Trinitarian Redactors and Novatian of Rome

One of the most important works on the Trinity
doctrine is Novatian's De Trinitate. This work has
been admired in the western church and became somewhat
of a manual or handbook in ancient times. In English, we
usually call Novatian's treatise On the Trinity. However, one wonders whether Novatian himself appended
the word "Trinity" to the title of this document?
Alternatively, is it possible that early copies of the
text were edited or redacted and the word "Trinity"
was added to Novatian's work?

Russell J. DeSimone (in his translation of De
Trinitate) points out that we do not know the
original title of what is now known as De Trinitate. He suggests that the "correct title" of the work
appears to have been De regula veritatis or De regula fidei (DeSimone 23). The latter title is probably more likely in view of what Novatian writes in De Trinitate 21 regarding the general thesis of his
work. In any event, Novatian the Presbyter never
utilizes the term "Trinity." DeSimone thus notes that
an amanuensis living after 381 probably altered the
title in view of what transpired in 325 and 381 CE at
the first two ecumenical councils (DeSimone 23).

Joseph M. Hallman (The Descent of God, page 70) similarly observes that De regula fidei may have been the original title of De Trinitate. Again, the possible work of a redactor is acknowledged.

One may also find evidence for Trinitarian redaction in the Latin versions of Origen's Peri Archon. See Basil Studer's Trinity and Incarnation, page 84.

Regards,
Edgar

Thoughts on the Tetragrammaton

Taken from the book edited by Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. (editor) This Is My Name Forever: The Trinity & Gender Language for God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001). See page 26:

"The notion that God has a proper name and can be differentiated from other deities with proper names is absolutely clear in the Old Testament. Other gods (ELOHIM) lay claims on humanity, but Israel is to have no god (ELOHIM) before or beside YHWH (Ex 20:3). Moreover, the character of the name is itself a matter of reverence, since the name really coheres with the God it names (20:7). One cannot therefore malign the name or substitute for the name another name, and somehow leave untouched the deity with whom the name is attached . . . Not taking the name of YHWH in vain implies, at a minimum, understanding that YHWH is not an 'accident' [non-essential property] detachable from a deeper 'substance,' that is, 'God himself.'"

Contrast the early church fathers, who believed God did not have a proper name or did not need to be distinguished from other entities since he is SUI GENERIS.

Here is another quote taken from a work titled Guide for the Perplexed which is written by the medieval thinker Maimonides. In 1.61 of that work, he writes:

"It is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are derived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton, which consists of the letters yod, hé, vau [or vav, waw] and hé. This name is applied exclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash, 'The nomen proprium.' It is the distinct and exclusive designation of the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are derived from actions, to which some of our own are similar, as we have already explained."

Best regards,
Edgar

Exodus 3:14 and The Ontological View

The Ontological View and Exodus 3:14

Exodus 3:14 is one of the most thought-provoking and highly debated
scriptures in all of Christian history. A question that immediately
comes up in connection with Exodus 3:14 is--what does Moses mean when he
records the authoritative words of God: 'tell them that I AM THAT I AM
has sent you'. Does this verse embody information that connotes
God's atemporality? Is God delineating His necessary existence (His ESSE A
SE) in this passage? Does this passage deal with ontological aspects of
God, or is there some other point that the writer wants us to glean from the
Hebrew phrase EHYEH ASHER EHYEH?

The second century (as I have contended elsewhere) was a time when Hellenistic religio-philosophical ideas permeated the church (ecclesia). One idea that trickled into the early Christian community was the notion of Divine Impassibility (APAQEIA). The notion of
impassibility seems to have distorted (conceptually) the biblical view of God's immutability. The ancient philosophical doctrine of divine impassibility chiefly stated that:

God was free of the changes and sufferings that characterize human life
and feeling, although derivatively it could also mean impassivity--that
God was indifferent to the changes and sufferings of man. It is
significant that Christian theologians customarily set down the doctrine
of the impassibility of God as an axiom, without bothering to provide
very much biblical support or theological proof . . . Even Tertullian,
for all his hostility to metaphysics, argued this way against Praxeas.
For Athanasius it was "an admitted truth about God that he stands in
need of nothing, but is self-sufficient and filled with
himself...Didymus the Blind took it for granted that the Holy Spirit, as
God, had to be "impassible, indivisible, and immutable." According to
Theodore of Mopsuetia, "it is well known...that the gulf between [the
Eternal One and a temporal being] is unbridgeable"; and again, "it is
known that variety belongs to creatures and simplicity to the divine
nature....The doctrine of the absoluteness and impassibility of God came
to form one of the presuppositions of the trinitarian and christological
issues; and the doctrine of the atonement in Anselm of Canterbury was
based on the axiom "that the divine nature is impassible, and that it
can in no sense be brought down from its loftiness or toil in what it
wills to do. (Pelikan, Jaroslav, The Christian Tradition I:52-4).

The idea of divine impassibility might seem as if it accurately elucidates
God's immutability. Such a conclusion apparently would be mistaken, however. For while the philosophical idea of divine impassibility seemed to articulate the nature of God, it appears to have distorted our understanding of it. The God of the Bible is not presented as an impassible deity. God is neither comparable to the First Mover of Aristotle nor can he be equated with The Good (the inexhaustible Ground of all Being) in Plato's Republic. To the contrary:

"Implicit in the biblical view of God as the Creator [is] the
affirmation of his sovereign independence: God [is] not dependent on his
creatures as they are on him . . . in their assertion of the freedom of
God, the prophets emphasized at the same time his involvement with the
covenant people in love and wrath. Therefore the Old Testament doctrine
of the sovereign freedom of God [cannot] be synonymous with the
philosophical doctrine of divine impassibility (APAQEIA)" (Pelikan, Christian Traditon, 52).

Impassibility denotes that God is free from the quality of becoming or
not subject to the vicissitudes concomitant with life in the finite
sphere of existence. In contrast, the Hebrew prophets affirm the active presence and power of God in their lives. They affirm a God who is living and
dynamic: EHYEH ASHER EHYEH. Exodus 3:14 contributes to this dynamic
view of YHWH. With the aforementioned information in mind, we will now
review this passage.

In the church of antiquity, Exodus 3:14 was believed
to be the supreme proof of God's impassibility. The hermeneutic views on this
text were divergent, yet there were numerous attempts to interpret
Exodus 3:14 in an ontological manner. Clement of Alexandria wrote that the verse meant that "God is one, and beyond the one and above the monad itself."
Hilary exclaims that Exodus 3:14 is "an indication concerning God so
exact that it expresses in the terms best adapted to human understanding
an unattainable insight into the mystery of the divine nature" (Pelikan, Christian Tradition,
54). Thomas Aquinas interpreted Exodus 3:14 in accordance with the Vulgate rendering "Qui est" (He Who Is). But is this view accurate? Should Exodus 3:14 be
understood in an ontological sense?

While I believe that all of the aforementioned ideas have some merit, it seems that that are only shadows pointing to the reality of God. Exodus 3:14 evidently is not an ontological statement of God's deity. It does not tell us so much about God's nature (His ONTWS), as it informs us about His purposes and functions with regard to the divine purposes. I would contend that the phenomenological view of Exodus 3:14 comes much closer to telling us what
the verse means. The phenomenological construal of the passage espouses the idea that God is the One who will "be" in the sense of carrying out His purposes (i.e. "he is the one causing to be"). In this exegetical paradigm, what God is to "be" is left unstated. He will become whatsoever he has to "become" in order to accomplish his purposes or manifest his presence. In Bibliotheca Sacra, Charles Gianotti offers some pertinent criticism regarding the ontological view of Exodus 3:14. He himself espouses either the phenomenological or the covenantal view. Concerning Exodus 3:14 and the ontological view, Gianotti writes:

This view seems to rest on the Septuagint translation of Exodus 3:14
(EGW EIMI hO WN). On the face of it, the use of eijmi seems to support
his view. This view is untenable for a number of reasons. Though the
Septuagint is a serviceable translation of the Pentateuch, the
Septuagint is not inspired; it is a human translation by Jewish
scholars. The primary understanding of Exodus 3:14 should come, rather,
from a contextual understanding of the passage as well as from an
analysis of the meaning and usage of the Hebrew term hy*h* and its
imperfect form hy#h=a# . . . Significantly, most interpreters translate
hy#h=a# in Exodus 3:12 as future (i.e.. "I will be [hy#h=a#] with you").
Yet, two verses later, why should not the same translation suffice?

Gianotti sums up matters by writing:

One may safely conclude that Exodus 3:14 does not support an
"ontological" or "existence" view; the name YHWH therefore is not rooted
in that view, by virtue of its close relation to Exodus 3:14.

In view of the Scriptural framework wherein Exodus 3:14 was originally
written, I espouse the phenomenological view of this verse. The passage
does not appear to support the ontological view favored by the early church writers.

Owen Thomas on the Incarnation

Note what systematic theologian Owen Thomas writes regarding the Incarnation or hypostatic union. The following is taken from his _Introduction to Theology_ (page 150):

"H.W. Montefiore has indicated an even more
fundamental problem in the Chalcedonian definition.
The formula asserts of Christ, 'the same perfect in
Godhead and the same perfect in manhood, truly God and
truly man . . .' The implication is that apart from
Christ we know what perfect godhead [sic] and perfect
humanity are, and that on the basis of the New
Testament testimony we are affirming that Jesus
possessed both. But in fact the Christian faith is
that it is precisely in Christ and nowhere else that
we see what perfect godhead and perfect humanity are.
Now Middle Platonist philosophy involved a doctrine of
God as impassible, completely transcendent and
immutable. Thus on these terms it is extremely
difficult to understand how God and humanity could be
united in one person. But the fundamental thing we
know from Christ is that God can be perfectly united
with humanity. This is where we begin in speaking
about God and humanity. The problem is not how a union
of God and humanity in one person is possible, but
given the union manifest in Christ what perfect
godhead and humanity are."

Jehovah's Witnesses and Globalization by Chryssides

Here is a link for an article written by George D. Chryssides. I believe that he attempts to be objective or fair when writing about the religious movement known as Jehovah's Witnesses. One criticism that I have of his work, however, is that he is sloppy or careless with historical details. But maybe he is not a historian. Anyway, his article isn't that difficult to read. One more criticism might be that what is mentioned in the abstract is not fully developed by the author in his actual writing.

http://www.cesnur.org/2007/bord_chryssides.htm

Rise in STDs Among Older Folks

Sex and older generations: it's not a topic that gets discussed much, not even in the doctor's office. But some physicians say that needs to change, because older patients are leading active sex lives - and their rates of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) may be on the rise.

Whatever the cause - Viagra, midlife divorce, online dating or simple ignorance - studies suggest that STDs are no longer just an affliction of the young. A study published online last week by the journal Sexually Transmitted Infections adds to that growing body of evidence. Researchers at England's West Midlands Health Protection Agency found that in less than a decade, STD rates had more than doubled among people ages 45 and older. And Dr. Babatunde Olowokure, an author of the study, thinks that figure may be low. "These observations are based on a small proportion of people who actually attend clinics," he says. While that proportion of the population has increased overall over the past decade, Olowokure points out that middle-aged and older people tend to delay visiting a doctor for treatment of an STD, or they avoid it altogether, in large part due to the stigma associated with sexually transmitted infections.

In their study, Olowokure and his team counted 4,445 infections (excluding HIV) reported to 19 clinics in the region. From 1996 to 2003, total cases of chlamydia, genital herpes, gonorrhea, syphilis and genital warts among people over 45 increased 127%, from 344 cases in 1996 to 780 in 2003. Rates of STDs increased in patients under age 45 as well, by 97%, during the same time period. In the U.S. the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention figures - which include prevalence of syphilis, chlamydia and gonorrhea - reflect relatively stable rates of infection in people ages 55 and older, but that data relies on self-reporting, and in many parts of the country it is out of step with what physicians are seeing. "Our rates of syphilis and chlamydia are up across all ages," says Dr. Sharon Lee, a Kansas City, Mo., family physician and medical director of HIV Wisdom for Older Women. According to a 2000 study of Washington State residents, one of the only comprehensive analyses of STD infection among the middle-aged and older, cases of gonorrhea increased 18.2% between 1997 and 1998 among people ages 45 and older; in younger people, that increase was 17.3%.

See http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20080708/hl_time/moremidlifeandolderstds

A Supposed Silver Lining to High Gas Prices?

WASHINGTON - Today's high gas prices could reduce auto deaths by nearly a third as driving decreases, with the effect particularly dramatic among price-sensitive teenage drivers, the authors of a new study said.

Professors Michael Morrisey of the University of Alabama-Birmingham and David Grabowski of Harvard Medical School found that for every 10 percent increase in gas prices there was a 2.3 percent decline in auto deaths. For drivers ages 15 to 17, the decline was 6 percent, and for ages 18 to 21, it was 3.2 percent.

The study looked at fatalities from 1985 to 2006, when gas prices reached about $2.50 a gallon. With gas now averaging over $4 a gallon, Morrisey said he expects to see a drop of about 1,000 deaths a month.

With annual auto deaths typically ranging from about 38,000 to 40,000 a year, a drop of 12,000 deaths would cut the total by nearly a third, Morrisey said.

"I think there is some silver lining here in higher gas taxes in that we will see a public health gain," Grabowski said. But he cautioned that their estimate of a decline of 1,000 deaths a month could be offset somewhat by the shift under way to smaller, lighter, more fuel-efficient cars and the increase in motorcycle and scooter driving.

See the whole story at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080711/ap_on_he_me/auto_deaths_gas_prices

My Amazon Review of Hal Flemings Book

Hal Flemings has presented a persuasive case for the reasonableness of God's existence. Flemings' approach is innovative, refreshing and hardly ever encountered in other books belonging to this genre. He initiates his discussion of theistic and atheistic arguments by seeking to clarify what the term "God" means. I believe you will find the answers that he supplies in the first chapter of his work to be quite informative. Flemings then proceeds to review what deists, theists, pantheists and agnostics have argued with respect to God's existence. These arguments are handled in an objective and balanced way: the author is not interested in simply pontificating. This part of his work also makes the book a pleasure to read. Flemings' book contains 10 chapters including a discussion of holy books that different religions use and there is a chapter dealing with the problem of evil. I especially enjoyed the chapter about the various arguments that have been posited to prove God's existence. Flemings handles the ontological, teleological, anthropological and scientific arguments for God with the utmost care and skill. I encourage you to purchase this book, if you have ever wondered whether there is logical, scientific or theological evidence that points to the existence of a loving and benevolent or all wise Creator. The information contained in this work can also be employed to help non-theists seriously reflect on the question as well as the reality of God.

Edgar Foster

graduate of the University of Glasgow (Ph.D.)

Revelation 15:8 and Christology

In Revelation 15:8, John reports that when the glory and power of God was fully manifest in his temple, OUDEIS EDUNATO EISELQEIN EIS TON NAON AXRI TELESQWSIN hAI hEPTA PLHGAI TWN hEPTA AGGELWN.

What did John mean by the words OUDEIS EDUNATO EISELQEIN? Who are included in the pronoun functioning as a substantive OUDEIS?

Uriah Smith (a Seventh Day Adventist commentator) writes:

"While the seven angels are performing
their fearful mission, the temple is filled
with the glory of God, and no man, OUDEIS, no one,
no being, referring to Christ and his heavenly
assistants, can enter therein. This shows that the
work of mercy is closed, and there is no ministration
in the sanctuary during the infliction of the plagues ;
hence they are manifestations of the wrath of God,
without any mixture of mercy" (Thoughts, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Revelation, page 308, published 1881).

Notice that Smith includes Christ and his "heavenly assistants" as referents of the term OUDEIS. It does not seem that Smith draws any ontological inferences from the language of Revelation 15:8. However, it seems to me that John is pointing out that not only were beings not in the holy NAOS in heaven--they COULD NOT enter because of the manifested glory and power of God the Father. What do you readers of this blog think?

Josef Stern on Identifying Metaphors

The following is taken from the first chapter of my dissertation on metaphor and divine paternity:

How does one undertake the task of identifying a metaphor? What
linguistic markers signal that an utterance or
proposition is metaphorical? Donald Davidson
maintains:

There are no instructions for devising
metaphors; there is no manual for determining what a
metaphor 'means' or 'says'; there is no test for
metaphor that does not call for taste.

But Josef Stern appears to posit compelling
evidence that may successfully militate against Davidson's thesis.
He initially presents a semantic account of metaphors,
comparing them to demonstrative or deictic signifiers
(i.e. indexicals) that linguistically point to
noetically intended objects. Nevertheless, Stern
recognizes that there is a linguistic pragmatic
element involved in the detection of metaphors. Two
such pragmatic features of human discourse are the
Sitz-im-Leben (life situation) and the koinonoetic context (shared social situation) of communicative agents. Therefore, knowledge of how language works in its real life social or contextual setting is essential for metaphor recognition; it forms an essential part of the
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity.

Stern rigorously develops this point in his seminal study on metaphor and context. Deciphering indexicals requires that a discourse agent possess both semantic competence and the knowledge of a particular discourse situation since demonstratives are apparently context-dependent. Juxtaposing deictic terms and metaphors, Stern maintains that in order to construe metaphors adequately, a speaker belonging to a given discourse community must also have semantic competence and intimate knowledge of the situational context in which communicative agents utter or write specific metaphors. Metaphors (like demonstratives) are also context-dependent: "Metaphors do not function in isolation. They exist in both a rhetorical context and a cultural context."

Recognizing a metaphorical locution thus requires being acquainted with a specified Sitz-im-Leben. When one is conversant with a certain social, cognitive, political, rhetorical, literary, intellectual or religious context, inter alia, he or she evidently is capable of discerning metaphors as such.

Predestination and Free Will

There is certainly a tension in the early church fathers between human free will (which they universally affirm) and foreordination. Moreover, the pre-Nicenes allude to the topic of foreordination, but they do not really elucidate their beliefs concerning it: predestination does not become a major issue until Augustine's time period (see Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. London: Banner of Truth, 1971, page 109).

In his authoritative work, The Christian Tradition (1:280), historian Jaroslav Pelikan points out that Augustine's spiritual predecessors [i.e. the pre-Nicenes and post-Nicenes] "leaned noticeably to one side of the dilemma, namely, the side of free will and responsibility rather than the side of inevitability and original sin."

Augustine argued that the reason those who preceded him did not adequately deal with the issue of human free will and divine foreordination was because their historical circumstances did not necessitate that they deal with the issue in a satisfactory manner (On the Predestination of the Saints 14.27; On the Gift of Perseverance 2.4). In other words, heresy had not yet made it necessary to deal with this problematic question (according to Augustine of Hippo).

One important caveat to mention at this point, however, is that Augustine did not reject free will in toto. According to what he writes in De Civitate Dei 5.9, God "knows all things before they come to pass," yet we will or act freely, of our own choosing. Nevertheless, the ancient bishop claims, free will is included in "a certain order of causes" that has been determined or decreed by God. Such a view can be aptly described as "soft determinism" since it does not affirm a libertarian version of human voluntas. William Hasker discusses these points in God, Time, and Knowledge (pp. 5-6).

Steven Ozment on Calvin and Servetus

The following quote is taken from Steven Ozment's The Age
of Reform:1250-1550 (page 371):

In the controversy that followed the execution [of
Servetus], Castellio memorably summarized what to many
contemporaries became the simple truth of the episode.
'To kill a man,' he wrote, 'is not to defend a
doctrine, but simply to kill a man.' Although that
assessment has also proved to be history's view of the
matter, another century of religious warfare would be
required before this principle became firmly
established in law.

Lactantius on the Freedom of Religion in Worship

Lactantius writes:

"These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship" (Epitome of the Divine Institutes LIV).

A Dialogue on Gender, Metaphor and God the Father

I am posting another dialogue that transpired privately between me and an interlocutor who shall remain nameless. I have replaced his actual name with a pseudonym:

[Edgar]
If cultures or societies decide what gender is, then
the phenomenon is somewhat arbitrary. But I would not
categorize what I believe about gender as arbitrary.
According to my paradigm, God created man as a
masculine being, woman as a feminine creature; he also
created masculine and feminine pairs of animals.
Nevertheless, sociologists and anthropologists tend to
define the term "gender" (used in a non-grammatical
sense) as a sociogenic or anthropological phenomenon. My
earlier comments reflected this common practice of the
social sciences.

[Jim]
Further, I deny that there can be no gender without
a bilogical entity of some kind. The sky is
masculine. The sea is feminine. Day is masculine.
Night is feminine.

[Edgar]
Are they? How do you know (in the sense of justified true belief) that the sky is masculine or the sea is
feminine?

[Jim]
You may be inclined to follow the pervasive nominalism
of our society in declaring this eisegetical. But on
what basis? What's to prevent this from being
exegetical--reading it out of nature? The linguistic
consensus surely seems near unanimous across history
and historical cultures.

[Edgar]
If the sky's gender, for example, can be read out of
nature, exactly how does one go about reading it thus?
And, as I see it, the onus probandi
is not on me to say what prevents your approach from being
eisegetical. Do you not have the responsibility to
provide justificatory utterances that logically
validate your position? ;-0 Finally, IMHO, linguistic
consensus is just that.

[Jim]
I don't follow your point about James 1:17.
Further, I don't deny that God in Himself contains
both masulinity and femininity, since He lacks
nothing. But I would insist that (1) in relation to
us He is properly masculine, and (2) that this
masculinity is not an arbitrary or merely human,
cultural development, but revealed as properly
His nature.

[Edgar]
My point about James 1:17 is that it seems nigh or
even downright impossible to construe the text as
saying God literally fathered the celestial lights.
Maybe you view the matter differently.

I agree that God is masculine (not sure about the term
"properly") in relation to us. And I've never denied
that the conceptual association of "God" with "Father"
in Scripture is catalogical (i.e. emanates from
above). So I'm not contending that the divine appellation
"Father" is arbitrary or merely human. What I am
arguing is that God evidently inspired humans to speak in such
human cultural terms so that "He" might be mentally
grasped, to an extent, in order that we might come to
understand (somewhat) the divine functions and
beneficences. But the word "Father" does not tell us whether God
is ontologically masculine or feminine. I tend to think God is
above gender, however, for reasons hitherto delineated.
Please explain to me how such a view is "arbitrary."

[Jim]
I refer you to my previous discussion in the
foregoing paragraphs. You may think that we human
beings read non-biotically based gender INTO nature,
but on what basis do you assume that? On what basis
do you assume it couldn't be read OUT of nature.

[Edgar]
Keep in mind that we're talking about how humans press
their respective natural languages into service. I thus
make my previously mentioned claims on the basis of my
ongoing studies in human language. For example, abstract
and impersonal attributes are spoken of in feminine
terms at times (e.g. SOPHIA or hOKHMAH). A man, that
is, the Son of David is referred to in feminine terms
(e.g. QOHELETH). Both a male child and a male lamb are
described with neuter nouns (e.g. PAIDION and ARNION).
These examples could be multiplied, but I think the
point I'm trying to make is somewhat established.
Grammatical gender is largely a social construct:
it doesn't necessarily tell us
anything about a particular animate or inanimate
referent's natural gender, although it might.

Even in times of antiquity, Arnobius of Sicca wrote:

"Yet, if you consider the true state of the case, no
language is naturally perfect, and in like manner none
is faulty. For what natural reason is there, or what
law written in the constitution of the world, that
paries
should be called ['used with'] hic, and sella
['used with'] haec?--since neither have they sex
distinguished by male and female, nor can the most
learned man tell me what hic and haec are, or why one
of them denotes the male sex while the other is
applied to the female. These conventionalities are
man's, and certainly are not indispensable to all
persons for the use of forming their language; for
paries might perhaps have been called haec, and sella
hic, without any fault being found, if it had been
agreed upon at first that they should be so called,
and if this practice had been maintained by following
generations in their daily conversation" (Adversus
Gentes 1.59).

None of the foregoing means that I deny God's role
in gifting us with language.

Updated Version of Origen and the Eternal Generation

B. Origen and the Eternal Generation of the Son

There is some debate to what extent Origen affirms God’s paternity. Does he teach the eternal generation doctrine? In what sense is God “Father” in Origenian thought? While the ancient writer is not altogether clear in this respect, there probably is a sense in which Hall’s analysis of Origen aptly encapsulates his thought: “God was however always Father; he could not change from one condition (not-Father) to another (Father). So the Son exists in God’s timeless eternity.” Origen himself possibly affirms the eternal generation of the Son in view of his sentential locution “There was not when he was not.” Nonetheless, his theological account suggests that the Son is not intrinsically God (autotheos), but God by derivation only (Commentary on the Gospel of John 2.2). The Son is not “self-sufficiently” God ; only the Father is Godself (autotheos) in Origen’s theological paradigm. The Son is God in a strictly predicative manner or to a lesser degree than the Father is. But in what sense is the Father greater than the Son in Origen’s system?

Hall indicates that Origen possibly balances his alleged subordinationism by means of the eternal generation doctrine, which would mean that the inferiority which he evidently ascribes to the Son is not ontological in nature. On the other hand, William J. Hill observes: “Still, eternal generation does not of itself give divine status because Origen views all spiritual beings, both what he calls theoi and human souls, as eternal.” Similarly, Brown laments Origen’s problematic approach to Christology and the Trinity since “he also taught the preexistence of individual human souls and spoke of those who are in Christ as eternally begotten.” Nevertheless, it has been argued that this speculation about eternal souls does not diminish Origen’s trinitarian contribution to the church. Nevertheless, Brown acknowledges that while Origen’s eternal generation doctrine seemingly defeated the notion that the Son is temporally posterior to the Father, it “did not entirely throw off the assumptions of earlier Christian thinkers that the Son is subordinate to the Father” or not fully divine. Studer equally concludes that Origen “does not succeed in ruling out subordinationism.” He points to Origen’s belief that there are hierarchical grades in deity with the Son possibly being one of the Seraphim in Isaiah’s vision of YHWH’s glory (Peri Archon 1.3.4). Yet, certain scholars attempt to resolve the intricacies of Origen’s scheme by positing the Son’s subordination to the Father in an economic sense. What makes matters more problematic, however, is that the extant writings of Origen suggest that he himself may have inconsistently formulated his doctrine of the Father and the Son. It is possible that Origen views the Son as ontologically subordinate to the Father (Contra Celsum 8.15) whereas other passages appear to teach that he does not think the Son is lesser in relation to his Father. The treatises of Origen accordingly tend to be aporetic.

Another factor lending itself to the aporetic tendencies of Origen's theology is his use of the term “creature” (kti,sma) for the Son. This usage has generated many discussions in Origen studies, discussions that have not led to wholly satisfactory conclusions. The first systematic theologian evidently derives kti,sma from Proverbs 8:22-25 (LXX). Neoplatonism may also influence what seems to be an idiosyncratic utilization of “creature” (kti,sma). Crouzel in fact believes that “creation” (kti,sij) for Origen applies to “everything that comes from God.” Along with Prestige and Wiles, he notes the fluid synonymity that existed between the words “generate” (genna,w) and “create” (gi,nomai) prior to Nicea. If this line of reasoning corresponds with the speech strategy of Origen, there would appear to be no genuine conflict between his supposed affirmation of the eternal generation doctrine and his manifest employment of “creature.” Yet although the Father putatively generates the Son timelessly in the thought of Origen, he clearly adheres to the notion that there are grades of being in the divine. Bulgakov thinks that Origen does not master cosmological subordinationism “with reference to the mutual relations of the hypostases, with reference to their equal dignity and divinity.” Even if he did posit a timeless or eternal generation for the Son, Origen also argues that other “created” rational spirits are eternal. In the final analysis, if “Father” is a metaphor for Christianity’s first systematic theologian, it is a rather curious trope that appears in his writings.

Plato on Homosexuality (Laws 1.636c)

Plato argues (in his work Laws) that two men having coitus with one another or the practice of lesbianism violates natural law. The views expressed in this Platonic work antedate the Christian New Testament or writings of the church fathers.

"And whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe that when male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature, but contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female, and that those first guilty of such enormities were impelled by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of concocting the story about Ganymede."

Dialogue on God's Infinity

The following dialogue took place between a member of my formerly active Greektheology yahoogroup and me. I have edited some parts of the dialogue to render it more coherent. Our debate centered around a passage that I quoted from Louis Berkhof's systematic theology. I have replaced my interlocutor's name with a pseudonym.

[Edgar]
I thought you had a copy of Berkhof. I was therefore
surprised when you described God's infinity as being
"quantitative," when Berkhof clearly shows that it
is not. Rather, God's unlimitedness is qualitative in
nature. Aquinas, Scotus and Berkhof all agree that
God's boundlessness is not quantitative.

[Earl]
Did you read the following sections on eternity and
immensity? It is clear their that with respect to God's being,
Berkhof sees God's infinity as quantitative,
and with respect to his attributes, from the section you partially
cited, as qualitative. I am simply saying that the
two (God's attributes and being) cannot be separated
except for the purposes of discussion.

[Edgar]
Yes, I've read what Berkhof has to say about God's
eternity, immensity and putative omnipresence. I can
therefore point out that he clearly does not view
God's infinity as "quantitative," nor does he even
conscript the term in his section on God's immensity
or eternity, as far as I can tell. As I demonstrated
earlier, if God's infinitude were quantitative in
nature, it could be counted or measured. But it cannot be
quantified; ergo, it is not quantitative. Berkhof most
definitely does not support you here. I don't know how
you're using or construing the adnominal "quantitative," but it
manifestly is not applicable to God's
infinity (whether He is incorporeal or not).

[Earl]
I don't agree because you are drawing an invalid
inference from what Berkhof actually writes.

[Edgar]
Can you demonstrate how I am drawing an "invalid
inference" from what Berkhof writes in Systematic
Theology? Where does he state that the infinity of
God is quantifiable? How much clearer could Berkhof be when
he writes that God's infinity "should not be
understood in a quantitative, but in a qualitative
sense; it qualifies all the communicable attributes of
God"?

[Edgar continued]
There appears to be no doubt that you and Berkhof
concur in the respect you have outlined. You are
apparently referring to the SIMPLICITAS DEI here,
when you speak of God's attributes being coextensive
with His being, a belief that I have not seen good
reason to affirm for biblical, logical and theological
reasons. Don't get me wrong. I do not believe that
God's attributes are parts or accidental modes of
the divine being. However, it appears to me that there
is both a conceptual and probably even a formal
distinction (at the very least)--that is to say, a
Scotistic-like DISTINCTIO FORMALIS--between, for
instance, divine omnipotence and divine
omniscience.

[Earl]
And that distinction would be?

[Edgar]
It is easy to see how these two divine incommunicable
attributes are conceptually distinct. Analytically
(i.e. by definition), omnipotence cannot be the same
attribute as omniscience without a severe
contradiction obtaining. I don't think you dispute
this point. The more controversial proposal might be
the notion that there is a "formal distinction"
(DISTINCTIO FORMALIS) that obtains between divine
omnipotence and divine omniscience. By this, I mean
that these two essential properties of God *may* be
two different aspects of one divine perfection. I'm
not sure about this idea though. In any event, if
there is a formal distinction between omniscience and
omnipotence, it would mean that the distinction is not
merely conceptual but much the same as the DISTINCTIO
between head/tails or space/time or matter/energy. If
we are careful with our speech and concepts, we do not
wholly conflate the foregoing things, one with
another, because they are not reducible, one to
another.

[Earl]
As long as you realize that these distinctions are
theoretical. We may speak of God's essence and existence,
but the former essentially (!) implies the latter.

[Edgar]
How does the former entail the latter? I define the
essence of an entity as its "quiddity" (QUIDDITAS),
nature or whatness. Existence, on the other hand,
refers to the lived actuality of an essence (Thomas
Aquinas uses the expression ACTUS ESSENDI). Scotus
makes a helpful distinction between the essence,
existence and HAECCEITAS of a RES. In other words, it
is possible to posit an essence for an entity (RES)
that does not actually exist. For example,
unicornality in no way implies that unicorns exist.
Essence does not imply existence. This is even the
case when God is the "essence" that we have in mind.

Regards,
Edgar

YHWH (Jehovah) and Theological Metaphors

Gerald O'Collins and Daniel Kendall argue that theological metaphors "refer to and describe reality." Concurring with Soskice, they reason that metasememes speak about one thing in terms that appear suggestive of another thing. For example, God does not instantiate the literal mind-independent properties of a crag, but the ancient Hebrew prophets articulate speech regarding YHWH in ways that appear suggestive of a rock. Likewise, YHWH is called "a sun and shield" in Psalm 84:11(12). Yet, he apparently does not exemplify the matter-of-fact predicates that structurally constitute the Sun or a shield. In these instances, the Bible writers presumably are employing tropes to speak about one entity (God) in terms suggestive of other entities (rock, Sun or shield). Metaphor seemingly permits the writers of Scripture to describe the supreme reality adequately, though indirectly. Far from being linguistically insufficient or vulnerable, theological metaphors seem to accomplish what "proper terminology" (De oratore 3.152-155) cannot achieve; they convey truths that non-tropic expressions attributing matter-of-fact properties to a particular subject are incapable of communicating.

The Memorial as a Communion Sacrifice

One Scriptural passage that has really helped me to
appreciate tonight's upcoming Memorial of Christ's
death on Nisan 14 is 1 Cor 10:18:

"Look at that which is Israel in a fleshly way: Are
not those who eat the sacrifices sharers with the
altar?"

When posing this rhetorical query, Paul alludes to the
OT practice of communion sacrifices. One can find a
lovely description of such offerings in Leviticus
7:1-38. I want to briefly recount what that Biblical
chapter says and apply it to Paul's words found in 1
Corinthians 10:18ff.

The communion sacrifices were peace offerings designed
to restore a broken relationship that might obtain
between God and His ancient worshipers. It was a holy
presentation to Almighty God (YHWH), and when offering
a communion sacrifice, the Israelites were fittingly
obligated to give their best to Jehovah (YHWH).

Leviticus 7:28-30 mandates that one presenting a
communion sacrifice to Jehovah should offer the 'fat
upon the breast' to Him as a wave offering.
(Leviticus 7:30 briefly explains what a wave offering
entailed.) In addition to offering the fat and the
blood to YHWH or Jehovah(Leviticus 7:33), the one presenting
peace offerings to God was also commanded to give 'the
right leg' of his sacrifice as 'a sacred portion' to
the officiating priests. Furthermore the High Priest
and his sons were to have a share in this communion
offering. What a privilege all those who offered
communion presentations enjoyed! Paul aptly stated
that those who sacrificed upon the altar in Israel became
(by means of their respective gifts to God) sharers in the altar.
But how does this Levitical practice apply to
Christians today?

As Paul intimates, the Lord's Evening Meal (1
Corinthians 11:20) is the antitype of the OT peace
offerings. Just as ancient worshipers of God brought
their sacrifices to Jehovah in order to repair a
breach that might have obtained between themselves and God,
so anointed Christians (2 Corinthians 1:21-22; 1 John 2:20, 27)
annually observe the Memorial of Jesus' death
in order to memorialize how God repaired the
figurative breach between God and sinful humanity and
thus fully reconciled humans to Himself.

Anointed Christians share in the antitypical communion
meal by figuratively partaking of Christ's blood (the cup of wine)
and his sacrificed body (the bread). The emblems at the Memorial
are symbols of the reality effectuated by God
through Christ. Yet those who partake of the cup and wine
today nonetheless share with God's altar as they partake
of a meal (in effect) with Jehovah, His High Priest
(Jesus) and other fellow anointed ones (i.e. underpriests).
It is still an inestimable privilege to have a figurative
meal with God. Anointed Christians therefore esteem
the undeserved kindness that has been shown to them
through the Son of God's ransom sacrifice. However,
they are not the only ones who benefit from being
present at the yearly communion meal.

The great crowd of other sheep who possess a hope of
living forever, while not partaking of the emblems and
thus sharing in the altar, still have their
appreciation for Christ's sacrifice deepened as they
listen to the discourse given about Jesus' death and
watch the symbols of his death being passed around the
Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. I thus hope that everyone
attending the Memorial this year reflects on what Christ's death
means in terms of a communion sacrifice. May you all continue to grow
in love and appreciation for Jehovah and His Son.

Brotherly love,
Edgar

Herold Weiss on John 5:17ff

Herold Weiss writes:

"Since the discourse that follows [John 5:18] denies the 'Jewish' understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son, is the 'Jewish' charge that Jesus had broken the sabbath to be taken seriously? I suggest that in John's view the 'Jews' are wrong both in their understanding of the equality of the Father and the Son and of Jesus as a sabbath breaker."

See "The Sabbath in the Fourth Gospel," Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 110, No. 2. (Summer, 1991): 311-321.

Regards,
Edgar