Here's a project I've been working on for months. I've tried to catalog all the uses of the word or concept "power" in Revelation, then I want to offer commentary on each verse from the aspect of how it contributes to the motif "power." I don't know if I'll ever finish this project, but it's been fun so far. Lots of editing remains.
A Commentary on the Concept of Power in Revelation (Apocalypse) of John
Rev 2:26--And he that overcometh, and keepeth my works unto the end, to him will I give power (ἐξουσίαν) over the nations:
Rev 4:11--Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power (δύναμιν): for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.
Rev 5:12--Saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power (τὴν δύναμιν), and riches, and wisdom, and strength (ἰσχὺν), and honour, and glory, and blessing.
Rev 5:13--And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power (τὸ κράτος), [be] unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever.
Rev 6:4--And there went out another horse [that was] red: and [power] was given to him (ἐδόθη αὐτῷ) that sat thereon to take peace from the earth, and that they should kill one another: and there was given unto him a great sword.
Rev 6:8--And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them (καὶ ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς ἐξουσία) over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth.
Rev 7:12--Saying, Amen: Blessing, and glory, and wisdom, and thanksgiving, and honour, and power, and might (ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς), [be] unto our God for ever and ever. Amen.
Rev 9:3--And there came out of the smoke locusts upon the earth: and unto them was given power, as the scorpions of the earth have power (καὶ ἐδόθη αὐταῖς ἐξουσία ὡς ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίαν οἱ σκορπίοι τῆς γῆς).
Rev 9:10--And they had tails like unto scorpions, and there were stings in their tails: and their power [was] to hurt men five months (καὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐραῖς αὐτῶν ἡ ἐξουσία αὐτῶν ἀδικῆσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μῆνας πέντε).
Rev 9:19--For their power is in their mouth, and in their tails (ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία τῶν ἵππων ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐραῖς αὐτῶν): for their tails [were] like unto serpents, and had heads, and with them they do hurt.
Rev 11:3--And I will give [power] unto my two witnesses, and they shall prophesy a thousand two hundred [and] threescore days, clothed in sackcloth. [The word "power" should be omitted in this verse]
Rev 11:6--These have power (ἔχουσιν τὴν ἐξουσίαν) to shut heaven, that it rain not in the days of their prophecy: and have power over waters (καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑδάτων) to turn them to blood, and to smite the earth with all plagues, as often as they will.
Rev 11:17--Saying, We give thee thanks, O Lord God Almighty, which art, and wast, and art to come; because thou hast taken to thee thy great power, and hast reigned (ὅτι εἴληφας τὴν δύναμίν σου τὴν μεγάλην καὶ ἐβασίλευσας).
Rev 12:10--And I heard a loud voice saying in heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ (ἡ σωτηρία καὶ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ): for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them before our God day and night.
Rev 13:2--And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as [the feet] of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion: and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority.
Rev 13:4--And they worshipped the dragon which gave power unto the beast: and they worshipped the beast, saying, Who [is] like unto the beast? who is able to make war with him?
Rev 13:5--And there was given unto him a mouth speaking great things and blasphemies; and power was given unto him to continue forty [and] two months.
Rev 13:7--And it was given unto him to make war with the saints, and to overcome them: and power was given him over all kindreds, and tongues, and nations.
Rev 13:12--And he exerciseth all the power of the first beast before him, and causeth the earth and them which dwell therein to worship the first beast, whose deadly wound was healed.
Rev 13:14--And deceiveth them that dwell on the earth by [the means of] those miracles which he had power to do in the sight of the beast; saying to them that dwell on the earth, that they should make an image to the beast, which had the wound by a sword, and did live.
Rev 13:15--And he had power to give life unto the image of the beast, that the image of the beast should both speak, and cause that as many as would not worship the image of the beast should be killed.
Rev 14:18--And another angel came out from the altar, which had power over fire; and cried with a loud cry to him that had the sharp sickle, saying, Thrust in thy sharp sickle, and gather the clusters of the vine of the earth; for her grapes are fully ripe.
Rev 15:8--And the temple was filled with smoke from the glory of God, and from his power; and no man was able to enter into the temple, till the seven plagues of the seven angels were fulfilled.
Rev 16:8--And the fourth angel poured out his vial upon the sun; and power was given unto him to scorch men with fire.
Rev 16:9--And men were scorched with great heat, and blasphemed the name of God, which hath power over these plagues: and they repented not to give him glory.
Rev 17:12--And the ten horns which thou sawest are ten kings, which have received no kingdom as yet; but receive power as kings one hour with the beast.
Rev 17:13--These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast.
Rev. 18:1--And after these things I saw another angel come down from heaven, having great power; and the earth was lightened with his glory.
Rev. 19:1--And after these things I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, Alleluia; Salvation, and glory, and honour, and power, unto the Lord our God:
See Rev. 19:6-7
Rev. 20:6--Blessed and holy [is] he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power, but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years.
Saturday, January 30, 2016
Friday, January 29, 2016
J. A. T. Robinson and John 1:1c
In the words of J.A.T Robinson:
"The New Testament says that Jesus was the Word of God, it says that God was in Christ, it says that Jesus is the Son of God, but it does not say that Jesus was God, simply like that" (Honest to God, page 70).
Paul Tillich has also observed that the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation can be regarded as "inadequate" since:
"'nature' in the Greek sense implies a static essence. Two such essences cannot be joined together to create one whole person" (See Daniel Day Williams' What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking, page 133).
"The New Testament says that Jesus was the Word of God, it says that God was in Christ, it says that Jesus is the Son of God, but it does not say that Jesus was God, simply like that" (Honest to God, page 70).
Paul Tillich has also observed that the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation can be regarded as "inadequate" since:
"'nature' in the Greek sense implies a static essence. Two such essences cannot be joined together to create one whole person" (See Daniel Day Williams' What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking, page 133).
An Argument That Sheds Light on Identity and the Trinity
1) X and Y are the same object, if X has every property that Y has, and Y has every property that X has.
2) Christ has a metaphysical property that his Father does not have (his humanity).
3) Christ's Father has a metaphysical property that his Son does not have (the Father is innascible).
4) Therefore, Christ is not the same object (i.e., person) as his Father.
The argument is presented from the perspective of a Trinitarian. The doctrine of the Trinity claims that Christ and his Father are the same God, but they are not hypostatically identical, that is, Christ and his Father are not the same in a personal sense.
2) Christ has a metaphysical property that his Father does not have (his humanity).
3) Christ's Father has a metaphysical property that his Son does not have (the Father is innascible).
4) Therefore, Christ is not the same object (i.e., person) as his Father.
The argument is presented from the perspective of a Trinitarian. The doctrine of the Trinity claims that Christ and his Father are the same God, but they are not hypostatically identical, that is, Christ and his Father are not the same in a personal sense.
Thursday, January 28, 2016
John 20:28 (Johannine Exegesis of God)
I've read part of this book, but not all of it. This post does not constitute an endorsement of the author's views, but I just find his approach to the issues somewhat different from other works I've read.
Robert Knopp, Christology, and Logical Consistency
How are we supposed to explain (rationally and Scripturally) three Persons who are self-existent in se? Do we not have three gods in this situation? Is it not contradictory to speak of tres personae una in substantia sui generis? Trinitarian scholar Robert Knopp demonstrates the problems with viewing the Godhead as three self-existent centers of consciousness. As we read the Biblical testimony, we must acknowledge that Jesus is said to be self-existent. Yet what is the ground of his self-existence? Is Jesus in his very being capable of functioning as his own Autopator? Does he need (logically or ontologically) a distinct Autopator to account for his aseity?
Knopp endeavors to handle these difficulties when exegeting John 5:26, where we are told that the Father has given the Son "self-existence" (Amplified Bible). He offers these remarks: "It is obviously contradictory to say that the Father gives the Son life in himself . . . How then can the Son have life in himself if he has been given it by the Father? John is trying to make human language do what it cannot do--express the infinite--and of course his human language breaks down in the attempt, as must all theological language that tries to express divine mystery" (Knopp 274).
It is obvious at this point that Knopp is trapped in a cognitive labyrinth from which he tries to extricate himself via linguistic acrobatics. Knopp is hard pressed to explain how Jesus can be God and be self-existent while looking to his Father to supply aseity. He appeals to the failure of language to adequately express John's thoughts. Such invocations--although possibly well-intentioned--are factually erroneous. Knopp therefore concludes: "[John] is saying that by generation the Son derives his life from the Father and that, nevertheless, this divinely generated life is
the very life of God, the very being of God, absolute equality with the Father" (Knopp 274). While seemingly, the writer has successfully delivered himself from the pit of contradiction, he has done nothing more than stay the inevitable. Furthermore, some trinitarians would take exception to Knopp's idea of divine generation.
For example, Spiros Zodhiates writes that there is no evidence in the Bible for such a phenomenon as divine begettal (Cf. Zodhiates' comments on Col. 1:15 in his word study). Leonard Hodgson also notes that such theological positing could be the result of pagan philosophy that has not "fully assimilated the Christian revelation." As noted by these scholars, the concept of derived divinity raises many seemingly insoluble problems. The problems associated with the divine generation concept have caused some theologians to contend that each individual Personage in the Godhead does not enjoy a se esse independently. Rather, the Godhead as a whole is self-existent. Therefore, the Father cannot exist without the Son (or the Holy Spirit) and the Son cannot exist without the Father (or the Holy Spirit), and the Holy Spirit cannot exist without the Father or the Son (because a se esse is a collective experience).
By resorting to this explanation, however, even more difficult questions are raised. How is it possible for a persona in the Godhead to enjoy deity in the fullest sense, yet not exemplify personal aseity? Where in the Bible is it ever intimated that the Father needs the Son or Holy Spirit to exist? Where are we ever told that the Holy Spirit is dependent upon the Son for existence? Truly, examining the issue of aseity in relation to the Trinity raises many dilemmas for those who propagate this confusing doctrine. In Eastern Orthodoxy, the idea of the Father being dependent upon the Son or the Holy Spirit has normally been viewed with repugnance. Orthodox theologians generally have viewed the Father as the pele [source], the arche [principle], and the aitia [cause] of the Godhead.
Knopp endeavors to handle these difficulties when exegeting John 5:26, where we are told that the Father has given the Son "self-existence" (Amplified Bible). He offers these remarks: "It is obviously contradictory to say that the Father gives the Son life in himself . . . How then can the Son have life in himself if he has been given it by the Father? John is trying to make human language do what it cannot do--express the infinite--and of course his human language breaks down in the attempt, as must all theological language that tries to express divine mystery" (Knopp 274).
It is obvious at this point that Knopp is trapped in a cognitive labyrinth from which he tries to extricate himself via linguistic acrobatics. Knopp is hard pressed to explain how Jesus can be God and be self-existent while looking to his Father to supply aseity. He appeals to the failure of language to adequately express John's thoughts. Such invocations--although possibly well-intentioned--are factually erroneous. Knopp therefore concludes: "[John] is saying that by generation the Son derives his life from the Father and that, nevertheless, this divinely generated life is
the very life of God, the very being of God, absolute equality with the Father" (Knopp 274). While seemingly, the writer has successfully delivered himself from the pit of contradiction, he has done nothing more than stay the inevitable. Furthermore, some trinitarians would take exception to Knopp's idea of divine generation.
For example, Spiros Zodhiates writes that there is no evidence in the Bible for such a phenomenon as divine begettal (Cf. Zodhiates' comments on Col. 1:15 in his word study). Leonard Hodgson also notes that such theological positing could be the result of pagan philosophy that has not "fully assimilated the Christian revelation." As noted by these scholars, the concept of derived divinity raises many seemingly insoluble problems. The problems associated with the divine generation concept have caused some theologians to contend that each individual Personage in the Godhead does not enjoy a se esse independently. Rather, the Godhead as a whole is self-existent. Therefore, the Father cannot exist without the Son (or the Holy Spirit) and the Son cannot exist without the Father (or the Holy Spirit), and the Holy Spirit cannot exist without the Father or the Son (because a se esse is a collective experience).
By resorting to this explanation, however, even more difficult questions are raised. How is it possible for a persona in the Godhead to enjoy deity in the fullest sense, yet not exemplify personal aseity? Where in the Bible is it ever intimated that the Father needs the Son or Holy Spirit to exist? Where are we ever told that the Holy Spirit is dependent upon the Son for existence? Truly, examining the issue of aseity in relation to the Trinity raises many dilemmas for those who propagate this confusing doctrine. In Eastern Orthodoxy, the idea of the Father being dependent upon the Son or the Holy Spirit has normally been viewed with repugnance. Orthodox theologians generally have viewed the Father as the pele [source], the arche [principle], and the aitia [cause] of the Godhead.
Wednesday, January 27, 2016
Jonah Notes (1:3, 5, 9-10, 15-17)
1. Most commentators I've read say that Jonah's flight might be explained by his words at Jonah 4:2. For instance:
"But Jonah rose up to flee.—The motive of the prophet's flight is given by himself (Jonah 4:2). He foresaw the repentance of the city, and the mercy which would be displayed towards it, and was either jealous of his prophetic reputation, or had a patriotic dislike of becoming a messenger of good to a heathen foe so formidable to his own country" (Ellicott's Commentary).
"He refused God's service, because, as he himself tells God afterward Jonah 4:2, he knew what it would end in, and he misliked it" (Barnes' Notes on the Bible).
NET Bible Notes for Jonah 1:3: "The narrator's description is also highly ironic, as the rest of the book shows. Jonah tries to sail to Tarshish, in the opposite direction from Nineveh, as if by doing that he could escape from the Lord, when the Lord is the one who knows all about Nineveh's wickedness and is involved in all that happens to Jonah throughout the book. Compare Jonah's explanation when talking with the Lord (see 4:2)."
2. In Constable's Notes for Jonah 1:10: "Before, the mariners had feared the storm, but now they feared the Lord,
recognizing the Creator above the creation."
3. Constable's Notes on 1:15-16: "The immediate cessation of the storm proved to the sailors that Yahweh really did control the sea (cf. Matt. 8:26). Therefore they 'feared' (respected) Him, 'offered a sacrifice' to Him (when they reached shore?), and 'made vows' (perhaps to venerate Him, cf. Ps. 116:17-18)."
4. "1: 5 afraid. The first of three references to the sailors' fear (see vv. 10, 16). While their fear of the storm intensifies in v. 10, by v. 16 their fear focuses on the one who initiated the storm. his own god. The sailors, possibly of different nationalities, apparently worshiped several different pagan gods. They later cry out to the Lord (v. 14). below deck. Descending yet again (see note on v. 3), Jonah is oblivious to the danger of the storm."
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210958-210962). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210956-210958). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
5. "1: 9 Hebrew. In foreign contexts often designates an Israelite (e.g., Gen 40: 15; Exod 1: 19). worship. Closely links to the Hebrew verb that reports the sailors' fear in vv. 5, 10, 16. Whereas their fear results in frantic action, Jonah's confession that he fears/ worships God rings hollow in the light of his disobedience. the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land. By emphasizing the Lord's authority over the whole creation, Jonah makes it very clear that his God is responsible for the storm."
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210969-210974). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
"But Jonah rose up to flee.—The motive of the prophet's flight is given by himself (Jonah 4:2). He foresaw the repentance of the city, and the mercy which would be displayed towards it, and was either jealous of his prophetic reputation, or had a patriotic dislike of becoming a messenger of good to a heathen foe so formidable to his own country" (Ellicott's Commentary).
"He refused God's service, because, as he himself tells God afterward Jonah 4:2, he knew what it would end in, and he misliked it" (Barnes' Notes on the Bible).
NET Bible Notes for Jonah 1:3: "The narrator's description is also highly ironic, as the rest of the book shows. Jonah tries to sail to Tarshish, in the opposite direction from Nineveh, as if by doing that he could escape from the Lord, when the Lord is the one who knows all about Nineveh's wickedness and is involved in all that happens to Jonah throughout the book. Compare Jonah's explanation when talking with the Lord (see 4:2)."
2. In Constable's Notes for Jonah 1:10: "Before, the mariners had feared the storm, but now they feared the Lord,
recognizing the Creator above the creation."
3. Constable's Notes on 1:15-16: "The immediate cessation of the storm proved to the sailors that Yahweh really did control the sea (cf. Matt. 8:26). Therefore they 'feared' (respected) Him, 'offered a sacrifice' to Him (when they reached shore?), and 'made vows' (perhaps to venerate Him, cf. Ps. 116:17-18)."
4. "1: 5 afraid. The first of three references to the sailors' fear (see vv. 10, 16). While their fear of the storm intensifies in v. 10, by v. 16 their fear focuses on the one who initiated the storm. his own god. The sailors, possibly of different nationalities, apparently worshiped several different pagan gods. They later cry out to the Lord (v. 14). below deck. Descending yet again (see note on v. 3), Jonah is oblivious to the danger of the storm."
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210958-210962). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210956-210958). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
5. "1: 9 Hebrew. In foreign contexts often designates an Israelite (e.g., Gen 40: 15; Exod 1: 19). worship. Closely links to the Hebrew verb that reports the sailors' fear in vv. 5, 10, 16. Whereas their fear results in frantic action, Jonah's confession that he fears/ worships God rings hollow in the light of his disobedience. the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land. By emphasizing the Lord's authority over the whole creation, Jonah makes it very clear that his God is responsible for the storm."
Zondervan (2015-08-25). NIV, Zondervan Study Bible, eBook: Built on the Truth of Scripture and Centered on the Gospel Message (Kindle Locations 210969-210974). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.
John Gill's Exposition of 1 Timothy 3:16 ("God was manifest in the flesh")
God was manifest in the flesh; not God essentially considered, or Deity in the abstract, but personally; and not the first nor the third Person; for of neither of them can this or the following things be said; but the second Person, the Word, or Son of God; see 1 John 3:8 who existed as a divine Person, and as a distinct one from the Father and Spirit, before his incarnation; and which is a proof of his true and proper deity: the Son of God in his divine nature is equally invisible as the Father, but became manifest by the assumption of human nature in a corporeal way, so as to be seen, heard, and felt: and by "flesh" is meant, not that part of the body only, which bears that name, nor the whole body only, but the whole human nature, consisting of a true body and a reasonable soul; so called, partly to denote the frailty of it, and to show that it was not a person, but a nature, Christ assumed; and the clause is added, not so much to distinguish this manifestation of Christ from a spiritual manifestation of him to his people, as in distinction from all other manifestations of him in the Old Testament, in an human form for a time, and in the cloud, both in the tabernacle and temple. This clause is a very apt and full interpretation of the word "Moriah", the name of the mount in which Jehovah would manifest himself, and be seen, Genesis 22:2.
Monday, January 25, 2016
Charles Gieschen, Ontology, and Angelomorphism
Gieschen believes that ontological concerns (questions concerning the being of Christ) have "inhibited" Angelomorphic studies undertaken in the past. He proposes that we should now ask another question in place of the ontological ones, namely, "Where and how did early Christians use the variegated angelomorphic traditions from the OT and other sources to express their Christology?" Consult Angelomorphic Christology, 349.
His new formulation of the Angelomorphic question is designed to show that Angelomorphic traditions significantly influenced early Christology qua high Christology. Gieschen further maintains that traditions portraying Christ as the visible manifestation of God's Son (the malak YHWH) paved the way for later Christological affirmations such as "Jesus is Lord" (1 Cor. 12:3) or YHWH. See ibid. 350.
While he tries to downplay questions concerning the being of Christ in his study, it is evident that Gieschen espouses a high Christology, linking the Son in his role as an angel with a/the visible manifestation of YHWH.
His new formulation of the Angelomorphic question is designed to show that Angelomorphic traditions significantly influenced early Christology qua high Christology. Gieschen further maintains that traditions portraying Christ as the visible manifestation of God's Son (the malak YHWH) paved the way for later Christological affirmations such as "Jesus is Lord" (1 Cor. 12:3) or YHWH. See ibid. 350.
While he tries to downplay questions concerning the being of Christ in his study, it is evident that Gieschen espouses a high Christology, linking the Son in his role as an angel with a/the visible manifestation of YHWH.
Sunday, January 24, 2016
Some Commentaries on Daniel 12:1 (Michael the Archangel)
I'm only going to quote parts of the commentaries that deal with the relationship between Michael and Jesus Christ. These works are available online and can be easily consulted:
From the Benson Commentary: "The word Michael signifies, Who is like God? which name, with the title here given him, The great prince which standeth for the children of thy people, manifestly points out the Messiah, and cannot properly be understood of a created angel."
Gill's Exposition of the Bible: "And at that time shall Michael stand up,.... The Archangel, who has all the angels of heaven under him, and at his command, the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ; who is as God, as the name signifies, truly and really God, and equal in nature, power, and glory, to his divine Father: 'he shall stand up'; which is not to be understood of his incarnation, or manifestation in the flesh, for this refers to times long after that; yet neither of his personal appearance in the clouds of heaven, and standing upon the earth in the latter day; but of his spiritual presence among his people, and protection of them, and continuance with them: this respects the spiritual reigns of Christ, the Lamb's standing upon Mount Zion, and the 144,000 with him, Revelation 14:1, and this will be at that time, when the eastern antichrist, the Turk, will be destroyed;"
John Trapp's Commentary: "Shall Michael stand up,] i.e., The Lord Christ (that Prince of angels, and protector of his people), not a created angel, much less Michael Servetus, that blasphemous heretic, burned at Geneva, who was not afraid to say, as Calvin reporteth it, se esse Michaelem illum, Ecclesae custodem, that he was that Michael, the Church's guardian. David George, also another black-mouthed heretic, said that he was the one David foretold by the prophets, [Jeremiah 30:9 Ezekiel 34:23 Hosea 3:5] and that he was confident that the whole world would in time submit to him."
Hawker's Poor Man's Commentary: "Here is a most lovely account of Jesus, and of his office-character, as Mediator. I do not hesitate to believe, that the Michael here spoken of is Christ. In confirmation, turn to those scriptures. Revelation 12:7-11. How Christ then stood up for all eternity: how in time, and how forever; all his offices typify. Proverbs 8:22-23; Psalms 40:6-8; Hebrews 7:24-25; 2 Thessalonians 1:10. In every point of view, it must be a time of trouble. When Christ comes to make up his jewels, he comes also to take vengeance of them that know not God, nor obey the gospel of Jesus. Malachi 4:1; 2 Peter 3:10-11. But what a sweet close is this verse, of the safety of Jesus own! Isaiah 4:3; Luke 10:20; Revelation 20:12-15."
Geneva Notes: The angel here notes two things: first that the Church will be in great affliction and trouble at Christ's coming, and next that God will send his angel to deliver it, whom he here calls Michael, meaning Christ, who is proclaimed by the preaching of the Gospel."
From the Benson Commentary: "The word Michael signifies, Who is like God? which name, with the title here given him, The great prince which standeth for the children of thy people, manifestly points out the Messiah, and cannot properly be understood of a created angel."
Gill's Exposition of the Bible: "And at that time shall Michael stand up,.... The Archangel, who has all the angels of heaven under him, and at his command, the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ; who is as God, as the name signifies, truly and really God, and equal in nature, power, and glory, to his divine Father: 'he shall stand up'; which is not to be understood of his incarnation, or manifestation in the flesh, for this refers to times long after that; yet neither of his personal appearance in the clouds of heaven, and standing upon the earth in the latter day; but of his spiritual presence among his people, and protection of them, and continuance with them: this respects the spiritual reigns of Christ, the Lamb's standing upon Mount Zion, and the 144,000 with him, Revelation 14:1, and this will be at that time, when the eastern antichrist, the Turk, will be destroyed;"
John Trapp's Commentary: "Shall Michael stand up,] i.e., The Lord Christ (that Prince of angels, and protector of his people), not a created angel, much less Michael Servetus, that blasphemous heretic, burned at Geneva, who was not afraid to say, as Calvin reporteth it, se esse Michaelem illum, Ecclesae custodem, that he was that Michael, the Church's guardian. David George, also another black-mouthed heretic, said that he was the one David foretold by the prophets, [Jeremiah 30:9 Ezekiel 34:23 Hosea 3:5] and that he was confident that the whole world would in time submit to him."
Hawker's Poor Man's Commentary: "Here is a most lovely account of Jesus, and of his office-character, as Mediator. I do not hesitate to believe, that the Michael here spoken of is Christ. In confirmation, turn to those scriptures. Revelation 12:7-11. How Christ then stood up for all eternity: how in time, and how forever; all his offices typify. Proverbs 8:22-23; Psalms 40:6-8; Hebrews 7:24-25; 2 Thessalonians 1:10. In every point of view, it must be a time of trouble. When Christ comes to make up his jewels, he comes also to take vengeance of them that know not God, nor obey the gospel of Jesus. Malachi 4:1; 2 Peter 3:10-11. But what a sweet close is this verse, of the safety of Jesus own! Isaiah 4:3; Luke 10:20; Revelation 20:12-15."
Geneva Notes: The angel here notes two things: first that the Church will be in great affliction and trouble at Christ's coming, and next that God will send his angel to deliver it, whom he here calls Michael, meaning Christ, who is proclaimed by the preaching of the Gospel."
Saturday, January 23, 2016
1 John 1:7 and Spiritual Cleansing
τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας. (1 John 1:7 WH)
S.M. Baugh asks whether this construction means "cleanses us from all sin" or "from every sin."
"'the death of Jesus his Son makes us clean from every sin' (or 'from all our guilt') 1 Jn 1:7" (Louw-Nida 88.310).
The OT formula is καθαρίσαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν ἔναντι Κυρίου, καὶ καθαρισθήσεσθε. (See Lev 16:30; compare Ps 18:14; 50:4).
BDAG indicates that the expression ἁμαρτίαν . . . ἔχομεν (1 Jn 1:8) refers to "a state of being sinful, sinfulness."
Conversely, in 1 John 1:9, τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν evidently pertains to "unrighteousness" (i.e., deviating from righteous human or divine standards).
S.M. Baugh asks whether this construction means "cleanses us from all sin" or "from every sin."
"'the death of Jesus his Son makes us clean from every sin' (or 'from all our guilt') 1 Jn 1:7" (Louw-Nida 88.310).
The OT formula is καθαρίσαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν ἔναντι Κυρίου, καὶ καθαρισθήσεσθε. (See Lev 16:30; compare Ps 18:14; 50:4).
BDAG indicates that the expression ἁμαρτίαν . . . ἔχομεν (1 Jn 1:8) refers to "a state of being sinful, sinfulness."
Conversely, in 1 John 1:9, τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν evidently pertains to "unrighteousness" (i.e., deviating from righteous human or divine standards).
Friday, January 22, 2016
How To Interpret Scripture Aright in the Eyes of Kevin Giles (Sean Killackey)
Sean, this post is from a larger informal review of the work by Giles that I undertook years ago. A discussion of The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downer's Grove: IVP, 2002):
Giles notes that Arius marshaled a significant number
of Bible texts to prove that the Son is a creature.
However, Athanasius thought Arius had egregiously
misrepresented the role of Christ in Holy Writ. He thus
accused Arius of selectively choosing and interpreting
scriptural texts to uphold beliefs Arius already
held dear, a phenomenon that psychologists commonly
label "confirmation bias." As Giles writes:
"Arius' methodology simply showed that given enough
time, a clever theologian could find texts and
interpretations to prove almost anything" (p. 3).
Athanasius, on the other hand, thought the proper
way to do theology was to first acquire a "profound
grasp" of the pattern of Scripture. That is, one must
comprehend the overall drift of the Bible or come to
understand its "theological center" (its focus or scope) before
proceeding with earnest biblical exegesis (Ibid.).
One who grasped the pattern, avers Athanasius,
would know the Son is eternally one in both
being and action with the Father. However, the Son
temporally subordinated himself to the Father when he
became a man for salvific reasons, that is, PRO NOBIS.
Nevertheless, Athanasius contended that the Son is by
no means subordinate to the Father vis-a-vis His eternal
relations to the Father and Holy Spirit: he is equal in all
respects to the Father and the Holy Spirit. At least, this
is what Athanasius gleaned from Scripture, as he understood it.
While Athanasius contended that those with eyes of
faith could discern the clear focus of Scripture and
what it teaches about the Son, he added that
biblical doctrine is "made plain" by what he
called "the teaching of the apostles and tradition of
the fathers" (p. 4). Tradition in this context simply
denotes teaching that was handed down from the
apostles through the fathers of the church. Tradition
(Athanasius maintained) proclaims that the Son of God is
eternally equal with regard to the "immanent Trinity"
but it teaches that the Son became subordinate, for a time,
per God's oikonomia. It was this theological premise that
informed Athanasius' reading of Scripture since he
believed that Scripture ought to be read through the
lens of church tradition. Without the aid of
traditio, one could not truly understand, interpret
or do theology aright.
The Concept of "Fear" in Jonah 1:3ff
The salience of the concept "fear" in Jonah 1 recently stood out to me:
The prophet Jonah possibly sought refuge in Tarshish because he morbidly feared the inhabitants of Nineveh (Jonah 1:3).
But then Jonah 1:5 (ESV) states: "Then the mariners were afraid, and each cried out to his god."
Afterwards, there is Jonah 1:9-10 (ESV): "And he said to them, 'I am a Hebrew, and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land.' Then the men were exceedingly afraid and said to him, 'What is this that you have done!' For the men knew that he was fleeing from the presence of the Lord, because he had told them."
"And they lift up Jonah, and cast him into the sea, and the sea ceaseth from its raging; and the men fear Jehovah — a great fear, and sacrifice a sacrifice to Jehovah, and vow vows" (Jonah 1:15-16 YLT).
A) Jonah presumably refused to accept his prophetic commission from Jehovah because he feared the Ninevites.
B) The mariners fear the tempest caused by Jehovah, but invoke their deities for deliverance.
C) Jonah discloses his reverential fear of Jehovah.
D) The mariners become "exceedingly afraid" (in a somewhat morbid sense) after Jonah reveals that he is a Hebrew, a worshiper of YHWH.
E) After the storm calms, the mariners now reverentially fear Jehovah, "a great fear," and offer sacrifices to Him--and they make solemn vows to the God of heaven.
Notes to follow later.
The prophet Jonah possibly sought refuge in Tarshish because he morbidly feared the inhabitants of Nineveh (Jonah 1:3).
But then Jonah 1:5 (ESV) states: "Then the mariners were afraid, and each cried out to his god."
Afterwards, there is Jonah 1:9-10 (ESV): "And he said to them, 'I am a Hebrew, and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land.' Then the men were exceedingly afraid and said to him, 'What is this that you have done!' For the men knew that he was fleeing from the presence of the Lord, because he had told them."
"And they lift up Jonah, and cast him into the sea, and the sea ceaseth from its raging; and the men fear Jehovah — a great fear, and sacrifice a sacrifice to Jehovah, and vow vows" (Jonah 1:15-16 YLT).
A) Jonah presumably refused to accept his prophetic commission from Jehovah because he feared the Ninevites.
B) The mariners fear the tempest caused by Jehovah, but invoke their deities for deliverance.
C) Jonah discloses his reverential fear of Jehovah.
D) The mariners become "exceedingly afraid" (in a somewhat morbid sense) after Jonah reveals that he is a Hebrew, a worshiper of YHWH.
E) After the storm calms, the mariners now reverentially fear Jehovah, "a great fear," and offer sacrifices to Him--and they make solemn vows to the God of heaven.
Notes to follow later.
Brief Comment on Divine Intraproduction
Reading an article on divine production recently moved me to think that God's production of the cosmos--a world peopled by finite creatures other than God--seems perfectly intelligible. We produce things that are non-human (and other than ourselves) all the time, although these productions share in our finitude. But the following propositions are harder to accept fully:
1) God the Father is innascible (unproduced or unborn and not capable of being produced or born).
2) God the Father is the timeless origin and ground of divinity for God the Son (i.e., God eternally produces the Son).
3) God the Son has all of the properties that God the Father "has" with the exception that God the Father is innascible and Father whereas God the Son is produced (eternally generated) and filial/begotten.
4) In Latin Church thinking, God the Father and God the Son produce God the Holy Spirit (i.e., the filioque).
5) The Spirit of God--"who" is also God--is neither innascible nor generated, but spirated by the Father and the Son.
6) Hence, three relations obtain in the triune Godhead: paternity, filiation, and spiration.
7) Thomas Aquinas explains that the Persons are the Relations.
It's still dificult for me to understand how one Person of the triune Godhead produces another. Aquinas and the article I just finished reading say divine production is a mystery that baffles the intellect: it can only be known via divine revelation since it transcends reason (they say).
Even some Trinitarian theologians have questioned divine production on both scriptural and logical grounds.
1) God the Father is innascible (unproduced or unborn and not capable of being produced or born).
2) God the Father is the timeless origin and ground of divinity for God the Son (i.e., God eternally produces the Son).
3) God the Son has all of the properties that God the Father "has" with the exception that God the Father is innascible and Father whereas God the Son is produced (eternally generated) and filial/begotten.
4) In Latin Church thinking, God the Father and God the Son produce God the Holy Spirit (i.e., the filioque).
5) The Spirit of God--"who" is also God--is neither innascible nor generated, but spirated by the Father and the Son.
6) Hence, three relations obtain in the triune Godhead: paternity, filiation, and spiration.
7) Thomas Aquinas explains that the Persons are the Relations.
It's still dificult for me to understand how one Person of the triune Godhead produces another. Aquinas and the article I just finished reading say divine production is a mystery that baffles the intellect: it can only be known via divine revelation since it transcends reason (they say).
Even some Trinitarian theologians have questioned divine production on both scriptural and logical grounds.
Delineation of Terms in Angelomorphic Discussions
Taken from my book on Tertullian and Angelomorphic Christology:
(1) Angel or angelic Christology is the theological concept that Martin Werner infamously maintained the early Christian congregation espoused. In Werner's estimation, the doctrine that teaches the Son is a creaturely spiritual essence who was produced in the same or similar fashion as other holy created spirit beings was a primordial Christian teaching:
"What has provided historians of doctrine for more than a century with an occasion for discussion has been the fact that Justin could conceive in one category the Logos-Son together with the 'host of the other good angels, of like being to him,' and that he set this angel-host, together with the Logos-Christ, before the (prophetic) Spirit."
Historians of dogma have not embraced Werner's reconstruction of the primitive or pre-Nicene doctrine of Christ's person and work. In fact, they have adamantly resisted his suggestion that angel Christology was the most ancient ecclesiastical formulation of the Son's person and work. Chapter one accordingly will discuss Werner's contribution to the study of Christ as an angel qua angel (whether in form or essence). It will then review modern-day assessments of his work.
(2) Angelomorphic Christology refers to the doctrine or complex of doctrines that contend Christ now and again assumes the form or external appearance of an angel during OT and NT angelophanies but he is not necessarily an angel according to His nature (i.e., substance). [Loren] Stuckenbruck notes that Christ is sometimes "made to appear among a series of angels." At other times, He evidently manifests Himself "as one who incorporates features frequently attributed to angels." The theological doctrine, "Angelomorphic Christology" aptly describes such manifestations, argues Stuckenbruck. This particular type of Christology is clearly phenomenologically-oriented. It attempts to provide a descriptive account of the Son's appearances in angelic settings (Rev 14:6-20) without pronouncing judgment on His seeming divinity ontos.
(3) Stuckenbruck prefers to employ the referring expression "angelophanic Christology" or Angelomorphic Christology over against using the terminology "angelic Christology." Both Christopher Rowland and Stuckenbruck advocate this terminological usage since they maintain that Christ is only an angel ostensibly in certain OT or NT angelophanies. He is not, they seem to aver, really a created supernatural spirit being, but the fully divine Son of God. Stuckenbruck limits the term "Angelomorphic Christology" to occasions when Christ either reveals Himself among a series of angels or provisionally incorporates the attributes of created heavenly beings without becoming an angel ontologically. He further avails himself of the expression "angel Christology" in order to speak of moments when the Scriptures identify Christ as an angel (ex officio) or possibly highlight His provisional angelic "nature." Moreover, Stuckenbruck appears to use “Angelomorphic” or “Angelophanic” somewhat synonymously (while preserving the respective shades of meaning for each adjective) as we will do throughout the course of this study. The difference between the two adnominals is that the former descriptive term emphasizes the form assumed or manifested by Christ while the latter adjectival expression underscores the act of manifestation (the appearance) simply and solely.
(4) A broader category that aptly describes what is often found in the documents of ancient and Second Temple Judaism as well as early Christian works is angelomorphism simpliciter. Angelomorphism refers to the phenomenon wherein exalted divine figures assume angelic or semi-divine forms. Such manifestations are not limited to the angelophanies of God's Son. Judaism speaks of such exalted figures as Adam, Abel, Enoch, Gabriel, Michael and Metatron.
(1) Angel or angelic Christology is the theological concept that Martin Werner infamously maintained the early Christian congregation espoused. In Werner's estimation, the doctrine that teaches the Son is a creaturely spiritual essence who was produced in the same or similar fashion as other holy created spirit beings was a primordial Christian teaching:
"What has provided historians of doctrine for more than a century with an occasion for discussion has been the fact that Justin could conceive in one category the Logos-Son together with the 'host of the other good angels, of like being to him,' and that he set this angel-host, together with the Logos-Christ, before the (prophetic) Spirit."
Historians of dogma have not embraced Werner's reconstruction of the primitive or pre-Nicene doctrine of Christ's person and work. In fact, they have adamantly resisted his suggestion that angel Christology was the most ancient ecclesiastical formulation of the Son's person and work. Chapter one accordingly will discuss Werner's contribution to the study of Christ as an angel qua angel (whether in form or essence). It will then review modern-day assessments of his work.
(2) Angelomorphic Christology refers to the doctrine or complex of doctrines that contend Christ now and again assumes the form or external appearance of an angel during OT and NT angelophanies but he is not necessarily an angel according to His nature (i.e., substance). [Loren] Stuckenbruck notes that Christ is sometimes "made to appear among a series of angels." At other times, He evidently manifests Himself "as one who incorporates features frequently attributed to angels." The theological doctrine, "Angelomorphic Christology" aptly describes such manifestations, argues Stuckenbruck. This particular type of Christology is clearly phenomenologically-oriented. It attempts to provide a descriptive account of the Son's appearances in angelic settings (Rev 14:6-20) without pronouncing judgment on His seeming divinity ontos.
(3) Stuckenbruck prefers to employ the referring expression "angelophanic Christology" or Angelomorphic Christology over against using the terminology "angelic Christology." Both Christopher Rowland and Stuckenbruck advocate this terminological usage since they maintain that Christ is only an angel ostensibly in certain OT or NT angelophanies. He is not, they seem to aver, really a created supernatural spirit being, but the fully divine Son of God. Stuckenbruck limits the term "Angelomorphic Christology" to occasions when Christ either reveals Himself among a series of angels or provisionally incorporates the attributes of created heavenly beings without becoming an angel ontologically. He further avails himself of the expression "angel Christology" in order to speak of moments when the Scriptures identify Christ as an angel (ex officio) or possibly highlight His provisional angelic "nature." Moreover, Stuckenbruck appears to use “Angelomorphic” or “Angelophanic” somewhat synonymously (while preserving the respective shades of meaning for each adjective) as we will do throughout the course of this study. The difference between the two adnominals is that the former descriptive term emphasizes the form assumed or manifested by Christ while the latter adjectival expression underscores the act of manifestation (the appearance) simply and solely.
(4) A broader category that aptly describes what is often found in the documents of ancient and Second Temple Judaism as well as early Christian works is angelomorphism simpliciter. Angelomorphism refers to the phenomenon wherein exalted divine figures assume angelic or semi-divine forms. Such manifestations are not limited to the angelophanies of God's Son. Judaism speaks of such exalted figures as Adam, Abel, Enoch, Gabriel, Michael and Metatron.
Tuesday, January 19, 2016
Ellingworth Comments About Hebrews 2:2 (Page 137-8)
As I said earlier, posts like these are not just designed to support my position, but also function as references for the deeper study of an issue.
Peter Carrell's PH.D. Thesis "Jesus and the Angels" (Link)
See http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5802/1/5802_3217.PDF?UkUDh:CyT
Regards,
Edgar
Regards,
Edgar
Saturday, January 16, 2016
Michael Fox and Proverbs 2:6 (Fear of God)
From Michael V. Fox, "The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2," Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 113, No. 2 (Summer, 1994): pp. 233-243.
"(2:6) 'For the Lord grants wisdom,/ at his behest come knowledge and good sense.' Verse 6 alludes to a stage prior to v. 5: the finding of wisdom, which produces the understanding promised in v.5. Wisdom engenders mature piety because God is the source of wisdom, and in seeking it you are in effect seeking him. Modern commentators agree that v. 6 does not imply verbal revelation, for God is never quoted in instructional wisdom literature.'2 The verse refers either to the granting of wisdom to the world as a divine gift or (more likely) to the bestowal of the faculty of wisdom on an individual. Wisdom both starts with fear of God (1:7;9:10)and leads to it. If the child does his part- the other parties will obviously do theirs- his fear of God will move to a higher stage, as described in this chapter. The simple fear of divine anger that prompted the first juvenile steps toward wisdom matures into a reasoned, cognitive conscience. Hence fear of God at this stage is the object of understanding (2:5a) and is defined by the parallel as a form of knowledge (2:5b).'3 With wisdom, fear of God becomes conscience, an inner sense of right and wrong and a desire to do what is right. (The history of the word 'conscience'-it derives from Latin conscientia, 'deep knowledge,' and originally meant consciousness or inner, unverbalized, thought-nicely points to the cognitive basis of conscience and suggests how the fear and the knowledge of God can be parallel, as in 2:5.) The fear of God, in Dermot Cox's words, is 'a form of conscience that calls for an intellectual adhesion to a principle, the divine order, the concept of goodness of life, and this is a guarantee of 'success'. . .. [I]t is a state of mind, not an action; it is almost synonymous with knowledge (especially in Prov 1-9)'14 Cox's definition is valid for the advanced stage of development."
"(2:6) 'For the Lord grants wisdom,/ at his behest come knowledge and good sense.' Verse 6 alludes to a stage prior to v. 5: the finding of wisdom, which produces the understanding promised in v.5. Wisdom engenders mature piety because God is the source of wisdom, and in seeking it you are in effect seeking him. Modern commentators agree that v. 6 does not imply verbal revelation, for God is never quoted in instructional wisdom literature.'2 The verse refers either to the granting of wisdom to the world as a divine gift or (more likely) to the bestowal of the faculty of wisdom on an individual. Wisdom both starts with fear of God (1:7;9:10)and leads to it. If the child does his part- the other parties will obviously do theirs- his fear of God will move to a higher stage, as described in this chapter. The simple fear of divine anger that prompted the first juvenile steps toward wisdom matures into a reasoned, cognitive conscience. Hence fear of God at this stage is the object of understanding (2:5a) and is defined by the parallel as a form of knowledge (2:5b).'3 With wisdom, fear of God becomes conscience, an inner sense of right and wrong and a desire to do what is right. (The history of the word 'conscience'-it derives from Latin conscientia, 'deep knowledge,' and originally meant consciousness or inner, unverbalized, thought-nicely points to the cognitive basis of conscience and suggests how the fear and the knowledge of God can be parallel, as in 2:5.) The fear of God, in Dermot Cox's words, is 'a form of conscience that calls for an intellectual adhesion to a principle, the divine order, the concept of goodness of life, and this is a guarantee of 'success'. . .. [I]t is a state of mind, not an action; it is almost synonymous with knowledge (especially in Prov 1-9)'14 Cox's definition is valid for the advanced stage of development."
Short Note on Michael the Archangel
The ancient texts of Judaism generally depict Michael as one of the holy angels of God, in fact, an/the chief angel. And Darrell L. Bock's book Blasphemy and Exaltation in Judaism provides sufficient evidence to buttress this idea on pp. 165-169. He supplies evidence that Michael was generally thought to be an angel (i.e., spirit being).
Interestingly, Michael is called ARXISTRATHGOS in 3 Bar. 11-16. See also TAbr 1:4A; TMos 10:2.
Interestingly, Michael is called ARXISTRATHGOS in 3 Bar. 11-16. See also TAbr 1:4A; TMos 10:2.
Isaiah 53 and the Suffering Servant of YHWH
In Matt. 8:14-17, Jesus healed Peter's mother-in-law, then he expelled demons and "cured all who fared badly." After reporting these events, Matthew applied Isa. 53:4 to Jesus: "He himself took our sicknesses and carried our diseases" (Matt. 8:17 NWT).
"Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows" (Isa. 53:4 KJV).
"But his form was ignoble, and inferior to that of the children of men; [he was] a man in suffering, and acquainted with the bearing of sickness, for his face is turned from [us]: he was dishonoured, and not esteemed. He bears our sins, and is pained for us: yet we accounted him to be in trouble, and in suffering, and in affliction" (Isa. 53:3-4 LXX).
"by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear
their iniquities" (Isa. 53:11 KJV).
According to the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus bore the sicknesses and sorrows of humanity when he cured infirm persons. His bearing their sicknesses did not mean that he literally took their pains upon him; he simply relieved them of their spiritual and physical burdens. I think the same principle can apply to 1 Pet. 2:24.
"The theme of one suffering on behalf of the sins of others is repeated in
Isa. 53:4, 5, 11, 12. Matthew interprets Isa. 53:4 LXX ('He bears our sins
and is pained for us') as referring both to spiritual and physical sickness
(Matt. 8:17), and Peter is adopting a similar line [in 1 Pet. 2:24]. In the
Talmud, Isa. 53:4 is taken to mean that Messiah is "the Leprous One" and the 'Sick One' (b. Sanh. 98b) . . . In the OT, to 'bear iniquity' (Lev. 5:17; Num. 14:34 RSV) means to suffer the penalty of its consequences" (Scott, James. 1 and 2 Peter, Jude, 90).
I might need to correct the reference to James Scott. Someone else might have penned the commentary I quote.
Yes, John 17:3 Does Define "Everlasting Life" (W. Hall Harris)
After researching the matter, and consulting a number of sources, I would say that it seems that John 17:3 defines everlasting life. Here is one commentary on the passage:
While I'm not endorsing his comments as a whole here, a number of commentators and Johannine scholars would agree that Jesus (through John's writing) is defining everlasting/eternal life in this verse. On the other hand, Witnesses also say that John 17:3 stipulates how one might obtain life eternal, namely, by knowing Jehovah and his Son.
See https://bible.org/seriespage/20-exegetical-commentary-john-17
"to introduce an explanation is typical Johannine style; it was used before in 1:19, 3:19, and 15:12. The Evangelist here defines 'eternal life' for the readers. It is not just unending life in the sense of prolonged duration. Rather it is a quality of life, with its qualitativeness derived from a relationship with God. Having eternal life is here defined as being in relationship with the Father, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom the Father sent. Cristov is not characteristically attached to Jesus' name in the Fourth Gospel; it occurs elsewhere primarily as a title and is used with Jesus' name only in 1:17. But that is connected to its use here: the statement here in 17:3 enables us to correlate the statement made in 1:18 of the Prologue, that Jesus has fully revealed what God is like, with Jesus' statement in 10:10 that he has come that people might have life, and have it abundantly. These two purposes are really one, according to 17:3, because (abundant) eternal life is defined as knowing (being in relationship with) the Father and the Son. The only way to gain this eternal life, that is, to obtain this knowledge of the Father, is through the Son (cf. 14:6). Although some have pointed to the use of ginwvskw here as evidence of Gnostic influence in the Gospel, there is a crucial difference: for John this knowledge is not intellectual, but relational. It involves being in relationship."
While I'm not endorsing his comments as a whole here, a number of commentators and Johannine scholars would agree that Jesus (through John's writing) is defining everlasting/eternal life in this verse. On the other hand, Witnesses also say that John 17:3 stipulates how one might obtain life eternal, namely, by knowing Jehovah and his Son.
See https://bible.org/seriespage/20-exegetical-commentary-john-17
Friday, January 15, 2016
Matthew, Luke and Birds/Ravens
"Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they?" (Matthew 6:26 ESV)
"Consider the ravens: they neither sow nor reap, they have neither storehouse nor barn, and yet God feeds them. Of how much more value are you than the birds!" (Luke 12:24 ESV)
Interesting how Luke specifically mentions "ravens" in his account of Jesus' exhortation. A word study of the term "raven" (as used in the Bible) is also enlightening. Furthermore, Matthew here calls God "heavenly Father," but Luke just uses "God."
See http://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/1200003651?q=ravens&p=par
http://www.internationalstandardbible.com/R/raven.html
"Consider the ravens: they neither sow nor reap, they have neither storehouse nor barn, and yet God feeds them. Of how much more value are you than the birds!" (Luke 12:24 ESV)
Interesting how Luke specifically mentions "ravens" in his account of Jesus' exhortation. A word study of the term "raven" (as used in the Bible) is also enlightening. Furthermore, Matthew here calls God "heavenly Father," but Luke just uses "God."
See http://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/1200003651?q=ravens&p=par
http://www.internationalstandardbible.com/R/raven.html
Thursday, January 14, 2016
Cry of Dereliction
In his commentary on Acts, Professor Richard Longenecker makes this comment about Acts 2:25:
"It should be remembered that only Luke among the synoptists omitted the cry of dereliction from the cross: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34); and only Luke has included the more filial, final word: 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit' (Luke 23:46). Both the omission and the inclusion are in line with the quotation of Ps 16:8 here [in Acts 2:25]: 'I saw the Lord always [DIA PANTOS] before me. Because he is at my right hand, I will not be shaken'" (Longenecker 77-78).
It is possible that Jesus' cry of dereliction could be understood in the light of Ps. 22:1ff; John 8:29; 16:32. Based on the Johannine passages, it seems highly unlikely that the Father was ever spiritually separated from His beloved Son as some claim. For example, "In these words Christ, when hanging on the cross, complained, that he was deprived, for a time, of the loving presence and comforting influence of his heavenly Father" (Benson Commentary)
Moreover, one should not infer that Jesus was mistaken in his cry--the key to what Jesus meant is echoed in Ps. 22:1:
"My God, my God . . . why are you far from saving me?" (NWT)
According to this fateful OT writing, God Jehovah forsook the Son in that he allowed his enemies to kill the Messiah. God did not intervene when His Son was being put to death though it undoubtedly pained the Father greatly to see His Son executed as a common criminal (Isa. 63:9). Prophetically the Son said, "O my God, I keep calling by day, and you do not answer" (Ps. 22:2 NWT). Additionally he prayed:
"I am a worm, and not a man, A reproach to men and despicable to the people" (Ps. 22:6).
Psalm 22 indicates that the Son was "abandoned" in the sense that Jehovah did not deliver Christ from his [the Son's] adversaries; He lovingly allowed the Son to die so that Christ might taste death for every man and woman (Heb. 2:9). Yet while God allowed the Messiah to suffer, He was still with the Son by empowering and supporting him through an extremely ignominious and painful trial (John 16:32).
When commenting upon the "cry of dereliction," William Barclay posits three possible meanings:
(1) Jesus repeated the words of the Psalm as a "song of trust and confidence" (a view held by Dibelius and others). In support of this view, read Ps. 22:3-5, 20-31.
(2) The weight of the world's sins came upon Jesus (2 Cor. 5:21). I would be glad to elaborate upon 2 Cor. 5:21 later to show why I tend to disagree with this possibility.
(3) Jesus was showing his communion with humans. Just as we may sometimes feel that God has forsaken us, even when He clearly has not, so Jesus descended to the proverbial "depths of despair" and felt that God had abandoned him. Cf. Heb. 5:7, 8, however.
While all of these views are quite possible, I find the previous explanation to be most compelling. In light of Ps. 22 and the Gospel of John, the Father only forsook Jesus by allowing him to be put to death. That's my "humble opinion."
"It should be remembered that only Luke among the synoptists omitted the cry of dereliction from the cross: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34); and only Luke has included the more filial, final word: 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit' (Luke 23:46). Both the omission and the inclusion are in line with the quotation of Ps 16:8 here [in Acts 2:25]: 'I saw the Lord always [DIA PANTOS] before me. Because he is at my right hand, I will not be shaken'" (Longenecker 77-78).
It is possible that Jesus' cry of dereliction could be understood in the light of Ps. 22:1ff; John 8:29; 16:32. Based on the Johannine passages, it seems highly unlikely that the Father was ever spiritually separated from His beloved Son as some claim. For example, "In these words Christ, when hanging on the cross, complained, that he was deprived, for a time, of the loving presence and comforting influence of his heavenly Father" (Benson Commentary)
Moreover, one should not infer that Jesus was mistaken in his cry--the key to what Jesus meant is echoed in Ps. 22:1:
"My God, my God . . . why are you far from saving me?" (NWT)
According to this fateful OT writing, God Jehovah forsook the Son in that he allowed his enemies to kill the Messiah. God did not intervene when His Son was being put to death though it undoubtedly pained the Father greatly to see His Son executed as a common criminal (Isa. 63:9). Prophetically the Son said, "O my God, I keep calling by day, and you do not answer" (Ps. 22:2 NWT). Additionally he prayed:
"I am a worm, and not a man, A reproach to men and despicable to the people" (Ps. 22:6).
Psalm 22 indicates that the Son was "abandoned" in the sense that Jehovah did not deliver Christ from his [the Son's] adversaries; He lovingly allowed the Son to die so that Christ might taste death for every man and woman (Heb. 2:9). Yet while God allowed the Messiah to suffer, He was still with the Son by empowering and supporting him through an extremely ignominious and painful trial (John 16:32).
When commenting upon the "cry of dereliction," William Barclay posits three possible meanings:
(1) Jesus repeated the words of the Psalm as a "song of trust and confidence" (a view held by Dibelius and others). In support of this view, read Ps. 22:3-5, 20-31.
(2) The weight of the world's sins came upon Jesus (2 Cor. 5:21). I would be glad to elaborate upon 2 Cor. 5:21 later to show why I tend to disagree with this possibility.
(3) Jesus was showing his communion with humans. Just as we may sometimes feel that God has forsaken us, even when He clearly has not, so Jesus descended to the proverbial "depths of despair" and felt that God had abandoned him. Cf. Heb. 5:7, 8, however.
While all of these views are quite possible, I find the previous explanation to be most compelling. In light of Ps. 22 and the Gospel of John, the Father only forsook Jesus by allowing him to be put to death. That's my "humble opinion."
Monday, January 11, 2016
More Johannine Comma Quotes
In the original Interpreter's Bible, which can be found in about any county library, the following is stated concerning 1 John 5:7ff:
One of the translators of the NIV also writes the following about 1
John 5:7:
Another authority states:
"We need not hesitate to declare our conviction that the disputed words
were not written by St. John: that they were originally brought into
Latin copies in Africa from the margin, where they had been placed as a
pious and orthodox gloss on ver. 8: that from the Latin they crept into
two or three late Greek codices, and thence into the printed Greek
text, a place to which they had no rightful claim" (A Plain
Introduction to the Criticism of the NT. Cambridge: 1883, 3rd Ed. P.
654. Comments made by FHA Scrivener).
Robert M. Grant makes this comment about 1 John 5:6-8:
I would also advise you to read William Barclay's commentary on 1 John and Raymond Brown's extensive treatment of the subject in his Anchor Bible Commentary.
"This verse in the KJV is to be rejected (with RSV). It appears in no
ancient Greek MS nor is it cited by any Greek fathers; of all the
versions only the Latin contained it, and even this in none of its most
ancient sources. The earliest MSS of the Vulg. do not have it. As [CH]
Dodd (Johannine Epistles, p. 127n) reminds us, "It is first quoted as a
part of 1 John by Priscillian, the Spanish heretic, who died in 385,
and it gradually made its way into MSS of the Latin Vulgate until it
was accepted as part of the authorized Latin text." The mention in the
true text (vs. 8) of the three witnesses which agree naturally led to
an interpretation along trinitarian lines, and this occasioned the
present gloss which appears in various forms in MSS and quotations from
the fifth century onward" (293-294).
One of the translators of the NIV also writes the following about 1
John 5:7:
"Anyone who uses a recent scholarly version of the NT will see that
these words on the Trinity are not in verse 7. This is because they
have no basis in the Greek text. Under Roman Catholic pressure, Erasmus
inserted them from the Latin Vulgate. They are not a part of the
inspired Bible" (Ralph Earle, Word Meanings in the NT, p. 452).
Another authority states:
"We need not hesitate to declare our conviction that the disputed words
were not written by St. John: that they were originally brought into
Latin copies in Africa from the margin, where they had been placed as a
pious and orthodox gloss on ver. 8: that from the Latin they crept into
two or three late Greek codices, and thence into the printed Greek
text, a place to which they had no rightful claim" (A Plain
Introduction to the Criticism of the NT. Cambridge: 1883, 3rd Ed. P.
654. Comments made by FHA Scrivener).
Robert M. Grant makes this comment about 1 John 5:6-8:
"To this mysterious but not theologically useful passage a Spanish
Pricillianist in the late fourth century added explicitly trinitarian
language so that it would mention three witnesses 'on earth' and end
thus: 'And there are three witnesses in heaven, the Father, the Word,
and the Spirit, and these three are one.' The addition is suitable in a
Johannine context, for it refers to the Logos as John does and is
ultimately based on 'I and the Father are one' (John 10:30).
Unfortunately it is not genuine, since it appears in no old manuscript
or versions or in any early [church] fathers" (Gods and the One God, p. 151).
I would also advise you to read William Barclay's commentary on 1 John and Raymond Brown's extensive treatment of the subject in his Anchor Bible Commentary.
Saturday, January 09, 2016
Friday, January 08, 2016
Augustine's City of God XIII.1 (Duncan)
Duncan writes:
Reply: I disagree with Augustine on many levels (Trinity, predestination, ecclesiology, etc.) and don't try to defend his theology. However, I wonder which part of this quote raises questions in your mind. That the world originated by means of divine creation and that the human race had a start is not controversial to me, and Genesis 3 details the Fall while Paul confirms this position in the NT (Romans 5:12ff; 1 Cor. 15).
Angels are possibly differentiated from men in Ps 8:4-5ff, but the Bible never predicates immortality of the angels, to my knowledge, unless someone interprets Lk 20:34-6 that way. As for human eternality upon obedience, that could be an implication from Gen 2:16-17 and the last portion of Gen. 3.
In City of God, Book XIII, Ch. 1, Augustine wrote,
Having disposed of the very difficult questions concerning the origin of our world and the beginning of the human race, the natural order requires that we now discuss the fall of the first man (we may say of the first men), and of the origin and propagation of human death. For God had not made man like the angels, in such a condition that, even though they had sinned, they could none the more die. He had so made them, that if they discharged the obligations of obedience, an angelic immortality and a blessed eternity might ensue, without the intervention of death; but if they disobeyed, death should be visited on them with just sentence—which, too, has been spoken to in the preceding book.
Any scriptural basis for these types of conclusions?
Reply: I disagree with Augustine on many levels (Trinity, predestination, ecclesiology, etc.) and don't try to defend his theology. However, I wonder which part of this quote raises questions in your mind. That the world originated by means of divine creation and that the human race had a start is not controversial to me, and Genesis 3 details the Fall while Paul confirms this position in the NT (Romans 5:12ff; 1 Cor. 15).
Angels are possibly differentiated from men in Ps 8:4-5ff, but the Bible never predicates immortality of the angels, to my knowledge, unless someone interprets Lk 20:34-6 that way. As for human eternality upon obedience, that could be an implication from Gen 2:16-17 and the last portion of Gen. 3.
Older Short Book Reviews on David Hill and Francis A. Sullivan--Biblical Semantics and Ecclesiology
Two more book recommendations include:
(1) Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings: Studies in the
Semantics of Soteriological Terms. Cambridge
University Press, 1967. (Author) David Hill.
(2) From Apostles to Bishops: The Development of the
Episcopacy in the Early Church. New York/Mahwah, N.J.:
Newman Press, 2001. (Author) Francis A. Sullivan.
Hill's main thesis is that biblical Greek (both LXX
and NT) changed the meaning of certain ancient Greek
terms or at least added a new meaning to these words.
Hill attempts to demonstrate this general thesis in
his well-documented work and does a fairly decent job,
it seems. One point that I find of interest in Hill's
study is his willingness to make words the proper
objects of semantic inquiry, "since the word is a
semantic marker, a pointer to a concept or field of
meaning which must be clarified and understood" (Hill,
p. 18). Nevertheless, he also stresses the
importance of taking both the "immediate context" and
the "historical context" of any given word or text
into consideration when performing exegesis or word
studies. In order to understand the terminology of the
GNT, one must also "deal with the meaning of their
[i.e., Greek words] Old Testament Hebrew equivalents"
(ibid, 19).
Francis A. Sullivan's study should interest those who
wonder about apostolic succession or the development
of bishops in the ancient church. Was the transition
from apostles to bishops a deviant move or one
that was faithful to the original intentions of Christ
and his designated apostles? Sullivan, who is Roman
Catholic, looks at the issue quite fairly and makes
concessions that are surprising at times.
Whether one agrees with his conclusion or not, it
seems that Sullivan is a careful, erudite and fair
scholar.
At one point in his study, Sullivan writes:
"As we have seen, the 'great commission' in Matthew
28:19-20 included the command to 'make disciples of
all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,
and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.' Scholars
generally agree that the trinitarian formula reflects
a later development of baptismal liturgy. On the other
hand, it would be difficult to explain the importance
the New Testament attributes to baptism and its role
as a distinctive sign of Christian initiation if it
were not based on a command given by the risen Christ"
(Apostles to Bishops, p. 35).
In the context of his discussion, Sullivan is
examining the alleged primordiality of the Church's
so-called "sacramental ministry." But the point that I
want to draw attention to now, is what Sullivan says
about the "trinitarian formula" found in Mt 28:19-20.
Of course, I do not agree with this description of the
language found in the Matthean text, but what really
strikes me, however, is Sullivan's view that the
words found in Matthew 28:19-20 are based on
subsequent baptismal practices. I've noticed that
Protestant scholars also tend to believe that 28:19-20, as
it now appears in modern Bibles, is not an authentic
representation of words, which the "historical Jesus" might
have uttered. The words are sometimes not considered ipsissima
verba Christi.
I've never been able to find solid textual evidence that discounts
the originality of the "Great Commission" contained at Matthew 28:19-20.
Yet there have been many who have doubted its genuineness or originality.
I have no problem with the text, as it now stands; maybe some reader has
researched this issue before.
Thursday, January 07, 2016
Proverbs 2:5-6ff (Brief Observations from Commentaries)
"then you will understand how to fear the Lord, and you will discover knowledge about God. For the Lord gives wisdom, and from his mouth comes knowledge and understanding" (Proverbs 2:5-6 NET Bible).
From Lange's Commentary:
Proverbs 2:5. Then wilt thou understand the fear of Jehovah.— “Understand” is here equivalent to taking something to one’s self as a spiritual possession, like the “finding” in the second clause, or like δέχεσθαι [“receiveth”] in 1 Cor. 2:14. The “fear of Jehovah” (comp. 1:7) is here clearly presented as the highest good and most valuable possession of man (comp. Is. 33:6), evidently because of its imperishable nature (Ps. 19:9), and its power to deliver in trouble (Prov. 14:26; Ps. 115:11; Ecclesiast. 1:11 sq.; 2:7 sq.).—And find knowledge of God.—Knowledge of God is here put not merely as a parallel idea to the “fear of Jehovah” (as in Proverbs 9:10; Is. 11:2), but it expresses a fruit and result of the fear of Jehovah, as the substance of the following causal proposition in Proverbs 2:6–8 indicates. Comp. the dogmatical and ethical comments. [Is the substitution of Elohim for Jehovah (in clause 6) a mere rhetorical or poetical variation? WORDSWORTH calls attention to the fact that this is one of five instances in the Book of Proverbs in which God is designated as Elohim, the appellation Jehovah occurring nearly ninety times. The almost singular exception seems then to be intentional, and the meaning will be, the knowledge of “Elohim—as distinguished from the knowledge of man which is of little worth.” In explaining the all but universal use of Jehovah as the name of God in our book, while in Eccles. it never occurs, WORDSWORTH says, “when Solomon wrote the Book of Proverbs he was in a state of favor and grace with Jehovah, the Lord God of Israel; he was obedient to the law of Jehovah; and the special design of the Book of Proverbs is to enforce obedience to that law,” etc. (see Introd. to Eccles., p. 78)—A.].
Here is the Cambridge Bible comment on Proverbs 2:6
6. For] Maurer rightly insists that this and two following verses are not a parenthesis, but an integral part of the main argument; q.d. I said that by diligent search after wisdom thou shouldest attain to the fear of Jehovah and the knowledge of God; and I said so because that knowledge involves the true conception of God, as the Fountain of all wisdom, and the right attitude towards Him of reverent expectation, which like the prophet’s “golden pipes” (Zechariah 4:2) brings your earnest desire to receive into contact with His readiness to give. Comp. James 1:5.
Now here is Peter Pett's observation on Proverbs 2:6-11:
The passage can be presented chiastically:
A For YHWH gives wisdom, out of his mouth comes knowledge and understanding (Proverbs 2:6).
B He lays up sound wisdom for the upright, He is a shield to those who walk in integrity (Proverbs 2:7).
C That he may guard the paths of justice, and preserve the way of his saints (holy ones) (Proverbs 2:8).
B Then will you understand righteousness and justice, and equity, yes, every good path (Proverbs 2:9).
A For wisdom will enter into your heart, and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul, discretion will watch over you, understanding will keep you (Proverbs 2:10-11).
Note in A the emphasis on wisdom, knowledge and understanding repeated in the parallel. In B He lays up sound wisdom for the upright, and in the parallel that sound wisdom is described. Centrally in C YHWH guards His people’s way.
See http://www.studylight.org/commentaries/pet/view.cgi?bk=19&ch=2
From Lange's Commentary:
Proverbs 2:5. Then wilt thou understand the fear of Jehovah.— “Understand” is here equivalent to taking something to one’s self as a spiritual possession, like the “finding” in the second clause, or like δέχεσθαι [“receiveth”] in 1 Cor. 2:14. The “fear of Jehovah” (comp. 1:7) is here clearly presented as the highest good and most valuable possession of man (comp. Is. 33:6), evidently because of its imperishable nature (Ps. 19:9), and its power to deliver in trouble (Prov. 14:26; Ps. 115:11; Ecclesiast. 1:11 sq.; 2:7 sq.).—And find knowledge of God.—Knowledge of God is here put not merely as a parallel idea to the “fear of Jehovah” (as in Proverbs 9:10; Is. 11:2), but it expresses a fruit and result of the fear of Jehovah, as the substance of the following causal proposition in Proverbs 2:6–8 indicates. Comp. the dogmatical and ethical comments. [Is the substitution of Elohim for Jehovah (in clause 6) a mere rhetorical or poetical variation? WORDSWORTH calls attention to the fact that this is one of five instances in the Book of Proverbs in which God is designated as Elohim, the appellation Jehovah occurring nearly ninety times. The almost singular exception seems then to be intentional, and the meaning will be, the knowledge of “Elohim—as distinguished from the knowledge of man which is of little worth.” In explaining the all but universal use of Jehovah as the name of God in our book, while in Eccles. it never occurs, WORDSWORTH says, “when Solomon wrote the Book of Proverbs he was in a state of favor and grace with Jehovah, the Lord God of Israel; he was obedient to the law of Jehovah; and the special design of the Book of Proverbs is to enforce obedience to that law,” etc. (see Introd. to Eccles., p. 78)—A.].
Here is the Cambridge Bible comment on Proverbs 2:6
6. For] Maurer rightly insists that this and two following verses are not a parenthesis, but an integral part of the main argument; q.d. I said that by diligent search after wisdom thou shouldest attain to the fear of Jehovah and the knowledge of God; and I said so because that knowledge involves the true conception of God, as the Fountain of all wisdom, and the right attitude towards Him of reverent expectation, which like the prophet’s “golden pipes” (Zechariah 4:2) brings your earnest desire to receive into contact with His readiness to give. Comp. James 1:5.
Now here is Peter Pett's observation on Proverbs 2:6-11:
The passage can be presented chiastically:
A For YHWH gives wisdom, out of his mouth comes knowledge and understanding (Proverbs 2:6).
B He lays up sound wisdom for the upright, He is a shield to those who walk in integrity (Proverbs 2:7).
C That he may guard the paths of justice, and preserve the way of his saints (holy ones) (Proverbs 2:8).
B Then will you understand righteousness and justice, and equity, yes, every good path (Proverbs 2:9).
A For wisdom will enter into your heart, and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul, discretion will watch over you, understanding will keep you (Proverbs 2:10-11).
Note in A the emphasis on wisdom, knowledge and understanding repeated in the parallel. In B He lays up sound wisdom for the upright, and in the parallel that sound wisdom is described. Centrally in C YHWH guards His people’s way.
See http://www.studylight.org/commentaries/pet/view.cgi?bk=19&ch=2
Wednesday, January 06, 2016
Thanks for Reading This Blog
Just want to take a moment to thank all who read this blog, and those who provide comments or send links/sources behind the scene. I hope to post more about text-critical issues (primarily Greek) and deal with arguments that substantiate God's existence. My hat is off to those who give me energy to continue doing research and writing.
Best,
Edgar
Best,
Edgar
Romans 6:9 (YLT)
"knowing that Christ, having been raised up out of the dead, doth no more die, death over him hath no more lordship" (Romans 6:9 YLT)
Another scripture that would indicate some important change occurred when Christ was raised from the dead. His everlasting Father bequeathed immortality to him.
Another scripture that would indicate some important change occurred when Christ was raised from the dead. His everlasting Father bequeathed immortality to him.
Divine Foreknowledge and Disparate Kinds of Necessity
If God foreknows that a man named Saul will persecute Jesus' followers, but later he will repent, turn around, and then become a zealous Christian himself--does God's knowledge of Saul's future actions mean that Saul necessarily carries out such activities?
While it's conceptually possible that we could say Saul will necessarily persecute Christians, but subsequently become a Christian himself--Boethius shows that we cannot rightly conclude God will cause Saul to persecute Christians, etc. For if I behold a man walking or sitting, it does not mean that the man's walking or sitting is necessary in a simple sense (i.e., it does not mean that the man's sitting or walking is caused by my visual activities or that the man's ambulatory movements cannot not happen).
If I watch an oval-track race on a hot Sunday afternoon, I do not cause the cars to travel incessantly around the track by watching the race. Similarly, even though God beholds certain future events, it seems that we cannot justly infer that His foreknowledge causes Pharaoh to act recalcitrantly or influences Peter to deny Jesus. Some might say that both Peter and Pharaoh still have the power to bring about different outcomes although God knows that they will not: He does not cause such events.
Boethius' explanation works beautifully in some ways; however, I disagree with his delineation of God's atemporality. But the distinction between conditional and simple necessity is helpful.
On the other hand, it's also difficult to understand how Boethius' explanation preserves libertarian free will. I have a similar criticism of Calvin's account.
See Boethius' work The Consolation of Philosophy 5.
While it's conceptually possible that we could say Saul will necessarily persecute Christians, but subsequently become a Christian himself--Boethius shows that we cannot rightly conclude God will cause Saul to persecute Christians, etc. For if I behold a man walking or sitting, it does not mean that the man's walking or sitting is necessary in a simple sense (i.e., it does not mean that the man's sitting or walking is caused by my visual activities or that the man's ambulatory movements cannot not happen).
If I watch an oval-track race on a hot Sunday afternoon, I do not cause the cars to travel incessantly around the track by watching the race. Similarly, even though God beholds certain future events, it seems that we cannot justly infer that His foreknowledge causes Pharaoh to act recalcitrantly or influences Peter to deny Jesus. Some might say that both Peter and Pharaoh still have the power to bring about different outcomes although God knows that they will not: He does not cause such events.
Boethius' explanation works beautifully in some ways; however, I disagree with his delineation of God's atemporality. But the distinction between conditional and simple necessity is helpful.
On the other hand, it's also difficult to understand how Boethius' explanation preserves libertarian free will. I have a similar criticism of Calvin's account.
See Boethius' work The Consolation of Philosophy 5.
Monday, January 04, 2016
Various Translations of Proverbs 2:4
"and if you look for it as for silver and search for it as for hidden treasure" (NIV)
"If you seek her as silver And search for her as for hidden treasures" (NASB)
"if you seek it like silver, and search for it like hidden treasure" (NET Bible)
"If you keep seeking for it as for silver, And you keep searching for it as for hidden treasures" (NWT 2013 Rev.)
"If you seek her as silver And search for her as for hidden treasures" (NASB)
"if you seek it like silver, and search for it like hidden treasure" (NET Bible)
"If you keep seeking for it as for silver, And you keep searching for it as for hidden treasures" (NWT 2013 Rev.)
Does the Trinity Doctrine Transcend Human Reasoning? (Aquinas)
"There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason" (Summa Contra Gentiles 1.3).
"Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis."
Translation by Anton C. Pegis.
"Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis."
Translation by Anton C. Pegis.
Sunday, January 03, 2016
Proverbs 2:3-5 (NET Bible Notes)
2:3 indeed, if 10 you call out for 11 discernment 12 – raise your voice 13 for understanding –
2:4 if 14 you seek 15 it like silver,16 and search for it 17 like hidden treasure,
2:5 then you will understand 18 how to fear the Lord,19 and you will discover 20 knowledge 21 about God. 22
NET:
Notes 18-22
18 tn The verb בִּין (bin, “to perceive; to understand; to discern”) refers to ability to grasp, discern or be sensitive to what it means to fear the Lord.
19 tn Heb “the fear of the Lord.” The noun is an objective genitive; the Lord is to be the object of fear and reverence.
20 tn Heb “find” (so KJV, NAB, NIV, NRSV).
21 tn The term דַּעַת (da’at, “knowledge”) goes beyond cognition; it is often used metonymically (cause) for obedience (effect); see, e.g., Prov 3:6, “in all your ways acknowledge him,” and BDB 395 s.v. This means that the disciple will follow God’s moral code; for to know God is to react ethically and spiritually to his will (e.g., J. H. Greenstone, Proverbs, 18).
22 tn Heb “knowledge of God.” The noun is an objective genitive.
2:4 if 14 you seek 15 it like silver,16 and search for it 17 like hidden treasure,
2:5 then you will understand 18 how to fear the Lord,19 and you will discover 20 knowledge 21 about God. 22
NET:
Notes 18-22
18 tn The verb בִּין (bin, “to perceive; to understand; to discern”) refers to ability to grasp, discern or be sensitive to what it means to fear the Lord.
19 tn Heb “the fear of the Lord.” The noun is an objective genitive; the Lord is to be the object of fear and reverence.
20 tn Heb “find” (so KJV, NAB, NIV, NRSV).
21 tn The term דַּעַת (da’at, “knowledge”) goes beyond cognition; it is often used metonymically (cause) for obedience (effect); see, e.g., Prov 3:6, “in all your ways acknowledge him,” and BDB 395 s.v. This means that the disciple will follow God’s moral code; for to know God is to react ethically and spiritually to his will (e.g., J. H. Greenstone, Proverbs, 18).
22 tn Heb “knowledge of God.” The noun is an objective genitive.
Friday, January 01, 2016
Proverbs 2:1 (NET Bible)
"My child, if you receive my words, and store up my commands within you," (NET)
There has been some debate about the protasis and apodosis in Proverbs 2. The NET Bible note here states:
On the other hand, Lange's Commentary explains:
[Proverbs 2:1 sq. DE WETTE and NOYES conceive of the first two verses as not conditional, but as containing the expression of a direct and independent wish: Oh that thou wouldest receive, etc. The LXX, Vulg., LUTHER, etc., make the first verse conditional, but find the apodosis in Proverbs 2:2. MUENSCHER finds in Proverbs 2:2 an independent condition, and not a mere sequence to the preceding; so HOLDEN, with a slightly different combination of the parts of Proverbs 2:2: If by inclining thine ear…thou wilt incline thine heart, etc. M., H., STUART and others find the apodosis of the series of conditional clauses in Proverbs 2:5, agreeing in this with the E. V. These diverse views do not essentially modify the general import of the passage. ZÖCKLER it will be observed finds the apodosis in Proverbs 2:5 and 9, Proverbs 2:6–8 being parenthetical.—A.].
There has been some debate about the protasis and apodosis in Proverbs 2. The NET Bible note here states:
sn Verses 1-11 form one long conditional sentence in the Hebrew text: (1) the protasis (“if…”) encompasses vv. 1-4 and (2) the apodosis (“then…”) consists of two parallel panels in vv. 5-8 and vv. 9-11 both of which are introduced by the particle אָז (’az, “then”).
On the other hand, Lange's Commentary explains:
[Proverbs 2:1 sq. DE WETTE and NOYES conceive of the first two verses as not conditional, but as containing the expression of a direct and independent wish: Oh that thou wouldest receive, etc. The LXX, Vulg., LUTHER, etc., make the first verse conditional, but find the apodosis in Proverbs 2:2. MUENSCHER finds in Proverbs 2:2 an independent condition, and not a mere sequence to the preceding; so HOLDEN, with a slightly different combination of the parts of Proverbs 2:2: If by inclining thine ear…thou wilt incline thine heart, etc. M., H., STUART and others find the apodosis of the series of conditional clauses in Proverbs 2:5, agreeing in this with the E. V. These diverse views do not essentially modify the general import of the passage. ZÖCKLER it will be observed finds the apodosis in Proverbs 2:5 and 9, Proverbs 2:6–8 being parenthetical.—A.].
Heb 11:1--A Response Once Given to a Questioner (Edited for Clarity and Content)
There are some who make a sharp distinction between faith and reason, but I question that approach. Heb. 11:1 reads: Ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων· (WH 1881)
Based on the Greek of this text, Jehovah's Witnesses believe that faith is somewhat synonymous with the evidence that buttresses unseen realities. Faith is therefore the same as conviction (ἔλεγχος) and it's based on strong and certain evidence. So I would provisionally define faith (and this does not encompass the whole of πίστις) as a rational acceptance of and continual trust and belief in God, His Son, and God's self-revelation. I.e., Christian faith involves human thinking that harmonizes with divine reason and godly purposes. James E. White sums up the view of Carl Henry in this matter quite well, when he pens the following words: "Truths must not contradict each other, and derived theorems must be self-consistent. Rational consistency as a test for truth is necessary for presuppositionalism to avoid lapsing into fideism" (White 103).
Authentic divine revelation must not have contradictory elements, and fideism should not be mistaken for genuine faith. If Jehovah's self-disclosure is true--in an absolute sense--then His self-disclosure should not/must not violate the law of non-contradiction.
Since writing this reply, I now understand the statement about "derived theorems" much better than I once did; the derivation of theorems from axioms is an interesting study in se. I believe Euclid derived thirteen volumes of theorems known as the Elements from just five axioms. One desideratum of logic and faith, it appears, is to derive only self-consistent theorems.
Based on the Greek of this text, Jehovah's Witnesses believe that faith is somewhat synonymous with the evidence that buttresses unseen realities. Faith is therefore the same as conviction (ἔλεγχος) and it's based on strong and certain evidence. So I would provisionally define faith (and this does not encompass the whole of πίστις) as a rational acceptance of and continual trust and belief in God, His Son, and God's self-revelation. I.e., Christian faith involves human thinking that harmonizes with divine reason and godly purposes. James E. White sums up the view of Carl Henry in this matter quite well, when he pens the following words: "Truths must not contradict each other, and derived theorems must be self-consistent. Rational consistency as a test for truth is necessary for presuppositionalism to avoid lapsing into fideism" (White 103).
Authentic divine revelation must not have contradictory elements, and fideism should not be mistaken for genuine faith. If Jehovah's self-disclosure is true--in an absolute sense--then His self-disclosure should not/must not violate the law of non-contradiction.
Since writing this reply, I now understand the statement about "derived theorems" much better than I once did; the derivation of theorems from axioms is an interesting study in se. I believe Euclid derived thirteen volumes of theorems known as the Elements from just five axioms. One desideratum of logic and faith, it appears, is to derive only self-consistent theorems.
Thursday, December 31, 2015
Book Recommendation: Concerning Religious Epistemology
I heartily recommend the book by James Emery White entitled What Is Truth? (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.) By the way, he's not the same J. White, who has launched multiple criticisms against Jehovah's Witnesses, Muslims, Mormons and others.
White's book deals with the religious epistemologies of Cornelius Van Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F.H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, and Millard Erickson. I have found the book extremely helpful in matters related to the theory of religious knowledge, and I especially connect with the epistemic system of Carl F.H. Henry as delineated in his magnum opus God, Revelation, and Authority. Concerning the law of non-contradiction, Henry writes: "Without noncontradiction and logical consistency, no knowledge whatever is possible" (Qt. in White 103). He adds: "whatever violates the law of contradiction cannot be considered revelation." But why? Because "the God of biblical revelation is the God of reason, not Ultimate Irrationality; all he does is rational" (103).
So contrary to what some may assert, the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction) is not a man-made law. Neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Aristotle created this "law." Henry concludes that God Himself is behind the law of contradiction (non-contradiction), and Henry is not alone in this regard.
One twentieth thinker, J. Mortimer Adler, also has written that the law of contradiction is an observation about real life: it is not simply a formal rule of human logic that has no applicability to ontology. Or as Henry puts matters--without the law of noncontradiction and without logical consistency, "no knowledge whatever is possible."
Another observation worth noting is this one: "Christian theology denies that the human mind or human reasoning is a creative source of revelational content; its proper role is not to fashion revelation or truth, but rather to recognize and elucidate it" (Henry qt. in White 95). Cf. Henry's God, Revelation, and Authority 1:41ff.
Compare Romans 12:1.
White's book deals with the religious epistemologies of Cornelius Van Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F.H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, and Millard Erickson. I have found the book extremely helpful in matters related to the theory of religious knowledge, and I especially connect with the epistemic system of Carl F.H. Henry as delineated in his magnum opus God, Revelation, and Authority. Concerning the law of non-contradiction, Henry writes: "Without noncontradiction and logical consistency, no knowledge whatever is possible" (Qt. in White 103). He adds: "whatever violates the law of contradiction cannot be considered revelation." But why? Because "the God of biblical revelation is the God of reason, not Ultimate Irrationality; all he does is rational" (103).
So contrary to what some may assert, the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction) is not a man-made law. Neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Aristotle created this "law." Henry concludes that God Himself is behind the law of contradiction (non-contradiction), and Henry is not alone in this regard.
One twentieth thinker, J. Mortimer Adler, also has written that the law of contradiction is an observation about real life: it is not simply a formal rule of human logic that has no applicability to ontology. Or as Henry puts matters--without the law of noncontradiction and without logical consistency, "no knowledge whatever is possible."
Another observation worth noting is this one: "Christian theology denies that the human mind or human reasoning is a creative source of revelational content; its proper role is not to fashion revelation or truth, but rather to recognize and elucidate it" (Henry qt. in White 95). Cf. Henry's God, Revelation, and Authority 1:41ff.
Compare Romans 12:1.
Sunday, December 27, 2015
Hina in John 6:29; 17:3
Granting that ἵνα + the subjunctive is appositional in Jn 17:3, I still wonder whether John is providing a definition or description of everlasting life. In Jn 6:29, we read: ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς Τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος.
This passage answers the question: "What shall we do, that we may perform the works of God?"
Is Jesus here defining the work of God in the appositional clause? Or is he delineating how one performs the work of God. The appositional clause could either identify (define) or explain the first nominal clause, and it seems to me that Jesus is giving a prescription in the latter part of 6:29, not a description. At least that is a possible reading of 6:29.
GRB Murray writes: "The hearers, as they were Jews, interpret 'the works which God demands' as works of the Law, which God will reward with eternal life. They learn, however, that the 'work' God wants is faith in the one God has sent" (John, 91).
Jn 6:29 seems to have some bearing on our understanding of Jn 17:3--and 6:29 appears to be prescriptive (i.e., it tells us what God expects or wills).
From the Greek Testament Critical Exegetical Commentary:
This passage answers the question: "What shall we do, that we may perform the works of God?"
Is Jesus here defining the work of God in the appositional clause? Or is he delineating how one performs the work of God. The appositional clause could either identify (define) or explain the first nominal clause, and it seems to me that Jesus is giving a prescription in the latter part of 6:29, not a description. At least that is a possible reading of 6:29.
GRB Murray writes: "The hearers, as they were Jews, interpret 'the works which God demands' as works of the Law, which God will reward with eternal life. They learn, however, that the 'work' God wants is faith in the one God has sent" (John, 91).
Jn 6:29 seems to have some bearing on our understanding of Jn 17:3--and 6:29 appears to be prescriptive (i.e., it tells us what God expects or wills).
From the Greek Testament Critical Exegetical Commentary:
The meaning is not,—that faith is wrought in us by God, is the work of God; but that the truest way of working the work of God is to believe on Him whom He hath sent.
ἔργον, not ἔργα, because there is but this one, properly speaking, and all the rest are wrapt up in it (see James 1:25).
Saturday, December 26, 2015
Acts 1:6-7, KAIROS and XRONOS (Questions)
Professor John B. Polhill writes that there is "probably no great distinction" between XRONOUS and KAIROUS in Acts 1:6, 7 (John B. Polhill, Acts. Nashville, TN: Broadman, 1992).
On the other hand, "XRONOUS refers to the time that must elapse before the establishment of the Kingdom; KAIROUS to the critical events accompanying its establishment" (F.F. Bruce).
At the present time, my view on the semantics of Acts 1:6, 7 vis-a'-vis KAIROS and XRONOS is a neutral one: Polhill indicates that there might be no semantic distinction between the two Greek terms in 1:6, 7. We can't simply base our conclusions on the particular senses of KAIROS and XRONOS in other Scriptures because those occurrences may fit into another semantic domain or context. Maybe if we apply the text-linguistic principles of considering the text (the linguistic unit), co-text (the words in the sentence or phrase being exegeted and, by extension, any texts that have an influence on the exegesis of the text in question) and the context (social and cultural factors), some light could possibly be shed on this problem.
On the other hand, "XRONOUS refers to the time that must elapse before the establishment of the Kingdom; KAIROUS to the critical events accompanying its establishment" (F.F. Bruce).
At the present time, my view on the semantics of Acts 1:6, 7 vis-a'-vis KAIROS and XRONOS is a neutral one: Polhill indicates that there might be no semantic distinction between the two Greek terms in 1:6, 7. We can't simply base our conclusions on the particular senses of KAIROS and XRONOS in other Scriptures because those occurrences may fit into another semantic domain or context. Maybe if we apply the text-linguistic principles of considering the text (the linguistic unit), co-text (the words in the sentence or phrase being exegeted and, by extension, any texts that have an influence on the exegesis of the text in question) and the context (social and cultural factors), some light could possibly be shed on this problem.
Thursday, December 24, 2015
John Wycliffe and the First English Bible
The NRSV (The Oxford Edition) states: "Prior to the sixteenth century, translations of the Bible into English were made from the Latin Vulgate instead of from the Hebrew or Greek, and were recorded only in manuscript copies" (P. 400).
It also affirms that "The first English versions of the entire Bible were the two associated with the work of John Wyclif, made by translation from the Latin Vulgate between 1380 and 1397" (NRSV 401).
Look as hard as you may, you will probably not find any earlier non-manuscript English versions in their entirety prior to Wycliffe.
Some versions that antedated his efforts were:
Whitby's version of the Psalms (670 CE)
The Venerable Bede's Gospel of John
King Alfred's renderings of portions of Exodus and the Acts of the Apostles, as well as some of the Psalms (849-901 CE)
Aelfric's translation of the Heptateuch (Genesis through Judges)
None of these versions were translated in their entirety, and you will not find any evidence of a work comparable to Wycliffe's before the Bible that was credited to him was produced:
"With the activities of Wyclif and the Lollards, as his disciples were called, is associated the vernacular English of the Bible that circulated in manuscript as the only translation of the Bible available in the English tongue till the time of Tyndale and Coverdale" (Geddes MacGregor 77).
As FF Bruce points out:
"The first translation of the whole Bible into English is associated with the name of John Wycliffe (c. 1330-1384), the most eminent Oxford theologian of his day" (The English Bible, p. 12).
It also affirms that "The first English versions of the entire Bible were the two associated with the work of John Wyclif, made by translation from the Latin Vulgate between 1380 and 1397" (NRSV 401).
Look as hard as you may, you will probably not find any earlier non-manuscript English versions in their entirety prior to Wycliffe.
Some versions that antedated his efforts were:
Whitby's version of the Psalms (670 CE)
The Venerable Bede's Gospel of John
King Alfred's renderings of portions of Exodus and the Acts of the Apostles, as well as some of the Psalms (849-901 CE)
Aelfric's translation of the Heptateuch (Genesis through Judges)
None of these versions were translated in their entirety, and you will not find any evidence of a work comparable to Wycliffe's before the Bible that was credited to him was produced:
"With the activities of Wyclif and the Lollards, as his disciples were called, is associated the vernacular English of the Bible that circulated in manuscript as the only translation of the Bible available in the English tongue till the time of Tyndale and Coverdale" (Geddes MacGregor 77).
As FF Bruce points out:
"The first translation of the whole Bible into English is associated with the name of John Wycliffe (c. 1330-1384), the most eminent Oxford theologian of his day" (The English Bible, p. 12).
Tuesday, December 22, 2015
Song of Songs and Rabbi Akiba
From Weston W. Fields:
It is further stated that Rabbi Akiba said: "God forbid!-no man in Israel ever disputed about the Song of Songs (that he should say) that it does not render the hands unclean, for all the ages are not worth the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel; for all the Writings are holy, but the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies."30 This is to some an indication that Rabbi Akiba interpreted the Song allegorically. It is true that it is difficult to understand his hyperbolic language if he did not.
Field's entire article can be found here: http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/OTeSources/22-SongOfSongs/Text/Articles/Fields-SongOfSongs-GTJ.htm
See also http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/16445/showrashi/true
http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/16452/showrashi/true
It is further stated that Rabbi Akiba said: "God forbid!-no man in Israel ever disputed about the Song of Songs (that he should say) that it does not render the hands unclean, for all the ages are not worth the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel; for all the Writings are holy, but the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies."30 This is to some an indication that Rabbi Akiba interpreted the Song allegorically. It is true that it is difficult to understand his hyperbolic language if he did not.
Field's entire article can be found here: http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/OTeSources/22-SongOfSongs/Text/Articles/Fields-SongOfSongs-GTJ.htm
See also http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/16445/showrashi/true
http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/16452/showrashi/true
Monday, December 21, 2015
LSJ on ERWS
http://nlp.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph.jsp?l=e%29%2Frws&la=greek&can=e%29%2Frws0&prior=o%28#lexicon
Initial Research on Judges 1:6-7
When Adoni-Bezek ran away, they chased him and captured him. Then they cut off his thumbs and big toes. Adoni-Bezek said, “Seventy kings, with thumbs and big toes cut off, used to lick up food scraps under my table. God has repaid me for what I did to them.” They brought him to Jerusalem, where he died. (Judges 1:6-7 NET Bible)
καὶ εἶπεν Αδωνιβεζεκ ῾Εβδομήκοντα βασιλεῖς τὰ ἄκρα τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκομμένοι ἦσαν συλλέγοντες τὰ ὑποκάτω τῆς τραπέζης μου· καθὼς οὖν ἐποίησα, οὕτως ἀνταπέδωκέν μοι ὁ θεός. καὶ ἤγαγον αὐτὸν εἰς Ιερουσαλημ, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖ (Judges 1:7 LXX).
So, in this case, it seems that God did approve of the mutilated toes and thumbs. At least Adoni-Bezek didn't get all his fingers and toes severed. More seriously, we see the law of lex talionis in motion here: eye for eye and tooth for tooth. Ellicott's Commentary marshals other verses that make similar proclamations. For example:
And Samuel said, "As your sword has made women childless, so shall your mother be childless among women." And Samuel hacked Agag to pieces before the LORD in Gilgal. (1 Samuel 15:33 ESV)
Concerning Judges 1:7, Ellicott remarks:
The "seventy" kings may have been the rulers of the towns which Adoni-bezek had taken in extending the territory of Bezek. Josephus says seventy-two kings (Antt. v. 2, § 2), and this common variation is found in some MSS. of the LXX. The Persians treated their Greek captives in this way (Curtius, v. 5,6). Mutilation in the East was so common that it was hardly accounted cruel (Xen. Anab. i. 9-13).
Addendum: While Jehovah God could have decreed Adoni-Bezek's fate, it's also possible that God merely permitted him to undergo this fate.
καὶ εἶπεν Αδωνιβεζεκ ῾Εβδομήκοντα βασιλεῖς τὰ ἄκρα τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκομμένοι ἦσαν συλλέγοντες τὰ ὑποκάτω τῆς τραπέζης μου· καθὼς οὖν ἐποίησα, οὕτως ἀνταπέδωκέν μοι ὁ θεός. καὶ ἤγαγον αὐτὸν εἰς Ιερουσαλημ, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖ (Judges 1:7 LXX).
So, in this case, it seems that God did approve of the mutilated toes and thumbs. At least Adoni-Bezek didn't get all his fingers and toes severed. More seriously, we see the law of lex talionis in motion here: eye for eye and tooth for tooth. Ellicott's Commentary marshals other verses that make similar proclamations. For example:
And Samuel said, "As your sword has made women childless, so shall your mother be childless among women." And Samuel hacked Agag to pieces before the LORD in Gilgal. (1 Samuel 15:33 ESV)
Concerning Judges 1:7, Ellicott remarks:
The "seventy" kings may have been the rulers of the towns which Adoni-bezek had taken in extending the territory of Bezek. Josephus says seventy-two kings (Antt. v. 2, § 2), and this common variation is found in some MSS. of the LXX. The Persians treated their Greek captives in this way (Curtius, v. 5,6). Mutilation in the East was so common that it was hardly accounted cruel (Xen. Anab. i. 9-13).
Addendum: While Jehovah God could have decreed Adoni-Bezek's fate, it's also possible that God merely permitted him to undergo this fate.
Saturday, December 19, 2015
Paul Johnson's Comments on the Availability of the Bible from 1080 CE Onwards
Catholic historian Paul Johnson relates the following account:
"Access to the Bible, whether in the original or in any other tongue,
had never been an issue in the East. In the West, the clergy had begun
to assert an exclusive interpretive, indeed custodial, right to the
Bible as early as the ninth century; and from about 1080 there had been
frequent instances of the Pope, councils and bishops forbidding not
only vernacular translations but any reading at all, by laymen, of the
Bible taken as a whole. In some ways this was the most scandalous
aspect of the Medieval Latin Church. From the Waldensians onwards,
attempts to scrutinize the Bible became proof presumptive of heresy--a
man or a woman might burn for it alone--and, conversely, the heterodox
were increasingly convinced that the Bible was incompatible with papal
and clerical claims" (A History of Christianity 273).
Erasmus also made the comment that "Nowadays they shout 'heresy!' at
you for almost anything. Anything that does not please them, or that
they do not understand, is heresy. To know Greek is heresy. To
pronounce it correctly is heresy" (276).
Friday, December 18, 2015
Violence in the Old Testament
I had a lot of bright students for fall semester 2015, many of whom posed a number of questions and/or objections to me concerning the "Old Testament" (Hebrew-Aramaic Bible).
Many people decry the "violence" in the Old Testament. They wonder how a holy book for Jews and Christians could sanction such violent acts. Then they go off, purchase tickets and popcorn (along with drinks), and they watch gory films produced by Hollywood iterum et iterum. I thus wonder how bothered moderns truly are.
I'm not trying to make a tu quoque defense for the Bible, since there are ways to explain the wars in the OT. But this question just arose in my mind as I heard numerous criticisms of the OT this semester. Why do so many violent films exist, violent TV shows (etc), if we enlightened moderns are so bothered by violence? Just thinking out loud.
Many people decry the "violence" in the Old Testament. They wonder how a holy book for Jews and Christians could sanction such violent acts. Then they go off, purchase tickets and popcorn (along with drinks), and they watch gory films produced by Hollywood iterum et iterum. I thus wonder how bothered moderns truly are.
I'm not trying to make a tu quoque defense for the Bible, since there are ways to explain the wars in the OT. But this question just arose in my mind as I heard numerous criticisms of the OT this semester. Why do so many violent films exist, violent TV shows (etc), if we enlightened moderns are so bothered by violence? Just thinking out loud.
The Law of Contradiction
When teaching logic or other courses that bear on the subject, I've had some of my students express their doubts regarding the law of contradiction (also known as the law of non-contradiction). But it is very difficult to outright deny the truthfulness of the LNC once this law (or principle) is rightly understood. Even opponents of the famed "law" usually have not been able to reject it in toto: they still hold to remnants of it in their formal schemas. Nevertheless, those who normally oppose strict adherence to the LNC think there are exceptions to the law (e.g., the liar's paradox or the famed "cat" of Schrödinger).
My interest in the law has been shaped by my studies on the Trinity doctrine: the Trinity appears to be contradictory. If the word "God" is an identity marker (A = A) and not a predicative signifier that points to a quality, then the Trinity seems to be incoherent and logically impossible. I submit that ELOHIM/QEOS used within a given context of utterance is a marker of identity and that the proposition, "The Father is God," is an identity statement and not a predicative one. Thus, if there is one person to whom the identity marker "God" applies and this word "God" speaks to His identity simpliciter et simpliciter--then there cannot be anyone else called God/god who has all properties in common with this singular person such that we could rightly apply the law of indiscernibility of identicals to this person and say that A = B or that X = Y (known as the law of Leibniz). Simply put, Ps. 90:2 states that from OLAM to OLAM, Jehovah is God and that one God of Israel is identified as Father in the Hebrew Bible. ELOHIM is therefore not something merely predicated of Jehovah the Father: it tells us Who He is. Cf. the Shema in Deut. 6:4, which certain scholars interpret as a monotheistic confession about one divine person.
Eph. 4:4-6 also declares that there is one God and Father, who is over all and through all and in all. If God is an identity statement, and since there is only one God, no other entity or person can be identified as God without contradicting a major supposition of Trinitarianism, namely, the proposition that there is only one true God. But one question about this whole line of reasoning involves the very LNC itself.
From the Western standpoint, I can safely say that Aristotle was not the first person to employ the LNC, since both Zeno and Parmenides utilized the law during the Presocratic era. And even when Aristotle invokes, formulates and amplifies the law, he is simply abstracting from observations of the empirical world. For instance, the Philosopher knew that p and ~p applied to everyday life in a metaphysical sense. Aristotle evidently realized that a woman cannot be both pregnant and not pregnant simultaneously (at the same time and in the same sense); a house cannot be white and non-white simultaneously or in the same sense; no object can be red and green all over simultaneously or in the same sense, and as far as we can tell--no entity is able to subsist in two natures at one time (the stories about minotaurs and centaurs must be false). The LNC also makes me suspect the logical possibility of the Incarnation (Christ existing in two natures simultaneously).
Some Potential Objections to the LNC and My Replies:
Interlocutor:
"(1) "Transition states: when I leave the room, for an instant I am both in it and not in it."
This example is debatable. If you have left a room, the transition has been completed, so that you're not still in the room; if you're leaving the room, the transition has not been completed but you're still in the room. There is no genuine refutation here, but this objection is playing upon vague predication. Either way, there is no contradiction of the form p and ~p in this case.
Interlocutor:
"(2) "Some of Zeno's paradoxes: the moving arrow is both where it is, and where it is not."
Read Aristotle for a sound refutation of Zeno's paradoxes. The latter's famed puzzles only work if one accepts the major presupposition of his argument, namely, that space is composed of discrete spatial units. Furthermore, the results of Zeno's reasoning are not that desirable--according to that philosopher, motion is illusory and impossible. Do you agree with Zeno in this regard? At any rate, Aristotle refuted the sophisms of Zeno by clarifying the distinction between possibility and actuality.
Interlocutor:
"(3) "Borderline cases of vague predicates: an adolescent is both an adult and not an adult."
The term "adolescent" simply denotes an artifical distinction that is contrived by certain societies (not all societies). You cannot legitimately use an arbitrary or constructed distinction to overthrow what seems to be a necessary and immutable truth of the cosmos.
Interlocutor:
"(4) "Certain quantum mechanical states: a particle may go through two slits simultaneously, even though this is not possible."
The problems that attend QM may be more epistemological than ontological (Mortimer Adler). What is more, QM emphasizes ontological contingency (not ontological necessity): QM may allow for circumstances in which the LNC is circumvented, but using QM for this purpose seems like a stretch to me. As one physicist remarked: "I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics."
"If you think you can talk about quantum theory without feeling dizzy, you haven't understood the first thing about it" (Niels Bohr).
My interest in the law has been shaped by my studies on the Trinity doctrine: the Trinity appears to be contradictory. If the word "God" is an identity marker (A = A) and not a predicative signifier that points to a quality, then the Trinity seems to be incoherent and logically impossible. I submit that ELOHIM/QEOS used within a given context of utterance is a marker of identity and that the proposition, "The Father is God," is an identity statement and not a predicative one. Thus, if there is one person to whom the identity marker "God" applies and this word "God" speaks to His identity simpliciter et simpliciter--then there cannot be anyone else called God/god who has all properties in common with this singular person such that we could rightly apply the law of indiscernibility of identicals to this person and say that A = B or that X = Y (known as the law of Leibniz). Simply put, Ps. 90:2 states that from OLAM to OLAM, Jehovah is God and that one God of Israel is identified as Father in the Hebrew Bible. ELOHIM is therefore not something merely predicated of Jehovah the Father: it tells us Who He is. Cf. the Shema in Deut. 6:4, which certain scholars interpret as a monotheistic confession about one divine person.
Eph. 4:4-6 also declares that there is one God and Father, who is over all and through all and in all. If God is an identity statement, and since there is only one God, no other entity or person can be identified as God without contradicting a major supposition of Trinitarianism, namely, the proposition that there is only one true God. But one question about this whole line of reasoning involves the very LNC itself.
From the Western standpoint, I can safely say that Aristotle was not the first person to employ the LNC, since both Zeno and Parmenides utilized the law during the Presocratic era. And even when Aristotle invokes, formulates and amplifies the law, he is simply abstracting from observations of the empirical world. For instance, the Philosopher knew that p and ~p applied to everyday life in a metaphysical sense. Aristotle evidently realized that a woman cannot be both pregnant and not pregnant simultaneously (at the same time and in the same sense); a house cannot be white and non-white simultaneously or in the same sense; no object can be red and green all over simultaneously or in the same sense, and as far as we can tell--no entity is able to subsist in two natures at one time (the stories about minotaurs and centaurs must be false). The LNC also makes me suspect the logical possibility of the Incarnation (Christ existing in two natures simultaneously).
Some Potential Objections to the LNC and My Replies:
Interlocutor:
"(1) "Transition states: when I leave the room, for an instant I am both in it and not in it."
This example is debatable. If you have left a room, the transition has been completed, so that you're not still in the room; if you're leaving the room, the transition has not been completed but you're still in the room. There is no genuine refutation here, but this objection is playing upon vague predication. Either way, there is no contradiction of the form p and ~p in this case.
Interlocutor:
"(2) "Some of Zeno's paradoxes: the moving arrow is both where it is, and where it is not."
Read Aristotle for a sound refutation of Zeno's paradoxes. The latter's famed puzzles only work if one accepts the major presupposition of his argument, namely, that space is composed of discrete spatial units. Furthermore, the results of Zeno's reasoning are not that desirable--according to that philosopher, motion is illusory and impossible. Do you agree with Zeno in this regard? At any rate, Aristotle refuted the sophisms of Zeno by clarifying the distinction between possibility and actuality.
Interlocutor:
"(3) "Borderline cases of vague predicates: an adolescent is both an adult and not an adult."
The term "adolescent" simply denotes an artifical distinction that is contrived by certain societies (not all societies). You cannot legitimately use an arbitrary or constructed distinction to overthrow what seems to be a necessary and immutable truth of the cosmos.
Interlocutor:
"(4) "Certain quantum mechanical states: a particle may go through two slits simultaneously, even though this is not possible."
The problems that attend QM may be more epistemological than ontological (Mortimer Adler). What is more, QM emphasizes ontological contingency (not ontological necessity): QM may allow for circumstances in which the LNC is circumvented, but using QM for this purpose seems like a stretch to me. As one physicist remarked: "I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics."
"If you think you can talk about quantum theory without feeling dizzy, you haven't understood the first thing about it" (Niels Bohr).
Thursday, December 17, 2015
ERWS and Song of Songs
It's interesting to me that ERWS appears twice (both times in Proverbs), but it's not used in the book that is all about godly and decent love between a man and a woman (i.e., the Song of Solomon). There's probably a reason why the translators chose agape to describe the love mentioned in the Song rather than erws.
See Proverbs 7:18; 30:16; Song of Solomon 8:6.
See Proverbs 7:18; 30:16; Song of Solomon 8:6.
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
SWMATIKWS (Colossians 2:9)
"For in Christ all the fullness of the Deity lives in bodily form" (Colossians 2:9 NIV)
The expression "bodily form" (σωματικῶς) is interesting. Does it refer to Jesus of Nazareth qua human or is the verse referring to a heavenly spiritual body (not human) that Christ might now possess in the celestial sphere amongst the holy angels and God the Father?
Thayer seems to choose the second option and I'm inclined to agree with him. Even if one does not accept this understanding of the text, however, it is important to point out that Col. 2:9 does not (necessarily) refer to the incarnate "God-man." Of course, I don't believe that God became incarnate at all; nevertheless, I'm not trying to make an issue of the Incarnation here.
David M. Hay explains that σωματικῶς may denote "in reality" and he thinks that this meaning "seems to fit the present context" (Hay, Colossians, p. 89). See Philo, Heres 84.
Hay also writes:
He then suggests that the Incarnation of Messiah might be in view but then Hay sallies forth the meaning "in reality" for σωματικῶς.
See Col. 2:17.
The expression "bodily form" (σωματικῶς) is interesting. Does it refer to Jesus of Nazareth qua human or is the verse referring to a heavenly spiritual body (not human) that Christ might now possess in the celestial sphere amongst the holy angels and God the Father?
Thayer seems to choose the second option and I'm inclined to agree with him. Even if one does not accept this understanding of the text, however, it is important to point out that Col. 2:9 does not (necessarily) refer to the incarnate "God-man." Of course, I don't believe that God became incarnate at all; nevertheless, I'm not trying to make an issue of the Incarnation here.
David M. Hay explains that σωματικῶς may denote "in reality" and he thinks that this meaning "seems to fit the present context" (Hay, Colossians, p. 89). See Philo, Heres 84.
Hay also writes:
"This is not simply a formula for incarnation since
the present tense of 'dwells' seems to rule out the
idea of limiting this to the time of Jesus' earthly
life" (ibid).
He then suggests that the Incarnation of Messiah might be in view but then Hay sallies forth the meaning "in reality" for σωματικῶς.
See Col. 2:17.
Tuesday, December 15, 2015
Nation Against Nation (Matthew 24:7)
καὶ πολεμήσει ἔθνος πρὸς ἔθνος καὶ πόλις πρὸς πόλιν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐξέστησεν αὐτοὺς ἐν πάσῃ θλίψει. (2 Chronicles 15:6 LXX)
ἐγερθήσεται γὰρ ἔθνος ἐπὶ ἔθνος καὶ βασιλεία ἐπὶ βασιλείαν καὶ ἔσονται λιμοὶ καὶ σεισμοὶ κατὰ τόπους (Mt. 24:7)
Not exactly alike, but there are possible resemblances here, it seems.
ἐγερθήσεται γὰρ ἔθνος ἐπὶ ἔθνος καὶ βασιλεία ἐπὶ βασιλείαν καὶ ἔσονται λιμοὶ καὶ σεισμοὶ κατὰ τόπους (Mt. 24:7)
Not exactly alike, but there are possible resemblances here, it seems.
Saturday, December 12, 2015
Dialogue on Time and the Present (Edited Discussion)
MY INTERLOCUTOR: "Where my main disagreement lies is with your statement that 'all that really exists or has duration is the present.' For, if only the present exists, then time does not exist. For this is the very definition of atemporality: being without succession in a constant undivided NOW. To be sure, neither the past nor the future have a duration greater than (or less than) zero in the present. But, neither does the present have a duration greater than (or less than zero) in the present. For, however long the duration is of the present, for that same length of time, time stands still. And when time stands still, time does not exist, for no temporal succession
occurs during that 'time'. So, in order for time to exist, the length of the duration of the present cannot be anything other than zero."
EDGAR: One could argue that a tense like "present" implies duration since we could and often do view "the present" as a temporal distinction. The argument set forth above only works if one accepts your definition of "atemporality." As one who believes in an A-series of time, I do not define "atemporality" as "being without succession in a constant undivided now." My view is that the present (i.e., now) necessarily shares in temporality insofar as it involves temporal succession. Richard Gale takes up this subject in a work entitled "Has the Present any Duration?," Noûs, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Feb., 1971): 39-47. He argues that certain problems arise when we talk about "the present" since it is possible to equivocate when employing this language. Gale makes a distinction between the durational present and the punctal present. An example of the former distinction is when we speak of the current year (2008) as the present; conversely, we can refer to the present or "now" in the sense of a particular moment of the current year (i.e., 4:15 on April 4, 2008). Unless we make a clear distinction between which "present" we're talking about, antinomies might result.
INTERLOCUTOR: "If the present is indivisible, how can it have a duration other than zero? For no number other than zero is indivisible."
EDGAR: The present is not necessarily indivisible. Besides, it depends on which "present" you have in mind. But even the present (in terms of this day, April 4) appears to have finite temporal parts or some type of extension. There is an informative article by C. W. K. Mundle "Augustine's Pervasive Error concerning Time," Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 156. (Apr., 1966): 165-168. Mundle critiques the Augustinian assertion that "No one would deny that the present has no duration" (Confessions 11.28). Using some of his examples, I might ask, if the present has no genuine duration, then how is it possible for me to hear a series of sounds now that I recognize as my favorite song? Or what if I am now having the experience of visually perceiving my 2005 BMW? How can I make sense of this (current) visual perception in terms of a durationless present?
INTERLOCUTOR:
"Thus, I argue that the past, the present, and the future have an atemporal mode of existence in the present. And by an atemporal mode of existence, I mean a non-durational mode of existence. If you reject this concept, then how can it be consistent with your views for you to speak of the past as 'being' potentially infinite, or to say that the past 'is' potentially infinite? Wouldn't consistency require you to say that 'the past was potentially infinite', with the implication being that the past is now no longer potentially infinite?"
EDGAR:
Firstly, I do not buy into the notion of tenseless time. Maybe it is not your intent, but it seems that you have verbally abolished tense vis-a-vis time and you're now content to have a tenseless past, present and future "in the present," which still does not make sense to me unless what you're trying to affirm is a B-series of time in A-series language. If I speak of the past as "being" potentially infinite, I do not mean that the past is still in existence. I have made it clear that I affirm the A-series of time which claims that the past is no longer and the future is not yet. When I used the language you allude to above, I did not mean to imply that I believe God's potentially infinite past still exists. I was simply trying to predicate potential infinity of the past: it is only a suggestion that is being made here.
INTERLOCUTOR:
"I am curious as to where John of Damascus speaks of time as having existed in an unmeasurable state prior to the coming into being of the created order. Wouldn't 'unmeasurable' time have to be indivisible, and thus atemporal?"
I came across the references in Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God. He culled the remarks of John of Damascus from a book written by Nelson Pike (God and Timelessness), which I have read and subsequently documented the references to John of Damascus for myself. You can find the Damascene's observations on time in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. His words appear on p. 181 of Nelson Pike's work. Keep in mind that Davis and Pike interpret John of Damascus as making the claim that God once existed in unmeasurable time or that unmeasurable time is somehow tied to God's nature.
occurs during that 'time'. So, in order for time to exist, the length of the duration of the present cannot be anything other than zero."
EDGAR: One could argue that a tense like "present" implies duration since we could and often do view "the present" as a temporal distinction. The argument set forth above only works if one accepts your definition of "atemporality." As one who believes in an A-series of time, I do not define "atemporality" as "being without succession in a constant undivided now." My view is that the present (i.e., now) necessarily shares in temporality insofar as it involves temporal succession. Richard Gale takes up this subject in a work entitled "Has the Present any Duration?," Noûs, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Feb., 1971): 39-47. He argues that certain problems arise when we talk about "the present" since it is possible to equivocate when employing this language. Gale makes a distinction between the durational present and the punctal present. An example of the former distinction is when we speak of the current year (2008) as the present; conversely, we can refer to the present or "now" in the sense of a particular moment of the current year (i.e., 4:15 on April 4, 2008). Unless we make a clear distinction between which "present" we're talking about, antinomies might result.
INTERLOCUTOR: "If the present is indivisible, how can it have a duration other than zero? For no number other than zero is indivisible."
EDGAR: The present is not necessarily indivisible. Besides, it depends on which "present" you have in mind. But even the present (in terms of this day, April 4) appears to have finite temporal parts or some type of extension. There is an informative article by C. W. K. Mundle "Augustine's Pervasive Error concerning Time," Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 156. (Apr., 1966): 165-168. Mundle critiques the Augustinian assertion that "No one would deny that the present has no duration" (Confessions 11.28). Using some of his examples, I might ask, if the present has no genuine duration, then how is it possible for me to hear a series of sounds now that I recognize as my favorite song? Or what if I am now having the experience of visually perceiving my 2005 BMW? How can I make sense of this (current) visual perception in terms of a durationless present?
INTERLOCUTOR:
"Thus, I argue that the past, the present, and the future have an atemporal mode of existence in the present. And by an atemporal mode of existence, I mean a non-durational mode of existence. If you reject this concept, then how can it be consistent with your views for you to speak of the past as 'being' potentially infinite, or to say that the past 'is' potentially infinite? Wouldn't consistency require you to say that 'the past was potentially infinite', with the implication being that the past is now no longer potentially infinite?"
EDGAR:
Firstly, I do not buy into the notion of tenseless time. Maybe it is not your intent, but it seems that you have verbally abolished tense vis-a-vis time and you're now content to have a tenseless past, present and future "in the present," which still does not make sense to me unless what you're trying to affirm is a B-series of time in A-series language. If I speak of the past as "being" potentially infinite, I do not mean that the past is still in existence. I have made it clear that I affirm the A-series of time which claims that the past is no longer and the future is not yet. When I used the language you allude to above, I did not mean to imply that I believe God's potentially infinite past still exists. I was simply trying to predicate potential infinity of the past: it is only a suggestion that is being made here.
INTERLOCUTOR:
"I am curious as to where John of Damascus speaks of time as having existed in an unmeasurable state prior to the coming into being of the created order. Wouldn't 'unmeasurable' time have to be indivisible, and thus atemporal?"
I came across the references in Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God. He culled the remarks of John of Damascus from a book written by Nelson Pike (God and Timelessness), which I have read and subsequently documented the references to John of Damascus for myself. You can find the Damascene's observations on time in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. His words appear on p. 181 of Nelson Pike's work. Keep in mind that Davis and Pike interpret John of Damascus as making the claim that God once existed in unmeasurable time or that unmeasurable time is somehow tied to God's nature.
Friday, December 11, 2015
NET Bible Note on Proverbs 2:22
Heb “the guilty.” The term רְשָׁעִים (rÿsha’im, “the wicked”) is from the root רָשַׁע (rasha’, “to be guilty”) and refers to those who are (1) guilty of sin: moral reprobates or (2) guilty of crime: criminals deserving punishment (BDB 957 s.v. רָשָׁע). This is the person who is probably not a covenant member and manifests that in the way he lives, either by sinning against God or committing criminal acts. The noun sometimes refers to guilty criminals who deserve to die (Num 16:26; 35:31; 2 Sam 4:11). Here they will be “cut off” and “torn away” from the land.
Thursday, December 10, 2015
Girdlestone's Comments on RASHA
As these remarks demonstrate, it seems that the moral element should not be removed from the lexicality or semanticity of RASHA.
These are pages 134-135 of Girdlestone. Other sources that make similar claims could be produced.
Wednesday, December 09, 2015
Psalm 31:17--Sheol
Ps 31:17:
"Let the wicked be disgraced; let them lie silent in
the grave" (NLT).
"Let the wicked be put to shame, let them be silent in
Sheol" (NASB).
The Hebrew term rendered "wicked" is RASHA (רָשָׁע).
The LXX has οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ("the ungodly") for RASHA.
In any event, we know that evil, bad or wicked
people (from God's standpoint) are under consideration
in Ps 31:17.
In view of the foregoing data, my question is this.
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that anyone who dies and
finds his/her abiding place in Sheol or Hades
(really not a place, but more of a condition) will one
day be raised from the dead (Rev 20:12-13) by God. But
if, as David indicates, the "wicked" are "brought down
to Hades" when they die, then wouldn't the wicked in
Hades have to be raised from the dead when God
empties Sheol? Compare Rev 6:8.
Someone might point out that Ps 31:17 does not explicitly
say the wicked go to Sheol post mortem, but it only states
that David prayed for God to consign the wicked in Sheol.
Nevertheless, the belief that at least some wicked
ones could be denizens of Sheol appears to be an
ancient belief of Judaism. While it is conceivable
that David prayed for the wicked to be
brought down to Sheol without believing that they would actually rest there,
that possibility seems highly unlikely, in view of
what other texts dealing with Sheol declare.
Tuesday, December 08, 2015
Impassibility: What Is It?
I've studied the putative divine attribute called "impassibility" (APAQEIA) for a number of years and think it seems safe to claim that the "ancients" generally understood APAQEIA (as applied to God) to mean "not subject to the emotions, changes, conditioning or sufferings common to humanity." In other words, God is the Unconditioned One or actus purus.
Richard A. Creel (Divine Impassibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) rigorously outlines and discusses eight possible senses of the term "impassibility," and it appears from his study that the ancients and a number of modern theologians thought/think divine APAQEIA rules out God having any emotions (i.e., passions) or at least emotions as we know of them. To be fair, Joseph M. Hallman (The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology) shows that the ANF and PNF treatment of God's supposed impassiblity is by no means neat or tidy. For instance, some of the ancient Fathers seem to affirm God's impassibility on one hand while qualifying it on the other. As with any theological subject, there are opposing viewpoints.
Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition, 1:53)
observes:
However, it seems that Justin's thought was inchoate and less than complete.
The Fathers admittedly spoke of God being impassible and simultaneously attributed emotions (in a way) to Him. But as the writings of Tertullian suggest, early church writers tended to reason that God certainly does not experience emotions in a human manner and possibly He does not have emotions on the "meta" level at all.
John Thompson (Modern Trinitarian Perspectives. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Page 55) writes:
"In line, therefore, with most modern theologians [Karl] Barth rejects the idea of APAQEIA, of God as an unmoved, unfeeling being beyond the reach of suffering."
And while he is not an "ancient," I believe that Anselm of Canterbury sums up the thought of the ANF and PNF well:
Richard A. Creel (Divine Impassibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) rigorously outlines and discusses eight possible senses of the term "impassibility," and it appears from his study that the ancients and a number of modern theologians thought/think divine APAQEIA rules out God having any emotions (i.e., passions) or at least emotions as we know of them. To be fair, Joseph M. Hallman (The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology) shows that the ANF and PNF treatment of God's supposed impassiblity is by no means neat or tidy. For instance, some of the ancient Fathers seem to affirm God's impassibility on one hand while qualifying it on the other. As with any theological subject, there are opposing viewpoints.
Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition, 1:53)
observes:
"Some [ancient] Christian theologians went so far as simply to identify the Christian doctrine of God with the philosophical rejection of anthropomorphism; Arnobius [of Sicca] argued that God (the gods) had to be 'immune to every disturbance and every perturbation,' with no 'agitation of spirit' or wrath. Others did not go to this extreme, but maintained that the philosophical doctrine of impassiblity was not incompatible with the biblical language about the wrath of God; Justin referred to God as impassible, but also spoke 'again and again of God in the most personal language.'"
However, it seems that Justin's thought was inchoate and less than complete.
The Fathers admittedly spoke of God being impassible and simultaneously attributed emotions (in a way) to Him. But as the writings of Tertullian suggest, early church writers tended to reason that God certainly does not experience emotions in a human manner and possibly He does not have emotions on the "meta" level at all.
John Thompson (Modern Trinitarian Perspectives. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Page 55) writes:
"In line, therefore, with most modern theologians [Karl] Barth rejects the idea of APAQEIA, of God as an unmoved, unfeeling being beyond the reach of suffering."
"In most places in his work, Gregory [of Nyssa] tends to use APAQEIA in reference to all feelings and to exalt the Christian attempt to attain it. APAQEIA in its usual meaning is the absence of all the passions [i.e., emotions], and Gregory inherits this usage. At times, however, he does give a positive valuation of some human emotions" (Hallman, op. cit. 89).
And while he is not an "ancient," I believe that Anselm of Canterbury sums up the thought of the ANF and PNF well:
"How, then, art though compassionate and not
compassionate, O Lord, unless because thou art
compassionate in terms of our experience, and not
compassionate in terms of thy being" (Proslogium 8).
Friday, December 04, 2015
2 Kings 4:37 (προσεκύνησεν)
καὶ εἰσῆλθεν ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ καὶ προσεκύνησεν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ἔλαβεν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξῆλθεν (2 Kings 4:37, LXX).
Brenton LXX (4 Kings 4:37): "And the woman went in, and fell at his feet, and did obeisance bowing to the ground; and she took her son, and went out."
NETS: "And the woman came in and fell at his feet and did obeisance on the ground, and she took her son and went out."
Brenton LXX (4 Kings 4:37): "And the woman went in, and fell at his feet, and did obeisance bowing to the ground; and she took her son, and went out."
NETS: "And the woman came in and fell at his feet and did obeisance on the ground, and she took her son and went out."
Thursday, December 03, 2015
F.E. Peters Discusses Philo's Logos Theory
From the pen of F.E. Peters (Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon, page 112):
Later Philo says that the Logos finds expression when God creates the cosmos (see De Fuga 2, 12). But the LOGOS is not a person in Philo, and it is not identical with Almighty God.
"Philo knew the distinction between interior and
exterior LOGOS and could apply it in an orthodox Stoic
fashion (De vita Mos. II, 137), and it was perhaps
this distinction, together with the Jewish scriptural
tradition about the 'Word of God' that led to his new
treatment of LOGOS. In the first instance LOGOS is the
Divine Reason that embraces the archetypal complex of
EIDE that will serve as the models of creation (De
opif. 5, 20)."
Later Philo says that the Logos finds expression when God creates the cosmos (see De Fuga 2, 12). But the LOGOS is not a person in Philo, and it is not identical with Almighty God.
Leonard Hodgson on Divine Unity
Hodgson's comments from his The Doctrine of the Trinity:
"The notion that in the Trinity one Person may be the fount or source
of being or Godhead for another lingered on to be a cause of friction
and controversy between the East and the West, and still persists
today. The main thesis of these lectures, I have said, is that
the act of faith required for acceptance of the doctrine
of the Trinity is faith that the Divine unity is a dynamic unity
actively unifying in the one divine life the lives of the three divine
persons. I now wish to add that in this unity there is no
room for any trace of subordinationism, and that the thought of the
Father as the source or fount of God-head is a relic of pre-Christian
theology which has not fully assimilated the Christian revelation"
(102).
Tuesday, December 01, 2015
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