I started these notes years ago, but never finished them because too many things got in the way. Roman has inspired me to post what I have so far. Maybe I will build on these notes. All page references are for On Communitarian Divinity: An African Interpretation of the Trinity, New York: Paragon House, 1994. The viewpoints expressed here represent the author's stance, not mine.
Notes from On Communitarian Divinity by Okechukwu A. Ogbonnaya:
Ogbonnaya insists that too much discourse about God is Eurocentric; even African theologians, who traditionally seem to rely on the notion of communality, still adhere to Eurocentric concepts in their theological discussions (x).
Page xiii-Tertullian's historical context permitted him to shape a notion of God "as community." The community notion of God purportedly allows for "ontological equality, personal distinctiveness within the Divine" and "functional subordination among the persons of the Trinity that is temporal rather than ontological."
Later debates about God in the Christian church "fostered concepts of ontological hierarchy instead of equality" (ibid.).
Ogbonnaya relates that Arians misconstrued Tertullian's proclamation, "there was a time when the Son was not" because they did not comprehend the notion of "communal ontological equality," which Tertullian was supposed to have advocated (ibid.). He allegedly expressed this view in Adversus Praxeas but actually expressed the concept more explicitly in Adv Hermogenem 3.4.
There is some debate among scholars as to whether Egyptian religion was monotheistic or polytheistic (33-38).
Ogbonnaya contends that evidence from the primary and secondary literature about religion in ancient Egypt suggests that Egyptian gods "were seen as a community of related beings who are of similar substance" but yet they were differentiated in terms of their hypostaticity and agential features (44). However, Ogbonnaya issues the following admonition: do not confuse modern conceptions of personhood (i.e., individuality) with ancient notions which are framed in relational terms. He points to Grant Allen, who urges that the word "god" anciently signified "a class or community of beings who share something in common" (ibid). The Egyptian gods were viewed as a community: these beings were consubstantial, coequal, but maintained "an independent existence" (45).
7 comments:
I'm so happy my pestering you to write more has inspired you a bit :). Thanks for the shout out, I love reading your reflections, and it inspires me to read more. It's especially nice to read reflections and research from someone who has the same worldview as me, and who is part of Jehovah's people.
I haven't read any Okechukwu Ogbonnaya, but I've heard of him, so it's nice to see some engagement.
Is his focus on Tertullian based on the fact that Tertullian was African, and thus could give a non-eurocentric perspective? If so I don't know how useful that is, since at that time there wasn't really break between North Africa and Southern Europe or the Levant, I mean I don't think Tertullian would have thought of himself as African as opposed to European, or Ireneaus thought of himself as European as opposed to African .... At that time the bounderies would be more greek/barbarian, or Roman/barbarian, educated/common, or class based (Aristocrat, free tradesman, free peasant, slave, etc), or national/ethnicity based (Synthian, Jew, Persian, etc etc).
So I don't think we can make a sharp modern African/European distinction (largely ariving out of Colonialism and racism as I understand it) and apply it to ancient theologians.
An equivalent though would be seeking voices "from below" ... of which there is very little ... although the Gospels are definately examples of voices from "below".
Moving on ....
I'm not sure what Ogbonnaya means by Ontologican equality, I think the Arian controversy got to the heart of the issue, i.e. did the Son have a beginning or not, did the Son come into being, and thus is the Son's existence contingent. It's absolutely clear what side Tertullian falls on that issue ... funny enough in "Against Hermogenes", it seems Hermogenes is using arguments later used by Athanasius and his followers (If God was such adnd such ... Father, Lord, etc .... he must have been so eternally and thus something else is eternal with him that defines him as such, a son, matter, etc), whereas Tertullian is arguing against that kind of reasoning.
As to the question of "community" ... not to be self-agrandizing, but I think my use of David Graeber in my works (along with other anthropologists) might be helpful. It's clear that Christianity, from the beginning, had strands that thought of a kind of divine communion (we see this all over John, with a communion between Jesus and the Father, and Jesus and his disciples). However, communion does not imply "equality."
The question of position comes up in hierarchical and exchange relationships, the former requires at least the appearance of inequality, whereas teh latter requires the appearance of equality. In "communism" (or to use Alan Fiske's less contentious term ... "communality") the question of equality or a "pecking order" doesn't come up, even if it exists it becomes irrelevant.
So Christ's communion with the Father, and our communion with Christ and the Father, is one where there is definate inequality, but what defines the "communion" is love and mutuality, you can see this in the covanental relationship God had with Israel, of course God is God and Israel are his people, but their communion was based on a mutuality, Israel had obligations to God and God had obligations to Israel that were neither exchanges nor imposed domination, but communion.
So you have a Divine community without ontological equality, and even if one wants to use the term "ontological equality" one would have to define it, and I can't think of how that term could be used do describe one necessary, infinate, truely eternal, reality, and the cause of all things, and another contingent reality which comes into being and is itself caused.
I can't comment on the Egyptian theology part, as I am in the dark there.
I appreciate your input, Roman. Engagement on biblical/theological topics not only sharpens us, but it also helps me to finish longstanding projects. I can't touch on everything you mentioned, but I would like to address some things:
Ogbonnaya does emphasize Tertullian's identity as an African although one category does not exhaust his identity. Granted, the current divisions of Europe did not exist 1800 years ago, but Ogbonnaya is trying to use a perspective that might not be Eurocentric. He seems to think that Tertullian exemplifies a way of thinking that one does not find in Europe's prominent theologians.
Of course, we know that Tertullian lived under Roman rule in one of Rome's provinces: he knew Punic, but also knew Latin and wrote fluently in the language. From my past studies on Tertullian and Lactantius, I recall patrologists identifying them both as Africans, but again, I will concede that their situation was not exactly like modern-day Africans. But Africans today are also diverse and their identities are likewise complex as Anthony Appiah has shown.
For one study that explores these issues, see https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/19311
One more thing for now: ontological equality means that the Father, Son, and holy spirit are supposed to be equal in terms of their being. All are supposed to be fully God with all the properties that make someone, "God."
The Greek "ontos" can be translated as being or existence. I think it's related to ousia.
Okay, here's the etymology for ontology: Originally Latin ontologia (1606, Ogdoas Scholastica, by Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus)), from Ancient Greek ὤν (ṓn, “on”), present participle of εἰμί (eimí, “being, existing, essence”) + λόγος (lógos, “account”).
Thanks Wiktionary!
Ontos/ontology (etc.) are related to ousia since that word is derived from the feminine present participle of εἰμί.
Not saying that I agree, but Ogbonnaya would argue that community lends itself more equality when we're talking about God. But he has a problem that dogs other theologians: he starts with the Trinitarian premise a priori, then attempts to make everything fit the general premise.
Tertullian certainly was distinct, in a certain way he's fun to read for his biting rhetoric and his uncompromising positions.
As for the question of equality and ontology, the problem with ontology when talking about God is what one takes as essencial in determining equality or a hierarchy of being, so for example one could take a kind of neo-platonic approach from matter up to pure nous, or something else .... When talking about God that's what you have to start with, so is it infinity, necessity, simplicity, eternity, or what have you. So that's what I mean with "I don't know what Ogbonnaya means by Ontological equality", what I was trying to get at is in order to make sense of ontological equality or heirarchy one has to find out how to determine a heirarchy or equality of being, it isn't self-evident as far as I can tell.
I totally agree about the problem of starting with the Trinitarian premis ... it's a shame because so much Theology is done basically attempting to work their way to the Trinity and try and make it fit with everthing else ...
The approaches I like have been with the kind of demonstrations (Scotus, Aquinas, and the whole "demonstration" tradition), which works it's way backward from creation to the creator, along with negative theology (Dionyisus the Areopagite, Maimonedes), and checking everything with scripture.
Anyway, would you recommend Ogbonnaya's work as a good resource for someone like me, who has an interest in theology proper?
Thanks again for your comments, I always learn a lot reading your posts.
I see what you mean, Roman, and the answer to one of your questions is that most theologians merely skip the hierarchy of being step, but move to the tres personae being one substance, etc.
Anselm of Canterbury is associated with the kind of perfect being theology that you dscribe: it starts the concept of a perfect being (a priori), then works it way to an actual perfect being (i.e., God). Bonaventure is yet another who seems to prefer this approach. But you're right that some theologians begin with God's infinity, others with God's simplicity or eternity. On the other hand, as you said, Thomas Aquinas does not like perfect being theology because it fails to make a distinction between what's self-evident in itself and that which is self-evident for us humans. Hence, the a posteriori approach of Aquinas.
Lastly, I would recommend Ogbonnaya's work to you, and for Scotus' essentially ordered idea, see the SEP entry for Scotus here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/
Yeah, it's unfortunate, funny enough I find in Pseudo-Dionysius, although he doesn't talk about Christoloy all that much, a kind of hierarchy of being, I'm sure he was a trinitarian himself, but his theology doesn't seem to be trinitarian in form.
Thanks for the recommendations, by the way, what do you think is the most useful approach for a theology proper?
You're welcome, Roman. Pseudo-Dionysius does emphasize the hierarchy of being, especially the hierarchy of angels. I'm pretty sure he was a Trinitarian but his thinking is informed by Neoplatonism. Aquinas quotes him at times.
I like the a posteriori approach to theology and feel there's a place for it, but I also favor the use of reason combined with scripture, which is basically the way that C.H. Henry did theology.
Systematic theology once intrigued me: over time, I became somewhat disappointed with its methods and results. My work in grad school was mostly historical theology rather than systematic although I read my share of the systematicians.
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