Here's a piece I'm always working on, and I've now decided to post this version on the blog.
This study will focus on Ronald Nash's analysis of future-tensed propositions within the context of divine omniscience. At stake is the issue of whether future-tensed propositions have any truth value and, if not, how does the lack of truth value for future-tensed propositions affect our understanding of divine omniscience?
Ronald Nash discusses future-tensed propositions in his work The Concept of God (55). [See also Rosenkrantz and Ockham.] The important question is whether propositions about the future have truth values (whether they are true or false). In order to address this question, Nash uses the familiar Aristotelian example concerning a sea-battle: "There will be a sea fight tomorrow." Is this proposition about the future true or false? [See Gerard Hughes]
If the proposition is now true (presently) then it would seem that there must be a sea-battle tomorrow which would entail that fatalism is true. [explain the difference between fatalism and determinism] Conversely, it is possible to read Aristotle's argument as an example of argumentum reductio ad absurdum (Nash, 56). add note. Nash quotes Anthony Kenny to this effect. Kenny maintains that if "future-tensed propositions about singulars" [qualification] are now true, then fatalism logically follows from the statement about the sea-battle. Yet fatalism is evidently absurd, so it is false. On the other hand, "since many future events are not yet determined" (Kenny) it seems that propositions or claims regarding future-tensed propositions that reference singulars have no truth-value (they are neither true nor false). See Nash, 56. Granting the truth of what Kenny has written without necessarily accepting it, Nash then applies Aristotle's argument to the case of future (free) human actions. He insists that if these acts have no truth-value, if they are neither yet true nor false, then not even an omniscient God has the power to know future human actions.
Nash contends that the Aristotelian view greatly hampers God's scientia to the extent that God cannot predict what Peter or Abraham will do in the future because if Peter or Abraham act freely (evidently defined in a libertarian sense), their actions putatively cannot be known. Foretelling the future becomes logically impossible for God (Nash 56). At best, it appears that God is an excellent guesser based on probable outcomes about the future. But if the future (free) actions of humans are unknowable, then God is not omniscient in the classical sense of the word. Nash therefore suggests that it is difficult to harmonize Aristotle's view of truth-values with the "scriptural" articulation of divine omniscience. [See Joel Green, et. al.]
Nash then posits that one model of divine omniscience which might result in a harmonization between divine omniscience and human freedom is what he labels "book of the future." The book of the future model is analogical language that sets forth three scenarios which account theoretically for God's knowing what S will freely do.
1) The first scenario depicts God opening the figurative "book of the future," wherein he finds every "true proposition about the future" (57). God's knowledge of all true propositions that concern the future (particularly those propositions about singulars) betokens (according to this model of divine omniscience and human free will) that God exhaustively knows all things (i.e. events) that "will" happen in the future (57).
2) According to the second possible scenario of this model, God figuratively opens the book of the future but finds that each page is blank. What is being described by Nash in this instance is the view of Aristotle that there are no truth-values concerning future propositions that reference singulars. If Aristotle is correct, Nash contends, then God (the deity of Scripture) cannot infallibly know future events nor can any other being know what will occur in the future. But maybe those who affirm God's omniscience do not have reason to be troubled since all that may follow logically from Aristotle's view is that God knows all that it is possible to know. [Swinburne and Thomas] It may not be possible to know with infallible certainty events that have not yet occurred.
3) The third possible scenario discussed by Nash is that the book of the future is just not complete: "some pages contain propositions, there are gaps, sometimes very large gaps. Many pages may be completely blank" (Nash, 57). Nash argues that this scenario indicates that God may have only "partial knowledge" concerning future events in view of the fact that God possibly elects to restrict what he knows about the future so that human free will may be safeguarded. This view appears to make the claim that God knows that what he has willed must occur but God does not know or elects not to know those future events which have not been willed in accordance with his sovereign purpose (57). The view that Nash identifies as the third scenario is reminiscent of what Jehovah's Witnesses say about divine omniscience and human freedom.
3 comments:
Alan Rhoda "open theism" paper give many good ideas about this
Nash raises a valid question about whether future-tensed propositions (e.g., “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”) have truth values and whether this impacts God’s omniscience. He suggests that if future propositions have no truth value, then even God cannot know them, which seems to challenge traditional notions of omniscience.
The assumption that future-tensed propositions lack truth value rests on a particular interpretation of how time and truth interact. Classical theism, however, maintains that God exists outside of time and thus does not experience past, present, and future in the sequential way humans do. This means that propositions about the future, from God's timeless perspective, DO have a truth value. God sees all events—past, present, and future—in one eternal, unchanging moment (the doctrine of divine timelessness). As such, future events are not uncertain to God, even if they appear indeterminate to us.
Moreover, the idea that future-tensed propositions are neither true nor false can be challenged by logical and metaphysical considerations. In logical terms, if a future event will indeed occur, then the proposition about it is true now, even if it hasn't happened yet. If the event will not happen, then the proposition is false now. God’s knowledge of such propositions is not contingent on them having already occurred but is grounded in His eternal nature.
Nash brings up the issue of fatalism, suggesting that if future-tensed propositions are already true, this would lead to fatalism, where future events are fixed and unchangeable. He seems to conflate this with divine foreknowledge, implying that if God knows the future, it must be determined. However, this is a misunderstanding of how divine foreknowledge interacts with human freedom. The classical position, as articulated by thinkers like Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, holds that God’s foreknowledge does not necessitate fatalism. Knowing an event in advance does not cause or determine the event—God's knowledge is simply INFINITELY PERFECT and therefore extends to all times. This distinction between knowing and causing is crucial. Human actions remain free even though God knows them, because God’s knowledge does not compel the choices made by individuals. His knowledge is, in this sense, analogous to a perfect observer who sees all events in their totality but does not interfere with the free will of the agents involved.
Nash proposes three potential models of divine knowledge about the future:
1. God knows all true propositions about the future.
2. The future is blank, and God cannot know future events.
3. God knows some future events but leaves gaps to allow for human free will.
Nash seems to favor the third model, which suggests that God has only partial knowledge of the future, either because He elects not to know certain things or because it is logically impossible to know free human actions in advance.
This model, which suggests that God may have only partial knowledge of the future to safeguard human free will, leads to significant theological problems. First, it compromises God’s omniscience by implying that there are things God does not or cannot know, which conflicts with the traditional understanding of God's perfect knowledge. Second, the notion that God "chooses" not to know certain things undermines the nature of divine omniscience as traditionally defined. Omniscience, by definition, includes knowledge of all things—past, present, and future—without limitation. If God voluntarily restricts His knowledge, this suggests a limitation in God's nature, which is inconsistent with classical theism.
Additionally, the idea that God’s foreknowledge might undermine free will is based on a misunderstanding of how God's knowledge operates. God's knowledge of future free actions does not force those actions to happen in a particular way. Instead, it is God’s nature to know perfectly what will freely happen without causing it to happen.
Nash's third model resonates with the Jehovah's Witnesses' teaching of "selective foreknowledge," where God chooses to know some things about the future but not others, particularly regarding human free actions. Selective foreknowledge is philosophically and theologically problematic because it implies that God's omniscience is contingent or partial. If God’s knowledge of the future is selective, then He is not truly omniscient in the full sense, which contradicts the biblical and traditional Christian view of God as all-knowing. Furthermore, it suggests that God’s knowledge is limited by human actions, which diminishes God’s sovereignty and omnipotence. In contrast, the classical view holds that God knows all things fully and perfectly, including the free actions of His creatures, without limiting their freedom or compromising His omniscience.
Nash’s concern, like many others who struggle with the relationship between foreknowledge and free will, centers on the idea that if God knows the future, human actions must be predetermined. Classical Christian theology, however, reconciles divine foreknowledge and free will without falling into determinism or fatalism. God’s knowledge of the future does not eliminate human freedom. From God’s perspective, all moments of time are equally present to Him. He knows what we will freely choose, but this foreknowledge does not cause those choices to be made. Boethius famously described God’s knowledge as an eternal present, where He sees everything at once but does not interfere with human freedom. This view preserves both God’s omniscience and human free will without contradiction.
In conclusion, Nash’s analysis of future-tensed propositions and divine foreknowledge raises important questions, but his conclusions are problematic. The suggestion that future-tensed propositions lack truth value and that God’s knowledge of future free actions is limited or partial is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of divine omniscience. Classical theism provides a coherent solution, where God’s eternal, atemporal knowledge encompasses all events, including free human actions, without violating human freedom or diminishing God’s omniscience.
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