Did Anyone Enter Heaven Prior to Jesus' Death and Resurrection? (link for article)

http://voices.yahoo.com/did-anyone-enter-heaven-prior-jesus-death-resurrection-11395456.html?cat=10

Alvin Plantinga Meets the Logical Problem of Evil (Updated Version)

This paper will discuss logician Alvin Plantinga's approach to the logical problem of evil. My position is that Plantinga successfully rebuts the charges of this well-known challenge to theism (belief in God).

What the Logical Problem of Evil Tries to Accomplish

The logical problem of evil is a puzzle for both the theistic and non-theistic mind--a conundrum that has its roots in times of antiquity. The "problem" can be formulated thus:

(1) God is omnipotent.

(2) God is omnibenevolent.

(3) Evil exists.

The atheologian J.L. Mackie argues that 1-3 constitute an inconsistent set of (formally) contradictory propositions. Worded simply, Mackie contends that God cannot be omnipotent (almighty) or omnibenevolent (wholly good) if evil obtains. He insists that it is logically problematic for God and evil to exist or obtain simultaneously: Mackie believes that it is not a case of both-and, but either-or. Either God exists or evil exists and ne'er the twain shall meet:

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.)

Quote is from J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind, New Series, 64.254. (April 1955): 200-212.

Plantinga's Reply to the Logical Problem of Evil

Conversely, Alvin Plantinga, taking a cue from Augustine of Hippo insists that it is logically possible for God to possess the objective properties of omnipotence and omnibenevolence although evil obtains. He systematically appeals to human free will and modal logic to rebut the atheistic charges of Mackie. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity: it distinguishes between possible and necessary truths. In summary, Plantinga maintains that 1-3 above are not formally inconsistent propositions when we account for the appropriate modal distinctions. For example, he states that the following proposition is not necessarily true: "A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can."

The modal term "necessarily" is important in this argument since the next proposition also does not appear to be necessarily true: "There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do." Yet, in order for Mackie's contention to hold, Plantinga maintains that the aforesaid propositions must be not only true, but necessarily true (i.e., they cannot not be true). These claims must be true in every possible world if Mackie's argument is going to be sustained.

While S (a certain person or subject) might be a good doctor, it does not mean that S always eliminates evil (E) as far as S can. A proposition of this sort does not appear to be necessarily true since there might be substantive reasons why S (a good doctor, in this case) would not eliminate evil insofar as it's possible for S to eliminate E. For example, a doctor who has the power to remove cataracts might not immediately perform surgery on a needful patient until a later time. But this reticence would not mean that the medical professional lacks the ability or the desire to remove the cataracts.

Moreover, it seems that an all-powerful (omnipotent) being might have certain limits, believe it or not. Can an omnipotent entity bring about a contradictory state of affairs such that 2 + 2 = 5 and square circles as well as married bachelors begin to obtain? Not if the law of logical necessity holds. Nor does it seem that a maximally powerful being can change the past without violating the law of noncontradiction. So, while there might be some possible world in which an omnipotent being eliminates suffering or evil altogether, it's possible that there are other worlds in which an omnipotent being does not remove evil, even though such a being would have the requisite power to eradicate evil.

Logical Outcome of Plantinga's Argument in the Light of Scripture

There are evidently good reasons why God has permitted evil. He made rational creatures upright, but we choose our respective paths (Ecclesiastes 7:29). God evidently allows creation to exist in a state of futility until a Messianic figure should arrive to liberate creation from bondage to slavery and corruption (Romans 8:19-21). That is a plausible account of God's permission of evil based on the New Testament and logic. In any event, there are apparently good reasons why God has not eliminated evil at this time (2 Peter 3:9). Plantinga makes a similar case based on his use of modal logic.

Conclusion

God apparently vouchsafed free will to human beings. So does there exist a possible world (counterfactual situation) in which creatures always freely do what is right and never violate the beneficent laws of deity? In the future (based on my reading of Scripture), humans will freely do what is right for all eternity. However, at that time, there will be no devil, no Satanic world nor any sin (Revelation 20:1-10; 21:1-5).

The bottom line: 1-3 do not constitute an inconsistent propositional set. It is logically possible that God would permit evil to obtain for reasons primarily known to God. But we have been given some plausible reasons why evil persists from the pages of Judeo-Christian Scripture.

Sources

Peterson, Michael L. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977.

Is Time Grammaticalized in New Testament Greek?

A burning question in New Testament Greek studies revolves around the grammaticalization of time and Greek tenses. Scholars use the terms Aktionsart (a German word that can denote "kind of action") and "aspect" to discuss this issue. This paper will explore whether Greek grammaticalizes time in the light of analyses undertaken by David Black and Rolf Furuli.

David Black on Tense and Aktionsart

Black insists that lexemes (minimal units of language having semantic content) possess "inherent aspect": they are intrinsically "durative" or "punctiliar" with regard to their aspect (80). By his use of the word "punctiliar" Black evidently means that lexical units (in some cases) may be aspectually aoristic: "The most important element of tense in the Greek verb system is the kind of action being referred to. This is called aspect or Aktionsart, and it is where the major distinction between the different tenses lies" (84).

Elsewhere, he continues: "A special morpheme indicates that the action of a verb refers to past time. This is a past time morpheme or augment, which is found in Sanskrit, Iranian, Armenian, and Greek, and only in the past tenses of the indicative mood" (Ibid., 81).

However, it's possible to distinguish verbal aspect from verbal Aktionsart. This German term refers to the kind of action being delineated by a Greek verbal tense or relation without necessarily grammaticalizing time. But the indicative mood in Greek probably does grammaticalize time, although this view certainly lends itself to more linguistic abnormalities when actual Greek constructs are studied.

Black argues that the imperfect, the aorist, and pluperfect tense "all refer to the past; the only difference between them is the kind of action, or aspect, that they indicate" (84). Therefore, we see that not every Greek scholar believes the concept of time is wholly absent from the imperfect or aorist tense. Additionally, Black speaks of time and aspect, then links aspect with Aktionsart (kind of action). But other grammarians and linguists make a clear distinction between the two categories; they do not believe that either the aorist, imperfect or pluperfect tense inherently refer to past action. Nonetheless, if Black is correct, then his comments would illuminate some anomalies encountered when reading New Testament Greek.

Rolf Furuli and the Grammaticalization of Time

On the other hand, Furuli observes that the Aktionsart of a particular verb is associated with its meaning. He reasons that the verb's contents (in this case) are not capable of being canceled. He connects Aktionsart to a word's lexical properties. That is, the verb's "kind of action" refers to the objective features conveyed by a determinate action word. The term Aktionsart also signifies that features of a particular verb retain their meaning in almost every contextual situation with hardly any exceptions.

Furuli provides the example of the verb "sing" which he notes is inherently punctiliar regarding its Aktionsart. Whether one thus says "he sang" or "he was singing," how Aktionsart is emphasized remains the same. The word "singing" is no less durative than "he sang" because of each term's intrinsic properties. Furuli defines tense as "the grammaticalization of location in time" (a definition found in Comrie). He accordingly seems to contend that Greek (with the exception of the future tense) may not have "tense" in the relevant sense discussed here. Nonetheless, a question that deserves future exploration is, what does the New Testament evidence reveal about this issue?

Conclusion

I have read the studies on Greek aspect and Aktionsart published by Furuli, Buist Fanning, Kenneth McKay and Stanley Porter. Yet I have been hesitant to concur with the non-temporal view of Greek tenses as a whole. There does not appear to be a good reason for completely removing the notion of time from Greek tenses, even when the future tense is not under consideration. But I do believe that verbal aspect is more prominent than the concept of time when it comes to Greek tenses. Furthermore, Daniel B. Wallace seems to have a point when he contends that a number of factors (i.e. affected and non-affected meaning) provide temporal information where Greek verbal relations are concerned.

Sources

Black, David A. Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications. Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Book House, 1988.

Furuli, Rolf. The Role of Theology and Bias in Bible Translation: With a Special Look at the New World Translation of Jehovah's Witnesses. Huntington Beach, Calif: Elihu Books, 1999.

Did John Calvin Oppose Michel Servetus Over 1 John 5:7?

I once had someone ask me whether Calvin decided to push for the death of Servetus based on 1 John 5:7. Here is my answer to that question.

Servetus was executed 1553 CE in Geneva. Harold O.J. Brown (in his book "Heresies") notes that the driving impetus behind Servetus' execution was actually the imperial decree known as the Justinian Code which made it clear that heresy was a crime against the state. Although Justinian I ruled from 527-65 CE, the code bearing his name was not promulgated until a millennium later. Nevertheless, this code allowed Servetus to be executed and burned at the prosecutorial hands of Calvin. See page 186 of Brown's study.

Brown writes: "As a young man, Servetus propounded the distinctive views that ultimately led him to the stake: his On the Errors of The Trinity appeared in 1531. He held God to be one Person only; this God was the literal, natural father of Jesus Christ, who was therefore God's natural Son . . . Although Servetus denied the deity and preexistence of Christ, he too was evidently trying to grapple with Christ's overwhelming majesty; he was unable to conceive of him as a mere man, even as one adopted by God, but had to postulate a direct, natural relationship with God. Servetus was condemned to death in Geneva for his denial of the Trinity" (Brown 330).

Servetus died with the words "O Jesus, Son of the eternal God, have mercy on me," on his lips. Brown concludes that "his execution in Geneva represents a stain that Reformed Protestantism has never quite been able to efface" (330).

Now back to your original question--did 1 John 5:7 influence Calvin to have Servetus executed? I do not think that we can limit Calvin's resistance to Servetus' ideas and his subsequent prosecution of Servetus to one biblical verse. Now Erasmus' Greek New Testament (1516 CE) contained the Comma Johanneum and it may have played some part in Calvin's fury. I just do not think we can say that Calvin's actions were solely based on 1 John 5:7. I would suggest that you also read Paul Johnson's A History of Christianity. On pp. 289-290, he also discusses the Servetus case and provides some information regarding how Calvin reacted after the debacle of 1553 CE.

Biblical Languages and Grammatical Gender (Holy Spirit)

Just because a Hebrew or Greek noun/pronoun is grammatically neuter does not mean that the referent of the noun/pronoun is neuter. In other words, grammatical gender does not always correspond to the sex or gender of a person or thing being thus described. So, for instance, the holy spirit is delineated by a feminine term in the Hebrew-Aramaic scriptures (ruah). However, in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament), the writers use masculine and neuter morphological forms when referring to the spirit of God. But this language is a result of linguistic accidents (morphology). It technically does not speak to the being or ontological constitution of an entity which, in this case, is the holy spirit. After all, Qoheleth of Ecclesiastes is a feminine term. Yet it evidently describes the son of David. So I would tend to believe that not much can be gained by arguing from grammatical gender to ontological gender, although Romans 8:16 (KJV) represents an interesting verse of comparison:

"The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God"

Notice how the KJV uses "itself" (a neuter pronoun) rather than "himself" (masculine).

Revised Version of the Moral Argument for God's Existence

Greetings everyone,

I'm now posting some of my writings on yahoo voices or their contributor network. If you get a chance, please check out some of my pieces that are contained there. For example, I've revised my moral argument for God's existence. You can see that paper at this link: http://voices.yahoo.com/moral-evidence-existence-god-11351918.html?cat=9

Thanks for all your support!

Edgar

Ontological Argument Roots Found in Cyprian of Carthage

The ontological argument for God's existence often is attributed to Anselm of Canterbury (circa 1033-1109 CE). If by "argument" we mean a systematic and developed case made for a belief or set of beliefs, then yes, Anselm might be credited with the first theistic argument based on the concept of perfect existence. However, I believe the roots for the ontological argument can be found in writers like Cyprian of Carthage. For instance, he writes:

"To God who alone is, belongs the whole name of God;
therefore He is one, and He in His entirety is
everywhere diffused. For even the common people in
many things naturally confess God, when their mind and
soul are admonished of their author and origin. We
frequently hear it said, 'O God,' and 'God sees,' and
'I commend to God,' and 'God give you,' and 'as God
will,' and 'if God should grant'; and this is the very
height of sinfulness, to refuse to acknowledge Him
whom you cannot but know" (On The Vanity of Idols 9).

I have yet to see an author make this connection although someone has possibly associated Cyprian with Anselm before. I'd like to advance this idea to see if it can float.

Frederic Louis Godet's Reading of John 14:14

Frederic Louis Godet argues that the "me" in John 14:14 seems to be an "absolutely impossible" reading since it makes little sense to ask Jesus something in his own name. Compare John 15:16; 16:23-24. This commentator also insists that Tischendorf, Weiss and Westcott defend the indefensible when they argue for the genuineness of the reading "me."

See Godet's Commentary on the Gospel of John, With an Historical and Critical Introduction (page 154). It is available on Google Books for free.

Carl Conrad's Remarks on Philippians 2:6-7 (MORFH)

From Carl Conrad. Originally appeared on B-Greek forum. I now quote Carl:

Like Bob Fuller, I'm hoping we may have a fruitful discussion of the question Edgar has presented to us (where have you been, Edgar; long time, no hear from!); I hope too that we can keep the discussion focused on lexical evidence and clear indicators deriving from immediate context of passages in which the word MORFH is found, both in the GNT and in extra-biblical literature. For my part I don't see any justification whatsoever for the definition of MORFH cited above, "the outward display of the inner reality or substance."


The word is found only in two texts in the GNT, once in the questionable "late-ending" of Mark's gospel, Mk 16:12, where the word pretty clearly means "external appearance"--and we'd have to assume, I think, that hETERAi certainly indicates that this MORFH is NOT identical with the inner reality of the risen Jesus.


Mk 16:12 META DE TAUTA DUSIN EX AUTWN PERPATOUSIN EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi POREUOMENOIS EIS AGRON.



The other passage is the Christ-hymn of Phil 2, where the word appears in successive verses 6 (EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN) and 7 (MORFHN DOULOU LABWN).



Phil 2:6 hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN OUC hARPAGMON hHGHSATO TO EINAI ISA QEWi. 7 ALLA hEAUTON EKENWSEN MORFHN DOULOU LABWN, EN hOMOIWMATI ANQRWPWN GENOMENOS; KAI SCHMATI hEUREQEIS hWS ANQRWPOS ...


And here, of course, the real problem is that, if MORFH means "essential form" in verse 6 for MORFH QEOU, it does not SEEM to mean the same thing in verse 7 for MORFHN DOULOU. It seems to me that Louw & Nida have a clear sense of what the problem here is but they have some problem in applying their perspective to Phil 2:6-7, inasmuch as they deem MORFH to have the sense "nature or character" as opposed to discernible form. With respect to MORFHN DOULOU they understand not "guise of a servant" but rather being and doing what a servant is and does as MORFH QEOU is supposed by them to mean "being and doing what God is and does."



58.2 MORFHa, HS, f: the nature or character of something, with emphasis upon both the internal and external form - 'nature, character.' hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN 'he always had the very nature of God' Php 2:6; MORFHN DOULOU LABWN 'he took on the nature of a servant' Php 2:7. In view of the lack of a closely corresponding lexical item such as 'nature,' it may be necessary to restructure the form of Php 2:7 as 'he became truly a servant.'


58.15 MORFHa, HS, f: a visual form of something - 'visual form, appearance.' EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi 'he appeared in a different form' Mk 16:12.


The problem, it seems to me, as evidently it did to Edgar, that this sense of "nature" is not readily found attested elsewhere for the noun MORFH. Although Aristotle's metaphysics/ontology is sometimes called "hylomorphism" because it involves the interrelations of hULH (matter) and MORFH (form) at the various levels of the Scala Naturae, Aristotle himself doesn't use the term MORFH of "essential form" but speaks rather of OUSIA
or TO TI HN EINAI, which latter phrase (lit. something like "being what it(in fact) is") comes close to the phrase I've used above, "being and doing what X is and does."


LSJ doesn't even HINT at any sense of MORFH as "nature" or "essential form":

MORFH, HS, hH , form, shape, twice in Hom. (not in Hes.), SOI D' EPI MEN MORFH EPEWN thou hast comeliness of words, Od.11.367 (cf. Eust. ad loc.); so prob. ALLOS MEN ... EIDOS AKIDNOTEROS PELEI ANHR, ALLA QEOS MORFHN EPESI STEFEI ? God adds a crown of shapeliness to his words, Od.8.170: freq. later, MORFAS DUO ONOMAZEIN Parm.8.53 ; MORFHN ALLAXANTA Emp.137.1 ;MORFAN BRACUS Pi.I.4(3).53 ; MORFHS METRA shape and size, E.Alc.1063: periphr., MORFHS FUSIS A.Supp.496 ; MORFHS SCHMA,TUPWMA, E.Ion992, Ph.162; THN AUTHN TOU SCHMATOS MORFHN Arist.PA640b34 ; KAI GAIA, POLLWN ONOMATWN MORFH MIA A.Pr.212 ; ONEIRATWN ALIGKIOI MORFAISIN ib.449; NUKTERWN FANTASMATWN ECOUSI MORFAS Id.Fr.312 ; PROUPEMYEN ANTI FILTATHS MORPHS SPODON S.El.1159 ; of plants, Thphr.HP1.1.12 (pl.); esp. with ref. to beauty of form, hUPERFATON MORFAi Pi.O.9.65 ; hOIS POSTISTAXHi CARIS EUKLEA MORFH ib.6.76, cf. IG42 (1).121.119 (Epid., iv B. C.), LXX To.1.13, Vett.Val.1.6, etc.; SWMA MORFHS EMHS OGI383.41 (Commagene, i B. C.); MORFHS EIKONAS ib.27; CARAKTHRA MORFHS EMHS ib.60.

2. generally, form, fashion, appearance, A.Pr.78, S.Tr.699, El.199 (lyr.); outward form, opp. EIDOS, HEKATERW TW EIDEOS POLLAI MORFAI Philol.5; ALLATTONTA TO AUTOU EIDOS EIS POLLAS MORFAS Pl.R.380d ; MORFH QEWN X.Mem.4.3.13 , cf. Ep.Phil.2.6, Dam.Pr.304; hHRWWN EIDEA KAI MORFAS A.R.4.1193 ; KATA TE MORFAS KAI FWNAS gesticulations and cries, D.H.14.9; THN MORFHN MELAGCROUS, THi MORFHi MELICROAS, in complexion, Ptol.Tetr.143,
144.

3. kind, sort, E. Ion 382, 1068 (lyr.), Pl.R.397c, etc.

The meanings cataloged in LSJ seem then to range from a more fundamental "aesthetically gratifying guise" through "outward form" to "discernible variety." The focal element seems to be "discernible framework" or "Gestalt" or "pattern."

When we turn to Fred Danker's latest revision of Bauer (BDAG), we have:

MORFH, HS, hH (Hom.+) form, outward appearance, shape gener. of bodily form 1 Cl 39:3; ApcPt 4:13 (Job 4:16; ApcEsdr 4:14 p. 28, 16 Tdf.; SJCh 78, 13). Of the shape or form of statues (Jos., Vi. 65; Iren. 1, 8, 1 [Harv. I 67, 11]) Dg 2:3. Of appearances in visions, etc., similar to persons(Callisthenes [IV BC]: 124 fgm. 13 p. 644, 32 Jac. [in Athen. 10, 75, 452b] LIMOS ECWN GUNAIKOS MORFHN; Diod. S. 3, 31, 4 EN MORFAIS ANQRWPWN; TestAbr A 16 p. 97, 11 [Stone p. 42] ARCAGGELOU MORFHN PERIKEIMENOS; Jos., Ant. 5, 213 a messenger fr. heaven NEANISKOU MORFHi): of God's assembly, the church Hv 3, 10, 2; 9; 3, 11, 1; 3, 13, 1; s 9, 1, 1; of the angel of repentance hH MORFH AUTOU HLLOIWQH his appearance had changed m 12, 4, 1. Of Christ(EN MORFHi ANQRWPOU TestBenj 10:7; Just., D. 61, 1; Tat. 2, 1; Hippol., Ref. 5, 16, 10. Cp. Did., Gen. 56, 18; of deities EN ANQRWPINHi MORFHi:Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 6, 30; cp. Philo, Abr. 118) MORFHN DOULOU LABWN he took on the form of a slave=expression of servility Phil 2:7 (w. SCHMA as Aristot., Cat. 10a, 11f, PA 640b, 30-36). This is in contrast to expression of divinity in the preëxistent Christ: EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN although he was in the form of God (cp. OGI 383, 40f: Antiochus' body is the framework for his m. or essential identity as a descendant of divinities; sim. human fragility [Phil 2:7] becomes the supporting framework for Christ's servility and therefore of his KENWSIS [on the appearance one projects cp. the epitaph EpigrAnat 17, '91, 156, no. 3, 5-8]; on MORFH QEOU cp. Orig., C. Cels. 7, 66, 21; Pla., Rep. 2, 380d; 381bc; X., Mem. 4, 3, 13; Diog. L. 1, 10 the Egyptians say; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 80; 110; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 190; Just., A I, 9, 1; PGM 7, 563; 13, 272; 584.-Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 357f) Phil 2:6. The risen Christ EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi appeared in a different form Mk 16:12 (of the transfiguration of Jesus: EDEIXEN hHMIN THN ENDOXON MORFHN hEAUTOU Orig., C. Cels. 6, 68, 23). For lit. s. on hARPAGMA and KENOW 1b; RMartin, ET 70, '59, 183f.-DSteenberg, The Case against the Synonymity of MORFH and EIKWN: JSNT 34, '88, 77-86; GStroumsa, HTR 76, '83, 269-88 (Semitic background).-DELG. Schmidt, Syn. IV 345-60. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

The first several lines of the above accounting are consistent in pointing in the same direction as LSJ: an outward form that may change, as in the compound verb and noun METAMORFOW and METAMORFWSIS. But when it comes to
our text in Phil 2:6, I'm frankly not quite sure what is intended by what is said: is it that the pre-existent Jesus somehow "expressed" or "manifested" God? And if so, is that really quite the same thing as the "nature" that Louw & Nida seem to understand MORFH to convey?

The end of the BDAG offering points us to Spicq, _Theological Lexicon of the New Testament_ (tr. James Ernest). Spicq has a fuller, more articulate discussion of MORFH, one that is, on the one hand, thoughtful and illuminating, and on the other hand, not as conclusive as one might perhaps have hoped. In the first place he offers the following as potential senses: "stature, form, condition, feature, external appearance, reproduction"--and note that this doesn't include "nature" or "being and doing what X is and does." Here are the key pair of paragraphs:

"Although MORFH is often very close in meaning to EIKWN, 9 and later on even becomes synonymous with it in Gnosticism,10 the texts cited disallow identifying them, as does this inscription from Laodicea, which distinguishes the two terms: "I bear the (bodily) form of Docticius, but the image of his divine virtue is carried on the lips of each person."11 This should be taken into account in the translation of Phil 2:6-7 (hOS EN MORFHi QEOU ... MORFHN DOULOU LABWN), which the Bible de Jérusalem correctly renders "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave."12 It is characteristic of MORFH to be modified, to appear to be changed, to take on new features,13 like the risen Lord appearing to the disciples at Emmaus en hETERA MORFH. 14 He had a new mode of being and a new appearance, analogous to that at the transfiguration (METAMORFOUSQAI, Matt 17:2). This is why in epiphanies of heavenly beings the MORFH is indeed said to be different, but not without affinities with earthly forms.15
"This changing of MORFH is to be compared on the one hand with the theme of "descent and ascent" because of the double MORFH in Phil 2:6-7(MORFH QEOU, MORFH DOULOU )-which owes nothing to the gnostic redeemer myth, which had not yet been concocted-and on the other hand with the consistent meaning of this term in the magical papyri. Whereas the Christian faith affirms that God is invisible and that no human has seen him or can see him (John 1:18; 6:46; 1John 4:12; Rom 1:20; 1Tim 1:17;6:16), the magicians call upon the deity as having a "form"16 and pray him
to appear in his "true form."17 This is a signal favor, for the Eight Books of Moses acknowledge that no one has been able to see this true divine form.18 The devotee of Hermes Trismegistos knows that his god appears in the East in the form of an ibis, in the West in the form of a dog's head,in the North in the form of a serpent, and in the south in the form of a wolf.19 What the mystic wishes to contemplate and be united with is "the sacred form" (Pap.Graec.Mag. 4, 216; vol. 1, p. 78; cf. XIII, 271; vol. 2, p. 101), the "gracious or joyous form,"20 and in the case of Aphrodite, her beauty made manifest: EPIKALOUMAI SE . . . DEIXASA THN KALHN SOU MORFHN.211"

Spicq cites the French Jerusalem Bible here with approval, "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave." I don't know whether English "condition" is quite equivalent to the French "condition." Perhaps better would be "circumstances, terms of existence." Certainly he's right to call attention to the fact that the usage of MORFH in Phil 2:6-7 is closely bound up with the context of "transformation" or METAMORFWSIS. If that's the case, then MORFH in 2:6 EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN and in 2:7 MORFHN DOULOU LABWN are indeed to be understood in the same sense, something like "mode of existence," the underlying assumption being that "mode of existence" is something that can undergo alteration. This is a notion that does seem consistent with other usages of MORFH, and it certainly doesn't approach the sense that Edgar cites: "the outward display of the inner reality or substance." "Outward display" is right, but if we say "outward display of the inner reality or substance," then we'd have to accept that the OUTWARD DISPLAY may mislead the one who views it regarding the "inner reality or substance" of what one beholds.

To sum up, Spicq writes, "It is clear from all of these examples that the use of MORFH in the hymn in Phil 2 is entirely to be expected in a context of metamorphosis or incarnation, but that it would be risky to give it a precise theological meaning."

And that seems like an appropriate imprecise formulation in which to end this endeavor to "divide the word."
--

Carl W. Conrad
Department of Classics, Washington University (Emeritus)
1989 Grindstaff Road/Burnsville, NC 28714/(828) 675-4243
cwconrad@artsci.wustl.edu
WWW: http://www.ioa.com/~cwconrad/

Robert Bowman, Philippians 2:13 and QEOS as Subject

Contra Robert M. Bowman, there is sufficient reason to construe QEOS in Philippians 2:13 as the subject rather than the predicate of the syntactical construction. Rogers and Rogers Linguistic and Exegetical Key points out that QEOS (Philippians 2:13) is fronted which indicates that it's the subject rather than the predicate (see p. 452).

John Calvin also seems to understand QEOS as the subject in this verse. Calvin writes: "God,'says he, 'is hO ENERGWN TO ENERGEIN he that worketh in us to do.' He brings, therefore, to perfection those pious dispositions which he has implanted in us, that they may not be unproductive, as he promises by Ezekiel, --'I will cause them to walk in my commandments.'"

(Ezekiel 11:20.) See his commentary on Philippians.

The Cry of Dereliction in Luke's Gospel

In his commentary on Acts, Professor Richard Longenecker makes this comment on Acts 2:25:

"It should be remembered that only Luke among the synoptists omitted the cry of dereliction from the cross: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34); and only Luke has included the more filial, final word: 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit' (Luke 23:46). Both the omission and the inclusion are in line with the quotation of Ps 16:8 here [in Acts 2:25]: 'I saw the Lord always [DIA PANTOS] before me. Because he is at my right hand, I will not be shaken'" (Longenecker 77-78).

My Slightly Revised Amazon Review of Richard Young's Intermediate New Testament Greek Grammar

Richard A. Young has produced a useful work that certainly provides assistance to students of intermediate NT Greek. Being an intermediate Greek textbook, it predictably deals with syntax and not morphology or phonology. One particularly distinctive feature of Young's work is that he mixes modern linguistic findings and insights based on classical rhetoric with his discussions of syntax. For instance, he supplies brief discussions on metaphors, "kernels," figurative language in general, and speech acts. Moreover, Young has included a helpful chapter on discourse analysis and he also references the prominent theories of aspect formulated by Stanley Porter and Buist Fanning. In many ways, he is also fair with his presentation of syntactical possibilities as illustrated by his approach to 1 Cor 15:29. However, it seems that more than a few of his explanations regarding word order are driven by certain theological preapprehensions. For example, on page 66, he criticizes the New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures' rendering of Jn 1:1c as "a god" rather than the traditional "God."

His criticisms are based (in part) on his notion of what constitutes a "monadic noun." Young utterly misunderstands the thrust behind the NWT rendering when he implies that the "a god" translation is polytheistic--which it is not, when rightly understood. Even worse, he depends on the inadequate (often abused) rule of E. C. Colwell to buttress his opposition to the NWT reading. Regardless of whether the NWT is justified in treating the Johannine text as it does, it is clear that Young sometimes allows theology to govern his syntactical judgments. He unfortunately overlooks the possibility that "a god" just might be a very plausible way to translate Jn 1:1c. In the final analysis, there is really no need for him to read polytheistic notions into the NWT rendering. Despite some issues that I have with Young's intermediate text, however, I recommend it and say, caveat emptor!

The Abuse of Colwell's Rule (John 1:1c)

I want to make it known from the outset that I think Colwell's rule has generally been abused by NT exegetes and GNT grammarians. But the following quotes primarily are for informational purposes: 

"Although there are exceptions, the Colwell rule does seem to be correct for the majority of cases. Colwell (1933:13) states, 'A definite predicate nominative has the article when it follows the verb; it does not have the article when it precedes the verb.' For example, a definite predicate nominative with the article follows the linking verb in John 8:12 EGW EIMI TO FWS TOU KOSMOU, whereas the same predicate nominative without the article precedes the verb in John 9:5 FWS EIMI TOU KOSMOU. The problem in applying the Colwell rule is to determine when the predicate nominative is definite. The rule itself does not establish the definiteness of a noun, an observation sometimes ignored when applying it to John 1:1. We have already mentioned that monadic and proper nouns are definite. The same applies to nouns qualified with a genitive. Colwell notes that proper names in the predicate regularly do not have the article. Other examples of the Colwell rule include Matthew 13:37 (cf. John 5:27), 27:42, John 1:49, and 19:21" (Intermediate NT Greek, p. 65). 

The next quote is taken from Daniel B. Wallace's GGBB, page 260, ftn. 18: "This is not to say that his [Colwell's] rule is invalid. Rather, it is to say that its validity is for TEXTUAL CRITICISM rather than for grammar. Textual criticism was Colwell's real love anyway (he is frequently regarded as the father of modern American NT textual criticism). The rule's validity for textual criticism is as follows: If it is obvious that a pre-verbal PN is definite, the MSS that lack the article are more likely to support the original reading. The issue of meaning is not in view; rather, the presence or absence of the article is."

Matt13 Weedhacker Post on Matthew 24:36; Mark 13:32 (Etc) Textual Issues

Hi Edgar.

I did a post touching what your talking about. It has the earliest references I could find to Matt 24:36, Mark 13:32, Acts 1:7, in Patristic writers.

It may or may not be of use.

http://matt13weedhacker.blogspot.co.nz/2011/11/matt-2436-mark-1332-acts-17-nor-son-but.html

Origen in his Commentary On Matthew 55, has a big section on Matt 24:36. I haven't been able to find an English translation of the text. I think it would make an interesting read.

Big hat tip to Matt13. This information is very useful. Please check out his blog.

Translating 1 Clement 11:1 (The Last Part)

Greek: τοὺς δὲ ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν τίθησιν

The version of Lightfoot that I'm using translates this passage: "but appointeth unto punishment and torment them which swerve aside."

He's translating:

δὲ = "but"
τοὺς = "them"
τίθησιν = "appointeth"
εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν = "unto punishment and torment"
ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας = "which swerve aside"

I would probably not change much about Lightfoot's rendering. Maybe "but set [placed, assigned] to punishment [pruning, mutilation, cutting-off] and harm them which are inclined to other loyalties."

1. κόλασιν can denote "punishment" (BDAG, Robertson's WP). See http://www.biblestudytools.com/commentaries/robertsons-word-pictures/matthew/matthew-25-46.html as an example. While I do not agree with Robertson's overall explanation for Mt 25:46, I believe that the Greek word may denote "punishment" which is not the same as the verb "punishing." See 1 John 4:18. BDAG includes the definition "retribution" as well.

2. BDAG points out that when αἰκισμὸν is used with κόλασιν (or their related lexical forms) that αἰκισμὸν evidently means "punishment." It cites 1 Cl 11:1. So what we appear to have in this passage is a redundancy or pleonasm. The words essentially communicate the same idea.

3. BDAG also cites 1 Cl 11:1 for the entry ἑτεροκλινεῖς. The word may convey notions of "leaning to one side" or "inclined to, having a propensity for" but in 1 Cl 11:1 probably means "having other allegiance" since it's used in the context of rebellious or apostate peoples.

By the way, ὑπάρχοντας is a present active participle ("being") in the accusative form.

Hope this helps,

Edgar

Apparent Sexism in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Donald Bloesch (Is the Bible Sexist?, pages 94-95) thinks that "later Judaism" manifested an increasingly hardened attitude toward women as indicated by daily prayers like "I thank thee, O Lord, that thou hast not created me a woman." However, this disposition apparently was not limited to ancient Jews since Augustine of Hippo believed that man chiefly, not woman, is the image and glory of God, while Ambrosiaster considers women inferior to men and even Thomas Aquinas evidently thinks that women are (in one sense) defective males within whom reason does not predominate. Of course, I've read articles that try to ameliorate Thomas' position. But such arguments don't seem all that convincing in light of the ST 1.91.1, Reply 1:

"As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the
masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2)."

Was Christ Absolutely Ignorant of the Day and Hour? (Matthew 24:36)

The following was once posted on greektheology by me:

Dear list-members,

While we were talking about the dual nature of Christ the past few days, something crossed my mind: the issue of Christ's Omniscience or lack thereof. In Mark 13:32, we read: PERI DE THS hHMERAS EKEINHS H THS hWRAS OUDEIS OIDEN OUDE hOI AGGELOI EN OURANWi OUDE hO hUIOS EI MH hO PATHR.

The NIV translates the Greek:

"No one knows about that day or hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father."

My question is--does this passage teach that the LOGOS become flesh was absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour mentioned in Mark 13:32 (Matt. 24:36)? First, it would be helpful to define "absolute ignorance." But before we do that, let me pose my query in this way. If Jesus existed in two natures in the days of his enfleshment (and still does subsist in this manner, according to orthodoxy), how could he have been absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour that is only privy to the Father? If he did not know as man, it seems that he should have known the day and the hour as God. But there is an escape hatch, some may say.

Commenting on Matt. 24:36, Ralph Earle writes:

"The oldest Greek manuscripts add this ["Nor the Son"] after "angels of heaven," so Matthew agrees with Mark (13:32) in reporting Jesus as saying that He did not know the time of his second coming. This is part of His KENOSIS--His self-emptying (see Phil. 2:7, NASB)--connected with his incarnation" (Earle 22).

Thus Earle's "escape hatch" is that Jesus did not know the day or the hour because he emptied himself when he came to be in the likeness of finite men and women. In the incarnation--the Son supposedly did not subtract his deity, but simply added humanity. His "ignorance" of the time when his Father would initiate pivotal eschatological events associated with his PAROUSIA was due to his self-emptying: it did not mean that the Son was not Almighty God the second Person of the Trinity). But does this "escape hatch" really serve Earle's purpose?

There are two objections that I have to Earle's proposition. One, if Jesus existed in two natures and had two wills, how could he be totally ignorant (as Mark 13:32 implies) of the day and the hour known only by the Father? Secondly, there seems to be indirect proof that Christ was not Omniscient in his pre-existence. This fact would seem highly problematic for those who affirm Christ's "Deity." Besides, I have argued elsewhere that the temporary relinquishing of divine attributes is highly problematic.

As for absolute ignorance, I will expound on that term if others want to discuss this issue. Suffice it to say for now that I define "absolute ignorance" (in this case) as total unawareness of a fact or some particular datum (or set of data).

Best regards,

Edgar Foster

How Does "Chance" Exist, If We Live in a Deterministic World?

A list-member of greektheology once said:

"I agree with you, there are definite paradoxes with omniscience in correlation with and predestination verses free will. But, with respect to omniscience (in the classic sense) and foreknowledge (which actual is rather redundant); I think that if you have the free will to choose T1 to cut the grass and change your mind to T2; T2 is ultimately your choice. T2 is what would have always been known to God, not T1. Now how does that answer a verse like Luke 10:31? One possibility, that it is the perception of chance. There are instances where God appears to change his mind. But, does the Alpha and the Omega, say one thing and later decide not to follow through? An example could be found in Jonah chapter 3. God tells Jonah again to go to Nineveh but on this time he goes. Jonah tells the people of Nineveh that if they will keep sinning, Nineveh will be destroyed in 40 days. After a little while the whole city became religious and started obeying God. Did God know all along or did he change his mind and spare them? Or is this "change of heart" simply how we understand the incident?"

I replied:

I have given thoughtful consideration to your question and it is another good one. While I don't want this conversation to stray too far into Hebrew (Scripture) theology, I think we need to address this vital issue.

Initially, I wonder if "chance" is our perception or if its an objective reality. In Eccl. 9:11, Qoheleth writes: "time and chance happeneth to them all" (ASV). This passage indicates that at least some events in our lives happen by "chance." This view also seems to be corroborated by the Scripture in Luke that was referenced heretofore (Luke 10:31). That verse says in part: KATA SUGKURIAN DE hIEREUS TIS KATABAINEN EN THi hODWi. Again, "by chance," the priest happened to be traveling along the road. There is no indication within this pericope that God foreordained the priest's actions. In fact, I actually wonder what purpose would be served by God foreknowing or foreordaining everything. For example, let's say that one day I was driving down the road imbibing a fifth of liquor (MH GENOITO!) and I lost control of my vehicle which led to me hitting a bridge.

Did God foreordain my actions? Were my actions seen long before there was ever a human race? What would have happened if I had not been drinking and driving? Would I have been involved in this horrible accident? Maybe, but it would not have been as a result of driving while intoxicated. In this case, I would put the blame on my present actions. I believe that God would choose not to know whether I would do such a foolhardy thing. At least, that's the way I see it. :-)

Conversely, as I read the OT and NT, I find that chance is possibly modified by God's intervention. A case example is Ruth 2:4: "And she went, and came and gleaned in the fields after the reapers: and her hap was to light on the portion of the field belonging unto Boaz" (ASV).

The writer of this particular OT account states that Ruth happened to "light on the portion of the field belonging unto Boaz." We are thus informed that Ruth coincidentally (fortuitously) began working in the field of Boaz. But the rest of the narrative assures us that God's ENERGEIA is at work in the life of Ruth. Now it is quite possible that God could have used Ruth if she would have lit upon another field belonging to someone else. The fact is, however, that she landed on Boaz's plot of land. Was this mere chance? Was it pure coincidence that Ruth began to work for Boaz? Personally, I think not. At the same time, I don't believe that God foreordained this event before there was ever a Ruth or a Boaz. Similarly, I find it quite implausible that God foreordains every event that happens throughout the KOSMOS. But I am not saying that the account is wrong when it attributes Ruth's fate to chance. My point is that God is also at work in Ruth's life (compare Ecclesiastes 9:1).

Regarding your question about Jonah 3. True, some wish to view the account anthropomorphically. I have reservations about such an approach for the following reasons. The Hebrew word used to describe God's "change of mind" is NaHaM. Concerning this lingual symbol, J.G. Wenham writes:

'"Regret" or "repent" may suggest a change of attitude, but when God "repents," he starts to act differently. Here [Gen. 6:6] and in 1 Sam. 15:11 and Jer. 18:10 he regrets some good thing he has done for his people, whereas in Exod. 32:12, 14; 2 Sam. 24:16; Amos 7:3, 6 he repents of some evil he is carrying out. That God should change his mind might lead to his being accused of capriciousness, which Scripture firmly denies: "God is not a son of man that he should repent" (Num 23:19; Cf. 1 Sam. 15:29). Such remarks obviously raise various questions for the doctrine of divine sovereignty and its correlate human responsibility, but theological systematization is hardly the concern of the biblical narrators. For them divine repentance is a response to man's changes of heart, whether for better or worse" (Wenham, JG. _Genesis_ Waco, Texas: Word, 1987. P. 144).

I concur with Wenham when he writes that God responds to the changes of men, "for better or worse." That is, when God changes, He is simply responding to the actions of his creatures. To illustrate, before I began to exercise faith in Christ as Savior and King, I was one of God's enemies (Rom. 5:8ff); the wrath of God remained upon me (John 3:36). After taking the necessary steps to become reconciled to God, God's attitude toward me changed from one of wrath to one of love and kindness. When God made this change, however, it was not a change of essence: it was a relational change. I would contend that it was an actual, not just a perceptual change. In sum, I think that chance is real, and change in God is real (as explained above)--"accidents" (i.e. things not foreordained) do happen. At the same time, it is important to remember that everything is in the hand of God (Eccl. 9:1ff). Nothing can happen without His permission.

The Greek of Galatians 4:10

See the remarks made in Vincent's Word Studies and Robertson's Word Pictures at http://www.godrules.net/para/gal/parallelgal4-10.htm

Compare how the NWT reads.

Regards,

Edgar

More on God and TEMPUS (God in Time)

Here is a dialogue that I once had on greektheology (my old yahoogroup). I will distinguish between my dialogue partner's remarks and mine.

[Dialogue partner]
Part of the problem with you, Blackman and others in this discussion is you have
a priori decided what "timeless/eternal" means without regard for the actual biblical revelation. This forces you to multiply a few entities yourself as you
seek to explain away the several Scriptures that clearly teach teach that God is in fact infinite with regard to space and time.

[Edgar]
Maybe I missed the data that you presented to back your arguments, but it certainly doesn't seem that the writers of Scripture presuppose or acknowledge God's timelessness. The term "infinity" (as far as I can tell) is not used in Scripture. What it means when applied to God is still a question of dispute among theologians. So, how can we dogmatically contend that God is timeless or that His infinity somehow obviates His being temporal?

In an essay entitled "God is Everlasting," Nicholas
Wolterstorff writes:

"God is spoken of as calling Abraham to leave Chaldea and later instructing Moses to return to Egypt. So does not the event of God's instructing Moses succeed that of God's calling Abraham? And does not this sort of succession constitute a change on God's time-strand--not a change in his 'essence,' but nonetheless a change on his time-strand."

Wolterstorff concludes:

"Though God is within time, yet he is the Lord of time. The whole array of contingent temporal events is within his power. He is Lord of what occurs. And that,
along with the specific pattern of what he does, grounds all authentically biblical worship of, and obedience to, God."

I might also add that William Lane Craig makes an important distinction between metaphysical time and Einsteinian space-time, between infinite space/time
and finite space-time. Based on these conceptual distinctions, it is possible that God has always subsisted in infinite space/time without being constrained or confined by or to (finite) space-time. The only real reason that I can see for rejecting Craig's distinction is an insalubrious attachment to the, for all intents and purposes, now defunct positivistic worldview of yore.

[Debate partner]
However, I would like you to address the question: in what sense can God foreknow and elect his people from before the foundation of the world, and yet still seek them? You will go one of two directions in your response (though it is possible you could a go a third, unexpected [by me] direction): either you will in someway so define foreknowledge and predestination/election to fit your concept of God as finite, or you will find someway to make the "seek" fit with those concepts.

[Edgar]
(1) I think that most exegetes today explain Eph 1:4 as a reference to a group of people, that is, the elect, and not to individuals composing that group. In other words, God knows that some will accept His offer of salvation and others will reject it. However, God wills that all men be saved and come to an accurate knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4). Men and women are therefore not passive objects or pawns in the divine work of salvation. We are free to choose God or spurn Him (Heb 3:12-14). Ergo, God, since He evidently knows all that it is possible to know, is aware that
there is an indeterminately numbered group of persons who will respond to His free unmerited gift. Nevertheless, He either chooses not to know or knows as indeterminate the decision that men and women will
make vis-a-vis His glorious person.

(2) How do you think the writer of Hebrews is employing the expression APO KATABOLHS KOSMOU in Heb 4:3?

Thanks,
Edgar