Lewis Ayres wrote a helpful book titled Nicaea and Its
Legacy. This work goes into painstaking detail about the Arian
Controversy and lines of thought that preceded the controversy and
fateful decision of 325 CE.
When discussing Athanasius of Alexandria and his construal of God's ontological relationship to the Son, Ayres writes:
"Thus, in the case of analogy between the Father and the Son and human
fathers and sons, Athanasius argues that the core of the language is to
convey a genetic relationship in which the son is 'from' the father in a unique sense. In the case of God we understand the divine being to
be simple, indivisible, eternal, perfect, and immutable. Therefore we
can speak of the Father generating the Son without being worried about
the notions of passion and division which might seem to be invoked by
such language. We can further proceed to assume the eternal generation
of the Son because of the nature of divine being" (112).
Eternal
generation also means that the Son's "origin" is timeless, without beginning or end. Augustine
of Hippo used the language "always born" (semper natus in Latin) to
describe the generation of the Son from the Father: it is supposedly a generation that occurs completely outside of time. Notice too that Athanasius evidently believes divine impassibility is not affected by the eternal generation of God's Son. But yet another concomitant idea linked with eternal generation is that the Son is allegedly consubstantial with the Father.
Substance here is not like wood, metal or
stone per se, but more like a kind/category of being: a nature or essence. The divine substance (for
instance) is conceptually linked with the properties of omniscience,
omnipotence, perfect wisdom, omnibenevolence--really, all of the
omni-properties: a being having such properties or being identical with them would be Almighty God in traditional
theism. Of course, I speak from the perspective of Christendom and not
my own view.
I emphasize that my comments about substance should be understood as an
explanation of Trinitarian claims. The Trinity doctrine is
not saying that every dog which has the same substance as another dog is
the same numerical dog. Nor do Trinitarians believe that the Son of God i the same person as his Father:
that's what I mean when I say the Father and Son are hypostatically
different, but substantially the same (i.e., consubstantial). Most
Trinitarians would argue that my wife and I are different persons, but
we share the same substance (human substance/nature). Therefore, we're both
human, but also we're distinct persons like God the Father and God the
Son. Trinitarians argue that all stars
instantiate or exemplify the same substance (star essence) and all dogs
have dogness in common. Another illustration is
triangles: they can be equilateral, scalene or obtuse, but they're still all
triangles that exemplify triangularity.
If it makes thing easier, we can just say that Trinitarians
claim the Word (the Son) is God like the Father is God, but they're
different persons. That's all Trinitarians mean by the same substance
language. Most Trinitarian authors that I have read use analogies to explain
the Trinity, but they admit the limitations of such examples. So once we understand "substance" to mean essence,
nature, quidditas (etc.), then it would logically follow that if the Son is homoousion to patri, then he would be God the Son alongside God the Father.
Being of a different substance would make the Son a different kind of
being if "substance" means essence or nature, that is, a general classification of
being.
However, if we claim that Christ is one substance with the Father, then
we are conceding that he is God as the Father is God because "substance"
(substantia/ousia) in this context refers to the essence or nature of a
thing. So dogs share a common substance (nature) on this view as do
fish and stars. There may be different types of stars, but one thing
they all have in common (so the theory goes) is that all stars have the
same essence/nature/quidditas. Therefore, if the Son has/is the same
substance as his Father, then the Son is Almighty God just as the Father
is. I hope this post
gives some insight into the Trinitarian mind.
Wednesday, November 02, 2022
Lewis Ayres, Athanasius, the Trinitarian Mind and Consubstantiality
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27 comments:
I'm not pursuaded that classical trinitarianism has a coherant notion of substance, since it wants to avoid the Aristotilean primary substance and secondary substance, since the former would imply modalism and the latter tri-theism. I wonder how many theologians would be willing to say that the persons share quiddity ... I know theologians like Gregory of Nyssa uses the example of human beings, but then again they seem to also want to the homoousian to mean more than just two instantiations of a kind of thing. I suppose if you hold this with divine simplicity and classical theism, sharing the quiddity/essence would by necesessity mean that the homoousian would be of a stronger sort than three instantiations, I guess Gregory of Nyssa would say that the 'more' is that the three are one in operation. .
Not disagreeing with anything just thinking out loud. Do trinitarians identify the homoousian with sharing quiddity?
Thanks Roman. I hope this link works:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1013%26context%3Dsod_mat&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiE54TyvZD7AhWMmmoFHf99Aw44ChAWegQIBxAC&usg=AOvVaw027qjIQzXmJdKpn_Pbhjg1
See pages 22-23 of the paper. To answer your question, some trinitarians do identify the homoousia with sharing quiddity although one who believes in divine simplicity night say that the tres personae are the divine quiddity, but they each instantiate it qua persons.
I don't think that there is one "trinitarian mind". Understandings vary significantly but the mantras stay the same.
I agree that there is not one trinitarian mind; that part is more rhetorical than anything else. I've written before that there are many different versions of the Trinity doctrine but at the end of the day, the creeds usually say three distinct persons, but one divine substance (essence). The eastern orthodox version differs some from the western version (Catholicism), but they have many things in common.
Thanks brother, it seems as though the paper speaks of God's quiddity, I fail to understand how one can fit that with divine simplicity (I mean, God's quiddity just IS his haecceity, such that the distinction would be meaningless?).
I see on page 24, the primary and secondary issue is avoided by an appeal to analogy (this move is fair, but the escape to analogy CANNOT be an escape to equivocity, I appeal to Scotus's brilliant argument here).
I won't continue critiquing the paper, because I know we are largely on the same page.
I've said it before, and I'll say it again, the best piece of "trinitarian" theology is Origen's commentary on John ... but it's not actually "trinitarian" in the orthodox sense, it's subordinationist.
Hello my brother, as I think you discern, quiddity is just a Latin term for "essence" or a thing's "whatness." So one might say that God's quiddity and existence are identical, according to the divine simplicity doctrine. But there are two complicating factors here: 1) I think Duns Scotus invented the term "haecceity," so it did not necessarily play a role in the early formulations of the Trinity doctrine and quidditas would have been a western concern, not terminology favored by the east. 2) Aquinas and other theologians/philosophers start to make fine distinctions with these Latin words (e.g., essentia, ente, quidditas, actus essendi). From there, they have to make numerous qualifications and appeal to analogy and the via negativa et via remotionis.
One helpful book I've come across in the last year on this subject is The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas by John Wippel.
See https://www.academia.edu/1801762/The_metaphysical_thought_of_Thomas_Aquinas_from_finite_being_to_uncreated_being
He has a lot to say about God's purported quiddity.
I agree with you about Origen. He frustrates some Trinitarians and attracts others because of his subordinationist tendencies.
Romans, also please go here and type in quiddity as a search term. Notice what Aquinas says about God in the Summa Theologiae, question 3, article 3: https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm#article3
Duncan, here's something that one Trinitarian once wrote:
Our survey of the history of the [Trinity] doctrine in the text has indicated that there are several doctrines of the trinity: Eastern, Western, social analogy, modal, so forth. There is one doctrine in the sense of the threefold name of God of the rule of faith as found, for example, in the Apostle's Creed. This, however, is not yet a doctrine. It is ambiguous and can be interpreted in a number of ways. There is one doctrine in the sense of the Western formula of “three persons in one substance.” However, this formula is also ambiguous if not misleading and can be interpreted in a number of ways. A doctrine of the trinity would presumably be one interpretation of this formula . . . let us assume that the phrase “doctrine of the trinity” in the question refers to any of a number of widely accepted interpretations of the threefold name of God in the role of faith. (Owen Thomas “Theological Questions,” page 34)
Thanks for the reply borther.
I know Scotus invented haecceity, but I just used to term to point out the metaphysical issue. I would think that haecceity and quiddity could be translated as primary and secondary substance (in aristotle).
But to be honest, I'm not as well read in Thomas as I should be before I comment to much on his trinitarian theology.
Thanks for the article, it's helpful.
Hi brother Roman,
I could be wrong, but I've customarily distinguished Aristotle's notion of primary substance from Scotus' concept of haecceity (haecceitas). Gary Rosenkrantz (UNC-G) wrote an entire study about haecceities and I always got the impression from his work that not everyone believes haecceities exist. At the very least, how we categorize metaphysical categories is a heated issue. That is why I mentioned Scotus.
There is always plenty to learn from Thomas and it's certainly an ongoing project for me, but I think that Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus differ in substantive ways with respect to their metaphysics.
Glad the article helped.
Again, as I said, I should probably get more read up on the issues before I say much more :).
This article sheds light on controversies that surround the potential existence of haecceities: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/haecceitism/
Another article from the Encyclopedia suggests Scotus not only came up with the term, but he might have originated the very concept of haecceities.
Lots to read :-)
I also recommend Rosenkrantz's study.
Some reminders about God and time:
Nicholas Wolterstorff concludes:
"Though God is within time, yet he is the Lord of time. The whole array of contingent temporal events is within his power. He is Lord of what occurs. And that, along with the specific pattern of what he does, grounds all authentically biblical worship of, and obedience to, God."
I might add that William Lane Craig makes an important distinction between metaphysical time and Einsteinian/cosmic space-time. One might distinguish between infinite and finite space-time. Based on these conceptual distinctions, it is possible that God has always subsisted in infinite time without being constrained or confined by or to finite space-time. The only real reason that I can see for rejecting Craig's distinction is an insalubrious attachment to the, for all intents and purposes, now defunct positivistic worldview of days gone by.
I also offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Check out John of Damascus; he has a fascinating idea about God and time as well. I've posted about it here before, I think.
The evangelical thinker John Feinberg offered a critique of the eternal generation theory. Matthew Barrett and others have challenged him vociferously.
Is this what is referred as social trinitarianism? I think where the coherence breaks down is when trinitarians insists that each member of their construct is "fully God" even insisting that the each of the listed persons should be considered the one God and not a part of God despite their being distinct thus creating a massive philosophical conundrum. In fact I recently discovered that there is an official name for this issue i.e the threeness oneness problem. It seems to be the source most intra trinitarian conflict.
As your comments suggest, the Trinity doctrine is all over the map. One Trinitarian himself said that there is no one doctrine of the Trinity, but interpretations of it. They usually want to say that each person is "fully God" as you point out above, but most Trinitarians do not mean that one of the persons exhaust the whole "Godhead," for they're going to have major problems if that's true. One church creed states regarding the Trinity that the divine substance should not be divided, but neither should the persons be "confounded." Yet if each person is fully identical with the divine substance (i.e., the Godhead), then the persons will wind up being confounded. It's a ball of confusion.
Social Trinitarianism teaches that God has three consciousnesses (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but see https://carm.org/doctrine-and-theology/what-is-social-trinitarianism/
Not everyone agrees on the definition of social Trinitarianism. I think the post-Nicenes (for the most part) were not social Trinitarians. That is a later human construct.
I got this from a website purporting to "explain" the trinity doctrine specifically what it means to state that each of the persons is fully God:"If God is three Persons, does this mean that each Person is “one-third” of God? Does the Trinity mean that God is divided into three parts?
The Trinity does not divide God into three parts. The Bible is clear that all three Persons are each one hundred percent God. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all fully God. For example, it says of Christ that “in Him all the fullness of Deity dwells in bodily form” (Colossians 2:9)." The article is by Matt Perman At Cru.org
Thanks, and that explanation is very helpful. It's common for Trinitarians to claim that each person in the triune Godhead is fully God, but what they apparently mean is that each person is supposed to have the omni-properties, yet each person is supposed to be distinct from the other.
So Jesus is ostensibly God, but he's not the Father or the holy spirit.
When trinitarians say that Jesus is God, is the word God in such a statement a count noun a ,proper noun or an abstract noun? I keep getting differing responses from trinitarians on this question do you have an idea of what the mainstream view is or even if there is a mainstream view?
I think you're going to get different answers to that questions, but the answer I've found which Trinitarians say is the least problematic is that the "God" in "Jesus is God" is an abstract noun or functioning somewhat adjectivally.
If you could access Daniel Wallace's remarks on John 1:1, Philip Harner and the NET Bible comments, it might shed light on how the mainstream is employing the expression, "Jesus is God." But I think it's fair to say that the majority of Trinitarians are predicating divinity of Christ when they make the statement. They are using God abstractly or qualitatively.
See https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%201&version=NET
A few more remarks:
"In the beginning the Word was existing. And the Word was in fellowship with God the Father. And the Word was as to His essence absolute deity." (Wuest)
One of the NIV translators, Ralph Earle, affirms this reading of John 1:1:
"The Logos is not equivalent to 'God'; there is also God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. But he is fully divine. We could translate this clause either literally--'God was the Word'--or as, 'The Word was deity.' It is an emphatic declaration of the deity of the Logos, who in verse 14 is identified with Jesus."
See Earle, Word Meanings in the New Testament, page 81.
Thank you this was Extremely helpful. In case you were wondering the ,back and forth to which I'm alluding arose out of a discussion of the NIV's rendering of Titus 2:13
You're welcome. Titus 2:13 is one of those verses that Trinitarians like to endlessly debate.
In this regard, another reference that comes to mind is Murray J. Harris' "Jesus As God." He's a Trinitarian but he makes some good points in the book about verses that purportedly call Jesus "God."
In short these goalposts are on wheels. No wonder trying to get fixed definitions in any discussion with trinitarians is like trying to nail jello to a wall.
Yes, I thinkt that's what is going on with Trinitarians. There is not one version of the Trinity, but many versions:
Systematic theologian Owen Thomas writes:
Our survey of the history of the [Trinity] doctrine in the text has
indicated that there are several doctrines of the trinity: Eastern,
Western, social analogy, modal, so forth. There is one doctrine
in the sense of the threefold name of God of the rule of faith as
found, for example, in the Apostle's Creed. This, however, is
not yet a doctrine. It is ambiguous and can be interpreted in a
number of ways. There is one doctrine in the sense of the
Western formula of “three persons in one substance.” However,
this formula is also ambiguous if not misleading and can be
interpreted in a number of ways. A doctrine of the trinity would
presumably be one interpretation of this formula . . . let us
assume that the phrase “doctrine of the trinity” in the question
refers to any of a number of widely accepted interpretations of
the threefold name of God in the role of faith. (Thomas
“Theological Questions” 34)
Robert Jenson similarly states that the Trinity doctrine is “less a
homogenous body of propositions than it is a task.” He claims that the ontological dogma of the Trinity is actually, “the church’s continuing effort to recognize and adhere to the biblical God’s hypostatic [i.e., personal] being.” See Systematic Theology (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1:90. Jenson’s comments suggest that the formulation of the Trinity is a perpetual, ongoing ecclesiastical task. It truly seems like a moving target.
@ E. Foster :this may seem a bit off topic but I've been thinking about your comment about the fact that trinitarian orthodoxy is less of a monolithic idea and more a body of loosely related ideas about the nature and identity of God of the bible.
Here is a comment about another orthodoxy kept in place by a powerful establishment.
Cornelius Hunter Ph.d biophysics on Darwinism
"What is evolution? The origin of species by: natural selection, random causes, common descent, gradualism, etc. Right?
Wrong. Too often that is what is taught, but it is false. That’s according to evolutionists themselves. A typical example? See, “The study of evolution is fracturing — and that may be a good thing,” by Lund University biologist Erik Svensson, writing at The Conversation.
Evolutionists themselves can forfeit natural selection, random causes, common descent, etc. How do I know? Because it is in the literature."
I have to say I find the mechanisms by which both these dominant orthodoxies are screened off from warranted skepticism remarkably similar.
Thank you, aservantofJehovah. I think that is an interesting and enlightening comparison. I appreciate the thoughts and suggested reading. Evolutionists (like Trinitarians) often accuse people of misunderstanding them. Maybe there's a reason why.
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