The doctrine of God's simplicity (simplicitas Dei) does not fail to encounter its own logical problematics. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig argue that it "seems patently false" to make the claim that God does not exemplify properties that are objectively distinct from one another since the property of being good apparently is objectively distinct from the property of being omniscient, just as the property of being omnipotent is not metaphysically identical with the abstract property of being omnibenevolent. Moreover, Christopher Stead maintains that it is problematic to insist that God's action toward the world is "simple and uniform." He maintains that divine simplicity does not seem to explain adequately how God loves numerous creatures simultaneously or providentially guides the multitudinous events that repeatedly and continuously occur in creation; nor does the doctrine evidently account for the notion of an immanent God, who personally acts in creation. Those who advocate this doctrine, however, contend that the supposed difficulties associated with God's simplicity emanate from dissimilar ontological emphases between the medieval and contemporary period, not from the concept of divine simplicity itself. They insist that medieval thinkers stress constituent ontology (i.e. entities are what they are as such) whereas contemporary thinkers are inclined to emphasize relational ontology (i.e. entities have essences, properties or sets of properties). In the light of relational ontology, Alvin Plantinga has contended that divine simplicity possibly leads to the logical conclusion that God is a property. Plantinga writes:
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property … In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property.
See http://74.6.239.67/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=plantinga+and+divine+simplicity&y=Search&fr=yfp-t-501&u=web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Making%2520Sense%2520of%2520Divine%2520Simplicity.pdf&w=plantinga+divine+divining+simplicity&d=cSuEHA-YSNrd&icp=1&.intl=us
Yet, there are other logical objections to divine simplicity that seem to function as sound defeaters for the doctrine. The next blog post will review some of these objections.
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When we say "God is omnipotent" and "God is omnibenevolent," these are not distinct properties added to God's essence but rather ways in which we, as limited creatures, understand the infinite perfection of God's singular nature. For God, these "properties" are not distinct realities but facets of the same simple, undivided reality. As Thomas Aquinas explains, God’s attributes differ only in their mode of understanding (modi intelligendi), not in God’s essence itself (modi essendi). What appears as multiple distinct attributes from our human perspective is unified in God’s eternal and singular being. For example, God’s omnipotence is His omniscience applied to action, and His omnibenevolence is the perfection of His will united with His knowledge. They are conceptually distinct but ontologically one in the divine nature.
Since God exists outside time and space, His act of creation, providence, and love is not sequential or divided but simultaneous and eternal. God’s love and action are one eternal act that encompasses all creation without division. What appears to us as multiple, successive acts are simply the effects of God’s singular, timeless act of willing creation and its governance. Stead’s critique assumes that God operates in a temporal framework akin to creatures, but divine simplicity does not compromise God’s capacity to engage with creation intimately. Instead, it affirms that God's actions in time are the effects of His eternal will, not changes in God Himself.
While relational ontology has become prominent in contemporary thought, it does not invalidate divine simplicity. Rather, relational ontology and classical simplicity address different levels of being. Relational ontology emphasizes how creatures relate to one another and to God. However, God, as the source of all being, is not a composite being composed of relations or properties. Instead, God's essence is to exist (ipsum esse subsistens), which grounds all relationality without being subject to it. The medieval notion of constituent ontology posited by Aquinas and others provides a metaphysical framework in which God, as “actus purus”, can be both utterly simple and the source of all relationality.
Plantinga’s critique assumes an equivocal understanding of "property" in God. In classical theism, God is not a "property" in the same sense as properties in contingent beings; rather, God is the subsistent act of being itself (ipsum esse subsistens), transcending the distinction between substance and property. Plantinga's reductio misunderstands divine simplicity by imposing creaturely categories onto the Creator. While creatures instantiate properties as something distinct from their essence, God’s essence and existence are identical. God does not "have" properties in the creaturely sense; rather, God *is* His attributes in a manner beyond human comprehension. Furthermore, the assertion that "God is a self-exemplifying property" is a mischaracterization. God is not a "property" at all but the metaphysical grounding of all reality. Properties in creatures are participations in the perfections that God possesses in an undivided manner.
Divine simplicity does not undermine God's immanence but rather ensures it. Since God is not composed of parts or dependent on anything outside Himself, He is fully present to all creation at every moment, sustaining all things in existence. Classical theism maintains that God's immanence is not a matter of spatial proximity but ontological dependence. God is "in" creation as the cause of its being, not as a part of it. The doctrine of divine simplicity reinforces God’s personal action because it affirms that God’s will and love are not separate attributes but are unified in His simple essence. Thus, God can be intimately involved in creation without being divided or diminished.
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