Saturday, January 14, 2006

Hannah Arendt on Metaphor and Cognition

Hannah Arendt insists that speculative thought only reveals itself by means of metaphoric implementation.[1] Metaphors bridge the gulf that allegedly demarcates cognitive processes from the realm of sensibilia.[2] Without metasememes that rhetorically alternate or maneuver conceptual similarities, “there would have been no bridge whereby to cross from the minor truth of the seen to the major truth of the unseen” or vice versa.[3] Arendt therefore contends that metaphors revert the contemplative human NOUS back towards the sensible realm so that the contemplative or speculative NOUS can disclose its hitherto wholly noetic activities to rational datives of manifestation dwelling in the phenomenal realm of appearances.[4] Based on her reading of Aristotle and Kant, Arendt prefers to associate “metaphor” with “the transition from one existential state, that of thinking, to another, that of being an appearance among appearances.”[5] She postulates that abstract relata forming metasememic constructs allow thought concealed to become thought revealed. For Arendt, percipient subjects make the existential transition from the notional to the empirical level of being by positing metaphors in analogical relation to one another.[6] Her reading of Aristotle’s substitution theory of metaphor through a Kantian-Heideggerian template undoubtedly explains the uniqueness of her construal. Arendt’s approach to substitution theory further implies that metaphor is the sine qua non of theolinguistics. Without rational agents positing metaphors in analogical relationship to one another, it might be impossible to bridge the ostensive linguistic or relational chasm that subsists between the seen (= creatures) and the unseen (= God).



[1] Arendt, Thinking, 103.

[2] Cristina Cacciari, “Why Do We Speak Metaphorically: Reflections on the Functions of Metaphor in Discourse and Reasoning” in Katz’s Figurative Language and Thought, 121-122.

[3] Quoted in Arendt, Thinking, 106.

[4] Thinking, Arendt, 106.

[5] Thinking, 106.

[6] Arendt, Thinking, 103.

2 comments:

N. Fredrickson said...

Given you interest in human cognition and the function of metaphor, I think you might enjoy reading _The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World_ (2009) by Iain McGilchrist. Here's a good interview on the subject: https://hiddenbrain.org/podcast/one-head-two-brains/

The essence of the research is that the left hemisphere copes with literal meaning, breaks the world apart, focuses narrowly, retains the words that anchor the pieces of reality we know, knows the rules of syntax to put words together, etc., but the right hemisphere deals with non-literal aspects of language (e.g., metaphor, irony), emotions (other than irritation and social/honor-based concerns) and music, holistic meaning, the big picture, the total context of the whole body and environmental situation, and so on. Without the right, we have words but can't makes sense of things; without the left, we're speechless (but not without music) but can still comprehend. Of course, in healthily functioning humans, the two ways of seeing and being collaborate, but McGilchrist argues that culture has been shifting to emphasize the capacities of the left hemisphere to the detriment of the right.

Edgar Foster said...

Thanks, N. Fredrickson. I like the points made in the interview and the book looks worth reading: that last sentence is weighty.