My Review of Edward Feser's work The Last Superstition (Abbreviated)

Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Feser for producing a work that effectively (for the most part) dismantles the fragile straw house of ideas that has been constructed by the so-called "new atheists" (Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens). Feser employs wit, mental acuity and reason to refute the claims made by Dawkins and company. I have enjoyed reading his work, although like any other book, it has strong points and weaknesses. In reviewing this publication, I have pointed out what I perceive to be strengths or weaknesses.

1. The discussion on nominalism versus realism (theory of universals) was one of the best parts of Feser's book. While I do not agree with his depiction of nominalism in toto, I believe that the discussion is relatively simple. The author's illustration of realism which involves the example of a rubber ball was excellent. Since I teach undergraduates, I really appreciated his approach and how it helps one to understand the Aristotelian or Platonic claims regarding universals. See pages 57-62 for Feser's treatment of Aristotelian hylomorphism along with a discussion of both moderate and extreme realism.

2. Feser also critiques the Humean "attack" on causation/causality (pages 105-110). David Hume (1711-1776) argues that he is able to conceive a thing (a bowling ball, for example) coming into existence without a cause. However, Feser addresses this "argument" by noting that Hume is conflating or confusing the verb "conceive" with the verb "imagine." But the two actions delineated by the respective verbs "conceive" and "imagine" clearly are not the same acts. It is conceptually possible to grasp the concept of a "chiliagon" (a thousand-sided figure) but that does not mean it is conceptually possible to form a distinct mental image of a chiliagon. Hume's argument suggests that he fails to understand this important distinction.

3. The Last Superstition continuously exploits the notion of Aristotelian final causality. The final cause is the telos (i.e. end, result, goal, function or purpose) of a thing. One might say that an oak tree is the final cause of an acorn or that the final cause of a human embryo is a full grown adult. Aristotle believed that most everything in our natural world has a final cause: trees, humans, animals, and artificial objects all have a telos. Thomas Aquinas thus used Aristotle's thought on causes to build a case for the existence of God via unaided natural reason. See pages 114-119 of Feser's work.

4. Having mentioned some positive things about Feser's work, please allow me to include some critical feedback in this portion of my review. Feser has a wry sense of humor. Sometimes his jokes hit the mark and sometimes they do not. There are paragraphs in this book wherein the sarcasm and cockiness just drips like water. Some of the remarks are indeed amusing. Moreover, Dawkins and company probably deserve the sarcasm directed at them. Nevertheless, I would have loved to see less sarcasm, less of a smart-alecky tone and more seriousness pertaining to the task at hand.

5. Feser might also have stayed on task a little more rather than being diverted by political issues or didactic moralizing about contemporary moral topics. The arguments that he makes, for example, against abortion do not contribute directly to his general thesis, although I concur with his take on the issue.

6. Finally, Feser responds to the new atheists on the subject of mind. He contends that universals must exist and if they do in fact exist, then our thoughts about triangularity or squareness (two universals) must be immaterial. After making these observations, Feser maintains that neuroscientific findings cannot rightly be used to refute this Aristotelian and Thomist concept since Aquinas is not doing science (understood in the modern sense of the word) but metaphysics when he insists that universals especially qua concepts and the mind cannot be material things. I do not agree when Feser says that the findings of neuroscience (for instance) should not count against Aristotelian metaphysical demonstrations. Nor does it seem that one must construe mental concepts as immaterial, based on what neuroscience and reflections from modern philosophy of mind have yielded. The findings of neuroscience (like other forms of human knowledge) are provisional. But accounts regarding consciousness being a higher-level brain process have already been developed by philosophers and neuroscientists.

See http://www.amazon.com/Last-Superstition-Refutation-New-Atheism/dp/1587314525/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356106647&sr=1-1&keywords=the+last+superstition

Gospel of Mark's Rhetorical Style

The Gospel of Mark is generally portrayed as being plain or uncultivated and even ungrammatical at points. In his NIB commentary on Mark, Larry Hurtado observes:

"To begin with basics, Mark's account is heavily narrative, conveying the feeling of fast-paced action. His Greek style is simple and unsophisticated, using many simple sentences connected by the word for 'and.' A comparison of events found in Mark and in the other Gospels will show that his version often seems wordy and less well constructed" (page 11).

However, Hurtado offers this qualification of his opening statements regarding the literary style of Mark:

"Yet, Mark did employ certain techniques that demonstrate some skill and literary intent. As we shall see, he sometimes quotes, but more frequently alludes to, the OT and seems to have expected his readers to be sufficiently familiar with it to appreciate these allusions" (ibid.).

(1) According to Hurtado, Mark's Gospel is "heavily narrative" and fast-paced. Therefore, we would expect certain literary devices or discourse markers to be present in Mark and they are. Indeed, one feature of the Gospel of Mark that is striking is the writer's continual use of the Greek EUQUS. It is no wonder that A. T. Robertson (A Grammar of the Greek NT) writes:

"broken and parenthetic clauses are frequent (cf. 7:19 KAQARIZWN); at times he is pleonastic (2:20 TOTE EN EKEINH TH hHMERA); he uses EUQUS (W. H.) 41 times; he is emotional and vivid, as shown by descriptive adjectives, questions and exclamations (cf. 1:24; 2:7); the intermingling of tenses (9:33ff., EPHRWTA . . . LEGIE . . . EIPEN) is not due to ignorance of Greek or to artificiality, as Swete well says, but to 'a keen sense of the reality and living interest of facts; there are 151 historic presents in the W. H. text against 78 in Matthew and 4 in Luke; there is frequent and discriminating use of prepositions (2:1, 2, 10, 13); the connective is usually KAI rather than DE, seldom OUN; there is little artistic effect, but much simplicity and great vividness of detail; the vernacular KOINH is dominant with little literary
influence, though EIPEN, PAIDIOQEN and OYIA are held so by Norden" (pp. 118-119).

(2) It has often been said that Mark's account of Jesus' life contains ungrammatical constructions. But one scholar, who challenges this charge, is David A. Black. Black faces this oft-mentioned criticism of Mark by utilizing the tools of discourse analysis and descriptive linguistics. Black's essay can be found in Linguistics and NT Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis. Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1992.

The name of Black's study is "Discourse Analysis, Synoptic Criticism, and Markan Grammar: Some Methodological Considerations" on pp. 90-98 of the above referenced publication, which he edits along with Katharine Barnwell and Stephen Levinsohn.

Discourse analysis refers to the inspection of macrostructures (i.e. phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs and entire compositions) as opposed to lexemes or individual units of sound-meaning (otherwise known as words). Richard A. Young points out that discourse analysis examines genre, structure, cohesion, propositions, relations, prominence, and setting as well.

Discourse analysis is a top-down approach to communicative situations. It probes context (the socio-political and religious climate or Sitz im Leben), the co-text (literary context of a text) and the text itself rather than simply focusing on the potential significations of sound-forms.

In any event, Black avails himself of discourse analytical principles and a descriptivist approach (linguistically) to refute the charge that Mark's Greek is ungrammatical at times. I highly recommend his essay along with Robertson's big grammar which contains information on each NT book and its style. Moreover, Nigel Turner has penned a book on style that also deserves consideration.

Revelation 22:3 and Daniel 7:27

George W. Buchanan contends that the singular third person pronoun in Rev 22:3 (AUTWi) could refer to God or to the Lamb: he does not argue that the pronoun must refer to both referents or antecedents.

One line of reasoning that indicates God receives LATREIA, writes Buchanan, is the fact that the hOI DOULOI could potentially be priests of God, and then they would be rendering LATREIA to the God whom they serve as priests and "slaves" (Rev 1:5-6).

On the other hand, Buchanan continues, Dan 7:27 (LXX) shows that the present nations and governments will one day become "subject to the saints and, of course, also to their leader, the Son of Man, who is here [Rev 22:3] called the Lamb" (Buchanan 612ff).

Buchanan thus seems to argue that strictly speaking the "saints" (holy ones) of the Most High actually receive the honor and obedience mentioned at Dan 7:27; but it seems that he wants to suggest that by the nations subjecting themselves to the holy ones, they also by default render homage to the leader of the holy ones. In this regard, Buchanan may be correct. But this line of reasoning does not seem to demonstrate that the Son of Man is the one who receives LATREIA in Rev 22:3. LATREIA is evidently not mentioned in Dan 7:27.

As Buchanan continues, however, it becomes clear that he is not claiming that the Messiah technically is worshiped or is ever ontologically on par with the Divine One. He appeals to his notion of forensic agency in which one has a principal and a legal agent to establish this point.

The legal agent may receive deference that is really directed toward the principal. But this fact does not indicate that the legal agent is equal (ontologically) to the principal. The concept of legal agency may well illustrates the relationship between the Father and the son of God. At any rate, it is clear that Buchanan is in no way arguing that the Lamb receives worship as the Father receives worship (LATREIA). But as we have also established hitherto, God is the most likely referent of AUTWi in Rev 22:3. He is the one whose face will be seen by those who are part of the first resurrection (1 Jn 3:1-3; Rev 20:4-6). God likely is the object of priestly LATREIA.

As a side note: Edward J Young (The Prophecy of Daniel: A Commentary) writes that the antecedent of the pronoun in the latter part of Dan 7:27 "is people, not Most High."

Louis Hartman and Alexander Di Lella (Anchor Bible Commentary on Daniel) also note that the pronominal suffix of MALKUTEH refers to 'AM ('people') and not to the Most High. It thus seems possible that both the Hebrew text and the LXX say the "holy ones" are obeyed in Dan 7:27.

Source: Buchanan's Mellen Series Commentary on Revelation

Regards,
Edgar

Does Revelation 20:9 Necessarily Rule Out the Heavenly Hope?

In his 3-volume commentary on Revelation, David Aune delineates the hermeneutical possibilities for the Greek expression τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὼν ἁγίων in Revelation 20:9a. They are

1) The heavenly city.
2) The encampment of the people of God which is identical with "the beloved city."
3) The encampment of the people of God stationed outside the city in expectation of the impending attack.
4) The martyrs with Christ in Jerusalem (Revelation 14:1-5).
5) An army of angels (perhaps the force mentioned in Revelation 19:14) that is "bivouacked" in Jerusalem's vicinity. In fact, Eichhorn renders the phrase with the Latin wording "castra angelorum" (cf. 2 Kings 6:17; 1QM 7:6 and 19:1).

Number 1) is taken from the commentary on Revelation by R. H. Charles. He argues that the heavenly city descends to the earth, but as I've noted previously, his interpretation is not necessarily the correct one. The heavenly city could be under attack insofar as its representatives are being assailed. Jesus taught that if you harm his brothers, you hurt him. Remember the words, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me"?

Number 5) might also be a viable possibility.

The Etymological Significance of the Preposition DIA

Romans 11:36 has DIA + the genitive which can be translated either as "through" or "by." Either translation is able to communicate the notion of intermediate agency, I would say. Colossians 1:16 is also DIA + genitive and Hebrews 2:10 is DIA + the genitive case (DI' hOU). What will determine how one renders the construction should be context or translator preference. But, as I see it, nothing is wrong with communicating agency with "through" or "by." BDAG shows that DIA may be used as a "marker of instrumentality or circumstance whereby someth. is accomplished or effected, by, via, through" (page 224); DIA can also be a "marker of pers. agency, through, by" (BDAG, 225).

In John 1:3, 10; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Colossians 1:16, DIA is used of "Christ as intermediary in the creation of the world" (BDAG, 225).

I examined a number of grammars that I own and one helpful resource I found was A.T. Robertson's A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research. On p. 580, Robertson quotes Delbruck who has "nothing to say" about the origin of DIA. Nevertheless, Robertson proceeds to offer a number of illuminating comments on this Greek preposition, wherein he notes that "there is no doubt about DIA being kin to DUO, DIS. (cf. Sanskrit DVIS, Greek DIS, b = v or U); German ZWEI; English two (fem. and neut.), twain (masc.), twi-ce, twi-light, be-tween, two-fold, etc."

A Discussion on 1 Peter 3:19

[Edgar]
Paul J. Achtemeier has a very thorough discussion on 1 Pet. 3:19 in his commentary on Peter's First Epistle that you can find in the Hermeneia series. He carefully reviews the explanations that have been posited vis-a'-vis 1 Pet. 3:19 and he then writes: "There is a clear Jewish tradition, however, in which the angelic beings of Gen. 6:1-6, whose disobedience caused the flood, were subsequently imprisoned" (Achtemeier 256). He adds: "That it is this tradition which underlies the reference to 'spirits' in our verse seems therefore likely to be the case" (256).

So while Achtemeier is not really dogmatic about the identity of the spirits in 1 Pet. 3:19--he does suggest that the view which I have advanced is probably the least problematic approach.

[Harry]
My questions to you would be, what is the point of introducing angels at 3:19, and what was Jesus accomplishing by going to a special group of angels already in prison?

[Edgar]
According to the discourse structure or context of 1 Pet. 3:19, there are a number of good reasons why Peter introduced the wicked spirits or angels in his discussion. Keep in mind that Peter is trying to show his brothers and sisters why they should suffer for the sake of righteousness (1 Pet. 3:16,17). In 3:18, he employs the example of Christ as a (the) model for all Christian believers. Since Christ suffered and subsequently died for our sins, though he was and is righteous, and since his ignominious and painful death opened the way for humans to approach God with a clean conscience, since he was also put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit and in this state (as the NWT says) he went and assured the angels of their doom--we too should suffer as Christ did and desist from sins, while asking God for a good conscience by being baptized in water through the resurrection of Christ from the dead (1 Pet. 3:18-4:1, 2). So the example of the fallen angels helps us to see the consequences of apostatizing from God. The mention of these rebellious spirits also impresses on us the fact that the waters of baptism (the antitype of the flood) can either serve as a salvific step to those who avail themselves of this godly provision. But baptism will not profit those who refuse to be immersed through the resurrection of Christ. Achtemeier thus suggests that Peter employs the story about the angels so that "Christians can face their future with confidence, despite whatever suffering that future may portend, because Christ has triumphed over the most powerful forces of the universe. The salvation Christ promises is therefore sure, and confidence in that Lord can sustain Christians until the final judgment, whose coming is sure and whose advent will rescue Christians from their tormented lives" (Achtemeier 246).

[Edgar continued]
As I will show later, KHRUSSW does not always refer to proclaiming the Gospel.

[Harry]
I said that it does so when Jesus is used with it, that is when he is the
one doing it in the NT. I did not say that it always referred to
proclaiming the Gospel.

[Edgar]
In your message dated 00-11-26 17:15:20 EST, you wrote: "i think of Jesus' preaching as positive because the Greek word kerussw, when used with Jesus in the NT, always has a positive connotation of a preaching of the Gospel."

But please notice that Jesus himself evidently used the word KHRUGMA to describe the message that Jonah preached to the men of Nineveh (Matt. 12:41; Lk. 11:32). The LXX also has KHRUSSW at Jonah 1:2 in delineating Jonah's message of doom. Achtemeier concludes that KHRUSSW "does not automatically mean that the content of the proclamation is forgiveness or salvation" (262).

Another work states: "In 1 Peter 3:19 there is no reference to evangelizing, but to the act of Christ, after his resurrection, in proclaiming His victory to fallen spirits"(Zodhiates, Complete Word Study: NT, page 928).

Answering Objections to the New Jerusalem Post

Certain objections have been set forth in reply to my New Jerusalem blog entry that I will now address:

1) I have written that the New Jerusalem (Revelation 21:1-5) descends from heaven in John's vision, but it does not light upon earth in the vision. That view may be logically inferred; however, it's not exactly what the text itself says. Revelation 21:2 states: "I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband" (NIV). Later, we read: "One of the seven angels who had the seven bowls full of the seven last plagues came and said to me, 'Come, I will show you the bride, the wife of the Lamb.' And he carried me away in the Spirit to a mountain great and high, and showed me the Holy City, Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God." In both sets of passages, we have the Greek structure καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ which includes the present active participle καταβαίνουσαν. The present morphology of the verb suggests progressive (not completed) action. The visionary never claims that the city became situated on earth. Some have interpreted the city's descent as an ongoing thing, whereas Gregory K. Beale understands the descent as a reference to the future because of how participles function in relation to finite verbs. In either case, we don't have to understand the city's descent in terms of completed action.

2) A further objection contends that the city and its descent are literal "within the apocalyptic imagery" of John's revelation. Revelation 3:12 supposedly buttresses this line of reasoning. But the language contained in 3:12 can be interpreted figuratively. One can become a symbolic "pillar" in the temple of God (Galatians 2:9) and emblematically have the name of God's holy city written upon one's person (Revelation 14:1). There's no need to interpret the discourse literally. For notice that Christ also promises to write his new name and the name of his God upon the loyal overcomer. Are we to construe all of these promises literally? Beale (The Book of Revelation, 295) writes that the pillar imagery of Revelation 3:12 "is a metaphor for the believer."

3) It's clear that we're talking about a symbolic visionary city (Revelation 21:9). If the city is actually the Lamb's bride, then a literal polis is not the focus of John's discourse. Additionally, this city has representatives on earth who suffer attack in the city's behalf. Just as Jehovah is personally distressed when opposers persecute his people, so the holy city is affected by attacks that are launched against its representatives. Compare Zechariah 2:8; Revelation 12:13. I thank "a servant of Jehovah" for reminding me of that last reference.

4) My criticism of Middleton invoking Revelation 5:9-10 is that he prefers the rendering "on the earth" whereas it should more likely be "over the earth." As I have written elsewhere, I do not understand the translation "over the earth" as a reference to location. Rather, it signifies authority: the kings and priests will exercise authority towards the earth. The text is not communicating the idea that Christian kings and priests will be located above the earth in terms of spatial orientation.

But Middleton renders the verse incorrectly, IMO. And while Exodus 19:5-6 may constitute a hermeneutical lens through which Revelation 5:9-10 may be read and understood, the latter text does not technically quote the former. It's an allusion at best. Finally, my interlocutor accepts the inference that since Exodus 19:5-6 is probably a restatement of the promise to Abraham, therefore, the blessing promised to Abraham must entail living forever on earth without any hope of heavenly life. But no such logical entailment necessarily follows from any of these premises.

Historian Brian Tierney on Papal Infallibility

"If the popes have always been infallible in any meaningful sense of the word--if their official pronouncements as heads of the church on matters of faith and morals have always been unerring and so irreformable--then all kinds of dubious consequences ensue. Most obviously, twentieth century popes would be bound by a whole array of past papal decrees reflecting the responses of the Roman church to the religious and moral problems of former ages . . . To defend religious liberty would be 'insane' and to persecute heretics commendable. Judicial torture would be licit and the taking of interests on loans a mortal sin. The pope would rule by divine right 'not only the universal church but the whole world.' Unbaptized babies would be punished in Hell for all eternity. Maybe the sun would still be going around the earth. All this is impossible of course. No one understands the fact better than modern theologians of infallibility. If past popes have always been infallible--again, we must add, in any meaningful sense of the word--then present popes are hopelessly circumscribed in their approaches to all the really urgent moral problems of the twentieth century, problems involving war, sex, scientific progess, state power, social obligations, and individual liberties . . . Real infallibility has regrettable implications. In the years since 1870, therefore, theologians have devoted much ingenuity to devising a sort of pseudo-infallibility for the pope, a kind of Pickwickian infallibility" (Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility: 1150-1350, pages 2-3).

Will New Jerusalem Literally Descend to the Earth?

J. Richard Middleton has written an article in which he posits the view that earth will be the only eternal home for mankind post-eschaton.

While I obviously agree with Middleton concerning the hope for everlasting or eternal life on earth, I could not disagree with him more when he argues that no Christian will find his/her everlasting dwelling place in heaven (Daniel 7:13-14, 27; 2 Corinthians 5:1-2).

First, I believe that much of his problem derives from weak exegesis in connection with the relevant texts. I am not a professional exegete but I have been reading the Scriptures for over twenty years with an intense desire to understand what they say. I find that Middleton arrives at sweeping conclusions based on a hasty analysis of the germane Biblical verses he discusses.

For instance, it is true that Revelation 21:2, 10 speaks of New Jerusalem "coming down out of heaven from God" (KATABAINOUSAN EK TOU OURANOU TOU QEOU) arrayed as a bride. However, the text does not explicitly say that the city lands on earth, even if that is a valid inference that one might derive from its language. Moreover, we must remember that John was beholding a vision of things that would occur in the Lord's day. Revelation 21:10 tells us that the apostle was taken to a mountain on which he saw New Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God. The curious thing about the city, however, is that one wonders how it could ever fit on earth in view of its dimensions (Revelation 21:15-17). It is obvious that the city is figurative (Revelation 21:9) and that the motif of descent (KATABASIS) should not be literally
construed (Compare Exodus 19:11). Other commentators have interpreted this passage in similar ways.

Bruce Malina notes that the "holy city" is "of astronomical proportions, since it measures 12,000 stadia in length, width, and height" (_The New Jerusalem in the Revelation of John_, 54).

After pointing out that the city of New Jerusalem is a cube, Malina cites Pliny's Natural History which tells us that a Greek stadion is equivalent to 125 Roman paces or 625 feet. The holy city, if measured in accordance with Pliny's comments, would thus extend through half of the USA and "reach the height of 260 Mount Everests (the top of Mount Everest stands 29,028 feet above sea level). Furthermore, the city was of transparent gold, 'gold like pure crystal'" (Ibid).

John does not seem to be saying that the city, even in a metaphorical sense, would land on earth. This interpretation seems to be a misreading of the text.

Albert Barnes says the following about Revelation 21:2:

"On the phrase 'new Jerusalem,' See Barnes 'Galatians 4:26'; See Barnes 'Hebrews 12:22.' Here it refers to the residence of the redeemed, the heavenly world, of which Jerusalem was the type and symbol. It is here represented as 'coming down from God out of heaven.' This, of course, does not mean that this great city was literally to descend upon the earth, and to occupy any one part of the renovated world; but it is a symbolical or figurative representation, designed to show that the abode of the righteous will be splendid and glorious. The idea of a city literally descending from heaven, and being set upon the earth with such proportions--three hundred and seventy miles high, (Revelation 21:16,) made of gold, and with single pearls for gates, and single gems for the foundations--is absurd. No man can suppose that this is literally true, and hence this must be regarded as a figurative or emblematic description. It is a representation of the heavenly state under the image of a beautiful city, of which Jerusalem was, in many respects, a natural and striking emblem."

Another problem that I have with Middleton is his use of Revelation 5:9-10 to demonstrate his point. EPI in that verse probably should be rendered "over" based on how it is employed in that particular context (See BDAG Lexicon and Richard A. Young's intermediate grammar).

Ancient Ecclesiastical Views on Proverbs 8:22

Many more examples could be provided [EF]

I added: "You perceive, my hearers, if you bestow attention, that the Scripture has declared that this Offspring was begotten by the Father before all things created; and that which is begotten is numerically distinct from that which begets, any one will admit." (Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, CXXIX).

This power and disposition of the Divine Intelligence is set forth also in the Scriptures under the name of Σοφία, Wisdom; for what can be better entitled to the name of Wisdom than the Reason or the Word of God? Listen therefore to Wisdom herself, constituted in the character of a Second Person: "At the first the Lord created me as the beginning of His ways, with a view to His own works, before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled; moreover, before all the hills did He beget me;" that is to say, He created and generated me in His own intelligence. Then, again, observe the distinction between them implied in the companionship of Wisdom with the Lord. "When He prepared the heaven," says Wisdom, "I was present with Him; and when He made His strong places upon the winds, which are the clouds above; and when He secured the fountains, (and all things) which are beneath the sky, I was by, arranging all things with Him; I was by, in whom He delighted; and daily, too, did I rejoice in His presence." Now, as soon as it pleased God to put forth into their respective substances and forms the things which He had planned and ordered within Himself, in conjunction with His Wisdom's Reason and Word, He first put forth the Word Himself, having within Him His own inseparable Reason and Wisdom, in order that all things might be made through Him through whom they had been planned and disposed, yea, and already made, so far forth as (they were) in the mind and intelligence of God. This, however, was still wanting to them, that they should also be openly known, and kept permanently in their proper forms and substances. (Against Praxeas VI)

See also http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.ix.vii.html#v.ix.vii-p7.1

Compare http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.v.xviii.html#v.v.xviii-p15.1

Question Regarding Athenagoras

Hello Matt13,

My replies will appear below. You wrote:

Hello Edgar.

I would like to ask your advice on a translation question once again please.

GREEK TEXT: “...πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρί, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον...” - (Legatio Chapter 10, MPG)

ATHENAGORAS (circa 177 C.E.): “...the first offspring of the Father. I do not mean that he was created...” ” - (Legatio Chapter 10. Library Of Christian Classics)

ATHENAGORAS (circa 177 C.E.): “...the first product of the Father, not as having been brought into existence...” - (Chapter X. Pages 133-134, Roberts & Donaldson ANF.)

It is in regard to this word Gk., ( γενόμενον ) in particular.

The Persus Lexicon gives this information:

γίγνομαι
come into a new state of being
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut acc
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut nom
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut voc
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid masc acc
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=%CE%B3%CE%B5%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BD&la=greek

My question is, could Gk., ( γενόμενον ) be translated as:

“...[then] coming-into-a-new-state-of-being/existence...”

I'm not sure how the aorist tense works in this construction.

Is adding "...then..." inaccurate?

REPLY: Of course, you have to account for the presence of οὐχ. Therefore, the translation must include some form of negation. With aorist participles, translated woodenly literal, the rule is usually "having Xed" or "having been Xed" as in Philippians 2:6-7 (see the KIT). So, "having come into being" or "having come into a new state of being" might work. James A. Brooks and Carlton Winbery (Syntax of New Testament Greek, page 146) also point out that aorist participles may be rendered by "when," "since" or "after." We could use "as" or "while" to render aorist participles too. But I'm wondering what the reason might be for using "then" in translation. It could be possible, but I just wonder about the rationale for using it.

You wrote further:

One reason I think that Athenagoras ( possibly ) meant this ( sense ) is the close context where he quotes Proverbs 8:22 LXX just a few lines later saying the Logos was Gk., ( ekitzen ) "....created..."!

Which appears to be self-contradictory.

A second reason is perhaps the text has been tinkered with. Although I'm pushing that.

REPLY: I'm not sure that Athenagoras is alluding to Proverbs 8:22 in order to establish the created status of Christ. According to Donaldson's rendition, "The Lord," it says, "made me, the beginning of His ways to His works." It seems that Athenagoras understands the Son to have been generated rather than created (strictly speaking). He believes that the Son of God is also the beginning of God's works. Notice his statement regarding the holy spirit being "an effluence of God, flowing from Him, and returning back again like a beam of the sun." The ideals found in Athenagoras are reflected in other early writings as well.

A third reason for my interpretation is the internal ( non )-personal existence with-in the mind of God --- verses --- the external-projection theory which is shared among the Apologists. In which he, (the Logos), ( then ) with-in God's mind, did not have a real or substantial ( personal ) existence, but ( later ) before the creation of the Universe/Kosmos came into existence as an inteligent living being when he was projected.

REPLY: It does seem that this kind of distinction can be ascertained in Athenagoras. There is probably a difference in his mind between the internal and external Logos.

John 7:8 and OUPW

Bruce Metzger observes that OUPW in Jn 7:8 "was introduced at an early date (it is attested by P66, 75) in order to alleviate the inconsistency between ver. 8 and ver. 10" (A Textual Commentary). However Ernst Haenchen (in his commentary on John) seems to think that OUPW is original. He reasons: "If Jesus does not know when his time is fulfilled and the Father calls him to Jerusalem (to die?) then logically he cannot say 'not,' but must say, as in v 6, 'not yet.' "

Even if OUK is not original, and we cannot be positively sure about its status, John's possible use of OUK does not mean that Jesus lied. A.T. Robertson points out that Jesus "did not change his plans . . . He simply refused to fall in with his brothers' sneering proposal for a grand Messianic procession with the caravan on the way to the feast" (Word Pictures in the NT).

Another scholar also makes this observation: "the more definite--and more difficult--reading, 'I am not going,' is undoubtedly the correct one. Jesus is represented as clearly refusing his brothers' proposal. He will not go to this festival at their request or initiative but only as his Father directs" (J.R. Michaels, John, 127).

C. K. Barrett writes: "He refuses in the plainest terms to comply with human--and unbelieving--advice, acting with complete freedom and independence with regard to men, but in complete obedience to his Father" (Barrett, John, 313).

Finally, we have these words from George Beasley-Murray: "That Jesus eventually goes to the festival EN KRUPTWi is to be interpreted strictly in relation to [John 7:4]: he journeys quietly to Jerusalem, without making any ostentatious entry into the city or drawing attention to himself on arrival at the festival" (Beasley-Murray, John 107).

Scotus, Aquinas and Infinity

John Duns Scotus defines infinite being as "a measure of intrinsic excellence that is not finite." For the Subtle Doctor, God is qualitatively infinite or exemplifies all of His divine qualities without limit. The Most High is therefore infinite power, infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. Infinity, for Scotus, is an intrinsic (non-relational) property.

Thomas Aquinas also considers divine infinity to be a negative property: it describes what God is not. He writes in Summa Contra Gentiles 1.43.1:

"But in God infinity can be understood negatively only, inasmuch as there is no term or limit to His perfection. And so infinity ought to be attributed to God."

In the same part of SCG, Aquinas supplies this data about infinity:

"Infinity cannot be attributed to God on the score of multitude, seeing there is but one God. Nor on the score of quantitative extension, seeing He is incorporeal. It remains to consider whether infinity belongs to Him in point of spiritual greatness. Spiritual greatness may be either in power or in goodness (or completeness) of nature. Of these two greatnesses the one follows upon the other: for by the fact of a thing being in actuality it is capable of action. According then to the completeness of its actuality is the measure of the greatness of its power."

Many years later, Louis Berkof similarly construes God's infinity in a qualitative (intensive) sense. He argues that infinity (as a descriptive term for God's perfection) "should not be understood in a quantitative, but in a qualitative sense; it qualifies all the communicable attributes of God. Infinite power is not an absolute quantum, but an exhaustless potency of power; and infinite holiness is not a boundless quantum of holiness, but a holiness which is, qualitatively free from all limitation or defect. The same may be said of infinite knowledge and wisdom, and of infinite love and righteousness" (Systematic Theology, p. 60).

DIKAIOW and BDAG Greek-English Lexicon

For DIKAIOW, Bauer, Danker, Arndt and Gingrich (BDAG) state that the potential senses of this word are (1) to take up a legal cause, show justice, do justice, take up a cause; (2) to render a favorable verdict, vindicate (Luke 7:35; 16:15); (3) be acquitted, be pronounced or treated as righteous and thereby become DIKAIOS (Galatians 2:16ff); (4) Concerning the view that DIAKAIOW can mean "make righteous," BDAG says the following:

"For the view (held since Chrysostom) that [DIKAIOW]
in these [Romans 3:24; 8:30, 33, Galatians 3:8] and
other pass[ages] means 'make upright' s[ee]
Goodsp[eed], Probs. 143-46, JBL 73, '54, 86-91."

LSJ observes that DIKAIOW may denote "set right, proved, tested, hold or deem right, claim or demand as a right, pronounce judgment, do a man right, chastise, punish, pass sentence on, have right done one, and pronounce and treat as righteous, justify, vindicate" (Exodus 23:7; Jeremiah 3:11; Luke 7:35; 16:15).

Louw and Nida's Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament Based on Semantic Domains observes that
DIKAIOW has the semantic range:

(a) to put right with
(b) show to be right
(c) acquit
(d) set free
(e) obey righteous commands

There are some interesting comments made regarding the forensic interpretation of DIKAIOW in semantic domain 34.46 of Louw and Nida. They basically argue that Paul stresses the covenant relationship between God and Christians as opposed to legal aspects of forensic judgment when he employs DIKAIOW. Under semantic domain 56.34, they also expand on the significance of the potential denotation, "acquit" by including the definition: "the act of clearing someone of transgression." See Acts 13:38; Romans 5:16, 18.

Finally, TDNT (2:215) states:

"For Paul the word DIKAIOUN does not suggest the
infusion of moral qualities, a justum efficere in the
sense of creation of right conduct. It implies the
justification of the ungodly who believe, on the basis
of the justifying action of God in the death and
resurrection of Christ."

My Revised Book Review of Tim Weldon's "Subtle Wisdom" (Link)

Tim Weldon has written a brief, but helpful introduction on John Duns Scotus. It's one of the simplest works I've ever read on Scotus. Please see http://voices.yahoo.com/the-sophisticated-wisdom-john-duns-scotus-11748226.html?cat=37

thanks,

Edgar

How Augustine Explains the Relationship Between Christ and the Holy Spirit

AservantofJehovah,

Maybe this quote from Augustine will be helpful. I post this information to promote understanding:

Therefore also the Lord Jesus Christ Himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received it as man, and therefore He is said to be full of grace, and of the Holy Spirit. And in the Acts of the Apostles it is more plainly written of Him, "Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit." Certainly not with visible oil but with the gift of grace which is signified by the visible ointment wherewith the Church anoints the baptized. And Christ was certainly not then anointed with the Holy Spirit, when He, as a dove, descended upon Him at His baptism. For at that time He deigned to prefigure His body, i.e. His Church, in which especially the baptized receive the Holy Spirit. But He is to be understood to have been then anointed with that mystical and invisible unction, when the Word of God was made flesh, i.e. when human nature, without any precedent merits of good works, was joined to God the Word in the womb of the Virgin, so that with it it became one person. Therefore it is that we confess Him to have been born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary. For it is most absurd to believe Him to have received the Holy Spirit when He was near thirty years old: for at that age He was baptized by John; but that He came to baptism as without any sin at all, so not without the Holy Spirit. For if it was written of His servant and forerunner John himself, "He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother’s womb," because, although generated by his father, yet he received the Holy Spirit when formed in the womb; what must be understood and believed of the man Christ, of whose flesh the very conception was not carnal, but spiritual? Both natures, too, as well the human as the divine, are shown in that also that is written of Him, that He received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, and shed forth the Holy Spirit: seeing that He received as man, and shed forth as God. And we indeed can receive that gift according to our small measure, but assuredly we cannot shed it forth upon others; but, that this may be done, we invoke over them God, by whom this is accomplished.

This quote is from De Trinitate 26.46.

Augustine of Hippo's Delineation of the Trinity Doctrine

"Wherefore also the Holy Spirit consists in the same unity of substance, and in the same equality. For whether He is the unity of both, or the holiness, or the love, or therefore the unity because the love, and therefore the love because the holiness, it is manifest that He is not one of the two, through whom the two are joined, through whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and loves Him that begot Him, and through whom, not by participation, but by their own essence, neither by the gift of any superior, but by their own, they are 'keeping the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace;' which we are commanded to imitate by grace, both towards God and towards ourselves" (De Trinitate VI.5.7).

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. .

Order in which the Gospels Were Written (Origen)

Quote from Origen's Commentary on Matthew (Book 1, Fragment)

Concerning the four Gospels which alone are uncontroverted in the Church of God under heaven, I have learned by tradition that the Gospel according to Matthew, who was at one time a publican and afterwards an Apostle of Jesus Christ, was written first; and that he composed it in the Hebrew tongue and published it for the converts from Judaism. The second written was that according to Mark, who wrote it according to the instruction of Peter, who, in his General Epistle, acknowledged him as a son, saying, "The church that is in Babylon, elect together with you, salutes you; and so does Mark my son." [1 Peter 5:13] And third, was that according to Luke, the Gospel commended by Paul, which he composed for the converts from the Gentiles. Last of all, that according to John.

Addressing the Charge of Dualism

A gentleman once accused Jehovah's Witnesses of being dualists. He wrote:

"Perhaps more to the point, the JW (and, indeed, the Platonic approach, generally) association of our being and identity with something that is NOT that dust [of Genesis 2:7] is very troublesome. It's not just the JWs, of course, who do this; unreflective Christians have been doing this since the beginning."

I say that Jehovah's Witnesses believe the body + the breath of life mentioned in Genesis 2:7 jointly constitute the human soul (NEPES). Witnesses believe that humans do not have souls but are souls. According to Witness belief, I am body and the force that animates my being, which must include cognitive and conscious states. My own personal take on anthropology is that the self is neural (i.e. syntactic), as Joseph Ledoux argues. The self is ultimately realized brain activity (synaptic connections or higher-order brain processes). But there cannot be a neural self without the body proper, a point which neuroscientist Antonio Damasio helps us to appreciate.

My interlocutor then writes:

"As for your observation that hylomorphism is a type of dualism: I think you are greatly underestimating the distinctions between Plato's concept of the soul and Aristotle's (and Aquinas'). Applying the 'dualism' tag to the latter probably obscures a great deal more than it reveals, in my estimation."

MY RESPONSE: With all respect, I've taught classes about each one of these thinkers for a number of years and I've used Catholic, Protestant and secular works to do it. I believe that I understand the distinction between Platonic and Aristo-Thomist anthropology well. I don't see how one cannot place the label "dualism" on each one. Now to avoid conflation, I did call Aristotle's theory and that of Aquinas, "compound or holistic" dualism. Kevin J. Corcoran also uses this label. Furthermore, I've seen hylomorphism described similarly in major academic works.

Interlocutor again:
"I think you may be missing the key elements of the Catholic thinking on this question and conflating that thinking with the more casual, 'folk' anthropology. Aquinas, for example, doesn't take the approach that he wants to show we have souls at all -- rather, he agrees with Aristotle that all living things have souls: you, me, my dog, a lion, whatever. The interesting question is: what kind of sould [SIC] do we have and how do they differ from those souls of lower animals. So, the kinds of questions you are asking in this paragraph are not going to be productive, since they are coming from a very different set of assumptions."

MY RESPONSE: In my view, it begs the question to assert that all living things have souls. How do we know (with any degree of objective certitude) that each living thing has a soul? Besides, I believe that Aristotle possibly means something different by the word "soul" than Thomas Aquinas does. Be that as it may, it seems to me that before we talk about rational, nutritive or sensitive souls (or elements of the soul), we should first try to determine whether or not souls (in the relevant sense) exist.

Interlocutor: "Finally, I'm not sure where, exactly, you are coming from. I thought I read you to say that you were in favor of some sort of materialism. If so, then I am confused that you find the body is not essential to identity. These seem to be quite contradictory statements, so I must be missing something."

MY RESPONSE: I do favor some kind of Christian materialism. IMO, Ledoux states matters almost exactly as I would put them: we are our synapses and the self is neural. But identity is a very complex notion. We humans cannot truly be selves without bodies: a brain is not much good if there is no body to accompany it. However, as Nancey Murphy has written, many factors contribute to our identity (memories, personal character, our external relations and human embodiment). In addition to Murphy's list, I might add DNA as a factor in identity (associated with embodiment). So, to answer your question, I think that I need A body to be identical to the person "Edgar Foster" but I don't need THIS particular body to preserve my personal identity. If time goes on, I'll die one day and THIS body will decompose as it returns to the dust. Let us assume that God will one day rearrange my decomposed body with the same atomic constituents that it formerly had, after it has decomposed. Would that reconstituted body be identical with the body that existed during my former lifetime on this earth? I think you run into the problem of Theseus' ship at this point. Either way, I believe it's fallacious to call Witnesses "dualists."

Regards,

Edgar

Stephen Smalley on 1 John 5:20

From Stephen Smalley's Word Commentary on 1 John:

"the most natural way of construing hOUTOS in v 20 (which need not refer to the nearest antecedent, and may allude to the main subject of the preceding statement as a whole; cf. 2:22; 2 John 7) is to take it as a reference to God: the God whom we recognize as genuine through the insight given us by his Son, and with whom we are in fellowship through Jesus Christ. 'This is the real God.' It is precisely through knowing him, as the Gospel [John 17:3] maintains, that eternal life itself becomes a reality" (p. 308).

Smalley does go on to write that if hOUTOS in 1 John 5:20 in fact refers to Jesus, then "we are presented with a NT christological witness which is rare in the NT." He cites John 20:28 as clear proof that Jesus is called God. Romans 9:5 is disputed, he says, and "Titus 2:13 is uncertain, since the Gr. can either mean, 'our great God and Savior Jesus Christ,' or 'the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ' " (Smalley 308).

Lastly, Smalley concludes that the writer of 1 John 5:20 may be ambivalent in this passage, but all of these remarks must be considered in the light of the initial statements I cited: the most natural way to construe hOUTOS is with TON ALHQINON.

A friend who uses the name "Martin Smart" provides these remarks on 1 John 5:20:

Zerwick, page 733 In A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament by Max Zerwick, Mary Grosvenor (4th edition) they say regarding 1John 5:20 with regards to hOUTOS

"the ref. is almost certainly to God the real, the true, op. paganism (v21)."

I have confirmed this quote in my personal copy of Zerwick and Grosvenor.