Notes/Commentary on "Simply Trinity" by Matthew Barrett

Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity (Baker Books, 2021).

This is not a review but more of a discussion about certain parts of Barrett's book.

Barrett's theological "saga" takes us back to the time when he intellectually digested Millard Erickson's Systematic Theology, a book that seeks to unfold theological concepts with rigorous logic. As Barrett studied theology more generally, but the Trinity more specifically, he learned the doctrine of God's triunity like one learns math or logic: he was taught that the Trinity is analogous to "a conundrum, even a problem, but one that could be solved with the proper formula" (page 26). Despite the apparent complexity of the Trinity doctrine, learning that God was triune seemed simple to Barrett, as long as one had the right theological heuristics or proper algorithms. Or so he thought.

However, as time proceeded, Barrett began to see that others had taught him the Trinity erroneously, as though it were some mathematical formula or worse, some conjured nonsense analogous to a magician pulling a rabbit from a hat. Another thing that bothered Barrett was that some people he respected did not accept the eternal generation of the Son idea, a belief that was echoed at Nicaea and elsewhere. Ironically, the ones who repudiated this belief the most were "respected" Evangelicals like W.L. Craig and John Feinberg: two reasons they eschew the eternal generation concept is its ostensible lack of scriptural support; furthermore, the eternal generation of the Son concept seems logically incoherent. Evangelical theologians/thinkers appear to believe that the idea does not make sense, yet Barrett finds it simple and evidently lucid.

The book Simply Trinity asks us to envision the three persons of the Trinity this way: the Father is unbegotten (the relation of paternity); the Son is eternally begotten (the relation of filiation), and the Holy Spirit is spirated like breath (the relation of spiration). Theologians call these relations, "relations of origins," but they're supposed to be eternal or timeless relations, having no beginning and no end. Barrett insists that if we considered the Holy Spirit to be God's "grandson," that would be weird. Weirder yet to me is to say God (regardless of the person) has/had an origin: it's also weird for me that the Holy Spirit is supposed to be a divine person, but the Spirit is spirated like breath, which makes "his" relation of origin sound impersonal. Moreover, what does it mean for someone to be generated timelessly or spirated timelessly? And what does "three modes of subsistence" mean? Maybe Barrett's book answers these questions to some people's satisfaction. In my dissertation, I ultimately argued that all of this Father and Son talk for the divine, is metaphorical anyway.

While Barrett appears to be flabbergasted by the Evangelical rejection of the eternal generation doctrine, he professes that there is something even worse. After relating a story about where he grew up, and a bookstore he visited, Barrett tells us what he found to be so shocking. As he started to peruse his theology books one day, he came across an author who claimed the Trinity doctrine is "our master plan for politics." In particular, the writer argued that the Trinity doctrine teaches us the best form of society is socialism in which all persons are equal. But the next book he grabbed made a case for ecumenism, based on the Trinity: in other words, religions can remain diverse but they need to cooperate with one another in putative imitation of the Trinity. Finally, another writer used the Trinity doctrine as an endorsement for pluralism whereas other books argued in favor of ecological concerns or feminism, all based on the Trinity. Dare we mention that other books made a plea for egalitarianism with respect to male-female relations while others made a case for homosexuality, again, all based on the Trinity doctrine. How did all these books affect Barrett? To quote him: "Socialism, ecumenism, pluralism, environmentalism, egalitarianism, complementarianism, homosexuality . . . as I put the books down, my theological soul felt a little nauseous" (page 37).

The disturbing part of all these developments for Barrett is that theologians--mostly Evangelicals--were turning the Trinity doctrine into the proverbial wax nose. He felt that the doctrine was being manipulated this way and that, for sociopolitical ends rather than for theological ends. He complains that some are turning theology into anthropology. Now I wouldn't say these problems are strictly Trinitarian because Bultmann was accused of doing the same thing, yet I don't view him as an ardent Trinitarian. But what these writers did with the Trinity vexed and pained Barrett, which likely moved him to write Simply Trinity. What does Barrett think will solve this sad state of affairs? He urges a return to "Nicene orthodoxy."

Barrett is aware that no one verse in the Bible spells out the Trinity doctrine: that leads him to point out that Trinitarians need help since "heretics" have and do (according to him) distort the Bible. We supposedly need church tradition to understand the Bible and, more specifically, to grasp the Trinity: that includes creeds and writers from the early church. However, he evidently thinks the Bible is the final authority for the ecclesia (sola scriptura rather than solo scriptura). But Barrett quotes a number of Pauline verses to establish his point that the apostles passed on "tradition" to the church, and this tradition was supposedly "trinitarian through and through." Barrett wants to work his way back to a Trinity that is "unmanipulated," one that accords with the doctrine of divine simplicity, but still makes a clear distinction between the tres personae trinitatis.

Each point that Barrett raises can be and has been challenged. It seems that only a revised account of ecclesiastical history can maintain that the early followers of Jesus were "trinitarian through and through." The Trinity doctrine developed over time; and even when church writers began to talk about God's supposed triunity, even they made sharp distinctions between God the Father and his Son, Jesus Christ. Just read Justin Martyr, Origen of Alexandria, Tertullian, Novatian of Rome, and Hippolytus.

Hebrews 5:9--"the source of eternal salvation?"

Greek (NA28): καὶ τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ αἴτιος σωτηρίας αἰωνίου

Robertson's WP: "Having been made perfect (τελειωθεὶς). First aorist passive participle of τελειοω, the completion of the process of training mentioned by this same verb in Hebrews 2:10 'by means of sufferings' (διὰ παθημάτων) as stated again here in verse Hebrews 5:8."

NET Bible: "And by being perfected in this way, he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him"

In what sense was Christ perfected? The LXX uses the language of perfecting, accomplishing or consecrating within a priestly context. See Exodus 29:9, 29, 33, 35; Leviticus 4:5; 8:33; 21:10; Numbers 3:3. Compare Hebrews 7:28. It seems that Jesus was made perfect for the position of high priest through suffering and obedience even to death.

ἐγένετο πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ-This passage makes an interesting comparison between Jesus, who learned obedience (ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν τὴν ὑπακοήν) from the things which he suffered, and all those who obey Christ and benefit from such obedience (cf. Hebrews 2:10; 11:8). The noun phrase is dative plural masculine: ὑπακούουσιν is the present active participle dative plural masculine of ὑπακούω.

BDAG: αἴτιος, ία, ον ⟦aítios⟧ (Hom.+) 1 pert. to being the cause of someth., in our lit. only subst. A ὁ αἴ. one who is the cause, source αἴ. σωτηρίας Hb 5:9 (Hdt. et al.; Diod S 4, 82 αἴ. ἐγένετο τῆς σωτηρίας; SIG 1109, 80; Philo, Agr. 96, Spec. Leg. 1, 252 θεὸν τ. σωτηρίας αἴτιον al.; Jos., Ant. 14, 136; Bel 42; 2 Macc 4:47; 13:4; EpArist 205; Just., D. 3, 5; 4, 1; Tat., Ath.). B neut. cause, reason (Hdt., Thu. et al.; PHib 73, 18 [243/242 b.c.]; BGU 1121, 27; 29; Philo; Jos., Ant. 7, 75; 12, 84; Just., D. 5, 6; Tat.; Ath. 19, 2) μηδενὸς αἰ. ὑπάρχοντος i.e. the crowd will be unable to explain its action Ac 19:40. 2 ground for legal action. τὸ αἴτ.= αἰτία 3a in a legal expr. ground for complaint, basis for a charge αἴ. εὑρίσκειν ἔν τινι Lk 23:4, 14. οὐδὲν αἴ. θανάτου no ground for capital punishment vs. 22.—DELG. M-M. Sv.

As one can see above, BDAG favors "cause, "source" as a meaning for αἴτιος in Hebrews 5:9. For classical denotations of this word, see LSJ. Paul Ellingworth discusses LXX and classical uses of αἴτιος in The Epistle to the Hebrews. See 1 Samuel 22:22; Aristotle, Physics 194b30; Polyb. 1.43.2; Philo, Spec. Leg. 1.252; Josephus Ant. 14.8.2 § 136. The Greek word appears once in the GNT, in Heb. 5:9. See Harold W. Attridge, Hebrews: A Commentary, page 154; Louw-Nida, Semantic Domain 89.15.

Abbott-Smith on αἴτιος : causative of, responsible for; as subst., ὁ αἰ., the cause, author: He 5:9; τὸ αἰ., the cause, Ac 19:40.

σωτηρίας αἰωνίου-Westcott points to Isaiah 45:17 in the LXX. Compare Hebrews 9:12, 15.

Hebrews 5:8--"Although he was a Son" and the Incarnation

 Greek: καίπερ ὢν υἱός, ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν τὴν ὑπακοήν

Margaret G. Sim explains the significance of καίπερ, a particle, especially when it accompanies a participle as happens in Hebrews 5:8: this construction makes concession relevant and prominent by grammatically marking it. Sim invokes Hebrews 7:5; 12:17 to illustrate how Hebrews employs καίπερ. See Sim, A Relevant Way to Read, pages 85-86.

καίπερ only occurs 5x in the GNT: compare Philippians 3:4; 2 Peter 1:12. About the kind of usage that one encounters in Hebrews 5:8, E.D. Burton writes:

437. The Adverbial Participle of Concession, equivalent to a concessive clause. The concessive force is sometimes emphasized by prefixing καὶπερ or καί γε to the participle.
Acts 13:28; καὶ μηδεμίαν αἰτίαν θανάτου εὑρόντες ᾐτήσαντο Πειλάτον
ἀναιρεθῆναι αὐτόν, and though they found no cause of death in him,
yet asked they of Pilate that he should be slain.

Heb 5:8; καίπερ ὢν υἱός, ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν τῆν ὑπακοήν,
he was a Son, yet he learned obedience by the things which he suffered.
See also Matt. 14:9; Mark 4:31; Acts 17:27.

See Burton, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses.

So this verse begins with a concessive clause: "Although being a Son/son." NABRE translates, "Son though he was . . ."

The anarthrous Greek construction could be definite instead of indefinite or qualitative (i.e., "Although he was the Son"), and the reference to ὢν υἱός likely makes a nexus with Hebrews 1:5-8; 2:10, 3:6; 4:14; 5:5, and 12:5-11. Jehovah God successfully helped Jesus to endure suffering and be refined by it; he can now assist Christian "sons" and daughters as they deal with suffering. If God's Son suffered and learned obedience from it, then how much more can God allow suffering as a way to refine imperfect humans. See Koester, Hebrews, page 299. He points out that the motif of learning through suffering was common in antiquity, and while Jesus was sinless, he still had to learn obedience in a new situation--under intense trial.

Some commentators try to press the term, "Son." Does it refer to the preexistent Son of God, the earthly Jesus or to the resurrected Christ? Might there be a blend of all three senses by the writer of Hebrews?

ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν-this part of the verse contains wordplay (paronomasia): the Son of God learned obedience from the things he suffered during his earthly and fleshly tenure (see Hebrews 5:7). Christopher Wordsworth points to 2 Thessalonians 3:2 as an example of paronomasia, but he also maintains that due to the "frequency" with which wordplay occurs in Hebrews, the letter bears the marks of Pauline writing and it must be "an original work, and not a translation" (394).

Wordsworth makes another interesting point on that same page regarding attraction and ὧν ἔπαθεν. I take issue with all of his points concerning the Incarnation and his comments on the Son growing in wisdom (from Luke's Gospel) as to his human soul. As many know, the Incarnation doctrine teaches that Christ assumed humanity but he still remained God the Son: most theologians think no change occurred when Christ as God supposedly assumed humanity. As God the Son in the flesh, B.F. Westcott (commenting on Hebrews 5:8) said the "powers" of Christ's human nature grew progressively and in harmony "with the divine in His one Person" ( The Epistle to the Hebrews, page 130). That is, Christ allegedly learned obedience (τὴν ὑπακοήν) as a human but not with respect to his divine nature although the natures putatively were united in one person/hypostasis.

While I disagree with the whole Incarnation teaching, I think Westcott makes one good point that appears to be supported grammatically: Christ learned obedience, not how to obey God. Was there ever a time when the Son of God was disobedient to his Father? As stated earlier, Christ learned obedience in a new setting or it's possible that he learned obedience as such, which would give him deeper insight into God's will (so Westcott). Either way, this whole verse appears to weaken the case for the Incarnation rather than strengthen it. Trinitarians expect non-Trinitarians to believe that God assumed humanity or became human, then he had to become an adult and grow in wisdom and stature. Then he suffered with respect to his human nature but not with respect to his divine nature; or some just say that the entire God-man suffered, but it still needs to be made clear that his alleged divine nature was supposed to be excluded from the suffering (i.e., he was supposed to be strongly immutable and impassible).

Lastly, the Incarnation implies that the immutable God of heaven (the Son) changed qua his humanity, but not with respect to his divinity. How this ever happened is largely chalked up to "mystery" or paradox. No wonder Aquinas said the Trinity doctrine cannot be proven demonstrably by logic alone; he saw the Trinity as a mystery of the faith, something that requires more than reason alone. In my humble opinion, reason will never capitulate to the Trinity doctrine.

For additional suggestions about how to read Hebrews 5:8, see https://sites.google.com/site/aquinasstudybible/home/hebrews/fr-william-most--on-jesus-learning-obedience-hebrews-5-8

James 1:21 (Put away all filthiness and the excess of badness)

Greek (SBLGNT): διὸ ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν κακίας ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν.

Steve Runge explains that James here employs καὶ as a coordinating conjunction to join two noun phrases (πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν κακίας). Later, in verses 22-23, James uses καὶ to make a contrast between being doers of the word or hearers only. The point is that items "of equal status" are connected by the coordinating conjunction, which also functions adversatively at times although Runge prefers the terminology semantic continuity and semantic discontinuity. See Discourse Grammar of the Greek New Testament, page 16. Compare James 1:24, where the writer joins three "main clauses" instead of making them asyndetic (Runge).

Additionally, it is noticeable how James writes ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν in 1:21, then uses πτωχὸς ἐν ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῆτι in James 2:2: the former account deals with moral filthiness but the latter is about physical uncleanness. Robert J. Foster maintains the writer's choices "may not be coincidental" in light of Zechariah 3:3-4 (LXX) and Revelation 22:11. That the reader is supposed to perceive a correspondence between moral/spiritual and physical uncleanness is likely. See Foster, "The Significance of Exemplars for the Interpretation of the Book of James," page 53 (Ph.D. Diss.). Luke Timothy Johnson includes James 1:27: remain unspotted (unsoiled) from the world.

Craig Blomberg's observations deserve to be read in full, but he explains that διὸ is a conjunction which links James 1:21 with the previous verse that deals with anger (James, page 87); ἀποθέμενοι is "an aorist temporal participle" that could be rendered "having put off" (Ibid.); Blomberg suggests that πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν κακίας could be translated "all dirtiness and excess of wickedness."

BDAG: ῥυπαρία, ας, ἡ ⟦rhuparía⟧ (since Critias [V b.c.] in Pollux 3, 116) prim. ‘dirt, filth’, fig., in ethical aspect a state of moral defilement or corruption, moral uncleanness, vulgarity (Pel.-Leg. p. 6, 30 ἀφῆκεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι πᾶσαν αὐτῆς τὴν ῥυπαρίαν; Did., Gen. 89, 9 ἡ ῥ. τῆς ἁμαρτίας), esp. sordid avarice, greediness (Teles p. 33, 4; 37, 5 H.; Plut., Mor. 60d; Cass. Dio 74, 5, 7; TestSol 10:12 C) w. κακία Js 1:21.—DELG s.v. ῥύπος. M-M. Spicq.

Johnson insists that James employs περισσείαν (excessiveness, superfluity), partly for the sake of rhetoric in view of πᾶσαν and other words or phrases that appear in James 1:21. Of course, James is giving serious admonitory counsel to his audience, but he does it with some rhetorical flair. Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon contrast κακία with ἀρετή. So it's probable that κακία refers to bad behavior or encompasses all vices: see L.T. Johnson, The Letter of James, page 201. A good parallel for James 1:21 is 1 Peter 2:1.

ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον-Plenty of questions arise for this portion of the verse. What does it mean to receive the word (of God) in "meekness"? If James' audience was composed of baptized Christians, then why did they need to have the word implanted? Thirdly, in what sense is the word supposed to be implanted? For possible answers to these questions, see Dan G. McCartney, James, BECNT series, page 116.

One point I will mention in this regard is that τὸν ἔμφυτον apparently does not reference an innate or inborn trait in this context: James Adamson, Ben Witherington III, and Chris Vlachos all mention Herodotus to make this point (see Hist. 9.94). Vlachos points out that the "implanted word" is the Christian gospel (good news), which "most commentators" evidently accept.

τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν-James begins this portion of the verse with a present middle participle that agrees with λόγον (accusative singular masculine) plus this participle tells us more about  ἔμφυτον: "the implanted word that is able . . . "

The implanted word has the lasting power to "save your souls," James tells his readers; Vlachos and Witherington III state that τὰς ψυχὰς alludes to the whole person. In many ways, James 1:21 helps Christians to avoid moral filth, bad behavior, malice, and evil tendencies.

Joseph Torchia--"Exploring Personhood" (Book Discussion)

Joseph Torchia (O.P.). Exploring Personhood: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Human Nature. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.

Here are some things I observed about Torchia's text:

1) I do not believe there is any question about Torchia's scholarly integrity since he seems to handle the data in a fair manner and offers comments that satisfactorily represent the proposed object of his inquiry. I would also note that Torchia's approach generally is objective although he makes clear his perspective from the outset (see his Preface). A large portion of the book is historical.

2) There are a number of insights in Torchia's work. Particular insights can be found in the concluding portion of his chapter on postmodernism where he examines the role that incommensurability plays in postmodernist dialogue. After discussing Thomas Kuhn and Alasdair MacIntyre (inter alios), Torchia offers an assessment of MacIntyre's Thomism, which entails lauding the apparent success of his Enlightenment critique while simultaneously criticizing fundamental aspects of MacIntyre's thought. The chapter on postmodernism additionally contains information pertaining to debates on what constitutes a person or the possibility of there being "non-human persons" or "human non-persons."

3) Torchia writes: "This work is broad in scope, covering the Pre-Socratics to postmodernism, with an assessment of what transpired during the intervening 2,500 years. This volume is by no means an exhaustive history of the philosophical understanding of human nature, personhood, and the self. Rather, it uses the history of Western philosophy as the framework in which to explore critical problems pertinent to these three topics" (Preface, xiii).

4) Torchia arranges the chapters of his book as follows: The Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, David Hume, Postmodernism, Our Interpersonal Journey, Epilogue. Each chapter contains a subtitle that helps the reader to focus and there are discussion questions as well as end notes that accompany each chapter. Torchia quotes a number of primary texts while offering full explanations of what he thinks the primary literature is saying; furthermore, he gives sufficient historical background information within the chapters. The book's content accentuates the thought of each philosopher respecting human nature and personhood. For example, Torchia supplies an adequate historical account of Hume's moral psychology and his concept of the self as a "bundle of perceptions." The conceptual nexus between Sir Isaac Newton and David Hume is also sufficiently explained.

Torchia's Exploring Personhood can be used to supplement the Leslie Stevenson human nature text since Torchia's work provides more historical background and fuller accounts of philosophical passages. Moreover, this book introduces beginning students to some of the primary literature although it does not contain major sections from Plato or Aristotle (etc.). Torchia's expositions or philosophical claims are clear, and his observations are fair, yet incisive.

My criticism might be the somewhat "dull" manner in which certain parts of the material is written. Furthermore, Torchia composed this book in an abstract manner: he does not supply simple explanations to popularize his topic.

There is no doubt in my mind about the value of the material; Torchia's chapter on postmodernism especially appeared to strike a chord with students in terms of its relevance. So did the chapter on Descartes and Aquinas. But I thought the discussion questions at the end of each chapter were a bit labored at times, the sentence structure was hard to follow every now and again, and the book started off rather slowly. I would add that the vocabulary often assumes a certain erudition on the part of its reader. Nevertheless, I liked the overall constitution of the chapters.

There is much to commend in this work, including its clarity and objectivity. Most of the chapters remain focused on the subject matter but there are times when Torchia seems to introduce subject matter that should have been omitted or possibly introduced in another context. For example, see the chapter on Plato.

I now leave you with a few sample sentences from this work:

"Aristotle broadly defines substance as what is neither predicable of something nor a property. The chief sense of Aristotelian substance, then, is the notion of an underlying substratum of which everything else is predicated but which is not itself predicated of anything else" (page 75).

"In its broadest terms, then, Aristotle designates the soul as the principle of the nutritive (or vegetative), sensitive, and rational (or intellective) powers or faculties. Each faculty, in turn, finds it psychic counterpart in a specific kind of soul (plant, animal, or human souls, respectively). Plants, for example, are capable of movement connected with nourishment, growth, decay, and reproduction; animals of sense appetites, sense perception, and movement from place to place; and humans of rational knowing and willing" (page 86).

"Humans occupy the hinterland of being, sharing in the aspect of Soul that animates the material world. In this respect, they stand on the periphery between being and nonbeing, between the eternal realm of contemplation and a temporal world that bears but a faint imprint of the higher intelligible order" (page 105).

1 Timothy 6:9 ("senseless and hurtful desires")

Greek (NA28): οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν καὶ παγίδα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς, αἵτινες βυθίζουσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν.

I want to concentrate on ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν καὶ παγίδα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς in this blog post. For a discussion of 1 Timothy 6:9-10 that makes other parts its focus, see https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2021/01/1-timothy-69-10-analysis.html

ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν-the verb here which occurs 7x in GNT passages is the present active indicative 3rd plural of ἐμπίπτω: compare 1 Timothy 3:6-7.

καὶ παγίδα-

καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς-Thomas Lea thinks the desires of a materialistic person are "foolish" (ἀνοήτους) because instead of benefitting the one who aspires to be rich, they wind up damaging the covetous person: the harm might be spiritual and/or material, but one probably cannot make that determination based on the language here. See 1,2 Timothy, Titus (NA Commentary).

This Pauline counsel likewise illustrates the potential harm that desire can bring to those who covet money or the things it can buy. Some desires are righteous, proper, and fitting, but other desires are ungodly, harmful and amount to covetousness or inordinate longings for what does not rightfully belong to us: "the lusts involved elements of what was foolish as well as what was hurtful" (so C.J. Ellicott, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, page 93).

William Mounce (Pastoral Epistles, WB Commentary): "Although ἐπιθυμία, 'passion,' can describe something that is good, in the PE it always describes strong sinful desire (cf. discussion of its verbal cognate in the Comment on 1 Tim 3: 1). In this case the passions are described as ἀνόητος, “foolish,” and βλαβερός, “harmful.” ἀνόητος occurs elsewhere only in Titus 3: 3 where Paul describes the pre-Christian state of people as being foolish. It is the opposite of σοφός, “wise” (Rom 1: 14), and is used elsewhere in the expression 'O foolish Galatians/ men' (Gal 3: 1 [cf. 3: 3]; cf. Luke 24: 25). J. Behm adds that its emphasis here is more moral than intellectual (TDNT 4: 962). βλαβερός occurs only here in the NT (cf. cognate verb in Luke 4: 35; Mark 16:18)."

Pastoral Epistles, Volume 46 (Word Biblical Commentary) (Kindle Locations 15568-15574). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Nomina Sacra Article Typo? (Larry Hurtado)

Not that I want to vaunt my own perfect record, because I don't have one, but do you notice anything curious about this article?



Two things I notice is that 666 does not appear in Revelation 13:17, but in 13:18; secondly, there is no Revelation 15:12. I liked Larry Hurtado and not trying to bash him, but I found it interesting that no one caught these typos before the article went to print. However, we all stumble in speech many times (James 3:2ff).