Jason posted some thoughts at the evangelicals and jws yahoogroup. I wish to interact with some of his remarks.
[Jason]
At one time I also conceived of God's eternal
existence in terms of 'unbounded temporality'.
Whereas I now speak of God (and His Son) as being
'ageless', back then I spoke of God (and His Son) as
having an 'infinite age.' The transition from
thinking in terms of 'unbounded temporality' to
'timelessness' occured for me through the realization
that God's 'age' is a constant; it always remains the
same; it does not increase with the passing of time;
and so, also, it is indivisible. Whatever the correct
answer is to the question: 'How old is God?' the exact
same answer will still be true ten minutes, ten years,
or ten thousand years from now. (Infinity + 1 =
Infinity; Infinity + 2 = Infinity; ect.)
[Edgar]
Job 36:26 states: "How great is God—beyond our understanding!
The number of his years is past finding out (NIV)."
Most theologians would probably contend that the language used in Job is metaphorical. God literally does not have years that can be counted, even AD INFINITUM. One might reason that the author of Job is employing poetic turns of phrase. While there is probably the use of metaphor or poetic imagery in Job, I believe that it might make sense to speak of God's "years" in terms of his infinite or boundless existence. Talk of infinity quickly becomes problematic. Aristotle makes a distinction between a potential and actual infinite. He argues that the former may exist, but the latter most assuredly does not for the very reason that Jason states (among other reasons). Since it is possible to successively add numbers AD INFINITUM, Aristotle suggests that potential infinites exist. However, actual [quantitative] infinites do not exist. I would thus content that God's "age" cannot constitute an actual quantitative infinite. At best, the "years" of God represent a potential infinite that can be counted potentially AD INFINITUM.
[Jason]
By reflecting further on this, I came to the
conclusion that God exists both 'independently' of
time (for his 'age' is unaffected by the passing of
time) and 'within' every individual moment of time
'simultaneously' and 'ever-presently' (for, whereas
infinity is indivisible, and the 'present' - i.e., the
unmeasurable, elusive 'instant' of time that 'now' is
- is also indivisible, the past and the future are, by
contrast, divisible, so that what is temporally
indivisible cannot have a past or a future distinct
from its 'present' existence). In other words, I
believe that God is both 'timeless' and 'temporally
omnipresent'. I also hold that it not despite God's
timelessness that He is temporally omnipresent, but
rather that it is precisely because of His
timelessness that He is able to be simultaneously
ever-present in every individual moment of time. I
believe that the one implies the other, and that,
therefore, the question as to how a timeless God can
act in time has no force as an argument against the
position that God is timeless and ageless. I do
believe, however, that the question: 'How can a
time-bound God know the future free actions of His
creatures?" does present a major difficulty for the
'unbounded temporality' conception of God's eternity.
For, I believe that the Scriptures teach both the
omniscience of God (which I understand is denied by
Open Theists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the free
will of rational creatures.
[Edgar]
PACE Jason's position, I submit that the foregoing account that he has presented is a confused delineation of God's temporality or His atemporality. It seems to me that one cannot have it both ways. Either God is atemporal or God is temporal (i.e. sempiternal). It is confusing to posit both that God is timeless and within time. Nelson Pike and Stephen T. Davis argue that a timeless God has neither temporal location (it does not make sense to posit a "before" or "after" of a timeless being) nor temporal extension (a timeless being does not have any duration). Yet, it seems that anything existing within time does have duration of some kind such that it makes sense to say that a temporal entity has lived for 80 years or existed during the entire tenure of the Bush administration. See Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, pp. 10-24.
I'm not going to enter into a discussion of God's foreknowledge and free will now. I believe that this question has already been addressed on the evangelicals and jws board.
[Jason]
Regarding Ps. 90:2, I think that the 'unbounded
temporality' interpretation would be more convincing
if the verse had said: "from olam you have (always)
been God and to olam you will (continue to) be God."
As the text stands however, with its present tense
verb 'are' I believe supports the 'timelessness'
interpretation by way of affirming God's 'temporal
omnipresence'. Don't you think it would be an odd
manner of expression if I were to state: 'from 1977 to
2008, I am Jason'?
[Edgar]
First, I believe that the lexical semantics of the text (i.e. the meaning of words used in a text) are on the side of those who believe in an limitlessly temporal or sempiternal God. OLAM can mean hidden or concealed time, that is, concealed from the standpoint of the present. In the case of God, it most certainly does not refer to God's timelessness. Second, you are placing the verb of the text in the wrong place. Psalm 90:2 actually says "from OLAM to OLAM, you ARE God." The writer is not attempting to tell us that God IS from OLAM to OLAM per se. The verb should be construed with the words "you" and "god." Do you see the difference regarding where one places the verb in the text?
To conclude, I offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Best regards,
Edgar
15 comments:
Hi Edgar, thank you for your detailed and fair treatment of the excerpt from my post
In regard to the second part commented on, I would submit that the first key to rendering the paradox of timelessness/temporal omnipresence intelligible lies in the distinction between the Divine Essence and the Divine Energies. This distinction is implied in the quote from Athanasius I included in my post: "[God] is within all things according to His own goodness and power [cf. Ps. 139:7,8], but outside of all according to His own proper nature. [cf. 1 Kings 8:27]" (Letter on the Council of Nicaea, 11)
Regarding this distinction, Basil says: "The operations [or, energies] of God are various, but His essence is simple. We say, however, that we know our God from His operations; His essence itself, we do not undertake to approach. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains inaccessible." (Letter to Amphilochius, 234,1) Cf. Habakkuk 3:3,4, in which we read of the divine 'brightness' which shines forth from God - God Himself being that Light in which there is no darkness according to 1 John 1:5 - revealing or manifesting Him outside His being, while at the same time hiding or concealing Him as He exists in His being. (Cf. Ps. 36:9; 1 Tim. 6:16)
While the Watch Tower Society verbally denies the God's omnipresence, it also teaches in connection with this denial that "His power and knowledge extend everywhere, reaching every part of the universe" (Insight on the Scriptures, vol. 1, p. 969) and even cites Ps. 139:7-12 in this regard, which passage, among other things, speaks of God Himself as being present everywhere (vs. 8). Would it necessarily be a distortion of the Society's teachings to say that it maintains that while God is not omnipresent according to His essence, He is omnipresent according to His energies? (I have so far been unsuccessful in my attempts to determine exactly how the Society conceives of the relation between the essence and the energies of God from the first couple chapters of its 1976 publication on "Holy Spirit", and I am not aware of any other material from the Society which provides a more detailed presentation on the subject than this.)
I also submit - though somewhat tentatively - that a second key to rendering the paradox of timelessness/temporal omnipresence intelligible may lie in a consideration of the indivisible, and hence atemporal, nature of any particular individual 'instant' of time. Does this imply an ever-present manifestation of atemporality within (not outside) the ever-moving flow of time? If there is a logical or mathematical error either stated or implied in my reasoning here, I would appreciate correction.
God bless,
Jason
Hi Edgar,
I can easily conceive of the future as being potentially infinite, for x + 1 < ∞ when x < ∞ (thus showing that the actually infinite future is a moment of time that neither will nor can ever be reached, and thus will never exist in time, and so cannot be properly categorized as a moment of time). What I have difficulty with is conceiving of the past as also being potentially infinite, for it is not only the case that x + 1 = x when x = ∞ or -∞ (thus excluding both an actually infinite future and an actually infinite past) but is also the case that x + 1 > -∞ when x > -∞. I could see how the past could be potentially infinite if time were to flow 'backwards', for x - 1 > -∞ when x > -∞, but if time were to flow 'backwards', the 'past' would be, by definition, not the past but the future instead, for time would be moving 'towards' the potentially infinite 'past', not 'away' from it. How can there be anything 'potential' in the past? Doesn't the past refer to the sum total of time that has 'actually', not just 'potentially' elapsed?
Jason
Jason,
I believe that what you call the Society's understanding of omnipresence is shaped by the "Society's" understanding of how the term "omnipresence" evidently is defined. You are correct in noting that Witnesses believe that God is present everywhere by means of his Holy Spirit. Now you could the distinction "uncreated energy" or "energies" to delineate what the Society's publications are saying. But that usually is not a conceptual category for Witnesses, even if we know the LOCUS CLASSICUS of the nomenclature. Maybe you can apprehend the problem insofar as there appear to be certain presuppositions that attend the terminology "uncreated energies."
Second, to talk of God's essence is also problematic for Witnesses. I don't have the time to chase down the reference right now, but you might consult the entry "Trinity" in the Reasoning from the Scriptures book. There is a quote in that portion of the work that well expresses the Witness view of God's "essence."
Is it possible for an individual instant of time to be atemporal? I believe that the concepts you posit will have to be more fully unfolded before they even begin to appear intelligible. I could possibly see how your suggestion might work according to the B-series of time theory which uses categories like "antecedent to," consequent with" and "subsequent to" as relations of time over against thinking of time in terms of past, present and future.
You've undoubtedly perused book 11 of Augustine's Confessions. He writes that "if time stood changeless, it would not be time" (Confessions, 11.14).
In the same portion of Confessions, he adds:
"if the present were always present and never flowed away into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity."
In view of Augustine's remarks, I wonder how a non-divisible instant of time can possibly be described (SENSU STRICTU) as atemporal.
Jason,
I'm not a mathematician, but I understand your argument for the impossibility of a potentially infinite past. However, I am familiar with the notion (in physics) of time possibly "flowing backwards" at the event horizon of a black hole (because of the gravity or curvature of the space-time continuum within this region of space). My contention would be that it is logically and maybe even factually possible for time to "flow backwards" which is really a metaphorical way of speaking. Second, Quentin Smith argues robustly that an actual infinite past is logically possible. See http://www.qsmithwmu.com/infinity_and_the_past.htm
Based on what thinkers like William Lane Craig, J. P. Moreland, Aristotle and Kant have written, I prefer to think of the past as being potentially infinite. I.e. it is logically possible to conceive of a potentially infinite past. Modern developments in physics at least demonstrate how these concepts are possible, even if they cannot be actualized according to reality's current structure.
I want to clarify that Craig and others would probably disagree that the past can even be potentially infinite. However, I'm not sure that the arguments that have been set forth by Craig (et. al.) have the effect of ruling out the potentially infinite past. Of course, there is much that we don't understand about God's nature.
Hi Edgar,
I am not studied enough in physics to be able to discuss intelligently the reversibility of time as regards black holes. I am not sure yet, however, what the degree of relevance of such a phenomenon might be in the context of the present discussion. Do you posit a distinction between created time and uncreated time? If so, how do you express the relation between the two? Do you think of the existence of time prior to the creation's coming into being in terms of a succession of individual divine thoughts within the mind of God? If so, then I ask as to how this could be conceived of except in non-reversible terms?
I confess the deficiencies of my knowledge regarding theories about the nature of time. I intend on reading more on what Padgett, Lane, Smith and others have said regarding the relation (or possible relation) of time and eternity to each other.
In speaking of the present as 'atemporal', I do not mean that the present lacks a temporal location in relation to the past and the future, but simply that when considered in itself, it is found to be without temporal duration. For, if it were otherwise, the present would thereby itself be divided into past, present, and future, having a 'before' and an 'after' within itself.
What I am suggesting is that the future flows through the present into the past without occupying any temporal space within the present prior to its receding into the past. I suggest that this is the primary reason why time-bound beings have no experience of any moment of time until it becomes part of the past. We cannot, so to speak, "seize" the moment. If we were to do so, we would attain to a timeless mode of existence, in that we would be experiencing time from within the perspective afforded by the temporally indivisible present, and thus we would not be experiencing it as the 'flowing' of the future into the past through the present, there being no 'flow' of time 'within' the present itself, but only a 'flow' of time 'through' the present. Yet, we would still be existing 'within' time, for although having no temporal duration within the present, time cannot exist without flowing through the present. For, without the present, there would be no connection between the past and the future, and thus no possibility of time flowing from the future into the past, which is to say that there would be no temporal succession, and thus, no time.
Hi Jason,
[Jason]
Hi Edgar,
I am not studied enough in physics to be able to discuss intelligently the reversibility of time as regards black holes. I am not sure yet, however, what the degree of relevance of such a phenomenon might be in the context of the present discussion. Do you posit a distinction between created time and uncreated time? If so, how do you express the relation between the two? Do you think of the existence of time prior to the creation's coming into being in terms of a succession of individual divine thoughts within the mind of God? If so, then I ask as to how this could be conceived of except in non-reversible terms?
[Edgar]
The concept that I mentioned concerning black holes does not require that one be all that conversant in physics. It is simply a basic matter regarding gravity and the space-time continuum. Let us assume that the gravitational field of a black hole severely warps space-time. Imagine being at the event horizon of a black hole where space-time is warped to the point that time slows down. We know that time slowing down at the edge of a black hole is a real possibility in view of a black hole's gravitational field. Now imagine if the gravity of a black hole's edge became so strong that time slowed down enough to actually "flow" backwards. Although time may never flow backwards, the reversal of time is a logical possibility considering what we now know about the universe.
I do posit a distinction between uncreated infinite time and created finite space-time. I cannot explain how uncreated time apparently works, but I do not limit it to God's individual thoughts. I would say that God probably has always experience successive temporal states in his very being. I don't believe that anyone has worked out this belief IN TOTO, however. Stephen T. Davis suggests that there are at least three ways to understand God's sempiternity. One way is to understand time as existing as "an eternal aspect of God's nature rather than a reality independent of God" (Logic and the Nature of God, 23). The past, present and future would then be real to God or meaningfully applied to him. Another less likely possibility which Davis entertains is that time has always existed, yet only became measurable when God created the material universe with its sun, moon and other celestial bodies. This idea evidently is found in John of Damascus.
[Jason]
I confess the deficiencies of my knowledge regarding theories about the nature of time. I intend on reading more on what Padgett, Lane, Smith and others have said regarding the relation (or possible relation) of time and eternity to each other.
[Edgar]
To be fair, there are interesting arguments on both sides of the debate. I like William Hasker's book which takes the position in favor of God being temporal. On the other hand, Brian Leftow has written a complex defense in favor of God being timeless. I also found a nice introductory article to the subject at http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/god-time.htm
[Jason]
In speaking of the present as 'atemporal', I do not mean that the present lacks a temporal location in relation to the past and the future, but simply that when considered in itself, it is found to be without temporal duration. For, if it were otherwise, the present would thereby itself be divided into past, present, and future, having a 'before' and an 'after' within itself.
[Edgar]
I could be mistaken, but I do not see how it logically follows that if the present in itself has temporal duration, then it would be divided into the past or present. In the internet article that I reference above, we read:
"It has also been argued that the notion of atemporal duration, that Stump and Kretzmann hold to be required by the timeless view, is at bottom incoherent. Paul Fitzgerald (1985) has argued that for there to be duration in the life of God, it must be the case that two or more of God's thoughts, for example, will have either the same or different amounts of duration. Different thoughts in God's mind can be individuated by their respective lengths of duration or at least by their locations within the duration. Fitzgerald argues that if a timeless duration does not have these analogues with temporal or spatial duration, it is hard to think of it as a case of bona fide duration. On the other hand, if the duration in God's life has this sort of duration, it is difficult to see that it is not simply one more case of temporal duration."
Maybe you can read the article by Fitzgerald, then we can discuss temporal and atemporal duration.
[Jason]
What I am suggesting is that the future flows through the present into the past without occupying any temporal space within the present prior to its receding into the past. I suggest that this is the primary reason why time-bound beings have no experience of any moment of time until it becomes part of the past. We cannot, so to speak, "seize" the moment. If we were to do so, we would attain to a timeless mode of existence, in that we would be experiencing time from within the perspective afforded by the temporally indivisible present, and thus we would not be experiencing it as the 'flowing' of the future into the past through the present, there being no 'flow' of time 'within' the present itself, but only a 'flow' of time 'through' the present. Yet, we would still be existing 'within' time, for although having no temporal duration within the present, time cannot exist without flowing through the present. For, without the present, there would be no connection between the past and the future, and thus no possibility of time flowing from the future into the past, which is to say that there would be no temporal succession, and thus, no time.
[Edgar]
As an undergraduate, I once wrote a paper on God and time. I then spent years trying to edit and make the paper longer and better than it originally was. However, one reason that I stopped working on the essay was because I realized how difficult it is to define or understand the phenomenon of time. I still find the subject fascinating, but I can see that you're working with a number of assumptions that I do not share about time. The language of time flowing seems to be metaphorical, in my estimation. Nor do I agree that the future somehow flows through the present into the past, whatever that means. Those who advocate the A-series of time believe that the past has already happened and the future is not yet: all that really exists or has duration is the present. Moreover, I would define time from a scientific perspective as the interval between event A and event B. There are other ways to define time; nonetheless, it seems that they all share the same problem. How do we define time without begging the question?
Hi Edgar,
First of all I agree that talk about time 'flowing' is metaphorical. I also agree that time is the interval between event A and event B, and that the past has already happened and the future is not yet.
I am not sure to what extent we actually disagree concerning 'atemporal duration'. I avoid the expression, as it seems to imply an 'atemporal temporality'. However, if one were to use it to mean simply a duration of zero units of time, i.e., no duration, then I would admit that one could in this sense speak of an atemporal duration, without falling into an error analogous to an objectification of the 'nothingness' in the expression 'creatio ex nihilo', i.e., treating 'nothingness' as though it were 'something'.
(IF infinity were a number, then I would also agree that an 'infinite duration' could be called an 'atemporal duration'. For, like zero, infinity is also indivisible, and as one of your quotes from Augustine stated: "If the present were ALWAYS present [i.e., if the present had an infinite duration] and NEVER flowed away into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity.")
Where my main disagreement lies is with your statement that "all that really exists or has duration is the present."
For, if only the present exists, then time does not exist. For this is the very definition of atemporality: being without succession in a constant undivided NOW. To be sure, neither the past nor the future have a duration greater than (or less than) zero in the present. But, neither does the present have a duration greater than (or less than zero) in the present. For, however long the duration is of the present, for that same length of time, time stands still. And when time stands still, time does not exist, for no temporal succession occurs during that 'time'. So, in order for time to exist, the length of the duration of the present cannot be anything other than zero.
If the present is indivisible, how can it have a duration other than zero? For no number other than zero is indivisible.
Thus, I argue that the past, the present, and the future have an atemporal mode of existence in the present. And by an atemporal mode of existence, I mean a non-durational mode of existence. If you reject this concept, then how can it be consistent with your views for you to speak of the past as 'being' potentially infinite, or to say that the past 'is' potentially infinite? Wouldn't consistency require you to say that 'the past was potentially infinite', with the implication being that the past is now no longer potentially infinite?
As regards Quentin Smith's concept of an actually infinite past, it seems to me that, in constructing his arguments, he has failed to take into account the fact that infinity is not a number.
As regards 'event horizons', I point out that some physicists - including Hawking, if I am understanding him correctly - have recently argued, on mathematical grounds, that these cannot exist. Whatever the case may be, however, how would one go about conceptualizing the existence of something analogous to an event horizon in the uncreated order (making it possible to attribute a potentially infinite past to God's own existence) which would not thereby, so to speak, cut God off from Himself?
I am curious as to where John of Damascus speaks of time as having existed in an unmeasurable state prior to the coming into being of the created order. Wouldn't 'unmeasurable' time have to be indivisible, and thus atemporal?
Hi Jason,
I'll reply to your comments on Friday. I've been rather busy of late.
Regards,
Edgar
Hi Jason,
You write
"I am not sure to what extent we actually disagree concerning 'atemporal duration'. I avoid the expression, as it seems to imply an 'atemporal temporality'. However, if one were to use it to mean simply a duration of zero units of time, i.e., no duration, then I would admit that one could in this sense speak of an atemporal duration, without falling into an error analogous to an objectification of the 'nothingness' in the expression 'creatio ex nihilo', i.e., treating 'nothingness' as though it were 'something.'"
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann have argued that God's duration is atemporal. Their concept of divine "eternal-simultaneity" is based on Boethius' account of divine eternity (supposedly understood as timeless duration) and Einsteinian relativity. Even some who advocate divine timelessness have found legitimate weaknesses in Stump and Kretzmann's argument. The weaknesses of their model have been so profound that Stump and Kretzmann also have seen fit to revise their understanding of "eternal-simultaneity." See http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/god-time.htm#SH3a
I submit that if one uses the expression "atemporal duration" to mean simply "no duration," then what we have is an expression that is all form and no genuine semantic content. Why not just say "no duration" rather than atemporal duration? The fact of the matter is that in order to have duration, we evidently need time (TEMPUS) or temporal parts. The concept of "atemporal duration" just does not seem to make sense. Paul Fitzgerald deals with this subject matter in "Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 5. (May, 1985), pp. 260-269. He contends that it appears difficult to maintain a belief in atemporal or infinitely extended duration without simultaneously positing finite parts for this kind of duration. Fitzgerald writes:
"So we can opt for a doctrine of God's eternality as not involving IN SE any duration or mode of extension at all (the point rather than the line). Or we get E-duration in God, in which case there are subphases at which distinct particulars of the divine life have their locations and E-durations (or could at least, even if in fact the divine duration is absolutely monotone, as would be suggested by the doctrine of divine immutability)." See p. 264 of the aforementioned article.
"(IF infinity were a number, then I would also agree that an 'infinite duration' could be called an 'atemporal duration'. For, like zero, infinity is also indivisible, and as one of your quotes from Augustine stated: 'If the present were ALWAYS present [i.e., if the present had an infinite duration] and NEVER flowed away into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity.')"
Then we evidently agree concerning atemporal duration since neither one of us seem to accept the terminology (as it has been understood throughout this discussion).
"Where my main disagreement lies is with your statement that 'all that really exists or has duration is the present.'
For, if only the present exists, then time does not exist. For this is the very definition of atemporality: being without succession in a constant undivided NOW. To be sure, neither the past nor the future have a duration greater than (or less than) zero in the present. But, neither does the present have a duration greater than (or less than zero) in the present. For, however long the duration is of the present, for that same length of time, time stands still. And when time stands still, time does not exist, for no temporal succession occurs during that 'time'. So, in order for time to exist, the length of the duration of the present cannot be anything other than zero."
Your argument only works if one accepts your definition of "atemporality." As one who believes in the A-series of time, I do not define "atemporality" as "being without succession in a constant undivided NOW." My view is that the present necessarily shares in temporality insofar as it involves some type of temporal succession. Richard Gale takes up this subject in a work entitled "Has the Present any Duration?," Noûs, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Feb., 1971), pp. 39-47.
He insists that certain problems arise when we talk about "the present" since we often equivocate when employing this expression. Gale makes a conceptual distinction between the durational present and the punctal present. An example of the former distinction is when we speak of the current year (2008) as the present; conversely, we may refer to the present or "now" in the sense of a particular moment of the "present" year (i.e. 4:15 PM on April 4, 2008). Unless we make a clear distinction between which "present" we're talking about, antinomies seem to result.
"If the present is indivisible, how can it have a duration other than zero? For no number other than zero is indivisible."
The present is not necessarily indivisible. Besides, it depends on which "present" you have in mind. But even the present (in terms of this day, April 4) appears to have finite temporal parts or some type of extension.
There is an informative article by C. W. K. Mundle "Augustine's Pervasive Error concerning Time," Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 156. (Apr., 1966), pp. 165-168. Mundle critiques the Augustinian assertion that "No one would deny that the present has no duration" (Confessions 11.28). Using some of his examples, I might ask, if the present has no genuine duration, then how is it possible for me to hear a series of sounds NOW that I recognize as my favorite song? Or what if I am NOW having the experience of visually perceiving my 2001 Ford Focus? How can I make sense of this visual perception (as a perceptual whole) in terms of a durationless present?
"Thus, I argue that the past, the present, and the future have an atemporal mode of existence in the present. And by an atemporal mode of existence, I mean a non-durational mode of existence. If you reject this concept, then how can it be consistent with your views for you to speak of the past as 'being' potentially infinite, or to say that the past 'is' potentially infinite? Wouldn't consistency require you to say that 'the past was potentially infinite', with the implication being that the past is now no longer potentially infinite?"
First, I do not buy into the notion of tenseless time. Maybe it is not your intent, but it seems that you have verbally abolished tense vis-a-vis time and you're now content to have a tenseless past, present and future "in the present," which still does not make sense to me unless what you're trying to affirm is a B-series of time in A-series language. If I speak of the past as "being" potentially infinite, I do not mean that the past is still in existence. I have made it clear that I affirm the A-series of time which tends to claim that the past is no longer and the future is not yet. When I used the language you allude to above, I did not mean to imply that I believe that God's potentially infinite past still exists. I was simply trying to predicate potential infinity of the past.
"As regards Quentin Smith's concept of an actually infinite past, it seems to me that, in constructing his arguments, he has failed to take into account the fact that infinity is not a number."
I'm not going to say much here since I do not believe that an actual quantitative infinite can exist. But I would not concur with your statement that Smith overlooks the fact that "infinity is not a number" without reading his article. Maybe you did read it, but overlooked what he says about Aleph-null.
"As regards 'event horizons', I point out that some physicists - including Hawking, if I am understanding him correctly - have recently argued, on mathematical grounds, that these cannot exist. Whatever the case may be, however, how would one go about conceptualizing the existence of something analogous to an event horizon in the uncreated order (making it possible to attribute a potentially infinite past to God's own existence) which would not thereby, so to speak, cut God off from Himself?"
I don't think that event horizons can be discounted yet, even if Hawking now questions their existence. At any rate, I did not mention event horizons in order to demonstrate that something akin to black holes exist in the uncreated order. My point in introducing event horizons was to demonstrate the logical possibility or maybe even the factual possibility (distinctions used in modal logic) that time does not perforce "flow" forward but may "flow" backwards under the exigent circumstances of an event horizon.
"I am curious as to where John of Damascus speaks of time as having existed in an unmeasurable state prior to the coming into being of the created order. Wouldn't 'unmeasurable' time have to be indivisible, and thus atemporal?"
I cam across the references in Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God. He culled the remarks of John Damascene from a book written by Nelson Pike God and Timelessness which I have read and documented the references to John of Damascus for myself. You can find his observations on time in An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. The quotes from the Damascene appear on pp. 181 of Pike's work. Keep in mind that Davis and Pike interpret John of Damascus as making the claim that God once existed in unmeasurable time. But I encourage you to read the primary source for yourself.
Best regards,
Edgar
Hi Edgar,
How do you define 'atemporality'? For if your definition differs from mine, then perhaps we agree that God is not 'atemporal' in the sense in which you understand 'atemporal'. How does acceptance of the a-series of time rule out my definition of God's eternity?
Is it all form and no genuine semantic content to speak of the 'number' zero? How can an actually infinite quantity be divided into finite parts? I ask these questions because I am not yet quite sure that we completely agree concerning the concept of 'atemporal duration'. Though we both reject as incoherent the concept as proposed by Stump and Kretzmann, our reasons for doing so may be not only different but also mutually incompatible.
I agree that April 4th, 2008 has temporal duration and that it is temporally divisible. I also agree that the minute 4:15 PM of April 4th has temporal duration and is temporally divisible. But certainly, the entirety of the day in question, or the minute of the day in question does not occur "all at once" as far as its temporal mode of existence goes. When, it is 4:15 PM, a certain number of seconds (anywhere from 0 to 59.999999... which is the same as 0 to 60) of that minute have gone by and are thus part of the past, and those remaining seconds which have not yet gone by so as to be part of the past have not yet occurred, and thus are still future. So, if exactly 30.412 seconds of the minute in question are past, then exactly 29.588 seconds of that same minute are future. So, how many seconds are then 'present'? Please explain how it is conceivable that the LITERAL 'present' time within 4:15 PM could have a duration of anything other than 0 seconds?
Being a time-bound being, how is it possible for you to hear a 'series' of sounds 'now', i.e., 'all at once'? For, as the series you are speaking of is a temporal series, it does not occur in time all at once, but successively, and thus in terms of past, present, and future divisions at any given time during which you are hearing the series of sounds, with one individual sound following upon the next until the entire series is completed in time.
I have not abolished tense vis-a-vis time, for I have not said that the past, the present and the future ONLY have a non-temporal existence in the present. I admit the reality of their temporal existence - the past in the past as past, the present in the present as present, and the future in the future as future.
Concerning my concept of an atemporal mode of existence of the past and the future in the present, I admit that I have not yet succeeded in defining exactly what this mode 'positively' consists in. However, in favour of the proposition that such an atemporal mode does exist, in addition to the temporal mode of time's existence, I present the following:
First of all, I maintain that one cannot think about time without SIMULTANEOUSLY thinking of the past, the present, and the future. For, if while thinking of event A I am not thinking of event B and vice versa, then I cannot be thinking of event A and event B in temporal relation to each other (or as being in any other relation to each other, for that matter.) But, if events A and B have a temporally simultaneous existence only in my own mind, then the same will be true of the existence of their temporal relation to each other. For if my thinking of them simultaneously - with both equally present to my mind in the present moment during which I am thinking of them as being in temporal relation to each other - has no correspondence to objective reality, then neither will my thinking about them as being in temporal relation to each other have any correpondence to objective reality. For the starting point of my thinking process whereby I can conceive of events A and B as existing in temporal relation to each other cannot yield a perception of objective truth, if it itself is based upon a purely subjective construct devoid of objective truth.
Why predicate potential infinity (or anything else for that matter) of something which cannot exist? For that which cannot exist can only have no attributes. If there is no sense in which the past still exists, then there is also no sense in which it ever did exist. For at whatever time when it, or any part of it, existed, it was not yet 'past'. If the past ever was potentially infinite, when did it cease being so? And if it was necessary for it to cease being so, what potentiality for being infinite did it really have in the first place?
If God's potentially infinite past existence does not
exist, then God is lacking a potentially infinite 'part' of His existence. But, as you're no doubt already well aware that it is precisely in order to avoid these types of conclusions that timelessness is posited of God, I realize that it is not enough for me to simply point out that these conclusions follow from your position regarding the relation of time to eternity, but that I must show that these conclusions are incompatible with divine revelation. However, I think that this will have to wait until it is a bit clearer as to where we agree and disagree about the nature of time and atemporality.
God bless,
Jason
Hi Jason,
You write:
"How do you define 'atemporality'? For if your definition differs from mine, then perhaps we agree that God is not 'atemporal' in the sense in which you understand 'atemporal'. How does acceptance of the a-series of time rule out my definition of God's eternity?"
I believe that "atemporal" means "timeless" or having no temporal location (not existing before, at or after T1) nor any temporal extension (not existing during WWI or during the reign of Louis XIV). Moreover, the adnominal term "atemporal" (as in the case of an atemporal being) implies that no temporal succession occurs or is experienced.
"Is it all form and no genuine semantic content to speak of the 'number' zero? How can an actually infinite quantity be divided into finite parts? I ask these questions because I am not yet quite sure that we completely agree concerning the concept of 'atemporal duration'. Though we both reject as incoherent the concept as proposed by Stump and Kretzmann, our reasons for doing so may be not only different but also mutually incompatible."
First, I have already stated that I do not believe that an actual infinite can exist. There is thus no question of an actual infinite, being divided into parts as far as I am concerned. My reason for rejecting an atemporal duration is simple. The very substantive "duration" presupposes or connotes time. Analytically or by definition, an atemporal (timeless) duration appears to be ruled out. See my comments above that are based on Fitzgerald's journal article. Please review the quote from his article, which you can find above.
"I agree that April 4th, 2008 has temporal duration and that it is temporally divisible. I also agree that the minute 4:15 PM of April 4th has temporal duration and is temporally divisible. But certainly, the entirety of the day in question, or the minute of the day in question does not occur "all at once" as far as its temporal mode of existence goes. When, it is 4:15 PM, a certain number of seconds (anywhere from 0 to 59.999999... which is the same as 0 to 60) of that minute have gone by and are thus part of the past, and those remaining seconds which have not yet gone by so as to be part of the past have not yet occurred, and thus are still future. So, if exactly 30.412 seconds of the minute in question are past, then exactly 29.588 seconds of that same minute are future. So, how many seconds are then 'present'? Please explain how it is conceivable that the LITERAL 'present' time within 4:15 PM could have a duration of anything other than 0 seconds?"
I've already replied to this objection in my mention of Richard Gale's journal article. The foregoing objection does not recognize the conceptual distinction between the durational present and the punctal present. Difficulties arise if one equivocates vis-a-vis the term "present." See Gale's article "Has the Present any Duration?," Noûs, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Feb., 1971), pp. 39-47 and C. W. K. Mundle's "Augustine's Pervasive Error concerning Time," Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 156. (Apr., 1966), pp. 165-168.
"Being a time-bound being, how is it possible for you to hear a 'series' of sounds 'now', i.e., 'all at once'? For, as the series you are speaking of is a temporal series, it does not occur in time all at once, but successively, and thus in terms of past, present, and future divisions at any given time during which you are hearing the series of sounds, with one individual sound following upon the next until the entire series is completed in time."
I hear my favorite song as a whole (i.e. I know it is one song, not two different songs or more, even though it is a series of sounds) or I visually perceive my vehicle (when I see it) as an undifferentiated whole "now" (that is, during the time period in which I am beholding my car). The antinomies are arising in view of the fact that the durational present is being conflated with the punctal present. There is a sense in which the song (as whole series of sounds) is present (durationally) and there is a sense in which part of the song is past, part is present and part if future. But we need to distinguish between the durational and the punctal present.
"I have not abolished tense vis-a-vis time, for I have not said that the past, the present and the future ONLY have a non-temporal existence in the present. I admit the reality of their temporal existence - the past in the past as past, the present in the present as present, and the future in the future as future."
Jason, my exact words were "Maybe it is not your intent, but it seems that you have verbally abolished tense vis-a-vis time and you're now content to have a tenseless past, present and future "in the present," which still does not make sense to me unless what you're trying to affirm is a B-series of time in A-series language." I was giving my impression of your views based on what you wrote earlier. Thanks for clarifying your prior statement.
"Concerning my concept of an atemporal mode of existence of the past and the future in the present, I admit that I have not yet succeeded in defining exactly what this mode 'positively' consists in. However, in favour of the proposition that such an atemporal mode does exist, in addition to the temporal mode of time's existence, I present the following:
First of all, I maintain that one cannot think about time without SIMULTANEOUSLY thinking of the past, the present, and the future. For, if while thinking of event A I am not thinking of event B and vice versa, then I cannot be thinking of event A and event B in temporal relation to each other (or as being in any other relation to each other, for that matter.) But, if events A and B have a temporally simultaneous existence only in my own mind, then the same will be true of the existence of their temporal relation to each other. For if my thinking of them simultaneously - with both equally present to my mind in the present moment during which I am thinking of them as being in temporal relation to each other - has no correspondence to objective reality, then neither will my thinking about them as being in temporal relation to each other have any correpondence to objective reality. For the starting point of my thinking process whereby I can conceive of events A and B as existing in temporal relation to each other cannot yield a perception of objective truth, if it itself is based upon a purely subjective construct devoid of objective truth."
I still believe that you're trying to hold in tension mentally two different theories of time, namely, the A-series of time and the B-series of time. The A-series posits time in terms of past, present and future whereas the B-series of time suggests that time should be conceived in terms of "earlier than," "consequent with" and "later than" relations. My point is that one does not have to conceive the past in relation to the present or future to make sense of the past qua the past. Talk of the past belongs to the A-series theory of time; relations, to the B-series.
"Why predicate potential infinity (or anything else for that matter) of something which cannot exist? For that which cannot exist can only have no attributes. If there is no sense in which the past still exists, then there is also no sense in which it ever did exist. For at whatever time when it, or any part of it, existed, it was not yet 'past'. If the past ever was potentially infinite, when did it cease being so? And if it was necessary for it to cease being so, what potentiality for being infinite did it really have in the first place?"
My suggestion of potential infinity for God's past was not presented as dogma. It was an attempt to explain how God's "years" or past eternity stretch back into the past. How does a sempiternalist talk about the temporally successive states that God possibly has experienced? May one who believes in a sempiternal God should just say that God has no beginning nor will God have an end. I actually like Garrett Deweese's idea that God experiences temporal succession, but it is a succession in relation to God's actions and his own consciousness. God's experience of time would then be intrinsic rather than be governed by external factors like some law-like metric.
"If God's potentially infinite past existence does not
exist, then God is lacking a potentially infinite 'part' of His existence. But, as you're no doubt already well aware that it is precisely in order to avoid these types of conclusions that timelessness is posited of God, I realize that it is not enough for me to simply point out that these conclusions follow from your position regarding the relation of time to eternity, but that I must show that these conclusions are incompatible with divine revelation. However, I think that this will have to wait until it is a bit clearer as to where we agree and disagree about the nature of time and atemporality."
Let me remind you that I essayed potential infinity of God's past as a possibility, not as some dogmatic pronouncement. It may still be possible to make sense of a potentially infinite past that does not exist ontologically. Nevertheless, if one accepted this idea of a potentially infinite past within an A-series theoretical framework, there would seem to be no difference between talking about my finite actual past that does not exist and God's potentially infinite actual past that (technically) does not exist.
Hi Edgar,
Are non-existent things atemporal? It seems to me that all such 'things' would fit your definition (as opposed to my definition) of atemporality.
If time exists only because God has freely willed it to exist, then time need not have come into existence. And if time need not have come into existence, then God is not subject to time, and exists independently of time. But, if God is not subject to time and exists independently of time, then it is inaccurate to define God's mode of existence in a manner which presupposes the existence of time. But, if one defines God's 'atemporality' or 'timelessness' a contrario to time, then one is doing precisely that. It seems to me that you have taken the expressions 'timelessness' and 'atemporality' a bit too literally, as though they were expressive not of TRANSCENDENCE over time, but of simply a mere negation of time.
Doesn't your definition of atemporality present atemporality as a mode of existence which is something less, not something greater than, the temporal mode of existence? Is a temporal mode of existence the greatest possible mode of existence? Does something have to be temporal in order for it, by definition, to exist? Is an atemporal existence logically possible, in the sense of an existence which is infinitely beyond the limitations of temporality?
God bless,
Jason
Hi Jason,
This reply is my last on this particular subject. I want to post a new thread on black holes and time reversibility in the future (no pun intended).
You write:
[Jason]
Are non-existent things atemporal? It seems to me that all such 'things' would fit your definition (as opposed to my definition) of atemporality.
[Edgar]
You pose an interesting question. However, since I have not dealt extensively into meontology (the theory of nonexistent things), I hesitate to answer your question. But if non-existent things do not exist--then how can time apply to them? Is a unicorn atemporal? At this point in my life, it is difficult for me to make sense of the question. I'll thus move on.
[Jason]
If time exists only because God has freely willed it to exist, then time need not have come into existence. And if time need not have come into existence, then God is not subject to time, and exists independently of time. But, if God is not subject to time and exists independently of time, then it is inaccurate to define God's mode of existence in a manner which presupposes the existence of time. But, if one defines God's 'atemporality' or 'timelessness' a contrario to time, then one is doing precisely that. It seems to me that you have taken the expressions 'timelessness' and 'atemporality' a bit too literally, as though they were expressive not of TRANSCENDENCE over time, but of simply a mere negation of time.
[Edgar]
As I often tell my students, I didn't invent the game, I just learned how to play it. While you credit me with having read the expression "atemporality" too literally, the truth is that my definition is standard or de rigueur in the literature (primary and secondary) on the subject of divine timelessness. While I understand that there are various ways of delineating God's supposed atemporality, the theologians with whom I have interacted in writing formulate their theories of divine atemporality in terms of timelessness. Allow me to briefly review some of these theories.
"Let them see than [sic] that there can be no time apart from creation, and let them cease to talk such nonsense. Let them stretch forth to the things that are before,and let them realize that before all times You are the Eternal Creator of all times, and that no times are co-eternal with You, nor is any creature, even if there were a creature above time" (Augustine, Confessiones 11.XXX).
"Thou wast not, then, yesterday, nor wilt thou be tomorrow; but yesterday and today and tomorrow thou art; or, rather, neither yesterday, nor today nor tomorrow thou art; but, simply, thou art, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow have no existence, except in time; but thou, although nothing exists without thee, nevertheless dost not exist in space and time, but all things exist in thee" (Anselm, qt. in Stephen T. Davis' Logic and the Nature of God, p. 9).
Paul Helm has also written a book entitled Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time. William Lane Craig critiques the book at http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/helm.html
In part, he states concerning Helm's work:
"Writing in the spirit of Jonathan Edwards, Helm provides a philosophical defense of the coherence and plausibility of the view that God is a timeless, omniscient being whose existence is logically inconsistent with libertarian freedom in any of His creatures. As the title of the book suggests, the fulcrum of Helm's case is his defense of divine timelessness."
There are plenty of other sources that I could quote to substantiate my understanding of atemporality.
[Jason]
Doesn't your definition of atemporality present atemporality as a mode of existence which is something less, not something greater than, the temporal mode of existence? Is a temporal mode of existence the greatest possible mode of existence? Does something have to be temporal in order for it, by definition, to exist? Is an atemporal existence logically possible, in the sense of an existence which is infinitely beyond the limitations of temporality?
[Edgar]
You ask a lot of questions above. First, I don't think I ever said that atemporality is something less than temporality and I'm not quite sure how my definition of atemporality implies that atemporality is less than temporality since it is the very definition employed by those who argue for divine timelessness.
Secondly, in my opinion, it seems that a temporal mode of existence is the only mode of existence. This judgment of mine is a studied one that is descriptive (as I view things) rather than prescriptive or evaluative.
Thirdly, what does it mean for something to exist? Do numbers or abstractions exist? For that matter, what type of predicate is "existence"? Is it an actual predicate or a conceptual predicate? Or should we classify the predicate "existence" as a second-order predicate as opposed to a first-order predicate like Frege apparently does? I'm not trying to be facetious here. The questions that you pose raise more questions. I would suggest that you read S. T. Davis' book and the work by William Hasker titled God, Time, and Knowledge.
Finally, I would concede that an atemporal existence is logically possible, as long as we're talking about logical possibility in the sense normally discussed in philosophical literature. That is, it is logically possible for the cow to jump over the moon or it is logically possible for me to grow 6 more feet, even though these things might be physically or metaphysically impossible.
Thanks for the discussion,
Edgar
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