My Review of Peter van Inwagen's Book "The Problem of Evil"

The so-called logical problem of evil suggests that there's a marked inconsistency between the statement "Almighty God exists" and the utterance "evil exists." For if God is almighty and omnibenevolent, then why does evil obtain? This problem was raised long ago by the Greek philosopher Epicurus and the ancient Gnostics.

Notre Dame University Professor, Peter van Inwagen, offers a useful contribution to the growing literature about the logical problem of evil. His book is a solid collection of eight Gifford lectures delivered at the University of St Andrews in May 2003. The prose contained in the work is often impressive, the reasoning is starkly lucid and van Inwagen's philosophical arguments generally are compelling. Hence, these lectures carefully analyze "evil" in order to remove manifold confusions that surround the concept. There are contexts in which "evil" denotes "moral depravity" but other contexts where the denotation is possibly "the absence of good." Defining evil is an arduous task, but the clarification of ideas should precede genuine philosophical analysis.

Before showing the deficiencies evidently associated with the logical problem of evil, van Inwagen posits his idea of God. He reasons that there are certain attributes which God should possess in order to be the maximally excellent entity, that than which a greater cannot be conceived (according to Anselm of Canterbury). These divine qualities include omniscience, moral perfection and omnipotence. The reader is subsequently treated to a definition and insightful analysis of the expression "philosophical failure." What is philosophical failure? How does this notion affect the argument from evil? Those perusing the book have such questions answered. Additionally, they find new distinctions regarding evil (for example, local versus global evil).

In the final analysis, I believe that van Inwagen demonstrates how the argument from evil fails. He establishes (with a certain degree of plausibility) that one cannot rightly argue from evil to the non-existence of God. There are other ways to account for the permission of divinely-preventable evil. To this end, the book addresses animal suffering, predatory activities among beasts and the so-called hiddenness of God. The author wisely frames a number of his arguments in dialogical form by creating two characters known as Theist and Atheist, who argue about the logical problem of evil in front of an imaginary neutral crowd. The dialogue is interesting, to a point, although I believe that van Inwagen tries to be too clever at times.

This philosophical treatise is written for those who have some familiarity with the common vocabulary of metaphysics, the philosophy of religion, and systematic theology. Moreover, I would not call the arguments here conclusive, in any sense of the word, but the read is generally enjoyable and illuminating.

Commentator Joseph Alexander on Acts 2:23

See http://archive.org/stream/actsapostles00alexgoog#page/n102/mode/1up

Very incisive remarks.

Is It Reasonable to Believe That God Brings All Things to Pass?

If God has foreordained every event or action, then he not only causes evil through evil men like Hitler or Judas--but he also causes "evil" (along with good) through every human who has ever lived. According to this line of reasoning, God evidently brings it to pass that fetuses are aborted through humans. It also seems that God caused evil through humans when the ancient Israelites offered their innocent babies in the fire to the false god Molech. Yet, YHWH explicitly stated that he never commanded such actions, nor did these kinds of sacrifices ever come up into his heart (Jer 7:31; 32:35). In fact, God called such sacrifices an "abomination." I also judge (condemn) similar actions and I would never think that God moved someone to offer his/her child in sacrifice, nor would a righteous and good deity move one man to rape another man's wife. "There is no darkness" in God (1 John 1:5).

Westminster Confession As It Pertains to Foreordination

Some people believe that God foreordains all that comes to pass--including the ungodly acts of those not serving him. The Westminster Confession of Faith (III.1) states:

"God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

So God evidently foreordained the Edenic Fall and he ordained (eternally) the violent death of his Son and so many other historical atrocities. Yet God is not the Author of sin. How does this kind of reasoning logically work? I also wonder how this view comports with scripture.

Two points for now:

1) Why foreordain the Fall, yet warn Adam and Eve what would happen if they disobeyed and took fruit from the tree in the middle of the garden? Why sentence them to death if they were simply doing what had been foreordained? What would you think about me giving an assignment to my students, and telling them there would be a penalty for failure to do it, but then make the assignment undoable by dint of its design? I would probably not win professor of the year for such a move. And I can't help but wonder how God's name would be magnified by the foreordination of evil.

2) James 1:13-17 seems to contradict the Westminster Confession. God does not tempt (try) us with evil. He is perfect, just and good in all his ways. God did not foreordain the treacherous act of Judas Iscariot; nor did he bring to pass chattel slavery or the Holocaust. Each one is tried or enticed by his own sinful desire. As for the Edenic Fall, it occurred because of two humans who chose to misuse the free will granted them by our God and sovereign. He did not bring that event to pass.

Why Are Some Utterances of Paul "Hard to Understand"?

Paul's letters can often be difficult to understand (in Greek or English). The apostle was a profound thinker, a point that I think is borne out by looking at the illustrations he uses (1 Corinthians 15:35-49). Granted, he was writing under inspiration and by means of the wisdom that God gave him (2 Peter 3:15); nevertheless, the Bible allows human personalities and abilities to shine through the text too (1 Corinthians 7:12, 39-40).

But it is not always easy to follow Paul's involved line of reasoning (Romans 9:15-33; Gal 3:1-20). Why is he hard to understand at times (2 Pet 3:15-16)?

A.T. Robertson makes this observation:

"The style of Paul, like his theology, has challenged the attention of the greatest minds. Farrar calls his language 'the style of genius, if not the genius of style.' There is no doubt about its individuality" (A Grammar of the Greek NT, p. 128).

Robertson also mentions K.L. Bauer, who compares Paul's writings to the treatises written by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. And here is what one scholar (John H. Finley, Jr.) has to say about the historiographical style of Thucydides:

"At farthest remove from the nascent [earliest Greek] prose is the co-called periodic style of Plato, Isocrates and the writers of the fourth century generally. By studious subordination of minor points to the major idea of a sentence, it achieves impressive organic unity but commonly at the cost of sapping the vitality of subordinate ideas. This is the style, which, adopted from Isocrates by Cicero, passed from him into the English cadences of Gibbon and Burke. Thucydides' prose stands somewhere between these two, the simple and periodic, styles. His chief devices are antithesis, comparison and contrast. Within any given sentence, clause will be paired with clause, subject with subject, verb with verb. This elaborately antithetical method is more characteristic, to be sure, of the speeches than of the common narrative" (The Peloponnesian War, page x in the introduction).

With the foregoing in mind, read (in Greek) Ephesians 1:3-14; Rom 1:24-28; 5:12-21; Galatians 5:19-21.

In addition to these points, it is important to remember that Paul employs numerous literary or rhetorical devices. His letters have even been compared to apologetico-rhetorical treatises of antiquity, although there may be some legitimate differences between the Pauline letters and epistles penned in the ancient world.

Timothy George (see his commentary concerning Galatians) makes an interesting point regarding the Pauline letters when he points out that H.D. Betz outlines Galatians as follows:

Exordium: Gal 1:6-11

Narratio: Gal 1:12-2:!4

Propositio: Gal 2:15-21

Probatio: Gal 3:1-4:31

Paraenesis: Gal 5:1-6:10

Postscript: Gal 6:11-18.

While George believes this analysis has some advantages, he thinks "Betz seems to have gone too far in pressing Galatians into the rhetorical structure of apologetic letters" (Galatians, page 64).

This caveat should be duly noted, but I also concur with Betz in some respects. I have worked with a number of Latin and Greek apologetico-rhetorical treatises (Tertullian, Lactantius, Cyprian, Tatian, Quintillian) as well as literary devices/tropes in general. The Apostle Paul is a master rhetor, as far as I can tell, even if he appears to speak of rhetoric in pejorative terms at times and possibly did not have formal training.

Robert Alter Offers Commentary on Genesis 7:11

Albert Barnes on Acts 19:9

Acts 19:9 casts doubt on the notion that all first century congregations/churches were house ecclesiae. Here are Barnes' remarks on the verse:

"In the school of one Tyrannus. Who this Tyrannus was, is not known. It is probable that he was a Jew, who was engaged in this employment, and who might not be unfavourable to Christians. In his school, or in the room which he occupied for teaching, Paul instructed the people when he was driven from the synagogue. Christians at that time had no churches, and they were obliged to assemble in any place where it might be convenient to conduct public worship" (Barnes NT Notes).

Theologian Kevin J. Vanhoozer Explains How Mental States Possibly Arise

From the book Is There a Meaning in This Text?, page 249):

"A cell is a complex phenomenon that emerges out of small infrastructures (molecules and atoms) and demands its own science (biochemistry). Similarly, mental properties depend on a biological infrastructure, yet they are irreducible to that substratum. Mental states, that is, 'supervene' on physical states. This way of conceiving mind has the advantage of being the most adequate scientific explanation of consciousness and of conforming to a Christian understanding of human beings as created in the divine image. Both mind and meaning, the self and the sentence, are higher level phenomena--new beings, as it were--that are discontinuous, at least in some respects, with the lower forms from which they emerge."

Do Jehovah's Witnesses Claim To Be Inspired?

Some critics of Jehovah's Witnesses claim that our organization thinks of itself as "inspired by God." However, the truth is that while we consider ourselves to be guided, led or directed by the holy spirit--no claim to inspiration has been made. In fact, the very opposite is true. We know that the Bible provides no warrant for calling spirit-anointed Christians QEOPNEUSTOS.

I am not denying that God has appointed men to take the lead in the Christian congregation or that Jehovah ministers in different ways via His spirit. But such operations of the spirit are not examples of inspiration (in the biblical sense of that word).

Charles Ryrie talks about the doctrine of illumination in his work on theology. He observes:

"The illumination theory of inspiration regards inspiration as an intensifying and elevating of the perceptions of the biblical writers. But generally the concept of illumination relates to the ministry of the Holy Spirit helping the believer to understand the truth of the Bible" (Ryrie, Basic Theology, 116).

Ryrie, therefore, makes a distinction between illumination of the believer and inspiration of the Bible writers. We're making a similar distinction when WT literature says that the "faithful and discreet slave" is guided by God's spirit--illuminated if you will--but that class is not and does not claim to be QEOPNEUSTOS (1 Cor 2:9-10).

Questions for Thomists Regarding Immaterial Intellects

I wrote the following to a colleague who teaches in my university's psychology department. I have retained the substance of my written correspondence to him:

Thomists argue that we need immaterial intellects to apprehend abstract universals. But how do we know that physical organs are only capable of apprehending concrete particulars? What incontrovertible proof do we have that intellects (of the Thomistic caliber) even exist? I admit that an intellect qua a power of the soul is logically possible (i.e. not self-contradictory). However, I am not convinced that such a faculty is factually possible (i.e. that it actually exists). So I guess my first line of attack would be to question the existence of the non-material intellect. Secondly, I would argue that what has been called "intellect" is really nothing more than a higher-order process of the brain: intellection is a biological phenomenon (see the work done by John Searle). The brain consequently makes it possible for us to have the facility for grasping what appear to be universals. So-called universals may be nothing more than generalizations of concrete experience or linguistic constructs of the mind.

I would add that the word "soul" in Aristotle's writings (upon which Thomistic hylomorphic thought is built) is amenable to a physicalist interpretation.

[END OF DIALOGUE]

Addendum: I want to make it clear that my comments pertain to human intellection, not divine (God or angels). It is my belief that human intellection only exists because of brain activity--not due to some immaterial intellect. We may not understand how the brain produces intellection, but evidence continues to lean in that direction.

I also have no problem using the term "mind." Mind would not exist if there were not physical (neurobiological) processes that obtained.

John Gill's Remarks on Ecclesiastes 9:5

"but the dead know not anything; this is not to be understood of their separate spirits, and of the things of the other world; for the righteous dead know much, their knowledge is greatly increased; they know, as they are known; they know much of God in Christ, of his perfections, purposes, covenant, grace, and love; they know much of Christ, of his person, offices, and glory, and see him as he is; they know much of the Gospel, and the mysteries of it; and of angels, and the spirits of just men, they now converse with; and of the glories and happiness of the heavenly state; even they know abundantly more than they did in this life: and the wicked dead, in their separate spirits, know there is a God that judgeth; that their souls are immortal; that there is a future state; indeed they know and feel the torments of hell, the worm that never dies, and the fire that is not quenched: but this is to be interpreted of their bodily senses now extinct, and of worldly things they have now nothing to do with; they know not any thing that is done in this world, nor how it fares with their children and friends they have left behind them; see Job 14:21; nor therefore are they to be prayed unto, and used as mediators with God."

I want to make a reply that addresses some of Gill's comments, in another post.

Colossians 1:22-23: A Discussion on Eternal Security

Colossians 1:22 discusses how God (see Col 1:19-20) has (already) effected reconciliation (νυνὶ δὲ ἀποκατήλλαξεν) for those who were once His enemies, through the precious blood that Jesus shed on his stauros. This act of love is why the apostle writes that God the Father has reconciled His former adversaries ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου; that is, through the death of Jesus Christ. Such a sin-offering has been provided lovingly in order that God's people might come before the Divine One without any blemishes, spots or accusations that would lamentably besmirch the beauteous name of Almighty God Jehovah (παραστῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ).

Paul then writes, more controversially, that enjoying an unblemished state through Christ's shed blood (i.e. his death) is only possible εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἑδραῖοι καὶ μὴ μετακινούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε (Colossians 1:23).

Prima facie this passage appears to teach us that "eternal security" could be a fictive theological construct that is not to be found in Scripture. Paul's inspired words seem to imply that a Christian must remain in the faith while adhering to the hope of the Gospel that was preached ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν so that he/she might be saved in a definitive sense. This verse thus appears to militate against any notion of eternal security; hence, at this point, it would be beneficial to see what some first-rate commentaries have observed about the conditional structure of this textual unit.

Peter O'Brien observes that Colossians 1:23 is a lengthy conditional sentence containing both positive and negative elements (O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69). He maintains that εἴ γε "does not express doubt" (Ibid); rather, he believes that the apostle is really saying, in so many words, "At any rate if you stand firm in the faith--and I am sure you will . . . " He takes this position in view of Colossians 2:5 (Ibid).

O'Brien however goes on to write that "If it is true that the saints will persevere to the end, then it is equally true that the saints must persevere to the end' (Ibid). He then attempts to show how Colossians constitutes an exhortatory message, which strengthens the "saints" to avoid lapsing into a state of smug complacency. O'Brien therefore does not believe that Colossians 1:22-23 fazes the doctrine of eternal security at all. When interviewed about this subject, he provided this response:

"The warnings of Hebrews [6:4-8; 10:26-39, etc.] have presented many challenges to believers throughout Christian history. And the misapplication of them has caused pastoral problems for Christians of all traditions, including the Reformed. These warnings have troubled earnest Christians by raising doubts about their assurance of salvation, an assurance that is so clearly affirmed, for example, in Romans 5:1-11 and Romans 8:18-39, and in Jesus's promises for his disciples in John 6:39-40, 44 and John 10:25-30."

See http://thegospelcoalition.org/article/warning-passages-ahead/

James Dunn, on the other hand, provides this commentary:

"εἴ γε may denote confidence more than doubt (cf. its use in 2 Cor. 5:3; Eph. 3:2; 4:21), but final acceptance is nevertheless dependent on remaining in the faith. The parenetic and pastoral point is that however such persistence must be and is enabled by God through the Spirit (1:11), there must be such persistence (cf. O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69)' (Dunn, Colossians, Philemon 110).

Dunn (in ftn 8, page 110) then quotes R.W. Wall as follows:

"Paul does not teach a 'once saved, always saved' kind of religion; nor does he understand faith as a 'once for all decision for Christ.'"

You can find Wall's remarks in full by consulting his commentary, Colossians and Philemon (The IVP NT Commentary; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), page 81.

I believe that Wall's understanding of Colossians 1:23 is closer to what Paul wanted to say with his use of εἴ γε, KTL.

Sheol and Hades

The Greek hADHS is synonymous with the Hebrew SHEOL. If we really want to understand what the NT says about hell, we must consider what the OT teaches about SHEOL. According to the holy writings that have been recorded primarily in Hebrew, SHEOL is a "place" of inactivity where all dead persons go; it is gravedom (Ecclesiastes 9:10).

Job 3 indicates that SHEOL is a place for both the wicked and the righteous to "sleep." In the midst of bemoaning his pitiable earthly existence, Job lamented that he had not perished after coming forth from his mother's womb--saying: "For by now I should have lain down that I might be undisturbed; I should have slept then; I should be at rest . . . There the wicked themselves have ceased from agitation, and those weary in power are at rest" (Job 3:13-20). Additionally, Job also depicts SHEOL as "the land of darkness and deep shadow" and as "the land of obscurity like gloom, of deep shadow and disorder, where it beams no more than gloom does" (Job 10:21, 22).

It's of interest how the signifier hADHS is used in Revelation too. In Rev. 6:8, John sees a pale horse with a rider that has hADHS closely following him. Later in the same book, the sea, death and hADHS are said to give up the dead in them (KAI EDWKEN hH QALASSA TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTHi KAI QANATOS KAI hO hADHS EDWKAN TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTOIS); then the dead are judged according to their deeds and death along with hADHS is subsequently hurled into the lake of fire which signifies the "second death" (Rev. 20:13-15). John then reports that "death is no more" (since it was hurled into the lake of fire). See Rev. 21:3-4.

"there shall be no more death] More exactly, death shall be no more, having been destroyed in the Lake of Fire, Revelation 20:14 : not that the personification is put forward here" (W.H. Simcox, Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges).

Based on the aforesaid information, I conclude that hADHS is identical to the Hebrew SHEOL (Cf. Ps. 16:10 and Acts 2:27ff). hADHS being thrown into the lake of fire evidently means that it is no more just as death is no more after being cast in the famed "lake." The lake of fire appears to symbolize eternal destruction (annihilation) and not eternal torment.

Dialogue on Genesis 1:1ff

My interlocutor writes:

The figure of speech used in Gen. 1:1 in the phrase "the heavens and the earth" is called synecdoche, in which the whole is evoked by the naming of the part. "The earth" includes the earth itself, and all forms of life which live upon it. It includes the dry land and the sea, mankind plants and animals, etc. "The heavens" also encompasses all this domain contains. Since the Hebrew for "created" (BARA) is a verb in the qal form with perfective aspect, it seems unlikely that this statement refers only to the beginning of creation.

MY RESPONSE:

The figure of speech in Gen. 1:1 may indeed be an example of synecdoche since these two signifiers occur so often in tandem. This fact does not mean that the "heavens" of Gen. 1:1 have anything to do with the spirit realm. The heavens and the earth of Gen. 1:1 could just as well be a way of referring to the entire material order (the realm that is governed by space, time and efficient causality). The term "heavens" is apparently used this way in Ex. 20:4 and the formula "heaven and earth" in Gen. 14:22 evidently has reference to the physical universe that Jehovah produced.

As for BARA speaking about the beginning of creation, Gordon J. Wenham writes (Word Commentary on Genesis): "it looks as though [Gen. 1:2, 3] were composed by the writer responsible for v 1, and not simply borrowed from a pre-biblical source. This makes it most natural to interpret the text synchronically, i.e., v 1: first creative act; v 2: consequence of v 1; v 3: first creative word" (p. 13).

Later, he notes: "It is therefore quite feasible for a mention of an initial act of creation of the whole universe (v 1) to be followed by an account of the ordering of different parts of the universe" (Wenham 15).

With all of this in mind, I am not insisting that Gen. 1:1 simply dwells on the "beginning" and does not teach us that God finished his creative work vis-a'-vis the heavens and the earth. As you mentioned, the Qal perfect verbal stem is employed and that indicates that the writer of Genesis is depicting simple, perfective action--which means that both the inception of the creative act and its TELOS (its end) is in view. That doesn't mean, however, that the earth did not need to be prepared for habitation as recorded in 1:2. ERES in Gen. 1:1 does not seem to mean the "productive land and all that dwells therein." If we construe the verse synchronically, as Wenham and other interpreters are wont to do, then Gen. 1:2 is manifestly relating God's preparation of the already created earth.

Quotes About Hell (Some Catholic Sources)

"The punishment of original sin is the deprivation of the sight of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent III).

"according as their works were good or bad, either perpetual punishment with the devil or eternal glory with Christ" (The Fourth General Lateran Council 1215).

"But whoever dies in mortal sin without penance will without any doubt suffer for ever in the fires of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent IV's Letter to the Bishop of Tusculum 1254).

Quotes Taken from "The Teaching of the Catholic Church" (Edited by Karl Rahner, S.J.).

Resurrection Beliefs in Second Temple Judaism

James Efird reports that a diversity of opinions concerning the resurrection existed within Second Temple Judaism. Some put credence in the notion that the resurrection from the dead would consist of the old body being conjoined with the human spirit; others believed in soul sleep, whereas yet others accepted Greek concepts of immortality. Efird maintains: "No one set of ideas really held the day, but most people seem to have believed in some form of resurrection. Whether it was physical or spiritual, future or present, to be accomplished in this historical continuum or in a supra-historical sphere--none of these was really the theory. Each theory has its own advocates and in some instances the ideas were rearranged in such ways as to present 'new' hypotheses" (The New Testament Writings: History, Literature, Interpretation, page 18. Emphasis in the text).

Moreover, Efird notes that some believed a new physical body would be raised whereas others contended that a non-material body would be resurrected from the dead. On a related note, John J. Collins cites 1 Enoch to support his position about "resurrection of the spirit." He argues that 1 Enoch 104ff uses astral imagery to describe the resurrection of the just: they will be like angels "and associates of the host of heaven." Based on such passages, Collins observes: "Here again, we are dealing with resurrection, not an unbroken state of immortality. But there is no mention of bodily resurrection or of return to life on earth. What is envisaged is the resurrection of the NEPES or spirit and its transformation to an angelic state" (Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, page 113). Collins also invokes Jubilees 23 as part of the testimony concerning ancient resurrection beliefs in Judaism. From Jubilees 23:30ff, he makes this point clear: "Here again we have a notion of resurrection that is neither immortality of the soul, in the Greek sense, nor resurrection of the physical body" (ibid).

How much clearer could Collins be when he states, "But it is by no means the case that Jews always thought of resurrection in bodily terms" (ibid)? He insists that what Daniel and Enoch say about the resurrection could best be described as "resurrection of the spirit" as opposed to resurrection of the body.

Jeffrey Asher further makes a case for understanding Paul's language in 1 Corinthians 15 about a "spiritual body" as a corpus informed by pneumatic stuff, based on ancient denotations of the Greek term pneuma and notable philosophical concepts at the time. See Asher's published work Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

1 Corinthians 15:36 and Resurrection from Death

Paul specifically writes ἄφρων, σὺ ὃ σπείρεις οὐ ζωοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ in 1 Cor 15:36, using language reminiscent of Jesus (John 12:24). He is particularly elucidating the concept of "the resurrection of the dead" in 1 Cor 15:42. So how fitting that Paul brings up the "death" of one seed which opens the way for a disparate "body" to materialize: one that is starkly different from the body which was initially planted (1 Cor 15:36-38).

Raymond B. Brown (Broadman Bible Commentary on Acts and 1 Corinthians) writes:

"The body that is buried is not the same body that is
raised because a transformation takes place. Paul sets
forth four antitheses to show the difference between
the body that dies and the body that is raised from
the dead" (page 391).

"So there is continuity between what dies and what is
raised because it is the same person who is buried and
raised. But there is discontinuity in the sense that
the same physical body will not be raised. The same
person will be raised in a new spiritual body [which
Brown evidently does not define as a 'soul']. Paul does not
describe the body but lives in faith that God will
give the body its appropriate form for life in his
presence" (page 392).

But consult the entirety of Brown's comments on 1 Cor 15:36ff.

Ronald Nash on Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge

Here's a piece I'm always working on, and I've now decided to post this version on the blog.

This study will focus on Ronald Nash's analysis of future-tensed propositions within the context of divine omniscience. At stake is the issue of whether future-tensed propositions have any truth value and, if not, how does the lack of truth value for future-tensed propositions affect our understanding of divine omniscience?

Ronald Nash discusses future-tensed propositions in his work The Concept of God (55). [See also Rosenkrantz and Ockham.] The important question is whether propositions about the future have truth values (whether they are true or false). In order to address this question, Nash uses the familiar Aristotelian example concerning a sea-battle: "There will be a sea fight tomorrow." Is this proposition about the future true or false? [See Gerard Hughes]

If the proposition is now true (presently) then it would seem that there must be a sea-battle tomorrow which would entail that fatalism is true. [explain the difference between fatalism and determinism] Conversely, it is possible to read Aristotle's argument as an example of argumentum reductio ad absurdum (Nash, 56). add note. Nash quotes Anthony Kenny to this effect. Kenny maintains that if "future-tensed propositions about singulars" [qualification] are now true, then fatalism logically follows from the statement about the sea-battle. Yet fatalism is evidently absurd, so it is false. On the other hand, "since many future events are not yet determined" (Kenny) it seems that propositions or claims regarding future-tensed propositions that reference singulars have no truth-value (they are neither true nor false). See Nash, 56. Granting the truth of what Kenny has written without necessarily accepting it, Nash then applies Aristotle's argument to the case of future (free) human actions. He insists that if these acts have no truth-value, if they are neither yet true nor false, then not even an omniscient God has the power to know future human actions.

Nash contends that the Aristotelian view greatly hampers God's scientia to the extent that God cannot predict what Peter or Abraham will do in the future because if Peter or Abraham act freely (evidently defined in a libertarian sense), their actions putatively cannot be known. Foretelling the future becomes logically impossible for God (Nash 56). At best, it appears that God is an excellent guesser based on probable outcomes about the future. But if the future (free) actions of humans are unknowable, then God is not omniscient in the classical sense of the word. Nash therefore suggests that it is difficult to harmonize Aristotle's view of truth-values with the "scriptural" articulation of divine omniscience. [See Joel Green, et. al.]

Nash then posits that one model of divine omniscience which might result in a harmonization between divine omniscience and human freedom is what he labels "book of the future." The book of the future model is analogical language that sets forth three scenarios which account theoretically for God's knowing what S will freely do.

1) The first scenario depicts God opening the figurative "book of the future," wherein he finds every "true proposition about the future" (57). God's knowledge of all true propositions that concern the future (particularly those propositions about singulars) betokens (according to this model of divine omniscience and human free will) that God exhaustively knows all things (i.e. events) that "will" happen in the future (57).

2) According to the second possible scenario of this model, God figuratively opens the book of the future but finds that each page is blank. What is being described by Nash in this instance is the view of Aristotle that there are no truth-values concerning future propositions that reference singulars. If Aristotle is correct, Nash contends, then God (the deity of Scripture) cannot infallibly know future events nor can any other being know what will occur in the future. But maybe those who affirm God's omniscience do not have reason to be troubled since all that may follow logically from Aristotle's view is that God knows all that it is possible to know. [Swinburne and Thomas] It may not be possible to know with infallible certainty events that have not yet occurred.

3) The third possible scenario discussed by Nash is that the book of the future is just not complete: "some pages contain propositions, there are gaps, sometimes very large gaps. Many pages may be completely blank" (Nash, 57). Nash argues that this scenario indicates that God may have only "partial knowledge" concerning future events in view of the fact that God possibly elects to restrict what he knows about the future so that human free will may be safeguarded. This view appears to make the claim that God knows that what he has willed must occur but God does not know or elects not to know those future events which have not been willed in accordance with his sovereign purpose (57). The view that Nash identifies as the third scenario is reminiscent of what Jehovah's Witnesses say about divine omniscience and human freedom.

"The Things Written" in 1 Corinthians 4:6

2 Pet. 1:20, 21 indicates that Scripture is Re Vera Vox Dei. The apostle proclaims that men "spoke from God" as they were carried along by holy spirit. This passage appears to uphold and articulate the unparalleled supremacy of Scripture.

Another verse which undoubtedly harmonizes with the passage in 2 Peter is 1 Cor. 4:6:

Ταῦτα δέ, ἀδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ Ἀπολλὼν δι' ὑμᾶς, ἵνα ἐν ἡμῖν μάθητε τό Μὴ ὑπὲρ ἃ γέγραπται, ἵνα μὴ εἷς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑνὸς φυσιοῦσθε κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου (W-H of 1881)

In this portion of Paul's exhortatio, we find a ἵνα (purpose) clause followed by the prepositional phrase ἐν ἡμῖν. The author then employs the aorist subjunctive active (μάθητε) followed by a particle of negation (Μὴ).

γέγραπται is the perfect indicative middle/passive form of γράφω. It would therefore seem that we could render part of the apostle's words as follows:

"that by our example you might learn the rule: "Do not go beyond the things that are written."

"in order to teach you by our example what those words mean, which say, 'Nothing beyond what is written!'" (Weymouth NT)

At issue, in this case, is what γέγραπται references. Does it mean, 'the things that Paul has written to the Corinthians in his first letter'? Or does it refer to something else?

Based on the context and the lexical significance of 1 Cor. 4:6, I would suggest that γέγραπται points to the Hebrew-Aramaic Scriptures that Paul quoted profusely in his letter to the Corinthians. These sacred writings are not to be transgressed (the aorist verb μάθητε indicates a totality/wholeness of action): their summative counsel is to be implicitly obeyed.

From Vincent's Word Studies:

Not to go beyond the things which are written (τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἃ γέγραπται)

Lit. (that ye might learn) the not beyond what stands written. The article the introduces a proverbial expression. The impersonal it is written is commonly used of Old-Testament references.

Now if the Bible tells us not to go beyond what the OT prescribes for us, how much more should we not go beyond the written instructions contained in the NT. It therefore seems that the Bible--God's written Word as a whole--is the final court of appeal and the Norma Normans of the Christian ecclesia.

Human Freedom and God's Foreknowledge (Determinism)

I had a discussion with one of my students this semester on free will since I was teaching a class that explored the subject from many different perspectives. I wrote:

If we say that "I wore a blue shirt today, and God knew I would wear a blue shirt today," the problem is that God's knowledge becomes located in the past by means of the perfect tense "knew" and the subjunctive verb "would" within this context indicates that an event might potentially happen. So Boethius and Aquinas completely remove time from the equation which is admittedly difficult when all we have is human language, yet some languages may be tenseless or express concepts tenselessly with relative ease. Putting those issues aside for a moment, here's another problem.

1) God cannot hold a mistaken belief (premise based on divine omniscience)
2) At T1 (some point in the past), God believes that I will wear a blue shirt at T2.
3) Therefore, I will wear a blue shirt at T2.

The implication which one can derive from this argument is that I cannot do otherwise than wear a blue shirt at T2. However, someone might counter by arguing that God's knowledge at T1 did not cause me to wear a blue shirt at T2. Let's say that I grant their point: still, it's hard for me to see how I can do otherwise at T2 if God knows what I'm going to do at T1. If I do other than what God believes I would do at T2, then I thereby falsify God's belief at T1. And I don't think either one of us wants to accept that idea.

David J. Williams and the Man of Sin (Lawlessness)

David J. Williams thinks that we cannot say "who" or "what" the man of lawlessness is. He writes that the "man" might be "an individual or a group, a government or an institution" (David J. Williams, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 124). Yet Williams goes on to identify the man of lawlessness with the Beast in Rev. 13 and thinks that the man-beast is the Antichrist.

However, other commentators believe that the man of lawlessness represents a part of the Church: the part that apostatizes from God. Ralph Earle seems to take this stance, though his treatment of the issue is somewhat ambiguous to me. He suggests that the man is linked with apostasy in the Church and lawlessness in the land. He even contends that there was once a time "when the Bob Ingersolls railed and ranted against Christianity." But now "this opposition comes from within the Church" (Ralph Earle, Word Meanings, 375).

It's probably no secret that I would say 2 Thessalonians indicates that the man is a group of persons inside the realm of professed Christianity who apostatize from God; for it's in the Temple of God [the Christian congregation] that the "man" takes his seat (2 Thess. 2:4). He evidently declares himself to be "a god" and he is an apostate, suggesting that the man must be a professed worshiper of God who draws away from the living Deity. But another reason we might contend that the man is not an individual is mentioned in 2 Thess. 2:7, 8.

In these fateful passages, Paul writes that the mystery of lawlessness was already at work in the first century. And yet, the mystery (i.e. the man and his activities) is still present when the Lord Jesus Christ executes his righteous judgment upon this wicked age.

How could one human's life or influence extend from the first century until now? This view seems untenable to me. And if my memory serves me correctly, even Augustine of Hippo (in the City of God) said that the man of lawlessness was composed of those who went out from the Church because they were not, in the final analysis, genuine Christians. While I'm not being dogmatic about the identity of the man of lawlessness, I do believe that 2 Thessalonians is not talking about one man when it mentions this lawless and ungodly figure.

Max Zerwick on Tense or Aspect

Stanley Porter and Buist Fanning as well as K. L. McKay have drawn our attention to aspect morphology and its relationship to ancient Greek. Maximilian Zerwick also has this to say about "tense" (TEMPUS) in Biblical Greek:

"The 'future' and the 'present' do connote time so far as the name is concerned, but not even the names of the other 'tenses' express the notion of time: the name 'imperfect' connotes incompleted action and 'perfect' completed, while 'aorist' (privative A and hORIZW 'define, determine') connotes simply the action without further determination. Hence the very names of the 'tenses' warn us to distinguish carefully between the notion of the time of an action and of the manner in which the action is regarded, its 'aspect'. In fact, 'aspect' is an essential element of the Greek 'tenses' (leaving out of account the future) and hence is always distinguished by the form, whereas the time of actions is expressed in the indicative only, and in the other moods is either lacking or secondary" (Zerwick, Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples, p. 77. Inverted commas in original).

Yet Richard Young states: "There is good support for the contention that the morphological features associated with Greek tense indicate only aspect, not time, and that time is established by the context rather than grammatical form (cf. Porter 1989:76-83; McKay 1981:290, 296). If this contention is correct, then it would be misleading to retain the term 'tense'" (Intermediate NT Greek, 105). The examples that he gives are John 1:29 (past reference time), Acts 16:18 (present reference time), Luke 19:8 (future reference time), and John 3:18 (timeless reference).

I'm not saying that time is not grammaticalized in Greek, but I do believe that Greek tenses and moods function much differently from English or Latin tenses/moods. So do the sequence of tenses/moods. At any rate, it appears that tensed Greek are not as rigid as those in Latin.

Comments on Ecclesiastes 3:19 (Edward Feser)

The question of whether man has a soul or not has captured my attention here recently since a Catholic philosopher named Edward Feser sets forth involved and logically developed arguments for the soul. In truth, I don't have time to address every argument made by Feser--I've had a private conversation with a Catholic colleague and friend, who posited similar arguments. That conversation got derailed because of my infirmities and time constraints. But I want to finish our discussion one day also. In any event, I'm trying to adduce biblical evidence to prove that the soul is not immortal. I'm going to offer rational evidence as well in the future. Feser is a nice guy: it just seems that he's wrong about the soul.

One text to consider is Eccl 3:19 which reads:

"For the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same. As one dies so dies the other; indeed, they all have the same breath and there is no advantage for man over beast, for all is vanity" (NASB).

Some commentators try to explain this verse by making a distinction between "soul" and "breath":

"For that which befalleth, &c. — They are subject to the same diseases, pains, and casualties. So dieth the other — As certainly, and no less painfully. They have all one breath — One breath of life, which is in their nostrils; by which the beasts perform the same animal functions. For he speaks not here of man's rational and immortal spirit, nor of the future life. So that a man hath no pre-eminence, &c. — In respect of the present life" (Benson Commentary).

See JFB Bible Commentary and Gill's Exposition of the Bible for similar attempts to exegete this passage. Matthew Poole's Commentary likewise claims that Eccl 3:19 means:

"one breath of life, which is in their nostrils; one and the same living soul, by which the beasts perform the same vital and animal operations. For he speaks not here of man's rational and immortal spirit, nor of the future life."

However, we have to ask what point Qoheleth is making here. Furthermore, does he suggest that man is composed of a soul/spirit that explains our "animal functions," and a rational spirit/soul that differentiates us from the (other) animals? Commentators apparently read that idea into Eccl 3:19. More recent scholars have pointed out that the verse is emphasizing our mortality or the sense in which we're just like earthly beasts. We must ask ourselves which interpretation of Eccl 3:19 harmonizes with other statements about death found in this Bible book (cf. 9:5, 10). We can account for Eccl 12:7 as well when we take into consideration how the writer is employing the word "breath" or "spirit."

Compare Duane Garrett's perceptive observations concerning this passage: http://books.google.com/books?id=p88xjLZQXP8C&pg=PA254&dq=ecclesiastes+3:19+commentary&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SxhkU43zI4OxyAS53oCgCQ&ved=0CFsQ6AEwCDgK#v=onepage&q=ecclesiastes%203%3A19%20commentary&f=false

Quotes About Birthdays and a Reference

Since this subject arises from time to time:

The Jews "regarded birthday celebrations as parts of idolatrous worship . . . , and this probably on account of the idolatrous rites with which they were observed in honor of those who were regarded as the patron gods of the day on which the party was born."-M'Clintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia (1882, Vol. I, p. 817)

"The later Hebrews looked on the celebration of birthdays as a part of idolatrous worship, a view which would be abundantly confirmed by what they saw of the common observances associated with these days."—The Imperial Bible-Dictionary (London, 1874), edited by Patrick Fairbairn, Vol. I, p. 225

“Early Christians [from time of Christ until the 4th century] frowned on [celebrating anyone’s birthday], which was too closely linked with pagan customs to be given the approval of the church.” - How It Started, Garrison, copyright 1972 by Abingdon Press, p. 213

See http://searchforbibletruths.blogspot.com/2011/05/why-do-jehovahs-witnesses-not-celebrate.html

The Apostle John's Use of "Soul" in Revelation

I want to post some thoughts regarding the word "soul" as it is employed in the book of Revelation. I think that most uses of this signifier are rather obvious and somewhat non-controversial. The only set of verses that might constitute a possible sticking point is Rev. 6:9-11. We will come back to that account, but let us now list John's other uses of ψυχή in the book of Revelation:

"And a third of the sea became blood, a third of the living creatures [τὰ ἔχοντα ψυχάς] in the sea died [ἀπέθανε], and a third of the ships were destroyed." (Rev. 8:9 RSV)

Please note that John here describes figurative sea creatures with the words τὰ ἔχοντα ψυχάς. By employing the word "soul" in this way, the apostle demonstrates that he was familiar with Judaism's attribution of the term "soul" to humans and animals as shown by such texts as Gen 1:21-24; Num 31:28. Notice that John also tells us the "souls" which he saw in vision "died," indicating they were not immortal.

"They overcame him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony; they did not love their lives [τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν] so much as to shrink from death." (12:11 NIV)

John records the words of the heavenly chorus commending the loyal and fastidious spiritual brothers of Christ, who conquered Satan the Devil through the ransom sacrifice of Christ Jesus and "the word of their testimony." Such ones do not even love their own "souls" in the face of death. That is, they are willing to lose their lives in order to glorify God and Christ so that they may discover the authentic life given freely by Almighty God. John clearly employs ψυχή here to denote "life" or human vitality. It is also important to note that the soul can die-- according to John.

"The second angel poured out his bowl into the sea, and it became blood like that of a dead man; and every living thing in the sea died." (16:3)

This passage again shows how the apostle utilizes the term ψυχή. He professes that "every living thing in the sea" (πᾶσα ψυχὴ ζωῆς) died.

"And cinnamon, and odours, and ointments, and frankincense, and wine, and oil, and fine flour, and wheat, and beasts, and sheep, and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men. And the fruits that thy soul lusted after are departed from thee, and all things which were dainty and goodly are departed from thee, and thou shalt find them no more at all." (18:13-14)

Observe how "soul" is employed in this text when it refers to men (ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων).

"And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given to them, and the souls of those who have been beheaded because of the testimony of Jesus, and because of the word of God, and who did not bow before the beast, nor his image, and did not receive the mark upon their forehead and upon their hand, and they did live and reign with Christ the thousand years . . ." (20:4)

This passage clearly suggests to me that souls can die and be brought back to life.

As I mentioned above, I will deal with Rev 6:9 in a separate post. But for now, I chose to examine John's usage of ψυχή and to show how it should govern our understanding of Rev 6:9. What is more--there are certain discourse or cultural features of Revelation that suggest Rev 6:9-11 is not teaching the immortality of the soul.

John Calvin on the Incarnation of Christ

"Here is something marvelous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed to be borne in the virgin's womb, to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross; yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning!" (Institutes 2.134)

Comma Johanneum (1 John 5:7)

In his work The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) Bart Ehrman explains why he 'felt constrained' to leave the Comma Johanneum out of his book.

Although (Ehrman writes) the famed Comma "represents the most obvious instance of a theologically motivated corruption in the entire manuscript tradition of the New Testament," (page 45, note 116) its appearance in the MS tradition "can scarcely be dated prior to the trinitarian controversies that arose" subsequent to the period of time examined in his monograph. In other words, the Comma is a late and spurious interpolation that does not belong in Holy Writ.

Ehrman (page 45) then references Catholic scholar Raymond E. Brown's excellent delineation of this textual issue in his Anchor Bible Commentary on The Epistles of John. See Brown, pp. 775-87. I heartily recommend Brown's thorough analysis of the issues surrounding the Comma Johanneum. Brown also shows that the Comma is an interpolation.

Rudolph Bultmann (_N.T Epistles of John_ [Die drei Johannesbriefe]. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969. Edition 8. Aufl.)--whatever you may think of his theology--seems to be on the mark (for the most part) vis-a-vis the textual tradition when he notes:

"The so-called Comma Johanneum (vss 7f) is found in Latin [MSS] dating before A.D. 400, the text of which(it varies in details in individual manuscripts) was also taken up into the Sixto-Clementine edition of the Vulgate in the following form: 'Quoniam tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in coelo Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt.' ('For there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one. And there are three who bear witness on earth, the Spirit and the water and the blood, and these three are one.') Although the decree of the Holy Office in 1897 decided in favor of the authenticity of the Comma Johanneum, today its spuriousness is also recognized by Catholic scholars. The passage is unknown to the entire Greek tradition" (Bultmann 81).

I am not sure about Bultmann's last observation in the quote above. Maybe he means that the JC does not appear in any of the early Greek MSS. For we know that it evidently does occur in the 14-15th century and it likewise appears in the 16th century. At any rate, it is more surely a late corruption of the Greek text as Ehrman
and Brown note: the Comma does not belong in Scripture. This is also the judgment of Westcott.

Is "Christianizing" Pagan Altars and Practices Okay in the Sight of God?

Scripturally I have problems with construing Acts 17 so that it supports using former pagan altars or temples in the worship of God because of what 1 Cor. 10:14 says: "Therefore, my beloved ones, flee from idolatry." No, we are not to "Christianize" idols and baptize them (as someone once told me). Stating this point even more forcefully is 1 Thess. 1:9: "you turned to God from [your] idols to slave for a living and true God."

The believers in first century Thessalonica did not "baptize" their idols or "Christianize" them; they abhorred, shunned, rejected or turned away from them. Their example is totally at odds with an interpretation of Paul's action in Athens that would imply he "baptized" Athenian altars (cf. 1 John 5:21).

Commenting on Rev. 9:20, David Aune writes that "Antagonism to idolatry is also expressed in the NT (1 Cor. 14:15), and critiques of idolatry (often borrowing from Hellenistic Jewish apologetic) are also found among the early Christian apologists (Tatian Oratio 4.2; Theophilus Ad Autolycum 1.9-10; 2.2). Celsus charged that Christians cannot bear to see temples, altars, and images" (Origen Contra Cels. 7.62).

"When a Christian passes through temples, he will spit down upon the smoking altars and blow them out. As to rooting out the strange gods in every way, it has been commanded, 'you shall utterly destroy all places where the pagans sacrifice to their gods. You shall overturn their pillars and dash them to pieces. You shall cut down their groves. You shall burn their graven images. You shall destroy their names'" (Tertullian, On Idolatry II; Scorpiace 2).

Bible Verses That Are Potentially Connected to the Great Crowd's "Washing Their Robes in Blood" (Revelation 7:9-17)

I am grateful for G.K. Beale's large commentary on Revelation. It helped me to track down these passages as they possibly relate to the great crowd of Revelation 7:9-17.

"Binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass's colt unto the choice vine, he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes" (Genesis 49:11, 21st Century King James Version).

"And Jehovah said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them to-day and to-morrow, and let them wash their garments" (Exod 19:10, ASV)

"And Moses went down from the mount unto the people, and sanctified the people; and they washed their garments" (Exodus 19:14, ASV).

"Then he took the Book of the Covenant and read it aloud to the people. Again they all responded, 'We will do everything the Lord has commanded. We will obey.' Then Moses took the blood from the basins and splattered it over the people, declaring, 'Look, this blood confirms the covenant the Lord has made with you in giving you these instructions'" (Exodus 24:7-8, NLT).

"Come now, and let us reason together, saith Jehovah: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool" (Isaiah 1:18, ASV).

"When the Lord has washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion and purged the bloodshed of Jerusalem from her midst, by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning, then the LORD will create over the whole area of Mount Zion and over her assemblies a cloud by day, even smoke, and the brightness of a flaming fire by night; for over all the glory will be a canopy. There will be a shelter to give shade from the heat by day, and refuge and protection from the storm and the rain" (Isaiah 4:4-6)

"For we are all become as one that is unclean, and all our righteousnesses are as a polluted garment: and we all do fade as a leaf; and our iniquities, like the wind, take us away" (Isaiah 64:6, ASV).

"And he was clothed with a robe dipped in blood: and his name is called The Word of God" (Revelation 19:13, KJV 2000 Bible).

See also Zechariah 3:1-5

Beale writes that the metaphor of the great crowd washing their robes in the Lamb's blood "primarily connotes the objective reality that the saints have been cleansed from their sin by their persevering faith in Christ's death for them, that faith having been refined by trials" (page 438).

A Dialogue about God's Foreknowledge and Our Free Will

Here is part of an extended dialogue I had years ago (in 2002) which provides insight on why some people have difficulty accepting a modified view of God's omniscience. My comment initiates the discussion. The subject is Paul's shipwreck at Malta--an event that was foretold before it happened.

[Edgar]
>Sure, Paul and his buddies were free to swim or free
>to not swim. Nevertheless, God could know what these
>human souls would do without "peeking" into the future
>or knowing their actions eternally.

Okay, we have to distinguish our points of view
here, since you're viewing God as temporal (not having
to "peek" into the future). But assuming your view, how
could God's "knowledge" of what these passengers
would do once their ship wrecked and they sunk into
the water be called anything more than a supremely
"well-educated guess"? How could he have "known"
(without "peeking") that this or that passenger wouldn't
panic and freak out, or that those who couldn't swim
would encounter a piece of floating timber at just the
opportune moment, or that a freak wave wouldn't smash
the mast down upon the heads of two swimmers and
instantly kill them? I just don't see how this could be
called "knowlege" at all, even in what Hume would call
the relatively "weak" epistemic sense with which we
declare ourselves to "know" that the sun will rise tomor-
row!

[Edgar]
>God knew what the
>sons of Israel would do [in the wilderness] by reading their collective
>hearts. He infallibly knew what Esau would do before
>birth, probably based on His knowledge of the human
>embryo.

Say WHAT? This sounds something like reading
tea leaves! How could knowledge of Esau's embryo
in the present furnish God with all the variables (of time,
place, relation, quality, and circumstance) necessary for
Him to know that Jacob would happen to be making an
appealing "mess of pottage" at the precise moment when
Esau would come in starving hungry from an unsuccessful
hunting trip?

[Edgar]
>My point is that God is capable of knowing the
>future without necessarily "foreknowing" the future. That is, God
>can predict [or foretell] with certainty what will happen based on
>one's track record or one's present desires and thoughts, etc.

I don't think this can work, because even
omniscient knowledge of a "track record" doesn't
account for the infinite number of variables involving
conditions of chance (future contingencies of weather,
earthquakes, famine, circumstance, and human choices)
that, on your view, God can't know before they are actual-ized.

>And, FWIW, I do not deny God's foreknowledge or foreordination.

Except when you do.

>Only timeless theists say that God does not literally foresee or foreordain events.

Not necessarily: we speak of God "foreknowing"
events just as the Bible does and as you and I, long
after the Copernican Revolution, continue to reasonably
speak of "sunrises." We just don't take such language
without due philosophical qualification when theorizing.

1 Thessalonians 4:1 (Robertson and Milligan)

Λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί, ἐρωτῶμεν ὑμᾶς καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα καθὼς παρελάβετε παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ πῶς δεῖ ὑμᾶς περιπατεῖν καὶ ἀρέσκειν θεῷ, καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε, ἵνα περισσεύητε μᾶλλον (1 Thessalonians 4:1 W-H Text of 1881).

From Robertson's Word Pictures: Finally (loipon). Accusative of general reference of loipo, as for the rest. It does not mean actual conclusion, but merely a colloquial expression pointing towards the end (Milligan) as in 2 Corinthians 13:11 ; 2 Timothy 4:8 . So to loipon in 2 Thessalonians 3:1 ; Philippians 3:1 ; Philippians 4:8 . We beseech (erwtwmen). Not "question" as in ancient Greek, but as often in N.T. ( 1 Thessalonians 5:12 ; 2 Thessalonians 2:1 ; Philippians 4:3 ) and also in papyri to make urgent request of one. How ye ought (to pw dei uma). Literally, explanatory articular indirect question (to pw) after parelabhte according to common classic idiom in Luke ( Luke 1:62 ; Luke 22:2 Luke 22:4 Luke 22:23 Luke 22:24 ) and Paul ( Romans 8:26 ). That ye abound (ina perisseuhte). Loose construction of the ina clause with present subjunctive after two subordinate clauses with kaqw (as, even as) to be connected with "beseech and exhort." More and more (mallon). Simply more, but added to same idea in perisseuhte.

George Milligan says the following about 1 Thess 4:1:

λοιπόν] a colloquial expression frequently used to point forward to a coming conclusion (cf. 2 Corinthians 13:11, 2 Timothy 4:8; τὸ λοιπ. 2 Thessalonians 3:1, Philippians 4:8), but in itself doing little more than mark the transition to a new subject as in late Gk. where it is practically equivalent to an emphatic οὖν: cf. Polyb. 1:15. 11 λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι φευδεῖς, Epict. Diss. 1:22. 15 ἄρχομαι λοιπὸν μισεῖν αὐτόν, and the other passages cited by Jannaris Exp. 5. 8. p. 429 f.: see also Schmid Attic. 3. p. 135. As showing its frequency as a connecting particle in the κοινή (cf. B.G.U. 1039, 8 (Byz.)), Wilcken remarks that it has passed over into Coptic in this sense (Archiv 3. p. 507). In mod. Gk. λοιπόν has displaced οὖν altogether.

In the present passage οὖν is retained in the text by WH. mg., Tischdf., Zimmer, Nestle. It might easily have dropped out after the -ον of λοιπόν: on the other hand the combination λοιπὸν οὖν is found nowhere else in the N.T., cf. however B.G.U. 1079, 6 ff. (a private letter—1./a.d.) λοιπὸν οὖν ἔλαβον παρὰ το(ῦ) ἄραβος τὴν ἐπιστολὴν καὶ ἀνέγνων καὶ ἐλυπήθην.

See http://www.studylight.org/com/gmt/view.cgi?bk=51&ch=4

Jason Beduhn on Hebrews 1:8 (Originally Posted on BGreek)

In fact, I say in my book, "Both translations [the conventional and the one found in the NWT, as well as in notes to the NRSV and TEV] are possible, so none of the translations we are comnparing [SIC] can be rejected inaccurate. We cannot settle the debate with certainty" (99) and "Let me repeat that both ways of translating Hebrews 1.8 are legitimate readings of the original Greek of the verse. There is no basis
for proponents of either translation to claim that the other translation is certainly wrong. All that can be discussed is which translation is more probable" (101). I hope that is clear. I argue in the book that "God is your throne" is more probable based on the following points:

Linguistic:
1. preponderance of use of hO QEOS as a nominative, rather than as a vocative;
2. lack of parallel to using EIS TON AIWNA as an absolute predicate phrase;
preponderance of its use as modifier of other elements within the predicate;
3. the existence of an alternative way to convey the vocative if it is
intended.

Literary:
1. literary context in Hebrews fails to supply another reference to Jesus as
"God"; functionality of the verse in its context without taking hO QEOS as a
vocative;
2. literary context of original passage in Psalm 45 shows that God is not
being addressed; rather a king is being praised by cataloguing the attributes
of his life in the palace.

Let me add that this argument in presented in just two pages written at a
popular level.

Dr. Conrad has gone to the trouble of carefully investigating my statement
that "There is no other example in the Bible where the expression 'forever'
stands alone as a predicate phrase with the verb 'to be' . . . 'Forever'
always functions as a phrase complementing either an action verb, or a
predicate noun or pronoun" (99, part of Linguistic argument 2 above). He cites
what he considers contrary examples, and this leads to his conclusion that my
statement is in error. It is in error only in the way I sometimes let the
popular level at which I am writing in the book oversimplify, namely, (a) I
use "Bible" and "New Testament" interchangeably in the book, and (b) once I
have given an English rendering for a Greek phrase, I use the English to stand
for the referenced Greek wording. I can see now that his needs to be handled
more carefully in future editions of the book. My statement, within the
context of how the book is written (with the two practices of simplification I
just mentioned) is correct. None of Dr. Conrad's examples refute it, and I am
surprised no one else on this list has noted that fact. In none of Dr.
Conrad's examples does the phrase EIS TON AIWNA stand alone with an explicit
or implicit EINAI in the predicate. Instead, his exampled involve either the
dative of possessor which the phrase complements (in the doxological formulae)
or the adverbial phrase MEQ' hUMWN, which again the phrase complements. Now
we all know how easy it is to quibble about what is or is not a true parallel.
But all I wish to assert here is that Dr. Conrad's argument falls short of
demonstrating a failing in mine.

On the other hand, Dr. Conrad's instincts were right, even if he did not
succeed in supporting them sufficiently. That is the case because if we take
the Septuagint into account, then my statement would need to be qualified.
Because there, in that part of the Bible that I did not take into
consideration in my analysis, we do find the phrase EIS TON AIWNA used
absolutely with either explicit or implicit EINAI, namely, in Psalm 80.16
(81.15), 103.31 (104.31), 134.13 (135.13), and repeatedly in the expression
"his mercy (is) forever" in Psalms 99, 105, 106, 117, 135, and 137). So this
information would require me to speak here, as I do in connection with hO
QEOS, of preponderance of usage rather than claiming that there are no other
examples. EIS TON AIWNA usually and regularly modifies some other element of
a predicate, but it can stand alone, and so this part of my argument looses
much of its force. A survey of the Psalms does show, however, that the
preferred way to make an existential statement about the subject with EIS TON
AIWNA is with MENW (e.g., Psalms 9.8, 32.11, 88.37, 101.13, 102.9, 110.3,
110.10, 111.3, 111.9, 116.2).

With that, let me just repeat that there is no objective, linguistic way to
determine which of the two possible translations of Heb. 1.8 is the correct
one, and one's choice must always be qualified by this fact. I have made an
argument for preferring one translation as more probable, and even with a
retraction of one part of it as too sweeping an assertion, that argument is
still stronger than any with which I am familiar on behalf of the other
possible translation. I would be interested to hear any argument that could
be made on linguistic and literary grounds for preferring the "conventional
translation" to the other.

best wishes,
Jason BeDuhn

Jason BeDuhn
Associate Professor of Religious Studies, and Chair
Department of Humanities, Arts, and Religion
Northern Arizona University

More on Luke 17:21

Concerning Luke 17:21 and its syntax (word order):

οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν Ἰδοὺ ὧδε ἤ Ἐκεῖ· ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν (NA27).

The NIV reads: "nor will people say, 'Here it is, ' or 'There it is,' because the kingdom of God is within you."

The margin offers the alternative: "Or among."

Ralph Earle writes: "Some commentators and translators prefer 'in your midst' (NASB). But the Greek preposition here is not EN, 'in'; it is ENTOS (only here and Matt. 23:26), which means 'within.' Alfred Plummer discusses both translations. His conclusion is that if 'within you' is adopted, the meaning will be, 'Instead of being something externally visible, the Kingdom is essentially spiritual; it is in your hearts, if you possess it at all' (p. 406). It would seem that this is what Jesus meant" (Earle, Word Meanings, page 72).

Louw-Nida, however, lists the semantic domains of ἐντὸς as follows:

(a) among
(b) what is inside

This reference work then notes:

83.9 "ἐντὸς: ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν 'the kingdom of God is among you' or ' . . . in your midst' Lk 17:21. For another interpretation of ἐντὸς in Lk 17:21, see discussion at 26.1."

83.17 "ἐντὸς: pertaining to being within an area - 'the contents of, that which is inside.' καθάρισον πρῶτον τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ποτηρίου 'clean what is inside the cup first' Mt 23:26. It is also possible, though not probable, to understand ἐντὸς in Mt 23:26 as the inside surface itself rather than the contents."

26.1 "In Lk 17:21 the phrase ἐντὸς ὑμῶν in the statement IDOU GAR hH BASILEIA TOU QEOU ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ESTIN 'look, God's reign is within you' may constitute a reference to the same inner being designated by the phrases hO ESW and hO EN TW XRUPTWi. On this basis some scholars have suggested that the phrase ENTOS hUMWN can be interpreted as a potentiality for participation and hence be translated 'within your grasp,' but it is more likely that one should understand the phrase ENTOS hUMWN in Lk 17:21 as a spacial relationship, for example, 'in your midst' or 'among you' (see 83.9)."

See the full discussion of ENTOS in BDAG, which says in part: "Lk generally avoids ref. to God's reign as a psychological reality. The passage has invited much debate" (BDAG 340-341).

Does God Know the Future Contingently?

I want to share a dialogue that I had with a colleague and friend some years ago. I've slightly altered part of my response because I believe a reformulated answer makes more sense.

My interlocutor believes that God must fully (exhaustively?) know the future or else, God is less than omniscient. I obviously disagree; so my comments below are designed to address this particular objection. It is my belief that there are at least some things about the future that God knows contingently. Comments are appreciated.

In brief, knowing a proposition contingently (future or otherwise) is not the same thing as saying that one does not know a certain proposition at all. If God contingently knows that Abraham will offer up Isaac, how can it be said (legitimately) that He has no knowledge of the fact that Abraham will offer up Isaac?

(1) Whether Abraham will offer up Isaac or not is contingent.
(1) Necessarily, a contingent event can only be known contingently.
(2) Therefore, necessarily, God contingently knows that Abraham will offer up Isaac.

How is it possible for a contingent future event or proposition to be known in any other way except contingently? It is by its very nature contingent.

In answer to your second question about omniscience, I point to the old atheological question, "Can God make a rock so big that He can't lift it?" One problem with this query is the definition of omnipotence that it assumes. My point is that there is a similar problem that has plagued the traditional definition of "omniscience." As S.T. Davis says, divine omniscience does not mean that "God knows all facts." Rather, IMO, it refers to God's (exhaustive) knowledge of all epistemic possibilia.

Three Persons or Three Gods?

The Trinity doctrine claims that God is three persons, but not three gods (tritheism). God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are supposed to constitute three divine persons, who do not compromise biblical monotheism. For instance, the Athanasian Creed states:

"And yet there are not three almighty beings, but one who is almighty. Thus the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God: And yet there are not three gods, but one God"

In the same creed, we're also told: "And in this Trinity, no one is before or after, greater or less than the other; but all three persons are in themselves, coeternal and coequal; and so we must worship the Trinity in unity and the one God in three persons. Whoever wants to be saved should think thus about the Trinity."

So there are Three Persons rather than three deities, we are assured. Yet the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes:

"By the latter part [of the Athanasian Creed], it follows by the indiscernibility of identicals that no person of the Trinity is identical with any other. And by the earlier part, it seems to follow that there are thus at least three eternal (etc.) things. But it asserts there's only one eternal thing. Hence, the creed seems contradictory, and has been attacked as such (Biddle 1691, i; Nye 1691a, 11; Priestley 1871, 321). Showing where the above argument for inconsistency goes wrong is a major motivation of recent Trinity theories (see sections 1 and 2 of the main entry). In contrast, mysterians hold that it somehow goes wrong, though no one can say quite where.(See section 3 of the main entry.) Finally, some simply reject the creed."

Trinitarians are likely to say that the Trinity doctrine teaches that there are Three divine Persons (three eternal things), but one God (one eternal thing); so it's not contradictory (they might aver) because this claim does not violate the law of non-contradiction. What's under consideration here is that God is claimed to be three in one sense, but one in another sense. Hence, there's supposedly no inconsistency in the claim.

On the other hand, Joseph Priestley and Dr. Magee have viewed the triune God in a different light:

"It must be universally true, that three things to
which the same definition applies can never make only
one thing to which the same definition applies . . .
If, therefore, the three persons agree in this same
circumstance, that they are each of them perfect God,
though they may differ in other respects, and have
peculiar relations to each other and to us, they must
still be three Gods; and to say that they are only one
God is as much a contradiction, as to say that three
men, though they differ from one another as much as
three men do, are not three men, but only one man"
(Joseph Priestley).

"If ideas are attached to the words employed,
Trinitarianism is, in reality, either Tritheism or
Sabellianism" (The Right Reverend Dr. Magee, Bishop of
Raphoe).

Defenders of the Trinity have sometimes tried to refute Priestley's criticism by appealing to three men (distinct from one another and three things in that sense) who have one thing in common: human nature. But just as Peter, James, and John are three men, it would seem that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit would be three gods--even if each Person is divine. But as we've mentioned on this blog before, the Trinitarian response to Priestley's criticism is usually the divine simplicity doctrine.

Without going down that road now, one point I want to make with this post is that Trinitarians and Non-Trinitarians sometimes talk past one another. A Trinitarian could possibly be uncharitable and refer to Non-Trinitarians as "deceptive" or intellectually dishonest." The truth of the matter, however, is that both groups approach the Trinity doctrine from two different perspectives. I would suggest that one try to understand someone's position before critiquing it; moreover, even where there's disagreement, name-calling does not have to occur.

Witnesses of Jehovah and other Non-Trinitarians do believe that the Trinity trangresses biblical monotheism. We are not necessarily saying that Trinitarians agree with us; in fact, we know they do not.

Adolf Harnack on Early Bible Reading

I will now sum up Adolf Harnack's arguments which are found in his work Bible Reading in the Early Church (New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 1912).

Harnack contends, as does yours truly, that private Bible reading (not private interpretation) was a common practice among ancient Jews. Therefore when the LOGOS became flesh and dwelt among us for a short time, dutifully selecting the Twelve along with other men and women who would constitute his spirit-begotten EKKLHSIA, "the private use of the Holy Scriptures simply continued" (Harnack 32) as suggested by Acts 17:10-11 and Eusebius' account of the layman who petitioned Bishop Melito of Sardis to make him a copy of the Law and Prophets (Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. IV.26.12.) so that he could get to know the soteriological matters pertaining to the Christian faith.

Another insightful passage is likewise found in Ignatius of Antioch's letter to the Philadelphians VIII.1-2. There we read:

"I trust in the grace of Jesus Christ, who shall loose
from you every chain; and I exhort you to do nothing
of contention, but according to the discipline of
Christ. Since I have heard certain men say, 'Unless I
find it in the ancients [the OT], I believe it not in
the Gospel.' And when I said unto them that 'It is
written,' they replied, 'That it is set forth
aforetime.' But my archives are Jesus Christ; his
cross and his death, his resurrection, and the faith
which is through him, are inviolable archives, through
which I desire to be justified by means of your
prayers."

Here Ignatius evidently alludes to certain laymen who were well-versed with Holy Writ, especially the OT. While they seemed to be contending with Bishop Ignatius and he thus had to remind them of the significance the Christ Event holds for believers in Jesus, this Ignatian passage almost certainly indicates that private Bible reading was common among the laity in the second century CE. Adding to this testimony in a powerful manner, Polycarp writes to the Philippians (XII.1):

"For I am persuaded that ye are well trained in the sacred writings, and nothing is hidden from you."

Notice how Tatian also describes his conversion to Christianity. He claims that it was wrought by reading and studying the "barbaric" antiquitous writings of Judaism and Christianity:

"Wherefore, having seen these things, and moreover
also having been admitted to the mysteries, and having
everywhere examined the religious rites performed by
the effeminate and the pathic, and having found among
the Romans their Latiarian Jupiter delighting in human
gore and the blood of slaughtered men, and Artemis not
far from the great city sanctioning acts of the same
kind, and one demon here and another there instigating
to the perpetration of evil, retiring by myself, I
sought how I might be able to discover the truth. And,
while I was giving my most earnest attention to the
matter, I happened to meet with certain barbaric
writings, too old to be compared with the opinions of
the Greeks, and too divine to be compared with their
errors; and I was led to put faith in these by the
unpretending east of the language, the inartificial
character of the writers, the foreknowledge displayed
of future events, the excellent quality of the
precepts, and the declaration of the government of the
universe as centred in one Being. And, my soul being
taught of God, I discern that the former class of
writings lead to condemnation, but that these put an
end to the slavery that is in the world, and rescue us
from a multiplicity of rulers and ten thousand
tyrants, while they give us, not indeed what we had
not before received, but what we had received but were
prevented by error from retaining" (Oratio ad Graecos
XXIX).

Lastly I will cite Justin's charitable exhortation
found in his 1 Apology XLIV:

"But by the agency of the devils, death has been
decreed against those who read the books of Hystaspes,
or of the Sibyl, or of the prophets, that through fear
they may prevent men who read them from receiving the
knowledge of the good, and may retain them in slavery
to themselves; which, however, they could not always
effect. For not only do we fearlessly read them, but,
as you see, bring them for your inspection, knowing
that their contents will be pleasing to all. And if we
persuade even a few, our gain will be very great; for,
as good husbandmen, we shall receive the reward from
the Master."

Questions Addressed to Dualists

I once addressed these words to a friend and colleague who advocates hylomorphic (hylemorphic) dualism:

How do we know that physical organs are only capable of apprehending particulars? What incontrovertible proof do we have that intellects (of the Thomistic caliber) even obtain [exist]? I admit that an intellect qua a power of the soul is logically possible [there's no logical contradiction in the idea itself]. However, I am not convinced that such a faculty is factually possible. So I guess my first line of attack would be to question the existence of the intellect, in the relevant sense we're discussing. Secondly, I would argue that what has been called "intellect" is really nothing more than a higher-order process of the brain: intellection is a biological phenomenon. The brain consequently makes it possible for us to have the facility for grasping what appear to be [abstract] universals.

I have slightly edited some of this message to promote understanding of its contents.

Regards,

Edgar

What Accounts for Mentality?

I've been studying neuroscience and mind theory for almost a decade. It's no secret that I don't believe the soul is immortal; however, when I read Antonio Damasio's work on Descartes, Francis Crick's "Astronishing Hypothesis" and Joseph LeDoux ("Synaptic Self"), I was convinced that mentality has to result from brain activity. In other words, while science cannot provide the knock out punch for the Witness understanding of the soul, the neuroscientific evidence overwhelmingly seems to be on our side. But scientific knowledge is provisional and limited. Therefore, it only takes us so far.

While I've been excited about the harmony between science and how Witnesses understand biblical anthropology, one Witness friend with whom I shared these findings said I should exercise caution: he feels that only Jehovah knows how mentality actually comes about. I respect this friend greatly, but I could not help but wonder what else accounts for mental states, if we're purely physical and don't have souls. In any event, two possibilities seem viable for me at this time:

1) Mental states could supervene on brain states

2) Mental states are identical with brain states

By supervenience, I simply mean a form of "dependence" such that M (mental states) depends on B (brain states), which is another way of saying that differences in B constitute differences in M (and vice versa). Another term for supervenience is property dualism (e.g., contrasting the physical properties of a painting over against its microphysical properties).

As support for the idea that minds could turn out to be continuous with matter, Anthony Appiah writes:

"We have learned about the properties of matter by seeing what can be made of it: we know that it is the kind of thing that magnets can be made out of, because we have found magnetic substances; we know that it is the kind of thing bacteria can be made out of, because we have found bacteria. Why is it especially hard to accept that it is the kind of thing minds can be made out of? Indeed, since the one thing of which each of us surely has the most extensive direct experience is our own mind, shouldn’t we be puzzled, if we are puzzled by anything, by the nature of matter? How can it be, one might want to ask, that a world made of the sorts of things and governed by the sorts of laws that physicists now believe in should give rise to the astonishing range of experiences that each of us has every day?" (Thinking It Through, page 52).

But Kevin Vanhoozer does not want to reduce mental properties to physical properties. He believes we should maintain some type of distinction between the two. Either way, I believe that physical factors completely explain mental states. Jehovah God created us as completely physical beings.

ENTITAS and Barbarousness (Thought for Today)

One definition for the adjective "barbarous" is "characterized by the occurrence of barbarisms" (M-W).

Barbarisms have been defined as:

"the practice or display of barbarian acts, attitudes, or ideas"

"an idea, act, or expression that in form or use offends against contemporary standards of good taste or acceptability"

While I can readily understand what it means for a sentence or paragraph to be "barbarous," I often have trouble comprehending what it means for a word to be less than well-formed or barbarous. John Stuart Mill asserts that the Latin word ENTITAS (from ENS) is barbarous like its English counterpart "entity."

ENTITAS is a neologism based on the present participle of ESSE (the Latin form of the verb "to be"). I'm not sure what makes ENTITAS or "entity" barbarous, but maybe a classicist or linguist can help with this question.

Luke 17:21

Rogers and Rogers point out that ἐντὸς with the genitive can denote "within, in the midst of, among." A similar observation is made in BDAG Greek-English Lexicon; I looked at the entry for ἐντὸς in BDAG and it might pay to read the entire thing. This lexical source indicates that Luke's ἐντὸς ὑμῶν probably is patterned after Isaiah's ἐν σοὶ in 45:14 (LXX). BDAG also provides texts that correspond syntactically with Luke 17:21: the lexicon seems to argue that the verse in question should not be given a psychological interpretation. See pp. 340-341 and the relevant literature listed in BDAG.

Theologian Karl Rahner Explains the Trinity Doctrine

Within the conceptual system of scholastic theology, no real question remains once the Trinitarian doctrine itself has been presupposed(i.e. once the linguistic usage of the New Testament has been taken to conform to that of theology): the word and concept ‘God’ signifies (significat) the Person to whom the divine nature is proper; and so ‘God’ can stand for (supponitur)each of the three Persons who possess this nature, or again ‘God’ can stand for all three Persons together. When, for example,the Logos is called ‘Son of God’, ‘God’ in this predication stands for the Father, in so far as he is one of the divine Persons, for ‘God' can stand for each of the three Persons, while the Father alone has a Son. Or again, in the statement, ‘God creates the world’, according to the conceptual system of Latin theology ‘God’ stands for the divine Person, this time indeed for the three Persons together, in so far as they are one God by reason of the unity of nature and thus one Source of the world by reason of the unity of their operation ad extra. For the theology of the Schools, then, ‘God’ is one with respect to the general concept of personality, if we may so put it, and consequently can stand for each of the three Persons individually and for all three together. Once more we do not of course wish to deny that such a view of the concept and the word ‘God’ is possible, legitimate and in the long run unavoidable. But the question nevertheless remains whether this is also the usage of the New Testament.

See Theological Investigations, page 101

Notes on William Lane Craig's View of God and Time (Grad School Notes)

Pre-Nicenes and Noah

I believe that the ante-Nicene Fathers (as well as the post-Nicenes) generally accepted the historical validity of the Noachian Flood:

"In the ninth generation are born the giants, so called from of old, not dragon footed, as the fables of the Greeks relate, but men of immense bodies, whose bones, of enormous size, are still shown in some places for confirmation. But against these the righteous providence of God brought a flood upon the world, that the earth might be purified from their pollution, and every place might be turned into a sea by the destruction of the wicked. Yet there was then found one righteous man, by name Noah, who, being delivered in an ark with his three sons and their wives, became the colonizer of the world after the subsiding of the waters, with those animals and seeds which he had shut up with him" (1 Clement 29).

In Refutation of all Heresies 26, Hippolytus also
maintains:

"And in Noah's time there occurred a flood throughout the entire world, which neither Egyptians, nor Chaldeans, nor Greeks recollect; for the inundations which took place in the age of Ogyges and Deucalion prevailed only in the localities where these dwelt. There are, then, in the case of these (patriarchs-that is, from Noah to Heber inclusive)-5 generations, and 495 years."

Moreover, in a work of Theophilus, we read:

"But Moses, our prophet and the servant of God, in giving an account of the genesis of the world, related in what manner the flood came upon the earth, telling us, besides, how the details of the flood came about, and relating no fable of Pyrrha nor of Deucalion or Clymenus; nor, forsooth, that only the plains were submerged, and that those only who escaped to the mountains were saved" (To Autolycus 3.18-19).

The quotes that illustrate the beliefs of the ante-Nicenes regarding the Noachian Flood are many. It appears safe to say that the Fathers generally thought it was a historical event. However, this does not mean that the account could not be read on other exegetical levels. For instance, Cyprian argues that anyone who does not have the church for his mother cannot have God for his Father. He then uses the account of Noah to explain the salvific or soteriological role of the church in the outworking of God's eternal purpose through Christ Jesus:

"If any one could escape who was outside the ark of Noah, then he also may escape who shall be outside of the Church" (On the Unity of the Church 6).

Augustine of Hippo later employs the biblical narrative of Noah and applies it to the church. He likens the clean and unclean animals taken into the Ark to defiled and undefiled persons in the Christian ecclesia. For Augustine, the church is a corpus permixtum: a body composed of different types of persons until Christ does the separating work. However, Augustine thought the Flood was an historical event as did the ante-Nicenes. Interestingly, Origen's interlocutor Celsus, also charged Christians during his time with distorting Greek flood stories by using the biblical account of Noah.

Translating 1 John 4:2

"Having come in the flesh" represents a fairly literal rendering of the perfect participle in 1 John 4:2.

I notice that J.B. Rotherham also translates the verse:

"Hereby do ye perceive the Spirit of God:--."

W. Hall Harris points out that the Greek expression ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα is literally "confess Jesus Christ in the flesh having come."

On perfect participles in general, Daniel B. Wallace makes this observation:

"The perfect participle is almost always antecedent with reference to the main verb. When it is contemporaneous, such is due to either an intensive use of the perfect or to a present force of the perfect in its lexical nuance" (Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, page 626).

But notice that John replaces the perfect participle with the present form of the Greek verbal adjective in 2 John 7 (ἐρχόμενον). This syntactical structure makes the translational issue a little more complex; however, the perfect participle no doubt refers to antecedent action in the first Johannine passage (1 John 4:2) whereas the present participle likely has the same reference in 2 John 7.

Robert Alter's Commentary on Genesis 17:10 (Circumcision)

New Book on NWT (written in Italian)

Documentary Hypothesis and the Margins of Scholarship

The Documentary Hypothesis teaches that the Pentateuch arose from four distinct sources known as JEDP (the Jahwist, Elohist, Deuteronomic, and Priestly source). The J document is usually given a 9th century date, the E source is believed to be an 8th century source, whereas D is attributed a 7th century date and P is considered a 6th century source.

"The Documentary Hypothesis claims that the Pentateuch is a composite of four separate, complete, and coherent documents." See http://imp.lss.wisc.edu/~rltroxel/Intro/hypoth.html

One point that interests me for now is how dogmatic that proponents of this view have been or continue to be. Furthermore, the Documentary Hypothesis is a lesson in how certain scholars get pushed to the margins if they do not follow the status quo. Tremper Longman III and Raymond B. Dillard relate the story of Franz Delitzsch, who apparently was pushed to the margins of scholarship because he did not accept the Documentary Hypothesis. While I understand the need for the scholarly guild to protect academic biblical studies from "loony" and unsupported ideas, it's somewhat disturbing that scholars have made the Documentary Hypothesis (a very speculative endeavor) a touchstone for who can have a voice in the biblical scholarly world and who cannot. That view strikes me as conformist to the utmost degree.

I am reminded of ancient controversies that used force instead of persuasion to shut "heretics" down; and one can't help but think of Martin Werner, whose views on Christ qua angel were intensely criticized by Wilhelm Michaelis. Werner never recovered from the latter's analysis. See https://www.academia.edu/2202637/Reconsidering_and_Aspect_of_the_Title_Kyrios_in_Light_of_4Q416_2_iii

You can believe what you want to believe in academic biblical studies, so long as your view harmonizes with the prevailing orthodoxy.

Birthdays and Circumcision--Again

1) While it may be tempting to deny that birthdays are rooted in superstition, magic and pagan religious customs--almost everything I read backs this idea. People (in general) evidently began celebrating birthdays in order to keep away bad spirits. Granted, not every culture has the same practices for birthdays or how to observe Christmas (etc). That's an understatement. But I'd like to see an early culture that observed birthdays for non-religious or non-superstitious reasons. I have not found one yet.

2) Ancient Jews and Christians roundly condemned the observance of birthdays at one time. Origen is a famous example: he wrote that not one "saint" (holy person) observed a feast on the day of his birth. Furthermore, Clement of Alexandria spoke ill of those who speculated about the Savior's day of birth. See John Davidson, The Gospel of Jesus: In Search of His Original Teachings, page 131. Another patristic writer who spoke against birthdays was Arnobius of Sicca; see Adversus Gentes 7.34. It's also possible that Philo condemned birthdays while we know that Josephus did.

"Nay, indeed, the law does not permit us to make festivals at the birth of our children, and thereby afford occasion of drinking to excess" (Josephus. Translated by W. Whiston. Against Apion, Book II, Chapter 26. Extracted from Josephus Complete Works, Kregel Publications, Grand Rapids (MI), 14th printing, 1977, p. 632).

See http://www.cogwriter.com/birthdays.htm

One writer examines both sides of the issue from a Jewish perspective, but it seems that all of his examples to uphold the celebration of birthdays are late, since they date from the 4th cent. CE onward. See http://louisjacobs.org/library/articles/birthday-celebrations.php

3) To my knowledge, wedding rings did not originate from pagan religious sources. I read an article on this point years ago, but would be happy to see additional research on the matter. I choose not to wear a wedding ring anyway, but not for religious reasons. It's a matter of conscience IMO.

4) On circumcision, we have two issues at play. What are its origins and why did God command Abraham to do it? Scholars point out that the issues surrounding circumcision are more complex than the subject may first appear. There's no necessary B-line from Egypt to Israel as far as circumcision is concerned; secondly, it's far from clear that the Egyptians started practicing circumcision because of religion.

In a journal article, "Circumcision in the Ancient Near East," Jack M. Sasson argues that it's very unlikely the Israelites or Phoenicians adopted circumcision from the Egyptians. After reviewing some archaeological evidence from Egypt, he reports: "Thus one can note a basic difference between the Israelites and the Egyptians in the surgical process involved in circumcision. Whereas the Hebrews amputated the prepuce and thus exposed the corona of the penis, the Egyptian practice consisted of a dorsal incision upon the foreskin which liberated the glans penis. The Old Kingdom reliefs at Saqqara clearly demonstrate the results obtained by the Egyptian surgeon." See JBL 85 (1966): 473-76.