Theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas describes God as ipsum esse subsistens: "subsistent being itself." or "subsisting existence itself." The Latin word ipsum is a pronominal form of ipse and it's nominative neuter singular in this case; the forms ipse, ipsa, ipsum (masculine, feminine, and neuter) are also intensives. Esse is translated "being" above, but the word is the present infinitive of sum ("to be"). Finally, subsistens is the present participial form of subsistere. Notice that it's modifying or describing esse. I find it interesting that subsistens is a one-termination (third declension) participle: not that I'm reading theological meaning into that datum, however.
The reason for this post centers around a question I've had for quite some time: what does it mean for God to be pure existence or existence itself? How can a personal being, be existence itself? What does that even mean? I've also wondered about the scriptural basis for this idea but feel I know why Aquinas thought in this way, and what his scriptural bases were.
One Catholic Dictionary defines ipsum esse this way: "Existence itself. Applied to God as subsistent Being, or the Being whose
essence is existence, i.e., who essentially exists, or who cannot not
exist, unlike creatures who can not exist."
See https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/dictionary/index.cfm?id=34306
This source ties God's identity to being/existence with the absolute simplicity notion: in other words, God is supposed to be absolutely "simple" or non-mereological, that is, God reputedly has no spatial or temporal parts--no potential or matter. God is said to be actus purus (pure actuality). Hence, if there is no genuine distinction in God save the tres persona of the trinitas, then there is no distinction between God's essence and his existence. It would then logically follow that God necessarily exists; he cannot not exist. Is that what it means for God to be pure existence (being itself)? Is Aquinas merely saying that God is identical with his essence and his essence is identical with his existence, thus God exists necessarily or a se?
If this is all that Aquinas means, then some of the mystery dissipates for me, but questions and problems still remain. First, must one commit to the simplicity doctrine to view God as pure existence? Secondly, it would appear that God is not being identified with a property (being/existence) but with an act? Students of the the middle ages and modernity know how contentious the definition and characterization for "existence" can be. Both Immanuel Kant and Gottlob Frege offered extensive reworkings of how we understand the predication of existence. These debates also impinge on arguments for the existence of God, but they need not detain us now. I think it's sufficient to recognize that Aquinas seems to be working with the concept of existence/being as act rather than a property or term of predication. Maybe this is why Bishop Robert Barron translates ipsum esse subsistens as "the shear act of 'to be' itself."
There is no lack of sources on Aquinas or the notion of ipsum esse: I will just refer to a few in the upcoming paragraphs. This post should be taken as a think out loud entry.
Some articles stress that Aquinas depicts God as being (actus essendi) rather than a being. The deity is not like the many objects we see in the world that belong to various classes or genera; God allegedly belongs to no genus or species and has no differentia. Aquinas teaches that God has no potency or accidental properties: God just is being itself (ipsum esse subsistens or αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι). I am reminded of Martin Heidegger's anxious concern that we carefully distinguish Being (Dasein) from beings. It is certainly the case that God is unlike any object in our phenomenal world. For more on Heidegger and grounding in relation to Dasein, see https://wagner.edu/psychology/files/2013/01/Heidegger-What-Is-Metaphysics-Translation-GROTH.pdf
An article written by John Cheng Wai Leung states:
As such, Ipsum Esse Subsistens contains within Itself or Himself the whole perfection of esse. All other created beings not only derive their esse, but also find the ultimate reality and meaning (abbreviated as URAM) of their esse in the Esse (Existence) or Essentia (Essence) of Ipsum Esse Subsistens (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 2). Here, it is must be clearly stated that “Dei igitur essentia est suum esse” (Aquinas, “Summa contra Gentiles,” XXII). In English, it simply means: “God’s essence (capitalized as Essence in this essay), thus, is His act of existence (capitalized as Act of Existence in this essay).” Thus, Thomistically, it is pertinent to reiterate that God’s Esse (Act of Existence) is equivalent to God’s Essentia (Essence).See https://utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/uram.36.3-4.103
Leung's work deals with the ambiguity of "being," which probably adds confusion to talk of God as ipsum esse subsistens. I find that many of his remarks and Peter Weigel's clarify the relevant terminology. One point some of the literature on Aquinas makes is that God would not necessarily exist--it would be possible for God not to exist--if God happened to be composite.
8 comments:
Thanks for this post Edgar, there was for me, a real attraction do divine simplicity because of the strength of the cosmological arguments which supposedly led to a simple God.
The problem is what is meant by divine simplicity, often, is not merely that God doesn't have any parts by which he can be divided (like my arm, which can exist distinct from me), but that he doesn't even have any attributes, and for some people, not even any relational attributes. So some people might say that even John Duns Scotus, with his formal distinction, wavered from divine simplicity (since for him the attributes of God were more than merely conceptual).
You also have the problem of what it means to merely exist. I'm not so familiar with Heideggar, but I myself am reminded of Hegel's logic, and his claim that pure being cannot be distinguished from pure nothingness.
Of course I don't think God can be cut up into parts, I would also argue that his attributions are inseperable, and perhaps even collapsible (I think an argument could be made that God's wisdom, justice, and power are merely modes of his Love, and that they may be merely formally distinct from his Love). But once you say that God stands in no real relations, or that his act of creation doesn't actually change HIM (at least in that he is now related to the world), or once you rule out open theism, that's where I can't go forward.
I also don't know what existence being his essence can even mean, since that would mean not only that he doesn't have any accidental properties (which I think is false, given his relationality), but also that his only essencial property is his existence, which means that one cannot predicate anything of him, except analogically, and even analogically it can only be the transcendentals (those properties which are interchangible with being). I think Thomas puts too much stock (it's not his fault btw, he was just working with what was available) with Aristotle and certain neo-platonists (Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius) which had an ontological heirarchy based partially on mutability, if you start from that kind of a metaphysic you're going end up neatly in divine simplicity.
There's a very good slim volume by Keith Ward called "Sharing in the Divine nature" where he proposes a "personalist" metaphysic and a "personalist" theology, it's quite good and he deals with the "Classical tradition" fairly while he critiques it.
One thing he points out is that the Bible DOES make metaphysical claims, and one can begin from those claims, one doesn't have to start with Aristotle and Plato and just use the Bible as window dressing, one can, and should, start with the Bible as one's metaphysical basis, and then bring philosophical insights from outside where appropriate and when helpful.
I personally think the German Idealist tradition is just as, if not more, helpful than the classical Hellenistic tradition, not to mention that Schelling actually took the Hebrew bible seriously, and even the divine name seriously, as metaphysics.
If you start from there you don't have to start from a heirarchy of immutability to mutability, but rather a dialectical metaphysics of determination through dynamic relation (or negation, and negation of negation).
Another thing about Kant, it's common to say Kant disproved the classical arguments about God, perhaps he did with the ontological argument (I never thought that argument was any good anyway), but if people think he disproved the cosmological arguments they should see how he actually "disproves" it ... the way he disproves it would also disprove basically all of science and all of knowledge ... so if you say Kant showed the cosmological argument fails, and you then go on to talk about the age of the universe, or natural laws, or the formation of planets, or evolution or whatever ... then you don't know what Kant's argument against the cosmological proof actually shows.
I also don't think the cosmological or teleological arguments necessarily imply divine simplicity, but I've written enough already :).
Thanks again, Roman. I benefit greatly from you, Duncan, and others who give me some valuable feedback that helps me to alter, adapt and hopefully improve the way I view a matter. What I have to say won't take too long :)
My understanding of divine simplicity, to put it briefly, is that it describes how that God is non-mereological (no temporal/spatial parts) and thus has no matter or potency, but God doesn't have attributes but rather "is" his attributes. Furthermore, I've read that the divine attributes are all identical with one another. I've written about the subject here before and I realize that Scotus and Aquinas differ in many respects. But the way I take divine simplicity (generally speaking) is that God is identical with his attributes. I do agree that Aquinas paints God as having no real relations with the world, nor is he conditioned/changed by his creatures, which is supposed to be a facet of divine aseity and immutability.
Aquinas does argue that we cannot know the divine essence. So we cannot predicate anything of the divine essence but as you said, only what is analogical. However, Aquinas does contend that we could take the way of remotion (via remotionis) or via negativa in our contemplative approach to God (theologia/sacra doctrina).
Thanks for the Ward recommendation: I haven't read that one yet.
There are things I like about the German idealist tradition; what Schelling does seems truly promising for theology. On the other hand, Hegel and Fichte might be problematic although I like some of their work too. Aquinas actually thought he was starting with scripture and creation, then he would invoke philosophy as the ancilla (maidservant) of theology. He wanted to build this grand system that synthesized Aristotle and the Greeks, the Hebrew scriptures, and the New Testament. But the Bible was the starting point for him. At least, in theory.
Lastly, I want to say that Kant did not disprove the ontological or cosmological argument: he raised serious questions that crippled metaphysics and made philosophers and theologians rethink those arguments; however, both arguments still exist in one form or another. For instance, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Maydole, Kurt Godel, and Peter van Inwagen have all developed versions of the ontological and cosmological argument. And think about William Lane Craig's kalam argument.
Well, thanks for listening :-)
See https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2008/12/trinity-doctrine-in-light-of-reason_19.html
This book exposits divine simplicity: https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/aquinas-on-simplicity-an-investigation-into-the-foundations-of-his-philosophical-theology/
I agree with you on Kant, I think his disproving the classical arguments is WAY overstated, I don't think he did. I look anxiously forward to hearing more of your thoughts on Divine Simplicity, and how you think of these issues, I would love to hear more of your thinking here.
Don't know if I'll have much new to write about divine simplicity, but I might expand on some things I've written before. In short, I don't like divine simplicity but I wonder about the implications of denying it and I want a clearer understanding of the God is identical to existence issue.
I'm more or less in the same spot.
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