Aquinas--Gospel of John 1:14

Taken from COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN (Aquinas)

Part I: Chapters 1-7 translated by James A. Weisheipl, O.P.
Magi Books, Inc., Albany, N.Y.

Lectio 7: καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν

"But if this were so, it would mean that God did not become man, for one particular suppositum cannot be predicated of another. Accordingly, if the person or suppositum of the Word is different than the person or suppositum of the man, in Christ, then what the Evangelist says is not true, namely, the Word was made flesh. For a thing is made or becomes something in order to be it; if, then, the Word is not man, it could not be said that the Word became man. And so the Evangelist expressly said was made, and not 'assumed,' to show that the union of the Word to flesh is not such as was the 'lifting up' of the prophets, who were not 'taken up' into a unity of person, but for the prophetic act. This union is such as would truly make God man and man God, i.e., that God would be man" (170).

(Sed secundum hoc Deus non esset factus homo; quia impossibile est quod duorum singularium, quae diversa sunt secundum suppositum, unum praedicetur de alio. Unde si alia est persona verbi, seu suppositum, et alia persona hominis, seu suppositum in Christo, tunc non erit verum quod dicit Evangelista verbum caro factum est. Ad hoc enim fit aliquid, ut sit; si ergo verbum non esset homo, non posset dici quod verbum sit factum homo. Et ideo signanter Evangelista dixit factum est, et non dixit assumpsit, ut ostendat quod unio verbi ad carnem non est talis qualis est assumptio prophetarum, qui non assumebantur in unitatem suppositi, sed ad actum propheticum: sed est talis quod Deum vere faceret hominem, et hominem Deum, idest quod Deus esset homo.)

"If you ask how the Word is man, it must be said that he is man in the way that anyone is, man, namely, as having human nature. Not that the Word is human nature itself, but he is a divine suppositum united to a human nature. The statement, the Word was made flesh, does not indicate any change in the Word, but only in the nature newly assumed into the oneness of a divine person. And the Word was made flesh through a union to flesh. Now a union is a relation. And relations newly said of God with respect to creatures do not imply a change on the side of God, but on the side of the creature relating in a new way to God" (172).

(Si vero quaeris quomodo verbum est homo, dicendum quod eo modo est homo quo quicumque alius est homo, scilicet habens humanam naturam. Non quod verbum sit ipsa humana natura, sed est divinum suppositum unitum humanae naturae. Hoc autem quod dicitur verbum caro factum est, non aliquam mutationem in verbo, sed solum in natura assumpta de novo in unitatem personae divinae dicit. Et verbum caro factum est, per unionem ad carnem. Unio autem relatio quaedam est. Relationes autem de novo dictae de Deo in respectu ad creaturas, non important mutationem ex parte Dei, sed ex parte creaturae novo modo se habentis ad Deum.)

BDAG Greek-English Lexicon on SEISMOS

Did the Incarnate Son Undergo Change? (Thomas Torrance's Answer)

I sent this discussion to a former professor of mine concerning T.F. Torrance's view of God, time and immutability as well as the Trinity doctrine. Wanted to share it with some of you also, who might benefit from a general knowledge of Torrance's Incarnation
views.
______________________________________________________

Hi xxxx,

I'll try to provide a brief summary of Torrance's book entitled The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996). All subsequent references (page numbers) will be taken from his monograph.

Torrance writes that God's being is dynamic (non-static) and thus "unique divine becoming" (237). But how is it possible for God to be "dynamic unchangeableness"?

The author contends that God forever has been Father, Son and Holy Spirit "but not always Creator" (ibid). The Supreme Being produced the cosmos EX NIHILO "in the unlimited freedom of his love" ungrudgingly, uncoerced, that is, by virtue of the fact that He is A SE ESSE (ibid).

Yet when God brought the universe into being through His own Word or Utterance (FIAT LUX), He did not undergo any change at this point (Torrance argues). The cosmos is, in fact, a demonstration of God's immutable and unchangeable nature--although it is not an after-thought, the universe emanates from His "divine life and love" (ibid).

But the "absolutely new [divine] event" (says Torrance) is the Incarnation (238). For while God has always been Father, Son and Holy Spirit and the creation is putatively awe-inspiring evidence of His immutable nature, the living deity of the Bible has not always been incarnate. The LOGOS (the second Person of the Trinity) "became" flesh (hO LOGOS SARX EGENETO) and we beheld his glory: the Son of God possessed the DOXA of an only-begotten son (MONOGENHS hUIOS) and this glory (DOXA) was manifested many times throughout the course of his earthly ministry.

Yet there is a sense in which the Incarnation is also a symbol of God's unchanging nature or essence. Despite God the Son's "crucifixion" and subsequent resurrection to life again--despite the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on those 120 persons gathered at Pentecost in 33 CE--God remains invariant. With Him, the disciple James declares, there is not a variation of the turning of the shadow (James 1:17 NWT). On the other hand, Pentecost might represent a change with respect to the divine life. Torrance notes:

"The transcendent Spirit of God had always been actively present in the world immanently sustaining its continuing relation to God the Creator, but what happened at Pentecost manifested a change not only in the form of his activity but in the mode of his immanence which it is difficult for us to conceive or express. It certainly illuminates for us the changed situation between God and man brought about by the incarnation, but at the same time it brings home to us the fact that what happened at Pentecost was not only quite new in the experience of mankind, but something incomprehensibly new in the life and activity of the eternal God and the mode of his presence to all flesh"(ibid).

To conclude, the upshot of Torrance's analysis of the creative activity of God and the INCARNATIO CHRISTI is that he believes the Triune God is neither the "Unmoved Mover" (Aristotle) nor the "Moved Unmover" (Whitehead) [1] or, I might add, the "Most Moved Mover" (Pinnock). No, YHWH (according to Torrance) is the Self-moved God, who is immutable with respect to His nature but infinitely mobile, absolutely free, and inexhaustibly new vis-à-vis His divine activity (239).

I now close with this quote from Torrance, who also seems to argue that God is somehow in time as well as eternal. Torrance writes of the living God:

"He is the Self-moved God who is transcendently and majestically free to become one with us in our creaturely existence and even to enter into the depths of our misery and alienation, while remaining he who he always is as the mighty living God, and who is therefore perfectly free and able to redeem and save us from our bondage and degradation" (ibid).

[1] Colin Gunton describes Whitehead's God as the "Moved Unmover." Torrance also appears to prefer this terminology.

Paul Wegner Views the Old Testament as Reliable

Kevin Giles Discusses Moltmann, Pannenberg and Catholic Views of the Trinity

The following paper outlines what Kevin Giles writes about subordinationism in the thought of Moltmann, Pannenberg and Roman Catholic theologians. I will discuss pp. 94-97 of Giles' work The Trinity and Subordinationism. All references are to his book.

I. Jurgen Moltmann and the Trinity

Jurgen Moltmann is one 20th century theologian and writer, who has intensely focused on the Trinity doctrine. Karl Barth has apparently exerted a great influence on Moltmann, especially with regard to the latter's stress on relationality. The community of the Three Persons within Moltmann's social Trinitarian thought is grounded in the Eastern notion of perichoresis (i.e. intermutuality, interpenetration
or mutual indwelling). The Three are considered to be divine subjects (centers of activity), Moltmann argues, who are coequal, live in one another, manifest themselves in one another, as they eternally work through one another (see Giles 94-95).

Giles concludes that Moltmann categorically repudiates "all subordinationism" (95). The Three Persons supposedly relate to the world and to one another in love. The argument is thus made that God is not a monarch to whom humans subject themselves. Rather, he is supposed to be "one who seeks a loving fellowship with those with whom he identifies himself" (ibid). Moltmann thinks God is our heavenly partner, it seems, suffering with and for us. Undoubtedly his form of social Trinitarianism is a result of his theological starting-point. He begins with God's activity in Heilsgeschichte (salvation history) rather than with God's immanence (divine existence in se).

II. Pannenberg, the Trinity and Subordinationism

Another significant Protestant theologian is Wolfhart Pannenberg. His thought has been described as "speculative" since he putatively has the tendency (Tendenz) to navigate theologically where other Trinitarian discussions are "currently cresting" (Giles quoting Ted Peters in Giles 95). Giles chooses Pannenberg because other Protestant theologians have stated that the German thinker espouses the eternal subordination of the Son. But while Pannenberg does write that the Son is "dependent" on the Father and he is evidently "differentiated" from the Father, Pannenberg's thought as a whole apparently does not support the claim made by certain Protestant theologians. Granted, he seems to believe that the Son and the Spirit are dependent on the Father; however, the Father is evidently also dependent on the Son in his post-resurrection existence according to Pannenberg:

"The Father's dependence on the Son takes place, Pannenberg argues, after Christ's resurrection, when he is given all power and authority, being made head over all things . . ." (Giles 96).

In nuce, it appears that Pannenberg believes the Son's dependence on the Father is balanced by the Father's mutual dependence on the Son. Giles thus concludes that a holistic reading of Pannenberg does not support the claim that he teaches the eternal subordination of the Son. To the contrary, a "mutuality in their relationship" obtains, is the view of Pannenberg.

III. Roman Catholicism and Subordinationism

Giles states that Roman Catholic treatments of the Trinity doctrine are examples of high-level scholarship: they are "impressive," and these Catholic studies apparently do not differ in substance from their Protestant counterparts. Giles summarizes these Roman Catholic works in the following way: "The Trinity is a communion of three distinct divine persons who interpenetrate one another and work as one, none being set over or under the others" (97).

Nevertheless, he reports that he was surprised when he researched Catholic books while writing his study, for he found that none of the Catholic works he consulted actually talked about subordinationism in any detail. He relates that Catholics think the pre-Nicenes "naively" subordinated the Son and Spirit to the Father (Bernard Lonergan). Furthermore, "Subordinationism is not given a hearing by Roman Catholic theologians because their doctrine of the Trinity is emphatically 'Western' "(ibid).

The Roman Catholic version of the Trinity doctrine supposedly begins with the unity of the persons. Ergo, "Whenever the divine unity is to the fore, subordinationism is excluded" (ibid). The Western Filioque clause also seems to preclude any suggestion that the Son is, in any way, subordinate to the Father. In ftn. 51 on page 97, Giles refers to Catholic books on the Trinity that he consulted in preparation for his study. He closes the section on Roman Catholic theologians by referring to Karl Rahner's rule, even though he denies that this notable axiom supports the eternal subordination of the Son concept. The famed rule says: "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity."

So whether drawing from Protestant or Roman Catholic thinkers, Giles insists that neither type of theologia upholds subordinationism.

Spirit of God and of Christ

A number of points in the NT and Phil. 1:19 make me think that Paul is speaking of the holy spirit when he talks about "the spirit of Jesus Christ."

(1) Paul says that both the prayers of the brothers and sisters as well as the spirit of Jesus will "result in his deliverance" (Emphatic Diaglott) or his "salvation" (NWT). Scholars are not sure whether the SWTHRIAN mentioned refers to eternal salvation, deliverance from prison, or vindication in a legal sense. But regardless of what "salvation" Paul is talking about, he most certainly has in mind his eternal destiny as well as a possible release from prison (this may be an example of deliberate ambiguity). But how would this "release" come about? Would it happen through the mental disposition of Christ manifested by Paul or through the holy spirit that God vouchsafed to Christ? In answer to this question, notice that Paul associates the spirit of Jesus with the prayers of the first century brothers and sisters in Philippi(Cf. Acts 4:23-31).

But why didn't Paul call the "spirit of Jesus Christ" God's spirit if they are in fact one and the same? Well, it is interesting that Paul entreated the Lord three times, begging God to remove a thorn that apparently plagued Paul for quite some time (2 Cor. 12:8). What was the result of this prayer? Jehovah told Paul that his power was perfected in Paul's weakness. Consequently, the Apostle said that he would boast in his weakness, "so that the POWER of the Anointed" would abide upon him (2 Cor. 12:9 Emphatic Diaglott).

Notice that DUNAMIS is first described as God's power, then it is called "the POWER of the Anointed" (Christ). But how would Paul be infused with the Anointed One's power? Acts 1:8; 10:38; Eph. 3:16ff all indicate that the power of God is communicated via His holy spirit. I therefore conclude Paul believed that God and Christ work so closely together as they imbue believers with the holy spirit that to desire the spirit of Jesus Christ is to desire the spirit of God.

Furthermore, it seems that Paul most certainly refers to God's spirit as the spirit of Christ in Rom. 8:9-11. Those verses dovetail with Titus 3:5-6.

But notice closely what Gal. 4:6-7 also teaches us. It is not God's sons who cry out in 4:6, but the spirit of God's Son (cf. Romans 8:14-17). And note that it cries out, "Abba, Father!" I would submit that the spirit of 4:6 is thus the holy spirit that engenders a conviction of sonship in God's children. Thus, while all Christians have (or are supposed to have) the dominant mental attitude of Christ, not all Christians have the conviction of sonship. So that makes me wonder: since the spirit in 4:6 cries "Abba," how could it refer to Christ's mental disposition? Why would Christ's mental disposition cry Abba in a worshiper of Jehovah? Surely it is not Christ's "mind" that produces God's sons, is it?

The Use of "Father" for God in Ancient Judaism

Taken from my dissertation "Metaphor and Divine Paternity" which will be published (hopefully) within the next year or two:

[Walter] Kasper states that ancient Israel believed God has “the attitude of a father.” Marsh similarly affirms that the use of “Father” as a divine appellation in the Tanakh “is clearly a metaphor, an image employed to express some aspect or aspects of God’s relationship with God’s people.” Moreover, Jeremiah the prophet indicates that God’s paternity with respect to Israel is symbolic or metaphorical when he speaks of YHWH “becoming” a Father to Israel (Jeremiah 31:9 NRSV). Therefore, it seems that the paternal title for deity is a well-established metaphor in ancient Judaism: the expression appears to form part of a metasememe that communicates the notion of God electing and providentially guiding Israel, the historical seed of Abraham (2 Chronicles 20:7; Isaiah 41:8). Hence, although the communal address “our Father” is “relatively late,” (according to Vermes) the metaphor of God as Father (ab) to the Israelite nation appears to have been a prominent motif in the sacred documents of early Judaism (Prayer for Intercession 3:5-8).

Is There An Actual Difference in God Between Essence and Person (Aquinas' Answer)

"I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question 3, Article 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as 'suppositum,' which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), 'relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,' some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be 'adjacent'; considering only in the relations the idea of 'reference to another,' and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question 28, Article 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons."

Summa Theologica (Prima Pars, Quaestio 39, Article 1)

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas

Second and Revised Edition, 1920

Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Online Edition Copyright © 2008 by Kevin Knight

Secular/Sacred Music and the Early Church Fathers

This bit of information is taken from a book entitled Theology and the Arts: Encountering God through Music, Art and Rhetoric(New York/Mahmah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 2000) by Richard Viladesau. The quote is found on page 16 of the aforementioned work:

"It was of course recognized that the Old Testament not only spoke approvingly of the use of music (including instruments) in worship, but even commanded it. However, in the Hellenistic church, derived principally from Gentile roots, the music prescribed by the Torah for Jewish ritual was thought to be an accommodation by God to the weaknesses of the covenanted people--much like the permission of divorce in the Law of Moses. The fathers supported their position by quoting out of context such passages as Amos 5:23--'Away from me with the noise of your songs; the playing of your harps I do not wish to hear'--and Isaiah 5:12--'they have lyre and harp, timbrel and flute and wine at their feasts; but they do not regard the deeds of the Lord.' As far as Christian worship is concerned, they interpreted the instruments allegorically as representing powers of the soul and mind. Thus, for example, Pseudo-Origen writes that when the psalm says, 'Praise him in the sound of the trumpet,' the 'trumpet' is to be understood as the contemplative mind."

My point in citing this passage is to show that the early church Fathers perhaps took some biblical passages out of context and also let their everyday assumptions (preapprehensions) or philosophical views govern their interpretation of both the Old and New Testament.

Generally, from what I've read, the pre-Nicenes totally disapproved of secular love music; but maybe they qualify these sentiments somewhere. In any event, here are some examples of their overall attitude toward love/secular and instrumental music:

"In W. Riedel we read among the Commandments of the Fathers, Superiors and Masters that:

Christians are not allowed to teach their daughters singing, the playing of instruments or similar things because, according to their religion, it is neither good nor becoming.

All these passages, it is true, are concerned with worldly song and worldly music, to the practice of which pagan women attached excessive importance . . . In contrast to this the singing of psalms was recommended again and again to Christian virgins precisely as a substitute for prohibited secular music. Tertullian writes:

Let the two [spouses] sing psalms and hymns and incite each other to see who can sing better to his God" (information taken from J. Quasten's Music and Worship in Pagan and Christian Antiquity, pages 83-84).

Also:

"The reasons for which Christians passed their sharp judgment were other than those of the pagans. It is true that Christians also held music in contempt because it promoted moral decay. Thus Clement of Alexandria condemned flute music because it was 'a chain in a bridge of sensual love and idle impulses,' and he rejected the noise of cymbal and tambourine because it made one forget propriety and morality. But the most important reason for Clement's condemnation of profane music in private life, which all other Christian writers shared with him, was the close relationship between music and the pagan cult of the idols. Therefore all the music of that time, as far as Christians were concerned, constituted one great worship of idols" (ibid. 126).

"God also gave man a voice. Yet, love songs and indecent things are not to be sung merely on that account" (Cyprian, ANF 5.433).

Geza Vermes' Statement on DSS and the Hebrew Bible

I'm addressing issues of Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) reliability.




See https://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt=ApJrWQr.0ocofKXN4MBnDCWbvZx4?p=geza+vermes+dead+sea+scrolls&toggle=1&cop=mss&ei=UTF-8&fr=yfp-t-442&fp=1

Keeping Comments Relevant

I love to interact with comments on my blog entries, but they need to relate to the original posts. There have been recent comments which I've had to reject because they strayed from the original posts or tried to link to some anti-Witness website. Sorry, but I will not promote such links or take off-topic remarks.

Thanks,

Edgar

Archer Demonstrates That the Old Testament Is Reliable

Taken from Gleason L. Archer, A Survey of Old Testament Introduction (Chicago: Moody Press, 1994 ed), p. 32.

"Even though the two copies of Isaiah discovered in Qumran Cave 1 near the Dead Sea in 1947 were a thousand years earlier than the oldest dated manuscript previously known (A.D. 980), they proved to be word for word identical with our standard Hebrew Bible in more than 95 percent of the text, but in 1QIsb, (ca. 75 B.C.) the preserved text is almost letter for letter identical with the Leningrad Manuscript. The five percent of variation consisted chiefly of obvious slips of the pen and variations in spelling. Even those Dead Sea fragments of Deuteronomy and Samuel which point to a different manuscript family from that which underlies our received Hebrew text do not indicate any differences in doctrine or teaching. They do not affect the message of revelation in the slightest."

You can find much more evidence in this work.

How Should We Understand 2 Corinthians 5:1-5?

A gentleman once wrote concerning 2 Cor 5:1-5:

"This seems to me to be indicating that Paul's mortal body would not be abandoned, but rather improved. That he [sic] "house" is referring to enhancement to his mortal condition which *descends* from God."

MY RESPONSE to Him:

Notice that Paul actually indicates that his earthly tent WILL be dissolved. The NASB rightly translates this verse as follows:

"For we know that if the earthly tent which is our house is torn down, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands,
eternal in the heavens."

Compare this thought with 2 Cor 5:4-5 (NASB)

4 For indeed while we are in this tent, we groan, being burdened, because we do not want to be unclothed but to be clothed, so that what is mortal will be swallowed up by life.

5 Now He who prepared us for this very purpose is God, who gave to us the Spirit as a pledge.

So we are not simply talking about "improving" a mortal body here. The apostle suggests that his earthly tent will undergo dissolution
and it will be replaced by a sturdy house, "eternal in the heavens." Additionally the verse says nothing about a body "descending" from God, but it simply shows that God is the source of the new body:

"Thus, the heavenly dwelling of 2 Cor 5:1, no less than the heavenly commonwealth of Phil 3:19, would be an image for that new age. Not
even death, the final proof of mortality, need cause the apostles to shrink back (4:16a), for they, like all believers, know that their
true home is in heaven" (Furnish, VP. II Corinthians; translated with introduction, notes and commentary. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1984).

2 Corinthians 5:8 and the Resurrection

Here are some points I have read about 2 Cor. 5:1-8:

"But what does Paul mean in his desire not to be found naked? While most commentators interpret 'naked' either as 'disembodied' or as 'moral nakedness' or 'shame,' there is another possibility if the allusion is to Ecclesiastes 5:14-15 LXX: 'As he [sc. the rich man] came forth naked from his mother's womb, he shall return back as he came, and he shall receive nothing for his labor, in order that it might go with him in his hand.' Seen in the light of this passage, Paul does not want to be found 'naked' in the sense of being physically buried without receiving a reward for his apostolic suffering and labor . . . If this interpretation is correct, then 2 Corinthians 5:3 is not as tautological as it may at first seem. Paul is saying that he wants to receive his resurrection body so that he will not be found naked in the grave, having lived and died in vain, without recompense"(James M. Scott, 2 Corinthians, 113).

See Marvin C. Pate's Adam Christology as the Exegetical and Theological Structure of 2 Corinthians 4:7-5:21. He contends that the word "naked" in 2 Cor. 5:3 should be interpreted in the light of the Genesis account and 3 Bar. 4:16; 2 En 22:8; 30:12. Pate thinks that Paul is referring to shamefulness and a "loss of glory" in 2 Cor. 5:3.

I would also suggest David Aune's discussion on GUMNOS in Revelation commentary (Word series). Note how "nakedness" is associated with shamefulness in Rev. 16:15. There are a number of parallels for this usage in non-canonical literature and the OT (Gen. 3:10; 9:24; Isa 20:4; 47:3; Hosea 2:10; 1 Cor. 12:23; Apoc. Moses 20). See also Jub. 3:30.

Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ (Philippians 1:19)

οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτό μοι ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν διὰ τῆς ὑμῶν δεήσεως καὶ ἐπιχορηγίας τοῦ πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Philippians 1:19)

I would submit that Philippians 2:1 and 3:3 are helpful in understanding Philippians 1:19. In 2:1, it's possible to understand πνεύματος as referring to a "spirit" other than God's holy spirit--but its interesting to note that C.B. Williams translates 2:1 as follows: "any common share in the Spirit." Cf. Weymouth's "any common sharing of the Spirit" and Ralph Earle's Word Meanings in the NT (page 335). Additionally, Philippians 2:1 reminds me of a similar Pauline expression in 2 Corinthians 13:14: ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.

2 Corinthians 13:14 contains an articular use of πνεύματος whereas Philippians 2:1 is anarthrous. However, the omission of the article in 2:1 does not mean that πνεύματος there lacks definiteness. Cf. the anarthrous use of πνεύματος in Hebrew 9:14 which could be translated: "how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God" (ESV) Moreover, Philippians 3:3 seems to be a clear reference to the spirit of God(πνεύματι θεοῦ) although the construction there is similarly anarthrous.

Geza Vermes Discusses the Ancient Use of Abba

The following post is based on Jesus in His Jewish Context written by Geza Vermes. Here is what he has to say about Jesus' use of the Aramaic word Abba:

"Much has been written about the significance of the
use by Jesus of the title abba, especially by Jeremias
and his followers. In the opinion of the late
professor from Gottingen, this ipsissima vox Jesu is
unparalleled in Jewish prayer. Compared with that of the
ancient Jews, who, as one of Jeremias' pupils
explains, 'maintained the dignity of God, in so far as
they addressed him as Father at all, by scrupulously
avoiding the particular form of the word used by
children', it is the 'chatter of a small child'.
Jeremias, that is to say, understood Jesus to have
addressed God as 'Dad' or 'Daddy', but apart from the
A PRIORI improbability and incongruousness of the
theory, there seems to be no linguistic support for
it. Young children speaking Aramaic addressed their
parents as abba or imma but it was not the only
context in which abba would be employed. By the time
of Jesus, the determined form of the noun, abba ([=]
'the father'), signified also 'my father'; 'MY
father', though still attested in Qumran and biblical
Aramaic, had largely disappeared as an idiom from the
Galilean dialect. Again, abba could be used in solemn,
far from childish, situations such as the fictional
altercation between the patriarchs Judah and Joseph
reported in the Palestinian Targum, when the furious
Judah threatens the governor of Egypt (his
unrecognized brother) saying: 'I swear by the life of
the head of abba ([=] my father) as you swear by the
life of the head of Pharaoh, your master, that if I
draw my sword from the scabbard, I will not return it
there until the land of Egypt is filled with the
slain'" (pages 37-38).

Vermes also notes that Jeremias' thesis that no Jew
ever called God abba in prayer is "also open to
question" (page 38). No evidence seems to buttress the notion that
individual prayers in Aramaic failed to contain the
vocative abba. Furthermore, Vermes points out that
there may be "at least one indirect attestation" to
abba used in Jewish prayer with the so-called
rain-maker Hanan (first century B.C.E.). See bTann.
23b.

Vermes' conclusion is that the portrait of the Father
communicated in the Gospels satisfies the
form-critical criteria of multiple attestation and
consistence since Jesus' teaching concerning God the
Father is echoed in other sources, whether they
explicitly mention the word Father or not (ibid).

The Grammar of Hebrews 11:11

W-H has: Πίστει καὶ αὐτὴ Σάρρα δύναμιν εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος ἔλαβεν καὶ παρὰ καιρὸν ἡλικίας, ἐπεὶ πιστὸν ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον· for Hebrews 11:11.

Ralph Earle's Word Meanings in the NT contains a fine discussion on this verse. Earle informs us that most translations consider Sarah to be the subject of Heb 11:11, but the NIV regards Abraham as the subject: "And by faith even Sarah, who was past childbearing age, was enabled to bear children because she considered him faithful who had made the promise" (NIV).

Earle refers to F.F. Bruce's commentary on Hebrews (NICNT) which suggests that αὐτὴ Σάρρα be construed as a dative of accompaniment rather than a subject nominative. That is, instead of αὐτὴ Σάρρα, we should read αὐτῇ Σάρρᾳ (Nestle GNT).

Bruce Metzger lists two possibilities for this portion of Heb 11:11. Either Abraham can be taken as the subject of the passage or αὐτὴ Σάρρα στεῖρα should be understood as a dative of accompaniment (A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, p. 602).

If we do, in fact, have a dative of accompaniment in Heb 11:11, it would then read:

"By faith he also, together with Sarah, received power to beget a child when he was past age, since he counted him faithful who promised."

According to BDAG, the dative of accompaniment is found in Thucydides X and Diod S. 20, 76, 1. See BDF 194.1.

Interestingly, John Chrysostom seems to have understood the text as a reference to Sarah being granted the power to conceive seed: he thus appears to construe Sarah as the subject like most modern translations do:

"By faith Sarah herself received power to conceive, even when she was past the age, since she considered him faithful who had promised" (ESV).

My Updated Book Review of Michael W. Palmer's "Levels of Constituent Structure"

Those who have studied an ancient biblical language like Greek or Latin (or Hebrew) know that genuine advancement in language learning is truly attained when one understands Greek (Latin) beyond the word or sentence level. Michael W. Palmer's Levels of Constituent Structure in New Testament Greek (New York: Peter Lang, 1995) emphasizes this point through the analysis of verb and noun phrases contained in New Testament Greek. Levels is part of a series called "Studies in Biblical Greek" edited by Donald A. Carson (the notable author of Exegetical Fallacies). The book is approximately 145 pp. in length and fairly technical: I would recommend this work for advanced students only. In the following paragraphs, the strong aspects and unique contents of Palmer's study will be noted.

Levels provides a succinct and clear review of modern linguistic approaches like rationalism and structuralism along with transformational-generative grammar (associated with Noam Chomsky); then a discussion on general linguistic methodology and syntactic structures in particular ensues. Accordingly, the main part of Palmer's analysis revolves around noun and verb phrases, but he manifests penetrating insight when calling for a reconsideration of attributive and predicative adjectival distinctions along with constituent structural levels as they pertain to noun and verb phrases.

Palmer's monograph is well-written. Its approach seems to be governed by transformational-generative grammar, but the work certainly goes beyond similar presentations offered up in the past. Levels includes a number of tree diagrams. Nonetheless, it helpfully provides a multitude of examples illustrating constituent structure within the NT. He also works with clause-level, phrase-level and word-level constituents. However, Palmer thinks that these kinds of constituents are not sufficient to account for other New Testament Greek structures: therefore he suggests an intermediate-level constituent between the familiar clause and phrase-level structures.

This intermediate-level constituent is discussed on page 72 of Levels where Luke 2:13 is invoked as an example of the need to use innovative distinctions that Palmer respectively calls N-bar and V-bar. That is, Palmer believes it is possible (even preferable) to designate some constituents as reduced noun and reduced verb phrases (N-bar and V-bar). He appeals to other constructions in Luke such as Luke 14:12 and 20:37 to substantiate this general point.

Palmer's work is valuable for those who want to move beyond studying Greek at the level of words or mere sentences. Consequently, it benefits students who desire to analyze Greek structures at the clause or phrase-level. This work will have little bearing on biblical interpretation; however, it just might change how scholars and students approach New Testament Greek grammar. The effects of Palmer's study will undoubtedly be indirect. He believes that syntactical studies will probably benefit the most from his work, although pragmatics (as a branch of linguistics) will assuredly contribute to an understanding of biblical Greek, ancient rhetoric and deixis (Palmer, page 82).

ἐκ + the Genitive

Here is an edited piece that I wrote years ago; consequently, Thayer rather than BAGD or BDAG is mentioned.

According to Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon, ἐκ (ἐξ) can denote the "origin, source" or "cause" of "generation, birth, race, lineage, [and] nativity" as well as any other type of beginning.

This Greek preposition may also speak of "the efficient cause, or agent from which any action or thing proceeds, is produced, or effected from, or by" (Spiros Zodhiates).

These remarks would indicate that when ἐκ is applied to the Father's activities at 1 Cor. 8:6, it is describing His creative function or his unique act of efficient causation with respect to all things.

It would probably be worth the time to reference the introduction of David Aune's three volume commentary on Revelation. On p. CLXXIX-CLXXX of his introduction to volume I, Aune details the many uses of ἐκ in Revelation. The examples he gives of ἐκ signifying the action of a personal or impersonal agent are: Rev. 2:9; 3:18; 8:11; 9:18. In my humble assessment, 2 Cor. 5:1 is also an example in which ἐκ describes a creation of God--a spiritual building which has a heavenly source.

As for διά, it seems difficult to associate it with the concept of maker or efficient cause in 1 Cor. 8:6 and Heb. 1:2. It is more appropriate to construe its significance as that of intermediate agency:

"Intermediate agency is normally conveyed by διά with the genitive. For example, God delivered the law to Moses by angels (Gal. 3:19) and John sent a message to Christ through his disciples (Matt. 11:2; cf. John 1:3; 3:17)" (Richard A. Young's Grammar, 91-92).

John Sanders Discusses the No-Risk Model of Divine Providence

An excerpt from the older edition of "The God Who Risks" by John Sanders:

"According to the no-risk model of providence there is
a specific divine reason for ordaining each and every
particular occurrence of evil and suffering. According
to [Paul] Helm, since 'God works everything for good' (Rom
8:28), there are no such things as accidents and there
are no real tragedies in life. If Jones is afflicted
with a debilitating mental illness in which he loses
touch with reality, or if a three-year-old child
contracts an incurable and intractably painful bone
cancer, or if a number of kindergartners are murdered
in a school gymnasium in Scotland, or if Christian
woman [sic] and children are raped and sold into
slavery in Sudan, such experiences were specifically
selected by God to happen to these individuals. In the
no-risk view all the poverty, genocide, ethnic
conflicts, debilitating illnesses, rapes, birth
defects, blindness, destructive government policies
and so on are all specifically ordained by God, who
applies them to the particular individuals involved.
We may not know the divine reasons, but, we are told,
we can be sure they are good ones because God is good.
Jerry Bridges writes that 'God's sovereignty over
people . . . means that God is in control of our pain
and suffering, and that he has in mind a beneficial
purpose for it. There is no such thing as pain without
a purpose'" (Sanders, page 253).

Sanders obviously takes exception with the views expressed by Paul Helm and Jerry Bridges. As a matter of fact, Sanders' description of Helm's position seems so extreme that I wondered if he did not misinterpret Helm. But apparently, he has not misconstrued Helm's view of divine providence after all.

Joel 3:3 and Predestination

"And they have cast lots for my people; and have given a boy for an harlot, and sold a girl for wine, that they might drink" (Joel 3:3).

"They have cast lots for my people — It was customary with conquerors, in those days, to divide the captives, taken in war, among themselves by lot, and so did these enemies of the Jews. And have given a boy for a harlot — By this is meant, that they exchanged, or gave away, Jewish boys, instead of money, for harlots. And sold a girl for wine, that they might drink — For a draught of wine, as it were; that is, at a very vile and low rate. These instances are mentioned, to signify the contempt in which these enemies of the Jews held the worshippers of the true God; they parted with them, when they had taken them captives, upon the vilest terms, as setting little or no value upon them. In Mingrelia, according to Sir John Chardin, they sell captive children for provisions and for wine: see Harmer vol. 2. p. 374" (Benson Commentary).

Think of how often the practice of trafficking children for dishonest gain has occurred throughout history and the practice is still happening. I guess the Calvinists might say that God wills/ordains selling children for sexual favors or wine, and some good is supposed to come out of it. But such a view is hard to square with the Bible and reason. Why would God condemn an action that he ordained/willed, especially if it has some type of ultimate worth? Secondly, why ordain such actions in the first place (whatever Calvinists mean by ordain/will)? Thirdly, couldn't salvation be accomplished without willing an act that wreaks emotional and psychological damage on children--maybe even irreparable damage?

(I am not talking about the logical problem of evil per se, since that is a related but separate question for me.)

The felix culpa view of divine providence strikes me as taking the long way (the scenic route) to get from North Carolina to Florida. Far be it from me to judge the workings of Almighty God; however, Jehovah has given us reason whereby we might judge whether something makes sense or not. Granted, God could have willed that the cosmos would reach eternal blessedness one day by means of turmoil, confusion, harlotry, child abuse, wars, genocide, child sacrifices to false gods and all other forms of evil. Yet that is taking the long way around when one could simply take the shortest route to Florida from North Carolina.

So God could bring eternal happiness (blessedness) without using evil to accomplish his purpose since he is omnipotent. If he could do it, then why would God intentionally decide to use evil as opposed to just taking the most efficient route to get where he's going (metaphorically speaking). Now there is a material difference between permitting evil and actively willing/ordaining it. I have no problem with God permitting evil: I do question a view which argues for more than divine permission where evil is concerned.

Did the Logos Change When He Became Flesh (John 1:14)

Here is something I posted elsewhere about the Incarnation:

Let "S" represent a human person:

1) S became a doctor
2) S became a Christian
3) S became a ruffian

In each of the cases listed above, it would be safe to conclude that some type of actual change or process has occurred to/regarding S. But if we now consider another proposition:

4) The Logos became flesh

We are asked to believe (by the majority of Incarnation advocates) that change neither occurred to the nature of the Logos nor to the divine person who was supposed to be the subject of the Incarnation: no real alteration took place. Yet if the Logos became (was made) flesh, it is still hard to comprehend how he (the person) became flesh without undergoing some kind of change. To just argue that God cannot experience actual change, the Logos is God, therefore, the Logos did not experience actual change seems like petitio principii to me.

Using the language of assumption doesn't make the problem go away either. If by assume, we mean "take to oneself" (Aquinas in the Summa Theologica), then to say that the Logos assumed human nature (flesh) could possibly be akin to assuming another identity or assuming a posture that one did not previously had. No, I'm not saying that Christ just assumed a new identity; my point is that the word "assumption" could also indicate change/alteration.

Before: The Logos is strictly spirit
Post-Incarnation: The Logos is flesh

However, most say that no actual change occurred to the nature or person of the Logos (Word).

More from Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology (Foreordination)

"The Bible clearly teaches that God judicially abandons men to their sins, giving them up to a reprobate mind, and He therein is most just and holy. It is not true, therefore, that an agent is responsible for all the certain consequences of his acts. It may be, and doubtless is, infinitely wise and just in God to permit the occurrence of sin, and to adopt a plan of which sin is a certain consequence or element; yet as he neither causes sin, nor tempts men to its commission, He is neither its author nor approver. He sees and knows that higher ends will be accomplished by its admission than by its exclusion, that a perfect exhibition of his infinite perfections will be thereby effected and therefore for the highest reason decrees that it shall occur through the free choice of responsible agents. Our great ground of confidence, however, is the assurance that the judge of all the earth must do right. Sin is, and God is; therefore the occurrence of sin must be consistent with his nature; and as its occurrence cannot have been unforeseen or undesigned, God's purpose or decree that it should occur must be consistent with his holiness" (Systematic Theology, 1:548).

Calvin and Human Depravity

Regarding the beliefs of John Calvin, Stanley M. Burgess informs us:

"At the fall, however, the natural gifts present in humans were corrupted, and the supernatural gifts were removed. Because humans are now despoiled of the Spirit's gifts, and of the 'light of reason, justice and rectitude,' they are prone to every evil. No longer considered worthy to be guided by the Holy Spirit, humans are abandoned to Satan's actions" (Burgess 3:164).

Calvin himself asserted the following:

"we do not condemn those inclinations which God so engraved upon the character of man at his first creation, that they were eradicable only with humanity itself, but only those bold and unbridled impulses which contend against God's control" (Institutes 3.3.12).

Granted, I'm not sure that Calvin explicitly affirms that the IMAGO DEI in man was lost at the Fall. Nevertheless, he writes that the IMAGO DEI of infralapsarian humanity was so distorted at the Fall that the human mind "conceives, desires, and undertakes, only that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure, and infamous. The heart is so steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out nothing but a loathsome stench. But if some men occasionally make a show of good, their minds nevertheless ever remain enveloped in hypocrisy and deceitful craft, and their hearts bound by inner perversity" (Institutes 2.5.19).

Based on these Calvinistic ideas, I would say that positing a nature/supernature dichotomy in this way does nothing to advance our understanding of human nature from a scriptural viewpoint. Calvin had a pretty dim view of fallen man qua fallen man. This is not to say that man is "basically good" as Enlightenment thinkers generally claim since we are sinners by nature (Romans 3:23). But I cannot concur with Calvin when he asserts that humanity only conceives what is vile and wicked. Nor can I agree when he claims that "some men occasionally make a show of good," but their hearts are still filled with malice and inner perversity; this evaluation goes wholly against the apostolic teaching of the "law within" (Romans 2:14-15). Some people without law do by nature the things of the law; yet there are also other consequences that are concomitant with his teaching.

(1) The teaching of total depravity indicates that man has absolutely nothing to do with his salvation: "Someone may say, 'Yes, the Holy Spirit must draw us to God, but we can use our freedom to resist or accept that drawing.' Our answer is: except for the continual exertion of saving grace, we will always use our freedom to resist God. That is what it means to be 'unable to submit to God.' If a person becomes humble enough to submit to God it is because God has given that person a new, humble nature" (John Piper). See http://www.desiringgod.org/articles/what-we-believe-about-the-five-points-of-calvinism

Of course, we might all agree that God is the Savior--the initiator and sole Director of the marvelous soteriological process. Yet the part that a human plays in salvation is a point of separation for many theologians. Luther defined faith in terms of FIDUCIA ("absolute trust in God"). He believed that faith is a passive act of reception in which we only receive God's grace. But as Emil Brunner has aptly pointed out, the dynamics of salvation cannot be explained properly in terms of cause and effect (divine activity and human passivity): it is much better to view salvation as a process of action and reaction insofar as God acts while man reacts. If what Brunner says is true, then it seems that we too play a significant part in our salvation (Philippians 2:12). We evidently have the ability and intellectual power to act in response to God's invitation and make important changes that show our love for God and the good news about Christ. It is not just a matter of God giving and our passively receiving. None of what I say here, however, is designed to minimize the role that God's spirit plays in shaping or directing our wills. God does indeed empower us to make changes in our lives--to receive his Son as the pioneer and high priest of our salvation.

(2) Total depravity also clouds the truthfulness of passages like Mark 10:18. While it might be tempting to understand this verse as a claim to Deity by Jesus Christ, in actuality, the verse is simply declaring that God is the only one who is superlatively Good. I.e., Jehovah is the only One who measures up fully to the absolute standard of goodness. This truth can be easily demonstrated by cross-referencing Revelation 15:1-4 and 1 Samuel 2:2. The account in Revelation says that only God is holy. Yet 1 Samuel 2:2 says that no one can compare with God in holiness. The verses are not contradictory: Revelation 15:1-4 is simply demonstrating the superlative nature of God's holiness. This point is also illustrated by the many examples in both the OT and NT that declare men and angels to be holy.

Lastly, I would acquiesce with the claim that man can do nothing on his own regarding his salvation: we all need the holy spirit to turn from lives of sin to lives of righteousness (1 Corinthians 6:9-11). However, there is an interesting tension at work between God guiding us (not coercing us) to believe in him and our taking the initiative to form intentions to serve him. Again, I refer to the law within and Joshua 24:15 which indicates that we must make the choice to serve or reject Jehovah. Making that choice of our own volition would be impossible if Calvin's words were true.

Ecclesiastes 9:5 Comments--Death Is A Deep Sleep

One young Catholic gentleman with whom I had extended discussions on many issues posted this remark to another forum about Eccl 9:5:

"But in [Ecclesiastes] IX., 5, we read, 'The dead know not anything, neither have they any more reward, for the memory of them is forgotten.' [Answer:] Those last words obviously show that it is useless to depend upon a reward as far as recognition by fellow men is concerned. The writer is speaking from the point of view of people still living in this world. To all practical purposes as far as this world is concerned the dead are removed from this world and know not anything as far as the evidence of our own senses goes."

My Response:

In context, Qoheleth (Solomon) recounts that all men, regardless of their station in life, in time die (Eccl 9:3). He then proceeds to inform his readers that "to him that is joined with all the living there is hope; for a living dog is better than a dead lion" (Eccl 9:4).

Is Qoheleth exclaiming that hope only exists for the living from the standpoint of other humans dwelling "under the sun"? Or is such an observation made by the ancient writer supposed to be epistemologically objective (mind-independent)? The context indicates that Qoheleth's words are objective in the eyes of God and not simply an exclamation of how humans "under the sun" view matters. The son of David goes on to make a stark contrast between the living and the dead in Ecclesiastes 9:5, even adding these telling words in 9:10: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might: for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in Sheol, whither thou goest" (ASV).

So the context refutes the view that Qoheleth thinks the dead are only conscious of nothing from the standpoint of earthly observers. Moreover, the OT consistently teaches that the dead know nothing simpliciter et simpliciter:

"For in death there is no remembrance of thee: In Sheol who shall give thee thanks?" (Ps 6:5).

"For the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same. As one dies so dies the other; indeed, they all have the same breath and there is no advantage for man over beast, for all is vanity. All go to the same place. All came from the dust and all return to the dust" (Eccl 3:19-20).

Cf Job 3:11-19.

The young man who posted this reply also expressed the view that John 11:11-14 uses "phenomenological language" concerning Lazarus:

"As far as the reference to Lazarus' "sleep" is concerned, this is what is known as phenomenological language. Jesus was doing nothing more than making a reference to death based on the phenomenon or *appearance* of sleep. We cannot isolate this passage from the rest of the Bible. Numerous other passages clearly attest to death being something other than sleep."

But I wonder how we are supposed to know that Jesus was employing "phenomenological language" in Jn 11:11-14? The metaphor of "sleep" for death was a common one that the ancient Greeks also utilized. We even find David using this figure of speech in Psalm 13:3: "Consider and answer me, O Jehovah my God: Lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death" (ASV). Daniel 12:2 also enunciates the Hebrew understanding of death that is manifestly consonant with such verses as Ps 146:3-4. This passage foretells that "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." This passage does not indicate that the writer is speaking phenomenologically. Compare Jeremiah 51:39.

In the NT, Jesus himself "awakened" Jairus' daughter in the presence of a crowd filled with cynical observers who "knew she was dead," though Jesus said she slept. The context of Luke 8:49-56 shows that the girl did not simply "appear" to be sleeping; she was sleeping "the sleep of death." Her spirit (life force) had gone out of her: she was dead. The young girl was conscious of nothing at all (Job 3:11-19), but Lazarus and the young maiden were also resurrected by the Messiah of God. They did not simply appear to be sleeping, for they were sleeping the "sleep of death."

"For Sheol cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee: They that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth" (Isa 38:18).

"O LORD, the God who saves me, day and night I cry out before you. May my prayer come before you; turn your ear to my cry. For my soul is full of trouble and my life draws near the grave. I am counted among those who go down to the pit; I am like a man without strength. I am set apart with the dead, like the slain who lie in the grave, whom you remember no more, who are cut off from your care. You have put me in the lowest pit, in the darkest depths. Your wrath lies heavily upon me; you have overwhelmed me with all your waves. You have taken from me my closest friends and have made me repulsive to them. I am confined and cannot escape; my eyes are dim with grief. I call to you, O LORD, every day; I spread out my hands to you. Do you show your wonders to the dead? Do those who are dead rise up and praise you? Is your love declared in the grave, your faithfulness in Destruction? Are your wonders known in the place of darkness, or your righteous deeds in the land of oblivion?" (Ps 88:1-12)

"And he kneeled down, and cried with a loud voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge. And when he had said this, he fell asleep" (Acts 7:59 ASV).

Donald E. Hartley's Remarks on Pancausality

I don't have a lot of time today, my friends, but just wanted to say that divine pancausality (the doctrine that teaches God is the ultimate cause of everything) has some untoward and possibly even bizarre implications. For example, Donald E. Hartley relates that the sexual violation of a child, while morally repugnant is nonetheless good in a "decretal" sense. That is to say, it's bad morally but good insofar as God brings all things to pass (including the violation of a young child). That view seems to denigrate the divine glory and detracts from God's goodness.

Stephen T. Davis on the Incarnation's Logic

While I'm on the subject of the Incarnation (the doctrine that God became human), I would like to post a few points once gleaned from Stephen T. Davis' wonderful book _Logic and the Nature of God_.

Davis initiates his discussion by citing John Hick, who avers that the claim "Jesus is fully God and fully man" (VERE DEUS, VERE HOMO) is in effect saying that a circle is fully square and fully circular. Hick argues that the claim is "devoid of meaning" and logically impossible. If an object is fully square, then it cannot be fully circular (it cannot be P and ~ P at the same time and in the same sense). Therefore, the proposition "Jesus is truly God and truly man" is deemed to be incoherent.

This point can also be illustrated by juxtaposing the properties of God and the properties of man. God is omniscient, but man is not omniscient; God is omnipotent, but man is not omnipotent; God is A SE ESSE, but man derives his existence from God.

God is immortal; man, however, is not. It seems that divine properties rule out finite properties subsisting in the same entity simultaneously? The predicates essential to God appear to be incommensurable with the predicates proper (essential) to man. Davis realizes this point and concludes that in order to coherently formulate the Incarnation doctrine--one must deny the essential nature of God's omniscience and furthermore, one must also state the Incarnation teaching in a way that does not imply Jesus has all of the essential properties of God or all of the essential properties of man SIMPLICITER. But surely this view is not in harmony with Chalcedonian orthodoxy. It reflects the kenoticist views of the 19th century.

In conclusion, I think that Davis' treatment of this issue shows the ineluctable conundrums that result when one tries to make the Jesus of the New Testament fit one's preconceived theological and philosophical notions of our Lord. He is an ardent defender of the Incarnation, but he has realized the logical difficulties associated with believing that God became man.

A Brief Followup to the Westminster Confession Subject and Predestination

Firstly, I want to thank Mike Felker for discussing the issue of foreordination (predestination) with me. His comments were quite helpful and I hope his understanding of Witness beliefs also has been advanced.

Looking at the Westminster Confession a little more closely, it seems that the "God brings whatsoever comes to pass" language should be interpreted as "God foreordains" (predestines) or God wills all events. That is to say, God foreordained the suffering and death of Jesus, he willed the rape of Tamar, the adulterous affair between David and Bathsheba and the Holocaust along with chattel slavery which wreaked such havoc on many Africans who were brought to America. Yet it is odd that God has condemned many of the acts he supposedly foreordained (willed) and even punished humans for committing them. That still makes little sense to me along with other implications of the Confession.

Am I being uncharitable in my interpretation of the Westminster Confession? I don't think that is the case, and here is why I make this claim.

John Hendryx, when composing a reply to Roger Olson (who is critical of Calvinism) writes:

We acknowledge that we cannot explain all of God's secret acts since God has chosen not to reveal many things about Himself. But one very prominent feature of the Bible is that it frequently declares that God meticulously ordains all that comes to pass (Eph 1:11) AND that men are responsible for their actions. One major example sticks out: the greatest sin ever committed by men in history -- the crucifixion of Jesus ---when the Apostle Peter, preaching at Pentecost declares:

"...this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men." (Acts 2:23)

[END QUOTE]

So Hendryx declares that God "meticulously ordains" all things eternally and immutably--even wicked actions that include the execution of Christ and genocide, cruel slavery, homicides, rape, child sacrifice, abortions, terrorism and a host of other evils that are manifestly ungodly. But yet humans are still fully responsible for all of the previously mentioned actions that God has putatively foreordained.

Or take the much stronger assertion made by Donald E. Hartley:

"No sin imaginable is more horrific than the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Yet, Scripture indicates that this was done by God the Father to God the Son (mediately) through the immediate agency of sinful human beings in the crucifixion (Isa 52:13-53:12; Acts 2:23; 4:28). If this is the worst possible evil that can be imagined, and God is clearly the ultimate cause behind it, then why be repulsed by divine causality when it comes to the rape of a child as if this is a greater evil?"

Hartley insists that God is the agent (doer) of all things (even sins performed by human agents), but God himself is not the author of sin. How this all works is said to be a mystery.

But there are further comments made by Hartley that bear on how one understands the Westminster Confession. He points to Aquinas who apparently thinks that every act undertaken (whether morally good or evil) is good insofar as God has willed all that comes to pass. Hartley therefore raises the possibility that while the rape of a child is evil in one sense, it's potentially good in a "decretal sense." Yet even Hartley admits that hardly anyone wants to hear this view espoused. See http://books.google.com/books?id=nnUrwTkP4iwC&pg=PA80&lpg=PA80&dq=god+foreordained+rape&source=bl&ots=5BGOa1yoRj&sig=Xhhg-VeAQgOBQ-jw_gC6K4SGvWs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fA_UU4maLIrs8QGtqICgAQ&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=god%20foreordained%20rape&f=false

So the "come to pass" language of the Westminster Confession should be understood to mean that God wills or foreordains all that happens. And we have not even touched on double predestination which is likewise addressed in the Confession. I'm still left with many questions that have not been satisfactorily answered. Hendryx, whom I quoted earlier, says:

"Likewise, nowhere in the Bible did God call us to work out the details of this doctrine by philosophical means, or pry into the secret things of God. Rather He calls us to be faithful to the Text that says God ordains all things, even evil, and that, at the same time, God is blameless in doing so. That He ordains sin sinlessly. I do not have to hold these truths together rationally (according to human knowledge) or philosophically but because they are axiomatic in the Bible. My understanding the intricacies of how this comes about is secondary. God is God. DO our finite minds have to understand HOW He does this in order for it to be true?"

While I'll concede that many aspects of God's purposes are not immediately understandable and rightly can be described as "incomprehensible," to retreat into the "mystery corner" is a hackneyed and unsatisfying way to evade the tough questions.

Reliability of the Bible and the DSS

We've had recent comments about the reliability of biblical translations in light of the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) or Septuagint Version (LXX). I guess that some perceive a possible conflict between the Masoretic Text, the LXX and the DSS.

I consulted Geza Vermes translation of the DSS (introductory notes) and he appears to downplay any potential difficulty that might exist for how we read Scripture juxtaposed with the DSS or LXX. Another article that touches upon this issue is found at http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-topics/bible-versions-and-translations/the-original-bible-and-the-dead-sea-scrolls/

The example adduced by Tov from 1 Samuel 1:24 provides an interesting case study.

Saint Jerome on the Bible Canon

"Therefore as the church indeed reads Judith, Tobit and the books of Maccabees, but does not receive them among the canonical books, so let it also read these two volumes [Sirach and Parables] for the edification of the people but not for establishing the authority of ecclesiastical dogma" (Prologue to the books of Wisdom).

My Review of Peter van Inwagen's Book "The Problem of Evil"

The so-called logical problem of evil suggests that there's a marked inconsistency between the statement "Almighty God exists" and the utterance "evil exists." For if God is almighty and omnibenevolent, then why does evil obtain? This problem was raised long ago by the Greek philosopher Epicurus and the ancient Gnostics.

Notre Dame University Professor, Peter van Inwagen, offers a useful contribution to the growing literature about the logical problem of evil. His book is a solid collection of eight Gifford lectures delivered at the University of St Andrews in May 2003. The prose contained in the work is often impressive, the reasoning is starkly lucid and van Inwagen's philosophical arguments generally are compelling. Hence, these lectures carefully analyze "evil" in order to remove manifold confusions that surround the concept. There are contexts in which "evil" denotes "moral depravity" but other contexts where the denotation is possibly "the absence of good." Defining evil is an arduous task, but the clarification of ideas should precede genuine philosophical analysis.

Before showing the deficiencies evidently associated with the logical problem of evil, van Inwagen posits his idea of God. He reasons that there are certain attributes which God should possess in order to be the maximally excellent entity, that than which a greater cannot be conceived (according to Anselm of Canterbury). These divine qualities include omniscience, moral perfection and omnipotence. The reader is subsequently treated to a definition and insightful analysis of the expression "philosophical failure." What is philosophical failure? How does this notion affect the argument from evil? Those perusing the book have such questions answered. Additionally, they find new distinctions regarding evil (for example, local versus global evil).

In the final analysis, I believe that van Inwagen demonstrates how the argument from evil fails. He establishes (with a certain degree of plausibility) that one cannot rightly argue from evil to the non-existence of God. There are other ways to account for the permission of divinely-preventable evil. To this end, the book addresses animal suffering, predatory activities among beasts and the so-called hiddenness of God. The author wisely frames a number of his arguments in dialogical form by creating two characters known as Theist and Atheist, who argue about the logical problem of evil in front of an imaginary neutral crowd. The dialogue is interesting, to a point, although I believe that van Inwagen tries to be too clever at times.

This philosophical treatise is written for those who have some familiarity with the common vocabulary of metaphysics, the philosophy of religion, and systematic theology. Moreover, I would not call the arguments here conclusive, in any sense of the word, but the read is generally enjoyable and illuminating.

Commentator Joseph Alexander on Acts 2:23

See http://archive.org/stream/actsapostles00alexgoog#page/n102/mode/1up

Very incisive remarks.

Is It Reasonable to Believe That God Brings All Things to Pass?

If God has foreordained every event or action, then he not only causes evil through evil men like Hitler or Judas--but he also causes "evil" (along with good) through every human who has ever lived. According to this line of reasoning, God evidently brings it to pass that fetuses are aborted through humans. It also seems that God caused evil through humans when the ancient Israelites offered their innocent babies in the fire to the false god Molech. Yet, YHWH explicitly stated that he never commanded such actions, nor did these kinds of sacrifices ever come up into his heart (Jer 7:31; 32:35). In fact, God called such sacrifices an "abomination." I also judge (condemn) similar actions and I would never think that God moved someone to offer his/her child in sacrifice, nor would a righteous and good deity move one man to rape another man's wife. "There is no darkness" in God (1 John 1:5).

Westminster Confession As It Pertains to Foreordination

Some people believe that God foreordains all that comes to pass--including the ungodly acts of those not serving him. The Westminster Confession of Faith (III.1) states:

"God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

So God evidently foreordained the Edenic Fall and he ordained (eternally) the violent death of his Son and so many other historical atrocities. Yet God is not the Author of sin. How does this kind of reasoning logically work? I also wonder how this view comports with scripture.

Two points for now:

1) Why foreordain the Fall, yet warn Adam and Eve what would happen if they disobeyed and took fruit from the tree in the middle of the garden? Why sentence them to death if they were simply doing what had been foreordained? What would you think about me giving an assignment to my students, and telling them there would be a penalty for failure to do it, but then make the assignment undoable by dint of its design? I would probably not win professor of the year for such a move. And I can't help but wonder how God's name would be magnified by the foreordination of evil.

2) James 1:13-17 seems to contradict the Westminster Confession. God does not tempt (try) us with evil. He is perfect, just and good in all his ways. God did not foreordain the treacherous act of Judas Iscariot; nor did he bring to pass chattel slavery or the Holocaust. Each one is tried or enticed by his own sinful desire. As for the Edenic Fall, it occurred because of two humans who chose to misuse the free will granted them by our God and sovereign. He did not bring that event to pass.

Why Are Some Utterances of Paul "Hard to Understand"?

Paul's letters can often be difficult to understand (in Greek or English). The apostle was a profound thinker, a point that I think is borne out by looking at the illustrations he uses (1 Corinthians 15:35-49). Granted, he was writing under inspiration and by means of the wisdom that God gave him (2 Peter 3:15); nevertheless, the Bible allows human personalities and abilities to shine through the text too (1 Corinthians 7:12, 39-40).

But it is not always easy to follow Paul's involved line of reasoning (Romans 9:15-33; Gal 3:1-20). Why is he hard to understand at times (2 Pet 3:15-16)?

A.T. Robertson makes this observation:

"The style of Paul, like his theology, has challenged the attention of the greatest minds. Farrar calls his language 'the style of genius, if not the genius of style.' There is no doubt about its individuality" (A Grammar of the Greek NT, p. 128).

Robertson also mentions K.L. Bauer, who compares Paul's writings to the treatises written by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. And here is what one scholar (John H. Finley, Jr.) has to say about the historiographical style of Thucydides:

"At farthest remove from the nascent [earliest Greek] prose is the co-called periodic style of Plato, Isocrates and the writers of the fourth century generally. By studious subordination of minor points to the major idea of a sentence, it achieves impressive organic unity but commonly at the cost of sapping the vitality of subordinate ideas. This is the style, which, adopted from Isocrates by Cicero, passed from him into the English cadences of Gibbon and Burke. Thucydides' prose stands somewhere between these two, the simple and periodic, styles. His chief devices are antithesis, comparison and contrast. Within any given sentence, clause will be paired with clause, subject with subject, verb with verb. This elaborately antithetical method is more characteristic, to be sure, of the speeches than of the common narrative" (The Peloponnesian War, page x in the introduction).

With the foregoing in mind, read (in Greek) Ephesians 1:3-14; Rom 1:24-28; 5:12-21; Galatians 5:19-21.

In addition to these points, it is important to remember that Paul employs numerous literary or rhetorical devices. His letters have even been compared to apologetico-rhetorical treatises of antiquity, although there may be some legitimate differences between the Pauline letters and epistles penned in the ancient world.

Timothy George (see his commentary concerning Galatians) makes an interesting point regarding the Pauline letters when he points out that H.D. Betz outlines Galatians as follows:

Exordium: Gal 1:6-11

Narratio: Gal 1:12-2:!4

Propositio: Gal 2:15-21

Probatio: Gal 3:1-4:31

Paraenesis: Gal 5:1-6:10

Postscript: Gal 6:11-18.

While George believes this analysis has some advantages, he thinks "Betz seems to have gone too far in pressing Galatians into the rhetorical structure of apologetic letters" (Galatians, page 64).

This caveat should be duly noted, but I also concur with Betz in some respects. I have worked with a number of Latin and Greek apologetico-rhetorical treatises (Tertullian, Lactantius, Cyprian, Tatian, Quintillian) as well as literary devices/tropes in general. The Apostle Paul is a master rhetor, as far as I can tell, even if he appears to speak of rhetoric in pejorative terms at times and possibly did not have formal training.

Robert Alter Offers Commentary on Genesis 7:11

Albert Barnes on Acts 19:9

Acts 19:9 casts doubt on the notion that all first century congregations/churches were house ecclesiae. Here are Barnes' remarks on the verse:

"In the school of one Tyrannus. Who this Tyrannus was, is not known. It is probable that he was a Jew, who was engaged in this employment, and who might not be unfavourable to Christians. In his school, or in the room which he occupied for teaching, Paul instructed the people when he was driven from the synagogue. Christians at that time had no churches, and they were obliged to assemble in any place where it might be convenient to conduct public worship" (Barnes NT Notes).

Theologian Kevin J. Vanhoozer Explains How Mental States Possibly Arise

From the book Is There a Meaning in This Text?, page 249):

"A cell is a complex phenomenon that emerges out of small infrastructures (molecules and atoms) and demands its own science (biochemistry). Similarly, mental properties depend on a biological infrastructure, yet they are irreducible to that substratum. Mental states, that is, 'supervene' on physical states. This way of conceiving mind has the advantage of being the most adequate scientific explanation of consciousness and of conforming to a Christian understanding of human beings as created in the divine image. Both mind and meaning, the self and the sentence, are higher level phenomena--new beings, as it were--that are discontinuous, at least in some respects, with the lower forms from which they emerge."

Do Jehovah's Witnesses Claim To Be Inspired?

Some critics of Jehovah's Witnesses claim that our organization thinks of itself as "inspired by God." However, the truth is that while we consider ourselves to be guided, led or directed by the holy spirit--no claim to inspiration has been made. In fact, the very opposite is true. We know that the Bible provides no warrant for calling spirit-anointed Christians QEOPNEUSTOS.

I am not denying that God has appointed men to take the lead in the Christian congregation or that Jehovah ministers in different ways via His spirit. But such operations of the spirit are not examples of inspiration (in the biblical sense of that word).

Charles Ryrie talks about the doctrine of illumination in his work on theology. He observes:

"The illumination theory of inspiration regards inspiration as an intensifying and elevating of the perceptions of the biblical writers. But generally the concept of illumination relates to the ministry of the Holy Spirit helping the believer to understand the truth of the Bible" (Ryrie, Basic Theology, 116).

Ryrie, therefore, makes a distinction between illumination of the believer and inspiration of the Bible writers. We're making a similar distinction when WT literature says that the "faithful and discreet slave" is guided by God's spirit--illuminated if you will--but that class is not and does not claim to be QEOPNEUSTOS (1 Cor 2:9-10).

Questions for Thomists Regarding Immaterial Intellects

I wrote the following to a colleague who teaches in my university's psychology department. I have retained the substance of my written correspondence to him:

Thomists argue that we need immaterial intellects to apprehend abstract universals. But how do we know that physical organs are only capable of apprehending concrete particulars? What incontrovertible proof do we have that intellects (of the Thomistic caliber) even exist? I admit that an intellect qua a power of the soul is logically possible (i.e. not self-contradictory). However, I am not convinced that such a faculty is factually possible (i.e. that it actually exists). So I guess my first line of attack would be to question the existence of the non-material intellect. Secondly, I would argue that what has been called "intellect" is really nothing more than a higher-order process of the brain: intellection is a biological phenomenon (see the work done by John Searle). The brain consequently makes it possible for us to have the facility for grasping what appear to be universals. So-called universals may be nothing more than generalizations of concrete experience or linguistic constructs of the mind.

I would add that the word "soul" in Aristotle's writings (upon which Thomistic hylomorphic thought is built) is amenable to a physicalist interpretation.

[END OF DIALOGUE]

Addendum: I want to make it clear that my comments pertain to human intellection, not divine (God or angels). It is my belief that human intellection only exists because of brain activity--not due to some immaterial intellect. We may not understand how the brain produces intellection, but evidence continues to lean in that direction.

I also have no problem using the term "mind." Mind would not exist if there were not physical (neurobiological) processes that obtained.

John Gill's Remarks on Ecclesiastes 9:5

"but the dead know not anything; this is not to be understood of their separate spirits, and of the things of the other world; for the righteous dead know much, their knowledge is greatly increased; they know, as they are known; they know much of God in Christ, of his perfections, purposes, covenant, grace, and love; they know much of Christ, of his person, offices, and glory, and see him as he is; they know much of the Gospel, and the mysteries of it; and of angels, and the spirits of just men, they now converse with; and of the glories and happiness of the heavenly state; even they know abundantly more than they did in this life: and the wicked dead, in their separate spirits, know there is a God that judgeth; that their souls are immortal; that there is a future state; indeed they know and feel the torments of hell, the worm that never dies, and the fire that is not quenched: but this is to be interpreted of their bodily senses now extinct, and of worldly things they have now nothing to do with; they know not any thing that is done in this world, nor how it fares with their children and friends they have left behind them; see Job 14:21; nor therefore are they to be prayed unto, and used as mediators with God."

I want to make a reply that addresses some of Gill's comments, in another post.

Colossians 1:22-23: A Discussion on Eternal Security

Colossians 1:22 discusses how God (see Col 1:19-20) has (already) effected reconciliation (νυνὶ δὲ ἀποκατήλλαξεν) for those who were once His enemies, through the precious blood that Jesus shed on his stauros. This act of love is why the apostle writes that God the Father has reconciled His former adversaries ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου; that is, through the death of Jesus Christ. Such a sin-offering has been provided lovingly in order that God's people might come before the Divine One without any blemishes, spots or accusations that would lamentably besmirch the beauteous name of Almighty God Jehovah (παραστῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ).

Paul then writes, more controversially, that enjoying an unblemished state through Christ's shed blood (i.e. his death) is only possible εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἑδραῖοι καὶ μὴ μετακινούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε (Colossians 1:23).

Prima facie this passage appears to teach us that "eternal security" could be a fictive theological construct that is not to be found in Scripture. Paul's inspired words seem to imply that a Christian must remain in the faith while adhering to the hope of the Gospel that was preached ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν so that he/she might be saved in a definitive sense. This verse thus appears to militate against any notion of eternal security; hence, at this point, it would be beneficial to see what some first-rate commentaries have observed about the conditional structure of this textual unit.

Peter O'Brien observes that Colossians 1:23 is a lengthy conditional sentence containing both positive and negative elements (O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69). He maintains that εἴ γε "does not express doubt" (Ibid); rather, he believes that the apostle is really saying, in so many words, "At any rate if you stand firm in the faith--and I am sure you will . . . " He takes this position in view of Colossians 2:5 (Ibid).

O'Brien however goes on to write that "If it is true that the saints will persevere to the end, then it is equally true that the saints must persevere to the end' (Ibid). He then attempts to show how Colossians constitutes an exhortatory message, which strengthens the "saints" to avoid lapsing into a state of smug complacency. O'Brien therefore does not believe that Colossians 1:22-23 fazes the doctrine of eternal security at all. When interviewed about this subject, he provided this response:

"The warnings of Hebrews [6:4-8; 10:26-39, etc.] have presented many challenges to believers throughout Christian history. And the misapplication of them has caused pastoral problems for Christians of all traditions, including the Reformed. These warnings have troubled earnest Christians by raising doubts about their assurance of salvation, an assurance that is so clearly affirmed, for example, in Romans 5:1-11 and Romans 8:18-39, and in Jesus's promises for his disciples in John 6:39-40, 44 and John 10:25-30."

See http://thegospelcoalition.org/article/warning-passages-ahead/

James Dunn, on the other hand, provides this commentary:

"εἴ γε may denote confidence more than doubt (cf. its use in 2 Cor. 5:3; Eph. 3:2; 4:21), but final acceptance is nevertheless dependent on remaining in the faith. The parenetic and pastoral point is that however such persistence must be and is enabled by God through the Spirit (1:11), there must be such persistence (cf. O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69)' (Dunn, Colossians, Philemon 110).

Dunn (in ftn 8, page 110) then quotes R.W. Wall as follows:

"Paul does not teach a 'once saved, always saved' kind of religion; nor does he understand faith as a 'once for all decision for Christ.'"

You can find Wall's remarks in full by consulting his commentary, Colossians and Philemon (The IVP NT Commentary; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), page 81.

I believe that Wall's understanding of Colossians 1:23 is closer to what Paul wanted to say with his use of εἴ γε, KTL.

Sheol and Hades

The Greek hADHS is synonymous with the Hebrew SHEOL. If we really want to understand what the NT says about hell, we must consider what the OT teaches about SHEOL. According to the holy writings that have been recorded primarily in Hebrew, SHEOL is a "place" of inactivity where all dead persons go; it is gravedom (Ecclesiastes 9:10).

Job 3 indicates that SHEOL is a place for both the wicked and the righteous to "sleep." In the midst of bemoaning his pitiable earthly existence, Job lamented that he had not perished after coming forth from his mother's womb--saying: "For by now I should have lain down that I might be undisturbed; I should have slept then; I should be at rest . . . There the wicked themselves have ceased from agitation, and those weary in power are at rest" (Job 3:13-20). Additionally, Job also depicts SHEOL as "the land of darkness and deep shadow" and as "the land of obscurity like gloom, of deep shadow and disorder, where it beams no more than gloom does" (Job 10:21, 22).

It's of interest how the signifier hADHS is used in Revelation too. In Rev. 6:8, John sees a pale horse with a rider that has hADHS closely following him. Later in the same book, the sea, death and hADHS are said to give up the dead in them (KAI EDWKEN hH QALASSA TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTHi KAI QANATOS KAI hO hADHS EDWKAN TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTOIS); then the dead are judged according to their deeds and death along with hADHS is subsequently hurled into the lake of fire which signifies the "second death" (Rev. 20:13-15). John then reports that "death is no more" (since it was hurled into the lake of fire). See Rev. 21:3-4.

"there shall be no more death] More exactly, death shall be no more, having been destroyed in the Lake of Fire, Revelation 20:14 : not that the personification is put forward here" (W.H. Simcox, Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges).

Based on the aforesaid information, I conclude that hADHS is identical to the Hebrew SHEOL (Cf. Ps. 16:10 and Acts 2:27ff). hADHS being thrown into the lake of fire evidently means that it is no more just as death is no more after being cast in the famed "lake." The lake of fire appears to symbolize eternal destruction (annihilation) and not eternal torment.

Dialogue on Genesis 1:1ff

My interlocutor writes:

The figure of speech used in Gen. 1:1 in the phrase "the heavens and the earth" is called synecdoche, in which the whole is evoked by the naming of the part. "The earth" includes the earth itself, and all forms of life which live upon it. It includes the dry land and the sea, mankind plants and animals, etc. "The heavens" also encompasses all this domain contains. Since the Hebrew for "created" (BARA) is a verb in the qal form with perfective aspect, it seems unlikely that this statement refers only to the beginning of creation.

MY RESPONSE:

The figure of speech in Gen. 1:1 may indeed be an example of synecdoche since these two signifiers occur so often in tandem. This fact does not mean that the "heavens" of Gen. 1:1 have anything to do with the spirit realm. The heavens and the earth of Gen. 1:1 could just as well be a way of referring to the entire material order (the realm that is governed by space, time and efficient causality). The term "heavens" is apparently used this way in Ex. 20:4 and the formula "heaven and earth" in Gen. 14:22 evidently has reference to the physical universe that Jehovah produced.

As for BARA speaking about the beginning of creation, Gordon J. Wenham writes (Word Commentary on Genesis): "it looks as though [Gen. 1:2, 3] were composed by the writer responsible for v 1, and not simply borrowed from a pre-biblical source. This makes it most natural to interpret the text synchronically, i.e., v 1: first creative act; v 2: consequence of v 1; v 3: first creative word" (p. 13).

Later, he notes: "It is therefore quite feasible for a mention of an initial act of creation of the whole universe (v 1) to be followed by an account of the ordering of different parts of the universe" (Wenham 15).

With all of this in mind, I am not insisting that Gen. 1:1 simply dwells on the "beginning" and does not teach us that God finished his creative work vis-a'-vis the heavens and the earth. As you mentioned, the Qal perfect verbal stem is employed and that indicates that the writer of Genesis is depicting simple, perfective action--which means that both the inception of the creative act and its TELOS (its end) is in view. That doesn't mean, however, that the earth did not need to be prepared for habitation as recorded in 1:2. ERES in Gen. 1:1 does not seem to mean the "productive land and all that dwells therein." If we construe the verse synchronically, as Wenham and other interpreters are wont to do, then Gen. 1:2 is manifestly relating God's preparation of the already created earth.

Quotes About Hell (Some Catholic Sources)

"The punishment of original sin is the deprivation of the sight of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent III).

"according as their works were good or bad, either perpetual punishment with the devil or eternal glory with Christ" (The Fourth General Lateran Council 1215).

"But whoever dies in mortal sin without penance will without any doubt suffer for ever in the fires of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent IV's Letter to the Bishop of Tusculum 1254).

Quotes Taken from "The Teaching of the Catholic Church" (Edited by Karl Rahner, S.J.).

Resurrection Beliefs in Second Temple Judaism

James Efird reports that a diversity of opinions concerning the resurrection existed within Second Temple Judaism. Some put credence in the notion that the resurrection from the dead would consist of the old body being conjoined with the human spirit; others believed in soul sleep, whereas yet others accepted Greek concepts of immortality. Efird maintains: "No one set of ideas really held the day, but most people seem to have believed in some form of resurrection. Whether it was physical or spiritual, future or present, to be accomplished in this historical continuum or in a supra-historical sphere--none of these was really the theory. Each theory has its own advocates and in some instances the ideas were rearranged in such ways as to present 'new' hypotheses" (The New Testament Writings: History, Literature, Interpretation, page 18. Emphasis in the text).

Moreover, Efird notes that some believed a new physical body would be raised whereas others contended that a non-material body would be resurrected from the dead. On a related note, John J. Collins cites 1 Enoch to support his position about "resurrection of the spirit." He argues that 1 Enoch 104ff uses astral imagery to describe the resurrection of the just: they will be like angels "and associates of the host of heaven." Based on such passages, Collins observes: "Here again, we are dealing with resurrection, not an unbroken state of immortality. But there is no mention of bodily resurrection or of return to life on earth. What is envisaged is the resurrection of the NEPES or spirit and its transformation to an angelic state" (Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, page 113). Collins also invokes Jubilees 23 as part of the testimony concerning ancient resurrection beliefs in Judaism. From Jubilees 23:30ff, he makes this point clear: "Here again we have a notion of resurrection that is neither immortality of the soul, in the Greek sense, nor resurrection of the physical body" (ibid).

How much clearer could Collins be when he states, "But it is by no means the case that Jews always thought of resurrection in bodily terms" (ibid)? He insists that what Daniel and Enoch say about the resurrection could best be described as "resurrection of the spirit" as opposed to resurrection of the body.

Jeffrey Asher further makes a case for understanding Paul's language in 1 Corinthians 15 about a "spiritual body" as a corpus informed by pneumatic stuff, based on ancient denotations of the Greek term pneuma and notable philosophical concepts at the time. See Asher's published work Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

1 Corinthians 15:36 and Resurrection from Death

Paul specifically writes ἄφρων, σὺ ὃ σπείρεις οὐ ζωοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ in 1 Cor 15:36, using language reminiscent of Jesus (John 12:24). He is particularly elucidating the concept of "the resurrection of the dead" in 1 Cor 15:42. So how fitting that Paul brings up the "death" of one seed which opens the way for a disparate "body" to materialize: one that is starkly different from the body which was initially planted (1 Cor 15:36-38).

Raymond B. Brown (Broadman Bible Commentary on Acts and 1 Corinthians) writes:

"The body that is buried is not the same body that is
raised because a transformation takes place. Paul sets
forth four antitheses to show the difference between
the body that dies and the body that is raised from
the dead" (page 391).

"So there is continuity between what dies and what is
raised because it is the same person who is buried and
raised. But there is discontinuity in the sense that
the same physical body will not be raised. The same
person will be raised in a new spiritual body [which
Brown evidently does not define as a 'soul']. Paul does not
describe the body but lives in faith that God will
give the body its appropriate form for life in his
presence" (page 392).

But consult the entirety of Brown's comments on 1 Cor 15:36ff.