According to Boethius (De Consolatio 5), there is no such thing as "divine forevision" or foreknowledge on the metaphysical level:
"If you will weigh the foresight with which God discerns all things, you will rightly esteem it to be the knowledge of a never fading instant rather than a foreknowledge of the 'future.' It should therefore rather be called provision than prevision because, placed high above all things, it looks out over all as from the loftiest mountain top."
While humans may rightly call God's knowledge of that which is future "foreknowledge," in reality (from the perspective of ultimate reality), it is not foreknowledge, but an intimate awareness of the present qua nunc aeterna.
But why would a Catholic thinker be tempted to make this move? There are at least two reasons that readily spring to mind. Firstly, Boethius believes that if God actually foresees future events or states, then He might also cause them (i.e., foreknowledge stems from foreordination). Secondly, Boethius reasons: "Without doubt . . . all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."
So libertarian free will only seems possible if God does not "foreknow" future free actions. The way out of this problem for Boethius is to posit an atemporal deity.
Nevertheless, De Consolatio 5 also maintains that something known "cannot be otherwise than it is known to be," such as God knowing a future free act. Free actions remain free IN SE even though God foreknows them--they "do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature" just because of divine foreknowledge (William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 7). That seems to be the position of Boethius.
Thomas Aquinas writes in support of what Boethius contends:
"Hence what is known by us must be necessary even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes" (ST I.14.13, Reply to Obj. 3. See also Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 10).
Notice that Aquinas likewise escapes the possible dilemmas that may arise from positing divine foreknowledge by appealing to the notion of God's eternal present (NUNC AETERNAE). But if God subsists in timeless eternity (above and beyond time), which both Boethius and Aquinas believe, then He doesn't really see future events or behold future states before they occur, but rather as they occur.
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Ultimate στρατηγία ?
Boethius' view of God's relationship to time, as outlined in De Consolatio 5, presents a nuanced understanding of divine foreknowledge, one that frames God's knowledge as occurring in an eternal "now", the permanent present moment of eternity, where there is no past or future (nunc aeterna). This perspective is shared by St. Thomas Aquinas and posits that God, being outside of time, does not "foreknow" events in the same way humans do. Rather, He perceives all events—past, present, and future—as a unified present. Let me address this view, clarify its implications, and respond to potential challenges it raises, particularly regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will.
Boethius' assertion that God’s knowledge is more like "provision" rather than "prevision" addresses a key theological concern: how can God know future events without causing them? If God is outside of time, He perceives all events—past, present, and future—as a present reality to Him. From this vantage point, God does not foresee or foreordain events in a temporal sequence. Instead, He sees all things in an eternal present. This avoids the issue of God "causing" events by knowing them in advance, as His knowledge is not bound by the constraints of time.
Aquinas builds on Boethius' insights by emphasizing that God's knowledge does not impose necessity on future events. God knows future contingencies (such as human free choices) as they are, which means He knows them in their contingency—not as predetermined or necessary events. Aquinas explains that what is contingent in itself remains contingent, even though it is seen by God in His eternal now. For Aquinas, this resolves the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge: humans still have free will, even though God, in His timeless perspective, knows the outcome of their choices.
Responding to Challenges
Does Divine Knowledge Impose Necessity? One challenge to Boethius’ and Aquinas’ views is that if God knows all things perfectly, doesn’t that imply that events must happen exactly as God knows them? In other words, doesn’t God’s knowledge make future events necessary?
This objection is based on a misunderstanding of how knowledge and causality work in relation to God. God’s knowledge does not impose necessity on events; rather, He knows them as they occur. Aquinas clarifies this distinction: events are necessary according to how they are subject to divine knowledge (i.e., God knows them perfectly), but not absolutely necessary in their own causes. Human free actions remain contingent and free in themselves, even though they are known by God. God’s knowledge of an event doesn’t cause the event, any more than a human being’s knowledge of a past event causes that event.
Is Divine Timelessness Coherent? Another objection might question whether divine timelessness (the idea that God exists outside of time) is coherent. If God exists in an eternal present, does this mean that God’s experience of time is completely static, and if so, how does He interact with a temporal world?
Boethius and Aquinas both assert that God, as the act of pure existence (actus purus), transcends time altogether. God’s eternal present does not imply stasis, but rather that God’s perspective on time is not linear. He interacts with the world not by being bound within time but by sustaining and guiding the unfolding of time itself. This is not a passive timelessness, but one in which God is fully engaged with creation, seeing all of history as a unified whole. For Aquinas, God’s timelessness is not a limit on His interaction with creation but rather the basis for His perfect, all-encompassing knowledge.
A key concern often raised is whether human free will is truly free if God knows the outcome of all choices. Boethius and Aquinas insist that divine foreknowledge does not negate free will because God’s knowledge of human actions does not cause those actions. From God’s eternal perspective, He sees what choices individuals will make, but they remain free in making those choices.
To use an analogy: imagine a person standing on a mountaintop watching a river flow below. The observer sees both the river’s source and its destination at once, but the water is still freely flowing according to its nature. Similarly, God, from His eternal vantage point, sees all of time as present to Him, but humans are still free to make their choices within that flow of time.
In conclusion, Boethius and Aquinas offer a robust response to the tension between divine foreknowledge and human free will by situating God outside of time. In this way, God’s knowledge does not impose necessity on human choices, and free will remains intact. From a Catholic perspective, this understanding safeguards both the immutability of God and the authenticity of human freedom, maintaining that God’s eternal knowledge of events does not interfere with their contingent nature.
Thus, God’s timeless knowledge is not foreknowledge in the temporal sense but an eternal awareness of all events as they occur, allowing for both divine omniscience and human freedom to coexist without contradiction.
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