
The participle "efficiens" is consistent with the theological language of eternal generation, where the Son is eternally "brought forth" from the Father. The relational subordination implied by "efficiens" does not indicate ontological inferiority but preserves the distinction of persons within the unity of substance. So the term “causing” in Chapter 31 does not suggest ontological inequality or dependency but instead refers to the relational origin of the Son in the Father. Novatian’s distinction between the Father as the source and the Son as begotten reflects the traditional understanding of the Father as the “principle without principle” within the Trinity. As Novatian emphasizes:
"He could not make a disagreement in the divinity by the number of two Gods, since He gathered His beginning by being born of Him who is one God." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This ensures that the Son’s divine nature is fully derived from the Father’s, affirming consubstantiality while preserving the relational order. Novatian’s use of “second person” is entirely orthodox and aligns with later Trinitarian formulations.
Finally, Novatian’s explicit rejection of “two Gods” directly counters Arianism. Arians introduce a subordinate, created Son, effectively dividing the Godhead into two beings: one supreme and one subordinate. Novatian, however, maintains monotheism by affirming the unity of divine substance:
“He did not make two Gods, because He did not make two beginnings.” (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
His theology anticipates the Nicene Creed’s assertion of the Son as "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father."
Novatian's De Trinitate was originally written in Latin, not Greek. This is significant because Latin lacks the definite and indefinite articles. The phrase in question:
"Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God"
"Christus Jesus omnis creaturae subjectam sibi habens a Patre proprio potestatem qua Deus est"
In Latin, "Deus" simply means "God." There is no way to distinguish between "God" (definite) and "a god" (indefinite) because Latin lacks articles. Any implication of definiteness or indefiniteness must come from the context. Novatian consistently affirms the full divinity of Christ in De Trinitate, so the rendering of Deus as "God" is correct in this theological context.
„potestatem qua Deus est”: "the power in which He is God" or "inasmuch as He is God."
Translating "potestatem qua Deus est" as "inasmuch as He is God" accurately reflects Novatian’s intended meaning. It underscores that Christ’s divine authority over creation derives from His nature as God, consistent with his affirmation of Christ’s full divinity.
There is no evidence at all that Novatian's theology directly reflects Origen's speculative framework. While both authors may discuss the relational distinction between the Father and the Son, Novatian does not use Greek terminology that suggests a subordination of essence, and explicitly affirms the unity of substance (per substantiae communionem) between the Father and the Son.
Part oof this comes down to how one interprets the Latin in On the Trinity, but Fortman understands minor to mean "inferior" there and he was not a JW. Additionally, Edmund Hill writes
"For Novatian, to argue the divinity of Christ, which he does with great vigor, actually involves arguing his inequality to the Father. The assumption is that Christ can only be both divine and other than the Father if he is divine in a different and lesser degree. Novatian interprets the famous text of Phil 2:6, ‘who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped,’ as meaning that though Christ was divine, in the form of God, he never dreamt of claiming equality with God."
No one is accusing Novatian of Arianism, but he certainly seems to espouse Christological subordinationism. As for the eternal generation part, I still don't think he clearly affirms it although he speaks of the Logos being ever in the Father.
“Hic ergo, cum sit genitus a Patre, semper est in Patre.” “He then, since He was begotten of the Father, is always in the Father.”
Novatian emphasizes the Son's eternal relationship with the Father. The term “semper est in Patre” (always in the Father) refutes the Arian claim that there was a time when the Son did not exist. For Novatian, the Son's existence is co-eternal with the Father, albeit with the relational distinction that the Son is begotten and the Father is unbegotten.
“Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem. “And I thus say always, that I may show Him not to be unborn, but born.”
Novatian distinguishes the Father (unbegotten) from the Son (begotten). This distinction does not imply Arian subordinationism (where the Son is created) but rather reflects the relational order within the Trinity. The term “natum” (born) refers to the eternal generation of the Son, not a temporal or created beginning.
“Sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in Patre fuisse dicendus est: nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est.” “But He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time.”
Novatian makes it clear that the Son's existence transcends time. The phrase “ante omne tempus” (before all time) is a strong affirmation of the Son's eternity. This directly contradicts Arianism, which holds that the Son was created in time.
“quin et Pater illum etiam (quadam ratione) praecedit, quod necesse est (quodammodo) prior sit qua Pater sit.” “only that the Father also precedes Him—in a certain sense—since it is necessary—in some degree—that He should be before He is Father.”
Novatian acknowledges a LOGICAL priority of the Father over the Son, which aligns with orthodox Trinitarian theology. The Father is the "principle" (or source) of the Son, but this precedence is not temporal or ontological. Instead, it reflects the eternal relational order within the Godhead.
“Simul ut hic MINOR sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem, quia nascitur.”
“Even as He is the LESS as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born.”
The term “minor” (less) might appear problematic, but it reflects the relational distinction, not an ontological inequality. The Son is "less" in the sense that He derives His being from the Father, not in the sense of being inferior in nature or substance. This is consistent with the Son's role as begotten, which Novatian explicitly contrasts with being created.
The language of "precedence" and "lesser" reflects the relational dynamic within the Trinity, not an ontological hierarchy. This is consistent with later Nicene theology, which affirms the Son's functional subordination in the economy of salvation while maintaining ontological equality.
“dum ex eo Patre qui originem solus non habet, nascitur.”
“inasmuch as He is born of that Father who alone has no beginning.”
The Father is unoriginated (originem solus non habet), while the Son derives His being from the Father. This affirms the Father's role as the source of the Son without denying the Son's co-eternal and co-equal divinity.
The Latin "minor" rather means "less", "lesser", or "smaller", in Novatian’s work refers to relational order, not ontological essence, likely referring back to John 14:28. This is clear when he uses the term in conjunction with the Son’s "originem" (origin) from the Father: "Simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem, quia nascitur" ("Even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born"). The relational dynamic does not imply inequality of divine essence but reflects the Father's role as the unbegotten source and the Son's role as the begotten Word. This mirrors the Nicene understanding of eternal generation, where the Son derives His being from the Father but is not created or lesser in essence.
If "minor" is interpreted as "inferior," it must be understood in terms of functional subordination, which Novatian repeatedly frames in the context of obedience to the Father’s will. This is consistent with the economic Trinity—where the Son submits to the Father in the divine economy—without implying inequality in nature or essence. The distinction between relational and ontological subordination is critical. His repeated insistence on the unity of substance between the Father and the Son precludes any suggestion that "minor" implies inferiority in essence.
Hill’s interpretation—that Novatian believes Christ is divine but not equal to the Father—may reflect a misreading of Novatian's argument. He argues that the term "forma Dei" ("form of God") denotes deity. He contrasts it with "imago Dei" ("image of God"), which applies to humanity (Genesis 1:27). This distinction is crucial because it establishes that Christ possesses the divine essence and is not merely a creature reflecting God's image. He explains that Christ is “God from God,” ("se ex Deo Patre Deum esse") deriving His deity from the Father. The phrase aligns with later Nicene formulations such as "God from God" (Deum de Deo) and "Light from Light." It affirms Christ’s ontological deity as derived from the Father.
"For although He remembered that He was God from God the Father, He never either compared or associated Himself with God the Father."
This highlights the relational distinction within the Trinity. Christ, as God from God the Father, acknowledges His divine nature but does not assert INDEPENDENT equality with the Father in a competitive or self-originating sense. Instead, His divine identity is always mindful of His derivation from the Father. This reflects the doctrine of eternal generation: the Son’s deity comes from the Father, not from Himself.
"He possessed that very thing that He is, because the Father had given it Him."
The Son's divine essence and attributes are not independent but received from the Father in the eternal relationship of generation. This does not imply ontological inferiority but reflects the relational order within the Godhead.
"He thought that the claim of a certain divinity would be robbery, to wit, that of equalling Himself with God the Father."
This does not deny Christ’s deity. Instead, he reads Phil. 2:6 as affirming Christ's humble acceptance of His role within the divine plan, rather than asserting His equality in a way that challenges the Father's role as the source of the Godhead.
While Novatian’s language reflects relational subordination, it does not imply inequality in nature. His description of the Son as "minor" is tied to the eternal relationship of begottenness, not to an ontological hierarchy. Novatian’s theology is consistent with the later Nicene formulation, which maintains relational subordination (the Son is begotten, not unbegotten) while affirming ontological equality.
Novatian emphasizes the Son’s obedience and relational distinction, he consistently affirms Christ’s deity and equality with the Father in essence. Subordinationism, if present, is only relational and functional, not ontological, making this passage incompatible with Arian or any ontological subordinationist interpretation.
Jerome's translation of the Greek term "ἀρχὴ" in Revelation 3:14 as "prīncipium creaturae Dei" in the Vulgate is highly significant, as it reflects his understanding of the Greek text and the theological implications of the phrase. The Latin word "prīncipium" is a versatile term meaning "beginning," "principle," "source," or "origin." In philosophical and theological contexts, it often conveys the idea of being the foundation or source of something. By choosing "prīncipium," Jerome emphasized Christ's preeminence and foundational role in creation, which aligns with the broader Christological interpretation of Revelation 3:14.
The choice of "prīncipium" highlights Christ as the origin and cause of creation, not merely the first in chronological sequence. This corresponds with other biblical passages, such as Colossians 1:16-17, which describe Christ as the one through whom all things were created and who sustains creation. Jerome’s choice may have been influenced by the need to avoid interpretations that could suggest Christ was a created being. The Arian controversy, which denied the full divinity of Christ, was still fresh in the theological landscape during Jerome’s time. By using "prīncipium," Jerome left room for the understanding of Christ as both the cause and ruler of creation, consistent with Nicene orthodoxy.
Jerome could have chosen from several other Latin terms to render "ἀρχὴ," but each carries specific nuances that would have altered the meaning or emphasis of the phrase:
1. "Initium": “Beginning” in a temporal sense, referring to the start of something. If Jerome had used "initium," it could have suggested a strictly temporal understanding of Christ as the first point in time within creation. This would risk implying that Christ was part of creation rather than its originator or ruler. "Initium" lacks the philosophical depth of "prīncipium" and could be misconstrued as subordinating Christ within creation, aligning with Arian theology.
2. "Prīmōrdium": Refers to the “earliest beginnings” or “primordial state” of something. "Prīmōrdium" would emphasize Christ as the first or earliest part of creation, which could again risk an interpretation aligned with subordinationist or Arian views. While richer than "initium," "prīmōrdium" lacks the connotation of causality or governance inherent in "prīncipium." It could have been misunderstood to mean Christ is merely the first among created beings.
3. "Orīgō": “Origin” or “source,” often emphasizing the point from which something arises. "Orīgō" could have been a plausible alternative, as it conveys the idea of Christ as the source of creation. However, it lacks the sense of preeminence and ruling authority found in "prīncipium." Jerome likely preferred "prīncipium" because it better encapsulated both Christ’s role as the cause of creation and His ongoing authority over it.
4. "Rudīmentum": “First principle” or “rudimentary beginning.” "Rudīmentum" would have emphasized Christ as the basic or formative principle of creation. However, it carries connotations of something undeveloped or primitive, which would be theologically inappropriate. This term would diminish Christ’s full divinity by suggesting an immature or incomplete aspect of His role in creation.
5. "Exōrdium": “Beginning” or “starting point,” with a rhetorical or structural nuance. "Exōrdium" would place emphasis on Christ as the starting point of creation but lacks the metaphysical and authoritative connotations of "prīncipium." This term, like "initium," would focus on temporal beginnings rather than Christ’s ontological primacy and causative role in creation.
"Prīncipium" aligns with the philosophical language of the time, particularly the Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian frameworks adopted by early Christian thinkers. It conveys the idea of a foundational principle that governs and sustains creation. By using "prīncipium," Jerome avoided any language that could imply Christ was merely a creature or had a beginning in time. The Nicene Creed affirms Christ as “begotten, not made,” and "prīncipium" supports this by emphasizing causality and preeminence rather than creation. "Prīncipium" harmonizes with John 1:1-3 and Colossians 1:16-17, which portray Christ as the source of all creation, distinct from created beings.By choosing "prīncipium," Jerome reinforced the Nicene understanding of Christ as the origin and cause of creation. This translation helped clarify that Christ’s relationship to creation was one of authority and causality, not inclusion within it.
It would be worth checking whether the Vetus Latina, made in the 2nd century, also has "principium".
The problem with the language (at least for me), is that in order to avoid ontological distinction the language has to be used almost equivocally, so something and its source are ontologically distinct, generation involves sequential bringing into being, in other words the language all are kinds of causation, now I know that this is what careful theology is avoiding, but the problem I see is that I don't know whats actually being said, I only know the language being used, but the language, being so removed from how the language is generally used, becomes vacuous.
Yes Arius believe the son was a creature (as do I), but I just wish people would be more careful to not say there was a "time" before the Logos for Arius, it's not that important, just a pet peve of mine.
I suppose whether or not Arius believed the Son had a beginning and thus was not eternal depends on what you mean by "beginning."
When it comes to clarity, I understand that theology cannot expel mystery, and shouldn't try to (attempting to expel all mystery ends up in idolatry), any time we are talking about the infinite ground of all being we're going to need intellectual humility. However, when language is being demanded, on pains of heresy, but without the language having any clear content, this isn't mystery, its not apophatism, it's word games. I don't even thing the language is even analogical, because even with analogy you can find what the basic common meaning is, even if the usages of the term have different senses, in terms of generation, or begetting, etc etc ... I don't even know where the analogy is supposed to be.
Roman, I've been reflecting on the terminology, eternal origin. An origin usually implies a beginning and end, but Trinitarians want to argue that the Son has an origin that lacks a beginning and an end since it's supposed to be timeless. That part of the "eternal generation" notion is problematic to me and so is the suggestion that God the Son gets either his essence or existence from the Father. It's difficult for me to understand how a self-existent God derives his essence or existence from another divine person.
Trinitarian theology deliberately uses analogical language, not univocal or equivocal terms, to speak about God. According to Thomas Aquinas, analogical terms allow us to speak truthfully about God while acknowledging the infinite difference between Creator and creature. Terms like "generation" or "begetting" are drawn from human experience but signify realities that transcend finite causation. In human terms, "generation" involves sequential causation and temporal dependency. In the divine context, these features are negated. The Son is eternally begotten, meaning that the Father is always the Father, and the Son is always the Son. There is no "before" or "after" because divine processions occur in eternity, not within time. The Son's "generation" is an eternal act of self-giving within the divine nature. This is why Trinitarian theology affirms that the Son is of the same essence (homoousios) as the Father. Thus, the language is not vacuous but precise in articulating mystery. It avoids the pitfalls of univocal causation (which would imply ontological distinction) while preserving the relational distinction of persons.
The term "origin" in Trinitarian theology does not imply a temporal beginning but a relational distinction. St. Thomas explains that the Father and the Son are distinguished by their relations of origin, which are 1) eternal (the Father's act of generation has no beginning or end because it occurs in eternity) and 2) ontologically unified (the Father generates the Son within the divine essence, so there is no division or subordination). The phrase "eternal generation" affirms that the Son receives His personal identity (not His divine essence) from the Father. The Father is the "principle without principle," while the Son is the "principle from the principle," yet both fully share the same divine nature. As the Council of Florence states: "In God, all things are one where there is no opposition of relation."
Mr. Foster claims it is incoherent for a self-existent God to derive His essence or existence from another person, but this conflates the person of the Son with the essence of God. In Trinitarian theology the divine essence is one and undivided. All three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) fully possess the same divine essence. The Son derives His PERSONAL existence (as Son) from the Father, not His essence. The Son's procession as "begotten" refers to His relation to the Father, not to the origin of the divine essence itself. St. Thomas writes: "Paternity is a relation, and the relation itself is the same as the essence in God, but it distinguishes the persons." The Son's "self-existence" is therefore preserved because He fully possesses the divine essence. His generation concerns personal origin, not essential dependency.
Analogical language does have a common foundation, even if its application differs. In human terms generation refers to the communication of nature (e.g., a father begets a son, sharing his human nature). In divine terms generation refers to the communication of the divine nature. The Father communicates the fullness of the divine essence to the Son without division, temporality, or imperfection. The analogy lies in the act of communication, though the mode is infinitely higher in God. The analogy breaks down only if one insists on importing human limitations (e.g., temporality or dependence) into divine realities. Augustine addressed this concern by emphasizing that while human language is limited, it still communicates truth when purified of creaturely limitations.
While Arius may not have explicitly described a "time" before the Logos, his theology necessarily implies it. Arius held that the Son was not begotten, but created by the Father, and at least implied that there was a moment when the Son "was not." By asserting that the Son is a creature, Arius denies the eternal existence of the Son. The distinction between "created" and "eternal" is categorical—something either always exists or it begins to exist. Thus, Arius’ denial of the Son's co-eternity with the Father leads directly to a temporal understanding of the Son's origin, even if Arius attempted to obscure this point.
The Hollingsworth article mentions that the patristic and medieval thinkers understood the Eternal Relations of Origin (ERO) in terms of causality, specifically Aristotle's efficient causality. But while the patristic fathers occasionally used causal language (e.g., “aitia” or “principium”), it was not causality in the strict Aristotelian sense of "efficient causation" as articulated in contemporary metaphysics. The fathers were careful to avoid notions that would imply temporal succession or ontological subordination. Gregory of Nyssa explicitly stated that causation in the Trinity denotes “a manner of existence” rather than a temporal or ontological dependency: “Cause” and “caused” describe the relational distinction between the Father and Son without implying change or production in the divine nature. Aristotle's efficient cause refers to a process of bringing something into being, which inherently suggests potentiality and actualization—concepts incompatible with God as “actus purus” in classical theism. Hollingsworth conflates patristic causality with a contemporary framework of efficient causation that assumes production, which the fathers explicitly ruled out by affirming God's simplicity and immutability.
According to Hollingsworth the ERO can be described as causal relations without involving temporal succession, citing analogies like the sun and its rays to illustrate this atemporal causation. The analogy of the sun and rays, while helpful for illustrating the simultaneity of divine relations, falls short when applied to causation. The analogy of simultaneous causation (e.g., a widow being caused by her husband’s death) presumes time as a framework, whereas the ERO occurs in eternity, where there is no "before," "after," or even "simultaneity" in temporal terms. Analogies like the sun and its rays are meant to signify the eternal procession without implying causality as understood in created terms. The Son’s generation is described as an eternal act, not as an effect produced by a cause. Aquinas and other scholastics avoided temporal or sequential language to affirm that the relations of origin in the Trinity are intrinsic to the divine nature. The term “causality” is analogical here, referring to relational dependence, not a process of effectuation.
Hollingsworth appears to assert that the Son and Spirit depend on the Father as their cause, which raises concerns about subordinationism or ontological inequality. While the Son and Spirit are relationally FROM the Father (via generation and spiration), they are not ontologically subordinate. Gregory of Nazianzus rejected any hierarchical implications of causality in the Trinity, stating that relational terms like “Father” and “Son” express modes of personal existence within the unity of essence. By framing the ERO in terms of efficient causation, Hollingsworth risks reintroducing notions of dependency and production that the pro-Nicene fathers explicitly rejected.
Hollingsworth mentions contemporary metaphysical theories of causation, such as powers theories, to explain the ERO, but applying these modern causal theories to the ERO risks to undermine the unique character of divine relations. Powers theories assume potentiality within the cause to bring about an effect. This is inapplicable to God, who is purely actual and lacks any potentiality. The Father’s generation of the Son is not an exertion of power but an eternal act intrinsic to the divine essence. Using contemporary metaphysical categories, which are grounded in creaturely experience, risks projecting finite causality onto the divine nature, contradicting the apophatic tradition of patristic theology. Classical theism deliberately refrains from over-specifying the mechanics of ERO to preserve divine mystery. The attempt to "cash out" the ERO in terms of contemporary metaphysical theories undermines the transcendence of God.
Hollingsworth contrasts classical understanding of the divine simplicity with social trinitarian models but neglects that divine simplicity is foundational for understanding the ERO. Without simplicity, the unity of the divine essence is compromised. Classical theism affirms that relational distinctions in the Trinity (e.g., Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten) do not imply composition or multiplicity within the divine essence. This relational framework is not adequately addressed in Hollingsworth’s paper, leading to potential misinterpretations of the ERO as separate "parts" or "agents."
You can spout all the garbage 50 million paragraph essays you like ( how is this constructive dialogue?) no one here buys anything you say… Because you haven’t cited a single source for said claims
Try not to get riled up. Remember that Nincs suffers with autism. Try to view his style of communication through the lens of his disability. People with Aspergers tend not to pick up on the social queues and tend to monologue over one specialist subject and don't realise when others are completely disinterested, or even worse, distasteful of what they have to say. He isn't here to intentionally harm, or at least I wouldn't say so. (Matt 7:1). People on the spectrum tend towards one specialist subject and memorise endless facts on that one topic, without being able to explicate outside of their own memorised scripts they create. Nincs could have had just as much fervour and robotic obsession with trains, or postage stamps dated from the 1800s, however his mind has settled on Roman Catholic dogmatics as his specialist "spectrum" subject. Be grateful that he's here. You'll find no greater human encyclopedia on Catholicism. Use his monologues to strengthen and refine your own position, and gain an insight into the history and development of how the Roman church deviated and became the Babylonish mess it has. But don't take things personally. He is neurodivergent. But he means well.
Thanks for your thoughts, Nincs. Others here do not like you. But I do!
Was there a time that the Church thought that the universe was Eternal having no beginning or ending. And if Jesus is before all other things including the universe than he would be eternal. Well we know the universe is not eternal. So it is not necessary to assume that if Jesus who existed before it would also have to be Eternal with the Father. So no it is not necessary. Proverbs 8:30 tells us he Jesus became the "Master Craftsman" ( NAB quote) "Master Worker" (NWT quote) this bring to like that Jesus was involved in creation but he was not the designer, Jehovah is. Jehovah produce/possessed the one who would become known as the son of God. Words of course change meaning as time goes by. No one will argue with that. Etymology meaning of possess to hold in the form of owning. If you own a slave they are not your equal. Eternal Generation is also not biblical it is a made up term from some ignorant person. Ignorant of the creator and his word the bible. True you can argue against the Idea of the expression Ignorant, but that doesn't change the fact that eternal generating is not found in the bible. To say that this is the way it is being explained does not mean it is correct either it just means that is the thought process that was used to explain it to the challengers of the teaching of Christians. Who should have just went with the bible says... And left it at that. The bible makes complete sense and with the holy spirit help who Jesus said he would send it is completely understood. There are no mysteries. Any religion who relies on mysteries to control the masses is corrupt.
Yep, we “neuro-normals” are party to non PC, emotionally loaded language at times. It procured my desired result, however. You responded in a more humane and non-robotic way. You do “suffer” with autism, my friend. Albeit you claim, and apparently, not consciously. Emotional and non-verbal communication marks a large percentage of the interpersonal world, a world I imagine you find yourself inept at participating in naturally and with meaning. That can’t be easy for you. Your retention of and ability to recall information is remarkable, but what your brain filters out as “noise” might actually be the keynote address. Sorry you missed it. Whether “the church” (whatever men claim that to be) deviated from the Truth is not the point. Neither is our correct understanding and mental application of the philosophical language of dead men the point, either. Perhaps one day you’ll realise. Perhaps not.
Finally, you state that your rhetoric and long verbiage is not self-serving, then proceed to boast in its benefits to you as an individual in a courtroom setting. I can assure you that it doesn’t serve the vast majority of us. If it isn’t serving your audience, (and that’s us, by the way), who else could it possibly be serving? The “Church” perhaps? It only serves you, my friend. People on the spectrum get blind-sided all the time at the subtle nuances apparent to everyone else but them. The positive reinforcement you get due to its benefitting your career should not negate the fact that that has a very limited range of applications as to its strengths and usually in only specialised fields. Commenting on blogposts where no one likes you and no-one wants to hear your opinion is a prime example of your autism causing you to come across as ego dominant and emotionally avoidant in attachment style. You may not consciously have intended to be, but you do present that way, sorry.
Too clarify - I do not dislike Ninc as a person.. I have said before they are lovely ( multiple times in fact) And tho it may seem I’m getting frustrated or whatever, I’m not - I’m more blunt in text generally, look at my engagements with anyone on this blog - very similar rhetoric, Ninc fails to answer any challenge posed to their position, so I’m even more blunt with him. What I do disagree with as follows
- posting 50+ paragraph essays when people have asked them to stop doing so ( I count at least 6 seperate times ) I know about autism, it runs in my family - this is NOT a social que tho - this is an EXPLICIT request of which has neither been responded to nor adhered to.
- accusing others of “quote mining” when they themselves proceed to basically say Catholic way is the only right way, while omitting AUTHORITY on the subject. I.e BDAG on Rev 3:14 - why can’t Ninc just accept that “beginning” likely means first-created”? Or that firstborn always has a temporal meaning? While citing no sources of their own ( when they have been very misleading on certain topics as I have pointed out and added context to.)
- selective uses of philosophical meanings.. we are to take the philosophical meaning to “beginning” as first cause or “principal” but when it comes to Col 2:9 suddenly the vulgate and said meanings are omitted. because they don’t suit the rhetoric being used.
- failing to mention certain details that are quite important to the topic being discussed. I.e we are talking about the word “principle” and what it means.. I’ll just point out in the vulgate it is also used at Job 40:19 of a creature Ninc cannot go and suddenly change the meaning to the word without valid linguistical evidence on why the change in meaning. Theology does not count as evidence.
- consistent misuse of scriptures such as John 1:1A to talk about Logos eternity ( which it does not mention) it’s simply says he was “in the beginning” This would not stop him existing before the start of creation. As Justin martyr takes firstborn of creation to mean “begotten BEFORE creatures” but he never discusses eternity as Ninc would like to make out.
Again I’m by no means frustrated - more curious as to why we MUST accept the catholic tradition - but when linguistic points are bought up or requested they MUST fit in with catholic theology because it has been around for 2000 years.. There has been traditions that were wrong that were around for decades.. there are variants that came about in the 4th century that are interesting as they take away any implication of a “created”Christ, interesting because Clement uses word that Ninc say are the opposite in meaning but Clement before the 4th century uses them interchangeably. So does the bible
Wish I had more time to explain my thoughts but that’s it from me for now, again I’m NOT frustrated and mean no disrespect to Ninc - but my crotons is simply: evaluate your methods and don’t copy paste the same text over and over without having a valid reason besides preferred theology as to what is correct and not
Historically, the Catholic Church has never officially taught that the universe is eternal. The Church has always held that creation had a beginning, as affirmed in Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” This belief aligns with the doctrine of “creatio ex nihilo” (creation out of nothing), which was explicitly defended by early Church Fathers such as Augustine and later reaffirmed by theologians like Thomas Aquinas. According to the Fourth Lateran Council God is “creator of all visible and invisible things, of the spiritual and of the corporal; who by His own omnipotent power at once FROM THE BEGINNING OF TIME created each creature from nothing, spiritual, and corporal, namely, angelic and mundane, and finally the human, constituted as it were, alike of the spirit and the body.” Philosophical debates about the eternity of the universe, such as those between Aristotle and medieval Islamic philosophers, were engaged with by the Church, but the theological teaching has remained consistent: the universe is not eternal.
You claim it is unnecessary to assume Jesus is eternal if He existed before the universe. However, Scripture explicitly attributes eternality to Jesus. Proverbs 8:30 personifies wisdom as a “master craftsman” (“amos” in Hebrew). While early Christians sometimes used Proverbs 8 to describe Jesus as divine Wisdom, this text is metaphorical and cannot be taken as a literal account of Christ's origin. The Bible teaches that Christ’s divine nature is eternal and uncreated (John 1:1–3; Hebrews 1:2–3). Proverbs 8 is better understood in the context of Hebrew poetry, which personifies abstract concepts.
The idea that Jehovah "produced" or "possessed" Jesus misunderstands the metaphorical language of Proverbs 8. The Hebrew verb QANAH can mean "possess" or "create," but in the context of divine Wisdom, it refers to a relationship of ownership, not literal creation. Early Church Fathers recognized this distinction, clarifying that Jesus is not a created being.
While the specific term "eternal generation" does not appear in Scripture, the doctrine it describes is biblical. John 1:14, 18 speaks of Jesus as the "only begotten Son" (monogenēs), which the Church has interpreted as referring to the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son. The Nicene Creed, which affirmed the doctrine of eternal generation, was not "made up" by ignorant individuals but was a theological synthesis of Scripture, addressing heresies like Arianism. This creed is rooted in passages such as John 5:26, which speaks of the Father giving the Son life in Himself.
The assertion that "there are no mysteries" contradicts Scripture itself. For example, 1 Timothy 3:16 calls the incarnation of Christ a "great mystery." Additionally, Romans 11:33–36 speaks of the depth of God's wisdom and knowledge as beyond human comprehension. Mystery in Christianity does not mean irrationality but refers to truths revealed by God that surpass finite human understanding. The Trinity, for example, is a mystery not because it is illogical but because it pertains to the infinite nature of God.
The claim that religions relying on mysteries are corrupt misunderstands the role of mystery in faith. Christianity does not use mystery to "control" but to invite believers into deeper communion with God. Ephesians 3:9 speaks of "the mystery hidden for ages in God," which has now been revealed through Christ. Jesus Himself used parables and taught profound spiritual truths, not to obscure but to reveal to those willing to receive (Matthew 13:10–17).
The accusation of "quote mining" is not about differing theological conclusions but about selectively presenting evidence in a way that misrepresents the broader context. For example, when I address Revelation 3:14, I have acknowledged different scholarly opinions, including interpretations like “first-created,” but I provide reasons why they are not linguistically or contextually robust when weighed against broader scriptural and theological evidence. BDAG, while respected, does not offer the sole authoritative voice on this matter—it is one of many resources. Revelation 3:14 (ἀρχή) is contextually consistent with meanings like “source” or “origin,” as seen in both scriptural and extra-biblical usage. The idea that it “likely means first-created” overlooks the broader semantic range and fails to reconcile this with passages like John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16-17, where Christ is depicted as the Creator, not part of creation. Regarding “firstborn,” scholarly sources—including BDAG—recognize both temporal and positional (preeminence) meanings. It is disingenuous to claim that “firstborn” ALWAYS carries a temporal connotation.
"Selective use of philosophical meanings, applying them to 'beginning' as 'first cause,' but ignoring them in Colossians 2:9."
This is a straw man argument. Philosophical meanings are employed where they are appropriate to the linguistic and theological context, not selectively. For example: In Revelation 3:14, the meaning of "ἀρχή" as “origin” or “source” aligns with the Johannine context and Christ's role as Creator (John 1:3, Colossians 1:16). This is consistent with philosophical and theological traditions that highlight Christ’s causative role in creation. Colossians 2:9 ("in him the fullness of deity dwells bodily") does not require reinterpretation in light of philosophical definitions. The text clearly affirms the ontological divinity of Christ, not simply a functional or derivative sense of divinity. The theological implications do not undermine the lexical integrity of the text.
"Failing to mention important details, like 'principle' in the Vulgate being used of a creature in Job 40:19."
The Vulgate's use of “principium” (or its variants) in Job 40:19 is irrelevant to the discussion of Revelation 3:14. Lexical meanings vary across contexts. For example in Job 40:19, “principium” refers to a "chief" or "foremost" position among created beings (in this case, Behemoth). This is a different context and does not inform how “principium” is used in Revelation 3:14. In Revelation 3:14, the context describes Christ's relationship to creation as its source or origin. This distinction is linguistically and theologically justified by parallel passages (e.g., John 1:3; Colossians 1:16-17). It is a false equivalence to conflate the two usages without addressing contextual differences.
"Misusing John 1:1 to discuss the Logos' eternity, which it does not mention—it only says he was 'in the beginning.'"
This accusation misunderstands both the text and the argument. John 1:1 explicitly affirms the eternal existence of the Logos. The phrase "Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος" (In the beginning was the Word) uses the imperfect verb "ἦν" (was), which indicates ongoing, continuous existence prior to the beginning of creation. This contrasts with "ἐγένετο" (came into being), used for created things in John 1:3. Early Church Fathers like Justin Martyr may describe the Logos as "begotten before all creation," but this is consistent with Nicene theology, which affirms the eternal generation of the Son. Justin does not deny the eternity of the Logos but focuses on His relationship to the Father and creation.
"We must accept the Catholic tradition, and linguistic points must fit Catholic theology."
This is a misrepresentation. My arguments are not predicated solely on Catholic tradition but on a holistic approach that integrates linguistic, contextual, and theological evidence. Linguistically, words like ἀρχή and πρωτότοκος (firstborn) are analyzed within their immediate and broader scriptural contexts. Theological conclusions are drawn based on how these terms function in the text, not imposed arbitrarily. Catholic tradition is cited where it aligns with the text and supports interpretations grounded in early Christian exegesis. This does not negate the need for robust linguistic analysis but highlights the consistency of theological understanding across centuries.
"Clement and others use words interchangeably that contradict Nicene theology."
Clement of Alexandria and other early writers often use terms like "Logos" or "Wisdom" with flexibility, reflecting the developing articulation of Christology. However the pre-Nicene Fathers, while sometimes imprecise, consistently affirm Christ’s divinity and unique role in creation. Any apparent contradictions are better understood as differences in terminology rather than substance. Nicene theology represents the formal clarification of these earlier insights, addressing ambiguities and ensuring consistency with the apostolic faith.
Proverbs 8:30, describing Wisdom as a “Master Worker,” does not negate Christ’s eternal existence but illustrates His active role in creation as the divine Logos. This passage uses personified Wisdom as a metaphor to describe God’s creative action, later identified with Christ in the New Testament (1 Corinthians 1:24). While Proverbs 8 personifies Wisdom as a "master worker," this does not reduce Christ to a subordinate role in creation. Instead, it highlights His intimate participation as Creator. The “Master Worker” imagery in Proverbs 8:30 reflects the active role of Wisdom (Christ) in creation but does not imply ontological subordination or that He is a creature. It demonstrates His cooperation with the Father in the act of creation.
“If you own a slave, they are not your equal."
This analogy is both theologically and logically flawed. While the Father is the source of the Son (eternal generation), this does not imply inequality or inferiority. The doctrine of the Trinity explicitly teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are coequal and coeternal. Philippians 2:6 states that Christ “did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped,” implying that He already possessed this equality and did not cling to it for personal advantage. The voluntary submission of the Son in the Incarnation does not negate His ontological equality with the Father.
"Eternal generation is not biblical; it is a made-up term by an ignorant person."
The doctrine of eternal generation is firmly rooted in Scripture and was articulated by the Church Fathers to explain the relationship between the Father and the Son. It asserts that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, emphasizing their unity and distinction within the Godhead.
John 1:18: “The only begotten Son [μονογενὴς υἱός], who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him.” The term "begotten" (μονογενής) refers to a unique and eternal relationship, not a temporal event.
Psalm 2:7: “You are My Son; today I have begotten You.” This verse is applied to Christ in Acts 13:33 and Hebrews 1:5, emphasizing His divine sonship.
Far from being a “made-up term,” eternal generation clarifies the biblical teaching that the Son is distinct from the Father but shares the same divine essence. It was articulated to combat heresies like Arianism, which claimed Christ was a created being.
"There are no mysteries. Any religion that relies on mysteries to control the masses is corrupt."
The claim that “there are no mysteries” contradicts both Scripture and Christian theology:
1 Timothy 3:16: “Great indeed, we confess, is the mystery of godliness: He was manifested in the flesh…” The Incarnation itself is described as a “mystery.”
Colossians 2:2-3 speaks of “God’s mystery, which is Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”
The concept of mystery in Christianity is not about “controlling the masses” but about the recognition that finite human minds cannot fully comprehend the infinite nature of God. The Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection are mysteries in the sense that they transcend human understanding, yet they are revealed truths that invite faith.
"Christians should have just gone with what the Bible says and left it at that."
This claim oversimplifies the role of theology and tradition. The Bible itself does not claim to be a self-interpreting document; rather, it presupposes the need for authoritative interpretation:
Acts 8:30-31: When the Ethiopian eunuch reads Isaiah, Philip asks, “Do you understand what you are reading?” The eunuch replies, “How can I, unless someone guides me?”
2 Peter 3:16 warns that Paul’s writings contain things “hard to understand,” which some twist to their destruction. This demonstrates the need for sound interpretation.
The early Church relied on both Scripture and apostolic tradition to combat heresies and clarify doctrine. The Nicene Creed, for example, was formulated to articulate the biblical truth of Christ’s divinity against Arian distortions.
Dear Nincsnevem, I'm willing to discuss the Trinity, but may we please not retread the same ground of qanah here and other topics we've covered before. Can we approach these issues differently and have constructive dialogue in the waning weeks of blog discussion here? Thank you.
I think you're misconstruing my character in everyday life, in an everyday situation I'm absolutely capable of casual conversation, friendships and healthy family relationships, and the like, so I'm a classic "high-functioning" one. Fortunately, my condition falls into the mild category, I enjoy the benefits and suffer only minor disadvantages, at least in my adult life.
But people like me rigidly separate life situations: if I'm talking to my friends now, I'm operating in "social" mode. If I'm talking about law, philosophy, theology etc., then the "social function" is turned off.
Then there are only arguments in their reality, and there's no personal aspect: there's no such thing as whether you're a good or likeable person, or whether your presentation style is catchy or not. All of this is just "noise" to me. I just look at what claim my debate partner is making in his post, what arguments he uses to support it, and I only respond to that, nothing else.
Is my argument effective in persuading? I don't believe that someone's deeply held beliefs can be changed by a few comments - no matter how good the content AND style - and I don't set such unrealistic goals. The realistic goal is that the other party might reconsider my arguments, and if I've convinced them that their view is not as clear-cut as they thought, then my contribution has been successful.
“the philosophical language of dead men”
Oh those "Dead White Males", huh? Leaving aside the academic (though more ideological) "debate" about it in the US (which I am fortunately far from), are you familiar with the term chronolatry? Metaphysical language is not some false imaginary concept detached from reality, used to build castles in the air. Good philosophy is really nothing more than common sense on a higher level.
"that has a very limited range of applications as to its strengths and usually in only specialised fields."
This is indeed true, but the field we are working on here is exactly one of those “specialised fields”. Or at least it should be, but most theological discussions degenerate into a primitive jab and trump cards like "pedophile priests and the Inquisition" (which is the reductio ad Hitlerum of theological discussions). What I like about commenting here is that there is much less from those stuff, so there's much less “noise”.
"ego dominant" - This is a common but completely unfounded accusation against people like me that they seem like conceited "smartass", but in reality, high functioning people on the spectrum have no ego complexes, are not narcissistic (on the contrary: many of them actually struggle with a lack of self-confidence even if they have achieved a lot), and even remove their own person from the picture when they argue.
I am not the one speaking, my arguments are. I am just a mouth, a pen (or keyboard), my person, personality, identity, etc. are all irrelevant. If what I say is true and correct, then it is, if it is not, then it is not, and nothing else matters.
“ but about selectively presenting evidence in a way that misrepresents the broader context. “ - where have any of us quote mined? Cite the discussion and extract and explain how it was used out of its context ( opinions do not count)
“ Christ's relationship to creation as its source or origin.” - but Christ isn’t the source of creation is he? The father is. As the church fathers claim.
“ It is disingenuous to claim that “firstborn” ALWAYS carries a temporal connotation.” - please cite the exception where it is not possible for firstborn to have a temporal aspect in some sense of the word It’s not.. all cases whether literal or figurative carry a temporal aspect to them.
“ Philosophical meanings are employed where they are appropriate to the linguistic and theological context”- philosophical meanings are NEVER employed by bible writers. You simply employ them when YOU deem fit. Beginning NEVER denotes authorship according to Barnes Beginning in a genitive construction always denotes a sequence And job 40:19 is referenced as a parallel quality commonly by dictionaries, scholars and commentaries alike… so your justification on this isn’t valid as there are highly educated people who do it… this is simply avoiding the inevitable
“ Any apparent contradictions are better understood as differences in terminology rather than substance.” - Clement uses first-created and firstborn interchangeably you cannot get around this fact. You wanted an instance of Logos being called first-created, you got it - you can’t go changing the goal posts now.
“ uses the imperfect verb "ἦν" (was), which indicates ongoing, continuous existence prior to the beginning ” - this is what you WANT it too mean.. it is possible it means from the beginning onwards to now. And as Robertson has said it could be understood to simply mean he existed at that time.. with NO indication to length of time. And in the beginning became the word sounds goofy in English and even more so in Greek.
The accusation of quote mining was specifically in reference to the selective use of patristic texts and scriptural citations to support a non-Trinitarian view while ignoring the broader context of these sources. For instance the writings of Clement of Alexandria are often cited to argue that he used "first-created" for Christ, but the broader context shows that Clement affirmed Christ’s divine pre-existence and role in creation as the Logos. When he uses terms like "first-created," it is metaphorical or poetic, used for the Wisdom, without making a claim that the preexistent Son was a literally “ex nihilo” created being. Similarly, citing Proverbs 8:22 without acknowledging that many Church Fathers understood "ektisen” in a metaphorical sense rather than a literal one misrepresents their overall theology. Figures like Dionysius of Rome and Athanasius explicitly clarified that this verse refers to Christ’s role as Wisdom, begotten, not created. If the quotes were genuinely contextualized, they would not lead to conclusions that contradict the Nicene Creed or the consensus of the early Church Fathers.
"Christ isn’t the source of creation, is he? The Father is. As the church fathers claim."
This is a false dichotomy. The Church Fathers consistently affirmed that the Father is the source WITHIN the Trinity, but creation is mediated THROUGH the Son. This is clear in both Scripture and patristic theology:
John 1:3: “All things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made.” The Son (the Logos) is the agent through whom the Father creates all things.
Colossians 1:16-17: “For by Him all things were created, in heaven and on earth… all things were created through Him and for Him.”
“for the Word was the author of form and beginning to all the Æons that came into existence after Him.” (Irenaeus)
“The Father creates all things through Him, and He Himself is not created but is the Creator.” (Athanasius)
The Father’s role as the source does not diminish the Son’s active participation as Creator. Both roles are complementary within the Trinitarian framework. To deny that Christ is the source of creation in this mediated sense directly contradicts the testimony of Scripture and the theological writings of the early Church.
"Please cite the exception where it is not possible for firstborn to have a temporal aspect in some sense of the word."
The claim that “firstborn” always carries a temporal meaning is incorrect. There are clear instances where "firstborn" (πρωτότοκος) denotes preeminence or rank rather than chronology. "The firstborn of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως) does not indicate temporal sequence but preeminence over creation. This is clarified in the immediate context: “so that in everything He might be preeminent” (Col. 1:18). If Paul meant “first-created,” he would have used the term πρωτόκτιστος (first-created), which he deliberately avoided. Psalm 89:27: Referring to King David, God says, “I will make him the firstborn, the highest of the kings of the earth.” Here, “firstborn” clearly denotes rank and preeminence, not literal birth order or creation. The temporal aspect in "firstborn" is context-dependent and does not universally apply. When applied to Christ, it signifies His supremacy and authority over all creation, consistent with His divine nature.
"Philosophical meanings are NEVER employed by Bible writers. You simply employ them when YOU deem fit. Beginning NEVER denotes authorship according to Barnes."
The assertion that philosophical meanings are never employed by biblical writers is baseless. The Gospel of John, especially in the prologue (John 1:1-18), employs the term "Logos" (λόγος), which carries deep philosophical significance in Greek thought, including in Philo of Alexandria and Stoicism. John uses this term to communicate profound theological truths about Christ’s divine nature and preexistence to both Jewish and Hellenistic audiences. The claim that “beginning” (ἀρχή) “never” (?) denotes authorship is demonstrably false. In Revelation 3:14, the term ἀρχή can indeed mean “origin” or “source,” as recognized by reputable lexicons (e.g., BDAG). This interpretation aligns with John’s broader theology, which presents Christ as the agent of creation (John 1:3). The citation of Job 40:19 (“He is the first of the works of God”) as a parallel is misleading. The context refers to a creature (Behemoth) as the pinnacle of God’s creation, whereas Revelation 3:14 refers to Christ’s divine role in creation. The contexts are entirely different, and the linguistic parallel fails.
"Clement uses first-created and firstborn interchangeably; you cannot get around this fact."
This claim misrepresents Clement’s writings. Clement uses terms like "first-created" for the Wisdom (not Christ) in a metaphorical or poetic sense. However, Clement affirms Christ’s divinity and preexistence, and explicitly describes the Logos as eternal and uncreated (Fragments, Part I, section III). The use of "first-created" in certain context does not negate their broader theology, which affirms Christ’s divine nature. The Church Fathers often employed figurative language to communicate theological truths, but this language must be interpreted in light of their consistent affirmation of Christ’s co-eternality with the Father.
________________________________________ Imperfect Verb "ἦν": "This is what you WANT it to mean. It is possible it means from the beginning onwards to now."
The interpretation of "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 is not a matter of subjective desire but linguistic and grammatical evidence. The use of the imperfect verb "ἦν" indicates continuous, ongoing existence without reference to a starting point. This contrasts with "ἐγένετο" (came into being), used for created things in John 1:3. The Logos is distinguished from creation because He always “was” rather than “became”. Renowned Greek grammarians, such as A.T. Robertson, affirm the interpretation, that the use of the imperfect tense emphasizes the timeless existence of the Logos before creation. The suggestion that "ἦν" could mean "from the beginning onwards to now" contradicts the context of John 1:1, which explicitly distinguishes the eternal Logos from temporal creation.
“All ye who are looking for a man’s many words, understand the One Word of God, “In the beginning was the Word.” Now, “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth.” But, “The Word was,” since we have heard, “In the beginning God made.” Acknowledge we in Him the Creator; for Creator is He who made; and the creature what He made. For no creature which was made “was,” as God the Word “was,” by whom it was made, always. […] Look not for time in Him, by whom times were made. “The Word was.” But you say, “There was a time that the Word was not.” You say falsely; nowhere do you read this. But I do read for you, “In the beginning was the Word.” What look you for before the beginning? But if you should be able to find anything before the beginning, this will be the beginning. He is mad who looks for anything before the beginning. What then doth he say was before the beginning? “In the beginning was the Word.” But you will say, “The Father both ‘was,’ and was before the Word.” What are you looking for? “In the beginning was the Word.” What you find, understand; seek not for what you are not able to find. Nothing is before the beginning.” (Augustine, https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf106.vii.lxx.html )
Edgar I have sent you a message on Academia (just notifying)
" If Paul meant “first-created,” he would have used the term πρωτόκτιστος (first-created), which he deliberately avoided." - yes, because it wasnt in common use in Pauls time... and even if Paul did use it - would you then admit Christ is creation? no
" However, Clement affirms Christ’s divinity and preexistence, and explicitly describes the Logos as eternal and uncreated " - I don't have all the proof I need yet but quote me verbatum where I say Christ did not pre-exist or I deny his "divinity" (whatever that means to you...) Do you know how eternity works it works in 2 directions you know, not one like you would try to make out.
" Psalm 89:27: Referring to King David, God says, “I will make him the firstborn, the highest of the kings of the earth.” Here, “firstborn” clearly denotes rank and preeminence, not literal birth order or creation. " - shall we ask academic experts whether it has a temporal meaning, I can cite 3 different sources right now that connect it with a temporal meaning.
"The suggestion that "ἦν" could mean "from the beginning onwards to now" contradicts the context of John 1:1, which explicitly distinguishes the eternal Logos from temporal creation." - how? on linguistic grounds it says he existed in the beginning until right now - saying nothing about the backwards implications..
"The claim that “beginning” (ἀρχή) “never” (?) denotes authorship is demonstrably false. In Revelation 3:14, the term ἀρχή can indeed mean “origin” or “source,” as recognized by reputable lexicons (e.g., BDAG). " - again shall we ask academic experts in the field, BDAG negates this with its "PROBABLE" comment - citing Job 40:19 "The context refers to a creature (Behemoth) as the pinnacle of God’s creation, whereas Revelation 3:14 refers to Christ’s divine role in creation. The contexts are entirely different, and the linguistic parallel fails." - The author of BDAG disagrees... the context of Rev 3:14 says NOTHING about the meaning to the word.. (Allin was honest in that regard) see Barnes commentary for the reference, he said it. im just quoting him.
you give alot of opinions not alot of facts (as shown by actaul academically credible sources)
"The assertion that philosophical meanings are never employed by biblical writers is baseless." - employing a term vs using a meaning to a word 90% of the population wouldn't use are 2 totally different things.. Logos is used as a title Come on, your not that dense. you know what I meant, this is willfull ignorance at this point
"This is clarified in the immediate context: “so that in everything He might be preeminent” (Col. 1:18)" - this still has temporal significance tho... as Augustine points out.. God is before all - so is "pre- eminent" (Whatever that means to you) "Before" - being the temporal modifier
" For instance the writings of Clement of Alexandria are often cited to argue that he used "first-created" for Christ, but the broader context shows that Clement affirmed Christ’s divine pre-existence and role in creation as the Logos. " - Clement uses Logs and Wisdom interchangably, there is no evidence otherwise (if you actaully did the study, you would know this) if you have evidence cite it
"citing Proverbs 8:22 without acknowledging that many Church Fathers understood "ektisen” in a metaphorical sense rather than a literal one misrepresents their overall theology. " - you mean in both cases it misrepresents YOUR theology, it has been proved they DID NOT hold the same trinitarian stance as you do today.. ofcourse this is now suddenly metaphorical... Where's your hard proof? We know texts were tampered with... it is not impossible that trinitarian rhetoric dominated.. any manuscripts we have would naturally be (any greek ones we have aswell, I would love to know how early they are, down to the estimated year)
okay so I [allegedly] quote mined fine (no one else has EVER accused me of this before..) anyone else?
"came into existence after Him.” (Irenaeus)" - ? it appears he is saying first the Son came into existence then everything else Ireanus is unreliable to your cause - this is selective quoting
"Figures like Dionysius of Rome and Athanasius explicitly clarified that this verse refers to Christ’s role as Wisdom, begotten, not created. " - So now Wisdom is a role (not a typology)? Can we have more than just staunch trinitarians - How about some more neutrals - Atha cant really be trusted IMO (see Stafford's cited sources)
"begotten" (in my study) seems to be the first and direct [something] without an intermediatory agent The only exception I can find being Paul. But I have a working theory on that.
The verb "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 is in the imperfect tense, which indicates continuous or ongoing action in the past. Unlike the aorist (which would indicate a specific event or moment), the imperfect suggests that the Logos' existence was continuous and unbounded prior to the "beginning." The distinction is clear in John 1:3, where "ἐγένετο" (came into being) is used for created things. This shows John's intentionality in contrasting the eternal existence of the Logos with the temporality of creation.
You reference other uses of "ἦν" in John, implying it does not always mean eternal existence. However, the contextual use in 1:1 is unique because it pertains to the Logos' existence "in the beginning." The phrase "Ἐν ἀρχῇ" refers to the absolute beginning, paralleling Genesis 1:1, where God exists prior to creation.
So it is not the verb "ἦν" itself that is said to not have a starting point, but 1. This statement is made "Ἐν ἀρχῇ", in parallel with Genesis 1:1 2. From the solemn and essentially doctrinal nature of the prologue, where this statement is made
In passages like John 1:4 ("In Him was life"), the verb describes a present attribute of the Logos, not His eternal preexistence. The context clarifies its nuanced application.
Early theologians like Augustine emphasized the eternal nature of the Logos in John 1:1. Augustine stated, "The Word was…what do you seek before the beginning? He was." This underscores the theological consensus that "ἦν" denotes eternal, uncreated existence.
The objection fails to account for the intentional contrast between "ἦν" and "ἐγένετο" in John 1. Created beings "came into being" (ἐγένετο), while the Logos "was" (ἦν). This linguistic distinction is deliberate, underscoring the Logos' uncreated and eternal nature.
Scholars like A.T. Robertson and Daniel Wallace affirm that "ἦν" in John 1:1 denotes timeless existence. Robertson notes that the verb implies the Word's eternal being, distinct from temporal creation.
If "ἦν" in John 1:1 merely referred to the Logos existing "from the beginning onwards," it would fail to distinguish the Logos from created beings. By using "ἦν," John asserts that the Logos preexists the "beginning" itself, affirming His divine nature and coeternity with the Father.
If Jehovah's Witnesses were correct, then John 1:1a should read:
1. "en archē epoiēsen ho theos ton huión"
or
2. "en archē ektisen ho theos ton huión"
or at very least
3. "en archē eɡéneto ho huiós"
Using „epoiēsen” or „ektisen” mean „created”, and this would imply that the Son (ho huios) was a created being, aligning with the Arian view that Jesus is not eternal but was created by God. The verb „egeneto” means "became" or "came into being." This would imply a point in time when the Son did not exist and then began to exist, supporting a creationist Christology. None of these reconstructions reflect the original Greek text of John 1:1, which explicitly uses the imperfect verb "ēn", meaning "was." This verb indicates continuous existence without a starting point.
The absence of the term "πρωτόκτιστος" (first-created) in Paul’s writings is not due to a lack of vocabulary but a deliberate choice to avoid associating Christ with creation. If Paul intended to say that Christ was "first-created," the term πρωτόκτιστος would have been an available and clear choice. Instead, Paul used "πρωτότοκος" (firstborn) to emphasize Christ’s preeminence, not His creation. Even if the term πρωτόκτιστος were used hypothetically, its meaning would still need to be contextualized within Paul’s theology. Paul’s Christology (e.g., Colossians 1:15-18, Philippians 2:6-11) consistently portrays Christ as preexistent and divine, not as part of creation. Therefore, your speculation about admitting Christ as a creature even if πρωτόκτιστος were used is moot since the broader Pauline context explicitly denies it.
The phrase “I will make him the firstborn” (Psalm 89:27) clearly refers to David’s kingly preeminence, not his literal birth order or creation. The temporal element here is secondary and subordinate to the emphasis on rank and authority.In biblical usage, "firstborn" often denotes preeminence rather than chronology. For example in Exodus 4:22 Israel is called God’s “firstborn,” signifying its chosen status, not temporal primacy. In Romans 8:29 Christ is described as the “firstborn among many brothers,” emphasizing His role and authority in redemption, not a literal birth order. While certain sources may point out a temporal element, this does not negate the primary emphasis on rank, as evidenced by the consistent biblical context.
The imperfect verb "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 indicates continuous existence without a starting point. Greek grammarians and lexicons consistently affirm this interpretation (e.g., A.T. Robertson, Wallace). It is not limited to temporal linearity as suggested. The juxtaposition of "ἦν" (was) for the Logos and "ἐγένετο" (came into being) for creation in John 1:3 underscores the distinction between the eternal preexistence of the Logos and the temporal origin of creation. This is a linguistic distinction that cannot be dismissed.
BDAG also acknowledges that “ἀρχή” in Revelation 3:14 can mean “origin” or “source.” While it notes the possibility of a temporal meaning (as in Job 40:19), the specific application to Christ in Revelation 3:14 aligns better with the interpretation of "source" or "origin" given the broader Johannine context (e.g., John 1:3, Colossians 1:15-18). The use of “ἀρχή” in Job 40:19 to describe Behemoth as the "chief" of God’s works does not equate to its use in Revelation 3:14. The latter explicitly refers to Christ's role in creation, consistent with the Johannine theme of the Logos as the agent of creation. The broader context of Revelation emphasizes Christ’s authority and divine role (e.g., Revelation 1:17-18, 5:13-14). Applying a purely temporal interpretation to "ἀρχή" in Revelation 3:14 would contradict this overarching theme.
The term “Logos” in John 1:1 undeniably draws on Hellenistic philosophical concepts, particularly as developed by Philo of Alexandria. While John adapts the term to express Christian theology, its philosophical implications cannot be dismissed as irrelevant or inaccessible. The Bible frequently employs terms and concepts with philosophical or theological depth, as seen in Paul’s use of “stoicheia” (elementary principles) in Galatians 4:3 and Colossians 2:8, or the author of Hebrews’ use of Platonic imagery (e.g., shadows and heavenly realities in Hebrews 8:5, 10:1).
Many early Church Fathers (e.g., Athanasius, Augustine) explicitly interpreted Proverbs 8:22 metaphorically, understanding "created" (ektise) as referring to Christ’s incarnation or role as Wisdom, not His ontological status as a creature. Claims of text tampering lack substantiation. The Greek Septuagint (LXX) predates the Trinitarian controversies, and its use of "ektise" in Proverbs 8:22 reflects the translators’ attempt to convey the Hebrew term "qanah" (acquire) in a way consistent with its broader semantic range. Irenaeus explicitly affirms Christ’s eternal generation from the Father and His role as Creator, misrepresenting Irenaeus to support a temporal creation of Christ ignores his consistent affirmation of Christ’s divine nature and preexistence.
The term πρωτοκτίστος appears in Clement's Stromata (5.14.89.5), where he refers to Wisdom (Sophia) by this term. You argue that this suggests Clement viewed the Logos as a created entity. However Clement explicitly distinguishes between Wisdom as an attribute or operation of God (used metaphorically in Proverbs 8:22) and the eternal Logos. The use of "first-created" here likely refers to a poetic or figurative description, not a literal ontological status. Clement is not asserting that the Logos was created but rather emphasizing the primacy of divine wisdom in creation's order. Clement adopts allegorical language to explain scriptural passages. His philosophical approach often borrows terminology from Greek thought while reinterpreting it within a Christian framework, distancing himself from literalist interpretations. In Stromata 5.12, Clement declares that God is without parts and indivisible, and the Logos shares in this divine simplicity. He writes that the Logos emanates eternally from the "bosom of the Father," illustrating the consubstantial and eternal nature of the Logos(Stromata).
Clement's opposition to Gnostic emanation theories is significant. He refutes the idea that creation is an emanation of God's essence (common in Gnostic thought). Instead, he defends the distinction between Creator and creation, affirming creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing), which underscores the eternal and uncreated nature of the Logos. Clement often uses the term "first-born" (πρωτότοκος) to describe the Logos, following biblical language (Colossians 1:15). This term refers to Christ's pre-eminence and unique relationship with creation rather than a chronological sequence of being created. By identifying the Logos as "first-born," Clement aligns with Pauline Christology, affirming Christ's role as the agent of creation while maintaining His divine pre-existence.
Clement emphasizes that scriptural language often uses anthropomorphic and accommodative expressions to describe God in ways humans can comprehend. Passages referring to Christ as "first-created" or "Wisdom" are interpreted metaphorically or allegorically, not literally. Clement's writings have been misinterpreted post-Nicene, as noted by theologians like Photios. However, these misinterpretations arise from isolating terms without contextualizing them within Clement's broader theological framework. The concept of Christ's preexistence is incompatible with a purely temporal interpretation of "firstborn" or "beginning." Clement's writings describe the Logos as eternal, not subject to time or creation, which undermines any claim that Clement saw Christ as a creature.
By the way, the term πρωτοκτίστος does not exclusively and necessarily mean "first-created" in the narrow sense of being the first thing created. Its meaning depends on the linguistic and contextual usage, and it can carry a range of implications depending on how it is employed in the text. The term πρωτοκτίστος is a compound word:
πρῶτος (prōtos) = "first" or "foremost." κτίζω (ktizō) = "to create" or "to found/establish."
While the literal construction of the word can suggest "first-created," it does not exclusively mean this in every context. Words with similar formations often have broader or figurative meanings. For example πρωτότοκος (first-born) does not always imply literal birth but can mean pre-eminence or rank (e.g., Colossians 1:15, where Christ is described as the "first-born of all creation" to signify supremacy, not temporal origin). Similarly, πρωτοκτίστος could imply pre-eminence, foundational role, or primacy in rank rather than a strict chronological creation.
The interpretation of πρωτοκτίστος is heavily dependent on its context. In theological writings like those of Clement of Alexandria, terms are often used metaphorically or analogically rather than literally. For instance Clement’s broader theology emphasizes the eternal nature of the Logos, making a literal interpretation ("first-created being") incompatible with his framework. In such contexts, πρωτοκτίστος could signify the Logos’s role as the foundation of creation or its primacy in the order of existence, without necessarily implying that the Logos is part of creation.
Greek terms often carry figurative or specialized meanings in philosophical and theological discourse. The term κτίζω itself can mean "to found" or "to establish" in a non-literal sense, such as founding a city or establishing an order. Thus, πρωτοκτίστος could be used metaphorically to signify the foundational or originating role of the Logos in creation, not its inclusion as part of creation. In Platonic and Hellenistic thought, "first-created" language is sometimes used symbolically to denote pre-eminence or the foundational principle in a metaphysical hierarchy.
Greek compound words often have nuanced meanings based on the relationship between the components. In some cases, πρῶτος (first) can indicate rank or priority rather than sequence (e.g., the "first" in importance or role). Similarly, κτίζω can imply something broader than literal creation, such as ordering or initiating a process. Thus, πρωτοκτίστος could reasonably be understood as "the one foremost in creation" or "the foundational principle of creation," depending on the context, without necessarily meaning "the first thing created." Clement uses terms like πρωτότοκος and ἀρχή in connection with Christ, often to denote pre-eminence rather than temporal priority. The same principle applies to πρωτοκτίστος, especially when used in a theological or metaphorical framework.
So Clement of Alexandria affirmed the eternal divinity and pre-existence of the Logos. His occasional use of terms like πρωτοκτίστος reflects a philosophical and figurative engagement with Greek thought and scriptural metaphors, not a literal belief in Christ as a created being. His works consistently uphold the Logos as co-eternal with the Father, integral to the classical Christian doctrine of God. Thus, the claim that Clement's Christology is Arian or subordinationist is unsubstantiated when examined in context. The term πρωτοκτίστος does not strictly or exclusively mean "first-created" in the sense of the first being created ex nihilo. Linguistically and contextually, it can carry broader meanings, including "foremost in creation" or "foundational to creation," especially in philosophical and theological discourse. Any interpretation must consider the broader context and the author's intended nuance, which often goes beyond a simplistic or purely literal reading.
Mod note: We're treading the same ground and points are being repeated in close proximity. We're clearly not going to agree on the ἦν issue. I'm aware that most all of the Trinitarian grammarians explain the verse and verb that way, but I think it's a theological construing of the data, not a linguistic or grammatical understanding of the verb, especially when we look at John's other uses of the verb. But will not approve further discussion of that point in this thread's limited life.
It's great that I got a lot of extra comments from what I said. Here's the thing I am glad you pointed that out about the Catholic Church not equating the universe as Eternal. Nice to know. Second Proverbs 8:30 in no way proves that Jesus is eternally generated. Personification of Wisdom in no way means he is wisdom. But it is a comparison. Etymology helps us to see it is an abstraction Wisdom represents Jesus but it is not Jesus he is much more than just wisdom. It is in my opinion the highlight of ignorance to use that to say he is eternally generated. The divine creature who became Jesus as a human had a beginning, he also has a God for he says to Martha my God and your God. To claim my God is to say I worship yes, Jesus worship someone and that someone is Jehovah God. Jesus says my God in several places in the bible. Here are the scriptures - John 20:17, Mark 15:34, (a quote of Psalms 22:1), Matt. 27:46, he says it 4 times in one verse at Rev. 3:12. Yes Jesus even in heaven claims to have a God he worships. So now would Martha think of Jesus as almighty God? It doesn't matter your biased point of view that isn't based on the question. Would Martha think that Jesus worships Jehovah as she does? These are the questions any honest bible student would ask. Without coming up with some lame explanation as to why or what she would believe the answer is obvious she does not believe that her resurrected lord is almighty God, but the son of God as the bible teaches.
It is a theological construction to the extent that we have to look at what the certain "arkhe" in John 1:1a refers to. According to the established explanation, it refers back to the absolute beginning according of Genesis 1:1.
The explanation of this concept is indeed not a linguistic, but a theological and philosophical question. Linguistics only gives the answer that the imperfect form of the verb to be is to be understood here: (already) ongoing, continuous existence. What is the theological consequence of asserting that the Logos was already in existence in the (absolute) beginning, when creation began at all, is obviously also not a linguistic question.
For example, if I say that there were already bananas on the shelves when the store opened, then logically this is only possible if they were placed there before the moment of opening. However, time began with the beginning of creation, and that which, although already in existence at the beginning of creation, is not temporal, but outside of time. And indeed, the view that the Logos was created at a specific point in time is indeed incompatible with this statement of John 1:1a. Of course, it must also be taken into account here that it can only be true for the "primum movens" that it did not begin to exist at a given point in time, which is: God.
Even more coherent is the Unitarian explanation, according to which the "arkhe" of John 1:1a does not refer back to an absolute beginning according of Genesis 1:1, but to the new creation.
75 comments:
If the causation is non sequential, (not accidental) then the cause must have an essential difference from the effect such that it provides something to the effect which the effect does not itself have but depends on, which makes, ironically, eternal begetting inconsistent with the homoousion doctrine.
BTW, many monarchian trinitarians are basically gonna agree with you, however they will redefine the divine essence to mean something like omnipotence, or something like that. (which arguments going back to Ireneaus already shows doesn't work).
I hear more and more that the Father is LOGICALLY prior to the Son, but both exist from Eternity past, somehow. I suppose in an attempt to dodge the problems caused by inferring causality.
I enjoyed researching Joshua Sijuwade’s model of
monarchial trinitarianism, where he states only the Father is “ungrounded” by anyone or anything.
Can and do any causes exist outside of time? I’ll wait for an example of a timeless cause or timeless result of a cause.
1. God Is the Uncaused Cause of All Things: The statement that God is the uncaused cause is correct and aligns with classical theism. However, this refers to God’s divine essence, which is shared equally by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Son, being God, is also uncaused in His divine essence. The distinction lies in the relationship within the Trinity: the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, which does not imply causation in the sense of a temporal or dependent act but rather an eternal relationship. "Uncaused cause" refers to the divine nature, not the relational distinctions within the Trinity. The Son's "begottenness" is not a temporal or causal event but an eternal reality within the Godhead.
2. God the Father Is Causally Prior to God the Son: This premise misrepresents Trinitarian theology. The relationship between the Father and the Son is one of eternal generation, not causation as we understand it in created terms. The Nicene Creed affirms that the Son is "begotten, not made," emphasizing that the Son's relationship to the Father is eternal and not dependent on temporal causality. Eternal generation is not equivalent to causality. The term "causally prior" is inappropriate because it introduces temporal and ontological hierarchy into the Trinity, which orthodox Trinitarian theology rejects. The theological term Eternal Generation describes the relationship of the Father to the Son. It is an eternal reality, not a temporal or causal event, and ensures that the Son is fully divine and co-eternal with the Father.
3. Nothing Has Caused or Causes God: This is true and remains consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. All three Persons of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—share the same divine essence, which is uncaused, eternal, and self-existent. The Son is God not because He was caused by the Father but because He shares the same uncaused divine essence. The Son is not "caused" by the Father. The eternal relationship of begetting is a relational distinction, not a causal or hierarchical one. The Father is unbegotten, the Son is eternally begotten, and the Spirit proceeds. These are not acts of causation but relational properties that describe how the Persons of the Trinity relate to one another. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial, meaning they share the same divine essence. There is no division or hierarchy in their essence or being.
4. Therefore, the Son Is Not God: This conclusion is a non sequitur because it depends on a misunderstanding of the terms "cause" and "begotten." The eternal generation of the Son does not imply that He is caused or created. Instead, it speaks to the relational order within the Trinity, where the Father is the "principle" or "source" within the Godhead but without any division of essence or being. The Son is fully God because He shares the same divine essence as the Father and the Spirit. The relational distinction of "begotten" does not imply ontological inferiority or dependence but describes the eternal and immutable relationship within the Trinity.
Nincsnevem, causally prior need not be understood temporally anymore than logically prior has to be construed that way. You criticize my use of the term "causation" for the eternal generation, but see https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P20/is-god-the-father-causally-prior-to-the-son
Admittedly, the western church prefers the language "principle" instead of cause, but some Trinitarians have no problem with cause as a way to describe the Father in relation to the Son.
Roman, I did mean for the cause to be understood in a non-sequential way.
Terence, I just finished listening to a discussion by Sijuwade and others about that subject. I also have a problem with atemporal causation and atemporal generation/spiration, etc. To me, logical priority does not stave off all difficulties.
Novatian of Rome (On the Trinity, chapter 31):
"And He is always in the Father, unless the Father be not always Father, only that the Father also precedes Him — in a certain sense — since it is necessary — in some degree — that He should be before He is Father. Because it is essential that He who knows no beginning must go before Him who has a beginning; even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born, and of like nature with the Father in some measure by His nativity, although He has a beginning in that He is born, inasmuch as He is born of that Father who alone has no beginning. He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father — that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made."
https://medium.com/@fanaticthomist/on-the-trinity-and-divine-aseity-a-scholastic-reply-to-khalil-andani-c57aa1708ab5
Applying "causation" in any form to describe the relationship within the Trinity leads to confusion. The issue lies in the conflation of causal and relational terms. Classical Trinitarian theology emphasizes that the Father is the "principle" of the Son, not the "cause." This distinction is critical. A principle denotes origin or relationship without implying causation, dependence, or temporal priority. For example, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains, the Father "begets" the Son, but this begetting is an eternal and immanent act, not an efficient or external cause like the universe's creation. Aristotle and subsequent scholastics differentiate between principles (which establish order or relation) and causes (which imply dependency or change). The Father is a principle of the Son, meaning the Son proceeds from the Father relationally, but this does not entail ontological subordination.
Trinitarian theology reconciles eternal generation with the Son's aseity, which refers to self-existence, meaning God has no cause or dependence for His existence. This applies to the divine nature, which is shared fully and equally by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The divine essence is uncaused, eternal, and self-existent. The relational property of being "begotten" does not mean the Son’s existence is caused or derived in the same way as creation. The Father eternally communicates the divine essence to the Son. This communication is intrinsic to God's being and does not involve dependence or causation. As Aquinas states, the Father and Son share one undivided essence, which is inherently aseitous. The divine nature remains one and indivisible. The Son possesses aseity in His divine nature because that nature is uncaused and eternal. The relational term "begotten" refers to how the Son eternally proceeds from the Father within the Godhead, not to a temporal or ontological subordination.
Using "cause" risks implying dependency, which contradicts the shared divine essence. The Latin tradition avoids this term for good reason: it misrepresents the eternal and relational nature of the Trinity. Scholastic theology consistently prefers "principle" to "cause" to emphasize that the Father is not a source in the way a creator causes a creature. The divine processions (begetting and spiration) are acts of internal relation within the Godhead, not acts of external causation. In Summa Theologiae (I, q. 33, a. 1), Aquinas explicitly denies that the Father "causes" the Son. He writes, "The Father is called the principle of the Son, but not the cause... For in all kinds of causes there is always a distance of perfection or power, which is not the case in the divine persons."
The Nicene Creed explicitly affirms the Son is "begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father." This underscores that the Son is fully divine, sharing the same essence as the Father. The term "begotten" describes a relational distinction, not an ontological hierarchy or dependency. The Son has a principle of origin in the Father. However, this does not negate His aseity because the divine essence is one and uncaused. The Father begets the Son in an eternal act that communicates the same essence without division or dependence.
Eastern theologians sometimes use "cause" in a more relational sense, but even they clarify that this does not imply ontological subordination, the Cappadocian Fathers, for example, affirm the Son's full divinity and consubstantiality with the Father.
This premise correctly asserts God’s aseity, meaning that God is self-existent and uncaused. However, it conflates the divine essence (God as uncaused) with the internal relations of the Trinity. The divine essence is one and indivisible (homoousion), shared equally by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The distinction between the persons lies in their relational properties, not their essence.
1. The Father is unbegotten (no principle of origin).
2. The Son is begotten (from the Father but not caused).
3. The Holy Spirit proceeds (from the Father and the Son in the Latin tradition, or from the Father through the Son in the Eastern tradition).
This relational order does not compromise the shared divine essence. As St. Thomas Aquinas clarifies, the Father is the principle, not the cause, of the Son (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1). "Cause" implies dependence and inferiority, which are absent in the eternal relations of the Trinity.
Scholastic theologians like Aquinas, and later Honoré Tournely, distinguished between "principle" and "cause." The Father is the principle of the Son, meaning the Son proceeds from the Father as an eternal act of self-knowing. This procession does not involve efficient causality, which would imply a difference in substance, dependence, or temporal priority.
The Son’s generation is eternal and immanent within the divine essence. This is not a sequential or temporal act. As Augustine states, "From the instant that the fire begins to be, that instant it begets the shining" (Sermon to Catechumens). Thus, the Son is co-eternal with the Father and not posterior to Him in being or dignity.
Logical priority indicates relational order, not temporal succession. The Father is "prior" in relation, as the unbegotten principle, but not in time or essence. This aligns with the Nicene Creed: "Begotten of the Father before all ages."
All three persons of the Trinity share the same divine aseity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are uncaused in their essence (ens a se). However, personal relations (e.g., the Son is begotten of the Father) do not negate divine aseity because:
1. A principle of origin (Father begets Son) does not imply causation in the Aristotelian sense of efficient cause (Summa Theologiae I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1).
2. Divine processions (generation and spiration) are acts of immanent intellection and volition, which are internal to God and do not compromise His aseity (Aquinas, Sententia libri Metaphysicae).
The shared divine essence ensures the Son's full divinity. The Nicene Creed affirms the Son as "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God." Furthermore the Son is of the same substance as the Father (homoousios). Eternal generation signifies the communication of the Father’s essence to the Son, ensuring both possess the same divine essence. Causation, when applied to divine processions, must not be understood as efficient causality. The Son is FROM the Father as principle, not as effect. Ontological priority suggests dependence, which is not applicable to the Trinity. All three persons are co-eternal and co-equal in being and glory.
While the analogy of a timeless cause is challenging, eternal generation occurs within the eternal, atemporal life of God. The Son’s generation is an immanent act, not a transient one, and is identical to the divine essence. This concept is supported by both the Western (Latin) and Eastern (Greek) traditions, albeit with terminological differences. The Cappadocian Fathers and Augustine affirm that the Son’s generation involves no time, inferiority, or dependence.
As to causality, what of John 6:57?
"I live beCAUSE of the Father."
I posit that all causes in this realm or any other exist in time, without exception.
See also John 5:26.
Terence
Yeah, that view is becoming more popular, however I honestly cannot see how it doesn't just fall into straight up Eunomianism/Arianism, his whole position depends on the view that Aseity is an extrinsic property, which (without getting into it too much here) is utter nonsense.
I personally am unsure about the right language to use with regards to the Logos and time, not because I think the Logos is eternal, but because I don't know how to speak of a first moment in temporal terms which brings eternity into temporality, this is an issue Origen struggled with, and a lot of people will say he believed in the pre-existence of souls, which it sounds like he did, but others (such as John Behr) say he's just threading the eternity of God's will with the temporality of creation.
BTW, I hear people say often that Arius believed that "there was a time when the son was not," as more careful scholarship has shown, that seems to be a misrepresentation, Arius was more subtle than that.
But either way, a nonsequential causal relation is necessarily one in which the cause and effect differ in essense.
Nincsnevem, does not begotten mean a kind of causation?
@Terence
Your objection that John 6:57 ("I live because of the Father") implies a causal relationship between the Father and the Son, undermining the Son's divinity, reflects a misunderstanding of the biblical and theological context. The phrase "I live because of the Father" is often interpreted in a way that suggests causality in the sense of dependence or derivation. However, this interpretation fails to consider the theological context of Jesus' statement. The context of John 6 emphasizes Christ’s role as the Mediator and the source of eternal life for humanity. When Jesus speaks of living "because of the Father," He is referring to His mission as the one sent by the Father to bring life to the world. This is not a statement about His divine essence but about His incarnate and mediatorial role. As a Mediator, Jesus’ human nature is fully dependent on the Father, consistent with His submission to the Father’s will during His earthly mission.
In His divine nature, the Son shares the same essence (homoousios) as the Father. The Son’s life is not caused by the Father in a temporal or dependent sense but proceeds from the Father in eternal generation. Eternal generation is not causation in the sense of creation or efficient cause but signifies the relational distinction between the Father and the Son within the Trinity. Aquinas clarifies this distinction by emphasizing that the Father is the principle of the Son, not His cause (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1).
The Greek preposition διά (dia) in "I live because of the Father" is better understood as "by reason of" or "through." This aligns with the understanding that the Son’s life as the eternal Logos is fully aligned with and derived relationally from the Father without implying inferiority or temporal causation.
You argument that all causes exist in time is flawed for several reasons. The doctrine of eternal generation asserts that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, a reality that exists outside of time. This is not a temporal act but an eternal relationship intrinsic to the divine nature. The Nicene Creed affirms this: "Begotten of the Father before all ages." God exists beyond time and space (Psalm 90:2). Thus, any relational distinctions within the Trinity are timeless and do not correspond to temporal causality. The existence of the universe itself provides an example of a cause that transcends time. God created time itself (Genesis 1:1). As the uncaused cause, God’s act of creation demonstrates causation that is not bound by temporal constraints.
John 5:26 states: "For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself." This verse has been interpreted by some as indicating the Father’s causal priority over the Son. However John 5:26 speaks of the Son’s authority to give life, a role entrusted to Him as Mediator. This authority is given to the incarnate Son in the context of His mission to humanity. The verse does not imply that the Son lacks life in Himself in His divine nature. Rather, it emphasizes the relational dynamic between the Father and the Son within the economy of salvation. The Son, as God, possesses life in Himself, a quality intrinsic to the divine nature. This is not "given" in a temporal or dependent sense but reflects the eternal relationship within the Trinity. The Father’s "granting" the Son life refers to the relational distinction of eternal generation, not a deficiency in the Son.
You objection assumes that causality within the Trinity must function like causality in the created order. This is a category error. The Father generates the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as immanent acts, meaning they are internal to God’s essence. These processions are timeless and do not involve sequential causation or dependence. Augustine’s analogy of fire and its light clarifies that the generation of the Son from the Father is simultaneous and eternal. The Father is not temporally or causally prior to the Son but is the source of the Son’s eternal life in a relational sense.
Novatian explicitly affirms that the Son is "God proceeding from God" and possesses the divine substance ("cuius nomen est Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil" – "that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made"). This statement directly opposes Arianism, which denies the full divinity of the Son. Arian theology holds that the Son is a created being and not of the same divine substance as the Father. Novatian, however, insists on the Son's divine nature and the essential unity of substance between the Father and the Son.
Novatian emphasizes the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son: "He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time." This indicates that the Son’s existence is eternal and not bound by temporal beginnings, countering the Arian claim that the Son was created and thus had a beginning.
Novatian does mention that the Father "precedes" the Son in some (most likely logical) sense, but this is not a statement of temporal precedence. Rather, it reflects the relational distinction within the Trinity—what later theology would term the eternal generation of the Son. This generation does not imply inferiority or a beginning in time but a relational order within the Godhead.
Novatian carefully distinguishes between being begotten (as the Son is) and being created. He writes, "If He had not been born—compared with Him who was unborn, an equality being manifested in both—He would make two unborn beings, and thus would make two Gods." Here, Novatian defends the distinction between the Father (unbegotten) and the Son (begotten), emphasizing that this distinction preserves monotheism. For Novatian, the Son is begotten of the Father, not created, and shares in the Father's divine essence. Arianism, on the other hand, conflates being begotten with being created, a confusion that Novatian avoids.
Novatian repeatedly stresses the unity of God: "He gathered His beginning by being born of Him who is one God," and "He did not make two Gods, because He did not make two beginnings." This unity of God, despite the relational distinction between Father and Son, is incompatible with Arianism. Arians reject the unity of essence between the Father and the Son, positing instead a hierarchy that undermines monotheism by effectively introducing a second, subordinate deity.
Novatian is clear in his rejection of any theology that would introduce "two Gods." He argues that the Son’s subjection to the Father (a theme Arians often exploit) does not imply inequality but demonstrates the relational order within the Godhead. He writes, "The Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to the Father the whole authority of His divinity," emphasizing relational harmony rather than ontological inferiority.
Although Novatian predates the Nicene Creed, his theology aligns with its central tenets. He affirms the Son’s divine nature, eternal relationship with the Father, and unity of essence with the Father. The Nicene Creed’s declaration that the Son is "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father" echoes Novatian’s teaching.
Arian proponents often misinterpret Novatian’s language of "procession" and "subjection" to argue for the Son’s inferiority. However, Novatian uses these terms to describe the relational and functional dynamics within the Trinity, not to diminish the Son's divinity. His affirmation that the Son is "the divine substance" and his rejection of two Gods clearly place him within an orthodox framework, not an Arian one.
@Roman
Eternal generation refers to the relational distinction within the Trinity, where the Son eternally proceeds from the Father, not in a temporal or sequential manner, but as an immanent and timeless act. The generation of the Son does not imply causality as understood in the created order. Instead, the Father is the principle of the Son, not His cause.
Your claim that "a nonsequential causal relation is necessarily one in which the cause and effect differ in essence" is incorrect when applied to divine processions. In the Trinity, the Father and the Son share the same essence (homoousios). The relational distinction between the Father and the Son arises from the eternal generation, not from an ontological or essential difference. The processions within the Godhead are unique because they do not involve division, dependency, or change.
The term "begotten" when applied to the Son is a relational term describing the Son’s eternal relationship to the Father. It does not signify causation in the sense of creation or dependence. In human language, "begotten" is analogous and reflects a unique divine reality that transcends human causality.
So eternal generation is not a form of causation that implies temporal or ontological dependency.
Aseity (self-existence) is not an extrinsic property but is intrinsic to the divine nature. All three persons of the Trinity share the same essence, and thus all three are ase (ens a se) in terms of essence. Aseity pertains to the divine essence, which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relational distinction (e.g., the Father as unbegotten) pertains to their personhood, not to the essence they share. To argue that aseity is extrinsic would imply that God’s self-existence depends on something external, contradicting the classical definition of God as “ipsum esse subsistens” (being itself subsisting).
The Son’s eternal generation is compatible with aseity because the procession is an immanent act within the Godhead. It does not imply a temporal or dependent existence. The Son is FROM the Father by eternal generation, but this procession does not negate His possession of the same divine essence, which is inherently ase.
So aseity is intrinsic to the divine essence and fully compatible with the relational distinctions within the Trinity.
Arius’s theology did, in essence, deny the co-eternity of the Son with the Father. While his language may have been nuanced, the core of his teaching was that the Son is a created being and thus not co-eternal with the Father. The Council of Nicaea explicitly rejected Arius’s view by affirming the “homoousios” of the Son with the Father, emphasizing that the Son is "begotten, not made," and "of one essence with the Father." While Arius may not have used the exact phrase "there was a time when the Son was not," his teaching effectively implied it by asserting that the Son was a created being. Any theology that denies the full co-eternity and co-equality of the Son risks falling into a similar subordinationist error.
God’s act of creation is an example of timeless causation. God, existing outside of time, brings time and the universe into being without Himself being subject to temporal constraints. Classical theism, as articulated by Aquinas, holds that God is the uncaused cause and the sustaining cause of all existence. This causation is not temporal but eternal. Within the Trinity, the processions (e.g., the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit) are eternal and timeless. They do not occur within time but reflect the relational distinctions within the Godhead.
So timeless causation is both theologically and philosophically coherent, as evidenced by God’s act of creation and the eternal processions within the Trinity.
@Nincs
Welcome back, matey, I have missed your one-sided, albeit android-like affirmative reasoning style.
I would not disagree that the statement at John 6:57 describes adequately Jesus’ role as a mediator for humankind. But a careful and non-biased, non-theologically motivated reading of the text states clearly that “JUST AS (kathos) the living Father” was the reason, means or cause by which the Son is LIVING (zao)” SO ALSO will his believers LIVE… beCAUSe of the Son.
Christians have not had life Co-existent with the Father from Eternity past in One hypostatic union, they receive it in response to their believing in and partaking (trogo) of the Christ’s saving power. They are given life. Sequentially. Causally. In time. As an effect. So was the Son. Otherwise his comparison falls apart and his use of (kathos - according to/ just as) is meaningless. Your interpretation fails to recognise basic Greek and English words and their meanings.
@Terence
The term καθώς often emphasizes a pattern or analogy, not an identical relationship. In John 6:57, the Son's life being "by reason of" (διά) the Father is not sequential or causal in the sense of temporal creation but relational and eternal. The analogy is not about identical mechanics but analogous dependence:
Father → Son (eternal, relational, intrinsic within the Godhead)
Son → Believers (temporal, salvific, and external to the Godhead)
The Son’s eternal generation and the believers’ participation in Christ’s life are qualitatively distinct. The Son’s life is intrinsic to His divine nature, eternally derived from the Father, whereas believers receive life as a created gift through Christ’s mediatorial role. Conflating these relationships ignores the unique nature of divine processions versus created participation.
So the analogy between the Father-Son relationship and the Son-believer relationship highlights relational dependence, not identical mechanics.
The context of John 6:57 does not support the idea that Jesus’ life is a temporal effect of the Father. The Father is the source (principle) of the Son’s life through eternal generation, which is not causal or sequential in a temporal sense. Believers’ reception of life is contingent on time because they are finite beings. However, Christ is eternal (John 1:1-3) and shares the same divine essence with the Father, meaning His life is uncreated and timeless.To insist that the analogy requires temporal sequence for the Son is to project the limitations of creation onto the Creator, a categorical error.
John 5:26 explicitly states: "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself." This is not about sequential granting but the eternal relational dynamic of the Trinity. The Son possesses life inherently because of His eternal generation from the Father. This life is not derivative in a created sense but reflects the shared divine essence. Believers, by contrast, do not possess life inherently but receive it as a gift through union with Christ. The Son’s role as the source of believers’ life is part of His mediatorial mission, not a reflection of how He Himself possesses life.
As applied to the Son, διά does not suggest that the Son’s life is “caused” in a temporal or dependent sense. Instead, it reflects the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son. The Son’s life originates relationally (not causally) from the Father, consistent with the doctrine of eternal generation. For believers, διά indicates that their life is mediated through the Son as the incarnate Redeemer, not that the Son’s life is a temporal effect of the Father.
The Son’s life is eternally derived from the Father in a way that transcends temporal causality, while believers receive life as a temporal gift.
You conflate Christ’s incarnate mediatorial role with His eternal divine nature. As Mediator, the incarnate Son submits to the Father and depends on Him in His human nature. This dependence is not a reflection of His divine essence but of His role in salvation history. In His divine nature, the Son is co-eternal and consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father. The life He has "by reason of the Father" is an eternal, non-temporal reality.
"The Son’s life is eternally derived from the Father in a way that transcends temporal causality, while believers receive life as a temporal gift."
So it's not "just as" then? Jesus didn't really mean what he said.
"The life He has "by reason of the Father" is an eternal, non-temporal reality."
So his believers don't gain life "just as" he received it, then?
The Father is the "reason" for The Son's life, but there was never a time this reason actually happened or occured in a measurable or discernible way according to the Aristotelian principles of causation. It was a non-event. It just always was. Am I stating that correctly? In what way is it a "reason", then? IMO, a better way of stating it would be that a Triunity of persons is the prime reality. But even then, some Trinitarians claim all of this is not in Reality, but by way of reason (logic). What a tangled web we weave...
"The truth alone is reasonable.
It's true.
It satisfies our longings as nothing else can do."
Nincsnevem, there is more than one way to look at the statements by Novatian of Rome as even other Catholics admit. But I will quote directly from Novatian's work:
For since that is the beginning to other creatures which is unborn — which God the Father only is, being beyond a beginning of whom He is who was born — while He who is born of Him reasonably comes from Him who has no beginning, proving that to be the beginning from which He Himself is, even although He is God who is born, yet He shows Him to be one God whom He who was born proved to be without a beginning. He therefore is God, but begotten for this special result, that He should be God. He is also the Lord, but born for this very purpose of the Father, that He might be Lord. He is also an Angel, but He was destined of the Father as an Angel to announce the Great Counsel of God. And His divinity is thus declared, that it may not appear by any dissonance or inequality of divinity to have caused two Gods. For all things being subjected to Him as the Son by the Father, while He Himself, with those things which are subjected to Him, is subjected to His Father, He is indeed proved to be Son of His Father; but He is found to be both Lord and God of all else. Whence, while all things put under Him are delivered to Him who is God, and all things are subjected to Him, the Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to the Father the whole authority of His divinity. The true and eternal Father is manifested as the one God, from whom alone this power of divinity is sent forth, and also given and directed upon the Son, and is again returned by the communion of substance to the Father. God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and extended. And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in reciprocal transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by the Son Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is God of all, and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord. Moreover, the Son is God of all else, because God the Father put before all Him whom He begot. Thus the Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God; with every creature subdued to Him, found at one with His Father God, has, by abiding in that condition that He moreover "was heard," briefly proved God His Father to be one and only and true God.
https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2005/08/novatian-and-trinity.html
I love how Terrence is exploiting the "Kathos" argument... Terrence is turning Trinitarian logic on itself.
"Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God" - was Novation written orignally in Greek or latin? - is this last instance of "God" translated correctly - or Did Novatoin observe Origens.
because based on the last sentence this doesnt make much sense unless indefinite
(and other catholics)
- credible answers please (so any one that is not named: Nincsnevem (or does not write 60 billion paragraphs for a single question that requires 5 words to answer ))
I see, I understand that the trinitarian theology rules out temporal or sequential causation, but I have heard many theologians talk about the begetting of the Son as a causal act (again, not temporal or sequential, but causal), however that might be something more common in eastern traditions than Latin ones.
As far as my claim, my claim just follows from the meatphysics of causation, of course this would not apply to your model as you deny that it's a kind of causation.
Just to clarify (I'm not debating here, just wanting to understand your model), when you say processions, would you say that this is a kind of emanation? If so, what is the shared essence, and is the distinction a real distinction or a conceptual or a formal?
I agree with you that Aseity is intrinsic, so me and you agree against Joshua Sijuwade and the monarchian trinitarians.
Unfortunately however, the repeating of the doctrinal language doesn't make the doctrine any clearer, I have to say this is something that can get annoying with certain theologians, they use language to make distinctions without ever defining the language clearly. I.e. what is meant by procession (if it is not a kind of causation), what is meant by personhood, what is the shared essence, etc etc. I mean i don't know if I can assent to, or deny, the language if I don't know what it means.
About Arius, Arius believed the Son was created, but, like Origen, believed he was created atemporally, so perhaps this does mean that Arius didn't believe the Son was eternal in the same sense as you mean it (I'm not sure in what sense you mean it to be honest), but for Arius the Son always existed in the sense that there was no time in which the Son did not exist, even though the Son is brought into being by the Father. Does this mean that the son isn't eternal? Perhaps depending on the sense of "eternal" you mean, but my point is just that the phrase "there was a time when the Son was not" misrepresents Arius's position.
The term KATHŌS ("just as") in this context does not demand strict equivalence but rather an analogy. In Scripture, analogies are often used to explain divine realities in ways that are comprehensible to human beings, see Mt. 5:48. The relationship between the Father and the Son is not identical to the relationship between the Son and believers because the former is eternal and intrinsic to the Godhead, while the latter is temporal and external, based on salvation. Jesus is highlighting a relational pattern: the Son receives life from the Father in an eternal relationship, and believers receive life from the Son in a salvific relationship. The "just as" emphasizes that both involve dependence and union, not identical mechanisms. Your interpretation incorrectly assumes that "just as" must mean that the nature of the life-giving relationship between the Father and the Son is the same as that between the Son and believers. This conflates divine and created realities, which are categorically distinct.
Believers do not gain life in the same way the Son has life from the Father because believers are finite creatures, while the Son is God. The analogy functions within the framework of relational dependence, not identical processes. Believers receive eternal life as a gift through faith in Christ, starting at a specific point in time. This life is contingent upon the salvific work of Christ, mediated by grace and faith (John 3:16, 6:40). The Son’s life is derived from the Father in an eternal, timeless generation. This is not a temporal "receiving" but an eternal relational reality within the Trinity. The comparison does not suggest sameness but rather an analogous structure of relational dependence: the Son derives life from the Father eternally, while believers derive life from the Son temporally.
The Son is eternally begotten of the Father, meaning that His existence as the Son is relationally derived from the Father without beginning or end. This is not a "reason" in the sense of a temporal or sequential cause, but rather a timeless relational dynamic intrinsic to God’s nature. The Father is the principle (ἀρχή, principium) of the Son’s life, not in a causal or temporal sense but in the eternal relational structure of the Trinity. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains, a principle does not necessarily imply temporal priority or external causation (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1). The Father is the source of the Son’s life in the sense of eternal origin, not as a temporal event or measurable process.
Your suggestion that this relationship is a "non-event" misunderstands the nature of eternal realities, which exist outside time and space. The term "reason" here does not imply sequential causation but reflects the Father as the relational source of the Son within the eternal unity of the Godhead.
The Trinity is indeed the prime reality, with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit existing in a relationship of perfect unity and distinction. However, describing the Trinity as a "Triunity of persons" without acknowledging the eternal relational roles of Father, Son, and Spirit risks flattening the distinctions between the persons. The doctrine of eternal generation (the Son from the Father) and eternal procession (the Spirit from the Father and the Son) ensures that the distinctions within the Godhead are preserved without compromising unity. Orthodox Trinitarian theology avoids reducing the Trinity to a mere logical construct ("by way of reason"). Instead, it affirms that the relational distinctions are intrinsic to God’s very being.
The Trinity is not a purely philosophical construct but is revealed in Scripture (e.g., John 1:1-3, 5:26, 14:9-11, Mt. 28:19). While human logic can help clarify and articulate the doctrine, it cannot fully comprehend the divine mystery. The language of eternal generation and relational distinctions reflects careful theological work to preserve both the unity of God and the personal distinctions within the Godhead. The complexity arises from the depth of the subject, not from incoherence.
@Edgar Foster
Novatian’s work, De Trinitate, explicitly asserts the divinity of the Son while carefully maintaining the distinction between the Father and the Son. Novatian describes the Son as “born” and “proceeding from the Father,” and emphasizes that the Son is of the same divine substance as the Father:
"God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and extended... by the communion of substance (per substantiae communionem) to the Father."
This communion of substance is critical. While Novatian discusses the relational distinction between the Father and the Son, he firmly places the Son within the divine nature. This is in direct contradiction to Arian theology, which denies the Son’s co-equal divinity with the Father. Novatian’s assertion that the Son is God "by the communion of substance" aligns with the later Nicene Creed’s declaration of homoousios (of the same substance). Furthermore Novatian explicitly denies that the Son is a creature:
"Cujus sacrae et divinae nativitatis arcana nec Apostolus didicit, nec Prophetes comperit, nec Angelus scivit, nec creatura cognovit."
(“The mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended.”)
By stating that the Son’s divine nativity is unknown even to creatures, Novatian distinguishes the Son’s generation from any kind of creaturely origin. The Son’s "beginning" refers to the eternal relational order between the Father and the Son, not a temporal creation. Novatian emphasizes that the Father is unbegotten and the source of the Son’s being, but this does not diminish the Son’s divinity.
Novatian uses terms like “lesser” and “subject” in describing the Son’s relationship to the Father. However, these terms do not indicate ontological inferiority but rather the relational dynamics within the Trinity. Novatian is clear that the Son’s submission is functional and reflects his role in the economy of salvation:
"Thus making Himself obedient to His Father in all things, although He also is God."
This obedience underscores the relational order but does not imply a difference in divine essence. Novatian explicitly affirms that the Son is God, fully divine, and not a second, lesser god:
"Thus Christ would have been the cause of two Gods... but now, whatever He is, He is not of Himself, because He is not unborn; but He is of the Father, because He is begotten."
Novatian’s careful language avoids the pitfalls of both Arianism (denying the Son’s divinity) and modalism (denying the distinction between persons).
@anonymous
Not my logic my friend, just letting the Bible speak for itself.
@Nincs
Architect vs Neo.
“You haven’t answered my question.”
But I take your point on analogies with (kata/kathos). Good use of Matthew 5 to substantiate your point. However Matthew isn’t talking about causes or reasons for the outcome desired. It’s a command. John 6 is a statement of fact.
Nincs, what is your view on Monarchial Trinitarianism? Just curious. You seem like a traditional “upper case C” Catholic.
I’d also be curious to understand your views on numerical identity within the supposed Triune Godhead. Is the Father numerically identical with the homousia/divine essence? Is the Son?
@Roman
It's true that Eastern theologians also use the term "cause" (αἰτία), as well as "source/principle" (ἀρχή) to describe the Father’s relation to the Son and the Spirit, emphasizing His role as the unoriginate principle of the Trinity. This "causation," however, is not analogous to temporal or efficient causation in the created order. It refers to a unique, eternal mode of existence within the Godhead—what the Eastern tradition often terms "eternal generation" for the Son and "eternal procession" for the Spirit. In Western theology, terms like "principle" (principium) or "source" are preferred over "cause" to avoid the connotations of ontological dependency or inferiority. The Father is not the efficient cause of the Son but the relational principle from whom the Son is eternally generated. While "cause" can be used in Eastern theology, it does not imply the kind of dependency or derivation found in created realities. The distinction lies in understanding causality in an eternal and non-temporal framework, where "causation" is relational rather than ontological or sequential.
The term "emanation" can be helpful if carefully qualified, but it carries risks of misunderstanding. The processions (generation and spiration) do not divide or multiply the essence; rather, they distinguish the persons relationally. The distinctions between the persons of the Trinity are real, not merely conceptual or formal. The Father is not the Son; the Son is not the Spirit. These distinctions are grounded in relational opposition (e.g., the Father begets, the Son is begotten, the Spirit proceeds), not in any division of essence. Unlike Neoplatonic emanation, where beings flow outward from a higher principle and diminish in perfection, the processions in the Trinity involve no ontological degradation. The Son and Spirit are fully God, equal in essence and perfection with the Father. "Procession" refers to an eternal and relational act intrinsic to the Godhead. The Son "proceeds" from the Father as eternally begotten, and the Spirit "proceeds" from the Father and the Son (in Western theology) or "from the Father through the Son" (in Eastern theology). These terms describe relations of origin, not causation in the created sense.
Arius indeed believed that the Son was created "before time" (before all the AIONs) and so it would logically follow that there was no "time" in which the Son did not exist. However, he still asserted that the Son was a created being, ontologically separate and subordinate to the Father. This makes the Son a contingent being, not co-eternal or consubstantial with the Father. In orthodox Trinitarian theology, "eternal" means without beginning or end, fully sharing in the divine essence. The Son is not created but eternally begotten, meaning that His existence is intrinsic to the divine nature. This is fundamentally different from Arius's view, even if Arius denied temporal sequentiality. While Arius may not have meant the phrase "there was a time when the Son was not" in a strictly temporal sense, it accurately reflects his claim that the Son's existence is derived and contingent, not intrinsic to the Godhead. The phrase captures the theological error of denying the Son’s co-eternity and "homoousios" with the Father. Orthodox Trinitarian theology rejects Arianism because it compromises the full divinity of the Son, reducing Him to a creature and undermining the unity of the Godhead.
While terms like "procession" and "personhood" may seem unclear, they aim to preserve the biblical revelation of God’s triune nature. For example, "procession" safeguards the relational distinctions within the Trinity, while "personhood" emphasizes the individuality of the Father, Son, and Spirit without dividing the essence. Theologians walk a fine line between clarity and preserving the mystery of God. The language is necessarily analogical because finite human concepts cannot fully capture the infinite reality of God.
Nincsnevem, Novatian's language seems anything but clear and I've never read where he said the Son was eternally born. "Born," yes but he does not use the adjective "eternal." Novatian's thought is far from being transparent about the Son and the Father. See Edmund Fortman, The Triune God, pages 121-123.
In On the Trinity 27, Novatian writes
"In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is inferior to the Father. Now, consequently, He who is inferior to the Father, is not the Father, but the Son; for had He been the Father, He would have given, and not received, sanctification."
How can God be inferior to another person of God?
In this translation of On the Trinity 31 by Novatian, the word "cause" comes into play:
"And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made. Assuredly God proceeding from God, causing a person second to the Father as being the Son, but not taking from the Father that characteristic that He is one God."
It's important to note that the Father wills this birth, according to Novatian.
Even if John 6:57 is a declarative statement, it employs analogical reasoning to make the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son comprehensible to a human audience. While Matthew 5:48 does contain an imperative, the underlying structure of analogical reasoning applies to both texts. The comparison between the Father’s perfection and the believer’s striving for perfection in Matthew 5:48 operates on a similar principle as the analogy between the Son's eternal life and the believer’s salvific life in John 6:57. Both reveal relational truths through analogy, not absolute equivalence. In John 6:57, the phrase "just as" indicates a relational parallel (pattern, model), not an identical mechanism. To expect strict numerical or causal equivalence conflates analogical and univocal uses of language, which is contrary to the scholastic understanding of divine language (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 5). The analogy conveys proportional similarity while respecting the categorical distinction between the eternal Godhead and created beings.
Monarchial Trinitarianism, especially in its Eastern form, emphasizes the Father as the sole source (αἰτία) of the Son and Spirit. While this is consistent with Nicene orthodoxy when properly articulated, certain interpretations veer dangerously close to subordinationism. Thomistic theology aligns with the Nicene affirmation that the Father is the "principle" (principium) of the Son and the Spirit, but avoids framing this in terms of causality that would imply subordination. The Son is begotten, not created, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father (and, in Western theology, the Son), both as co-equal and co-eternal persons. While the Father is the "arche" of the Trinity, His monarchy does not entail ontological priority. To imply that the Father has a superiority in essence or existence would contradict the doctrine of homoousios—the shared, singular divine essence. Thomism emphasizes the inseparability of divine action (opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt), ensuring that the monarchy of the Father does not undermine the co-equality of the Son and Spirit. This is why Catholic theology holds to the “Filioque”, affirming that the Spirit proceeds from the Father AND the Son, safeguarding the unity of essence and will. Thus, while Monarchial Trinitarianism preserves some important relational truths, it must avoid interpretations that diminish the full co-equality and consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit with the Father.
Yes, in the sense that the Father is the divine essence fully and without division. However, the Father is not numerically identical to the Son or Spirit. The divine essence is numerically one and indivisible, but the relations between the persons constitute real distinctions. According to Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28, a. 2), the distinctions within the Trinity are relational, not essential. The Father, Son, and Spirit each fully possess the one divine essence, but they are distinct by their relations of origin (Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten, Spirit as proceeding). Numerical identity refers to the essence, not the persons. If the persons were numerically identical, it would collapse the distinctions between Father, Son, and Spirit into a single person, leading to modalism.
Regarding the Trinity the term “procession” refers to the eternal relational origin of one person from another within the Trinity. For example the Son proceeds from the Father by way of intellectual generation: the Father’s perfect self-knowledge generates the Word (Logos), and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son by way of love: the perfect love between Father and Son spirates the Spirit. Procession does not imply a chronological or causal sequence but describes relational distinctions that are eternally present within the divine nature. The shared essence is the one, undivided divine nature (homoousios). The distinctions between the persons are real, grounded in relational opposition (Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten, Spirit as proceeding).
@Edgar Foster
It is true that Novatian does not explicitly use the phrase “eternally born” in modern terminology, but his description of the Son’s relationship to the Father makes it clear that he understands the Son’s generation as timeless and eternal. For example, Novatian writes:
"He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This statement affirms the timelessness of the Son’s generation. Novatian explicitly rejects the idea that the Son’s begetting involves temporal succession. The language of “always in the Father” directly refutes Arianism, which posits that “there was a time when the Son was not.” Moreover, Novatian emphasizes that the Son’s relationship to the Father is rooted in an eternal relational order, not a temporal act. His use of terms like “proceeded” reflects this theological framework. The absence of the word "eternal" does not undermine this doctrine; instead, Novatian uses theological concepts consistent with later orthodox formulations of eternal generation.
Your quote from Chapter 27:
“In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is INFERIOR to the Father…”
“um ergo accipit sanctificationem a Patre, MINOR Patre est”
In Latin, MINOR rather means "lesser" or "smaller", not (ontologically) "inferior." In this theological context, MINOR refers to a relational distinction, not an ontological one. Novatian uses this term to describe the relational order within the Trinity rather than suggesting any inferiority of essence or nature. Novatian affirms that the Son shares the same divine essence as the Father. His description of the Son as "minor" pertains to the relational roles within the Trinity, emphasizing the Father as the source of the Son's being. This relational subordination (seen in the economia, or divine economy) does not imply ontological inequality.
The Son is described as "minor" in His role of obedience and functional submission, but Novatian repeatedly affirms the unity of substance between the Father and the Son. The phrase "minor autem Patre consequenter est" must be understood within the broader framework of Novatian’s argument, which rejects both Arian subordinationism and modalism. This is consistent with biblical language where Christ, in His human nature, is obedient to the Father. For example, Philippians 2:6–8 describes Christ as “emptying Himself” and taking the form of a servant, yet being in the form of God. Novatian’s theology mirrors the biblical and patristic tradition that the Son’s obedience does not imply an inferior divine nature but rather a relational distinction within the Godhead. The Son’s functional subordination highlights the order within the Trinity without compromising the unity of essence.
It is true that Novatian states:
"He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This has been misunderstood as suggesting that the Father’s will caused the Son’s existence. However, Novatian’s language is better understood within the framework of eternal generation: the Son is eternally and naturally begotten of the Father, not created. The Father’s “will” here does not imply a temporal or contingent act but reflects the eternal harmony of the Father’s nature and will with the Son’s generation. Moreover, Novatian contrasts the Son’s generation with creation, clearly distinguishing the Son’s divine nature from that of creatures:
“The mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended.” (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This language makes it evident that the Son’s generation is unique, divine, and eternal, unlike the act of creating creatures, which occurs in time and by divine fiat.
In De Trinitate, Chapter 31, the English translation uses the term "causing a person second to the Father." To analyze the Latin text and verify what word corresponds to "causing," let’s see the relevant portion of the Latin original:
"Deus utique procedens ex Deo, secundam personam EFFICIENS post Patrem qua Filius; sed non eripiens illud Patri, quod unus est Deus."
The Latin word translated as "causing" is "efficiens." The Latin verb "efficiens" (present participle of "efficere") can be translated as: "producing", "bringing about", "effecting", or "accomplishing." In this context, "efficiens" does not imply a causal or creative act in the sense of creating something "ex nihilo" (as in the creation of the world). Rather, it emphasizes the relational aspect of the Son being "produced" or "brought forth" as a second person from the Father. This aligns with the doctrine of eternal generation, where the Son's existence derives from the Father, but not as a temporal or contingent act.
The participle "efficiens" is consistent with the theological language of eternal generation, where the Son is eternally "brought forth" from the Father. The relational subordination implied by "efficiens" does not indicate ontological inferiority but preserves the distinction of persons within the unity of substance. So the term “causing” in Chapter 31 does not suggest ontological inequality or dependency but instead refers to the relational origin of the Son in the Father. Novatian’s distinction between the Father as the source and the Son as begotten reflects the traditional understanding of the Father as the “principle without principle” within the Trinity. As Novatian emphasizes:
"He could not make a disagreement in the divinity by the number of two Gods, since He gathered His beginning by being born of Him who is one God." (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
This ensures that the Son’s divine nature is fully derived from the Father’s, affirming consubstantiality while preserving the relational order. Novatian’s use of “second person” is entirely orthodox and aligns with later Trinitarian formulations.
Finally, Novatian’s explicit rejection of “two Gods” directly counters Arianism. Arians introduce a subordinate, created Son, effectively dividing the Godhead into two beings: one supreme and one subordinate. Novatian, however, maintains monotheism by affirming the unity of divine substance:
“He did not make two Gods, because He did not make two beginnings.” (De Trinitate, Chapter 31)
His theology anticipates the Nicene Creed’s assertion of the Son as "God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father."
@Anonymous
Novatian's De Trinitate was originally written in Latin, not Greek. This is significant because Latin lacks the definite and indefinite articles. The phrase in question:
"Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God"
"Christus Jesus omnis creaturae subjectam sibi habens a Patre proprio potestatem qua Deus est"
In Latin, "Deus" simply means "God." There is no way to distinguish between "God" (definite) and "a god" (indefinite) because Latin lacks articles. Any implication of definiteness or indefiniteness must come from the context. Novatian consistently affirms the full divinity of Christ in De Trinitate, so the rendering of Deus as "God" is correct in this theological context.
„potestatem qua Deus est”: "the power in which He is God" or "inasmuch as He is God."
Translating "potestatem qua Deus est" as "inasmuch as He is God" accurately reflects Novatian’s intended meaning. It underscores that Christ’s divine authority over creation derives from His nature as God, consistent with his affirmation of Christ’s full divinity.
There is no evidence at all that Novatian's theology directly reflects Origen's speculative framework. While both authors may discuss the relational distinction between the Father and the Son, Novatian does not use Greek terminology that suggests a subordination of essence, and explicitly affirms the unity of substance (per substantiae communionem) between the Father and the Son.
Part oof this comes down to how one interprets the Latin in On the Trinity, but Fortman understands minor to mean "inferior" there and he was not a JW. Additionally, Edmund Hill writes
"For Novatian, to argue the divinity of Christ, which he does with great vigor, actually involves arguing his inequality to the Father. The assumption is that Christ can only be both divine and other than the Father if he is divine in a different and lesser degree. Novatian interprets the famous text of Phil 2:6, ‘who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped,’ as meaning that though Christ was divine, in the form of God, he never dreamt of claiming equality with God."
No one is accusing Novatian of Arianism, but he certainly seems to espouse Christological subordinationism. As for the eternal generation part, I still don't think he clearly affirms it although he speaks of the Logos being ever in the Father.
“Hic ergo, cum sit genitus a Patre, semper est in Patre.”
“He then, since He was begotten of the Father, is always in the Father.”
Novatian emphasizes the Son's eternal relationship with the Father. The term “semper est in Patre” (always in the Father) refutes the Arian claim that there was a time when the Son did not exist. For Novatian, the Son's existence is co-eternal with the Father, albeit with the relational distinction that the Son is begotten and the Father is unbegotten.
“Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem.
“And I thus say always, that I may show Him not to be unborn, but born.”
Novatian distinguishes the Father (unbegotten) from the Son (begotten). This distinction does not imply Arian subordinationism (where the Son is created) but rather reflects the relational order within the Trinity. The term “natum” (born) refers to the eternal generation of the Son, not a temporal or created beginning.
“Sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in Patre fuisse dicendus est: nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est.”
“But He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time.”
Novatian makes it clear that the Son's existence transcends time. The phrase “ante omne tempus” (before all time) is a strong affirmation of the Son's eternity. This directly contradicts Arianism, which holds that the Son was created in time.
“quin et Pater illum etiam (quadam ratione) praecedit, quod necesse est (quodammodo) prior sit qua Pater sit.”
“only that the Father also precedes Him—in a certain sense—since it is necessary—in some degree—that He should be before He is Father.”
Novatian acknowledges a LOGICAL priority of the Father over the Son, which aligns with orthodox Trinitarian theology. The Father is the "principle" (or source) of the Son, but this precedence is not temporal or ontological. Instead, it reflects the eternal relational order within the Godhead.
“Simul ut hic MINOR sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem, quia nascitur.”
“Even as He is the LESS as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born.”
The term “minor” (less) might appear problematic, but it reflects the relational distinction, not an ontological inequality. The Son is "less" in the sense that He derives His being from the Father, not in the sense of being inferior in nature or substance. This is consistent with the Son's role as begotten, which Novatian explicitly contrasts with being created.
The language of "precedence" and "lesser" reflects the relational dynamic within the Trinity, not an ontological hierarchy. This is consistent with later Nicene theology, which affirms the Son's functional subordination in the economy of salvation while maintaining ontological equality.
“dum ex eo Patre qui originem solus non habet, nascitur.”
“inasmuch as He is born of that Father who alone has no beginning.”
The Father is unoriginated (originem solus non habet), while the Son derives His being from the Father. This affirms the Father's role as the source of the Son without denying the Son's co-eternal and co-equal divinity.
Also see https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1183&context=dissertations_mu
The Latin "minor" rather means "less", "lesser", or "smaller", in Novatian’s work refers to relational order, not ontological essence, likely referring back to John 14:28. This is clear when he uses the term in conjunction with the Son’s "originem" (origin) from the Father: "Simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem, quia nascitur" ("Even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born"). The relational dynamic does not imply inequality of divine essence but reflects the Father's role as the unbegotten source and the Son's role as the begotten Word. This mirrors the Nicene understanding of eternal generation, where the Son derives His being from the Father but is not created or lesser in essence.
If "minor" is interpreted as "inferior," it must be understood in terms of functional subordination, which Novatian repeatedly frames in the context of obedience to the Father’s will. This is consistent with the economic Trinity—where the Son submits to the Father in the divine economy—without implying inequality in nature or essence. The distinction between relational and ontological subordination is critical. His repeated insistence on the unity of substance between the Father and the Son precludes any suggestion that "minor" implies inferiority in essence.
Hill’s interpretation—that Novatian believes Christ is divine but not equal to the Father—may reflect a misreading of Novatian's argument. He argues that the term "forma Dei" ("form of God") denotes deity. He contrasts it with "imago Dei" ("image of God"), which applies to humanity (Genesis 1:27). This distinction is crucial because it establishes that Christ possesses the divine essence and is not merely a creature reflecting God's image. He explains that Christ is “God from God,” ("se ex Deo Patre Deum esse") deriving His deity from the Father. The phrase aligns with later Nicene formulations such as "God from God" (Deum de Deo) and "Light from Light." It affirms Christ’s ontological deity as derived from the Father.
"For although He remembered that He was God from God the Father, He never either compared or associated Himself with God the Father."
This highlights the relational distinction within the Trinity. Christ, as God from God the Father, acknowledges His divine nature but does not assert INDEPENDENT equality with the Father in a competitive or self-originating sense. Instead, His divine identity is always mindful of His derivation from the Father. This reflects the doctrine of eternal generation: the Son’s deity comes from the Father, not from Himself.
"He possessed that very thing that He is, because the Father had given it Him."
The Son's divine essence and attributes are not independent but received from the Father in the eternal relationship of generation. This does not imply ontological inferiority but reflects the relational order within the Godhead.
"He thought that the claim of a certain divinity would be robbery, to wit, that of equalling Himself with God the Father."
This does not deny Christ’s deity. Instead, he reads Phil. 2:6 as affirming Christ's humble acceptance of His role within the divine plan, rather than asserting His equality in a way that challenges the Father's role as the source of the Godhead.
While Novatian’s language reflects relational subordination, it does not imply inequality in nature. His description of the Son as "minor" is tied to the eternal relationship of begottenness, not to an ontological hierarchy. Novatian’s theology is consistent with the later Nicene formulation, which maintains relational subordination (the Son is begotten, not unbegotten) while affirming ontological equality.
Novatian emphasizes the Son’s obedience and relational distinction, he consistently affirms Christ’s deity and equality with the Father in essence. Subordinationism, if present, is only relational and functional, not ontological, making this passage incompatible with Arian or any ontological subordinationist interpretation.
Jerome's translation of the Greek term "ἀρχὴ" in Revelation 3:14 as "prīncipium creaturae Dei" in the Vulgate is highly significant, as it reflects his understanding of the Greek text and the theological implications of the phrase. The Latin word "prīncipium" is a versatile term meaning "beginning," "principle," "source," or "origin." In philosophical and theological contexts, it often conveys the idea of being the foundation or source of something. By choosing "prīncipium," Jerome emphasized Christ's preeminence and foundational role in creation, which aligns with the broader Christological interpretation of Revelation 3:14.
The choice of "prīncipium" highlights Christ as the origin and cause of creation, not merely the first in chronological sequence. This corresponds with other biblical passages, such as Colossians 1:16-17, which describe Christ as the one through whom all things were created and who sustains creation. Jerome’s choice may have been influenced by the need to avoid interpretations that could suggest Christ was a created being. The Arian controversy, which denied the full divinity of Christ, was still fresh in the theological landscape during Jerome’s time. By using "prīncipium," Jerome left room for the understanding of Christ as both the cause and ruler of creation, consistent with Nicene orthodoxy.
Jerome could have chosen from several other Latin terms to render "ἀρχὴ," but each carries specific nuances that would have altered the meaning or emphasis of the phrase:
1. "Initium": “Beginning” in a temporal sense, referring to the start of something. If Jerome had used "initium," it could have suggested a strictly temporal understanding of Christ as the first point in time within creation. This would risk implying that Christ was part of creation rather than its originator or ruler. "Initium" lacks the philosophical depth of "prīncipium" and could be misconstrued as subordinating Christ within creation, aligning with Arian theology.
2. "Prīmōrdium": Refers to the “earliest beginnings” or “primordial state” of something. "Prīmōrdium" would emphasize Christ as the first or earliest part of creation, which could again risk an interpretation aligned with subordinationist or Arian views. While richer than "initium," "prīmōrdium" lacks the connotation of causality or governance inherent in "prīncipium." It could have been misunderstood to mean Christ is merely the first among created beings.
3. "Orīgō": “Origin” or “source,” often emphasizing the point from which something arises. "Orīgō" could have been a plausible alternative, as it conveys the idea of Christ as the source of creation. However, it lacks the sense of preeminence and ruling authority found in "prīncipium." Jerome likely preferred "prīncipium" because it better encapsulated both Christ’s role as the cause of creation and His ongoing authority over it.
4. "Rudīmentum": “First principle” or “rudimentary beginning.” "Rudīmentum" would have emphasized Christ as the basic or formative principle of creation. However, it carries connotations of something undeveloped or primitive, which would be theologically inappropriate. This term would diminish Christ’s full divinity by suggesting an immature or incomplete aspect of His role in creation.
5. "Exōrdium": “Beginning” or “starting point,” with a rhetorical or structural nuance. "Exōrdium" would place emphasis on Christ as the starting point of creation but lacks the metaphysical and authoritative connotations of "prīncipium." This term, like "initium," would focus on temporal beginnings rather than Christ’s ontological primacy and causative role in creation.
"Prīncipium" aligns with the philosophical language of the time, particularly the Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian frameworks adopted by early Christian thinkers. It conveys the idea of a foundational principle that governs and sustains creation. By using "prīncipium," Jerome avoided any language that could imply Christ was merely a creature or had a beginning in time. The Nicene Creed affirms Christ as “begotten, not made,” and "prīncipium" supports this by emphasizing causality and preeminence rather than creation. "Prīncipium" harmonizes with John 1:1-3 and Colossians 1:16-17, which portray Christ as the source of all creation, distinct from created beings.By choosing "prīncipium," Jerome reinforced the Nicene understanding of Christ as the origin and cause of creation. This translation helped clarify that Christ’s relationship to creation was one of authority and causality, not inclusion within it.
It would be worth checking whether the Vetus Latina, made in the 2nd century, also has "principium".
The problem with the language (at least for me), is that in order to avoid ontological distinction the language has to be used almost equivocally, so something and its source are ontologically distinct, generation involves sequential bringing into being, in other words the language all are kinds of causation, now I know that this is what careful theology is avoiding, but the problem I see is that I don't know whats actually being said, I only know the language being used, but the language, being so removed from how the language is generally used, becomes vacuous.
Yes Arius believe the son was a creature (as do I), but I just wish people would be more careful to not say there was a "time" before the Logos for Arius, it's not that important, just a pet peve of mine.
I suppose whether or not Arius believed the Son had a beginning and thus was not eternal depends on what you mean by "beginning."
When it comes to clarity, I understand that theology cannot expel mystery, and shouldn't try to (attempting to expel all mystery ends up in idolatry), any time we are talking about the infinite ground of all being we're going to need intellectual humility. However, when language is being demanded, on pains of heresy, but without the language having any clear content, this isn't mystery, its not apophatism, it's word games. I don't even thing the language is even analogical, because even with analogy you can find what the basic common meaning is, even if the usages of the term have different senses, in terms of generation, or begetting, etc etc ... I don't even know where the analogy is supposed to be.
Roman, I've been reflecting on the terminology, eternal origin. An origin usually implies a beginning and end, but Trinitarians want to argue that the Son has an origin that lacks a beginning and an end since it's supposed to be timeless. That part of the "eternal generation" notion is problematic to me and so is the suggestion that God the Son gets either his essence or existence from the Father. It's difficult for me to understand how a self-existent God derives his essence or existence from another divine person.
https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/15/1/35
Eternal generation and causation
Trinitarian theology deliberately uses analogical language, not univocal or equivocal terms, to speak about God. According to Thomas Aquinas, analogical terms allow us to speak truthfully about God while acknowledging the infinite difference between Creator and creature. Terms like "generation" or "begetting" are drawn from human experience but signify realities that transcend finite causation. In human terms, "generation" involves sequential causation and temporal dependency. In the divine context, these features are negated. The Son is eternally begotten, meaning that the Father is always the Father, and the Son is always the Son. There is no "before" or "after" because divine processions occur in eternity, not within time. The Son's "generation" is an eternal act of self-giving within the divine nature. This is why Trinitarian theology affirms that the Son is of the same essence (homoousios) as the Father. Thus, the language is not vacuous but precise in articulating mystery. It avoids the pitfalls of univocal causation (which would imply ontological distinction) while preserving the relational distinction of persons.
The term "origin" in Trinitarian theology does not imply a temporal beginning but a relational distinction. St. Thomas explains that the Father and the Son are distinguished by their relations of origin, which are 1) eternal (the Father's act of generation has no beginning or end because it occurs in eternity) and 2) ontologically unified (the Father generates the Son within the divine essence, so there is no division or subordination). The phrase "eternal generation" affirms that the Son receives His personal identity (not His divine essence) from the Father. The Father is the "principle without principle," while the Son is the "principle from the principle," yet both fully share the same divine nature. As the Council of Florence states: "In God, all things are one where there is no opposition of relation."
Mr. Foster claims it is incoherent for a self-existent God to derive His essence or existence from another person, but this conflates the person of the Son with the essence of God. In Trinitarian theology the divine essence is one and undivided. All three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) fully possess the same divine essence. The Son derives His PERSONAL existence (as Son) from the Father, not His essence. The Son's procession as "begotten" refers to His relation to the Father, not to the origin of the divine essence itself. St. Thomas writes: "Paternity is a relation, and the relation itself is the same as the essence in God, but it distinguishes the persons." The Son's "self-existence" is therefore preserved because He fully possesses the divine essence. His generation concerns personal origin, not essential dependency.
Analogical language does have a common foundation, even if its application differs. In human terms generation refers to the communication of nature (e.g., a father begets a son, sharing his human nature). In divine terms generation refers to the communication of the divine nature. The Father communicates the fullness of the divine essence to the Son without division, temporality, or imperfection. The analogy lies in the act of communication, though the mode is infinitely higher in God. The analogy breaks down only if one insists on importing human limitations (e.g., temporality or dependence) into divine realities. Augustine addressed this concern by emphasizing that while human language is limited, it still communicates truth when purified of creaturely limitations.
While Arius may not have explicitly described a "time" before the Logos, his theology necessarily implies it. Arius held that the Son was not begotten, but created by the Father, and at least implied that there was a moment when the Son "was not." By asserting that the Son is a creature, Arius denies the eternal existence of the Son. The distinction between "created" and "eternal" is categorical—something either always exists or it begins to exist. Thus, Arius’ denial of the Son's co-eternity with the Father leads directly to a temporal understanding of the Son's origin, even if Arius attempted to obscure this point.
The Hollingsworth article mentions that the patristic and medieval thinkers understood the Eternal Relations of Origin (ERO) in terms of causality, specifically Aristotle's efficient causality. But while the patristic fathers occasionally used causal language (e.g., “aitia” or “principium”), it was not causality in the strict Aristotelian sense of "efficient causation" as articulated in contemporary metaphysics. The fathers were careful to avoid notions that would imply temporal succession or ontological subordination. Gregory of Nyssa explicitly stated that causation in the Trinity denotes “a manner of existence” rather than a temporal or ontological dependency: “Cause” and “caused” describe the relational distinction between the Father and Son without implying change or production in the divine nature. Aristotle's efficient cause refers to a process of bringing something into being, which inherently suggests potentiality and actualization—concepts incompatible with God as “actus purus” in classical theism. Hollingsworth conflates patristic causality with a contemporary framework of efficient causation that assumes production, which the fathers explicitly ruled out by affirming God's simplicity and immutability.
According to Hollingsworth the ERO can be described as causal relations without involving temporal succession, citing analogies like the sun and its rays to illustrate this atemporal causation. The analogy of the sun and rays, while helpful for illustrating the simultaneity of divine relations, falls short when applied to causation. The analogy of simultaneous causation (e.g., a widow being caused by her husband’s death) presumes time as a framework, whereas the ERO occurs in eternity, where there is no "before," "after," or even "simultaneity" in temporal terms. Analogies like the sun and its rays are meant to signify the eternal procession without implying causality as understood in created terms. The Son’s generation is described as an eternal act, not as an effect produced by a cause. Aquinas and other scholastics avoided temporal or sequential language to affirm that the relations of origin in the Trinity are intrinsic to the divine nature. The term “causality” is analogical here, referring to relational dependence, not a process of effectuation.
Hollingsworth appears to assert that the Son and Spirit depend on the Father as their cause, which raises concerns about subordinationism or ontological inequality. While the Son and Spirit are relationally FROM the Father (via generation and spiration), they are not ontologically subordinate. Gregory of Nazianzus rejected any hierarchical implications of causality in the Trinity, stating that relational terms like “Father” and “Son” express modes of personal existence within the unity of essence. By framing the ERO in terms of efficient causation, Hollingsworth risks reintroducing notions of dependency and production that the pro-Nicene fathers explicitly rejected.
Hollingsworth mentions contemporary metaphysical theories of causation, such as powers theories, to explain the ERO, but applying these modern causal theories to the ERO risks to undermine the unique character of divine relations. Powers theories assume potentiality within the cause to bring about an effect. This is inapplicable to God, who is purely actual and lacks any potentiality. The Father’s generation of the Son is not an exertion of power but an eternal act intrinsic to the divine essence. Using contemporary metaphysical categories, which are grounded in creaturely experience, risks projecting finite causality onto the divine nature, contradicting the apophatic tradition of patristic theology. Classical theism deliberately refrains from over-specifying the mechanics of ERO to preserve divine mystery. The attempt to "cash out" the ERO in terms of contemporary metaphysical theories undermines the transcendence of God.
Hollingsworth contrasts classical understanding of the divine simplicity with social trinitarian models but neglects that divine simplicity is foundational for understanding the ERO. Without simplicity, the unity of the divine essence is compromised. Classical theism affirms that relational distinctions in the Trinity (e.g., Father as unbegotten, Son as begotten) do not imply composition or multiplicity within the divine essence. This relational framework is not adequately addressed in Hollingsworth’s paper, leading to potential misinterpretations of the ERO as separate "parts" or "agents."
Do you read? I asked for someone credible i.e not you..
I’m assuming this is all theological garbage until I get either a reputable source or someone like Terrence answers me
How does Aquila translate Gen 1:1 Ninc?
You can spout all the garbage 50 million paragraph essays you like ( how is this constructive dialogue?) no one here buys anything you say…
Because you haven’t cited a single source for said claims
@Anonymous.
Try not to get riled up. Remember that Nincs suffers with autism. Try to view his style of communication through the lens of his disability. People with Aspergers tend not to pick up on the social queues and tend to monologue over one specialist subject and don't realise when others are completely disinterested, or even worse, distasteful of what they have to say. He isn't here to intentionally harm, or at least I wouldn't say so. (Matt 7:1).
People on the spectrum tend towards one specialist subject and memorise endless facts on that one topic, without being able to explicate outside of their own memorised scripts they create. Nincs could have had just as much fervour and robotic obsession with trains, or postage stamps dated from the 1800s, however his mind has settled on Roman Catholic dogmatics as his specialist "spectrum" subject.
Be grateful that he's here.
You'll find no greater human encyclopedia on Catholicism.
Use his monologues to strengthen and refine your own position, and gain an insight into the history and development of how the Roman church deviated and became the Babylonish mess it has. But don't take things personally.
He is neurodivergent. But he means well.
Thanks for your thoughts, Nincs. Others here do not like you. But I do!
En kephalaiō ektisen ho Theos syn ton ouranon kai syn tēn gēn
Was there a time that the Church thought that the universe was Eternal having no beginning or ending. And if Jesus is before all other things including the universe than he would be eternal.
Well we know the universe is not eternal. So it is not necessary to assume that if Jesus who existed before it would also have to be Eternal with the Father. So no it is not necessary. Proverbs 8:30 tells us he Jesus became the "Master Craftsman" ( NAB quote) "Master Worker" (NWT quote) this bring to like that Jesus was involved in creation but he was not the designer, Jehovah is. Jehovah produce/possessed the one who would become known as the son of God. Words of course change meaning as time goes by. No one will argue with that. Etymology meaning of possess to hold in the form of owning. If you own a slave they are not your equal. Eternal Generation is also not biblical it is a made up term from some ignorant person. Ignorant of the creator and his word the bible. True you can argue against the Idea of the expression Ignorant, but that doesn't change the fact that eternal generating is not found in the bible. To say that this is the way it is being explained does not mean it is correct either it just means that is the thought process that was used to explain it to the challengers of the teaching of Christians. Who should have just went with the bible says... And left it at that. The bible makes complete sense and with the holy spirit help who Jesus said he would send it is completely understood. There are no mysteries. Any religion who relies on mysteries to control the masses is corrupt.
@Nincs
Yep, we “neuro-normals” are party to non PC, emotionally loaded language at times. It procured my desired result, however.
You responded in a more humane and non-robotic way.
You do “suffer” with autism, my friend. Albeit you claim, and apparently, not consciously. Emotional and non-verbal communication marks a large percentage of the interpersonal world, a world I imagine you find yourself inept at participating in naturally and with meaning. That can’t be easy for you. Your retention of and ability to recall information is remarkable, but what your brain filters out as “noise” might actually be the keynote address. Sorry you missed it.
Whether “the church” (whatever men claim that to be) deviated from the Truth is not the point. Neither is our correct understanding and mental application of the philosophical language of dead men the point, either.
Perhaps one day you’ll realise. Perhaps not.
Finally, you state that your rhetoric and long verbiage is not self-serving, then proceed to boast in its benefits to you as an individual in a courtroom setting. I can assure you that it doesn’t serve the vast majority of us. If it isn’t serving your audience, (and that’s us, by the way), who else could it possibly be serving? The “Church” perhaps? It only serves you, my friend.
People on the spectrum get blind-sided all the time at the subtle nuances apparent to everyone else but them. The positive reinforcement you get due to its benefitting your career should not negate the fact that that has a very limited range of applications as to its strengths and usually in only specialised fields. Commenting on blogposts where no one likes you and no-one wants to hear your opinion is a prime example of your autism causing you to come across as ego dominant and emotionally avoidant in attachment style. You may not consciously have intended to be, but you do present that way, sorry.
I’ll leave it there for now.
Thanks for the dialogue.
Terrence
Too clarify - I do not dislike Ninc as a person.. I have said before they are lovely ( multiple times in fact)
And tho it may seem I’m getting frustrated or whatever, I’m not - I’m more blunt in text generally, look at my engagements with anyone on this blog - very similar rhetoric, Ninc fails to answer any challenge posed to their position, so I’m even more blunt with him.
What I do disagree with as follows
- posting 50+ paragraph essays when people have asked them to stop doing so ( I count at least 6 seperate times )
I know about autism, it runs in my family - this is NOT a social que tho - this is an EXPLICIT request of which has neither been responded to nor adhered to.
- accusing others of “quote mining” when they themselves proceed to basically say Catholic way is the only right way, while omitting AUTHORITY on the subject.
I.e BDAG on Rev 3:14 - why can’t Ninc just accept that “beginning” likely means first-created”?
Or that firstborn always has a temporal meaning?
While citing no sources of their own ( when they have been very misleading on certain topics as I have pointed out and added context to.)
- selective uses of philosophical meanings.. we are to take the philosophical meaning to “beginning” as first cause or “principal” but when it comes to Col 2:9 suddenly the vulgate and said meanings are omitted. because they don’t suit the rhetoric being used.
- failing to mention certain details that are quite important to the topic being discussed.
I.e we are talking about the word “principle” and what it means..
I’ll just point out in the vulgate it is also used at Job 40:19 of a creature
Ninc cannot go and suddenly change the meaning to the word without valid linguistical evidence on why the change in meaning.
Theology does not count as evidence.
- consistent misuse of scriptures such as John 1:1A to talk about Logos eternity ( which it does not mention) it’s simply says he was “in the beginning”
This would not stop him existing before the start of creation.
As Justin martyr takes firstborn of creation to mean “begotten BEFORE creatures” but he never discusses eternity as Ninc would like to make out.
Again I’m by no means frustrated - more curious as to why we MUST accept the catholic tradition - but when linguistic points are bought up or requested they MUST fit in with catholic theology because it has been around for 2000 years..
There has been traditions that were wrong that were around for decades..
there are variants that came about in the 4th century that are interesting as they take away any implication of a “created”Christ, interesting because Clement uses word that Ninc say are the opposite in meaning but Clement before the 4th century uses them interchangeably. So does the bible
Wish I had more time to explain my thoughts but that’s it from me for now, again I’m NOT frustrated and mean no disrespect to Ninc - but my crotons is simply: evaluate your methods and don’t copy paste the same text over and over without having a valid reason besides preferred theology as to what is correct and not
Historically, the Catholic Church has never officially taught that the universe is eternal. The Church has always held that creation had a beginning, as affirmed in Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” This belief aligns with the doctrine of “creatio ex nihilo” (creation out of nothing), which was explicitly defended by early Church Fathers such as Augustine and later reaffirmed by theologians like Thomas Aquinas. According to the Fourth Lateran Council God is “creator of all visible and invisible things, of the spiritual and of the corporal; who by His own omnipotent power at once FROM THE BEGINNING OF TIME created each creature from nothing, spiritual, and corporal, namely, angelic and mundane, and finally the human, constituted as it were, alike of the spirit and the body.” Philosophical debates about the eternity of the universe, such as those between Aristotle and medieval Islamic philosophers, were engaged with by the Church, but the theological teaching has remained consistent: the universe is not eternal.
You claim it is unnecessary to assume Jesus is eternal if He existed before the universe. However, Scripture explicitly attributes eternality to Jesus. Proverbs 8:30 personifies wisdom as a “master craftsman” (“amos” in Hebrew). While early Christians sometimes used Proverbs 8 to describe Jesus as divine Wisdom, this text is metaphorical and cannot be taken as a literal account of Christ's origin. The Bible teaches that Christ’s divine nature is eternal and uncreated (John 1:1–3; Hebrews 1:2–3). Proverbs 8 is better understood in the context of Hebrew poetry, which personifies abstract concepts.
The idea that Jehovah "produced" or "possessed" Jesus misunderstands the metaphorical language of Proverbs 8. The Hebrew verb QANAH can mean "possess" or "create," but in the context of divine Wisdom, it refers to a relationship of ownership, not literal creation. Early Church Fathers recognized this distinction, clarifying that Jesus is not a created being.
While the specific term "eternal generation" does not appear in Scripture, the doctrine it describes is biblical. John 1:14, 18 speaks of Jesus as the "only begotten Son" (monogenēs), which the Church has interpreted as referring to the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son. The Nicene Creed, which affirmed the doctrine of eternal generation, was not "made up" by ignorant individuals but was a theological synthesis of Scripture, addressing heresies like Arianism. This creed is rooted in passages such as John 5:26, which speaks of the Father giving the Son life in Himself.
The assertion that "there are no mysteries" contradicts Scripture itself. For example, 1 Timothy 3:16 calls the incarnation of Christ a "great mystery." Additionally, Romans 11:33–36 speaks of the depth of God's wisdom and knowledge as beyond human comprehension. Mystery in Christianity does not mean irrationality but refers to truths revealed by God that surpass finite human understanding. The Trinity, for example, is a mystery not because it is illogical but because it pertains to the infinite nature of God.
The claim that religions relying on mysteries are corrupt misunderstands the role of mystery in faith. Christianity does not use mystery to "control" but to invite believers into deeper communion with God. Ephesians 3:9 speaks of "the mystery hidden for ages in God," which has now been revealed through Christ. Jesus Himself used parables and taught profound spiritual truths, not to obscure but to reveal to those willing to receive (Matthew 13:10–17).
@Anonymous
The accusation of "quote mining" is not about differing theological conclusions but about selectively presenting evidence in a way that misrepresents the broader context. For example, when I address Revelation 3:14, I have acknowledged different scholarly opinions, including interpretations like “first-created,” but I provide reasons why they are not linguistically or contextually robust when weighed against broader scriptural and theological evidence. BDAG, while respected, does not offer the sole authoritative voice on this matter—it is one of many resources. Revelation 3:14 (ἀρχή) is contextually consistent with meanings like “source” or “origin,” as seen in both scriptural and extra-biblical usage. The idea that it “likely means first-created” overlooks the broader semantic range and fails to reconcile this with passages like John 1:3 and Colossians 1:16-17, where Christ is depicted as the Creator, not part of creation. Regarding “firstborn,” scholarly sources—including BDAG—recognize both temporal and positional (preeminence) meanings. It is disingenuous to claim that “firstborn” ALWAYS carries a temporal connotation.
"Selective use of philosophical meanings, applying them to 'beginning' as 'first cause,' but ignoring them in Colossians 2:9."
This is a straw man argument. Philosophical meanings are employed where they are appropriate to the linguistic and theological context, not selectively. For example: In Revelation 3:14, the meaning of "ἀρχή" as “origin” or “source” aligns with the Johannine context and Christ's role as Creator (John 1:3, Colossians 1:16). This is consistent with philosophical and theological traditions that highlight Christ’s causative role in creation. Colossians 2:9 ("in him the fullness of deity dwells bodily") does not require reinterpretation in light of philosophical definitions. The text clearly affirms the ontological divinity of Christ, not simply a functional or derivative sense of divinity. The theological implications do not undermine the lexical integrity of the text.
"Failing to mention important details, like 'principle' in the Vulgate being used of a creature in Job 40:19."
The Vulgate's use of “principium” (or its variants) in Job 40:19 is irrelevant to the discussion of Revelation 3:14. Lexical meanings vary across contexts. For example in Job 40:19, “principium” refers to a "chief" or "foremost" position among created beings (in this case, Behemoth). This is a different context and does not inform how “principium” is used in Revelation 3:14. In Revelation 3:14, the context describes Christ's relationship to creation as its source or origin. This distinction is linguistically and theologically justified by parallel passages (e.g., John 1:3; Colossians 1:16-17). It is a false equivalence to conflate the two usages without addressing contextual differences.
"Misusing John 1:1 to discuss the Logos' eternity, which it does not mention—it only says he was 'in the beginning.'"
This accusation misunderstands both the text and the argument. John 1:1 explicitly affirms the eternal existence of the Logos. The phrase "Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος" (In the beginning was the Word) uses the imperfect verb "ἦν" (was), which indicates ongoing, continuous existence prior to the beginning of creation. This contrasts with "ἐγένετο" (came into being), used for created things in John 1:3. Early Church Fathers like Justin Martyr may describe the Logos as "begotten before all creation," but this is consistent with Nicene theology, which affirms the eternal generation of the Son. Justin does not deny the eternity of the Logos but focuses on His relationship to the Father and creation.
"We must accept the Catholic tradition, and linguistic points must fit Catholic theology."
This is a misrepresentation. My arguments are not predicated solely on Catholic tradition but on a holistic approach that integrates linguistic, contextual, and theological evidence. Linguistically, words like ἀρχή and πρωτότοκος (firstborn) are analyzed within their immediate and broader scriptural contexts. Theological conclusions are drawn based on how these terms function in the text, not imposed arbitrarily. Catholic tradition is cited where it aligns with the text and supports interpretations grounded in early Christian exegesis. This does not negate the need for robust linguistic analysis but highlights the consistency of theological understanding across centuries.
"Clement and others use words interchangeably that contradict Nicene theology."
Clement of Alexandria and other early writers often use terms like "Logos" or "Wisdom" with flexibility, reflecting the developing articulation of Christology. However the pre-Nicene Fathers, while sometimes imprecise, consistently affirm Christ’s divinity and unique role in creation. Any apparent contradictions are better understood as differences in terminology rather than substance. Nicene theology represents the formal clarification of these earlier insights, addressing ambiguities and ensuring consistency with the apostolic faith.
@Philip Fletcher
Proverbs 8:30, describing Wisdom as a “Master Worker,” does not negate Christ’s eternal existence but illustrates His active role in creation as the divine Logos. This passage uses personified Wisdom as a metaphor to describe God’s creative action, later identified with Christ in the New Testament (1 Corinthians 1:24). While Proverbs 8 personifies Wisdom as a "master worker," this does not reduce Christ to a subordinate role in creation. Instead, it highlights His intimate participation as Creator. The “Master Worker” imagery in Proverbs 8:30 reflects the active role of Wisdom (Christ) in creation but does not imply ontological subordination or that He is a creature. It demonstrates His cooperation with the Father in the act of creation.
“If you own a slave, they are not your equal."
This analogy is both theologically and logically flawed. While the Father is the source of the Son (eternal generation), this does not imply inequality or inferiority. The doctrine of the Trinity explicitly teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are coequal and coeternal. Philippians 2:6 states that Christ “did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped,” implying that He already possessed this equality and did not cling to it for personal advantage. The voluntary submission of the Son in the Incarnation does not negate His ontological equality with the Father.
"Eternal generation is not biblical; it is a made-up term by an ignorant person."
The doctrine of eternal generation is firmly rooted in Scripture and was articulated by the Church Fathers to explain the relationship between the Father and the Son. It asserts that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, emphasizing their unity and distinction within the Godhead.
John 1:18: “The only begotten Son [μονογενὴς υἱός], who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him.” The term "begotten" (μονογενής) refers to a unique and eternal relationship, not a temporal event.
Psalm 2:7: “You are My Son; today I have begotten You.” This verse is applied to Christ in Acts 13:33 and Hebrews 1:5, emphasizing His divine sonship.
Far from being a “made-up term,” eternal generation clarifies the biblical teaching that the Son is distinct from the Father but shares the same divine essence. It was articulated to combat heresies like Arianism, which claimed Christ was a created being.
"There are no mysteries. Any religion that relies on mysteries to control the masses is corrupt."
The claim that “there are no mysteries” contradicts both Scripture and Christian theology:
1 Timothy 3:16: “Great indeed, we confess, is the mystery of godliness: He was manifested in the flesh…” The Incarnation itself is described as a “mystery.”
Colossians 2:2-3 speaks of “God’s mystery, which is Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”
The concept of mystery in Christianity is not about “controlling the masses” but about the recognition that finite human minds cannot fully comprehend the infinite nature of God. The Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection are mysteries in the sense that they transcend human understanding, yet they are revealed truths that invite faith.
"Christians should have just gone with what the Bible says and left it at that."
This claim oversimplifies the role of theology and tradition. The Bible itself does not claim to be a self-interpreting document; rather, it presupposes the need for authoritative interpretation:
Acts 8:30-31: When the Ethiopian eunuch reads Isaiah, Philip asks, “Do you understand what you are reading?” The eunuch replies, “How can I, unless someone guides me?”
2 Peter 3:16 warns that Paul’s writings contain things “hard to understand,” which some twist to their destruction. This demonstrates the need for sound interpretation.
The early Church relied on both Scripture and apostolic tradition to combat heresies and clarify doctrine. The Nicene Creed, for example, was formulated to articulate the biblical truth of Christ’s divinity against Arian distortions.
Dear Nincsnevem, I'm willing to discuss the Trinity, but may we please not retread the same ground of qanah here and other topics we've covered before. Can we approach these issues differently and have constructive dialogue in the waning weeks of blog discussion here? Thank you.
I'm also trying to avoid John 1:1.
I'm going to set a limit for this thread. It will close around 12:00 am EST.
@Terence
I think you're misconstruing my character in everyday life, in an everyday situation I'm absolutely capable of casual conversation, friendships and healthy family relationships, and the like, so I'm a classic "high-functioning" one. Fortunately, my condition falls into the mild category, I enjoy the benefits and suffer only minor disadvantages, at least in my adult life.
But people like me rigidly separate life situations: if I'm talking to my friends now, I'm operating in "social" mode. If I'm talking about law, philosophy, theology etc., then the "social function" is turned off.
Then there are only arguments in their reality, and there's no personal aspect: there's no such thing as whether you're a good or likeable person, or whether your presentation style is catchy or not. All of this is just "noise" to me. I just look at what claim my debate partner is making in his post, what arguments he uses to support it, and I only respond to that, nothing else.
Is my argument effective in persuading? I don't believe that someone's deeply held beliefs can be changed by a few comments - no matter how good the content AND style - and I don't set such unrealistic goals. The realistic goal is that the other party might reconsider my arguments, and if I've convinced them that their view is not as clear-cut as they thought, then my contribution has been successful.
“the philosophical language of dead men”
Oh those "Dead White Males", huh? Leaving aside the academic (though more ideological) "debate" about it in the US (which I am fortunately far from), are you familiar with the term chronolatry? Metaphysical language is not some false imaginary concept detached from reality, used to build castles in the air. Good philosophy is really nothing more than common sense on a higher level.
"that has a very limited range of applications as to its strengths and usually in only specialised fields."
This is indeed true, but the field we are working on here is exactly one of those “specialised fields”. Or at least it should be, but most theological discussions degenerate into a primitive jab and trump cards like "pedophile priests and the Inquisition" (which is the reductio ad Hitlerum of theological discussions). What I like about commenting here is that there is much less from those stuff, so there's much less “noise”.
"ego dominant" - This is a common but completely unfounded accusation against people like me that they seem like conceited "smartass", but in reality, high functioning people on the spectrum have no ego complexes, are not narcissistic (on the contrary: many of them actually struggle with a lack of self-confidence even if they have achieved a lot), and even remove their own person from the picture when they argue.
I am not the one speaking, my arguments are. I am just a mouth, a pen (or keyboard), my person, personality, identity, etc. are all irrelevant. If what I say is true and correct, then it is, if it is not, then it is not, and nothing else matters.
“ but about selectively presenting evidence in a way that misrepresents the broader context. “ - where have any of us quote mined? Cite the discussion and extract and explain how it was used out of its context
( opinions do not count)
“ Christ's relationship to creation as its source or origin.” - but Christ isn’t the source of creation is he? The father is.
As the church fathers claim.
“ It is disingenuous to claim that “firstborn” ALWAYS carries a temporal connotation.” - please cite the exception where it is not possible for firstborn to have a temporal aspect in some sense of the word
It’s not.. all cases whether literal or figurative carry a temporal aspect to them.
“ Philosophical meanings are employed where they are appropriate to the linguistic and theological context”- philosophical meanings are NEVER employed by bible writers.
You simply employ them when YOU deem fit.
Beginning NEVER denotes authorship according to Barnes
Beginning in a genitive construction always denotes a sequence
And job 40:19 is referenced as a parallel quality commonly by dictionaries, scholars and commentaries alike… so your justification on this isn’t valid as there are highly educated people who do it… this is simply avoiding the inevitable
“ Any apparent contradictions are better understood as differences in terminology rather than substance.” - Clement uses first-created and firstborn interchangeably you cannot get around this fact.
You wanted an instance of Logos being called first-created, you got it - you can’t go changing the goal posts now.
“ uses the imperfect verb "ἦν" (was), which indicates ongoing, continuous existence prior to the beginning ” - this is what you WANT it too mean.. it is possible it means from the beginning onwards to now.
And as Robertson has said it could be understood to simply mean he existed at that time.. with NO indication to length of time.
And in the beginning became the word sounds goofy in English and even more so in Greek.
The accusation of quote mining was specifically in reference to the selective use of patristic texts and scriptural citations to support a non-Trinitarian view while ignoring the broader context of these sources. For instance the writings of Clement of Alexandria are often cited to argue that he used "first-created" for Christ, but the broader context shows that Clement affirmed Christ’s divine pre-existence and role in creation as the Logos. When he uses terms like "first-created," it is metaphorical or poetic, used for the Wisdom, without making a claim that the preexistent Son was a literally “ex nihilo” created being. Similarly, citing Proverbs 8:22 without acknowledging that many Church Fathers understood "ektisen” in a metaphorical sense rather than a literal one misrepresents their overall theology. Figures like Dionysius of Rome and Athanasius explicitly clarified that this verse refers to Christ’s role as Wisdom, begotten, not created. If the quotes were genuinely contextualized, they would not lead to conclusions that contradict the Nicene Creed or the consensus of the early Church Fathers.
"Christ isn’t the source of creation, is he? The Father is. As the church fathers claim."
This is a false dichotomy. The Church Fathers consistently affirmed that the Father is the source WITHIN the Trinity, but creation is mediated THROUGH the Son. This is clear in both Scripture and patristic theology:
John 1:3: “All things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made.” The Son (the Logos) is the agent through whom the Father creates all things.
Colossians 1:16-17: “For by Him all things were created, in heaven and on earth… all things were created through Him and for Him.”
“for the Word was the author of form and beginning to all the Æons that came into existence after Him.” (Irenaeus)
“The Father creates all things through Him, and He Himself is not created but is the Creator.” (Athanasius)
The Father’s role as the source does not diminish the Son’s active participation as Creator. Both roles are complementary within the Trinitarian framework. To deny that Christ is the source of creation in this mediated sense directly contradicts the testimony of Scripture and the theological writings of the early Church.
"Please cite the exception where it is not possible for firstborn to have a temporal aspect in some sense of the word."
The claim that “firstborn” always carries a temporal meaning is incorrect. There are clear instances where "firstborn" (πρωτότοκος) denotes preeminence or rank rather than chronology. "The firstborn of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως) does not indicate temporal sequence but preeminence over creation. This is clarified in the immediate context: “so that in everything He might be preeminent” (Col. 1:18). If Paul meant “first-created,” he would have used the term πρωτόκτιστος (first-created), which he deliberately avoided. Psalm 89:27: Referring to King David, God says, “I will make him the firstborn, the highest of the kings of the earth.” Here, “firstborn” clearly denotes rank and preeminence, not literal birth order or creation. The temporal aspect in "firstborn" is context-dependent and does not universally apply. When applied to Christ, it signifies His supremacy and authority over all creation, consistent with His divine nature.
"Philosophical meanings are NEVER employed by Bible writers. You simply employ them when YOU deem fit. Beginning NEVER denotes authorship according to Barnes."
The assertion that philosophical meanings are never employed by biblical writers is baseless. The Gospel of John, especially in the prologue (John 1:1-18), employs the term "Logos" (λόγος), which carries deep philosophical significance in Greek thought, including in Philo of Alexandria and Stoicism. John uses this term to communicate profound theological truths about Christ’s divine nature and preexistence to both Jewish and Hellenistic audiences. The claim that “beginning” (ἀρχή) “never” (?) denotes authorship is demonstrably false. In Revelation 3:14, the term ἀρχή can indeed mean “origin” or “source,” as recognized by reputable lexicons (e.g., BDAG). This interpretation aligns with John’s broader theology, which presents Christ as the agent of creation (John 1:3). The citation of Job 40:19 (“He is the first of the works of God”) as a parallel is misleading. The context refers to a creature (Behemoth) as the pinnacle of God’s creation, whereas Revelation 3:14 refers to Christ’s divine role in creation. The contexts are entirely different, and the linguistic parallel fails.
"Clement uses first-created and firstborn interchangeably; you cannot get around this fact."
This claim misrepresents Clement’s writings. Clement uses terms like "first-created" for the Wisdom (not Christ) in a metaphorical or poetic sense. However, Clement affirms Christ’s divinity and preexistence, and explicitly describes the Logos as eternal and uncreated (Fragments, Part I, section III). The use of "first-created" in certain context does not negate their broader theology, which affirms Christ’s divine nature. The Church Fathers often employed figurative language to communicate theological truths, but this language must be interpreted in light of their consistent affirmation of Christ’s co-eternality with the Father.
________________________________________
Imperfect Verb "ἦν": "This is what you WANT it to mean. It is possible it means from the beginning onwards to now."
The interpretation of "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 is not a matter of subjective desire but linguistic and grammatical evidence. The use of the imperfect verb "ἦν" indicates continuous, ongoing existence without reference to a starting point. This contrasts with "ἐγένετο" (came into being), used for created things in John 1:3. The Logos is distinguished from creation because He always “was” rather than “became”. Renowned Greek grammarians, such as A.T. Robertson, affirm the interpretation, that the use of the imperfect tense emphasizes the timeless existence of the Logos before creation. The suggestion that "ἦν" could mean "from the beginning onwards to now" contradicts the context of John 1:1, which explicitly distinguishes the eternal Logos from temporal creation.
“All ye who are looking for a man’s many words, understand the One Word of God, “In the beginning was the Word.” Now, “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth.” But, “The Word was,” since we have heard, “In the beginning God made.” Acknowledge we in Him the Creator; for Creator is He who made; and the creature what He made. For no creature which was made “was,” as God the Word “was,” by whom it was made, always. […] Look not for time in Him, by whom times were made. “The Word was.” But you say, “There was a time that the Word was not.” You say falsely; nowhere do you read this. But I do read for you, “In the beginning was the Word.” What look you for before the beginning? But if you should be able to find anything before the beginning, this will be the beginning. He is mad who looks for anything before the beginning. What then doth he say was before the beginning? “In the beginning was the Word.” But you will say, “The Father both ‘was,’ and was before the Word.” What are you looking for? “In the beginning was the Word.” What you find, understand; seek not for what you are not able to find. Nothing is before the beginning.” (Augustine, https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf106.vii.lxx.html )
Notice how John uses ἦν in 1:4, 8, 9, 15. To claim that the verb does not have a starting point is an opinion, not linguistic fact.
Edgar I have sent you a message on Academia (just notifying)
" If Paul meant “first-created,” he would have used the term πρωτόκτιστος (first-created), which he deliberately avoided." - yes, because it wasnt in common use in Pauls time...
and even if Paul did use it - would you then admit Christ is creation? no
" However, Clement affirms Christ’s divinity and preexistence, and explicitly describes the Logos as eternal and uncreated " - I don't have all the proof I need yet but quote me verbatum where I say Christ did not pre-exist or I deny his "divinity" (whatever that means to you...)
Do you know how eternity works it works in 2 directions you know, not one like you would try to make out.
" Psalm 89:27: Referring to King David, God says, “I will make him the firstborn, the highest of the kings of the earth.” Here, “firstborn” clearly denotes rank and preeminence, not literal birth order or creation. " - shall we ask academic experts whether it has a temporal meaning, I can cite 3 different sources right now that connect it with a temporal meaning.
"The suggestion that "ἦν" could mean "from the beginning onwards to now" contradicts the context of John 1:1, which explicitly distinguishes the eternal Logos from temporal creation." - how? on linguistic grounds it says he existed in the beginning until right now - saying nothing about the backwards implications..
"The claim that “beginning” (ἀρχή) “never” (?) denotes authorship is demonstrably false. In Revelation 3:14, the term ἀρχή can indeed mean “origin” or “source,” as recognized by reputable lexicons (e.g., BDAG). " - again shall we ask academic experts in the field, BDAG negates this with its "PROBABLE" comment - citing Job 40:19
"The context refers to a creature (Behemoth) as the pinnacle of God’s creation, whereas Revelation 3:14 refers to Christ’s divine role in creation. The contexts are entirely different, and the linguistic parallel fails." - The author of BDAG disagrees...
the context of Rev 3:14 says NOTHING about the meaning to the word.. (Allin was honest in that regard)
see Barnes commentary for the reference, he said it. im just quoting him.
you give alot of opinions not alot of facts (as shown by actaul academically credible sources)
"The assertion that philosophical meanings are never employed by biblical writers is baseless." - employing a term vs using a meaning to a word 90% of the population wouldn't use are 2 totally different things..
Logos is used as a title
Come on, your not that dense. you know what I meant, this is willfull ignorance at this point
"This is clarified in the immediate context: “so that in everything He might be preeminent” (Col. 1:18)" - this still has temporal significance tho... as Augustine points out.. God is before all - so is "pre- eminent" (Whatever that means to you)
"Before" - being the temporal modifier
" For instance the writings of Clement of Alexandria are often cited to argue that he used "first-created" for Christ, but the broader context shows that Clement affirmed Christ’s divine pre-existence and role in creation as the Logos. " - Clement uses Logs and Wisdom interchangably, there is no evidence otherwise (if you actaully did the study, you would know this) if you have evidence cite it
"citing Proverbs 8:22 without acknowledging that many Church Fathers understood "ektisen” in a metaphorical sense rather than a literal one misrepresents their overall theology. " - you mean in both cases it misrepresents YOUR theology, it has been proved they DID NOT hold the same trinitarian stance as you do today..
ofcourse this is now suddenly metaphorical... Where's your hard proof? We know texts were tampered with... it is not impossible that trinitarian rhetoric dominated.. any manuscripts we have would naturally be (any greek ones we have aswell, I would love to know how early they are, down to the estimated year)
okay so I [allegedly] quote mined fine (no one else has EVER accused me of this before..) anyone else?
"came into existence after Him.” (Irenaeus)" - ? it appears he is saying first the Son came into existence then everything else
Ireanus is unreliable to your cause - this is selective quoting
"Figures like Dionysius of Rome and Athanasius explicitly clarified that this verse refers to Christ’s role as Wisdom, begotten, not created. " - So now Wisdom is a role (not a typology)? Can we have more than just staunch trinitarians - How about some more neutrals - Atha cant really be trusted IMO (see Stafford's cited sources)
"begotten" (in my study) seems to be the first and direct [something] without an intermediatory agent
The only exception I can find being Paul. But I have a working theory on that.
@Edgar Foster
The verb "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 is in the imperfect tense, which indicates continuous or ongoing action in the past. Unlike the aorist (which would indicate a specific event or moment), the imperfect suggests that the Logos' existence was continuous and unbounded prior to the "beginning." The distinction is clear in John 1:3, where "ἐγένετο" (came into being) is used for created things. This shows John's intentionality in contrasting the eternal existence of the Logos with the temporality of creation.
You reference other uses of "ἦν" in John, implying it does not always mean eternal existence. However, the contextual use in 1:1 is unique because it pertains to the Logos' existence "in the beginning." The phrase "Ἐν ἀρχῇ" refers to the absolute beginning, paralleling Genesis 1:1, where God exists prior to creation.
So it is not the verb "ἦν" itself that is said to not have a starting point, but
1. This statement is made "Ἐν ἀρχῇ", in parallel with Genesis 1:1
2. From the solemn and essentially doctrinal nature of the prologue, where this statement is made
In passages like John 1:4 ("In Him was life"), the verb describes a present attribute of the Logos, not His eternal preexistence. The context clarifies its nuanced application.
Early theologians like Augustine emphasized the eternal nature of the Logos in John 1:1. Augustine stated, "The Word was…what do you seek before the beginning? He was." This underscores the theological consensus that "ἦν" denotes eternal, uncreated existence.
The objection fails to account for the intentional contrast between "ἦν" and "ἐγένετο" in John 1. Created beings "came into being" (ἐγένετο), while the Logos "was" (ἦν). This linguistic distinction is deliberate, underscoring the Logos' uncreated and eternal nature.
Scholars like A.T. Robertson and Daniel Wallace affirm that "ἦν" in John 1:1 denotes timeless existence. Robertson notes that the verb implies the Word's eternal being, distinct from temporal creation.
If "ἦν" in John 1:1 merely referred to the Logos existing "from the beginning onwards," it would fail to distinguish the Logos from created beings. By using "ἦν," John asserts that the Logos preexists the "beginning" itself, affirming His divine nature and coeternity with the Father.
If Jehovah's Witnesses were correct, then John 1:1a should read:
1. "en archē epoiēsen ho theos ton huión"
or
2. "en archē ektisen ho theos ton huión"
or at very least
3. "en archē eɡéneto ho huiós"
Using „epoiēsen” or „ektisen” mean „created”, and this would imply that the Son (ho huios) was a created being, aligning with the Arian view that Jesus is not eternal but was created by God. The verb „egeneto” means "became" or "came into being." This would imply a point in time when the Son did not exist and then began to exist, supporting a creationist Christology. None of these reconstructions reflect the original Greek text of John 1:1, which explicitly uses the imperfect verb "ēn", meaning "was." This verb indicates continuous existence without a starting point.
https://catholicinsight.com/the-big-bang-and-creation/
The absence of the term "πρωτόκτιστος" (first-created) in Paul’s writings is not due to a lack of vocabulary but a deliberate choice to avoid associating Christ with creation. If Paul intended to say that Christ was "first-created," the term πρωτόκτιστος would have been an available and clear choice. Instead, Paul used "πρωτότοκος" (firstborn) to emphasize Christ’s preeminence, not His creation. Even if the term πρωτόκτιστος were used hypothetically, its meaning would still need to be contextualized within Paul’s theology. Paul’s Christology (e.g., Colossians 1:15-18, Philippians 2:6-11) consistently portrays Christ as preexistent and divine, not as part of creation. Therefore, your speculation about admitting Christ as a creature even if πρωτόκτιστος were used is moot since the broader Pauline context explicitly denies it.
The phrase “I will make him the firstborn” (Psalm 89:27) clearly refers to David’s kingly preeminence, not his literal birth order or creation. The temporal element here is secondary and subordinate to the emphasis on rank and authority.In biblical usage, "firstborn" often denotes preeminence rather than chronology. For example in Exodus 4:22 Israel is called God’s “firstborn,” signifying its chosen status, not temporal primacy. In Romans 8:29 Christ is described as the “firstborn among many brothers,” emphasizing His role and authority in redemption, not a literal birth order. While certain sources may point out a temporal element, this does not negate the primary emphasis on rank, as evidenced by the consistent biblical context.
The imperfect verb "ἦν" (was) in John 1:1 indicates continuous existence without a starting point. Greek grammarians and lexicons consistently affirm this interpretation (e.g., A.T. Robertson, Wallace). It is not limited to temporal linearity as suggested. The juxtaposition of "ἦν" (was) for the Logos and "ἐγένετο" (came into being) for creation in John 1:3 underscores the distinction between the eternal preexistence of the Logos and the temporal origin of creation. This is a linguistic distinction that cannot be dismissed.
BDAG also acknowledges that “ἀρχή” in Revelation 3:14 can mean “origin” or “source.” While it notes the possibility of a temporal meaning (as in Job 40:19), the specific application to Christ in Revelation 3:14 aligns better with the interpretation of "source" or "origin" given the broader Johannine context (e.g., John 1:3, Colossians 1:15-18). The use of “ἀρχή” in Job 40:19 to describe Behemoth as the "chief" of God’s works does not equate to its use in Revelation 3:14. The latter explicitly refers to Christ's role in creation, consistent with the Johannine theme of the Logos as the agent of creation. The broader context of Revelation emphasizes Christ’s authority and divine role (e.g., Revelation 1:17-18, 5:13-14). Applying a purely temporal interpretation to "ἀρχή" in Revelation 3:14 would contradict this overarching theme.
The term “Logos” in John 1:1 undeniably draws on Hellenistic philosophical concepts, particularly as developed by Philo of Alexandria. While John adapts the term to express Christian theology, its philosophical implications cannot be dismissed as irrelevant or inaccessible. The Bible frequently employs terms and concepts with philosophical or theological depth, as seen in Paul’s use of “stoicheia” (elementary principles) in Galatians 4:3 and Colossians 2:8, or the author of Hebrews’ use of Platonic imagery (e.g., shadows and heavenly realities in Hebrews 8:5, 10:1).
Many early Church Fathers (e.g., Athanasius, Augustine) explicitly interpreted Proverbs 8:22 metaphorically, understanding "created" (ektise) as referring to Christ’s incarnation or role as Wisdom, not His ontological status as a creature. Claims of text tampering lack substantiation. The Greek Septuagint (LXX) predates the Trinitarian controversies, and its use of "ektise" in Proverbs 8:22 reflects the translators’ attempt to convey the Hebrew term "qanah" (acquire) in a way consistent with its broader semantic range. Irenaeus explicitly affirms Christ’s eternal generation from the Father and His role as Creator, misrepresenting Irenaeus to support a temporal creation of Christ ignores his consistent affirmation of Christ’s divine nature and preexistence.
The term πρωτοκτίστος appears in Clement's Stromata (5.14.89.5), where he refers to Wisdom (Sophia) by this term. You argue that this suggests Clement viewed the Logos as a created entity. However Clement explicitly distinguishes between Wisdom as an attribute or operation of God (used metaphorically in Proverbs 8:22) and the eternal Logos. The use of "first-created" here likely refers to a poetic or figurative description, not a literal ontological status. Clement is not asserting that the Logos was created but rather emphasizing the primacy of divine wisdom in creation's order. Clement adopts allegorical language to explain scriptural passages. His philosophical approach often borrows terminology from Greek thought while reinterpreting it within a Christian framework, distancing himself from literalist interpretations. In Stromata 5.12, Clement declares that God is without parts and indivisible, and the Logos shares in this divine simplicity. He writes that the Logos emanates eternally from the "bosom of the Father," illustrating the consubstantial and eternal nature of the Logos(Stromata).
Clement's opposition to Gnostic emanation theories is significant. He refutes the idea that creation is an emanation of God's essence (common in Gnostic thought). Instead, he defends the distinction between Creator and creation, affirming creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing), which underscores the eternal and uncreated nature of the Logos. Clement often uses the term "first-born" (πρωτότοκος) to describe the Logos, following biblical language (Colossians 1:15). This term refers to Christ's pre-eminence and unique relationship with creation rather than a chronological sequence of being created. By identifying the Logos as "first-born," Clement aligns with Pauline Christology, affirming Christ's role as the agent of creation while maintaining His divine pre-existence.
Clement emphasizes that scriptural language often uses anthropomorphic and accommodative expressions to describe God in ways humans can comprehend. Passages referring to Christ as "first-created" or "Wisdom" are interpreted metaphorically or allegorically, not literally. Clement's writings have been misinterpreted post-Nicene, as noted by theologians like Photios. However, these misinterpretations arise from isolating terms without contextualizing them within Clement's broader theological framework. The concept of Christ's preexistence is incompatible with a purely temporal interpretation of "firstborn" or "beginning." Clement's writings describe the Logos as eternal, not subject to time or creation, which undermines any claim that Clement saw Christ as a creature.
By the way, the term πρωτοκτίστος does not exclusively and necessarily mean "first-created" in the narrow sense of being the first thing created. Its meaning depends on the linguistic and contextual usage, and it can carry a range of implications depending on how it is employed in the text. The term πρωτοκτίστος is a compound word:
πρῶτος (prōtos) = "first" or "foremost."
κτίζω (ktizō) = "to create" or "to found/establish."
While the literal construction of the word can suggest "first-created," it does not exclusively mean this in every context. Words with similar formations often have broader or figurative meanings. For example πρωτότοκος (first-born) does not always imply literal birth but can mean pre-eminence or rank (e.g., Colossians 1:15, where Christ is described as the "first-born of all creation" to signify supremacy, not temporal origin). Similarly, πρωτοκτίστος could imply pre-eminence, foundational role, or primacy in rank rather than a strict chronological creation.
The interpretation of πρωτοκτίστος is heavily dependent on its context. In theological writings like those of Clement of Alexandria, terms are often used metaphorically or analogically rather than literally. For instance Clement’s broader theology emphasizes the eternal nature of the Logos, making a literal interpretation ("first-created being") incompatible with his framework. In such contexts, πρωτοκτίστος could signify the Logos’s role as the foundation of creation or its primacy in the order of existence, without necessarily implying that the Logos is part of creation.
Greek terms often carry figurative or specialized meanings in philosophical and theological discourse. The term κτίζω itself can mean "to found" or "to establish" in a non-literal sense, such as founding a city or establishing an order. Thus, πρωτοκτίστος could be used metaphorically to signify the foundational or originating role of the Logos in creation, not its inclusion as part of creation. In Platonic and Hellenistic thought, "first-created" language is sometimes used symbolically to denote pre-eminence or the foundational principle in a metaphysical hierarchy.
Greek compound words often have nuanced meanings based on the relationship between the components. In some cases, πρῶτος (first) can indicate rank or priority rather than sequence (e.g., the "first" in importance or role). Similarly, κτίζω can imply something broader than literal creation, such as ordering or initiating a process. Thus, πρωτοκτίστος could reasonably be understood as "the one foremost in creation" or "the foundational principle of creation," depending on the context, without necessarily meaning "the first thing created." Clement uses terms like πρωτότοκος and ἀρχή in connection with Christ, often to denote pre-eminence rather than temporal priority. The same principle applies to πρωτοκτίστος, especially when used in a theological or metaphorical framework.
So Clement of Alexandria affirmed the eternal divinity and pre-existence of the Logos. His occasional use of terms like πρωτοκτίστος reflects a philosophical and figurative engagement with Greek thought and scriptural metaphors, not a literal belief in Christ as a created being. His works consistently uphold the Logos as co-eternal with the Father, integral to the classical Christian doctrine of God. Thus, the claim that Clement's Christology is Arian or subordinationist is unsubstantiated when examined in context. The term πρωτοκτίστος does not strictly or exclusively mean "first-created" in the sense of the first being created ex nihilo. Linguistically and contextually, it can carry broader meanings, including "foremost in creation" or "foundational to creation," especially in philosophical and theological discourse. Any interpretation must consider the broader context and the author's intended nuance, which often goes beyond a simplistic or purely literal reading.
Mod note: We're treading the same ground and points are being repeated in close proximity. We're clearly not going to agree on the ἦν issue. I'm aware that most all of the Trinitarian grammarians explain the verse and verb that way, but I think it's a theological construing of the data, not a linguistic or grammatical understanding of the verb, especially when we look at John's other uses of the verb. But will not approve further discussion of that point in this thread's limited life.
It's great that I got a lot of extra comments from what I said.
Here's the thing I am glad you pointed that out about the Catholic Church not equating the universe as Eternal. Nice to know.
Second Proverbs 8:30 in no way proves that Jesus is eternally generated. Personification of Wisdom in no way means he is wisdom. But it is a comparison. Etymology helps us to see it is an abstraction Wisdom represents Jesus but it is not Jesus he is much more than just wisdom.
It is in my opinion the highlight of ignorance to use that to say he is eternally generated.
The divine creature who became Jesus as a human had a beginning, he also has a God for he says to Martha my God and your God. To claim my God is to say I worship yes, Jesus worship someone and that someone is Jehovah God. Jesus says my God in several places in the bible. Here are the scriptures - John 20:17, Mark 15:34, (a quote of Psalms 22:1), Matt. 27:46, he says it 4 times in one verse at Rev. 3:12. Yes Jesus even in heaven claims to have a God he worships.
So now would Martha think of Jesus as almighty God?
It doesn't matter your biased point of view that isn't based on the question. Would Martha think that Jesus worships Jehovah as she does?
These are the questions any honest bible student would ask.
Without coming up with some lame explanation as to why or what she would believe the answer is obvious she does not believe that her resurrected lord is almighty God, but the son of God as the bible teaches.
It is a theological construction to the extent that we have to look at what the certain "arkhe" in John 1:1a refers to. According to the established explanation, it refers back to the absolute beginning according of Genesis 1:1.
The explanation of this concept is indeed not a linguistic, but a theological and philosophical question. Linguistics only gives the answer that the imperfect form of the verb to be is to be understood here: (already) ongoing, continuous existence. What is the theological consequence of asserting that the Logos was already in existence in the (absolute) beginning, when creation began at all, is obviously also not a linguistic question.
For example, if I say that there were already bananas on the shelves when the store opened, then logically this is only possible if they were placed there before the moment of opening. However, time began with the beginning of creation, and that which, although already in existence at the beginning of creation, is not temporal, but outside of time. And indeed, the view that the Logos was created at a specific point in time is indeed incompatible with this statement of John 1:1a. Of course, it must also be taken into account here that it can only be true for the "primum movens" that it did not begin to exist at a given point in time, which is: God.
Even more coherent is the Unitarian explanation, according to which the "arkhe" of John 1:1a does not refer back to an absolute beginning according of Genesis 1:1, but to the new creation.
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