One student asked me if the universe is necessary, and I think it's a good question. There are numerous ways to approach the issue, but let's think about it logically, with the help of ancient and medieval writers.
At the outset, I would define "necessary" in this context as "must exist/cannot not exist/not dependent upon anything or anyone" and "possible" as "contingent/could be otherwise." This means that if the universe is possible, although it exists, it might not have existed and the universe might fail to exist one day; furthermore, contingency implies dependence and a possible universe would not be dependent on itself but would be dependent on something outside itself.
So, to answer my student's question, it seems possible to formulate a disjunctive syllogism which might strike at the heart of the issue. By the way, the student is a theist but wants to build stronger arguments in order to support his case for God's existence.
The disjunctive syllogism I have in mind is the following:
1) Either the universe depends on itself or the universe depends on something else. (p v q)
2) The universe does not depend on itself. (~p)
3) Therefore, the universe depends on something else. (q)
This argument is a disjunctive syllogism, so it's deductively valid. And there seems to be good reasons for believing that the universe does not depend on itself to continue existing; nor did the universe cause itself to begin existing. Theoretically, without God, it's possible that the universe could stop existing. Either way, the universe appears to be possible rather than necessary.
Anselm of Canterbury contributes to this discussion by distinguishing between kinds of entities that might exist ab alio (through another) versus a being that possibly exists a se (through itself). When we reflect upon objects in the universe, it seems that they exist ab alio, not a se: that includes we ourselves, trees, animals, grass, and stars. Each of these things appear to be possible/contingent, but what about the universe as a whole?
When these kinds of discussions arise, scholars often point to Thomas Aquinas' five ways for the existence of God: the third way proceeds "from possibility and necessity." Edward Feser argues that by "possibility," Aquinas means the inherently transitory or
"inherent metaphysical instability" of hylemorphic objects, that is, objects composed of matter and form (e.g., trees, rocks, humans, dogs, cats, tables, etc.). The third way seems to teach (among other things) that objects which come into being and go out of being (hylemorphic objects which have potential and actuality, form and matter) are possible (contingent), not necessary insofar as they depend on something else for their existence.
Aquinas' argument is a posteriori or rooted in experience since we commonly see things come into existence, then pass out of existence. Because his argument is a posteriori, it's probable but not certain, given the premises--Aquinas is aware of how much his argument can accomplish. At this point, theists don't have to prove in an apodictic sense that God is a necessary being while the universe is not; again, Aquinas is only trying to demonstrate the probability that the universe is possible/contingent but God is not.
[To be continued]
14 comments:
There's a philosophical problem, which I'm sure you've heard of called the "modal collapse," which really only applies to strict Thomists who affirm strict simplicity and immutability, which basically makes everything necessary since God cannot change, and since his relations cannot be contingent. It's not something I've taken a big interest in but it's interesting. But I think it might be the case that modern science assumes contingency, in which case denying it for the natural world would lead one to have some strange epistemic opinions about science.
Yes, over the last, year, I've heard a lot about the modal collapse problem. Ryan T. Mullins discusses it and so does Joe Schmid, but the latter seems to have wavered on the problem. There has also been pushback by Catholic thinkers, including a philosopher named Brandon at his Siris blog. See https://branemrys.blogspot.com/2021/07/divine-simplicity-and-modal-collapse.html
I think Aquinas basically addresses the difficulty in the Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica). I'm not saying that either divine simplicity or strict immutability are true, but it may be difficult to address these ideas by appealing to a modal collapse concept.
As for why contingency and necessity are such big issues when it comes to the universe, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#Obje1UnivJust
I've seen Joe Schmid and Ryan Mullins's discussion of the issue.
Thanks for the blog, it was helpful, although I'm not sure if I fully understand it, and if i do understand it, I don't think I buy it, I don't think I'm able to formulate why though: But I DO think that this whole issue can be avoided if one adopts Schelling's idea that God determines himself through creation; and a dialectical approach -- this might be me just preferring something I can make sense of. :)
I don't necessarily agree with Brandon's analysis either. He struggles hard to minimize the modal collapse problem or refute it, but I'm not sure he's successful. However, even some of its exponents now say it might be much ado about nothing. I feel that Aquinas endeavored to answer these questions in the Summa.
Okay, one problem I have with Schelling and Hegel is this suggestion that God determines himself through creation or comes to some greater awareness as history progresses. I can accept the idea that God's knowledge is mutable in some way, but at the same time, the Hebrew declares that Jehovah is "perfect in knowledge." Systematic theology traditionally understands perfect knowledge to be omniscience. If God is omniscient, perfect in knowledge and his knowledge is comprehensive, I would like to know how he determines himself or gets to know himself through creation.
I would need to review Schelling but something else that bugged me about German idealism, in general, is its panentheistic tendencies. Does Schelling make a sharp distinction between the Creator and his creation? What do you think?
Speaking of typos, I should have typed Hebrew Bible above.
Thanks Edgar for your comments. It's nice to hear your problems with Schelling and Hegel.
So I agree with the critique with regards to Hegel, for me the value of Hegel is mainly in his Logic, and that merely as a tool of analysis, I think it's extremely helpful to philosophy in general to always start with the relations and see how they determine the essences of things, and then how the relations determine further relations.
BUT, Hegel is panthesitic, and this is because he really wants to tie a nice rationalistic bow on everything, and I think his whole model is basically monistic, and simply being working itself out through history, the infinite God determines itself as through the working ot of finite consciousness, but ultimately the two are the same (this interpretation of Hegel isn't universal, and the later Hegel would probably deny it, but I don't see how)
However, Schelling is different, especially with the Philosophical Investigations on Human freedom and the Ages of the World. Schelling has a clear creator/creation distinction, but the distinction is determined by the free creative will of the creator. For Schelling, God determines himself through creation, but the real distinction is that of creaturely freedom, God creates a world in which real freedom exists, and is thus distinct from him, but grounded in him. Schelling's project was largely an escape from Spinoza, and what I like about him is he focused on the will, and freedom of the will: as opposed to Leibniz and Spinoza whose rationalism led to either pantheism, or a God without real freedom.
As far as God determining himself through creation, I'm extremely attracted to that idea, simply because it makes sense to me metaphysically (God is always interactive, and if God is what he does, then God is determined by his creative act), and it seems to fit the conception of God in the Hebrew bible: I will come to be what I will come to be, God becomes through the working out of his will (Wolfhart Pannenberg highlights this as well), This seems to be even embedded in the very name Jehovah. I could go on about this more :). Of course this doesn't in itself negate aseity, because God's will is logically prior to it's determination through creation (in Schelling), and God's will grounds everything, including God's own determination, but it does move it away from the Thomist notion of simplicity.
I highly recommend reading Schelling's "Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human freedom." It really changed my perspective, and my comments are certainly not doing it justice :)
Here is a PDF of it
https://germanidealism.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/schelling-fs-english.pdf
Thanks for the explanation and pdf, Roman. I've got a number of works by Schelling and I've read some of his thoughts before, but it's been a while. I don't even remember if I've got his Philosophical Investigations, but I will download it just in case.
To be clear, I think Hegel's theology is panentheistic rather than straight-up pantheistic (i.e., God is in the world but not completely identical with it): the same charge has been made against Pannenberg but I'm not going to press it.
Some of what you wrote reminded me of the medieval debates about which divine faculty should have priority: the divine intellect or the divine will. Aquinas favors the divine intellect taking precedence whereas Scotus and Augustine think the divine will is prior to the divine intellect. Schelling seems to agree with the voluntarist school of thought; each side has its theological/logical implications.
I'm glad to know that Schelling does clearly distinguish between the Creator and the creation. Granted, God is I will come to be what I will come to be, but that statement is fraught with interpretational difficulties. One last thing I'll say for now is that I find it hard to understand how an omniscient and perfect being determines himself through his creation. While I'm not a Thomist, who advocates divine simplicity and strong immutability, I tend to believe that God is who he is regardless of his creation.
I'm not saying that God doesn't interact with his creation or that God doesn't have real relations with creaturely beings (contra Aquinas), but I will have to think a little more on the determination idea of Schelling :-)
You might like to check out Marilyn Adams as well: she discusses the ontotheology fallacy, which is an interesting lecture.
Appreciate the input.
You're probably right about Hegel, but for the life of me I can't figure out what the distinction actually is in Hegel, or what that "more" that the world is in God. But as I said before, my interest in Hegel is more in his dialectical method and metaphysics of negation and determination than his system as a whole.
I don't want to say too much on Pannenberg, because I've not read his systematics, but I must say I was extremely impressed with his metaphysics and the idea of God volume, I can see the panentheistic charge there, but I don't think I would interpret him that way, at least not panentheistic in any way that would be offensive to my sensibilities, I mean he does that have Hegelian notion of the infinite enveloping the finite, but I think that's more for theological epistomology than for theological ontology, since his theological ontology is eschatologocial, i.e. God is fully God in the eschaton, when the finite world is reconciled with the infinite God.
When it comes to omniscience and perfection, I think my toe dipping into German idealism has helped qualify my thinking here. omniscience is what we call God in terms of his knowledge of the world compared to our limited knowledge, yet God in himself only knows the world he creates, he knows potential worlds but not as real worlds, thus his omniscience as a realized reality is dependent on his creative act, and any potential world would be known, but only as a potential. I think similar things could be said about the concept of divine perfection.
Thanks for the Marilyn Adams tip, I found the lecture; I know ontotheology is often meant as a kind of insult ... but I've been persuaded by Scotus, we gotta be clear in our language, God may be an infinite being but he's still a being (at least as far as he relates to creation), otherwise I don't even know what we're talking about.
Thanks Edgar, I find my thinking being aided a lot by reading your posts.
I benefit immensely from our discussions and your research, Roman. The only thing I will say for now is that I lean toward viewing omniscience as an everlasting attribute, something Jehovah's always had. Maybe the same can be said for his omnipotence and his infinity.
While I'm not an advocate of divine simplicity or divine impossibility, I tend to believe that God did not become omniscient or infinite. We can maybe discuss the issues later.
Adams makes numerous points in the lecture, but near the end, she says God is not reducible to relations. That's my stance too, but I know the position needs to be defended.
However, I'm just throwing stuff out tonight. It's late here :-)
Thanks Foster, I listened to the lecture and I was very happy with it, I more or less agree with her position about onto-theology, and I agree that the critiques of it are often unfounded.
I caught that at the end of her lecture too, that relations presuppose relati. I'm not sure I would be comfortable reducing God to relations, in my "God as Love" paper I distinguish between God without creation and with creation, and that the former is God "beyond being" i.e. the God of apophatic theology; whereas the latter is God as determinate being which is determined by his relations.
But I'll leave it at that, we'll save it for a different time :).
Roman, I know you know that these matters have been hashed out by many before us. I need to look at your paper again because my short-term memory is not what it used to be. But I think we've briefly discussed apophatic versus cataphatic theology before, and I think T.V. Morris (influenced by Duns Scotus) claims that apophatic theology presupposes cataphatic thought.
I'm not completely against apophatic theology and I believe (unlike Aquinas) that God is truly related to the world. However, the question in my mind is whether the created sphere defines/determines who God is. I believe that God genuinely enters into give-and-take relations when we pray and he responds to our prayers. That is the language of Scripture, however, some want to explain such language as being phenomological--not metaphysical or ontological. Or they say this language is anthropomorphic/anthropopathic. I've even argued for Father language being metaphorical as well as divine roles like King, Shepherd, and Friend. Yet I see a transcendent and infinite side of Jehovah that could be above and beyond relata while still being utterable or cataphatic.
I wouldn't mind spelling out and developing these thoughts one day, but I have other irons in the fire right now. As you say, another time is a better time :-)
As you bring different things up, it just reminds me of something else.
Hi Edgar and Roman! I appreciate the pdf you shared, I will download it and take a look as well. Additionally, I'm interested to read that blog post, I've been hearing a lot about arguments from modal collapse lately as well. I've heard some of Mullins & Schmid's thoughts on it, but I haven't gone through Schmid's newer material where he seems to be wavering on the issue. Interestingly, I'm quite convinced that Joe is leaning Theist these days. Personally, I'll celebrate if the day comes. He's no slouch. I'd be interested to meet your student one day. The question of whether or not the universe is contigent is one of the most important questions that can be considered.
I think the Fallacy of Composition worry can be overcome when it's realized that it's not a concern in the case of every property. The question I would ask is whether or not the property is one which is inherited by the whole or not. If it is, than you end up with a construction error, in which case you need either an outside cause powerful enough to explain everything, or an independent layer within the universe of the same kind. In this case, it's fairly straightforward to prefer the former over the latter due to the reasons you referred to.
One way I've heard it framed by Oppy, Rasmussen, Tim Howard, and many others these days is by way of a comparison of simplicity in terms of fundamental entities. Suggesting that the universe as a whole is necessary rather than contingent seems to drastically lower the intrinsic probability of the theory and smacks of arbitrariness, indicating a lack of explanatory scope, and I would say a premature stopping point in the chain of explanation.
I'd enjoy a conversation on this topic with the both of you and Michael Gonzalez some time in the near future.
Enjoyed your remarks, Fikra. I will talk more later and look forward to a future discussion with you and Michael and Roman, if possible.
Fikra, as you stated above, there are times when what applies to the part does apply to the whole. Hume tried to argue that even if we grant that all parts of the universe need an efficient cause to account for their motion or existence, one cannot infer that the universe also needs an efficient cause. However, what are the alternatives to positing a Maker for the cosmos? The subject has been beaten to death, but the alternatives to God the Creator don't look good for the atheist camp.
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