Photius on Origen's De Principiis

Taken from Photius' Bibliotheca

See http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/photius_03bibliotheca.htm

"Read Origen's four books On First Principles. The first deals with the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. In this his statements are often blasphemous; thus, he asserts that the Son was created by the Father, the Holy Ghost by the Son; that the Father pervades all existing things, the Son only those that are endowed with reason, the Holy Ghost only those that are saved. He also makes other strange and impious statements, indulging in frivolous talk about the migration of souls, the stars being alive, and the like. This first book is full of fables about the Father, Christ (as he calls the Son), the Holy Ghost, and creatures endowed with reason. In the second book he treats of the world and created things. He asserts that the God of the Law and the prophets, of the Old and the New Testament, is one and the same; that there was the same Holy Spirit in Moses, the rest of the prophets, and the Holy Apostles. He further discusses the Incarnation of the Saviour, the soul, resurrection, punishment, and promises. The third book deals with free will; how the devil and hostile powers, according to the Scriptures, wage war against mankind; that the world was created and is perishable, having had a beginning in time. The fourth book treats of the final end, the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, and the proper manner of reading and understanding them."

The Word "Father" as Metaphor for God

There is a long section on PATHR in TDNT (volume V). This reference work states that "when the term father occurs [in the Hebrew Scriptures or Tanakh], it is fundamentally applied to God only in a metaphorical sense, and if we are to understand it everything depends on finding the right point of comparison [tertium comparationis]" (TDNT, V:970). See Deuteronomy 8:5; 2 Samuel 7:12-14; Psalm 2:7; 89:26; 103:13; Proverbs 3:12.

LSJ just notes that PATHR is used of God the Father of Israel (Deuteronomy 32:6), the Father of Jesus Christ (Matthew 7:21) and the Father of men (Matthew 6:9). It then states that the usage of PATHR at James 1:17 is metaphorical. But I would include the OT and Matthean passages as well as other authors do.

I looked at the entry for PATHR in the Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament. It too mentions that God is a metaphorical Father to Israel or creatures. But this work insists that the term is not metaphorical in the case of Jesus Christ being generated by God the Father.

See http://tinyurl.com/37z8ya

Trinitarian Redactors, Novatian and Origen

Matt13weedhacker,

Here is something I posted on another forum. At the end of this message, you'll find a reference to Studer's work.

Greetings!

One of the most important works on the Trinity
doctrine is Novatian's _De Trinitate_. This work has
been admired in the western church and became somewhat
of a VADE MECUM in ancient times. In English, we
usually call Novatian's treatise _On the Trinity_.
However, one wonders whether Novatian himself appended
the word "Trinity" to the title of this document?
Alternatively, is it possible that early copies of the
text were edited or redacted and the word "Trinity"
was added to Novatian's work?

Russell J. DeSimone (in his translation of _De
Trinitate_) points out that we do not know the
original title of what is now known as _De Trinitate_.
He suggests that the "correct title" of the work
appears to have been _De regula veritatis_ or _De
regula fidei_ (DeSimone 23). The latter title may be
more likely in view of what Novatian writes in _De
Trinitate_ 21 regarding the general thesis of his
work. In any event, Novatian the Presbyter never
utilizes the term "Trinity." DeSimone thus notes that
an amanuensis living after 381 probably altered the
title in view of what transpired in 325 and 381 CE at
the ecumenical councils (DeSimone 23).

Joseph M. Hallman (_The Descent of God_, page 70)
similarly observes that _De regula fidei_ may have
been the original title of _De Trinitate_. Again, the
possible work of a redactor is acknowledged.

One may also find evidence for Trinitarian redaction
in the Latin versions of Origen's _Peri Archon_. See
Basil Studer's _Trinity and Incarnation_, page 84.

Regards,
Edgar

Notes on Matthew 10:29

Text: OUXI DUO STROUQIA ASSARIOU PWLEITAI KAI hEN EX
AUTWN OU PESEITAI EPI THN GHN ANEU TOU PATROS hUMWN.

OUXI, in a manner analogous to the Latin NONNE,
introduces a question with the expectation that the
answer will be "yes." See Zerwick and Grosvenor, page
31.

ASSARIOU-diminutive form of Latin AS (= 1/16 denarius
or less than a half hour's wage).

ASSARIOU is a genitive of price (Zerwick-Grosvenor).

Genitive of price-"The genitive substantive specifies
the price paid for or value assessed for the word to
which it is related. This is relatively rare in the
NT" (Daniel B. Wallace, GGBB, page 122).

Brooks and Winbery use the terminology "adverbial
genitive of measure" which includes the genitive of
price or genitive of measure.

ANEU TOU PATROS hUMWN is an example of the substantive
with an adverbial preposition (see Brooks and Winbery,
22).

KAI-"And yet."

NET Bible translates the latter portion of this verse:
"Yet not one of them falls to the ground apart from
your Father's will."

The NET Bible footnote, however, states: "Or 'to the
ground without the knowledge and consent of your
Father.'"

"nonne duo passeres asse veneunt et unus ex illis non cadet super terram sine Patre vestro" (Matthew 10:29 Biblia Sacra Vulgata).

Vincent's Word Studies

Sparrows (στρουθία)

"The word is a diminutive, little sparrows, and carries with it a touch of tenderness. At the present day, in the markets of Jerusalem and Jaffa, long strings of little birds, sparrows and larks, are offered for sale, trussed on long wooden skewers. Edersheim thinks that Jesus may have had reference to the two sparrows which, according to the Rabbins, were used in the ceremonial of purification from leprosy (Leviticus 14:49-54)."

Regards,
Edgar

Brunner's Distinction Between Omnipotence and Almightiness

Thomas Aquinas essentially defines omnipotence as the power to do all that is logically possible. Other theologians similarly define omniscience as the ability to know all that it is possible to know. In his interesting study on evil and providence, Peter Geach likewise suggests that God is not omnipotent but rather "almighty." Emil Brunner develops this concept in The Christian Doctrine of God (volume I, page 248ff).

Brunner contends: "The Biblical conception [of God's almightiness] means God's power over the whole universe; but omnipotentia means the abstract idea that 'God can do everything.'" See p. 248.

This distinction seems theologically meaningful or substantial. What are your thoughts on this matter?

Hippolytus and the Trinity Doctrine (A Dialogue)

Here is another dialogue between me and a Trinitarian friend/interlocutor:

Greetings [Sam],

[Foster]
Hippolytus died circa 236 C.E. While his writings may
have been "unsystematic," as you say, there is almost
no doubt (historically) that he was accused of being
a "ditheist" by Bishop Callistus. W.H.C. Frend thinks
that the bishop may have been justified in labeling
Hippolytus thus. He also thinks that Hippolytus
thought of the Logos as a created being, deified for
a time. The Catholic writer Edmund Fortman in his book
_The Triune God_ also informs us that Hippolytus
"rather deliberately seems to avoid putting the Holy
Spirit on the same personal plane with the Father and
the Son, and to regard Him more as a divine force
than a divine person" (page 119). Granted, as Fortman
writes, Hippolytus may not have highlighted the
"personality" of the Spirit because he was not
dealing with a heated issue that arose prior to 381 C.E.,
namely, the Pneumatomachi Controversy. Nevertheless,
he does not seem to ascribe personhood to the Spirit
of God and he appears to subordinate the Son
(ontologically) to the Father.

["Sam"]
I have no serious quarrells here, as far as I
can tell. Muslims regularly accuse Christians of
tri-theism, and Christians aren't always cautious to
avoid being thus misunderstood. If you ask nearly
any rank-and-file Christian to explain "God," he will
almost always, if he ventures the least bit beyond
the confessional formulations, end up saying things
that could be understood either in the direction of
modalism or tri-theism. Beyond that, it's an
empirical fact that trinitarian concepts are refractory to
facile understanding and that many people-- even theologians
otherwise known for reasonably careful thought-- have
expressed themselves incautiously or misunderstandingly
on the Trinity.

[Foster]
The primary point I want to make about Hippolytus,
however, is that his views do not stem from lack of
precision or conceptual clarity. Nor do they originate
from his being less than circumspect when it comes to
articulating his theological concepts. Hippolytus
expresses himself the way he does, I contend, because
he believes that Christ is a deified creature, one who
has gradually progressed from LOGOS ENDIAQETOS to
hUIOS (i.e. LOGOS PROFORIKOS) to QEOS.

[Foster Previously]
The problem, as Swete notes, is that the language of
Hippolytus does not allow for the Holy Spirit being
an eternal divine relation or Person--he also believes
that the Son as such is not eternal--and his thought
evidently contains elements of subordinationism. That
is, Hippolytus is not just maintaining that the Son
or Spirit are subordinate to the Father as respects
function; they are subordinate PER ESSENTIAM. Such
claims are utterly at odds with Nicene Christianity.

["Sam"]
I find it difficult to be surprised by any of
this. Until controversy compels the Church to
publicly clarify her mind on a doctrinal issue such as this and
define it (as at Nicea), one expects to find a great
deal of latitude in what is believed and asserted
about the question. This is the case at present with
questions such as those eschatological questions
concerning the anti-Christ, the meaning of the
'millenial' reign of Christ, the tribulation, the
'binding of Satan', etc., etc. And it was the case
with other doctrines before they were defined.

[Foster]
I don't think the Church allows that much latitude.
Bishop Callistus (who was evidently a modalist or
Monarchian) accused Hippolytus of being a ditheist.
Frend thinks Callistus was quite justified in
appending this descriptive term to the Roman
theologian. Moreover, if Hippolytus really did believe
that Christ was a deified or apotheosized creature as
suggested by _Refutation of all Heresies 10_, this
would put him outside the bounds of orthodoxy. We are
not just talking about imprecise God-talk: the
Christological ideas contained in the writings of
Hippolytus are at odds with basic Trinitarian thought.

["Sam"]
Hence, if Hippolytus held a form of subordinationism
of the Holy Spirit or Son, this should not surprise
us. Further, as mentioned before, there is a legitimate
respect in which these two Persons of the Trinity ARE
subordinate to the Father and proceed from Him, even
if this isn't clearly articulated in the possibly
deficient formulations of Hippolytus.

[Foster]
According to orthodox Trinitarian thought, the Son and
Spirit may be subordinate to the Father in a
functional sense--though Kevin Giles disputes this
point--but no orthodox Trinitarian is going to openly
or knowingly concede the second and third Persons of
the Trinity are inferior in essence, which (as you
know) is what subordinationism entails.

[SNIP for editorial purposes]

[Prior Foster]
The problem with God willing the Son into existence,
even if He did so by means of His own essence or
substance, have been detailed by Jesuit Edmund
Fortman (quoted earlier). Fortman lists what he calls two
"grave defects" with Hippolytus' "theory" of the
Father metaphysically (!) willing the Son into
existence: (1) The Logos was not a person or the Son
eternally, but only precreationally [if the Father willed him intro existence];
(2) "The generation of the Son was not essential to God but
only the result of a free decision of God.
Hence God might have remained without a Son and thus might have
remained only one Person" (Fortman, page 118). In
other words, the generation of the Son, according to
Hippolytus as interpreted by Fortman, was something
that may or may not have transpired.
It was a contingent divine act [if the Father willed the Son into existence].

["Sam"]
Yes, indeed. I don't dispute this [what has been said hitherto about Hippolytus]. What I dispute is the notion that he can be taken for a
careful trinitarian theologian. He's the theological
equivalent of an Empedocles, and the notion that his
writings can meaningfully be adduced against Nicea
seem not more plausible to me than that Empedocles
metaphysic should be proposed as counting against
the Periodic Table of Elements developed in the 19th
Century. At most, it seems to me, Hippolytus gives
us one snapshot of the kinds of inchoate Trinitarian
opinions that existed in the ante-Nicene period.

[Foster]
I wonder if Hippolytus can be taken for a "trinitarian
theologian" at all. At what point does a person become
a non-Trinitarian theologian? The problem I see with
the paragraph above is that you appear to assume that
Hippolytus is expressing an "inchoate" form of the
Trinity doctrine in a non-precise manner. But I submit
that a comparison between Ptolemy and Copernicus would
be more apt. Hippolytus does not seem to espouse an
inchoate form of Trinitarianism at all. His writings
help us to see that the famed "way to Nicea" was
filled with twists, turns and diversions. Nicea was
firm in its insistence that the Son is begotten, not
created. He is consubstantial with the Father (says
Nicea), not by promotion or progressive divinization,
but UT NATURA or PER ESSENTIAM. I don't believe that
Hippolytus' statements were even headed in this
direction.

[Foster Previously]
If the pre-Nicenes truly did not view Christ as
"fully God," then the early Christians were not simply
saying that Christ is subordinate to the Father. Augustine
of Hippo writes that each divine Person is fully God or
that the whole of the Godhead is in each Person. To say
otherwise, to deny that Christ is "fully God," is to
blatantly contradict what Augustine averred. One who
makes such a declaration is not merely insisting that
Christ is subordinate in function to the Father.
Rather, a Christian who does not affirm the full
deity of Christ is subordinating him to the Father
vis-a-vis being, essence or nature.

["Sam"]
This is assuming that "fully God" can mean only
what you think it means. But why should we believe
that? It is also to assume that each ante-Nicene
utterance regarding a Person of the Trinity is to be
accorded the same weight you would accord it in a
theological treatise on the Holy Trinity. But why
should we think that? It seems to me that there are a
wide variety of contexts in which men made reference
to "God" ("Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit") in the
first three centuries. If I were to respond in the
affirmative to my young son's question "Daddy, did
Jesus pray to God?" would this mean that I was denying
that Jesus is "fully God"?

[Foster]
I use the terminology "fully God" as the Nicenes used
it and as Augustine employed the nomenclature. For
Augustine of Hippo, the whole of the divine substance
is in each Person somewhat perichoretically. For
Auggie, the Son is VERE DEUS, VERE HOMO. I understand
this to mean that Christ (in Augustine's paradigm)
exemplifies or instantiates every divine property
exemplified or instantiated by the Father and the Holy
Spirit, EX HYPOTHESI. One Catholic theologian writes:

"There are various aspects hence arising, which do not
belong to the Divine Essence as such, but are peculiar
to one of the other of the Persons and not common to
all. These are the only differences between the
Persons. They are not differences of substance or of
the essential divine attributes; so they mark, not a
multiplication of the Godhead, but of the
personalities in the one Godhead."

Hence, "fully God" (as I see it) has reference to the
divine essential attributes or necessary properties.
So, in answer to your question, I would say that you
are not necessarily denying that Jesus is God because
you answer in the affirmative. Of course, your example
has to do with Christ in his incarnate state though,
and not with intra-Trinitarian relations per se. In
any event, what I'm trying to say is that God is
supposed to instantiate or exemplify certain
properties or particular attributes. If a being does not
possess (i.e. exemplify) such attributes EX TOTO, then the said entity [in question]
cannot be "fully God." Therefore, if the Son
(according to Hippolytus) is a deified creature or not
eternal as such, how can he be fully God? Since God is eternal or everlasting.

Regards,

Edgar

Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho Chap 125:3

Matthew13weedhacker writes:

'Can I get your opinion please?

CXXV(125):
3 καὶ τὸ οὖν Ἰσραὴλ ὄνομα τοῦτο σημαίνει· ἄνθρωπος νικῶν δύναμιν· τὸ γὰρ ἴσρα ἄνθρωπος νικῶν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἢλ δύναμις. ὅπερ καὶ διὰ τοῦ μυστηρίου τῆς πάλης, ἣν ἐπάλαισεν Ἰακὼβ μετὰ τοῦ φαινομένου μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς βουλῇ ὑπηρετεῖν, θεοῦ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὅλων κτισμάτων, ἐπεπροφήτευτο οὕτως καὶ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος ὁ Χριστὸς ποιήσειν.

Chapter 125:[3] "...That Christ ... in that Christ ministered to the will of God, yet He is God, because He is the First-begotten of all creatures..." (KET)

CHAPTER CXXV:[III]: "...And that Christ ... in that He ministered to the will of the Father, yet nevertheless is God, in that He is the first-begotten of all creatures..." (R&DT)

θεοῦ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὅλων κτισμάτων

"(of) God but out-of (of) the to be a child first-born (of) the (of) entire/whole (of) created things"

What is your opinion?'

REPLY:

If I understand your question correctly, you are asking about how the bold part of the quote from Justin's Greek text has been translated. Frankly, I can see that the Greek is not rendered literally, but I don't personally believe that it has been mistranslated. At least, not the part in bold. δὲ is functioning adversatively here. It can be rendered "but," "however," or "yet" in this context.

The translations you quote above have also left out τέκνον in their renderings, but that choice does not pose a major difficulty for me. I notice that one translation has "He ministered to the will of the Father" where the other says "Christ ministered to the will of God." These renditions may be due to textual variants, although the sense of the passage remains fairly the same. Let me know if I have understood you correctly.

Regards,

Edgar

Conscience (Moral Intutition) and Neuroscience

In her book The Moral of the Story: An Introduction to Ethics, Nina Rosenstand discusses a study published in 2007 by Antonio Damasio (a neuroscientist) and others working in the scientific field. The study appeared in the journal Nature and I have read similar observations in Damasio's books.

The study in Nature continues Damasio's work on individuals who have suffered ventromedial frontal lobe damage. It concludes that damage to one's frontal lobes usually makes it difficult for humans to make decisions that involve the lives of others. We evidently have "an emotional reluctance" (Rosenstand, 22) to make decisions that will bring about the death of others. However, persons who have experienced damage to the ventromedial frontal lobes evidently do not hesitate to make decisions that possibly save numerous lives but also bring it about that one or at least a few humans die.

The upshot of this study is supposed to be that we have a center in the brain that is responsible for providing a "moral compass" (ibid). In the words of Rosenstand, "we do appear to have been equipped with some sort of moral intuition from birth" (ibid). Furthermore, the study by Damasio (et. al.) indicates that our moral decisions are probably based on both emotional and rational factors. Rosenstand points out that the scientific study of where moral decisions are made does not exhaust ethics. Moreover, there are admittedly other studies that balance the one undertaken by Damasio and his colleagues. But I think that Damasio, other scientists and philosophers have made a good case for viewing human conscience or moral intuition as a neurobiological phenomenon.

Ben Witherington on Exodus 3:14 and HAYAH

Hi all,

This is taken from the book The Shadow of the
Almighty: Father, Son and Spirit in Biblical
Perspective (pp. 10-11):

"Notice that we do not have in v. 14 ANI ASHER ANI but
a paranomastic use of the verb HAYAH. This suggests on
the one hand that we ought not to translate the phrase
'I am that I am' as if it were an ontological
statement, a statement about God's being, but rather
we seem to be being told something about God's
activity or self-revelation in his activity. The focus
then is not on God's being a self-contained,
self-existent being . . . God then is not speaking
about what God is in the divine essence, but rather
what Yahweh is or will be in relationship to his
people--in his self-revelation."

Best wishes,
Edgar

Exodus 3:14, Being, and Reading Texts as Discourse

I once had a conversation with a colleague and friend who suggested that Exodus 3:14 teaches us that God is Being. Here is my response to this claim:

I'm not sure how a metaphysician goes about
concluding that God IS being from Exod 3:14 or any
other sacred passage, for that matter.

As you well know, reading is a complicated affair. One
key to reading a text closely is taking note of the
multifaceted discourse levels that constitute a
particular text. As J.P. Louw argues in the essay,
"Reading a Text as Discourse," discourse
considerations are linguistic, para-linguistic and
extra-linguistic. In order to avoid going beyond a
text, one needs to be mindful of the discourse
constraints that govern conclusions derived from the
text.

Linguistic features refers to things like syntax,
style, nominalization and embedding; some
para-linguistic features are punctuation, intonation,
speech acts and genre, whereas extra-linguistic
features include spatio-temporal context, the medium
of presentation and textual history and background.

The point of alluding to Louw's paper is that I see
nothing in the grammar of Exod 3:14 that would lead
one to conclude that God IS being. Witherington points
out that Moses probably would have employed ANI ASHER
ANI, if he was calling God "I AM." Moreover, the
imperfect state is used for the verb in Exod 3:14
indicating what God will be, rather than delineating
what he is, per se (compare how HAYAH is employed in
Exod 3:12). Even one famous ancient Greek translation
of the Hebrew scriptures renders EHYEH ASHER EHYEH at
Exod 3:14 as ESOMAI hOS ESOMAI. In light of this data,
I find it difficult to accept [Etienne] Gilson's suggestion.

Pax tibi,
Edgar

Gregory M. Reichberg on Beyond Evil as Privation

Reichberg contends:

EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY
in the notion of privation to dispel our
human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated
whether this concept is adequate to the task.
The intensity and scope of evil
in the twentieth century--which has seen the horrors
of world war and genocide--have added fuel to the
debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good,
however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the
calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive
that underlie the most virulent projects in
malfeasance? While the privation account might appear
a reasonable strategy for explaining passive
wrongdoing--indifference to people in grave need, or
cooperation with injustice--the more active and
dynamic forms of evil would nevertheless seem to elude
its conceptual net.

See his article Beyond Privation: Moral Evil in Aquinas's De
Malo

The Review of Metaphysics - June 1, 2002

The Doctrine of Theosis (QEWSIS)

An interlocutor wrote:

"[Charles Taze] Russell, in the following issue of his publication, again elevated his followers to Godhood, announcing, 'Ye are Gods.' He further concluded that, 'When we claim on the scriptural warrant, that we are begotten of a divine nature and Jehovah is thus our Father, it is claiming that we are divine beings - hence all such are Gods.' Absent from Russell's assertion that we can become gods is any reminder of Satan's lie to Eve in the garden, 'You will become like God!' (Genesis 3:5), Lucifer's fall from glory for wishing to be as God (Isaiah 14:14), and the words from Yahweh himself, stating that 'The gods that did not make the heavens and the earth shall perish [SIC] from the earth and from under the heavens.' (Jeremiah 10:11)"

My comments are below:

In Eastern Christendom, an often heard refrain has been: "God became man, in order that man might be shown how to become God (divine)." The Greek theologian Maximus wrote: "All that God is, except for an identity in OUSIA, one becomes when one is deified by grace" (Max. Ambig. 41).

His explanation of QEWSIS left a way for the Greek theologians to preserve a distinction between the Creator and the creature. Gregory Palamas also suggested that "the deifying gift of the Spirit is not the superessential OUSIA of God, but the deifying activity [ENERGEIA] of the superessential OUSIA of God." In other words, 2 Peter 1:4 was not viewed as describing an identical participation of the finite referent in the "superessential OUSIA of God." To the contrary, humans were supposedly able to participate in the divine OUSIA by the wonderful divine work of deification. Thus one would go from corruptibility to incorruptibility, as a result of God's XARIS (See The Christian Tradition, Vol. II, pp. 267-268).

This view of Eastern Christendom is not just an obsolete, antiquitous view. Even in 1953, Russian writer Vladimir Lossky, while presenting a synopsis of the Grecian idea of QEWSIS said:

"The descent (KATABASIS) of the divine person of Christ makes human persons capable of an ascent (ANABASIS) in the Holy Spirit. It was necessary that the voluntary humiliation, the redemptive self-emptying (KENOSIS) of the Son of God should take place, so that fallen men might accomplish their vocation of QEWSIS, the deification of created beings by uncreated grace. Thus the redeeming work of Christ--or rather, more generally speaking, the Incarnation of the Word--is seen as directly related to the ultimate goal of creatures: to know union with God. If this union has been accomplished in the divine person of the Son, who is God become man, it is necessary that each human person should in turn become god by grace, or become 'a partaker in the divine nature,' according to St Peter's expression (2 Peter 1:4)" (See Alister McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, pp. 413-414).

As we read the thoughts of orthodox theologians and the ancient fathers of the church, Russell's comments seem mild by comparison. In actuality, his views were evidently scriptural. Christians who are "born again" DO have the hope of sharing in the divine nature. By making this statement, Russell was not saying that some mystical type of QEWSIS would take place whereby the individual Christian referent would be absorbed into God Himself. To draw this conclusion from 2 Peter 1:4 would be to cross the forbidden line between Creator and creature. McGrath warns against the potential danger of such inferences:

"A distinction must be drawn between the idea of deification as
'becoming God' (QEWSIS) and as 'becoming like God' (HOMOIOSIS QEOI).
the first, associated with the Alexandrian School, conceives of
deification as a union with the SUBSTANCE of God; the second,
associated with the Antiochene school, interprets the believer's
relationship with God more in terms of a participation in that which is
divine, often conceived in terms of ethical perfection. The distinction
between these approaches is subtle, and reflects significantly
different Christologies." (McGrath 414).

James Pustejovsky on Mass and Count Nouns

James Pustejovsky's (in the context of discussing polysemy) book also examines mass and count nouns in his text The Generative Lexicon. Pustejovsky sets forth a few examples of mass and count nouns that I want to present. He writes that sand, "although in fact composed of individual grains," is a mass noun because it refers to "undifferentiated stuff in our daily experience of it" (Pustejovsky 17). But the word "house" (he writes) "is obviously perceivable as an individuated object and is classified as a count noun."

Pustejovsky goes on to provide the following examples:

Mass nouns: much sand, more water.
Count nouns: several houses, every child.

Examples of nouns which are both mass and count simultaneously are
given:

1a. Texans drink a lot of beer.
1b. Patsy relished every beer she drank.

2a. More e-mail is arriving every day.
2b. Every e-mail I send gets bounced.

From Pustejovsky's discussion, it seems that he classifies mass/count nouns
on the basis of individuation potential.

1 Corinthians 5:1 Interpretation

Back in 1999, I discussed 1 Cor. 5:1ff with a couple of interlocutors on a public forum. One suggested that 1 Cor. 5:11-13 refers to the Lord's Supper. Here is my reply: I must admit that a reference to the Lord's Supper is a possibility (1 Cor. 11:23ff), but my analysis rules out that conclusion for the following reasons. In 1 Cor. 5:1, Paul describes a Christian brother's sin in Corinth. The brother was cohabiting with his father's wife, thus living incestuously. Even worse, the older men of Corinth--part of the EKKLESIA--were tolerating this immoral conduct. Paul laments that the Corinthians are "puffed up" rather than mourning over the abhorrent deeds of the immoral brother in their midst. In 1 Cor. 5:3-5, the "apostle to the nations" recommends that the one practicing sin be "delivered up to the adversary." This act is done in order to destroy the sinful "flesh" and preserve the spirit of the believer "in the day of the Lord." Next, Paul continues to explain why the sinning believer must be turned over to the Devil. By allowing him to remain in the midst of the congregation, the EKKLESIA will suffer corruption and will not be able to rightly observe the antitypical passover: "for even our Paschal Lamb, Christ, was sacrificed" (Emphatic Diaglott). Therefore, the congregation of God must take the action prescribed in 1 Cor. 5:9-13. What is the thrust of this counsel? What action is the EKKLESIA urged to take? 1 Cor. 5:11 says: "NUNI DE EGRAYA hUMIN MH SUNANAMIGNUSQAI EAN TIS ADELFOS ONOMAZOMENOS hH PORNOS . . ." The phrase that really catches my attention here is NUNI DE EGRAYA hUMIN MH SUNANAMIGNUSQAI. This part of the verse indicates that Paul is not simply talking about ceasing to share "the meal" [i.e. Lord's Supper] with a brother who practices sin--although clearly the congregation should take this action as well. The present infinitive middle SUNANAMIGNUSQAI tells me that all association should cease with this person (not just the Lord's evening meal). Elsewhere we are told, "do not receive him into your house nor wish him success" (2 John 10, 11). If you want to discuss the applicability/inapplicability of 2 John 2:7, we can examine that verse too. In sum, I would say that 1 Cor. 5:11 is talking about general association (i.e., "don't even eat lunch with this man"!). For now, I am inclined to agree with the words of Kathleen Callow concerning 1 Cor. 5:6-8: "In this unit Paul urges the expulsion (EKKAQARATE, v. 7a) in the light of the effect of evil on their fellowship as a whole, and of their own status as AZOUMOI--a purified community" (See Linguistics and NT Interpretation, edited by DA Black, page 202).

Are There Three "I Think's" in God?

The following quote is taken from John J. O'Donnell's The Mystery of the Triune God. This snippet convincingly demonstrates the problem with viewing the TRES PERSONAE TRINITATIS as three separate centers of consciousness.

"In contemporary parlance, person is spontaneously identified as centre
of consciousness and freedom. However, if we bring these pre-reflective
categories to theology, we are immediately confronted with a problem.
For if we say that God is one being in three persons, and if we
understand by person centres of consciousness and freedom, then God
becomes three centres of consciousness and there are three I think's in
God. But such an understanding is the same as tritheism" (O'Donnell
103).

Can We Get To "Know" God By Reading Scripture?

The following is a dialogue that occurred publicly on another forum. I have left the discussion in its original form. This post was originally written in 1999 when I was an undergrad at Lenoir-Rhyne College. I would now characterize it as a dialogue about religious epistemology. My responses are outside the quotation marks after the post begins.

Hi George

I'm glad we got all the details worked out about polemics, etc.

George writes:

From: Edgar Foster

"OIDAMEN DE hOTI hO hUIOS TOU QEOU hHKEI KAI DEDWKEN
hHMIN DIANOIAN hINA GINWSKOMEN TON ALHQINON."

"True, John does write that our DIANOIA comes from
the Son of God. This verse is in harmony with John 1:18, where we read
that the Son of God came and explained (exegeted) the Father, thus
revealing Him to humanity in a way not hitherto experienced.
Nevertheless, I must ask--where do we find the words and deeds of the
Son of God? Is it not in the written Word of God? Does not the Bible
report God's revelatory activities?"

[George]
"Of course it does. It is a report ABOUT God. It is
NOT God. It is written by men who are inspired DIA TON QEON."

Not only is it a report ABOUT God: it is a report BY God. God speaks to
us DIA His written Word.

DESPOTA SU hO POIHSAS TON OURANON KAI THN GHN KAI THN QALASSAN KAI
PANTA TA EN AUTOIS hO TOU PATROS hHMWN DIA PNEUMATOS hAGIOU STOMATOS
DAUEID PAIDOS SOU (Acts 4:24, 25).

"I am noticing the three levels of our 'knowing' in the above passage:
OIDAMEN is a visionary term of perception here, imho.

DIANOIA is the understanding [through mind] we are given when the Son
of God comes to us and gives it to us. I take this 'giver' to be the
"Spirit of Truth" [PARAKLEITOS] GINWSKAMEN is the actual knowing in the
fullest sense, the identity of self, mind, and God. When one knows in this way, there is no need of other "proof", because ANY proof rests upon IT. This is the goal of our study of scripture, and not the proofs that we are so convinced that we 'know'..."

I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but that is not the teaching of
the GNT [Greek New Testament]. At least, not at its surface level. :-)

It is very difficult to prove that we come to know God solely through
the inward mediation of the Spirit, and not by [means of] Scripture (Cf. Acts
18:24-28). 1 John 5:20 (in its first century context) does not say that
the Spirit of truth has given/gives us DIANOIAN. John is talking about
a historical event in the past: "EKEINOS EXHGHSATO" (that one unfolded
our understanding of the Father).

hOUTOS ESTIN hO ELQWN DI' hUDATOS KAI hAIMATOS IHSOUS XRISTOS (1 John
5:6).

The tenor of the entire first Epistle of John is historical. Jesus came
and provided us with DIANOIAN--the capacity to understand the Father.
He came and taught us how to love others by dying PRO NOBIS (1 John
3:16). He CAME and bore witness to God, glorifying Him and zealously
announcing His heavenly kingdom in fulfillment of the numerous
prophecies that bore witness to him. All of these historical events are
recorded in the GNT. John even wrote:

POLLA MEN OUN KAI ALLA SHMEIA EPOIHSEN hO IHSOUS ENWPION TWN MAQHTWN hA
OUK ESTIN GEGRAMMENA EN TWi BIBLIWi TOUTWi TAUTA DE GEGRAPTAI hINA
PISTEUHTE hOTI IHSOUS ESTIN hO XRISTOS hO hUIOS TOU QEOU KAI hINA
PISTEUONTES ZWHN EXHTE EN TWi ONOMATI AUTOU (John 20:30, 31).

[George quoting Edgar]
"When the Beroeans came to know the true one, was it not through their
dilligent study of the Scriptures?"

[George]
"Their diligent study brought them to the 'EIDOMEN'
level, in terms of the above passage, and from there came the Son, etc.
[I am guessing here, because in my scriptural ignorance I have not even
heard of the Beroeans before!]"

Beroea was about fifty miles from Thessalonica. It lay on the eastern
slopes of Mt. Vermion in the Olympian mountain range (See Pohill "Acts"
363).

The Beroeans are reported to have carefully examined the Scriptures
everyday to determine whether Paul and Silas were speaking the truth to
them. This search resulted in 'many Jews' becoming believers. I would
say they were past the point of OIDAMEN. They entered into a
relationship with the Most High God and His Son. They were at the level
of GINWSKW via their study of the Scriptures. (IMHO) Knowledge in a
Biblical sense is not only "head knowledge": it is relational
knowledge.

"The point here is that we do not KNOW God through
study of scripture, but only through God. There are tons of folks who
can read and study scripture till their eyes wear out and still not
know God! Reading God's Word does not give us KNOWLEDGE of God, in the
GINWSKW meaning of knowledge, but only in the EPISTHMH sense... Which
is knowing ABOUT God, you see..."

In view of Matt. 22:29-32, I would respectfully disagree. In this
Matthean pericope, Jesus offers a stinging rebuke to the Sadducees. He
informs them that that [sic] the reason they misunderstand the resurrection
of the dead is because of their Scriptural ignorance: "You know neither
the Scriptures nor the power of God."

"As regards the resurrection of the dead, did you not read what was
spoken to you hUPO QEOU LEGONTOS" (Matt. 22:31, 32).

Then Jesus references the account of the thornbush in Ex. 6. He
concludes that God is a God of the living, and not of the dead. How
does he arrive at this conclusion? By reflecting on the grammar of the
written record. This indicates that we can come to know God through a
careful reading of the Scriptures. I will concede your point, however.
There are many folks that read the Bible diligently and do not
understand [or know] God. This fact doesn't mean that one can't obtain knowledge of
God by reading Scripture (John 5:39ff).

[George quoting Edgar]
"Whenever Paul participated in his ministerial work, he reasoned with
people from the Scriptures, proving to them by references that Jesus is the Christ
(Acts 17:3, 4). I believe that he set an example for us, in this regard."

[George]
"No question about that, and what we overlook so
often is that he "came to them EN DUNAMIN..." His scriptural proofs
and reasonings would have had no impact at all without that power of the Spirit of the risen Christ actively supporting his efforts."

I agree 100%.

Take Care, George.

Edgar Foster
Classics Major
Lenoir-Rhyne College

Remarks on Stephen Hawking's New Book from the Pertinacious Papist

See http://pblosser.blogspot.com/2010/09/stephen-hawking-god-did-not-create.html

Luke 2:22

Certain scholars have claimed that Luke made a mistake
when he spoke of the purification of "them" (hAI
hHMERAI TOU KAQARISMOU AUTWN) in accordance with the
Law of Moses (Luke 2:22). Should one hastily conclude
that Luke the doctor-cum-historian was mistaken in
speaking of the need for "them" to be purified rather
than "her" (i.e. Mary, the mother of Jesus)?

The KJV says "her purification" rather than alluding to
the purification of "them." The interpretive or textual problem is that
we know of only one Greek MS that reads AUTHS as opposed to AUTWN (a 12th century text). This change was probably made because of the supposed
difficulties with the Lukan account. The evidence from MSS
dating from the fourth century onwards is that the
text should read AUTWN. Yet, the Law of Moses only
prescribed that the mother of a male child should make
purification for herself (Leviticus 12:1-8). How then,
can one account for Luke's wording of this account?

Ralph Earle offers three possible explanations for the
use of the plural AUTWN:

(1) The pronoun could refer to Joseph and Mary; (2) it could reference the Jews (i.e. "Jewish" purification) or (3) Luke may have "run together the cleansing of the mother and the offering of the child" (Word Meanings in the NT,
55).

Rogers and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key
to the Greek NT suggests that the genitive plural AUTWN possibly refers to Mary and Joseph (indicating family solidarity) "or it may refer to the purification of Mary and to the redemption of the
firstborn" (page 112).

I. Howard Marshall writes (after examining different factors): "It is most likely that Luke has run together the cleansing of the mother and the offering of the child . . ." into one act" (see The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text).

Avo,

Edgar Foster

Thomas Aquinas on Ecclesiastes 3:19 and 12:7 (SCG 2.79)

Aquinas on Eccl 12:7 (from Summa Contra Gentiles 2.79)

"Hereby is banished the error of the impious in whose person it is said: We were born out of nothingness, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been (Wisd. ii, 2); in whose person again Solomon says: One is the perishing of man and beast, and even is the lot of both: as man dies, so do beasts die: all breathe alike, and man hath no advantage over beasts (Eccles iii, 19): that he does not say this in his own person, but in the person of the ungodly, is clear from what he says at the end, as it were drawing a conclusion: Till the dust return to the earth, from whence it came; and the spirit go back to the God who gave it (Eccles xii, 7)."

What a way to explain Ecclesiastes 3:19.

Regards,

Edgar

My Amazon Review of S.M. Baugh's "A First John Reader"

Baugh's reader is about 150 pages in length. It is a unique work that I think will be of value to anyone who wishes to learn Greek in a fun and orderly manner.

What makes Baugh's work unique is how he teaches Greek to the neophyte. By the time that the beginning Greek student has progressed through Baugh's book, he or she will have acquired a solid foundation in the Greek language and will also have worked his or her way through the entire book of 1 John. That is no little accomplishment for the beginning Greek student.

In my humble opinion, Baugh's method is much more effective than simply
learning paradigms and morphological forms by rote memorization. His approach provides a methodological way to learn Greek that is simultaneously educative and
stimulating. Baugh also sets forth penetrating exegetical questions as the student
works his or her way through the reader, thus prompting the beginner to
continue in the hopes of finding grammatical or exegetical treasure.

Some Examples

Each section of Baugh's reader deals with some particular grammatical issue
(the Greek article, pronouns, cases, and tenses). Instead of just discussing
these matters abstractly, however, Baugh provides numerous examples from the
book of 1 John. On p. 3, Baugh points out that hO is "repeated four times in
[1 John 1:1] at the beginning of the first four clauses (and once in v. 3)."
But why does John keep employing hO in this passage? Baugh answers this
question in his reader and gives supplementary information buttressing his
stand vis-a'-vis the Johannine use of hO.

On p. 50, Baugh also has a very insightful discussion about Greek aspect and
its relationship to 1 John 3:9. He concludes that the standard interpretation of
3:9 is probably the best one. When exegeting the passage, Baugh skillfully
interacts with the views of D. Wallace and S. Smalley who do not espouse the
habitual sin view of 1 John 3:9 which Baugh advocates. This interaction is
appreciated, because it helps the student to make up his or her own mind
about 1 John 3:9 and Greek aspect.

The same cannot be said for other parts of Baugh's grammar. Overall I like his reader and do not regret that I purchased it. Nevertheless, there are some places where I have "quibbles" with his presentation.

When discussing 1 John 3:2, Baugh talks about the dative of respect (hOMOIOI
AUTWi), but never says to whom the dative of respect might apply. Does it possibly apply to the Father or to the Son? Granted, he writes concerning 1 John 3:1b that "the quality of God's love is John's focus.". But the author does not say whom Christians will be like, when commenting on 1 John 3:2c. Also, when speaking about 1 John 5:20, Baugh asks--"Who is the antecedent of hOUTOS? Jesus, the Son of God? Is this not an unambiguous statement of his deity?" Personally I think this section would have been better if Baugh asked the question and left it at that or offered grammatical possibilities. The student must decide who the antecedent of hOUTOS is, not the teacher. The instructor can guide, help, and point out little details here and there, but instruction is much more effective when a professor sets forth possibilities before students and lets them make grammatical decisions.

I am not just taking Baugh to task because I disagree with him theologically at a number of different points. Rather, I just feel that his reader could have been more effective had he not pushed certain viewpoints at particular junctures in his work. Since I thrive intellectually from examining conflicting views and arriving at a conclusion that I believe is theologically and grammatically warranted, I can read Baugh's book and derive great benefit from it in spite of my "quibbles." In the final analysis, I give it 4 stars and would recommend this reader to those who are interested in learning ancient Greek. Baugh's work is valuable in its own way.

You can find Baugh's Reader at http://www.amazon.com/First-John-Reader-Intermediate-Reading/dp/0875520952/ref=cm_rna_own_review_prod

Edgar G. Foster