I. Trinity Doctrine and Ethics
A. God is supposedly three persons in one substance (i.e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit).
B. The term "person" is used analogically (i.e. God is both like and unlike human persons) when one applies it to God. God does not have a body or God has intuitive rather than discursive knowledge.
II. What "Person" Means when Applied to God
A. The modern conception of person implies a distinct center of consciousness (e.g. Rene Descartes' cogito ergo sum).
B. This usage becomes problematic when one speaks of the divine persons in terms of distinct centers of consciousness. The terminology then implies tritheism (the belief in three gods). Yet, to speak of one center of consciousness obtaining in the triune Godhead implies modalism (= God reveals Godself in three successive modes), not Trinitarianism.
C. In any event, Trinitarians argue that one needs to avoid defining "person" (in this case) as a distinct center of consciousness or rationality. Some other definition must be more suitable.
III. Definitions of "Person" for God
A. Boethius (circa 475-525 CE): "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia).
B. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) contends that the term "person" when applied to God does refer to "an individual substance of a rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as one carefully nuances or qualifies what is meant by "individual" (i.e. incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual) and "substance" ('self-grounded existing'). Aquinas views God as ipsum esse or self-subsistent being.
C. Richard of St. Victor (died 1173) defines "person" (in relation to God) as "an incommunicable existence of the divine nature." Persons have a certain property that distinguishes them from other persons (Fortman, The Triune God, 191-192).
D. Some believe that the Trinity doctrine possibly helps us to understand what personhood entails. Maybe a "person" is an individual substance of a rational nature, one who either actually reasons or who has the potential to deploy reason (i.e. the faculty of inference or intelligence). The term "persons" may also have reference to entities that intelligently relate to one another as Father, Son and Holy Spirit putatively relate to one another in the Godhead.
E. But one difficulty with the Trinity doctrine concerns the problem of identity. For instance, consider the following set of propositions:
(1) The Father is God.
(2) The Son is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.
(4) The Father is not the Son.
Number (4) appears to be inconsistent with propositions 1-3. Let us also consider this example using the planet Venus:
(a) Venus is the morning star.
(b) Venus is the evening star.
(c) The morning star is not the evening star.
To solve this apparent difficulty, certain Trinitarians appeal to the concept of relative (rather than absolute) identity. The definition of absolute identity = "X = Y → Y = X"; relative identity = "X and Y are the same F but not the same G," where F and G are both predicates. Hence, the Father or the Son are not absolutely identical to "God," but only relatively identical to the divine substance. One question remains, however. Does relative identity actually resolve the putative tensions obtaining between the Trinity doctrine and absolute identity?
F. Another seeming difficulty with using the Trinity doctrine to determine what it means to be a person might also be the fact that God's purported triunity seems to transcend our phenomenal experiences (a Kantian argument). Whether God is triune or not appears to be noumenal concern, not a phenomenal one. God's triune nature just might be thinkable but not knowable like Kant's Dinge-an-sich.
4 comments:
Hi Edgar,
All of these definitions of person have two things in common with each other: a) they all confuse person with nature, in that, to one extent or another, they define person in terms of nature; and b) they are all from post-Augustinian Western philosophers and theologians.
For a non-Western perspective, I offer the following:
"Purged of its Aristotelian content, the theological notion of hypostasis in the thought of the eastern Fathers means not so much 'individual' as 'person,' in the modern sense of this word. Indeed, our ideas of human personality, of that 'personal' quality which makes every human being unique, to be expressed only in terms of itself: this idea of 'person' comes to us from Christian theology. The philosophy of antiquity knew only human individuals. The human person cannot be expressed in concepts. It eludes all rational definitions, indeed all description, for all the properties whereby it could be characterized can be met with in other individuals." - Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church.
For the East, 'person' is not a mode of nature, but is that which is distinguished from nature. Hence, for the East, there is no logical difficulty involved in affirming both: a) that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and b) that the Person of the Father is not the Person of the Son. Absolutely identified with each other as regards 'what' they are, the Divine Persons are NO LESS absolutely distinguished from each other as regards 'who' they are. From this perspective neither natural identity is ontologically prior to personal diversity, nor is personal diversity ontologically prior to natural identity; the consequence of this being that the Persons are never conceived of apart from their consubstantiality, nor is their common Essence ever conceived of except as the consubstantiality of the Persons.
Contrary to both St. Paul and to the Nicene and Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creeds, Augustine identified the one God, not with the Person of the Father, but with the Divine Essence common to the Persons of the Trinity, thus giving the Divine Essence an ontological primacy over the Divine Persons. (Contrast Gregory of Nazianz: "Each (considered in himself is) God because of the consubstantiality, the three (considered together are) God BECAUSE OF THE MONARCHY.")
Indeed, in Augustine's version of the doctrine of the Trinity, person is confused with nature to such an extent that the real distinction of Divine Persons from each other AS PERSONS is all but verbally abolished by the numerical unity of Their common nature. This is borne out by the following statements found in Augustine's book De Trinitate:
"But when [the Persons] are spoken of individually in respect to themselves, they are not spoken of as three in the plural number, but as one, THE TRINITY ITSELF....For these things are said according to ESSENCE...."
[Objection: But certainly the term 'person' is said of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit individually in respect to themselves. For, unlike the terms 'Father' and 'Son', the term 'person' is not a 'relative' term. So, then, doesn't it follow that something is said of the Persons individually in respect to themselves which is not said according to essence?]
"When we say the PERSON of the Father we mean nothing else than the SUBSTANCE of the Father."
[Objection: But certainly the substance of the Father is the substance of the Son and the Holy Spirit as well. Surely you don't really mean to say that the Person of the Father is the Person of the Son and the Person of the Holy Spirit?]
"Neither does anything forbid us, not only to understand those words spoken to Adam as spoken by the Trinity, but also to take them as manifesting the PERSON of that Trinity."
[So, then, if the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct from each other ONLY IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER, and thus are not distinct from each other as regards WHO they are considered in themselves - there being no 'who' in distinction from 'what' on the 'absolute' level (as opposed to the merely 'relative' and thus 'secondary' level) - then why do we call them 'three' persons instead of only 'one' person?]
"They are CALLED three persons...so that when someone asks, 'Three what?' or 'What three?,' we may be able to answer with some one word."
Hi Jason,
You write:
"All of these definitions of person have two things in common with each other: a) they all confuse person with nature, in that, to one extent or another, they define person in terms of nature; and b) they are all from post-Augustinian Western philosophers and theologians."
Far be it from me to speak for the western Trinitarian tradition and how it conceives of (divine) personhood. My outline only contains western theories of personhood because I use the outline in a course that surveys western ethical thought. But I don't think that Aquinas or Richard of St. Victor would concur with your assessment of their thought which claims that they confuse person and nature. Let us not forget that the term "nature" or substance in Aquinas or Richard of St. Victor can refer to individual or universal essences (e.g. to Socrates' individual humanity or to the common humanity that Socrates and Plato share). Both Aquinas and Richard are well aware of these distinctions.
"For the East, 'person' is not a mode of nature, but is that which is distinguished from nature. Hence, for the East, there is no logical difficulty involved in affirming both: a) that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and b) that the Person of the Father is not the Person of the Son. Absolutely identified with each other as regards 'what' they are, the Divine Persons are NO LESS absolutely distinguished from each other as regards 'who' they are. From this perspective neither natural identity is ontologically prior to personal diversity, nor is personal diversity ontologically prior to natural identity; the consequence of this being that the Persons are never conceived of apart from their consubstantiality, nor is their common Essence ever conceived of except as the consubstantiality of the Persons."
I don't see how the eastern approach to divine personhood and triunity overcomes the difficulty associated with considering each divine person (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) as God in the sense that each person (i.e. hypostasis) is absolutely identical with the divine essence. The problem that I am posing is one of identity and defining "person" in a manner that is distinguished from nature does not appear to solve the difficulty. The West affirms that each divine person is God; the West also professes that the Father is not the Son or that the Son is not the person of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, western theologians generally contend that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are identical in terms of what they are whereas the Three are distinguished in terms of who they are. How do these concepts overcome the problem that is raised by Leibniz' Law, namely, if an entity X has all properties in common with an entity Y, then X and Y are identical? The western answer to this dilemma is relative identity wherein the Father and Son are said to be the same F (the same God) without being the same G (the same person). Or John Calvin argues that the Father has a peculiar property that the Son does not have which distinguishes the Father from the Son. In any event, the West conceptually distinguishes the person of the Father from the person of the Son.
Finally, I might say that Lewis Ayres (in his work Nicaea and its Legacy) argues that the so-called distinction between eastern and western Trinitarianism has been greatly exaggerated. Ayres presents a more nuanced account of Augustine's Trinitarianism on pp. 364-383 of his study.
Regards,
Edgar
Hi Edgar,
But this is precisely what the East rejects: the idea that the Divine Persons are identical with the Divine Essence. The East does not accept Anselm's so-called 'Trintarian Law': "In God all is one except where there is opposition of relation."
If Aquinas and Richard of St. Victor held that the Divine Persons are 'individual essences', then this would make them tritheists. For, by way of anaology, three individuals of the species man are three men precisely because they are three individuals of the species man. (I point out that - according to the Eastern concpetion of personhood - while three human persons are three men, it is not because they are three human persons that they are three men. For, persons (unlike individuals) do not divide common nature into indivdual natures. For, as I said before, person, unlike individual, is that which is totally differentiated from nature.
However, I fail to see how the western scholastic theological system allows for there to be any essence in the Trinity other than the one indivisible essence common to the Divine Persons. Indeed, Aquinas held that the Son proceeds from the Intellect of the Father and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Will of the Father and the Son. But, the Divine Intellect and the Divine Will are common to the three Divine Persons, and in accord with Anselm's Trinitarian Law, which Aquinas accepted and which has its basis in Augustine's version of the doctrine of the Trinity, the Divine Intellect is the Divine Will and vice versa, and both thee Divine Intellect and the Divine Will are the Divine Essence common to the Divine Persons. Thus, in Aquinas, one does not really have a Trinity of Divine Persons, but rather merely a Divine Individuality which in knowing Itself loves Itself.
The starting point for the scholastics was a philosophical concept of an absolute (and impersonal) simplicity of essence, upon which they then tried (rather unsuccessfully) to superimpose the Trinity of Divine Persons by artificially introducing relations of opposition into that absolutely simple essence.
Thus, ultimately for Aquinas, the Father is the Source of the Son and the Holy Spirit only inasmuch as He is identifiable with the Divine Essence. (I recall here that according to Aquinas the persons are their relations which are their common essence.) This is what allows Aquinas to hold that the Son is together with the Father the Source of the Holy Spirit. For the West concurs with the East that there is only one Source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that the Father alone is the Source of the Son.
Jason
Hi Jason,
It is my understanding that the West talks about identity between the Persons and the Godhead in somewhat attenuated terms. The western church evidently wants to say that the Persons are absolutely identical to the divine essence or Godhead, but what does such language mean? It would result in a genuine confusion of some type (between essence and person) to speak in this manner. It thus seems to me that the West recognizes the epistemological or terminological difficulties that possibly arise from its formulation of the Trinity doctrine. That is why certain philosophers have suggested the notion of relative as opposed to absolute identity as a way to circumvent problems associated with identifying the persons with the divine essence. But as I said earlier, I am not a representative for the western church.
"If Aquinas and Richard of St. Victor held that the Divine Persons are 'individual essences', then this would make them tritheists. For, by way of anaology, three individuals of the species man are three men precisely because they are three individuals of the species man. (I point out that - according to the Eastern concpetion of personhood - while three human persons are three men, it is not because they are three human persons that they are three men. For, persons (unlike individuals) do not divide common nature into indivdual natures. For, as I said before, person, unlike individual, is that which is totally differentiated from nature."
I don't believe that Thomas or Richard of St. Victor had any problem with employing the term "individual" for the TRES PERSONAE. However, as I mentioned in an earlier submission, Thomas painstakingly qualifies each aspect of Boethius' famed definition of the term "person." He understands "individual" in terms of that which is incommunicable. Moreover, he seems to maintain the substantiality aspect of personhood.
"However, I fail to see how the western scholastic theological system allows for there to be any essence in the Trinity other than the one indivisible essence common to the Divine Persons. Indeed, Aquinas held that the Son proceeds from the Intellect of the Father and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Will of the Father and the Son. But, the Divine Intellect and the Divine Will are common to the three Divine Persons, and in accord with Anselm's Trinitarian Law, which Aquinas accepted and which has its basis in Augustine's version of the doctrine of the Trinity, the Divine Intellect is the Divine Will and vice versa, and both thee Divine Intellect and the Divine Will are the Divine Essence common to the Divine Persons. Thus, in Aquinas, one does not really have a Trinity of Divine Persons, but rather merely a Divine Individuality which in knowing Itself loves Itself."
Thomas accepts Boethius' definition of "person" with the necessary qualifications. One should understand "individual" (as applied to God) in his writings to mean "incommunicable." As for your portrayal of Aquinas' formulation of the Trinity doctrine, I would submit that you're being a little less than charitable--not on purpose--to Aquinas. He would be surprised to learn that "there is no Trinity of divine Persons" in his work. See Edmund Fortman, The Triune God, p. 205-208. It also addresses your argument about the West confusing person and essence.
Regards,
Edgar
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