Reliability of the Bible and the DSS

We've had recent comments about the reliability of biblical translations in light of the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) or Septuagint Version (LXX). I guess that some perceive a possible conflict between the Masoretic Text, the LXX and the DSS.

I consulted Geza Vermes translation of the DSS (introductory notes) and he appears to downplay any potential difficulty that might exist for how we read Scripture juxtaposed with the DSS or LXX. Another article that touches upon this issue is found at http://www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-topics/bible-versions-and-translations/the-original-bible-and-the-dead-sea-scrolls/

The example adduced by Tov from 1 Samuel 1:24 provides an interesting case study.

Saint Jerome on the Bible Canon

"Therefore as the church indeed reads Judith, Tobit and the books of Maccabees, but does not receive them among the canonical books, so let it also read these two volumes [Sirach and Parables] for the edification of the people but not for establishing the authority of ecclesiastical dogma" (Prologue to the books of Wisdom).

My Review of Peter van Inwagen's Book "The Problem of Evil"

The so-called logical problem of evil suggests that there's a marked inconsistency between the statement "Almighty God exists" and the utterance "evil exists." For if God is almighty and omnibenevolent, then why does evil obtain? This problem was raised long ago by the Greek philosopher Epicurus and the ancient Gnostics.

Notre Dame University Professor, Peter van Inwagen, offers a useful contribution to the growing literature about the logical problem of evil. His book is a solid collection of eight Gifford lectures delivered at the University of St Andrews in May 2003. The prose contained in the work is often impressive, the reasoning is starkly lucid and van Inwagen's philosophical arguments generally are compelling. Hence, these lectures carefully analyze "evil" in order to remove manifold confusions that surround the concept. There are contexts in which "evil" denotes "moral depravity" but other contexts where the denotation is possibly "the absence of good." Defining evil is an arduous task, but the clarification of ideas should precede genuine philosophical analysis.

Before showing the deficiencies evidently associated with the logical problem of evil, van Inwagen posits his idea of God. He reasons that there are certain attributes which God should possess in order to be the maximally excellent entity, that than which a greater cannot be conceived (according to Anselm of Canterbury). These divine qualities include omniscience, moral perfection and omnipotence. The reader is subsequently treated to a definition and insightful analysis of the expression "philosophical failure." What is philosophical failure? How does this notion affect the argument from evil? Those perusing the book have such questions answered. Additionally, they find new distinctions regarding evil (for example, local versus global evil).

In the final analysis, I believe that van Inwagen demonstrates how the argument from evil fails. He establishes (with a certain degree of plausibility) that one cannot rightly argue from evil to the non-existence of God. There are other ways to account for the permission of divinely-preventable evil. To this end, the book addresses animal suffering, predatory activities among beasts and the so-called hiddenness of God. The author wisely frames a number of his arguments in dialogical form by creating two characters known as Theist and Atheist, who argue about the logical problem of evil in front of an imaginary neutral crowd. The dialogue is interesting, to a point, although I believe that van Inwagen tries to be too clever at times.

This philosophical treatise is written for those who have some familiarity with the common vocabulary of metaphysics, the philosophy of religion, and systematic theology. Moreover, I would not call the arguments here conclusive, in any sense of the word, but the read is generally enjoyable and illuminating.

Commentator Joseph Alexander on Acts 2:23

See http://archive.org/stream/actsapostles00alexgoog#page/n102/mode/1up

Very incisive remarks.

Is It Reasonable to Believe That God Brings All Things to Pass?

If God has foreordained every event or action, then he not only causes evil through evil men like Hitler or Judas--but he also causes "evil" (along with good) through every human who has ever lived. According to this line of reasoning, God evidently brings it to pass that fetuses are aborted through humans. It also seems that God caused evil through humans when the ancient Israelites offered their innocent babies in the fire to the false god Molech. Yet, YHWH explicitly stated that he never commanded such actions, nor did these kinds of sacrifices ever come up into his heart (Jer 7:31; 32:35). In fact, God called such sacrifices an "abomination." I also judge (condemn) similar actions and I would never think that God moved someone to offer his/her child in sacrifice, nor would a righteous and good deity move one man to rape another man's wife. "There is no darkness" in God (1 John 1:5).

Westminster Confession As It Pertains to Foreordination

Some people believe that God foreordains all that comes to pass--including the ungodly acts of those not serving him. The Westminster Confession of Faith (III.1) states:

"God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

So God evidently foreordained the Edenic Fall and he ordained (eternally) the violent death of his Son and so many other historical atrocities. Yet God is not the Author of sin. How does this kind of reasoning logically work? I also wonder how this view comports with scripture.

Two points for now:

1) Why foreordain the Fall, yet warn Adam and Eve what would happen if they disobeyed and took fruit from the tree in the middle of the garden? Why sentence them to death if they were simply doing what had been foreordained? What would you think about me giving an assignment to my students, and telling them there would be a penalty for failure to do it, but then make the assignment undoable by dint of its design? I would probably not win professor of the year for such a move. And I can't help but wonder how God's name would be magnified by the foreordination of evil.

2) James 1:13-17 seems to contradict the Westminster Confession. God does not tempt (try) us with evil. He is perfect, just and good in all his ways. God did not foreordain the treacherous act of Judas Iscariot; nor did he bring to pass chattel slavery or the Holocaust. Each one is tried or enticed by his own sinful desire. As for the Edenic Fall, it occurred because of two humans who chose to misuse the free will granted them by our God and sovereign. He did not bring that event to pass.

Why Are Some Utterances of Paul "Hard to Understand"?

Paul's letters can often be difficult to understand (in Greek or English). The apostle was a profound thinker, a point that I think is borne out by looking at the illustrations he uses (1 Corinthians 15:35-49). Granted, he was writing under inspiration and by means of the wisdom that God gave him (2 Peter 3:15); nevertheless, the Bible allows human personalities and abilities to shine through the text too (1 Corinthians 7:12, 39-40).

But it is not always easy to follow Paul's involved line of reasoning (Romans 9:15-33; Gal 3:1-20). Why is he hard to understand at times (2 Pet 3:15-16)?

A.T. Robertson makes this observation:

"The style of Paul, like his theology, has challenged the attention of the greatest minds. Farrar calls his language 'the style of genius, if not the genius of style.' There is no doubt about its individuality" (A Grammar of the Greek NT, p. 128).

Robertson also mentions K.L. Bauer, who compares Paul's writings to the treatises written by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. And here is what one scholar (John H. Finley, Jr.) has to say about the historiographical style of Thucydides:

"At farthest remove from the nascent [earliest Greek] prose is the co-called periodic style of Plato, Isocrates and the writers of the fourth century generally. By studious subordination of minor points to the major idea of a sentence, it achieves impressive organic unity but commonly at the cost of sapping the vitality of subordinate ideas. This is the style, which, adopted from Isocrates by Cicero, passed from him into the English cadences of Gibbon and Burke. Thucydides' prose stands somewhere between these two, the simple and periodic, styles. His chief devices are antithesis, comparison and contrast. Within any given sentence, clause will be paired with clause, subject with subject, verb with verb. This elaborately antithetical method is more characteristic, to be sure, of the speeches than of the common narrative" (The Peloponnesian War, page x in the introduction).

With the foregoing in mind, read (in Greek) Ephesians 1:3-14; Rom 1:24-28; 5:12-21; Galatians 5:19-21.

In addition to these points, it is important to remember that Paul employs numerous literary or rhetorical devices. His letters have even been compared to apologetico-rhetorical treatises of antiquity, although there may be some legitimate differences between the Pauline letters and epistles penned in the ancient world.

Timothy George (see his commentary concerning Galatians) makes an interesting point regarding the Pauline letters when he points out that H.D. Betz outlines Galatians as follows:

Exordium: Gal 1:6-11

Narratio: Gal 1:12-2:!4

Propositio: Gal 2:15-21

Probatio: Gal 3:1-4:31

Paraenesis: Gal 5:1-6:10

Postscript: Gal 6:11-18.

While George believes this analysis has some advantages, he thinks "Betz seems to have gone too far in pressing Galatians into the rhetorical structure of apologetic letters" (Galatians, page 64).

This caveat should be duly noted, but I also concur with Betz in some respects. I have worked with a number of Latin and Greek apologetico-rhetorical treatises (Tertullian, Lactantius, Cyprian, Tatian, Quintillian) as well as literary devices/tropes in general. The Apostle Paul is a master rhetor, as far as I can tell, even if he appears to speak of rhetoric in pejorative terms at times and possibly did not have formal training.

Robert Alter Offers Commentary on Genesis 7:11

Albert Barnes on Acts 19:9

Acts 19:9 casts doubt on the notion that all first century congregations/churches were house ecclesiae. Here are Barnes' remarks on the verse:

"In the school of one Tyrannus. Who this Tyrannus was, is not known. It is probable that he was a Jew, who was engaged in this employment, and who might not be unfavourable to Christians. In his school, or in the room which he occupied for teaching, Paul instructed the people when he was driven from the synagogue. Christians at that time had no churches, and they were obliged to assemble in any place where it might be convenient to conduct public worship" (Barnes NT Notes).

Theologian Kevin J. Vanhoozer Explains How Mental States Possibly Arise

From the book Is There a Meaning in This Text?, page 249):

"A cell is a complex phenomenon that emerges out of small infrastructures (molecules and atoms) and demands its own science (biochemistry). Similarly, mental properties depend on a biological infrastructure, yet they are irreducible to that substratum. Mental states, that is, 'supervene' on physical states. This way of conceiving mind has the advantage of being the most adequate scientific explanation of consciousness and of conforming to a Christian understanding of human beings as created in the divine image. Both mind and meaning, the self and the sentence, are higher level phenomena--new beings, as it were--that are discontinuous, at least in some respects, with the lower forms from which they emerge."

Do Jehovah's Witnesses Claim To Be Inspired?

Some critics of Jehovah's Witnesses claim that our organization thinks of itself as "inspired by God." However, the truth is that while we consider ourselves to be guided, led or directed by the holy spirit--no claim to inspiration has been made. In fact, the very opposite is true. We know that the Bible provides no warrant for calling spirit-anointed Christians QEOPNEUSTOS.

I am not denying that God has appointed men to take the lead in the Christian congregation or that Jehovah ministers in different ways via His spirit. But such operations of the spirit are not examples of inspiration (in the biblical sense of that word).

Charles Ryrie talks about the doctrine of illumination in his work on theology. He observes:

"The illumination theory of inspiration regards inspiration as an intensifying and elevating of the perceptions of the biblical writers. But generally the concept of illumination relates to the ministry of the Holy Spirit helping the believer to understand the truth of the Bible" (Ryrie, Basic Theology, 116).

Ryrie, therefore, makes a distinction between illumination of the believer and inspiration of the Bible writers. We're making a similar distinction when WT literature says that the "faithful and discreet slave" is guided by God's spirit--illuminated if you will--but that class is not and does not claim to be QEOPNEUSTOS (1 Cor 2:9-10).

Questions for Thomists Regarding Immaterial Intellects

I wrote the following to a colleague who teaches in my university's psychology department. I have retained the substance of my written correspondence to him:

Thomists argue that we need immaterial intellects to apprehend abstract universals. But how do we know that physical organs are only capable of apprehending concrete particulars? What incontrovertible proof do we have that intellects (of the Thomistic caliber) even exist? I admit that an intellect qua a power of the soul is logically possible (i.e. not self-contradictory). However, I am not convinced that such a faculty is factually possible (i.e. that it actually exists). So I guess my first line of attack would be to question the existence of the non-material intellect. Secondly, I would argue that what has been called "intellect" is really nothing more than a higher-order process of the brain: intellection is a biological phenomenon (see the work done by John Searle). The brain consequently makes it possible for us to have the facility for grasping what appear to be universals. So-called universals may be nothing more than generalizations of concrete experience or linguistic constructs of the mind.

I would add that the word "soul" in Aristotle's writings (upon which Thomistic hylomorphic thought is built) is amenable to a physicalist interpretation.

[END OF DIALOGUE]

Addendum: I want to make it clear that my comments pertain to human intellection, not divine (God or angels). It is my belief that human intellection only exists because of brain activity--not due to some immaterial intellect. We may not understand how the brain produces intellection, but evidence continues to lean in that direction.

I also have no problem using the term "mind." Mind would not exist if there were not physical (neurobiological) processes that obtained.

John Gill's Remarks on Ecclesiastes 9:5

"but the dead know not anything; this is not to be understood of their separate spirits, and of the things of the other world; for the righteous dead know much, their knowledge is greatly increased; they know, as they are known; they know much of God in Christ, of his perfections, purposes, covenant, grace, and love; they know much of Christ, of his person, offices, and glory, and see him as he is; they know much of the Gospel, and the mysteries of it; and of angels, and the spirits of just men, they now converse with; and of the glories and happiness of the heavenly state; even they know abundantly more than they did in this life: and the wicked dead, in their separate spirits, know there is a God that judgeth; that their souls are immortal; that there is a future state; indeed they know and feel the torments of hell, the worm that never dies, and the fire that is not quenched: but this is to be interpreted of their bodily senses now extinct, and of worldly things they have now nothing to do with; they know not any thing that is done in this world, nor how it fares with their children and friends they have left behind them; see Job 14:21; nor therefore are they to be prayed unto, and used as mediators with God."

I want to make a reply that addresses some of Gill's comments, in another post.

Colossians 1:22-23: A Discussion on Eternal Security

Colossians 1:22 discusses how God (see Col 1:19-20) has (already) effected reconciliation (νυνὶ δὲ ἀποκατήλλαξεν) for those who were once His enemies, through the precious blood that Jesus shed on his stauros. This act of love is why the apostle writes that God the Father has reconciled His former adversaries ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου; that is, through the death of Jesus Christ. Such a sin-offering has been provided lovingly in order that God's people might come before the Divine One without any blemishes, spots or accusations that would lamentably besmirch the beauteous name of Almighty God Jehovah (παραστῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ).

Paul then writes, more controversially, that enjoying an unblemished state through Christ's shed blood (i.e. his death) is only possible εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἑδραῖοι καὶ μὴ μετακινούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε (Colossians 1:23).

Prima facie this passage appears to teach us that "eternal security" could be a fictive theological construct that is not to be found in Scripture. Paul's inspired words seem to imply that a Christian must remain in the faith while adhering to the hope of the Gospel that was preached ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν so that he/she might be saved in a definitive sense. This verse thus appears to militate against any notion of eternal security; hence, at this point, it would be beneficial to see what some first-rate commentaries have observed about the conditional structure of this textual unit.

Peter O'Brien observes that Colossians 1:23 is a lengthy conditional sentence containing both positive and negative elements (O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69). He maintains that εἴ γε "does not express doubt" (Ibid); rather, he believes that the apostle is really saying, in so many words, "At any rate if you stand firm in the faith--and I am sure you will . . . " He takes this position in view of Colossians 2:5 (Ibid).

O'Brien however goes on to write that "If it is true that the saints will persevere to the end, then it is equally true that the saints must persevere to the end' (Ibid). He then attempts to show how Colossians constitutes an exhortatory message, which strengthens the "saints" to avoid lapsing into a state of smug complacency. O'Brien therefore does not believe that Colossians 1:22-23 fazes the doctrine of eternal security at all. When interviewed about this subject, he provided this response:

"The warnings of Hebrews [6:4-8; 10:26-39, etc.] have presented many challenges to believers throughout Christian history. And the misapplication of them has caused pastoral problems for Christians of all traditions, including the Reformed. These warnings have troubled earnest Christians by raising doubts about their assurance of salvation, an assurance that is so clearly affirmed, for example, in Romans 5:1-11 and Romans 8:18-39, and in Jesus's promises for his disciples in John 6:39-40, 44 and John 10:25-30."

See http://thegospelcoalition.org/article/warning-passages-ahead/

James Dunn, on the other hand, provides this commentary:

"εἴ γε may denote confidence more than doubt (cf. its use in 2 Cor. 5:3; Eph. 3:2; 4:21), but final acceptance is nevertheless dependent on remaining in the faith. The parenetic and pastoral point is that however such persistence must be and is enabled by God through the Spirit (1:11), there must be such persistence (cf. O'Brien, Colossians, Philemon 69)' (Dunn, Colossians, Philemon 110).

Dunn (in ftn 8, page 110) then quotes R.W. Wall as follows:

"Paul does not teach a 'once saved, always saved' kind of religion; nor does he understand faith as a 'once for all decision for Christ.'"

You can find Wall's remarks in full by consulting his commentary, Colossians and Philemon (The IVP NT Commentary; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), page 81.

I believe that Wall's understanding of Colossians 1:23 is closer to what Paul wanted to say with his use of εἴ γε, KTL.

Sheol and Hades

The Greek hADHS is synonymous with the Hebrew SHEOL. If we really want to understand what the NT says about hell, we must consider what the OT teaches about SHEOL. According to the holy writings that have been recorded primarily in Hebrew, SHEOL is a "place" of inactivity where all dead persons go; it is gravedom (Ecclesiastes 9:10).

Job 3 indicates that SHEOL is a place for both the wicked and the righteous to "sleep." In the midst of bemoaning his pitiable earthly existence, Job lamented that he had not perished after coming forth from his mother's womb--saying: "For by now I should have lain down that I might be undisturbed; I should have slept then; I should be at rest . . . There the wicked themselves have ceased from agitation, and those weary in power are at rest" (Job 3:13-20). Additionally, Job also depicts SHEOL as "the land of darkness and deep shadow" and as "the land of obscurity like gloom, of deep shadow and disorder, where it beams no more than gloom does" (Job 10:21, 22).

It's of interest how the signifier hADHS is used in Revelation too. In Rev. 6:8, John sees a pale horse with a rider that has hADHS closely following him. Later in the same book, the sea, death and hADHS are said to give up the dead in them (KAI EDWKEN hH QALASSA TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTHi KAI QANATOS KAI hO hADHS EDWKAN TOUS NEKROUS TOUS EN AUTOIS); then the dead are judged according to their deeds and death along with hADHS is subsequently hurled into the lake of fire which signifies the "second death" (Rev. 20:13-15). John then reports that "death is no more" (since it was hurled into the lake of fire). See Rev. 21:3-4.

"there shall be no more death] More exactly, death shall be no more, having been destroyed in the Lake of Fire, Revelation 20:14 : not that the personification is put forward here" (W.H. Simcox, Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges).

Based on the aforesaid information, I conclude that hADHS is identical to the Hebrew SHEOL (Cf. Ps. 16:10 and Acts 2:27ff). hADHS being thrown into the lake of fire evidently means that it is no more just as death is no more after being cast in the famed "lake." The lake of fire appears to symbolize eternal destruction (annihilation) and not eternal torment.

Dialogue on Genesis 1:1ff

My interlocutor writes:

The figure of speech used in Gen. 1:1 in the phrase "the heavens and the earth" is called synecdoche, in which the whole is evoked by the naming of the part. "The earth" includes the earth itself, and all forms of life which live upon it. It includes the dry land and the sea, mankind plants and animals, etc. "The heavens" also encompasses all this domain contains. Since the Hebrew for "created" (BARA) is a verb in the qal form with perfective aspect, it seems unlikely that this statement refers only to the beginning of creation.

MY RESPONSE:

The figure of speech in Gen. 1:1 may indeed be an example of synecdoche since these two signifiers occur so often in tandem. This fact does not mean that the "heavens" of Gen. 1:1 have anything to do with the spirit realm. The heavens and the earth of Gen. 1:1 could just as well be a way of referring to the entire material order (the realm that is governed by space, time and efficient causality). The term "heavens" is apparently used this way in Ex. 20:4 and the formula "heaven and earth" in Gen. 14:22 evidently has reference to the physical universe that Jehovah produced.

As for BARA speaking about the beginning of creation, Gordon J. Wenham writes (Word Commentary on Genesis): "it looks as though [Gen. 1:2, 3] were composed by the writer responsible for v 1, and not simply borrowed from a pre-biblical source. This makes it most natural to interpret the text synchronically, i.e., v 1: first creative act; v 2: consequence of v 1; v 3: first creative word" (p. 13).

Later, he notes: "It is therefore quite feasible for a mention of an initial act of creation of the whole universe (v 1) to be followed by an account of the ordering of different parts of the universe" (Wenham 15).

With all of this in mind, I am not insisting that Gen. 1:1 simply dwells on the "beginning" and does not teach us that God finished his creative work vis-a'-vis the heavens and the earth. As you mentioned, the Qal perfect verbal stem is employed and that indicates that the writer of Genesis is depicting simple, perfective action--which means that both the inception of the creative act and its TELOS (its end) is in view. That doesn't mean, however, that the earth did not need to be prepared for habitation as recorded in 1:2. ERES in Gen. 1:1 does not seem to mean the "productive land and all that dwells therein." If we construe the verse synchronically, as Wenham and other interpreters are wont to do, then Gen. 1:2 is manifestly relating God's preparation of the already created earth.

Quotes About Hell (Some Catholic Sources)

"The punishment of original sin is the deprivation of the sight of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent III).

"according as their works were good or bad, either perpetual punishment with the devil or eternal glory with Christ" (The Fourth General Lateran Council 1215).

"But whoever dies in mortal sin without penance will without any doubt suffer for ever in the fires of eternal hell" (Pope Innocent IV's Letter to the Bishop of Tusculum 1254).

Quotes Taken from "The Teaching of the Catholic Church" (Edited by Karl Rahner, S.J.).

Resurrection Beliefs in Second Temple Judaism

James Efird reports that a diversity of opinions concerning the resurrection existed within Second Temple Judaism. Some put credence in the notion that the resurrection from the dead would consist of the old body being conjoined with the human spirit; others believed in soul sleep, whereas yet others accepted Greek concepts of immortality. Efird maintains: "No one set of ideas really held the day, but most people seem to have believed in some form of resurrection. Whether it was physical or spiritual, future or present, to be accomplished in this historical continuum or in a supra-historical sphere--none of these was really the theory. Each theory has its own advocates and in some instances the ideas were rearranged in such ways as to present 'new' hypotheses" (The New Testament Writings: History, Literature, Interpretation, page 18. Emphasis in the text).

Moreover, Efird notes that some believed a new physical body would be raised whereas others contended that a non-material body would be resurrected from the dead. On a related note, John J. Collins cites 1 Enoch to support his position about "resurrection of the spirit." He argues that 1 Enoch 104ff uses astral imagery to describe the resurrection of the just: they will be like angels "and associates of the host of heaven." Based on such passages, Collins observes: "Here again, we are dealing with resurrection, not an unbroken state of immortality. But there is no mention of bodily resurrection or of return to life on earth. What is envisaged is the resurrection of the NEPES or spirit and its transformation to an angelic state" (Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, page 113). Collins also invokes Jubilees 23 as part of the testimony concerning ancient resurrection beliefs in Judaism. From Jubilees 23:30ff, he makes this point clear: "Here again we have a notion of resurrection that is neither immortality of the soul, in the Greek sense, nor resurrection of the physical body" (ibid).

How much clearer could Collins be when he states, "But it is by no means the case that Jews always thought of resurrection in bodily terms" (ibid)? He insists that what Daniel and Enoch say about the resurrection could best be described as "resurrection of the spirit" as opposed to resurrection of the body.

Jeffrey Asher further makes a case for understanding Paul's language in 1 Corinthians 15 about a "spiritual body" as a corpus informed by pneumatic stuff, based on ancient denotations of the Greek term pneuma and notable philosophical concepts at the time. See Asher's published work Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

1 Corinthians 15:36 and Resurrection from Death

Paul specifically writes ἄφρων, σὺ ὃ σπείρεις οὐ ζωοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ in 1 Cor 15:36, using language reminiscent of Jesus (John 12:24). He is particularly elucidating the concept of "the resurrection of the dead" in 1 Cor 15:42. So how fitting that Paul brings up the "death" of one seed which opens the way for a disparate "body" to materialize: one that is starkly different from the body which was initially planted (1 Cor 15:36-38).

Raymond B. Brown (Broadman Bible Commentary on Acts and 1 Corinthians) writes:

"The body that is buried is not the same body that is
raised because a transformation takes place. Paul sets
forth four antitheses to show the difference between
the body that dies and the body that is raised from
the dead" (page 391).

"So there is continuity between what dies and what is
raised because it is the same person who is buried and
raised. But there is discontinuity in the sense that
the same physical body will not be raised. The same
person will be raised in a new spiritual body [which
Brown evidently does not define as a 'soul']. Paul does not
describe the body but lives in faith that God will
give the body its appropriate form for life in his
presence" (page 392).

But consult the entirety of Brown's comments on 1 Cor 15:36ff.

Ronald Nash on Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge

Here's a piece I'm always working on, and I've now decided to post this version on the blog.

This study will focus on Ronald Nash's analysis of future-tensed propositions within the context of divine omniscience. At stake is the issue of whether future-tensed propositions have any truth value and, if not, how does the lack of truth value for future-tensed propositions affect our understanding of divine omniscience?

Ronald Nash discusses future-tensed propositions in his work The Concept of God (55). [See also Rosenkrantz and Ockham.] The important question is whether propositions about the future have truth values (whether they are true or false). In order to address this question, Nash uses the familiar Aristotelian example concerning a sea-battle: "There will be a sea fight tomorrow." Is this proposition about the future true or false? [See Gerard Hughes]

If the proposition is now true (presently) then it would seem that there must be a sea-battle tomorrow which would entail that fatalism is true. [explain the difference between fatalism and determinism] Conversely, it is possible to read Aristotle's argument as an example of argumentum reductio ad absurdum (Nash, 56). add note. Nash quotes Anthony Kenny to this effect. Kenny maintains that if "future-tensed propositions about singulars" [qualification] are now true, then fatalism logically follows from the statement about the sea-battle. Yet fatalism is evidently absurd, so it is false. On the other hand, "since many future events are not yet determined" (Kenny) it seems that propositions or claims regarding future-tensed propositions that reference singulars have no truth-value (they are neither true nor false). See Nash, 56. Granting the truth of what Kenny has written without necessarily accepting it, Nash then applies Aristotle's argument to the case of future (free) human actions. He insists that if these acts have no truth-value, if they are neither yet true nor false, then not even an omniscient God has the power to know future human actions.

Nash contends that the Aristotelian view greatly hampers God's scientia to the extent that God cannot predict what Peter or Abraham will do in the future because if Peter or Abraham act freely (evidently defined in a libertarian sense), their actions putatively cannot be known. Foretelling the future becomes logically impossible for God (Nash 56). At best, it appears that God is an excellent guesser based on probable outcomes about the future. But if the future (free) actions of humans are unknowable, then God is not omniscient in the classical sense of the word. Nash therefore suggests that it is difficult to harmonize Aristotle's view of truth-values with the "scriptural" articulation of divine omniscience. [See Joel Green, et. al.]

Nash then posits that one model of divine omniscience which might result in a harmonization between divine omniscience and human freedom is what he labels "book of the future." The book of the future model is analogical language that sets forth three scenarios which account theoretically for God's knowing what S will freely do.

1) The first scenario depicts God opening the figurative "book of the future," wherein he finds every "true proposition about the future" (57). God's knowledge of all true propositions that concern the future (particularly those propositions about singulars) betokens (according to this model of divine omniscience and human free will) that God exhaustively knows all things (i.e. events) that "will" happen in the future (57).

2) According to the second possible scenario of this model, God figuratively opens the book of the future but finds that each page is blank. What is being described by Nash in this instance is the view of Aristotle that there are no truth-values concerning future propositions that reference singulars. If Aristotle is correct, Nash contends, then God (the deity of Scripture) cannot infallibly know future events nor can any other being know what will occur in the future. But maybe those who affirm God's omniscience do not have reason to be troubled since all that may follow logically from Aristotle's view is that God knows all that it is possible to know. [Swinburne and Thomas] It may not be possible to know with infallible certainty events that have not yet occurred.

3) The third possible scenario discussed by Nash is that the book of the future is just not complete: "some pages contain propositions, there are gaps, sometimes very large gaps. Many pages may be completely blank" (Nash, 57). Nash argues that this scenario indicates that God may have only "partial knowledge" concerning future events in view of the fact that God possibly elects to restrict what he knows about the future so that human free will may be safeguarded. This view appears to make the claim that God knows that what he has willed must occur but God does not know or elects not to know those future events which have not been willed in accordance with his sovereign purpose (57). The view that Nash identifies as the third scenario is reminiscent of what Jehovah's Witnesses say about divine omniscience and human freedom.