Dialogue About Identifying the True Ecclesia

I've changed my dialogue partner's name to protect his identity.

[Edgar]
For one, I do not define the word "Church" (EKKLHSIA) in the same way that you do. The Church is not an institution as understood by the RCC and I have never said that I believe it is.

[Lamar]
Then you’ll have to specify what you mean by “church.” Also: (a) Was the early EKKLHSIA an institution in *any* manner at all? Was it organized? Was it visible? What criteria characterize an institution? (b) What, then, did Jesus mean when He said that He was building His EKKLHSIA upon Peter (cf. Matthew 16:18-19)? What type church, exactly, did He build? Which is more reasonable and makes more sense to say—that Jesus established an invisible communion of believers upon Peter or that a visible institution was founded upon Peter?

[Edgar]
(1) I define the word "church" (EKKLHSIA) in the same way (MUTATIS MUTANDIS) that Ralph Earle does: "the whole Body of Believers (the Church of Jesus Christ) and . . . local congregations--but never for a building, as today"(Earle 16).

Louw-Nida has this: "EKKLHSIA, AS [feminine]: the totality of congregations of Christians-'church' (Semantic Domain 11.33).

In contrast to the RCC, I think the Church is primarily made up of Jesus' anointed followers (those Christians who have the hope of subsisting immortally and incorruptibly in the heavens) and secondarily is composed of Christians with the hope of living forever on a paradise earth (Heb. 2:5). At any rate, the Church is never tied to the Bishop (in the NT) and it is never expressly linked to the Pope. That is where we differ, [sir].

(2) In his work "An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament" theologian Hans Conzelmann has a section entitled "The Church As An Institution." On page 303, he makes the following observation: "Paul knows no fixed organization. True, there are particular activities and positions (Phil. 1:1; 1 Cor. 12:28), but there is no hierarchy. There is a church order, but it does not in itself represent the nature of the church."

Therein lies my objection to the term "institution." I am not against defining Christianity in terms of community and even in terms of an organizational structure. Where I part ways with you is when it comes to construing the Church in hierarchical terms. In the first century there were no "bishops." The word itself is an anachronism superimposed on the biblical Greek text. It is manifestly clear that the first century Church did not have a system of bishops, priests, and deacons. As Elaine Pagels ("The Gnostic Gospels") points out--these developments were a result of second century Church politics.

(3) Jesus did not build his Church on Peter. You cannot conclusively demonstrate this assertion to be true. In BAGD, we read that PETRA either refers to "the apostle so named, or [to] the affirmation he has just made" (BAGD 1b). In context, I would choose the latter. Or to be more precise I would view the rock-mass as Christ himself. Certainly Peter seems to have thought that Christ and not he (Peter) was the foundation upon which the Christian EKKLHSIA was built. In 1 Pet. 2:6-8, Peter wrote in part: IDOU TIQHMI EN SION LIQON EKLEKTON AKROGWNIAION ENTIMON . . . KAI LIQOS PROSKOMMATOS KAI PETRA SKANDOLOU.

[Lamar]
Okay, so how was it that at any point in the history someone could readily and accurately identify those “true believers”? If true believers always existed, how could a person living in the 4th, 7th, 9th, 11th, and 15th centuries *properly* identify those true believers? After all, the WTS itself says that one criterion for salvation is identifying Jehovah’s organization and serving him as part of it. If Jesus’ Church were not a visible organization (i.e., an institution), then how was this identification made throughout history? Or did God leave a critical component of our salvation to mere happenstance or guesswork?

[Edgar]
The statement that you quote from the WTS must be viewed in its proper context. In the United in Worship (WTBTS) book, we are plainly told that Jesus originally planted "wheat" but the Devil scattered "weeds" in the same "field" that Jesus has sown "wheat." The "slaves of the householder" asked their Master whether he wanted them to collect the "tares" out from among the wheat. The Master (Jesus Christ) answered "no" because he did not want the wheat to be simultaneously pulled up with the weeds (indicating that true Christians would be hard to identify for a period of time).

The information that you cite from the WTS must be construed with the previously mentioned information in mind. While it is true that today one needs to identify God's organization in order to obtain salvation--such was not the case during the time periods you speak about. That is, there was a time when it was very hard to differentiate between false and genuine Christians. According to Scripture, God allowed this situation to obtain until the last days. In the harvest, Jesus foretold, there would be a separation work taking place. Until the weeding out occurred-true worshipers were dispersed and eternal salvation was not based one's religious group.

[Lamar]
Also, if true believers always existed, there must be some way to trace their *visible* existence through history; otherwise we’re left with saying that true believers exist, but we have no way of knowing who they are—and therefore we have no way of being able to identify Christ’s Church (and proper doctrine) and consequently we cannot serve Jehovah as part of it.

[Edgar]
I've answered your concern about not being a part of God's organization above. But please note that I am not saying we could not know who was and who was not practicing true Christianity. I hesitate to pass value judgments because I am not God (James 4:11, 12). Yet if Christians were living their lives in harmony with the Bible and imitating the first century apostles (even imperfectly)--I would say that we could safely conclude such individuals were truly "Christians" in God's eyes (2 Tim. 2:19). One member of the Greek Orthodox Church that I have long admired is Cyril Lucaris (17th century) whom the WT recently wrote about. This man was by no means perfect and he admittedly held what I would term "erroneous beliefs." But his views on Scripture and justification are quite impressive and he may well have been one of those whom Jehovah recognized as "wheat."

Some Commentators on Romans 8:11

I concede that certain scholars understand Romans 8:11 as a reference to the future. But these comments below are posted to show the other side of things:

"Your mortal bodies. That this does not refer to the resurrection of the dead seems to be apparent, because that is not attributed to the Holy Spirit. I understand it as referring to the body, subject to carnal desires and propensities; by nature under the reign of death, and therefore mortal—i. e. subject to death. The sense is, that under the gospel, by the influence of the Spirit, the entire man will be made alive in the service of God. Even the corrupt, carnal, and mortal body, so long under the dominion of sin, shall be made alive and recovered to the service of God. This will be done by the Spirit that dwells in us, because that Spirit has restored life to our souls, abides with us with his purifying influence, and because the design and tendency of his indwelling is to purify the entire man, and restore all to God. Christians thus in their bodies and their spirits become sacred. For even their body, the seat of evil passions and desires, shall become alive in the service of God" (Barnes' New Testament Notes).

"By mortal bodies he understands all those things which still remain in us, that are subject to death; for his usual practice is to give this name to the grosser part of us. We hence conclude, that he speaks not of the last resurrection, which shall be in a moment, but of the continued working of the Spirit, by which he gradually mortifies the relics of the flesh and renews in us a celestial life" (Commentary on Romans, John Calvin).

"The apostle believed in a present participation in those revivifying forces which broke into the history of the world with the advent of Jesus Christ; the power of God is now active in the believer who yields to that action. In particular the doctrine of the Spirit included the assurance and the present experience of the power of God; on this point Paul shares a very widespread tradition. Hence the allusion here [in Rom 8:11] is to the vivifying energy of the Spirit, who liberates from the tyranny of sin, according to the framework of ideas already sketched out in [Rom] 6:12-23" (Franz J. Leenhardt, The Epistle to the Romans. London: Lutterworth Press, 1961. Pages 209-10).

Others could be marshaled.

Why Divine Revelation Should Not Be Contradictory (Yahoo Link)

Please see http://voices.yahoo.com/why-divine-revelation-never-contradict-itself-11537270.html?cat=38

Thanks,

Edgar

The Greek Text of John 12:11: Senseless?

A gentleman once claimed that John 12:11 in the Greek form does not make sense. He wrote:

"Now I have translated the Aramaic of this passage as follows:

because many of the Judeans, on account of him, were trusting more and more ('EZAL) in Yeshua."

The Greek version makes no sense. Why would believing in Him cause them to "go away"?"

I replied:

As I pointed out on December 26 [2002], the Greek in Jn 12:11 is fine. There is no difficulty with the text as it now stands in the GNT. I consequently suggested understanding the text as a reference to Jews departing from the tutelage of religious leaders, who left the sheep of Judaism skinned and thrown about like sheep without a shepherd.

But after I made this reply, I decided to do a little more research. What I found interesting in my studies is how different Bibles render this verse.

"because on account of him many of the Jews were going there [hUPHGON-imperfect indicative active 3rd pl of hUPAGW] and putting faith in Jesus" (NWT).

"for on account of him many of the Jews were going over to Jesus and putting their faith in him" (NIV).

"because on account of him many of the Jews were going away and were believing in Jesus" (NASB).

"Because on account of him many of the Jews were going away [were withdrawing from and leaving the Judeans] and believing in and adhering to Jesus" (Amplified Bible). Words in the bracket are in the original text of the Amplified Bible.

"because on account of him many of the Jews were going away, and were believing in Jesus" (YLT).

"for on account of him many of the Jewish people from Jerusalem were going away and believing in Jesus" (NET Bible).

The quotes listed above quickly reveal that a number of translators think that hUPHGON (Jn 12:11) refers to the Jews "going away" from the Jewish authorities in order to follow Jesus. However, the NWT does not necessarily communicate this idea but instead simply says that the Jews were going to Bethany, where Jesus was staying. Why does the NWT read so differently?

BDAG informs us that hUPAGW is used only intransitively in our literature and is found most frequently in John. The verb can mean "to leave someone's presence" or to "go away." In Mt 4:10, for instance, we read: "TOTE LEGEI AUTWi hO IHSOUS hUPAGE SATANA . . ."

John also writes: APEKRIQH IHSOUS EIPON hUMIN hOTI EGW EIMI EI OUN EME ZHTEITE AFETE TOUTOUS hUPAGEIN (18:8).

While hUPAGW can delineate the action of departing or going away, however, BDAG reminds us that the line between "going away" and "going" is not fixed. See Mk 6:31; Jn 13:3; Rev 17:8, 11.

A second sense listed in BDAG for hUPAGW is "to be on the move, esp. in a certain direction, go." After listing a number of instances illustrating this usage, the Greek lexicon mentions that hUPAGW can also be used to simply mean "go" (absolutely) and in these cases, "the context supplies the destination" of the movement thus delineated. See Mt 8:32; 13:44; Lk 10:3;Jn 15:16. Finally, BDAG categorizes Jn 12:11 as an example of hUPAGW meaning "to be on the move, esp. in a certain direction, go." The idea of movement away from or in a certain direction therefore seems to be supplied from the context. BDAG also states that P66 omits hUPAGW in Jn 12:11.

At any rate, we can now more clearly discern why some render it either "going away" or "going there" in the case of the NWT. Either way, the Greek of Jn 12:11 is not really problematic.

Regards,
Edgar

Is ARXH Timeless in John 1:1a?

Some years ago, a person with whom I was conversing tried to argue that ARXH in John 1:1a is timeless and dimensionless because the word is anarthrous there. Here is my reply to that claim:

What grammatical evidence do we have that ARXH when employed anarthrously, has a special or unique lexical content? I don't know how you feel about the issue of Johannine authorship, but I personally believe that the apostle John wrote both the Gospels and the three Epistles. If this is so, the opening verses of the first Epistle shed illumination on the Prologue of Jn 1.

EN ARXHi HN hO LOGOS KAI hO LOGOS HN PROS TON QEON KAI QEOS HN hO LOGOS (Jn 1:1).

hO HN AP' ARXHS hO AKHKOAMEN hO hEWRAKAMEN TOIS OFQALMOIS hHMWN hO EQEASAMEQA KAI hAI XEIRES hHMWN EYHLAFHSAN PERI TOU LOGOU THS ZWHS (1 Jn 1:1).

Please notice that ARXHS in the first Epistle is also anarthrous. Yet there is no indication that the writer is employing ARXHS in a timeless--from a human viewpoint--sense. He goes to great lengths to locate the ARXHS within history (within time). "From the beginning," the disciples "heard" "saw" "looked upon" and "handled" TOU LOGOU THS ZWHS. There is no indication of a dimensionless ARXH in the Johannine Epistle. This seems significant in view of the fact that ARXH here [Jn 1:1a] is also anarthrous. Of course, my argument relies heavily on a literary nexus between the Johannine Gospel and Epistles. But even if different writers composed these Scriptural works, 1 John 1:1 still serves as an example of an anarthrous ARXH that is manifestly historical.

The same can also be said of Jn 1:1:

"ARXH, HS, ARXOMAI: a point in time at the beginning of a duration--'beginning, to begin.' ARXH: EN ARXHi HN hO LOGOS 'in the beginning was the Word' or 'before the world was created, the Word (already) existed' or 'at a time in the past when there was nothing . . .' Jn 1:1" (Louw-Nida 67.65).

Question about First Clement Text

A reader of the blog sent these questions. I've edited the comments for the sake of time and length:

Hi Edgar.

I have a grammar question, (or a sense in translation, on a text in 1st Clement Chapter 7:4 in the Codex Alexandrinus and Rufinus of Aquileia's Latin version of Clement of Rome's 1st Epistle.

Here's one version of MPG critical text:

GREEK TEXT: “...[Ἀτενίσ]ωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, [καὶ ἷδ]ῶμεν, ὡς ἔστιν τίμιον τῷ Θεῷ [αἷμα] αὐτοῦ...” - (Chapter 7:4, [MPG] Jacques Paul Migne's “Patrologia Graeca,” or “Patrologiae Cursus Completus,” Series Graeca, Imprimerie Catholique, 1857–1866 .)

Here's another different version of MPG that I found:

GREEK TEXT: “...Ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ γνῶμεν, ὡς ἔστιν τίμιον τῷ Πατρὶ αὐτοῦ...” - (Chapter 7:4, ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ’. Epistula i ad Corinthios Τοῦ ἁγίου Κλήμεντος τοῦ Ῥώμης ἐπισκόπου ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Κορινθίους Α ’. Ἐκ προσώπου τῆς Ῥωμαίων Ἐκκλησίας γραφεῖσα, [MPG] Jacques Paul Migne's Patrologia Graeca (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca) Imprimerie Catholique, 1857–1866.)
http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/pgm/PG_Migne/Clement%20of%20Rome_PG%2001-02/

Rufinus has this reading:

LATIN TEXT: “...Fixis oculis respiciamus in sanguinem Christi, cernamusque quam pretiosus Deo sit ejus sanguis...” - (Chapter 7:4, AD CORINTHIOS EPISTOLA PRIMA. SANCTI CLEMENTIS EPISCOPI ROMANI, ( EX VERSIONE RUFINI ) Tomus Primus [Book I], Patres Apostolici, COLLECTIO SELECTA SS. ECCLESIAE PATRUM, Complectens Exquisitissima Opera. By D. M. N. S. Guuillon. M. DCCC. XXIX.)

Now I need help interpreting:

1.) Grammatically who Ltn., ( sanguis ) applies to
2.) Sense

Of the two texts.

Who do you think Rufinus and the MPG version is trying to say it applies to:

1.) God?
2.) Jesus?

Are they trying to make it look like it is: “...God's blood...” in the Tri{3}nitarian sense here?

Like what has been attempted in some of the MSS with Chapter 2:1 of Ist Clement, (See link below for more info), and in the Bible at Acts 20:28.

MY RESPONSE: I don't think there's any doubt that sanguis ought to be construed with eius and understood as a reference to "Christi." Sanguis (nominative case) is the subject. Moreover, the accusatival use of "sanguinem" earlier in the construction helps us to know the referent of "sanguis."

The sense appears to be (similar to 1 Peter 1:18ff) that Christ's blood is highly valued by God. Notice the dative form "Deo" which suggests who is viewing the blood as precious.

Finally, the "blood" terminology seems applicable to Christ in Rufinus and MPG. Both texts have the subject term for "blood." While someone might try to use this passage for Trinitarian purposes, it's a stretch to use it that way.

Hope this helps,

Edgar

Romans 8:11 and Mortal Bodies (Reply to John)

My remarks below demonstrate why I say Romans 8:10-11 does not teach the future resurrection of the physical body. While I believe certain believers will be raised from the dead with physical bodies, I don't think Jesus was raised with a physical body nor will God's anointed sons and daughters be resurrected with physical bodies.

The text reads in the NASB:

"If Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, yet the spirit is alive because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit who dwells in you."

These apostolic words seem to cap a discussion that is found in Romans 6:2ff in which Paul talks about a figurative death "with reference to sin" (THi hAMARTIA). Since Christians have experienced this death vis-a-vis sin, the apostle reasons that believers should no longer conduct their lives according to the sinful flesh:

"Seeing that we died with reference to sin, how shall we keep on living any longer in it?" (Rom 6:2 NWT)

Paul also writes that God "impaled" (SUNESTAURWQH) the "old man" in order that our "sinful body" (TO SWMA THS hAMARTIAS) might be rendered inoperative (no longer remain captive to sin). See Romans 6:6

Paul then familiarly writes:

"for he who hath died hath been set free from the sin" (YLT). The NWT says "acquitted from sin."

This text obviously refers to the here-and-now from a strict contextual standpoint, although it can evidently apply in a principled way to the millennial reign of Jesus Christ.

Those interested in pursuing this topic further may also wish to read Romans 6 & 7 in their entirety. But let me now cut to the chase.

Paul's words at Romans 8:10-11 (NASB) are again as
follows:

"If Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, yet the spirit is alive because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit who dwells in you."

Notice that in the cotext of these verses, Paul has been dealing with the ongoing death of the body (Romans 7:24). The SWMA is still sinful, even though Christians have undergone a figurative death with reference to sin and then been raised by
Christ (Ephesians 2:1-7). Therefore Paul writes that the body undergoing death needs to be rescued. God through Christ obviously provides the way out for those who exercise faith in the Son (Romans 7:25). But notice that the apostle proclaims himself a slave to "sin's law" with his flesh (THi SARKI). So we can still legitimately ask how Paul's "mortal [sinful] body" can be quickened in the here-and-now? That is, how can Paul and others avoid living in harmony with the sinful flesh and stop the ongoing death of the body? Paul's answer (in Romans 8:11)is the indwelling spirit of God. Franz J. Leenhardt explicates Romans 8:11 this way:

"The apostle believed in a present participation in those revivifying forces which broke into the history of the world with the advent of Jesus Christ; the power of God is now active in the believer who yields to that action. In particular the doctrine of the Spirit included the assurance and the present experience of the power of God; on this point Paul shares a very widespread tradition. Hence the allusion here [in Rom 8:11] is to the vivifying energy of the Spirit, who liberates from the tyranny of sin, according to the framework of ideas already sketched out in [Rom] 6:12-23" (The Epistle to the Romans. London: Lutterworth Press, 1961. Page 209-10).

Did Jesus Christ Resurrect Himself? (John 10:17-18)

John 10:17-18 reports Jesus exclaiming:

10:17: Διὰ τοῦτο με ὁ πατὴρ ἀγαπᾷ ὅτι ἐγὼ τίθημι τὴν ψυχήν μου, ἵνα πάλιν λάβω αὐτήν.

10:18: οὐδεὶς ἤρεν αὐτὴν ἀπ’ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τίθημι αὐτὴν ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ. ἐξουσίαν ἔχω θεῖναι αὐτήν, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν· ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρός μου.

These Johannine verses are often invoked to prove that Jesus resurrected himself from the dead and even James Kleist alludes to this Johannine account in his translation of Ignatius and Clement of Rome's writings. But it seems the Bible clearly shows us that God the Father raised Jesus Christ from the dead through the agency of God's Holy Spirit. In other words,Jesus did not resurrect himself:

"Paul, an apostle--sent not from men nor by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead" (Galatians 1:1 NIV)

"He was chosen before the creation of the world, but was revealed in these last times for your sake.Through him you believe in God, who raised him from the dead and glorified him, and so your faith and hope are in God" (1 Pt 1:20-21 NIV).

"But if the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit who dwells in you" (Rom 8:11 NASB).

A.T. Robertson writes about Jn 10:17: "That I may take it again (hina palin labw authn). Purpose clause with hina and second aorist active subjunctive of lambanw.He looked beyond his death on the Cross to the resurrection. 'The purpose of the Passion was not merely to exhibit his unselfish love; it was in order that He might resume His life, now enriched with quickening power as never before' (Bernard). The Father raised Jesus from the dead (Acts 2:32). There is spontaneity in the surrender to death and in the taking life back again (Dods)."

Also concerning Jn 10:18, we read: "And I have power to take it again (kai exousian ecw palin labeinauthn). Note second aorist active infinitive in both cases (qeinai from tiqhmi and labein from lambanw),single acts. Recall [John] 2:19 where Jesus said: 'And in three days I will raise it up.' He did not mean that he will raise himself from the dead independently of the Father as the active agent (Romans 8:11). I received from my Father (elabon para tou patros mou). Second aorist active indicative of lambanw. He always follows the Father's command (entolh) in all things (Romans 12:49; Romans 14:31). So now he is doing the Father's will about his death and resurrection" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

J.H. Bernard (International Critical Commentary on John) writes about Jn 10:17-18: "That He [Jesus] had been given this latter EXOUSIA is in accordance with the consistent teaching of the NT writers that it is God the Father who was the Agent of the Resurrection of Jesus. Jesus is not represented as raising himself from the dead" (page 2:365).

Mt 16:21 also teaches that the Son of Man would be 'raised up' on the third day. Note Matthew's use of the passive in that verse (KAI THi TRITHi hHMERAi EGERQHNAI). EGERQHNAI is aorist infinitive passive. Mark, however, uses the aorist infinitive active in his account of Peter's rebuke (ANASTHNAI), but this hardly shows that Jesus would raise himself from the dead (Compare Mk 8:31). See C. S. Mann's Anchor Bible Commentary on Mark.

Sincere regards,

Edgar

My Edited Review of Rebecca Lyman's Early Christian Traditions

General Overview

Rebecca Lyman's work Early Christian Traditions is volume six in the New Church's Teaching Series. It has been published to inform Anglicans about the origin, history and essence of the Christian religion. While Lyman's work contains few surprises, it is still informative and scholarly. She primarily reviews the historical activities of the first century and medieval Church. Lyman's coverage of how the Trinity doctrine developed also should prove to be useful for students of fourth century Christological disputes. Christology refers to the doctrine of Jesus Christ: it may include not only teachings about him, but also deal with how salvation is brought about through the Lord.

Some of the topics discussed in this book are the social world of the early church, what the expression "imperial Christianity" means and some early depictions of Jesus Christ. Lyman closes out this introductory work on a climactic note, detailing the theology of Bishop Augustine and his famed teaching about the city of God. These contents alone make the book worth purchasing for Church historians. But other details could be added to this review.

Specific Contents

Lyman adroitly employs sociological and historical tools with satisfactory results. Her knowledge and methodology are impressive though I was somewhat disappointed with the writer's seeming inability to "think outside the box" of orthodoxy. For example, we read: "For the most part in this early stage, the word 'God' was usually reserved for the Father as creator. However, in the Gospel of John the language of 'Father' and 'Son' was used to express the unique and eternal intimacy between God and Jesus" (113).

While it is correct to say that the word God in Scripture normally refers to the Father (and this term also has a unique reference to his unparalleled Deity), Lyman apparently is regurgitating well-worn claims when she writes that the expression "Son" (hUIOS) is used in the Gospel of John to express "the unique and eternal intimacy between God and Jesus." In the Hebrew writings, the word "son" (used non-Christologically) is utilized to express an intimacy between God and his spirit sons--without denoting an "eternal" form of closeness (Job 38:4-7). A suggestion that John employs "Son" in the way purported by Lyman does not seem to be justified.

I was also disappointed by Lyman's treatment of the Arian controversy. Contemporary research has revealed that Arianism and "orthodoxy" were not that far apart in terms of how they viewed Christ (Jaroslav Pelikan). The Arians worshiped the Son and regularly prayed or sang hymns to God's Messiah. Arius said that Jesus was "fully God" and "the strong God." The ancient presbyter's study of Christ was primarily driven by his soteriology and ardent desire to understand the biblical witness about the Lord. In my personal estimation, Lyman should have implemented what recent studies have unfolded about Arius. Despite these small quibbles, however, her book is well worth the money. I learned from the study's presentation of familiar events, and felt that Lyman was fairly objective. I give the book a 4 star rating out of 5 stars.

Moulton-Turner and 1 John 5:20

In researching the subject of 1 John 5:20 and the Greek pronoun οὗτος, I have checked grammatical works by Smyth, Blass-Debrunner and Funk, J. W. Wenham, and Moulton-Turner, among others. Only Moulton-Turner proves to be helpful here (IMO)--I might add Winer to the list as well.

On page 44 of Moulton-Turner (Vol. III, Syntax), we are told that οὗτος appears frequently in the papyri and NT. It can refer to someone present (Luke 15:30), and may also refer to "the noun which is most vivid in the writer's mind."

Examples given after this statement are Matt. 3:3; 3:17; Acts 4:11; 1 Jn. 5:20. Concerning 1 Jn. 5:20, we read: "God, not Christ, is the true God" (Moulton-Turner, p. 44). Looking up 1 Jn. 5:20 in the older Interpreter's Bible, I found out that it too identifies the Father as the subject described by οὗτος. He is the main subject of 1 John 5, and the Father is the true God and life everlasting (cf. Jn. 17:3; 1 Jn. 5:11).

Just because Moulton-Turner, the IB, Winer, Zerwick, Westcott, Murray J. Harris and others say that the Father is represented by οὗτος doesn't make the case absolutely ironclad. But I thought you might appreciate the information found in Moulton-Turner.

Dialogue on Birthdays and Idolatry

I have left this dialogue unedited. The only thing I've changed is my dialogue partner's name for the sake of confidentiality.

[John]
Rather, it [i.e. Edgar's explanation concerning
birthdays] strikes me as arbitrary and strechted [sic]
beyond plausibility. Terms like 'extravagant' and
'idolatry' seem historically and metaphysically
unrooted.

[Edgar]
I'm not sure that I understand what you're saying
here. I understand what it means for something to be
"historical" or "metaphysical," but I do not quite
grasp how my use of "extravagant" or "idolatry" fails
to be rooted with respect to history or metaphysics.
Surely it is logically or factually possible for glory
or honor to be extravagant or to approach the point of
idolatry. [Paul] Tillich even writes that when we treat
concerns that are less than ultimate as though they
are ultimate, then we commit idolatry. In my opinion,
terms like "idolatry" are primarily analytic. In the
words of phenomenologists like [Martin] Heidegger or
[Josef] Seifert, acts like idolatry show themselves from themselves.
It seems that if we render honor or glory to creatures
that is more properly reserved for the Creator, then
we have committed idolatry. I could stand to be
corrected. But that is how I understand matters.

[John]
I mean simply that their use doesn't seem to make much
sense either in terms of their common historical use
or common reality of human experience.

[Edgar]
My use of the term "idolatry" is rooted in apostolic
thought. The Pauline Epistle to the Romans refers to
certain individuals worshiping and serving the
creature more than the Creator. While you may not
agree that birthdays fit into the category discussed
by the apostle in Rom 1:25, it is difficult for me to
understand how lavishing too much attention on
creatures fails to meet the criterion of a sufficient
condition for considering an act to be idolatrous.

As far as the common reality of human experience is
concerned, there are many aspects of Christianity that
conflict with "the common reality of human
experience." How much sense does it make from the
standpoint of l'etre pour soi (i.e. human reality) to
speak of covetousness or inordinate sexual desire as
idolatry? Yet, that is how early Christians and Jews
thought of PLEONEXIA or PATHOS (understood as
inordinate sexual desire).

[See Colossians 3:5]

Erasmus of Rotterdam on Making the Scriptures Accessible

"I totally dissent from those who are unwilling that the Sacred Scriptures, translated in the vulgar tongue, should be read by private individuals. I would wish even all women to read the Gospel and the Epistles of St Paul. I wish they were translated into all languages of the people. I wish that the husbandmen might sing parts of them at his plough, and the weaver at his shuttle, and that the traveller might beguile with their narration the weariness of his way."

Tertullian Believed that the Son of God was Lower than the Angels Before He Became a Man

Here is the text from Tertullian's work Adversus Marcionem 2.27 (Holmes' translation):

"Now we believe that Christ did ever act in the name of God the Father; that He actually from the beginning held intercourse with (men); actually communed with patriarchs and prophets; was the Son of the Creator; was His Word; whom God made His Son by emitting Him from His own self, and thenceforth set Him over every dispensation and (administration of) His will, making Him a little lower than the angels, as is written in David. In which lowering of His condition He received from the Father a dispensation in those very respects which you blame as human; from the very beginning learning, even then, (that state of a) man which He was destined in the end to become."

For more details, see http://www.amazon.com/Angelomorphic-Christology-Exegesis-Psalm-Tertullians/dp/0761833145/ref=sr_1_2_title_1_p?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1301668928&sr=1-2

Jerome H. Neyrey on 2 Peter 1:1

After providing reasons why other scholars believe that 2 Peter 1:1 refers to Christ as God, Jerome Neyrey provides reasons which evidently support the view that 2 Peter 1:1 does not refer to Christ as God (2 Peter, Jude, p. 147-148). The reasons he gives are outlined below:

1) 2 Peter 1:2 evidently makes a distinction between God and Christ. In fact, Neyrey insists that "there appears to be an intended parallelism between 1:1 and 1:2." That is, 2 Peter 1:1 reads: EN DIKAIOSUNH TOU QEOU hHMWN KAI SWTHROS IHSOU XRISTOU; 2 Peter 1:2 states: EN EPIGNWSEI TOU QEOU KAI IHSOU TOU KURIOU hHMWN.

2) It is rare for the NT to call Jesus "God." Neyrey refers to John 1:1-3; 20:28 and he appeals to late first or second century occurrences of addressing Christ as QEOS in Ignatius of Antioch (Eph. 18:2; Smyrn. 1:1).

3) All references to DIKAIOSUNH (with the possible exception of Phil 1:11) refer to the righteousness of God, not to Christ's righteousness. It would not be clear from the context of 2 Peter 1:1 what is meant by the righteousness of Christ.

Neyrey thus indicates that the apostle has God's justice in mind when he writes what is now the opening verse of the Second Epistle of Peter. See 2 Peter 2:5.

Neyrey's observations are found in his Anchor Bible Commentary.

Present Tense Clarification (1 John 3:9, Etc)

Greetings all,

I want to post some thoughts here that clarify my stand on the Greek present tense.

Some have asked whether I deny that verses like Matthew 7:7 depict continuous (progressive) action or whether the present generally portrays continuous action. My previous remarks were not intended to deny that the present normally or does portray continuous action. However, I wanted to urge caution about too facilely reading the present tense as progressive action. That is the point I wanted to make.

Let's take 1 John 3:6-9 as an example.

S. M. Baugh writes:

"In my opinion, the fact that John chose to use the present infinitive hAMARTANEIN rather than the aorist hAMARTEIN, shows that he was thinking about 'sinning' in v. 9 as a characteristic action. Hence, John does not teach 'perfectionism'--that Christians can experience sinlessness in this life. Rather, when he says OU DUNATAI hAMARTANEIN he teaches that the genuine Christian cannot be characterized by a life of unrepentant sin" (1 John Reader, pp. 50-51).

Baugh believes that three factors buttress his interpretation of 3:9.

(1) The immediate context.

(2) The lexical significance of hAMARTANEIN.

(3) The influence of DUNAMAI upon the tense form of its complementary infinitive.

The idea expressed here by Baugh is that since the infinitival form of hAMARTANW does not appear elsewhere in the GNT, John must have used this verbal formation at 3:9 to signal an ongoing activity, not a state. He concludes:

"the phrase OU DUNATAI hAMARTANEIN in 1 John 3:9 expresses the fact that the Christian is prevented by the new birth and the abiding presence of God from falling into persistent sin" (52).

But the point I want to make is that it's not the present tense alone that signals continuous activity: other contextual factors affect the meaning of 1 John 3:6-9.

Contrast Baugh's treatment of 1 John 3:6-9 with Buist Fanning's approach. Regarding 1 John 2:1, Fanning argues (Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek) as follows:

"One solution to the problem [of the seeming contradiction between 1 John 2:1 and 3:9] is to note the difference in the tenses used to refer to the Christian's sin in 2:1 (aorists) vs. 3:4-10 (presents), and to trace a distinction in meaning along the line of 'occasional vs. habitual' sin or 'committing a single sin vs. being characterized by sin as a ruling principle'. Zerwick's phrasing of it is: 'commit sin in the concrete, commit some sin or other' as opposed to 'be a sinner, as a characteristic" (213).

Fanning goes on to demonstrate that while this view could well explain the apparent contradiction in the Johannine Epistles, other scholars take a different view. He himself opts for the approach that says 1 John 3:9 is likely not describing habitual sin. Nevertheless, Fanning acknowledges the possibility that 1 John 3:9 could be understood as referring to habitual sin. This is in harmony with what Greek professor Ralph Earle observes.

Commenting on 1 John 3:6ff, he explains: "The verb hAMARTANW in both cases is in the present tense of continuing action. This is brought out helpfully by 'keeps on sinning . . . continues to sin' (NIV). The same use of the present tense is found in 9. Here again it should be brought out: 'No one who is born of God will continue to sin . . . he cannot go on sinning"(Earle, 451).

This interpretation seems to make the most sense to me. But probably more than tense alone (i.e. morphology) leads us to the conclusion that habitual sin is the subject matter of 1 John 3:6-9.

Analyzing Grammatical and Ungrammatical Greek in the Apocalypse (Revelation 1:4)

Ἰωάνης ταῖς ἑπτὰ ἐκκλησίαις ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ· χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ Πνευμάτων ἃ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θρόνου αὐτοῦ (Revelation 1:4)

Readers of the Apocalypse frequently claim that the syntax (word order) and grammar of Revelation 1:4 (among other places in the work) overtly violates standard rules of Koine Greek. Dionysius of Alexandria reportedly verbalized his criticisms of the Greek found in Revelation--his appraisal is taken from Eusebius of Caesarea's Church History (7.25.24-27):

Moreover, it can also be shown that the diction of the Gospel and Epistle differs from that of the Apocalypse. For they were written not only without error as regards the Greek language, but also with elegance in their expression, in their reasonings, and in their entire structure. They are far indeed from betraying any barbarism or solecism, or any vulgarism whatever. For the writer had, as it seems, both the requisites of discourse—that is, the gift of knowledge and the gift of expression—as the Lord had bestowed them both upon him. I do not deny that the other writer saw a revelation and received knowledge and prophecy. I perceive, however, that his dialect and language are not accurate Greek, but that he uses barbarous idioms, and, in some places, solecisms. It is unnecessary to point these out here, for I would not have any one think that I have said these things in a spirit of ridicule, for I have said what I have only with the purpose of showing clearly the difference between the writings.

One could translate Revelation 1:4: "from the one who is, the one who was, and the one who is coming." I will now examine whether the grammatical evidence indicates that this expression is an instance of nonstandard Greek forms in the Apocalypse.

Descriptivist and Prescriptivist Views of Language

Grammarians dutifully inspect extant literature, then take note of consistent patterns in order to formulate various rules regarding syntax or morphology (word formation). But it is possible to differentiate between a prescriptivist view of language and a descriptivist approach. By "prescriptivist" I am referring to a normative view of language in which grammatical rules are prescribed or outlined.

Descriptivism is the approach to language that just notes how people use abstract signifiers. With this distinction in mind, we can see how imperative it becomes to recall Ferdinand De Saussure's distinction between speech (la parole) and language (la langue). This differentiation of concepts posits a measure of disparity between the formal rules of a language and the way that people actually speak at home and work, or while shopping.

Saussure's observations indirectly shed light on the importance of Greek papyri: these documents provide evidence of how Koine Greek was used in daily ancient affairs. The papyri from Egypt were not intended to be literary or metaphysical documents per se; all such factors must be considered before we talk about anyone breaking grammatical rules. Rather than discuss grammatical rule-breaking in general, however, I will focus on Revelation 1:4.

Concerning Revelation 1:4

Daniel B. Wallace thinks that the syntax of Revelation 1:4 is intentionally violated. He argues that it's unlikely any audience would view this passage's grammar as a standard way of expressing Greek utterances. However, Richard A. Young takes a descriptivist approach to this issue. He realizes that cultures may communicate ideas in variously accepted ways:

"Charles (1920:10) calls John's use of the nominative in Revelation 1:4 a deliberate violation of the rules of grammar. Yet it can only be a violation if grammar is viewed prescriptively. With a descriptive view of grammar, it merely illustrates the range of expression that koine Greek tolerates. Thus John's use of the nominative is not a mistake in grammar" (Richard A Young, Intermediate New Testament Greek, 13).

While a number of ancient manuscripts did apparently try to correct John's grammar, scholar David Aune makes a persuasive case that Revelation 1:4 possibly regards the threefold attribution to God as "an indeclinable divine name" (Revelation 52A:24).

Aune suggests that John's usage is influenced by the Septuagint Version (LXX) of the Bible and its handling of the divine name. My conclusion: There is no need for us to believe that John's apocalyptic lingual patterns are not grammatical. David A. Black also proffers that "there is nothing wrong" with the phrase in Revelation 1:4 (Black, 13). Of course, more work needs to be done in order to develop a satisfactory account that explains the Greek of Revelation.

Sources
David Aune. Revelation: 1-5. Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1997.

David Black. Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988.

Is It Possible to Know and Comprehend God?

There is much that one could say about knowing and comprehending God. What I write below is just an initial reply to some arguments posed by Trinitarians regarding God's cognoscibility.

(1) I think that Augustine of Hippo was wrong when he said that it's easier to know what God is not, as opposed to knowing what or who God is. This type of theology is clearly apophatic: it is an insidious form of "Christian" agnosticism that fails to treat the divine revelation found in the Bible justly. Matthew 11:27 proclaims that "No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (NIV).

Additionally, John 1:18 informs us that the Son of God came and "explained" or "revealed" (EXHGHSATO) the Father. These verses indicate that we do in fact know God by means of the Son. If we do not know what God is, this would invalidate the fact that God has been revealed through His Son. Compare John 17:3; 1 John 5:20.

(2) Some persons may assert that God can be known in his economy, but not immanently (in his essence). Systematic theologian Gordon Kaufman insists that the distinction between God's "essence" and his "economy" is a misleading one. God is who he has revealed himself to be in his economy (OIKONOMIA). If God has been revealed in a certain way through his Son, then we can expect that the revelation conforms to God's essence. For example, if God has revealed that he is triune by means of his Son, then it would seem that God is triune in ESSENTIA. On the other hand, if God has not revealed himself to be three in one through the Son, then the divine one is likely not triune with respect to his ESSENTIA.

(3) Lastly, while I would agree that God is incomprehensible--we can never understand or know everything there is to know about God--I would also contend that there is no biblical evidence to suggest that the Supreme God is triune or that his essence is unknowable. The point can be illustrated by a story which the late historian Jaroslav Pelikan (who was a Trinitarian) tells. He relates a narrative about rabbi Herbanus who debated with the sixth century Orthodox Bishop Gregentius.

(a) Herbanus reasoned that "God is one, and not two or three, as you [Gregentius] say." He added that the Old Testament refers to "sons of God," who are not of the same OUSIA as the Father (i.e. they are not from the OUSIA of the Father, yet they are "sons"). Gregentius responded by quoting Genesis 1:26, where God utters the fateful words, "Let us make man in our image." Herbanus applied this passage to the angels but Gregentius disagreed. To this day the problem has not been resolved from an exegetical perspective, and it will undoubtedly serve as a perennial cause for debate in this AIWN. Be that as it may, certain Trinitarians have written essays demonstrating that neither the Old Testament nor the New Testament explicitly states or even implies that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one. Alan J. Hauser of Appalachian State University concluded that the Trinity doctrine is a "later development" in Christian history. He does not reject the doctrine for this reason, but Hauser's candor about the Biblical testimony is refreshing.

See The Christian Tradition (Vol. II:204-206) by Jaroslav Pelikan.

Early Christian Thinkers By Foster, Paul (EDT)

Is Abraham Already A Son of God?

The answer to this question may seem obvious to some on this forum. One may either choose to say that Abraham is either a son of God right now or that he is not. Things may not be quite so simple when one reexamines Lk 20:34-36, however. For now, I want to focus on 20:36:

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται, ἰσάγγελοι γὰρ εἰσιν καὶ υἱοί εἰσιν θεοῦ τῆς ἀναστάσεως υἱοὶ ὄντες.

The text above typed in 'Greek' is made in a context involving certain Sadducees disputing with Jesus about the resurrection from the dead. After these men had posed a 'stumper' for the Christ, he in turn referred them to the Pentateuch, which the Sadducees accepted as authoritative, in order to overturn their fallacious use of Scripture and logic. As one reads Jesus' skilled use of the thornbush account to confute his adversaries, one cannot help but be astounded at his manner of teaching in the face of such formidable opposition.

For instance, Jesus points out that while people in this age marry and are often given in marriage, those whom God deems worthy of the resurrection will neither marry nor be given in marriage. Without trying to explain that perplexing statement, I will move on to Lk 20:34-36.

The context makes it clear that Jesus has Abraham in mind when he exclaims that the children of the resurrection will not be able to die anymore since they will be like angels, being children of God by virtue of the resurrection. A few points now merit our attention.

(1) Luke employs a hapax legomenon (ἰσάγγελοι) that is equivalent to ὡς ἄγγελοι as Matthew 22:30 shows (see Matthew Vellanickal. The Divine Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings. Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977, page 62).

a) More importantly, however, Luke also utilizes the participial ὄντες which should no doubt be construed as a "causal circumstantial participle here" (NET Bible ftn on Lk 20:36). Vellanickal rightly contends that ὄντες in Lk 20:36 "is very significant" (page 63). We offer full consent to his observation. Yet, one is justified in asking, in what way is this participle highly significant?

b) Vellanickal argues that ὄντες is important in Lk 20:36 because the writer's use of this participial form shows that Jesus is saying it is by virtue of the resurrection that ones such as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob become sons of God: "thus the resurrection becomes the cause and condition of the 'divine sonship' and the 'equality to the angels'"(Vellanickal, 63).

2) The author referenced above ultimately argues that it is only when Abraham and others are resurrected that they truly become children of God "in the full sense of the term." However, to be fair to the author and Luke's text, we must say that Abraham on one level is not a child of God yet; for he has not been raised from the dead. Still, there is a sense in which Abraham must be a child of God already. This is in the sense in that his resurrection has already occurred in the eyes of God. As Jesus exclaimed to the Sadducees: "He is a God, not of the dead, but of the living, for they are all living to him" (Lk 20:38).

a) So while I think it is technically correct to maintain that Abraham is not literally a son of God but only becomes one by virtue of the resurrection from the dead, he is still now a son since Jehovah God will certainly raise Abraham and others from the dead at the divinely appointed time. Abraham evidently became a son of God, in a sense, after he died. This still means that he was not technically one of God's children while he walked the earth. To the contrary, Abraham was one of God's friends, as Scripture indicates (Isa 41:8; James 2:23). In the resurrection, he will assuredly become one of God's earthly sons.

The Gospel by Luke, St [Paperback]

Lastest Book Review: WHC Frend's The Rise of Christianity (link enclosed)

Please see http://voices.yahoo.com/review-w-h-c-frends-rise-christianity-11421228.html?cat=38

Thanks,

Edgar

Greek Grammatical Aids

From time to time folks ask me to recommend some good Greek grammars. I have sent out bibliographies previously, but I like to update them from time to time. Here is one of my latest bibliographies that includes both Greek works and religious ones.

Recommended Religious and Grammatical Works

Aune, David. Revelation. Word Biblical Commentary, vols. 52a-c. Dallas, TX: Word Book, 1997.


Bauer, Walter. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Christian Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.


Baugh, S.M. _A First John Reader_: Intermediate Greek Reading Notes and Grammar_. Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1999.


Black, David A. (Editor). _Linguistics and New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis_. Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1992.


Blackwelder, Boyce W. _Light From the Greek New Testament_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1976.


Brooks, James A., and Carlton L. Winbery. _Syntax of New Testament Greek_. Lanham, MD, 1979.


Conybeare, F.C. and St. George Stock. _Grammar of Septuagint Greek: With Selected Readings, Vocabularies, and Updated Indexes_. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995.


Dana, H.E. and Julius R. Mantey. _A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament_. Toronto: Macmillan, 1955.


Earle, Ralph. _Word Meanings in the New Testament_. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997.


Hawthorne, Gerald F. _Philippians_. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 43. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983.


Kennedy, George A. _New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism_. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1984.


Longenecker, Richard N. _Acts_: The Expositor's Bible Commentary_. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995.


Louw, Johannes and Eugene A. Nida. _Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains_. 2 vols. New York: United Bible Societies, 1988.


Mastronarde, Donald J. _Introduction to Attic Greek_. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993.


Murray, George R. Beasley. _John_. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 36. Waco, TX, 1987.


Robertson, A.T. and W. Hershey Davis. _A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research_. Nashville, Broadman Press, 1934.


Silva, Moises. _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996.


Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.


Zerwick, Maximilian. _Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples_. Rome: Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1963.

Notes on Revelation 6:4

KAI EXHLQEN ALLOS hIPPOS PURROS KAI TWi KAQHMENWi EP' AUTON EDOQH AUTWi LABEIN THN EIRHNHN EK THS GHS KAI hINA ALLHLOUS SFAXOUSIN KAI EDOQH AUTWi MAXAIRA MEGALH.

"Then another horse came out, a fiery red one. Its rider was given power to take peace from the earth and to make men slay each other. To him was given a large sword" (NIV).

"And another, a red horse, went out; and to him who sat on it, it was granted to take peace from the earth, and that men would slay one another; and a great sword was given to him" (NASB).

"And another horse came forth, a red horse: and to him that sat thereon it was given to take peace from the earth, and that they should slay one another: and there was given unto him a great sword" (ASV).

"The second [horseman], who rides a fiery red horse, is intent to engage the enemy in battle. God has given earth over to itself to engage in a global, civil war, preventing its inhabitants from attaining the very things that make for peace and security" (Robert W. Wall, Revelation, p. 110).

"A red horse (hIPPOS PURROS). Old adjective from PUR(fire), flame-coloured, blood-red (2 Kings 3:22), in N.T. only here and Revelation 12:3, like Zechariah 1:8; Zechariah 6:2 (roan horse). To take peace from the earth (LABEIN THN EIRHNHN EK THS GHS). Second aorist active infinitive of LAMBANW, and here the nominative case, the subject of EDOQH (see verse Zechariah 2), "to take peace out of the earth." Alas, how many red horses have been ridden through the ages. And that they should slay one another (KAI hINA ALLHLOUS SFAXOUSIN). Epexegetical explanatory purpose clause with hINA and the future active of SPAZW(Zechariah 5:6) instead of the more usual subjunctive (verse Zechariah 6:2). Cf. Robertson, Grammar, p. 998f. This is what war does to perfection, makes cannon fodder (cf. John 14:27) of men. A great sword (MAXAIRA MEGALH). MAXAIRA may be a knife carried in a sheath at the girdle (John 18:10) or a long sword in battle as here. ROMFAIA, also a large sword, is the only other word for sword in the N.T. (Revelation 1:16; Revelation 2:12,16; Revelation 6:8; Revelation 19:15,21)" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

"The color red may symbolize blood, representing the death and destruction caused by the second cavalier" (David Aune, Revelation 6-16, p. 395).

"PURROS, A, ON . . . (s[ee] prec. entry; Aeschyl., Hdt. +; ins, pap, LXX; En 18:7. On the double R s[ee] B-D-F Section 34, 2; Mlt-H. 101) fiery red as the apocalyptic color of a horse (Theocr. 15, 53, of a fox standing on its hind legs) Rv 6:4 . . . In Rv, prob. because of the influence of the hIPPOS PURROS of Zech 1:8 and 6:2, the word ER. has been changed to its practical equivalent PURR" (BDAG, p. 900).

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More on the Greek Tense (Aorist)

For years, exegetes, pastors and Biblical translators "abused" the aorist tense by emphasizing the once-for-all-time understanding of the Greek tense. That was until Frank Stagg's groundbreaking article in JBL ("The Abused Aorist." Journal of Biblical Literature 91 (1972) 222-231.

Donald A. Carson highlights some of these abuses and briefly discusses the scholarship that resulted in a demythologization of the aorist. We now know that the AORISTOS generally delineates action as a whole and does not necessarily portray one act for-all-time over against the continuous action of the present tense, although the present tense (imperfective aspect) may at times depict continuous action (note how the aorist is also used in John 3:16 when the apostle stresses the Father's love manifested in sending His only-begotten Son for the sake of humanity).

Other factors such as context and lexis will also help us to discern the aspect or Aktionsart of a particular verb instead of loading a certain "tense" with a meaning such as the one discussed above.

Did Anyone Enter Heaven Prior to Jesus' Death and Resurrection? (link for article)

http://voices.yahoo.com/did-anyone-enter-heaven-prior-jesus-death-resurrection-11395456.html?cat=10

Alvin Plantinga Meets the Logical Problem of Evil (Updated Version)

This paper will discuss logician Alvin Plantinga's approach to the logical problem of evil. My position is that Plantinga successfully rebuts the charges of this well-known challenge to theism (belief in God).

What the Logical Problem of Evil Tries to Accomplish

The logical problem of evil is a puzzle for both the theistic and non-theistic mind--a conundrum that has its roots in times of antiquity. The "problem" can be formulated thus:

(1) God is omnipotent.

(2) God is omnibenevolent.

(3) Evil exists.

The atheologian J.L. Mackie argues that 1-3 constitute an inconsistent set of (formally) contradictory propositions. Worded simply, Mackie contends that God cannot be omnipotent (almighty) or omnibenevolent (wholly good) if evil obtains. He insists that it is logically problematic for God and evil to exist or obtain simultaneously: Mackie believes that it is not a case of both-and, but either-or. Either God exists or evil exists and ne'er the twain shall meet:

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.)

Quote is from J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind, New Series, 64.254. (April 1955): 200-212.

Plantinga's Reply to the Logical Problem of Evil

Conversely, Alvin Plantinga, taking a cue from Augustine of Hippo insists that it is logically possible for God to possess the objective properties of omnipotence and omnibenevolence although evil obtains. He systematically appeals to human free will and modal logic to rebut the atheistic charges of Mackie. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity: it distinguishes between possible and necessary truths. In summary, Plantinga maintains that 1-3 above are not formally inconsistent propositions when we account for the appropriate modal distinctions. For example, he states that the following proposition is not necessarily true: "A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can."

The modal term "necessarily" is important in this argument since the next proposition also does not appear to be necessarily true: "There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do." Yet, in order for Mackie's contention to hold, Plantinga maintains that the aforesaid propositions must be not only true, but necessarily true (i.e., they cannot not be true). These claims must be true in every possible world if Mackie's argument is going to be sustained.

While S (a certain person or subject) might be a good doctor, it does not mean that S always eliminates evil (E) as far as S can. A proposition of this sort does not appear to be necessarily true since there might be substantive reasons why S (a good doctor, in this case) would not eliminate evil insofar as it's possible for S to eliminate E. For example, a doctor who has the power to remove cataracts might not immediately perform surgery on a needful patient until a later time. But this reticence would not mean that the medical professional lacks the ability or the desire to remove the cataracts.

Moreover, it seems that an all-powerful (omnipotent) being might have certain limits, believe it or not. Can an omnipotent entity bring about a contradictory state of affairs such that 2 + 2 = 5 and square circles as well as married bachelors begin to obtain? Not if the law of logical necessity holds. Nor does it seem that a maximally powerful being can change the past without violating the law of noncontradiction. So, while there might be some possible world in which an omnipotent being eliminates suffering or evil altogether, it's possible that there are other worlds in which an omnipotent being does not remove evil, even though such a being would have the requisite power to eradicate evil.

Logical Outcome of Plantinga's Argument in the Light of Scripture

There are evidently good reasons why God has permitted evil. He made rational creatures upright, but we choose our respective paths (Ecclesiastes 7:29). God evidently allows creation to exist in a state of futility until a Messianic figure should arrive to liberate creation from bondage to slavery and corruption (Romans 8:19-21). That is a plausible account of God's permission of evil based on the New Testament and logic. In any event, there are apparently good reasons why God has not eliminated evil at this time (2 Peter 3:9). Plantinga makes a similar case based on his use of modal logic.

Conclusion

God apparently vouchsafed free will to human beings. So does there exist a possible world (counterfactual situation) in which creatures always freely do what is right and never violate the beneficent laws of deity? In the future (based on my reading of Scripture), humans will freely do what is right for all eternity. However, at that time, there will be no devil, no Satanic world nor any sin (Revelation 20:1-10; 21:1-5).

The bottom line: 1-3 do not constitute an inconsistent propositional set. It is logically possible that God would permit evil to obtain for reasons primarily known to God. But we have been given some plausible reasons why evil persists from the pages of Judeo-Christian Scripture.

Sources

Peterson, Michael L. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977.

Is Time Grammaticalized in New Testament Greek?

A burning question in New Testament Greek studies revolves around the grammaticalization of time and Greek tenses. Scholars use the terms Aktionsart (a German word that can denote "kind of action") and "aspect" to discuss this issue. This paper will explore whether Greek grammaticalizes time in the light of analyses undertaken by David Black and Rolf Furuli.

David Black on Tense and Aktionsart

Black insists that lexemes (minimal units of language having semantic content) possess "inherent aspect": they are intrinsically "durative" or "punctiliar" with regard to their aspect (80). By his use of the word "punctiliar" Black evidently means that lexical units (in some cases) may be aspectually aoristic: "The most important element of tense in the Greek verb system is the kind of action being referred to. This is called aspect or Aktionsart, and it is where the major distinction between the different tenses lies" (84).

Elsewhere, he continues: "A special morpheme indicates that the action of a verb refers to past time. This is a past time morpheme or augment, which is found in Sanskrit, Iranian, Armenian, and Greek, and only in the past tenses of the indicative mood" (Ibid., 81).

However, it's possible to distinguish verbal aspect from verbal Aktionsart. This German term refers to the kind of action being delineated by a Greek verbal tense or relation without necessarily grammaticalizing time. But the indicative mood in Greek probably does grammaticalize time, although this view certainly lends itself to more linguistic abnormalities when actual Greek constructs are studied.

Black argues that the imperfect, the aorist, and pluperfect tense "all refer to the past; the only difference between them is the kind of action, or aspect, that they indicate" (84). Therefore, we see that not every Greek scholar believes the concept of time is wholly absent from the imperfect or aorist tense. Additionally, Black speaks of time and aspect, then links aspect with Aktionsart (kind of action). But other grammarians and linguists make a clear distinction between the two categories; they do not believe that either the aorist, imperfect or pluperfect tense inherently refer to past action. Nonetheless, if Black is correct, then his comments would illuminate some anomalies encountered when reading New Testament Greek.

Rolf Furuli and the Grammaticalization of Time

On the other hand, Furuli observes that the Aktionsart of a particular verb is associated with its meaning. He reasons that the verb's contents (in this case) are not capable of being canceled. He connects Aktionsart to a word's lexical properties. That is, the verb's "kind of action" refers to the objective features conveyed by a determinate action word. The term Aktionsart also signifies that features of a particular verb retain their meaning in almost every contextual situation with hardly any exceptions.

Furuli provides the example of the verb "sing" which he notes is inherently punctiliar regarding its Aktionsart. Whether one thus says "he sang" or "he was singing," how Aktionsart is emphasized remains the same. The word "singing" is no less durative than "he sang" because of each term's intrinsic properties. Furuli defines tense as "the grammaticalization of location in time" (a definition found in Comrie). He accordingly seems to contend that Greek (with the exception of the future tense) may not have "tense" in the relevant sense discussed here. Nonetheless, a question that deserves future exploration is, what does the New Testament evidence reveal about this issue?

Conclusion

I have read the studies on Greek aspect and Aktionsart published by Furuli, Buist Fanning, Kenneth McKay and Stanley Porter. Yet I have been hesitant to concur with the non-temporal view of Greek tenses as a whole. There does not appear to be a good reason for completely removing the notion of time from Greek tenses, even when the future tense is not under consideration. But I do believe that verbal aspect is more prominent than the concept of time when it comes to Greek tenses. Furthermore, Daniel B. Wallace seems to have a point when he contends that a number of factors (i.e. affected and non-affected meaning) provide temporal information where Greek verbal relations are concerned.

Sources

Black, David A. Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications. Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Book House, 1988.

Furuli, Rolf. The Role of Theology and Bias in Bible Translation: With a Special Look at the New World Translation of Jehovah's Witnesses. Huntington Beach, Calif: Elihu Books, 1999.

Did John Calvin Oppose Michel Servetus Over 1 John 5:7?

I once had someone ask me whether Calvin decided to push for the death of Servetus based on 1 John 5:7. Here is my answer to that question.

Servetus was executed 1553 CE in Geneva. Harold O.J. Brown (in his book "Heresies") notes that the driving impetus behind Servetus' execution was actually the imperial decree known as the Justinian Code which made it clear that heresy was a crime against the state. Although Justinian I ruled from 527-65 CE, the code bearing his name was not promulgated until a millennium later. Nevertheless, this code allowed Servetus to be executed and burned at the prosecutorial hands of Calvin. See page 186 of Brown's study.

Brown writes: "As a young man, Servetus propounded the distinctive views that ultimately led him to the stake: his On the Errors of The Trinity appeared in 1531. He held God to be one Person only; this God was the literal, natural father of Jesus Christ, who was therefore God's natural Son . . . Although Servetus denied the deity and preexistence of Christ, he too was evidently trying to grapple with Christ's overwhelming majesty; he was unable to conceive of him as a mere man, even as one adopted by God, but had to postulate a direct, natural relationship with God. Servetus was condemned to death in Geneva for his denial of the Trinity" (Brown 330).

Servetus died with the words "O Jesus, Son of the eternal God, have mercy on me," on his lips. Brown concludes that "his execution in Geneva represents a stain that Reformed Protestantism has never quite been able to efface" (330).

Now back to your original question--did 1 John 5:7 influence Calvin to have Servetus executed? I do not think that we can limit Calvin's resistance to Servetus' ideas and his subsequent prosecution of Servetus to one biblical verse. Now Erasmus' Greek New Testament (1516 CE) contained the Comma Johanneum and it may have played some part in Calvin's fury. I just do not think we can say that Calvin's actions were solely based on 1 John 5:7. I would suggest that you also read Paul Johnson's A History of Christianity. On pp. 289-290, he also discusses the Servetus case and provides some information regarding how Calvin reacted after the debacle of 1553 CE.

Biblical Languages and Grammatical Gender (Holy Spirit)

Just because a Hebrew or Greek noun/pronoun is grammatically neuter does not mean that the referent of the noun/pronoun is neuter. In other words, grammatical gender does not always correspond to the sex or gender of a person or thing being thus described. So, for instance, the holy spirit is delineated by a feminine term in the Hebrew-Aramaic scriptures (ruah). However, in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament), the writers use masculine and neuter morphological forms when referring to the spirit of God. But this language is a result of linguistic accidents (morphology). It technically does not speak to the being or ontological constitution of an entity which, in this case, is the holy spirit. After all, Qoheleth of Ecclesiastes is a feminine term. Yet it evidently describes the son of David. So I would tend to believe that not much can be gained by arguing from grammatical gender to ontological gender, although Romans 8:16 (KJV) represents an interesting verse of comparison:

"The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God"

Notice how the KJV uses "itself" (a neuter pronoun) rather than "himself" (masculine).

Revised Version of the Moral Argument for God's Existence

Greetings everyone,

I'm now posting some of my writings on yahoo voices or their contributor network. If you get a chance, please check out some of my pieces that are contained there. For example, I've revised my moral argument for God's existence. You can see that paper at this link: http://voices.yahoo.com/moral-evidence-existence-god-11351918.html?cat=9

Thanks for all your support!

Edgar

Ontological Argument Roots Found in Cyprian of Carthage

The ontological argument for God's existence often is attributed to Anselm of Canterbury (circa 1033-1109 CE). If by "argument" we mean a systematic and developed case made for a belief or set of beliefs, then yes, Anselm might be credited with the first theistic argument based on the concept of perfect existence. However, I believe the roots for the ontological argument can be found in writers like Cyprian of Carthage. For instance, he writes:

"To God who alone is, belongs the whole name of God;
therefore He is one, and He in His entirety is
everywhere diffused. For even the common people in
many things naturally confess God, when their mind and
soul are admonished of their author and origin. We
frequently hear it said, 'O God,' and 'God sees,' and
'I commend to God,' and 'God give you,' and 'as God
will,' and 'if God should grant'; and this is the very
height of sinfulness, to refuse to acknowledge Him
whom you cannot but know" (On The Vanity of Idols 9).

I have yet to see an author make this connection although someone has possibly associated Cyprian with Anselm before. I'd like to advance this idea to see if it can float.

Frederic Louis Godet's Reading of John 14:14

Frederic Louis Godet argues that the "me" in John 14:14 seems to be an "absolutely impossible" reading since it makes little sense to ask Jesus something in his own name. Compare John 15:16; 16:23-24. This commentator also insists that Tischendorf, Weiss and Westcott defend the indefensible when they argue for the genuineness of the reading "me."

See Godet's Commentary on the Gospel of John, With an Historical and Critical Introduction (page 154). It is available on Google Books for free.

Carl Conrad's Remarks on Philippians 2:6-7 (MORFH)

From Carl Conrad. Originally appeared on B-Greek forum. I now quote Carl:

Like Bob Fuller, I'm hoping we may have a fruitful discussion of the question Edgar has presented to us (where have you been, Edgar; long time, no hear from!); I hope too that we can keep the discussion focused on lexical evidence and clear indicators deriving from immediate context of passages in which the word MORFH is found, both in the GNT and in extra-biblical literature. For my part I don't see any justification whatsoever for the definition of MORFH cited above, "the outward display of the inner reality or substance."


The word is found only in two texts in the GNT, once in the questionable "late-ending" of Mark's gospel, Mk 16:12, where the word pretty clearly means "external appearance"--and we'd have to assume, I think, that hETERAi certainly indicates that this MORFH is NOT identical with the inner reality of the risen Jesus.


Mk 16:12 META DE TAUTA DUSIN EX AUTWN PERPATOUSIN EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi POREUOMENOIS EIS AGRON.



The other passage is the Christ-hymn of Phil 2, where the word appears in successive verses 6 (EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN) and 7 (MORFHN DOULOU LABWN).



Phil 2:6 hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN OUC hARPAGMON hHGHSATO TO EINAI ISA QEWi. 7 ALLA hEAUTON EKENWSEN MORFHN DOULOU LABWN, EN hOMOIWMATI ANQRWPWN GENOMENOS; KAI SCHMATI hEUREQEIS hWS ANQRWPOS ...


And here, of course, the real problem is that, if MORFH means "essential form" in verse 6 for MORFH QEOU, it does not SEEM to mean the same thing in verse 7 for MORFHN DOULOU. It seems to me that Louw & Nida have a clear sense of what the problem here is but they have some problem in applying their perspective to Phil 2:6-7, inasmuch as they deem MORFH to have the sense "nature or character" as opposed to discernible form. With respect to MORFHN DOULOU they understand not "guise of a servant" but rather being and doing what a servant is and does as MORFH QEOU is supposed by them to mean "being and doing what God is and does."



58.2 MORFHa, HS, f: the nature or character of something, with emphasis upon both the internal and external form - 'nature, character.' hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN 'he always had the very nature of God' Php 2:6; MORFHN DOULOU LABWN 'he took on the nature of a servant' Php 2:7. In view of the lack of a closely corresponding lexical item such as 'nature,' it may be necessary to restructure the form of Php 2:7 as 'he became truly a servant.'


58.15 MORFHa, HS, f: a visual form of something - 'visual form, appearance.' EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi 'he appeared in a different form' Mk 16:12.


The problem, it seems to me, as evidently it did to Edgar, that this sense of "nature" is not readily found attested elsewhere for the noun MORFH. Although Aristotle's metaphysics/ontology is sometimes called "hylomorphism" because it involves the interrelations of hULH (matter) and MORFH (form) at the various levels of the Scala Naturae, Aristotle himself doesn't use the term MORFH of "essential form" but speaks rather of OUSIA
or TO TI HN EINAI, which latter phrase (lit. something like "being what it(in fact) is") comes close to the phrase I've used above, "being and doing what X is and does."


LSJ doesn't even HINT at any sense of MORFH as "nature" or "essential form":

MORFH, HS, hH , form, shape, twice in Hom. (not in Hes.), SOI D' EPI MEN MORFH EPEWN thou hast comeliness of words, Od.11.367 (cf. Eust. ad loc.); so prob. ALLOS MEN ... EIDOS AKIDNOTEROS PELEI ANHR, ALLA QEOS MORFHN EPESI STEFEI ? God adds a crown of shapeliness to his words, Od.8.170: freq. later, MORFAS DUO ONOMAZEIN Parm.8.53 ; MORFHN ALLAXANTA Emp.137.1 ;MORFAN BRACUS Pi.I.4(3).53 ; MORFHS METRA shape and size, E.Alc.1063: periphr., MORFHS FUSIS A.Supp.496 ; MORFHS SCHMA,TUPWMA, E.Ion992, Ph.162; THN AUTHN TOU SCHMATOS MORFHN Arist.PA640b34 ; KAI GAIA, POLLWN ONOMATWN MORFH MIA A.Pr.212 ; ONEIRATWN ALIGKIOI MORFAISIN ib.449; NUKTERWN FANTASMATWN ECOUSI MORFAS Id.Fr.312 ; PROUPEMYEN ANTI FILTATHS MORPHS SPODON S.El.1159 ; of plants, Thphr.HP1.1.12 (pl.); esp. with ref. to beauty of form, hUPERFATON MORFAi Pi.O.9.65 ; hOIS POSTISTAXHi CARIS EUKLEA MORFH ib.6.76, cf. IG42 (1).121.119 (Epid., iv B. C.), LXX To.1.13, Vett.Val.1.6, etc.; SWMA MORFHS EMHS OGI383.41 (Commagene, i B. C.); MORFHS EIKONAS ib.27; CARAKTHRA MORFHS EMHS ib.60.

2. generally, form, fashion, appearance, A.Pr.78, S.Tr.699, El.199 (lyr.); outward form, opp. EIDOS, HEKATERW TW EIDEOS POLLAI MORFAI Philol.5; ALLATTONTA TO AUTOU EIDOS EIS POLLAS MORFAS Pl.R.380d ; MORFH QEWN X.Mem.4.3.13 , cf. Ep.Phil.2.6, Dam.Pr.304; hHRWWN EIDEA KAI MORFAS A.R.4.1193 ; KATA TE MORFAS KAI FWNAS gesticulations and cries, D.H.14.9; THN MORFHN MELAGCROUS, THi MORFHi MELICROAS, in complexion, Ptol.Tetr.143,
144.

3. kind, sort, E. Ion 382, 1068 (lyr.), Pl.R.397c, etc.

The meanings cataloged in LSJ seem then to range from a more fundamental "aesthetically gratifying guise" through "outward form" to "discernible variety." The focal element seems to be "discernible framework" or "Gestalt" or "pattern."

When we turn to Fred Danker's latest revision of Bauer (BDAG), we have:

MORFH, HS, hH (Hom.+) form, outward appearance, shape gener. of bodily form 1 Cl 39:3; ApcPt 4:13 (Job 4:16; ApcEsdr 4:14 p. 28, 16 Tdf.; SJCh 78, 13). Of the shape or form of statues (Jos., Vi. 65; Iren. 1, 8, 1 [Harv. I 67, 11]) Dg 2:3. Of appearances in visions, etc., similar to persons(Callisthenes [IV BC]: 124 fgm. 13 p. 644, 32 Jac. [in Athen. 10, 75, 452b] LIMOS ECWN GUNAIKOS MORFHN; Diod. S. 3, 31, 4 EN MORFAIS ANQRWPWN; TestAbr A 16 p. 97, 11 [Stone p. 42] ARCAGGELOU MORFHN PERIKEIMENOS; Jos., Ant. 5, 213 a messenger fr. heaven NEANISKOU MORFHi): of God's assembly, the church Hv 3, 10, 2; 9; 3, 11, 1; 3, 13, 1; s 9, 1, 1; of the angel of repentance hH MORFH AUTOU HLLOIWQH his appearance had changed m 12, 4, 1. Of Christ(EN MORFHi ANQRWPOU TestBenj 10:7; Just., D. 61, 1; Tat. 2, 1; Hippol., Ref. 5, 16, 10. Cp. Did., Gen. 56, 18; of deities EN ANQRWPINHi MORFHi:Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 6, 30; cp. Philo, Abr. 118) MORFHN DOULOU LABWN he took on the form of a slave=expression of servility Phil 2:7 (w. SCHMA as Aristot., Cat. 10a, 11f, PA 640b, 30-36). This is in contrast to expression of divinity in the preëxistent Christ: EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN although he was in the form of God (cp. OGI 383, 40f: Antiochus' body is the framework for his m. or essential identity as a descendant of divinities; sim. human fragility [Phil 2:7] becomes the supporting framework for Christ's servility and therefore of his KENWSIS [on the appearance one projects cp. the epitaph EpigrAnat 17, '91, 156, no. 3, 5-8]; on MORFH QEOU cp. Orig., C. Cels. 7, 66, 21; Pla., Rep. 2, 380d; 381bc; X., Mem. 4, 3, 13; Diog. L. 1, 10 the Egyptians say; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 80; 110; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 190; Just., A I, 9, 1; PGM 7, 563; 13, 272; 584.-Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 357f) Phil 2:6. The risen Christ EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi appeared in a different form Mk 16:12 (of the transfiguration of Jesus: EDEIXEN hHMIN THN ENDOXON MORFHN hEAUTOU Orig., C. Cels. 6, 68, 23). For lit. s. on hARPAGMA and KENOW 1b; RMartin, ET 70, '59, 183f.-DSteenberg, The Case against the Synonymity of MORFH and EIKWN: JSNT 34, '88, 77-86; GStroumsa, HTR 76, '83, 269-88 (Semitic background).-DELG. Schmidt, Syn. IV 345-60. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

The first several lines of the above accounting are consistent in pointing in the same direction as LSJ: an outward form that may change, as in the compound verb and noun METAMORFOW and METAMORFWSIS. But when it comes to
our text in Phil 2:6, I'm frankly not quite sure what is intended by what is said: is it that the pre-existent Jesus somehow "expressed" or "manifested" God? And if so, is that really quite the same thing as the "nature" that Louw & Nida seem to understand MORFH to convey?

The end of the BDAG offering points us to Spicq, _Theological Lexicon of the New Testament_ (tr. James Ernest). Spicq has a fuller, more articulate discussion of MORFH, one that is, on the one hand, thoughtful and illuminating, and on the other hand, not as conclusive as one might perhaps have hoped. In the first place he offers the following as potential senses: "stature, form, condition, feature, external appearance, reproduction"--and note that this doesn't include "nature" or "being and doing what X is and does." Here are the key pair of paragraphs:

"Although MORFH is often very close in meaning to EIKWN, 9 and later on even becomes synonymous with it in Gnosticism,10 the texts cited disallow identifying them, as does this inscription from Laodicea, which distinguishes the two terms: "I bear the (bodily) form of Docticius, but the image of his divine virtue is carried on the lips of each person."11 This should be taken into account in the translation of Phil 2:6-7 (hOS EN MORFHi QEOU ... MORFHN DOULOU LABWN), which the Bible de Jérusalem correctly renders "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave."12 It is characteristic of MORFH to be modified, to appear to be changed, to take on new features,13 like the risen Lord appearing to the disciples at Emmaus en hETERA MORFH. 14 He had a new mode of being and a new appearance, analogous to that at the transfiguration (METAMORFOUSQAI, Matt 17:2). This is why in epiphanies of heavenly beings the MORFH is indeed said to be different, but not without affinities with earthly forms.15
"This changing of MORFH is to be compared on the one hand with the theme of "descent and ascent" because of the double MORFH in Phil 2:6-7(MORFH QEOU, MORFH DOULOU )-which owes nothing to the gnostic redeemer myth, which had not yet been concocted-and on the other hand with the consistent meaning of this term in the magical papyri. Whereas the Christian faith affirms that God is invisible and that no human has seen him or can see him (John 1:18; 6:46; 1John 4:12; Rom 1:20; 1Tim 1:17;6:16), the magicians call upon the deity as having a "form"16 and pray him
to appear in his "true form."17 This is a signal favor, for the Eight Books of Moses acknowledge that no one has been able to see this true divine form.18 The devotee of Hermes Trismegistos knows that his god appears in the East in the form of an ibis, in the West in the form of a dog's head,in the North in the form of a serpent, and in the south in the form of a wolf.19 What the mystic wishes to contemplate and be united with is "the sacred form" (Pap.Graec.Mag. 4, 216; vol. 1, p. 78; cf. XIII, 271; vol. 2, p. 101), the "gracious or joyous form,"20 and in the case of Aphrodite, her beauty made manifest: EPIKALOUMAI SE . . . DEIXASA THN KALHN SOU MORFHN.211"

Spicq cites the French Jerusalem Bible here with approval, "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave." I don't know whether English "condition" is quite equivalent to the French "condition." Perhaps better would be "circumstances, terms of existence." Certainly he's right to call attention to the fact that the usage of MORFH in Phil 2:6-7 is closely bound up with the context of "transformation" or METAMORFWSIS. If that's the case, then MORFH in 2:6 EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN and in 2:7 MORFHN DOULOU LABWN are indeed to be understood in the same sense, something like "mode of existence," the underlying assumption being that "mode of existence" is something that can undergo alteration. This is a notion that does seem consistent with other usages of MORFH, and it certainly doesn't approach the sense that Edgar cites: "the outward display of the inner reality or substance." "Outward display" is right, but if we say "outward display of the inner reality or substance," then we'd have to accept that the OUTWARD DISPLAY may mislead the one who views it regarding the "inner reality or substance" of what one beholds.

To sum up, Spicq writes, "It is clear from all of these examples that the use of MORFH in the hymn in Phil 2 is entirely to be expected in a context of metamorphosis or incarnation, but that it would be risky to give it a precise theological meaning."

And that seems like an appropriate imprecise formulation in which to end this endeavor to "divide the word."
--

Carl W. Conrad
Department of Classics, Washington University (Emeritus)
1989 Grindstaff Road/Burnsville, NC 28714/(828) 675-4243
cwconrad@artsci.wustl.edu
WWW: http://www.ioa.com/~cwconrad/

Robert Bowman, Philippians 2:13 and QEOS as Subject

Contra Robert M. Bowman, there is sufficient reason to construe QEOS in Philippians 2:13 as the subject rather than the predicate of the syntactical construction. Rogers and Rogers Linguistic and Exegetical Key points out that QEOS (Philippians 2:13) is fronted which indicates that it's the subject rather than the predicate (see p. 452).

John Calvin also seems to understand QEOS as the subject in this verse. Calvin writes: "God,'says he, 'is hO ENERGWN TO ENERGEIN he that worketh in us to do.' He brings, therefore, to perfection those pious dispositions which he has implanted in us, that they may not be unproductive, as he promises by Ezekiel, --'I will cause them to walk in my commandments.'"

(Ezekiel 11:20.) See his commentary on Philippians.

The Cry of Dereliction in Luke's Gospel

In his commentary on Acts, Professor Richard Longenecker makes this comment on Acts 2:25:

"It should be remembered that only Luke among the synoptists omitted the cry of dereliction from the cross: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34); and only Luke has included the more filial, final word: 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit' (Luke 23:46). Both the omission and the inclusion are in line with the quotation of Ps 16:8 here [in Acts 2:25]: 'I saw the Lord always [DIA PANTOS] before me. Because he is at my right hand, I will not be shaken'" (Longenecker 77-78).

My Slightly Revised Amazon Review of Richard Young's Intermediate New Testament Greek Grammar

Richard A. Young has produced a useful work that certainly provides assistance to students of intermediate NT Greek. Being an intermediate Greek textbook, it predictably deals with syntax and not morphology or phonology. One particularly distinctive feature of Young's work is that he mixes modern linguistic findings and insights based on classical rhetoric with his discussions of syntax. For instance, he supplies brief discussions on metaphors, "kernels," figurative language in general, and speech acts. Moreover, Young has included a helpful chapter on discourse analysis and he also references the prominent theories of aspect formulated by Stanley Porter and Buist Fanning. In many ways, he is also fair with his presentation of syntactical possibilities as illustrated by his approach to 1 Cor 15:29. However, it seems that more than a few of his explanations regarding word order are driven by certain theological preapprehensions. For example, on page 66, he criticizes the New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures' rendering of Jn 1:1c as "a god" rather than the traditional "God."

His criticisms are based (in part) on his notion of what constitutes a "monadic noun." Young utterly misunderstands the thrust behind the NWT rendering when he implies that the "a god" translation is polytheistic--which it is not, when rightly understood. Even worse, he depends on the inadequate (often abused) rule of E. C. Colwell to buttress his opposition to the NWT reading. Regardless of whether the NWT is justified in treating the Johannine text as it does, it is clear that Young sometimes allows theology to govern his syntactical judgments. He unfortunately overlooks the possibility that "a god" just might be a very plausible way to translate Jn 1:1c. In the final analysis, there is really no need for him to read polytheistic notions into the NWT rendering. Despite some issues that I have with Young's intermediate text, however, I recommend it and say, caveat emptor!

The Abuse of Colwell's Rule (John 1:1c)

I want to make it known from the outset that I think Colwell's rule has generally been abused by NT exegetes and GNT grammarians. But the following quotes primarily are for informational purposes: 

"Although there are exceptions, the Colwell rule does seem to be correct for the majority of cases. Colwell (1933:13) states, 'A definite predicate nominative has the article when it follows the verb; it does not have the article when it precedes the verb.' For example, a definite predicate nominative with the article follows the linking verb in John 8:12 EGW EIMI TO FWS TOU KOSMOU, whereas the same predicate nominative without the article precedes the verb in John 9:5 FWS EIMI TOU KOSMOU. The problem in applying the Colwell rule is to determine when the predicate nominative is definite. The rule itself does not establish the definiteness of a noun, an observation sometimes ignored when applying it to John 1:1. We have already mentioned that monadic and proper nouns are definite. The same applies to nouns qualified with a genitive. Colwell notes that proper names in the predicate regularly do not have the article. Other examples of the Colwell rule include Matthew 13:37 (cf. John 5:27), 27:42, John 1:49, and 19:21" (Intermediate NT Greek, p. 65). 

The next quote is taken from Daniel B. Wallace's GGBB, page 260, ftn. 18: "This is not to say that his [Colwell's] rule is invalid. Rather, it is to say that its validity is for TEXTUAL CRITICISM rather than for grammar. Textual criticism was Colwell's real love anyway (he is frequently regarded as the father of modern American NT textual criticism). The rule's validity for textual criticism is as follows: If it is obvious that a pre-verbal PN is definite, the MSS that lack the article are more likely to support the original reading. The issue of meaning is not in view; rather, the presence or absence of the article is."

Matt13 Weedhacker Post on Matthew 24:36; Mark 13:32 (Etc) Textual Issues

Hi Edgar.

I did a post touching what your talking about. It has the earliest references I could find to Matt 24:36, Mark 13:32, Acts 1:7, in Patristic writers.

It may or may not be of use.

http://matt13weedhacker.blogspot.co.nz/2011/11/matt-2436-mark-1332-acts-17-nor-son-but.html

Origen in his Commentary On Matthew 55, has a big section on Matt 24:36. I haven't been able to find an English translation of the text. I think it would make an interesting read.

Big hat tip to Matt13. This information is very useful. Please check out his blog.

Translating 1 Clement 11:1 (The Last Part)

Greek: τοὺς δὲ ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν τίθησιν

The version of Lightfoot that I'm using translates this passage: "but appointeth unto punishment and torment them which swerve aside."

He's translating:

δὲ = "but"
τοὺς = "them"
τίθησιν = "appointeth"
εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν = "unto punishment and torment"
ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας = "which swerve aside"

I would probably not change much about Lightfoot's rendering. Maybe "but set [placed, assigned] to punishment [pruning, mutilation, cutting-off] and harm them which are inclined to other loyalties."

1. κόλασιν can denote "punishment" (BDAG, Robertson's WP). See http://www.biblestudytools.com/commentaries/robertsons-word-pictures/matthew/matthew-25-46.html as an example. While I do not agree with Robertson's overall explanation for Mt 25:46, I believe that the Greek word may denote "punishment" which is not the same as the verb "punishing." See 1 John 4:18. BDAG includes the definition "retribution" as well.

2. BDAG points out that when αἰκισμὸν is used with κόλασιν (or their related lexical forms) that αἰκισμὸν evidently means "punishment." It cites 1 Cl 11:1. So what we appear to have in this passage is a redundancy or pleonasm. The words essentially communicate the same idea.

3. BDAG also cites 1 Cl 11:1 for the entry ἑτεροκλινεῖς. The word may convey notions of "leaning to one side" or "inclined to, having a propensity for" but in 1 Cl 11:1 probably means "having other allegiance" since it's used in the context of rebellious or apostate peoples.

By the way, ὑπάρχοντας is a present active participle ("being") in the accusative form.

Hope this helps,

Edgar

Apparent Sexism in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Donald Bloesch (Is the Bible Sexist?, pages 94-95) thinks that "later Judaism" manifested an increasingly hardened attitude toward women as indicated by daily prayers like "I thank thee, O Lord, that thou hast not created me a woman." However, this disposition apparently was not limited to ancient Jews since Augustine of Hippo believed that man chiefly, not woman, is the image and glory of God, while Ambrosiaster considers women inferior to men and even Thomas Aquinas evidently thinks that women are (in one sense) defective males within whom reason does not predominate. Of course, I've read articles that try to ameliorate Thomas' position. But such arguments don't seem all that convincing in light of the ST 1.91.1, Reply 1:

"As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the
masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2)."

Was Christ Absolutely Ignorant of the Day and Hour? (Matthew 24:36)

The following was once posted on greektheology by me:

Dear list-members,

While we were talking about the dual nature of Christ the past few days, something crossed my mind: the issue of Christ's Omniscience or lack thereof. In Mark 13:32, we read: PERI DE THS hHMERAS EKEINHS H THS hWRAS OUDEIS OIDEN OUDE hOI AGGELOI EN OURANWi OUDE hO hUIOS EI MH hO PATHR.

The NIV translates the Greek:

"No one knows about that day or hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father."

My question is--does this passage teach that the LOGOS become flesh was absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour mentioned in Mark 13:32 (Matt. 24:36)? First, it would be helpful to define "absolute ignorance." But before we do that, let me pose my query in this way. If Jesus existed in two natures in the days of his enfleshment (and still does subsist in this manner, according to orthodoxy), how could he have been absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour that is only privy to the Father? If he did not know as man, it seems that he should have known the day and the hour as God. But there is an escape hatch, some may say.

Commenting on Matt. 24:36, Ralph Earle writes:

"The oldest Greek manuscripts add this ["Nor the Son"] after "angels of heaven," so Matthew agrees with Mark (13:32) in reporting Jesus as saying that He did not know the time of his second coming. This is part of His KENOSIS--His self-emptying (see Phil. 2:7, NASB)--connected with his incarnation" (Earle 22).

Thus Earle's "escape hatch" is that Jesus did not know the day or the hour because he emptied himself when he came to be in the likeness of finite men and women. In the incarnation--the Son supposedly did not subtract his deity, but simply added humanity. His "ignorance" of the time when his Father would initiate pivotal eschatological events associated with his PAROUSIA was due to his self-emptying: it did not mean that the Son was not Almighty God the second Person of the Trinity). But does this "escape hatch" really serve Earle's purpose?

There are two objections that I have to Earle's proposition. One, if Jesus existed in two natures and had two wills, how could he be totally ignorant (as Mark 13:32 implies) of the day and the hour known only by the Father? Secondly, there seems to be indirect proof that Christ was not Omniscient in his pre-existence. This fact would seem highly problematic for those who affirm Christ's "Deity." Besides, I have argued elsewhere that the temporary relinquishing of divine attributes is highly problematic.

As for absolute ignorance, I will expound on that term if others want to discuss this issue. Suffice it to say for now that I define "absolute ignorance" (in this case) as total unawareness of a fact or some particular datum (or set of data).

Best regards,

Edgar Foster