Has science solved the problem of why something exists rather than nothing?
1) Gottfried Leibniz famously asked why is there something rather than nothing. I know that certain scientists have tried to answer this metaphysical question, although I'm not sure that science can satisfactorily reply to Leibniz. I respect the place of science in rational discussions. However, why something exists when it's possible that nothing might have existed is a question that seems to exceed the purview of science. We must also remember that "nothing" is being used by Leibniz in a metaphysical rather than scientific sense.
2) Is light-speed still the cosmic speed limit? The notion of things going faster than light seems to have been refuted for now. And the second video link you included is less than clear about what "nothing" means. In other words, the term "nothing" can be defined within a quantum context or it can be fleshed out metaphysically. To make the discussion fair, a term needs to be used monosemically as opposed to being used equivocally.
3) I personally do not believe that free will is an illusion. It's somewhat of a mystery how free will exists, but one could argue for free will by appealing to moral responsibility and counterfactual freedom. Peter van Inwagen has written extensively on incompatibilist free will. Nancey Murphy also provides evidence that free will may possibly arise from an initially deterministic system. Think about the robot in "I, Robot" that learns how to wink; maybe free volition can be produced in a similar way from a system (the brain) that's supposed to be wholly deterministic.
6 comments:
Hi Edgar,
I really liked the way you handled your response here. Personally, I think that Leibniz was one of the most gifted minds to have ever entered into the "God" debate and, if nothing else, his reformulation of the argument from contingent being aptly demonstrates the absurdities one must entertain in order to deny its conclusion. However, if one does in fact deny Leibniz’ conclusion then all bets are off, since if anything can happen then anything will happen – making any argument fair game.
In order to wrest absurdity from arguments of this kind, either side of the debate must invariably posit something eternal and self-existent. The theist speaks of God, and reductive materialists resort to material's most primitive state, namely energy. But what causal power does energy have? Moreover, I'm not even sure it makes sense to speak of eternal energy within a physical system. It seems to me that energy that is eternal would have already reached a state of equilibrium by now and thus prevented any observers from making observations about the energy state of the universe!
Nathan
Hi Nathan,
As always, your points are appreciated and they hit the proverbial target.
1) I've been thinking about the principle of sufficient reason here lately. If it's understood in a certain way--possibly as Leibniz intended the principle to be interpreted--then the PSR seems to be a powerful argument for God's existence. Regardless, I don't believe that anyone has successfully answered the question posed by Leibniz.
2) I agree with your intuition about energy. Could the second law of thermodynamics potentially help in this regard? Alan Padgett reminds us that the universe will eventually wind down if the Creator does not continue to sustain the cosmos. If energy had always existed, might that winding down have already occurred? Secondly, the Big Bang suggests that the universe had a beginning. That would not appear to support the eternal energy thesis.
Hi Edgar,
1) I agree. I've never encountered anyone who would deny the PSR, save for when it is applied to the universe or multiverse. However, that seems to me to be putting the cart before the horse. For if every part of a whole conforms to the PSR then it is highly likely that the whole must too. This seems especially so when considering how something without a sufficient reason could even be capable of mass producing the very thing that it lacks, namely sufficient reason(s). If a cause really does necessitate its effects, then something that lacks a sufficient explanation for its existence shouldn't be able to sufficiently explain anything else. And so I think those who deny the PSR carry a huge burden – one that ultimately ends up hurting scientific credibility. As I'm sure you are aware, Alexander Pruss has written extensively on this issue and his work is a powerful defence in affirming the PSR.
2) So long as one doesn't employ the second law as a mechanism of entropy, but rather as a description of it, then I think the law falsifies the eternal energy thesis (at least for this universe). This has been a thorn in the side of cyclical and oscillating cosmological models due to their gerrymandered approach at attempting to preserve or lower entropy within a closed system. In addition, as you pointed out, Big Bang cosmology represents the most powerful scientific evidence that the universe (along with its energy) is not eternal. Of course, the multiverse now seems to have taken centre stage... But good old Leibniz can steal that spotlight too. ;)
It's always great speaking with you, Edgar. I learn something every time.
Nathan
Hi Nathan,
I have questioned--not necessarily rejected--the PSR because of how it was stated. But disambiguating the language of the famed principle is quite helpful. Now I believe that Peter van Inwagen (a believer in God) might reject the principle although he believes there is a Creator God. See http://comp.uark.edu/~senor/ContraPSR.html
Pruss has also done thorough and fine work on the PSR as you noted: I think he makes a strong case for it.
Point take regarding the second law of thermodynamics. It properly should be descriptive rather than normative. There is also some good work now being undertaken on multiverse theory by William Lane Craig. This idea seems to represent a desperate attempt by naturalists to preserve their superficial hegemony.
Hi Edgar,
I wasn't aware that van Inwagen might have rejected the principle. However, given that he is a master metaphysician I'll definitely take a look at the link you posted. Thanks!
Your description about the importance of the multiverse for naturalism is spot on. Though the hypothesis is being used to close down various arguments used to support theism, one unintended consequence of it invariably returns to confound the naturalist's position due to what it opens back up again. Indeed, by closing down one road the multiverse hypothesis opens up arterials that lead all the way back to religious concerns. I'm convinced that atheistic partisans of the multiverse have not fully thought through the consequences of their speculation. Persuaded as they are of only the short term discursive benefits of using the multiverse in the God debate, they fail to grasp its long term consequences and have handed their opponents the probabilistic resources needed to dismantle their own worldview without even realising it.
This may sound like a bold claim, but I see it as the obvious corollary of the core mechanism behind naturalism when coupled with a model of eternal inflation like that of the multiverse.
Nathan
Hi Nathan,
Robert J. Spitzer has a nice work "New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy." It's a "heady" book that discusses string multiverse theory and other topics. Spitzer pretty much rebuts multiverse theory. See pages 90-103 of his book.
Regards,
Edgar
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