Greetings,
"But when the Lord says that God is a Spirit, I think
that Christ spoke thus of the Father, as wishing that
something still more should be understood than merely
that God is a Spirit. For although, in His Gospel, He
is reasoning for the purpose of giving to men an
increase of intelligence, nevertheless He Himself
speaks to men concerning God, in such a way as they
can as yet hear and receive; although, as we have
said, He is now endeavouring to give to His hearers
religious additions to their knowledge of God. For we
find it to be written that God is called Love, and yet
from this the substance of God is not declared to be
Love; and that He is called Light, while in this is
not the substance of God" (De Trinitate 7).
Notice that propositions such as "God is love" or "God is light" are not metaphysical pronouncements (according to this passage), which is to say, Novatian thinks that they do not speak to the divine essence in se. One can find similar reasoning in orthodox writers belonging to the ancient and medieval period.
XAIREIN KAI ERRWSQAI,
Edgar Foster
Monday, January 18, 2010
Novatian's De Trinitate 7 and Metaphoric God-talk
Lactantius on the "Brightness" of Divine Truth
Hello all,
This is taken from Divine Institutes 1.5.1 (Numbering based on Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey's
Translation):
"the effect of the actual truth is too strong for even
a blind man not to see divine brightness when it
forces itself on his eyes."
Regards,
Edgar
Friday, January 15, 2010
Andrei Orlov on Metatron (the lesser YHWH)
Dr. Orlov is pretty good about making some of his works available online:
http://www.marquette.edu/maqom/metatronyhwh.html
http://www.marquette.edu/maqom/metatronyhwh.html
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
Bavinck on the Proper Name of God
"By means of proper names, especially by means of the name Jehovah, God made himself known unto Israel. Through the Mal'akh in whom his name abides, Ex. 23:20, he revealed himself to Israel" (Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, 84).
Saturday, January 02, 2010
Alexander R. Pruss on the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God
I am going to be editing this post, but I wanted to go ahead and submit it to my blog. It has been my contention that without the doctrine of divine simplicity being presupposed, the Trinity doctrine falls. Conversely, other Trinitarians have argued that it is difficult to make sense of the Trinity doctrine if one presupposes or believes in a simple or non-mereological deity. But it seems to me that without the presupposition or belief that God is simple while also being three persons in one God (one divine substance), what one has with the doctrine of God's triunity is really tritheism or modalism (depending on the respective formulation of the dogma). In any event, a number of thinkers have taken issue with the simplicity doctrine. One of these individuals is Dr. Alexander R. Pruss. You can reference his entire discussion at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html
Pruss' first objection to the divine simplicity doctrine is that it does not seem to allow for a meaningful predication of those attributes which distinctly characterize God. Let A = "God's perfect justice" and B = "God's perfect mercy." If the divine simplicity doctrine is correct, then A is ontologically identical with B such that it appears that it is not meaningful to discourse about God's perfect justice or perfect mercy since the two attributes would be identical in this case.
Pruss' first objection to the divine simplicity doctrine is that it does not seem to allow for a meaningful predication of those attributes which distinctly characterize God. Let A = "God's perfect justice" and B = "God's perfect mercy." If the divine simplicity doctrine is correct, then A is ontologically identical with B such that it appears that it is not meaningful to discourse about God's perfect justice or perfect mercy since the two attributes would be identical in this case.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Clement of Alexandria on 1 John 3:2
These remarks are taken from Cassiodorus' Latin translation of the Fragmenta from Clemens Alexandrinus. Cassiodorus lived in the sixth century CE, whereas Clemens lived approximately 150-215 CE.
'“Beloved,” says he, “now are we the sons of God,” not by natural affection, but because we have God as our Father. For it is the greater love that, seeing we have no relationship to God, He nevertheless loves us and calls us His sons. “And it hath not yet appeared what we shall be;” that is, to what kind of glory we shall attain. “For if He shall be manifested,”—that is, if we are made perfect,—“we shall be like Him,” as reposing and justified, pure in virtue, “so that we may see Him” (His countenance) “as He is,” by comprehension.'
Regards,
Edgar
Monday, December 28, 2009
Reply to Jason on Matthew 12:5ff
Hi Jason,
You write:
"Edgar, how does one account for the words 'not lawful' in Matt. 12:4 and 'profane' or 'desecrate' in Matt. 12:5, if Jesus was in fact arguing that His disciples were not breaking the sabbath, instead of arguing that He has the authority to dispense them from the obligation of keeping the sabbath?"
I do not believe that Jesus is agreeing with his opponents, who charge the disciples with practicing what is "unlawful" on the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-2). The Lord is replying to the baseless aspersions of the Pharisees who suggest that what the disciples of Jesus are doing on the Sabbath is unlawful or forbidden. But Christ uses the examples of David and the priests who work on the Sabbath to prove that God allows those engaged in his work to do what could be viewed as "unlawful" or could be seen as technically profaning the Sabbath. However, notice that Christ says the priests who work on the Sabbath are blameless (Matthew 12:5). A fortiori, why should not Christ's disciples also be considered blameless while they carry out God's work and pluck grain from the fields through which they walk (Matthew 12:6)?
There are some interesting observations found on this account in Aquinas' Catena Aurea. John Chrysostom states that the disciples broke the Sabbath law, but not "absolutely." They were given an "out," so to speak, because they were hungry. Jerome thinks that the disciples "broke the letter of the Sabbath," but he appears to believe that the charge of the Pharisees was false. Jerome writes:
"But the laws of God are never contrary one to another; wisely therefore, wherein His disciples might be accused of having transgressed them, He shews that therein they followed the examples of Achimelech [sic] and David; and this their pretended charge of breaking the sabbath He retorts truly, and not having the plea of necessity, upon those who had brought the accusation."
John Nolland (The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text) notes that the first mention of the Sabbath in Matthew's Gospel is found at our text in 12:1. After providing commentary that centers on what ancient Jewish writings (including the Philonic texts) stated about the Sabbath, Nolland then writes:
"a sympathetic viewpoint on the situation of the needy is likely to have treated their [the disciples'] eating in the fields on the sabbath as not constituting work that would violate the sabbath. Such was not the view of Philo or of the Pharisees we meet in the Gospels. But it clearly is the view of Jesus" (p. 482).
Commenting on Matthew 12:5, Nolland also maintains:
"Again what is established in that the non-work requirement of the sabbath is not absolute . . . Once more at best the comparison creates a space in which apparently unlawful behavior may be justified on other grounds" (p. 484).
You write:
"Edgar, how does one account for the words 'not lawful' in Matt. 12:4 and 'profane' or 'desecrate' in Matt. 12:5, if Jesus was in fact arguing that His disciples were not breaking the sabbath, instead of arguing that He has the authority to dispense them from the obligation of keeping the sabbath?"
I do not believe that Jesus is agreeing with his opponents, who charge the disciples with practicing what is "unlawful" on the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-2). The Lord is replying to the baseless aspersions of the Pharisees who suggest that what the disciples of Jesus are doing on the Sabbath is unlawful or forbidden. But Christ uses the examples of David and the priests who work on the Sabbath to prove that God allows those engaged in his work to do what could be viewed as "unlawful" or could be seen as technically profaning the Sabbath. However, notice that Christ says the priests who work on the Sabbath are blameless (Matthew 12:5). A fortiori, why should not Christ's disciples also be considered blameless while they carry out God's work and pluck grain from the fields through which they walk (Matthew 12:6)?
There are some interesting observations found on this account in Aquinas' Catena Aurea. John Chrysostom states that the disciples broke the Sabbath law, but not "absolutely." They were given an "out," so to speak, because they were hungry. Jerome thinks that the disciples "broke the letter of the Sabbath," but he appears to believe that the charge of the Pharisees was false. Jerome writes:
"But the laws of God are never contrary one to another; wisely therefore, wherein His disciples might be accused of having transgressed them, He shews that therein they followed the examples of Achimelech [sic] and David; and this their pretended charge of breaking the sabbath He retorts truly, and not having the plea of necessity, upon those who had brought the accusation."
John Nolland (The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text) notes that the first mention of the Sabbath in Matthew's Gospel is found at our text in 12:1. After providing commentary that centers on what ancient Jewish writings (including the Philonic texts) stated about the Sabbath, Nolland then writes:
"a sympathetic viewpoint on the situation of the needy is likely to have treated their [the disciples'] eating in the fields on the sabbath as not constituting work that would violate the sabbath. Such was not the view of Philo or of the Pharisees we meet in the Gospels. But it clearly is the view of Jesus" (p. 482).
Commenting on Matthew 12:5, Nolland also maintains:
"Again what is established in that the non-work requirement of the sabbath is not absolute . . . Once more at best the comparison creates a space in which apparently unlawful behavior may be justified on other grounds" (p. 484).
Saturday, December 26, 2009
Some Recommended Books
Armstrong, Karen. _A History of God_. New York: Ballantine, 1993.
Black, David A. _Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A
Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1995.
Brooks, James A. and Winbery, Carlton L. _A Morphology of New Testament
Greek_. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.
Grant, Robert M. _Heresy and Criticism: The Search for Authenticity in
Early Christian Literature_. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John
Knox, 1993.
Porkorny, Petr. _Die Entstehung der Christologie_ (The Genesis of
Christology). Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd., 1987.
Russell, D.S. _The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Old
Testament Library)_. Philadelphia, PN: Westminster, 1964.
Silva, Moises. _Philippians_ (Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary). Chicago,
Ill: Moody, 1988.
______ _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_.
Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1996.
Trakatellis, Demetrius C. _The Pre-Existence of Christ in Justin Martyr:
An Exegetical Study with Reference to The Humiliation and Exaltation
Christology_. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976.
Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and
Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.
Black, David A. _Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A
Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1995.
Brooks, James A. and Winbery, Carlton L. _A Morphology of New Testament
Greek_. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.
Grant, Robert M. _Heresy and Criticism: The Search for Authenticity in
Early Christian Literature_. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John
Knox, 1993.
Porkorny, Petr. _Die Entstehung der Christologie_ (The Genesis of
Christology). Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd., 1987.
Russell, D.S. _The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Old
Testament Library)_. Philadelphia, PN: Westminster, 1964.
Silva, Moises. _Philippians_ (Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary). Chicago,
Ill: Moody, 1988.
______ _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_.
Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1996.
Trakatellis, Demetrius C. _The Pre-Existence of Christ in Justin Martyr:
An Exegetical Study with Reference to The Humiliation and Exaltation
Christology_. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976.
Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and
Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.
Thursday, December 24, 2009
The Didache on Baptism
One question that comes up with regard to the Didache is, when was it written? Is it a first or second century document? While there is no unanimous consensus on this question, a number of scholars believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If so, this would comport with the observations of Origen and Tertullian regarding infant baptism taking place in their day.
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History, Page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70 (See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering (as usual) possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think the evidence favors the second century dating. I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation for deciding on that date. But as I said earlier, the contents belonging to the work incline me to assign second-century dating for the Didache. This factor along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my decision.
I think that baptism started out as the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." This famed and late ecclesiastical historian argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (Cf. The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that there were different kinds of baptism from the second century onward, though it seems that the Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts 8:34-39).
Harold O.J. Brown writes that "Although a critical reaction against its [the Didache's] significance took place in the earlier part of this century, its place as a valuable composition of the earliest of Apostolic Fathers texts is secure."
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. It also seems
highly unlikely that all believers in Christ practiced sprinkling at that time (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53, Tertullian ANF Series, 3.669-671).
Regards,
Edgar
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History, Page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70 (See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering (as usual) possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think the evidence favors the second century dating. I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation for deciding on that date. But as I said earlier, the contents belonging to the work incline me to assign second-century dating for the Didache. This factor along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my decision.
I think that baptism started out as the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." This famed and late ecclesiastical historian argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (Cf. The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that there were different kinds of baptism from the second century onward, though it seems that the Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts 8:34-39).
Harold O.J. Brown writes that "Although a critical reaction against its [the Didache's] significance took place in the earlier part of this century, its place as a valuable composition of the earliest of Apostolic Fathers texts is secure."
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. It also seems
highly unlikely that all believers in Christ practiced sprinkling at that time (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53, Tertullian ANF Series, 3.669-671).
Regards,
Edgar
Friday, December 11, 2009
Revelation 1:1 and SHMAINW
Regarding Rev 1:1: for SHMAINW, BDAG has
(1) to make known, report, communicate
(2) to intimate someth[ing] respecting the future, indicate, suggest, intimate
(3) to provide an explanation for someth[ing] that is enigmatic, mean, signify.
Rev 1:1 is categorized under (1) in this lexicon.
On the other hand, _The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_ explains that ESHMANEN (the aor indicative active of SHMAINW) can mean "to signify." Moreover, we read that "The word strictly means to show by some sort of sign, and it is esp[ecially] used of any intimation given by the gods to men, esp[ecially] concerning the fut[ure]" (page 610).
David Aune provides substantial textual evidence that suggests the NWT (New World Translation] is most certainly on the right track in its handling of ESHMANEN at Rev 1:1. After reviewing how the Greek verb SHMAINW is employed in extra-biblical literature and the NT, he writes:
"In Rev 1:1, SHMAINEIN cannot mean 'to indicate clearly.' By using the term SHMAINEIN, the author expresses the difficulty in understanding the revelation narrated in the text that follows, and perhaps even emphasizes the necessity of informed interpretation" (Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation 52A:15).
One pivotal classic text in this regard is Plutarch's De Pyth orac which reads:
OUTE LEGEI, OUTE KRUPTEI, ALLA SHMAINEI
"[Apollo] neither declares, nor conceals but signifies."
Aune comments:
"This [text' refers to the fact that the Delphic oracle gave ambiguous advice using images and riddles and that such advice required interpretation (see Kahn, Heraclitus, 121-23)."
Quoted from Aune, ibid.
Best regards,
Edgar
(1) to make known, report, communicate
(2) to intimate someth[ing] respecting the future, indicate, suggest, intimate
(3) to provide an explanation for someth[ing] that is enigmatic, mean, signify.
Rev 1:1 is categorized under (1) in this lexicon.
On the other hand, _The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_ explains that ESHMANEN (the aor indicative active of SHMAINW) can mean "to signify." Moreover, we read that "The word strictly means to show by some sort of sign, and it is esp[ecially] used of any intimation given by the gods to men, esp[ecially] concerning the fut[ure]" (page 610).
David Aune provides substantial textual evidence that suggests the NWT (New World Translation] is most certainly on the right track in its handling of ESHMANEN at Rev 1:1. After reviewing how the Greek verb SHMAINW is employed in extra-biblical literature and the NT, he writes:
"In Rev 1:1, SHMAINEIN cannot mean 'to indicate clearly.' By using the term SHMAINEIN, the author expresses the difficulty in understanding the revelation narrated in the text that follows, and perhaps even emphasizes the necessity of informed interpretation" (Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation 52A:15).
One pivotal classic text in this regard is Plutarch's De Pyth orac which reads:
OUTE LEGEI, OUTE KRUPTEI, ALLA SHMAINEI
"[Apollo] neither declares, nor conceals but signifies."
Aune comments:
"This [text' refers to the fact that the Delphic oracle gave ambiguous advice using images and riddles and that such advice required interpretation (see Kahn, Heraclitus, 121-23)."
Quoted from Aune, ibid.
Best regards,
Edgar
Monday, November 30, 2009
Mellone on Tertullian's Christology
Sydney H. Mellone on Tertullian's Subordinationist Christology
"He [Tertullian] has not avoided a subordination not only in the order of revelation to mankind but in essential being. Even if we set aside his purely metaphorical illustrations, we find it clearly stated that the Father is the originating principle of the Son and the Spirit, and therefore holds in relation to them a certain superiority: 'The Father is wholly essential being (SUBSTANTIA): the Son is derived from the Whole as part thereof (PORTIO TOTIUS): the Father is greater than the Son, as One who begets, who sends, who acts, is greater than the One is begotten, who is sent, through whom He acts," (Leaders of Early Christian Thought, London: The Lindsey Press, 1954, Page 178).
The salient point that I wish to extract from Mellone's writing is the one that he makes about Tertullian subordinating the Son "in essential being" and not simply in the order of divine revelation. In Adversus Praxean 12 and Adversus Praxean 3, Tertullian suggests that the Father is superior to the Son in essential being, not just in the order of Heilsgeschichte.
Sydney H. Mellone (M.A., D.Sc.) was external examiner in Philosophy at the University of London.
Best regards,
Edgar
"He [Tertullian] has not avoided a subordination not only in the order of revelation to mankind but in essential being. Even if we set aside his purely metaphorical illustrations, we find it clearly stated that the Father is the originating principle of the Son and the Spirit, and therefore holds in relation to them a certain superiority: 'The Father is wholly essential being (SUBSTANTIA): the Son is derived from the Whole as part thereof (PORTIO TOTIUS): the Father is greater than the Son, as One who begets, who sends, who acts, is greater than the One is begotten, who is sent, through whom He acts," (Leaders of Early Christian Thought, London: The Lindsey Press, 1954, Page 178).
The salient point that I wish to extract from Mellone's writing is the one that he makes about Tertullian subordinating the Son "in essential being" and not simply in the order of divine revelation. In Adversus Praxean 12 and Adversus Praxean 3, Tertullian suggests that the Father is superior to the Son in essential being, not just in the order of Heilsgeschichte.
Sydney H. Mellone (M.A., D.Sc.) was external examiner in Philosophy at the University of London.
Best regards,
Edgar
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Justin Martyr and the Soul
"And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories" (1 Apology 44).
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Latest Amazon.com Book Reviews
See http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A1M2WK58L35MXJ/ref=cm_pdp_rev_title_1?ie=UTF8&sort_by=MostRecentReview#R2VZML53FPQ2US
Among some of the books that I have reviewed, the most up to date review is the book written by R.M. Grant Gods and the One God. Please check out my reviews on amazon.
Best,
Edgar
Among some of the books that I have reviewed, the most up to date review is the book written by R.M. Grant Gods and the One God. Please check out my reviews on amazon.
Best,
Edgar
Wednesday, November 04, 2009
Brief Thoughts on ALHQINOS/ALHQHS
Here are some brief thoughts on the ALHQINOS/ALHQHS:
Louw-Nida point out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly." See John 6:55.
This source comments on John 17:3 (in semantic domain 70.3), noting that this Johannine passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth." Cf. John 4:18. Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, "true, genuine."
I would encourage our brothers and sisters on this site to study the entry for ALHQINOS in BDAG. It is very informative, especially if one also consults the entry for MONOS in BDAG.
Your brother,
Edgar
Louw-Nida point out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly." See John 6:55.
This source comments on John 17:3 (in semantic domain 70.3), noting that this Johannine passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth." Cf. John 4:18. Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, "true, genuine."
I would encourage our brothers and sisters on this site to study the entry for ALHQINOS in BDAG. It is very informative, especially if one also consults the entry for MONOS in BDAG.
Your brother,
Edgar
Saturday, October 10, 2009
Plotinus and Birthdays
"Plotinus was so fervently committed to his Platonic ideas regarding the imperfection of his physical body, in contrast to the perfection of his eternal soul, that he refused to celebrate his birthday. His reasoning was that he was ashamed that his immortal soul had to be contained in such an imperfect vessel as his body, and that celebrating its birth was a cause for regret, not celebration" (John Chaffee, The Philosopher's Way: A Text with Readings, page 105).
Now I'm not citing this information to prove that we should not celebrate our day of birth (although I believe that celebrating birthdays is not a biblically based practice). However, I never knew that Plotinus did not celebrate his birthday and I found his reason for not celebrating his it to be an interesting one.
Regards,
Edgar
Now I'm not citing this information to prove that we should not celebrate our day of birth (although I believe that celebrating birthdays is not a biblically based practice). However, I never knew that Plotinus did not celebrate his birthday and I found his reason for not celebrating his it to be an interesting one.
Regards,
Edgar
Friday, October 09, 2009
Thomas Hobbes on Genesis 3
Taken from Hobbes' work Leviathan (chapter XX):
Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil, but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said that, having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed did tacitly censure God Himself. And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten," etc., as if He should say, doest thou that owest me obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured nor disputed.
Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil, but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said that, having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed did tacitly censure God Himself. And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten," etc., as if He should say, doest thou that owest me obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured nor disputed.
Sunday, October 04, 2009
Walter Kasper on the Son of God Concept in the Old Testament
The following is taken from Jesus the Christ (page 164):
the people of Israel (cf., among other texts, Exod
4.22-3; Hos 11.1), for the king as representative of
the people (cf., among other texts, Ps 2.7; 2 Sam
7.14) or - as in late Judaism - for any devout and
righteous Israelite (cf., among other texts, Ecclus
4.10), this usage is not based either on the
background of mythological-polytheistic thinking or on
the pantheistic background of Stoic philosophy,
according to which all men in virtue of their common
nature have the one God as Father and are therefore
called sons of God. The title Son or Son of God in the
Old Testament must be understood against the
background of election-faith and the theocratic ideas
based on it. Consequently, divine sonship is not
founded on physical descent, but is the result of
God's free, gracious choice. The person so chosen as
Son of God receives a special mission within salvation
history, binding him to obedience and service. The
title of Son of God therefore is understood, not as
natural-substantial, but functionally and personally."
I would add that the title "son of God" is also used as a scriptural metaphor for Jesus Christ and others.
"Although the Old Testament uses the title of Son for
the people of Israel (cf., among other texts, Exod
4.22-3; Hos 11.1), for the king as representative of
the people (cf., among other texts, Ps 2.7; 2 Sam
7.14) or - as in late Judaism - for any devout and
righteous Israelite (cf., among other texts, Ecclus
4.10), this usage is not based either on the
background of mythological-polytheistic thinking or on
the pantheistic background of Stoic philosophy,
according to which all men in virtue of their common
nature have the one God as Father and are therefore
called sons of God. The title Son or Son of God in the
Old Testament must be understood against the
background of election-faith and the theocratic ideas
based on it. Consequently, divine sonship is not
founded on physical descent, but is the result of
God's free, gracious choice. The person so chosen as
Son of God receives a special mission within salvation
history, binding him to obedience and service. The
title of Son of God therefore is understood, not as
natural-substantial, but functionally and personally."
I would add that the title "son of God" is also used as a scriptural metaphor for Jesus Christ and others.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
John Gill on Divine Omnipotence
Here is part of what Gill has to say about the almightiness or omnipotence of God:
The power of God reaches to all things, and therefore is, with propriety, called Omnipotence; all things are possible with God, and nothing impossible; this is said by an angel, and confirmed by Christ, (Luke 1:37; Mark 14:36) what is impossible with men is possible with God; what cannot be done according to the nature of things, the laws, rules, and course of nature, may be done by the God of nature, who is above these, and not bound by them, and sometimes acts contrary to them; as when he stopped the sun in its course, in the times of Joshua; made iron to swim by the hands of the prophet Elisha; and suffered not fire to burn in the furnace of Nebuchadnezzar, so that the three persons cast into it were not hurt by it, nor their clothes so much as singed, nor the smell of fire upon them: whereas, it is the nature of the sun to go on in its course, without stopping, nor can any creature stop it; and for ponderous bodies, as iron, to sink in water; and for fire to burn. There are some things, indeed, which God cannot do, and which the Scriptures express as, that "he cannot deny himself", (2 Tim. 2:13) nor do anything that is contrary to his being, his honour and glory, or subversive of it; thus, for instance, he cannot make another God, that would be contrary to himself, to the unity of his Being, and the declaration of his Word; "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", (Deut. 6:4) he cannot make a finite creature infinite; that would be to do the same, and there would be more infinites than one, which is a contradiction; he cannot raise a creature to such dignity as to have divine perfections ascribed to it, it has not, which would be a falsehood; or to have religious worship and adoration given it, which would be denying himself, detracting from his own glory, and giving it to another, when he only is to be served and worshipped: in such manner it is also said of him, that he "cannot lie", (Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18) for this would be contrary to his truth and faithfulness; he can do nothing that is contrary to his attributes; he cannot commit iniquity, he neither will nor can do it; for that would be contrary to his holiness and righteousness; (see Job 34:10,12, 36:23) he cannot do anything that implies a contradiction; he cannot make contradictions true; a thing to be, and not to be at the same time; or make a thing not to have been that has been[4]; he can make a thing not to be, which is, or has been; he can destroy his own works; but not make that not to have existed, which has existed; nor make an human body to be everywhere; nor accidents to subsist without subjects; with many other things which imply a manifest contradiction and falsehood: but then these are no prejudices to his omnipotence, nor proofs of weakness; they arise only out of the abundance and fulness of his power; who can neither do a weak thing nor a wicked thing, nor commit any falsehood; to do, or attempt to do, any such things, would be proofs of impotence, and not of omnipotence.
See http://www.pbministries.org/books/gill/Doctrinal_Divinity/Book_1/book1_08.htm
The power of God reaches to all things, and therefore is, with propriety, called Omnipotence; all things are possible with God, and nothing impossible; this is said by an angel, and confirmed by Christ, (Luke 1:37; Mark 14:36) what is impossible with men is possible with God; what cannot be done according to the nature of things, the laws, rules, and course of nature, may be done by the God of nature, who is above these, and not bound by them, and sometimes acts contrary to them; as when he stopped the sun in its course, in the times of Joshua; made iron to swim by the hands of the prophet Elisha; and suffered not fire to burn in the furnace of Nebuchadnezzar, so that the three persons cast into it were not hurt by it, nor their clothes so much as singed, nor the smell of fire upon them: whereas, it is the nature of the sun to go on in its course, without stopping, nor can any creature stop it; and for ponderous bodies, as iron, to sink in water; and for fire to burn. There are some things, indeed, which God cannot do, and which the Scriptures express as, that "he cannot deny himself", (2 Tim. 2:13) nor do anything that is contrary to his being, his honour and glory, or subversive of it; thus, for instance, he cannot make another God, that would be contrary to himself, to the unity of his Being, and the declaration of his Word; "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", (Deut. 6:4) he cannot make a finite creature infinite; that would be to do the same, and there would be more infinites than one, which is a contradiction; he cannot raise a creature to such dignity as to have divine perfections ascribed to it, it has not, which would be a falsehood; or to have religious worship and adoration given it, which would be denying himself, detracting from his own glory, and giving it to another, when he only is to be served and worshipped: in such manner it is also said of him, that he "cannot lie", (Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18) for this would be contrary to his truth and faithfulness; he can do nothing that is contrary to his attributes; he cannot commit iniquity, he neither will nor can do it; for that would be contrary to his holiness and righteousness; (see Job 34:10,12, 36:23) he cannot do anything that implies a contradiction; he cannot make contradictions true; a thing to be, and not to be at the same time; or make a thing not to have been that has been[4]; he can make a thing not to be, which is, or has been; he can destroy his own works; but not make that not to have existed, which has existed; nor make an human body to be everywhere; nor accidents to subsist without subjects; with many other things which imply a manifest contradiction and falsehood: but then these are no prejudices to his omnipotence, nor proofs of weakness; they arise only out of the abundance and fulness of his power; who can neither do a weak thing nor a wicked thing, nor commit any falsehood; to do, or attempt to do, any such things, would be proofs of impotence, and not of omnipotence.
See http://www.pbministries.org/books/gill/Doctrinal_Divinity/Book_1/book1_08.htm
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Death of My Dad (Correction)
Hello friends, I just experienced a deep loss. My dad passed away this Saturday afternoon (9/19/09): he was almost 78, so I got to enjoy his loving presence for many years. I'll miss him dearly. He taught me about God and opened the way up
(ultimately) for there to be an Edgar Foster who was interested in biblical Greek and
theology. Thanks to all of you! If you reply personally, I probably will not
have the ability to respond to every email, but please know that I appreciate you
all. What did the Romans say? Memento mori? At least I have my mother who has faithfully served Jehovah for more than 30 years. As for my dad-I trust in the God who can raise up redeemable humans from the dead (2 Cor 1:9).
Have a nice day,
Edgar
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Dialogue on Christian Materialism
A friend and I had a discussion not too long ago about "Christian materialism." Since that conversation is already public, I reproduce a portion of our dialogue for your consideration.
My friend writes:
> Although the view of those "Christian materialists"
> might be
> practically the same as ours, I always saw us (or
> myself) more
> as "idealists".
I reply:
The term "materialist" admittedly is somewhat confusing in this context. When thinking about a materialist, those who espouse atheism might come to mind. However, what the "Christian materialist" wants to assert (among other things) is that while the human body is not identical with what we are as persons--it does *constitute* what we are as persons. Think of "Christian materialism" in this way. The marble of a statue may not be identical with the statue; nevertheless, the marble does constitute the statue. Similarly, it is possible that our bodies constitute what we are as persons without being identical to our respective personalities. Maybe conscious states arise from neurobiological processes (started by God) and only neurobiological processes. It is possible that what we are as persons is primarily determined by synaptic connections and sensory experiences. I am speaking with respect to humans and not with regard to the angels.
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