John Gill on Divine Omnipotence

Here is part of what Gill has to say about the almightiness or omnipotence of God:

The power of God reaches to all things, and therefore is, with propriety, called Omnipotence; all things are possible with God, and nothing impossible; this is said by an angel, and confirmed by Christ, (Luke 1:37; Mark 14:36) what is impossible with men is possible with God; what cannot be done according to the nature of things, the laws, rules, and course of nature, may be done by the God of nature, who is above these, and not bound by them, and sometimes acts contrary to them; as when he stopped the sun in its course, in the times of Joshua; made iron to swim by the hands of the prophet Elisha; and suffered not fire to burn in the furnace of Nebuchadnezzar, so that the three persons cast into it were not hurt by it, nor their clothes so much as singed, nor the smell of fire upon them: whereas, it is the nature of the sun to go on in its course, without stopping, nor can any creature stop it; and for ponderous bodies, as iron, to sink in water; and for fire to burn. There are some things, indeed, which God cannot do, and which the Scriptures express as, that "he cannot deny himself", (2 Tim. 2:13) nor do anything that is contrary to his being, his honour and glory, or subversive of it; thus, for instance, he cannot make another God, that would be contrary to himself, to the unity of his Being, and the declaration of his Word; "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", (Deut. 6:4) he cannot make a finite creature infinite; that would be to do the same, and there would be more infinites than one, which is a contradiction; he cannot raise a creature to such dignity as to have divine perfections ascribed to it, it has not, which would be a falsehood; or to have religious worship and adoration given it, which would be denying himself, detracting from his own glory, and giving it to another, when he only is to be served and worshipped: in such manner it is also said of him, that he "cannot lie", (Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18) for this would be contrary to his truth and faithfulness; he can do nothing that is contrary to his attributes; he cannot commit iniquity, he neither will nor can do it; for that would be contrary to his holiness and righteousness; (see Job 34:10,12, 36:23) he cannot do anything that implies a contradiction; he cannot make contradictions true; a thing to be, and not to be at the same time; or make a thing not to have been that has been[4]; he can make a thing not to be, which is, or has been; he can destroy his own works; but not make that not to have existed, which has existed; nor make an human body to be everywhere; nor accidents to subsist without subjects; with many other things which imply a manifest contradiction and falsehood: but then these are no prejudices to his omnipotence, nor proofs of weakness; they arise only out of the abundance and fulness of his power; who can neither do a weak thing nor a wicked thing, nor commit any falsehood; to do, or attempt to do, any such things, would be proofs of impotence, and not of omnipotence.

See http://www.pbministries.org/books/gill/Doctrinal_Divinity/Book_1/book1_08.htm

Death of My Dad (Correction)

Hello friends, I just experienced a deep loss. My dad passed away this Saturday afternoon (9/19/09): he was almost 78, so I got to enjoy his loving presence for many years. I'll miss him dearly. He taught me about God and opened the way up
(ultimately) for there to be an Edgar Foster who was interested in biblical Greek and
theology. Thanks to all of you! If you reply personally, I probably will not
have the ability to respond to every email, but please know that I appreciate you
all. What did the Romans say? Memento mori? At least I have my mother who has faithfully served Jehovah for more than 30 years. As for my dad-I trust in the God who can raise up redeemable humans from the dead (2 Cor 1:9).

Have a nice day,
Edgar

Dialogue on Christian Materialism

A friend and I had a discussion not too long ago about "Christian materialism." Since that conversation is already public, I reproduce a portion of our dialogue for your consideration.

My friend writes:

> Although the view of those "Christian materialists"
> might be
> practically the same as ours, I always saw us (or
> myself) more
> as "idealists".

I reply:

The term "materialist" admittedly is somewhat confusing in this context. When thinking about a materialist, those who espouse atheism might come to mind. However, what the "Christian materialist" wants to assert (among other things) is that while the human body is not identical with what we are as persons--it does *constitute* what we are as persons. Think of "Christian materialism" in this way. The marble of a statue may not be identical with the statue; nevertheless, the marble does constitute the statue. Similarly, it is possible that our bodies constitute what we are as persons without being identical to our respective personalities. Maybe conscious states arise from neurobiological processes (started by God) and only neurobiological processes. It is possible that what we are as persons is primarily determined by synaptic connections and sensory experiences. I am speaking with respect to humans and not with regard to the angels.

Revelation 5:10 and EPI

Greetings everyone,

What I've written below was addressed to an interlocutor who believes that the decision to translate Revelation 5:10 as "over" rather than "on" is not a Greek but an English issue. I would like to see what the members of Bible Translation think. I wrote the foregoing to my interlocutor:

Dear ****,

There are scholars who prefer to render EPI in Revelation 5:9-10 as "on" even though the context has reference to the authority of men and women, whom God (through Christ) has bought or redeemed from the earth.

Robert L. Thomas does not offer a justifying explanation for why he chooses to translate EPI as "on" rather than "over," but he does render this portion of Revelation 5:10: "and they shall reign on the earth" (Revelation 1-7: An Exegetical Commentary, page 402).

David Aune (in his Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation) prefers the translation "on" for EPI in Revelation 5:10. See his text Revelation 1-5, page 362. But this scholar also does not offer an explanation for his rendition of the verse.

However, both Charles B. Williams (New Testament in the Language of the People) and William F. Beck (New Testament in the Language of Today) choose to translate EPI as "over." I reproduce those renderings below:

"and they will rule over the earth" (Williams)

"and they will rule as kings over the earth" (Beck)

Is this issue simply one of how English treats [Greek] prepositions that function within the context of descriptions about authority or rulership? That is not what I glean from reading Greek grammars. Moreover, BDAG Greek-English lexicon (the authoritative NT Greek lexicon) states that EPI can be a "marker of power, authority, control of or over someone or [something], over." The examples that are listed in the lexicon include Revelation 5:10; 17:18, 20:6; 2:26. It doesn't seem like this is a matter of how English treats [Greek] prepositions within the context of authority (cf. Matthew 24:45-47; Acts 12:20; Ephesians 4:6).

Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon (semantic domain 37.9) also notes that
EPI (in particular contexts) can function as "a marker of the object
over which someone exercises a control or authority." This resource
suggests the rendering "over, with responsibility for." The examples
given in this work are Acts 8:27; Luke 1:33. Again, I do not see how
it is just a matter of English idiom. However, it is possible that I
am not seeing matters clearly. Nevertheless, let us consider some other sources.

William Douglas Chamberlain writes: "A metaphorical use [of EPI] with
the idea 'over,' in the sense of ruling, grows quite naturally out of
'upon': hO WN EPI PANTWN (Rom 9:5), 'the one who is over (rules) all
things.'"

See _An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament_, pages 122-123.

"EPI with any of its cases can express the object of one's control,
authority, or rule. Jesus gave his disciples authority over the power
of the enemy (Luke 10:19 acc.)" is what one finds in Richard A.
Young's _Intermediate New Testament Greek_ grammar, page 98.

LSJ states that EPI can be used with the causal sense "over, of
persons in authority, EP' hOU ETAXQHMEN Hdt. 5.109; hOI [EPI] TWN
PRAGMATWN the public officers, D 18.247." See the entry for EPI (A.III.1).

Finally, I will quote Max Zerwick: "The accusative and the genitive are found together and in a quite similar sense in Mt 25,21: 'because thou wast faithful over little (EPI OLIGA) I will set thee over much (EPI POLLWN).' This example, however, belongs to the metaphorical use, where e.g. of rule 'over' we find in the NT, alongside the classical genitive, the accusative as in BASILEUSEI EPI TON OIKON IAKWB Lk 1,33." See Zerwick's _Biblical Greek, page 42.

Best wishes,
Edgar Foster

NAOS and hIERON

Ralph Earle (when discussing Matt. 24:1) says that NAOS finds it etymological roots in the verb NAIW ("dwell"). This Greek word was used in classical Greek to delineate the "dwelling place of the gods," and it was also used in the LXX to describe God's temple at Jerusalem (Earle 21). Earle then quotes Thayer, who writes that NAOS is "used of the temple at Jerusalem, but only of the sacred edifice (or sanctuary) itself, consisting of the Holy place and the Holy of Holies" (Qt. in Earle 21). So this source seems to indicate that NAOS is confined to the sanctuary of the temple (the Holy and Most Holy place). But let's continue our examination before we come to any set conclusion.

About hIERON, Earle exclaims that it is the "substantive neuter of the adjective hIEROS, 'sacred.'" The adjective hIEROS is used of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (Acts 19:27); twice in the LXX for the Temple at Jerusalem (Ezek. 45:19; 1 Chron. 29:4); "71 times in the NT--45 in the Gospels, 25 in Acts, and only once elsewhere" (1 Cor. 9:13). After this analysis, Earle concludes that "hIERON in the Gospels and Acts . . . refers to the whole Temple area" (Earle 21). He claims that "only the priests could go into the NAOS, the sanctuary itself."

In the interest of fairness, Earle cites Michel (TDNT 4:882) who believes that there is "no real distinction between the terms [NAOS and hIERON] in either meaning or range," although Michel appears to temper this comment somewhat on page 4:885. So Earle says, but I do not interpret Michel in the same way. Please read the TDNT entry and decide for yourself. At any rate, Michel appears to believe that Matt. 27:5 supports the view that NAOS can also be used of the whole temple area (i.e., it is not limited to the sanctuary).

BAGD has an extensive examination of NAOS that I'm not about to post in full here. Nevertheless, some of the observations found in this lexicon bear repeating. NAOS means, "temple," says BAGD. It refers to the temple at Jerusalem--to the "whole temple precinct" in Matt. 23:17, 35; 27:5, 40 (BAGD 533). But cf. Matt. 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.

Some more important references to the "heavenly sanctuary" are Rev. 14:15; 15:6; 16:1, 17. BAGD also lists Rev. 7:15; 11:19b; 15:5 (cf. Rev. 3:12; 21:22, 23). There is more to be said in BAGD under figurative uses. I suggest that this information be read and analyzed by all interested parties.

Louw-Nida reads: "NAOS . . . a building in which a deity is worshiped (in the case of the Temple in Jerusalem, a place where God was also regarded as dwelling)--'temple, sanctuary.' " (See Mt 23:35; John 2:21).

"hIERON . . . a temple or sanctuary . . . and the surrounding consecrated area." See John 10:23; Mt 21:12; 1 Cor. 9:13. Note an apparent exception at Acts 19:27. "hIERON in the NT refers to the Temple in Jerusalem, including the entire temple precinct with its buildings, courts, and storerooms."

I'm going the leave the matter at this right now.

Best regards,

Edgar Foster

"A logic must work in some way, and it must be possible to show how it
operates and to characterize this operation" (John M. Ellis).

John Locke on the Soul

Greetings to all:

I have been reading John Locke's (1632-1704) The
Reasonableness of Christianity and found the foregoing comments interesting. The text that I own is edited by I.T. Ramsey. Concerning Gen 2:17, Locke reasons (on p. 26):

"I shall say nothing more here, how far, in the
apprehensions of men, this [the idea of eternal
torment] consists with the justice and goodness of
God, having mentioned it above; but it seems a strange
way of understanding a law [such as the one found in
Gen 2:17], which requires the plainest and directest
words, that by death should be meant eternal life in
misery. Could any one be supposed, by a law, that
says, 'For felony thou shalt die', not that he should
lose his life, but kept alive in perpetual exquisite
torments? And would any one think himself fairly dealt
with, that was so used?"

The obvious answer to both questions for Locke is
"no." He then defines what the word "death" as used in Gen
2:17 means to him:

"I must confess by death here, I can understand
nothing but a ceasing to be, the losing of all actions
of life and sense" (p. 27).

Warm regards,
Edgar

Richard Kearney on Exodus 3:14

Richard Kearney's text The God Who May Be discusses the controversial passage found at Exodus 3:14. I believe that what he has to say about EHYEH ASHER EHYEH is pertinent for this blog. The following quote can also be found at http://iupress.indiana.edu/textnet/0-253-33998-7/0253109167.htm:

'The great medieval Jewish commentator Rashi (Rabbi
Solomon ben Isaac, 1040–1105) renders the burning-bush
encounter as follows: "And God said unto Moses, 'I
shall be what I shall be.' And he said, 'so shall you
say to the children of Israel, I shall be has sent me
to you.'" And lest there be any lingering doubt, God
adds the binding promise: "This is my name for ever
and this is my remembrance from generation to
generation."

Rashi interprets the "name" in terms of mandate and
mission. He offers this daring commentary on God’s
address to Moses on Mount Horeb: "the vision that you
have seen at the thornbush is the sign for you that I
have sent you—and that you will succeed in My mission,
and that I have the wherewithal to save you. Just as
you saw the thornbush performing My mission without
being consumed, so too, you will go on My mission and
you will not be harmed." And Rashi adds, tellingly,
that this mandate itself prefigures the fact that
three months later Moses and his followers would
receive the Torah upon the very same mountain. Going
on to render the key passage of Exodus 3:14, he
writes, in very much the same spirit of futural
promise: "I shall be what I shall be—I shall be with
them during this trouble what I shall be with them at
the time of their subjugation at the hands of other
kingdoms." In other words, Rashi tells us, the
transfiguring God of the burning bush is pledging to
remain with those who continue to suffer in future
historical moments, and not just in the present
moment. Rashi attributes a similar sense to the phase
"This is My Name forever, and My Remembrance from
generation to generation" (Exodus 3:15). The
transfiguring God is not a once-off deity but one who
remembers the promises of the past and remains
faithful to them into the eschatological future.'

END OF QUOTE

Kearney's own translational preference for Exodus 3:14
is stated thus:

'My ultimate suggestion is that we might do better to
reinterpret the Transfiguring God of Exodus 3 neither
as "I who am" nor as "I who am not" but rather as "I
am who may be"—that is, as the possibility to be,
which obviates the extremes of being and non-being.
EHYEH ASHER EHYEH might thus be read as signature of
the God of the possible, a God who refuses to impose
on us or abandon us, traversing the present moment
while opening onto an ever-coming future.'

END OF QUOTE

Yet, Kearney concedes that Rashi's "eschatological"
reading of Exodus 3:14 is "arguably more attuned to the
original biblical context of meaning."

Lily Ross Taylor on PROSKUNHSIS

The following is taken from Lily Ross Taylor's _The Divinity of the Roman Emperor_, Philological Monographs, no. 1 (Middletown, Conn: American Philological Association, 1931).

This post deals with PROSKUNHSIS

"The Greek word PROSKUNHSIS denotes an act of devotion to a god that consisted either in kissing the hand toward the image or--less often--in kissing the ground before it. The Greeks used the word to describe the Persian custom of greeting the king by bowing down and kissing the earth. Alexander's conquest of the great Persian empire had brought him into close contact with Persian customs and manners, and in general he found it wise to adopt them" (pp. 18-19).

"Of course the PROSKUNHSIS did not always imply 'worship' in our sense of the word. It was a form of greeting extended among the Persians by inferiors to those far above them (Hdt. 1.134). For an analysis of the material on the PROSKUNHSIS, see Schnabel, Klio, XIX, 118ff."

The full reference for the article to which Taylor refers is
Paul Schnabel, "Die Begründung des hellenistischen Königskultes durch Alexander," Klio 19 (1925) 113-27.

Frederick Danker on the Greek word BLASFHMEW

"Distortion of the source text can also occur when a translator uses an expression that loads the source text with a negative intensity derived from a receptor's term that has acquired a specialized sense. For example, the Greek verb BLASFHMEW means 'to speak in a disrespectful way that demeans, denigrates, maligns.' The word is thus used in Greek about humans or transcendent beings, whereas in English the transliteration 'blaspheme' has acquired an exclusive association with sacral aspects, and when used in translations of the Bible obscures the cultural breadth of the Greek term" (Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography: Essays in Honor of Frederick W. Danker. Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), page 26.

Danker also proffers remarks on how one should understand the Greek verb rendered "blaspheme" in Acts 19:26-27. See the aforementioned publication.

Regards,
Edgar

The 24 Elders and Golden Crowns

Why do the 24 elders (older persons) depicted in Revelation 4:4 have golden crowns on their heads? I am not sure, but certain suggestions have been set forth. They are:

"Emblematic of the fact that they sustained a kingly office. There was blended in the representation the idea that they were both 'kings and priests'" (Barnes NT Notes).

"An emblem of their dignity. The Jewish writers represent human souls as being created first; and before they enter the body, each is taken by an angel into paradise, where it sees the righteous sitting in glory with crowns upon their heads. Rab. Tanchum, fol. 39, 4" (Adam Clarke's Commentary).

"they had on their heads crowns of gold, signifying the honour and authority given them of God, and the glory they have with him. All these may in a lower sense be applied to the gospel church on earth, in its worshipping assemblies; and, in the higher sense, to the church triumphant in heaven" (Matthew Henry, Commentary on the Whole Bible).

"Four and twenty elders sitting. These ancients were (1) twenty-four in number; (2) they were clothed in white, the color of victory and purity; (3) on their heads were golden crowns, not the diadem which means a kingly crown, but the golden crown of honor (Stephanos). Critics are not agreed as to the signification of these elders, but most of them think that they symbolize the glorified church of God gathered round the throne. They disagree as to the significance of the number twenty-four. There were twenty-four courses of priests. There were twelve tribes, and twelve apostles" (People's NT).

Any other suggestions? I am particularly interested in why the crowns of the 24 elders are "golden."

Genesis 22:1-18: Abraham and Isaac

There has been a lot of hand-wringing over the narrative found in Genesis 22:1-18. Skeptics and critics have wondered how a loving God could ask a parent to sacrifice his or her child up to a divine being. Some even accuse God of playing a "trick" on Abraham. Others, while considering themselves believers in God, have also spent countless pages trying to analyze and somewhat explain how God (YHWH) could make such a request from his beloved servant. I have also spent hours teaching this account, trying to understand it and mulling it over. There are numerous ways that one could understand the account of Abraham and Isaac, but two things seem clear to me. First, Genesis 22:1 says that God was testing Abraham, not tricking him. As Jamieson, Fausset and Brown state:

"God did tempt Abraham--not incite to sin ( Jam 1:13 ), but try, prove--give occasion for the development of his faith ( 1Pe 1:7 )."

The writer of Genesis (traditionally viewed as Moses) states from the outset that what is about to be read in the narrative is a "test": God is trying to see what is in Abraham's heart. That is why YHWH later utters the words "now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only [son] from me" (Genesis 22:12 KJV).

Open theist Gregory Boyd writes concerning this passage:

"if the classical understanding of foreknowledge is true, God's statement 'now I know' seems disingenuous. The meaning of God's explanation for this knowledge — 'since you have…' — is also obscured. Indeed, if the future is exhaustively settled there would be no point in his test of Abraham, because God would never have to find out anything."

So, Genesis 22:1 seems to offer firm evidence that God did not trick Abraham but tested his faith. The account must be read with Genesis 22:1 in mind. Secondly, the Hebrew-Aramaic Scriptures (the Old Testament or Tanach) make it abundantly clear that God does not want nor did he ever want or desire child sacrifices. Read Micah 6:1-8; Jeremiah 7:31. The account of Abraham and Isaac (also known as the Akedah or Aqedah) is understood more easily when read in context.

Theodoret on The Death of Arius

Theodoret relates the words of Athanasius:

"The followers of Eusebius were covered with shame, and buried him whose belief they shared. The blessed Alexander completed the celebration, rejoicing with the Church in piety and orthodoxy, praying with all the brethren and greatly glorifying God. This was not because he rejoiced at the death of Arius—God forbid; for 'it is appointed unto all men once to die'; but because the event plainly transcended any human condemnation. For the Lord Himself passing judgment upon the menaces of the followers of Eusebius, and the prayer of Alexander, condemned the Arian heresy, and shewed that it was unworthy of being received into the communion of the Church; thus manifesting to all that, even if it received the countenance and support of the emperor, and of all men, yet by truth itself it stood condemned."

See The Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret (Book 1, Extract from the Letter of Athanasius on the Death of Arius)

Augustine of Hippo on 2 Thessalonians 2:8-13

Why they are called signs and lying wonders [in 2 Thess. 2:8-13], we shall then be more likely to know when the time itself arrives. But whatever be the reason of the name, they shall be such signs and wonders as shall seduce those who shall deserve to be seduced, "because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." Neither did the apostle scruple to go on to say, "For this cause God shall send upon them the working of error that they should believe a lie." For God shall send, because God shall permit the devil to do these things, the permission being by His own just judgment, though the doing of them is in pursuance of the devil's unrighteous and malignant purpose, "that they all might be judged who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." Therefore, being judged, they shall be seduced, and, being seduced, they shall be judged. But, being judged, they shall be seduced by those secretly just and justly secret judgments of God, with which He has never ceased to judge since the first sin of the rational creatures; and, being seduced, they shall be judged in that last and manifest judgment administered by Jesus Christ, who was Himself most unjustly judged and shall most justly judge.

See Augustine's City of God (De Civitate Dei), Chapter 19.

Reflections on the Eastern Idea of Theosis (QEWSIS)

Personally, I think that QEWSIS [deification] is a doctrine that has a certain element of truth, but it is also capable of being distorted.

In the New Testament, there are scriptures that support the idea of deification
(at least, in a limited sense). 2 Pet. 1:4 speaks of Christians
becoming "partakers of the divine nature" (GENHSQE QEIAS KOINWNOI
FUSEWS). 1 John 3:2 also says that the sons of God will "see God and
be LIKE him." These Scriptures indicate that at least some Christians
will experience QEWSIS.

The doctrine of QEWSIS is a beautiful teaching insofar as it is delineated in
the NT. The only danger is that it could be misconstrued to imply that
humans will become equal to God. MH GENOITO! There is a sharp eternal
[ontological] distinction between the Creator and the creature.
For this reason, Alister McGrath has suggested that we speak
of deification as QEIWSIS rather than QEWSIS. That is,
those deified will be godlike, but not God.

At any rate, I think that QEWSIS for those Christians privileged to
inherit it, will entail being clothed with immortality and
incorruption--with self-existence. They will also share in ruling with
Christ Jesus for 1000 years, transforming the present world order into
a new age devoid of death, sickness, and crime (Revelation 20:6; 21:1-5).

My thoughts,

Edgar

Note: I wrote these reflections a number of years ago. At the time I quoted McGrath but did not document where I found his distinction between QEIOSIS and QEOSIS. I went to Googlebooks, however, and found two references. See http://books.google.com/books?id=DvPMFcGIZgkC&pg=PA171&dq=mcgrath+and+theiosis&lr= and http://books.google.com/books?id=AEtIlaWp9foC&pg=PA392&dq=mcgrath+and+theiosis&lr=

Saul Kripke on Necessity, Possibility and Rigidity

The following dialogue is one that I had with a friend and colleague back in 2004. I am not including his name in order to protect his identity:

Saul Kripke is speaking the language of modal logic when he uses the operator "possibly" in Naming and Necessity. He appears to have in mind counterfactual situations (i.e., counterfactual conditionals) or possible worlds such that if P is logically or modally possible in one or more possible world, then there is a counterfactual situation [a possible world] in which P is evidently not logically or modally impossible. In other words, it could have been the case (possibly) that mental states obtain without brain states. It also might have been the case that my arms were white instead of "black." One Kripkean example of possibility addressing this issue is that there is a counterfactual situation (call it W1) in which the first Postmaster General is not identical with the inventor of bifocals. He doesn't come right out and say that he is using "possibility" thus; however, Naming and Necessity
turns on counterfactual situations and possible worlds. And I now know that Kripke basically ignores the question
about whether something might have existed or not.

Concerning "necessity," Kripke writes, "Thus the identity of pain with the stimulation of C-fibers, if true, must be necessary" (N & N, 149).

What does he mean by "necessary" here? Hasker makes a
distinction between logical (i.e. conceptual)
necessity and metaphysical necessity, noting that
statements such as the one above are metaphysically
necessary, meaning that they are true in all possible
worlds. Kripke also asserts that "This table is not
made of ice," IF TRUE, is necessarily true or true in
all possible worlds (i.e. counterfactual situations).
so necessity evidently means "true in all
counterfactual situations or possible worlds."

For "rigid," Kripke simply writes that the RD or "rigid designator"
(which is apparently stipulative) names the same object in
all possible worlds. The RD, Nixon, names the same
object in W1, W2, W3 . . .

Now here is what I also found on a website article written by
Quentin Smith:

<<[Tyler] Burge then identifies Kripke's essays as the first "account of names [in terms of] a theory of necessity. He counted names as 'rigid designators' - expressions that maintained a certain constancy of reference through variation in the possible worlds by reference to which modal sentences might be evaluated" [1992: 25]. However, these ideas about names and rigid designators were not presented first by Kripke, but earlier presented by Plantinga [1967], Føllesdal [1961] and Marcus [1961].>>

See
http://www.qsmithwmu.com/direct%2C_rigid_designation_and_a_posteriori.htm

Smith thinks that Kripke posits a similarity of
identity between logical and metaphysical necessity.
Nevertheless, he still defines it [i.e. necessity] as "true in all
possible worlds."

Regards,
Edgar

The Anonymous God Tradition

John Cooper argues that the term "name" can have four basic denotations: (1) a personal name (e.g. Jehovah or Peter); (2) a proper noun (e.g. Father, God, King); (3) a general designation (e.g. dog, cat, slanderer); (4) any linguistic reference (e.g. "God is light" or "the greatest possible being").

While it seems that the pre-Nicenes generally acknowledged that God had a name in the sense of (3) or (4) above, the early church writers often appear to be denying that God has a name in the sense of (1) or (2) above. I am reminded of Marcus Minucius Felix, who writes in Octavius 18:

"Nor should you seek a name for God: God is His name. We have need of titles in cases where we want to separate individuals from a large group; we use, then the distinguishing mark of personal names. But God is unique; all He has for title is God" (Nec nomen deo quaeras: Deus nomen est. Illic vocabulis opus est, cum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est: deo, qui solus est, dei vocabulum totum est).

There is an anonymous God tradition in early Christianity that is manifested in the East and West. The tradition asserted that God does not have a proper name.

Alister McGrath on Understated Tritheism in the Cappadocians

The notable writer Alister McGrath (a Trinitarian himself) writes concerning the Cappadocian notion of God in three persons:

"We are asked to imagine three human beings. Each of
them is distinct; yet share a common humanity. So it
is with the trinity: There are three distinct persons,
yet with a common divine nature. When all is said and
done, this analogy leads directly to understated
tritheism. Yet the treatise in which Gregory of Nyssa
develops this analogy is entitled That There Are Not
Three Gods! In fact, Gregory develops his analogy with
a degree of sophistication which blunts the prima
facie charge of tritheism; however, even the most
studious reader of the work is often left with the
lingering impression of three distinct independent
entities within the trinity" (Christian Theology: An
Introduction, page 302).

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Greetings,

I am trying the Google AdSense to generate extra income which means that discreet ads will be placed to the side of this blog. Currently, I am changing my preferences from interest generated to non-interest generated ads. I prefer not to direct people toward religions other than my own. :) Please bear with me on the transition. Nothing else about this blog will change. Thank you.

Animals, Language and Speech (A Short Paper)

Animals, Language, and Speech

Dr. Edgar Foster

Is language strictly a human activity or do animals also use language? What is language? Is there a difference between speech and language? The following brief treatment of these questions in no way claims to be comprehensive or exhaustive. It is merely a short reply to specific claims regarding language and animals.
Rodolfo R. Llinas (author of I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self) claims that language simpliciter, but particularly human language, "arose as an extension of premotor conditions, namely, those of the increasing complexities of intentionality as abstract thinking grew richer" (242). Llinas defines intentionality as "the premotor detail of the desired result of movement through which a particular emotional state is expressed: the choice of what to do before the doing of it" (228). Notice that intentionality, as opposed to being primarily mentalistic, is associated with "a motor representation of what is happening inside our heads" (ibid). Intentionality expressed in premotor activity essentially predicts or adumbrates genuine motor patterns, according to Llinas. Language, he argues, arose because premotor activity increasingly grew more complex as abstract cerebration became richer.

The upshot of Llinas' analysis is that language is not simply a human possession (228-230). He contends that non-rational animals also use language. For language, on this view, is "the given methodology by which one animal may communicate with another" (229). Is Llinas correct? Do animals really implement or deploy language in their daily activities? Did non-rational animal language precede the use of language by Homo sapiens?

Most psycholinguists now believe that human language acquisition is not based on external stimuli. Scientific studies of “language” deployed by apes and by children indicate that human language is somehow innate since there evidently is such a discrepancy between the lingual performance of apes and that of humans. This difference is so profound that it moved Noam Chomsky to argue that humans possess a "language acquisition device"(LAD). Based on the foregoing, is it accurate to say that animals utilize language?

Linguist and NT scholar Moises Silva thinks that non-rational animals do communicate with one another and this point seems hard to deny. Nevertheless, Silva also holds that "the most successful experiments to date serve, if anything, to emphasize the enormous difference between the 'language' of the most intelligent animals—even after extensive training—and the linguistic competence of even a three-year old human being" (Silva, "God, Language and Scripture" in Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, 207). At any rate (Silva insists) animals do not use speech. This leaves us with two questions to consider. What is language? Secondly, what is the difference, if any, between language and speech?

Ferdinand Saussure famously made a distinction between la langue and la parole. The former refers to an abstract system of different phonological signs, whereas the latter has reference to the use of abstract language in communication. La langue additionally has both an internal and external aspect in that phonology, morphology, syntax (internal features) and semantics (external feature) all constitute language. Ergo, if we define language as Saussure and other linguists or philosophers have defined the phenomenon, then it seems that animals possess neither langue nor parole. The matter will no doubt remain controversial, yet there are good scientific and logical reasons to doubt that animals use language, as one commonly understands that term.

In conclusion, I affirm the uniqueness of human language and speech. I will close with quotes from Sophocles and King David to support my case:

"And speech, and wind-swift thought, and all the moods
that mould a state, hath he [i.e. man] taught himself;
and how to flee the arrows of the frost, when 'tis
hard lodging under the clear sky, and the arrows of
the rushing rain; yea, he hath resource for all;
without resource he meets nothing that must come: only
against Death shall he call for aid in vain; but from
baffling maladies he hath devised escapes"(Antigone 332-340).

"What are humans that you are mindful of them, mere
mortals that you care for them? Yet you have made them
little less than a god, crowned them with glory and
honor" (Psalm 8:5ff NAB).

Pouring Out of the Spirit as a Metaphor (Joel 2:28-29)

I have not researched this point thoroughly but I have been wondering if the language that Scripture employs regarding God pouring out his spirit of holiness is metaphorical or not. For example, Joel 2:28 states:

"It will come about after this That I will pour out My Spirit on all mankind; And your sons and daughters will prophesy, Your old men will dream dreams, Your young men will see visions" (NASB).

We also read in Isa 32:15:

"Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest" (KJV).

The argument is sometimes made that a "person" of the triune Godhead cannot be poured out. But the thought has crossed my mind lately that a "force" also cannot be literally "poured out" in the manner described by the prophets, can it? If a force or person cannot be "poured out" it seems that the language employed by the holy prophets and apostles is metaphorical.