Opinion, Belief, Understanding and Knowledge in Platonic Thought--How Applied to Theology?

Plato makes the following epistemic distinctions in his work, the Republic (509d-510a). These steps go in ascending order: in other words, d) comes before c), etc. I have called these steps--"the epistemic ladder." Others make use of this terminology but sometimes apply it differently at times; see 

https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=phil

https://academic.oup.com/book/32898/chapter/276569490

In any event, here are the four distinctions that Plato makes along with the objects of their episteme:

a) dialectic thought (noesis)-contemplation of the Platonic Forms/Ideas

b) understanding (dianoia)-reflection on or use of mathematics/geometry

c) belief (pistis)-immediately apprehends sensory sensation

d) opinion (eikasia)-rooted in sensory phenomena

How do these distinctions apply to theology? Thomas Aquinas delineates one potential way:

"The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason" (Aquinas, SCG 1.3).

To be clear, Aquinas' theology owes more to Aristotle than to Plato, but I'm just showing how the epistemic distinctions of Plato might be applied to theological methods in general. Historically, theologians did make use of Platonic philosophy to shape the contours of their thought: Augustine of Hippo and Justin Martyr are prime examples among the church fathers.

Some of the Best Theistic Defenses Around

1. Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. Revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

2. Craig, William Lane. The Kalām Cosmological Argument. London: Macmillan, 1979.

3. Feinberg, John S. The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004.

4. Nowacki, Mark. The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007.

5. Feser, Edward. Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2017.

6. Spitzer, Robert J. New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy.

7. Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. 2^nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016. doi:10.1093/0198240708.001.0001

8. O'Connor, Timothy. Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. Malden, MA. Blackwell, 2008.

9. Erasmus, Jacob. The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Cham: Springer, 2018.

10. Davies, Brian. The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil. London ; New York: Continuum, 2006.







   

 

 

 

Augustine of Hippo, the Divine Essence, and the Trinity Doctrine

To say that all formulations of the Trinity doctrine are not the same is an understatement. While church historians warn that one should not overly emphasize the differences between western and eastern versions of the Trinity, I believe the divine essence is uniquely fundamental for Augustine, who is the chief representative of the western church. That is, Augustine appears to stress the essence of God when he reflects on the three persons rather than their putative status as divine persons. Edmund Fortman writes that Augustine "thought rather of one single divine nature subsisting in three Persons" (The Triune God, pp. 140-141). Furthermore, notice that Fortman quotes from Augustine's De Trinitate on p. 141 (second paragraph):

"Each person of the Trinity is God, and all together are One God. Each is the full essence, and all together are One essence."

Again from Fortman, we read: "And by presenting the divine essence with all its absolute perfections as existing identically in each of the three Persons . . ." (p. 141).

See other quotes on pp. 141-142 of Fortman.

Augustine writes in De Trinitate 7.2.3: 

Therefore the Father and the Son together are one essence, and one greatness, and one truth, and one wisdom. But the Father and Son both together are not one Word, because both together are not one Son. For as the Son is referred to the Father, and is not so called in respect to Himself, so also the Word is referred to him whose Word it is, when it is called the Word. Since He is the Son in that He is the Word, and He is the Word in that He is the Son. Inasmuch, therefore, as the Father and the Son together are certainly not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not the one Word of both.