I know what the Trinitarian "response" will be, but here it goes:
Jesus, however, apparently did need sleep: "And he was in the hinder part of the ship, asleep on a pillow: and they awake him, and say unto him, Master, carest thou not that we perish?" (Mark 4:38 KJV)
God doesn't need food or drink: "Do I eat the flesh of bulls or drink the blood of goats?" (Psalm 50:13 KJV)
But Jesus evidently did need food to live: "The Son of man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. But wisdom is justified of her children" (Matthew 11:19 KJV).
It's hard to understand how one person can both need sleep/food qua human, but not need sleep/food or drink qua divinity. I would also argue that some things we do as humans do not befit the dignity of God and I'm not talking about sinful acts but simply things associated with being biological entities like expelling waste products.
13 comments:
Hmmm... actually, that's exactly why I don't understand why Antitrinitarians are bothered by the fact that the Trinity is a mystery (which they interpret as something silly), when God himself (regardless of his Trinitarian or non-Trinitarian nature) is a mystery, since God is infinite, while our minds are finite. The Incarnation and hypostatic unity, the union of the infinite with the finite, are MUCH more incomprehensible than the Trinity.
The answer is the dual nature of Christ. It is a mysterium absolutum, so we will never understand it. Jesus, as God, knew and knows the day of judgment, but as a man he did not. Jesus is dead or not dead. After all, God never dies: Jesus, as God is immortal, as a man died for sinful humanity. Did Jesus know the time of his birth when he was an embryo? As an embryo no, as God yes.
How can a human be God? Only in this way: that the divine personality also assumes human nature, almost as if it clothes itself in a human body and soul; yet at the same time, it naturally remains who it has been from eternity: God, the only-begotten, eternal, divine Son of the Father. This dual nature is expressed by the term "God-man," or alternatively: "the Word made flesh."
How could finiteness be united with infinity in Jesus, human weakness with divine perfection? There would only be a contradiction if the divine and human properties in Jesus had fused into one nature and thereby mutually negated each other. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, Jesus remained fully God and at the same time fully human. In his human nature, he was small and weak; in his divine nature, he was infinite and almighty. In his human nature, he became like us in all things except for sin; in his divine nature, he far surpasses us in every way. In his human nature, he was born, grew, learned, tired, hungered, thirsted, wept, sweated, suffered, died, and rose again; in his divine nature, he was the very essence of eternal immutability. All of this did not cause any contradiction or division within him; on the contrary, it wonderfully complemented each other.
MYSTERIUM ABSOLUTUM!!!
But let us not forget! In Jesus, everything is dual except for the person. The person is purely divine. The unity of person realized in Christ results in the interchangeability of properties (communicatio idiomatum). In Christ, the two natures were united in such a way that they did not mix, did not change, but each retained all its own characteristics. This emphasis on the uniqueness of Jesus, however, leads to a new dogma: in Christ, there is only one person, namely the divine person, the Word, since this existed from eternity, this assumed the human nature, and not the other way around.
In Christ the Logos fulfills the role of the person because the duality of nature in Jesus did not result in two persons. (This would be schizophrenia, or Nestorianism) The Bible, in fact, attributes both divine and human properties to the same person. The two natures, therefore, exist in one person. From this follows the interchangeability of properties (communicatio idiomatum), meaning that what I attribute to Jesus Christ as God is also true of Christ as man, and vice versa, since the ultimate subject of the properties of both natures is identical. There are four rules related to this:
1. Divine properties can be attributed to Jesus named as a man, and human properties can be attributed to Christ named as God.
2. It is forbidden to do this with emphasizing duplication (reduplicative formaliter) (e.g., Christ as man is omnipresent, or the Word as Word suffered), or to interchange abstractly named properties (e.g., omnipotence lies in a manger).
3. The statements cannot be exclusive or negative (e.g., The Son of God did not suffer, or Jesus is only mortal).
4. An exception to these rules is what has become customary during liturgical practice or at the level of everyday religiosity understood by everyone (e.g., “Justice was condemned to death”), and thus it is comprehensible to all. From the teaching of the interchangeability of properties, it follows that the same worship is due to the Son of God as to Jesus the man, and that Christ’s humanity is also essentially holy and deserves worship.
In Jesus Christ, even after the union, the two natures remain, unmingled and unchanged. This doctrine is a consequence of two fundamental Christological tenets: Christ is truly God; Christ is truly human. We justify both by recognizing that in the living, unified Christ, the properties of both the divine and human natures are clearly discernible. Thus, this unity neither mixed nor obscured these natures.
This is how the Church Fathers taught long before the Council of Chalcedon. Saint Augustine speaks on behalf of them all: "Let us acknowledge the two natures in Christ; the divine nature, by which he is equal to the Father, and the human nature, by which he is greater than the Father." Therefore, when the unity in Christ is described as a mixture (mixtura, commixtio), it is intended to express only the firmness and indissolubility of the unity, or the close union and interpenetration (perichoresis) of the two natures. The Church Fathers also provide a metaphysical reason for this: due to God's absolute immutability and simplicity, He cannot mix with another nature, nor can He become the form of another nature. Hence, the kenosis doctrine of certain Protestant thinkers is entirely mistaken. Referring to the Apostle Paul, who said, "He emptied himself" (ἑαυτόν ἐκένωσεν), these thinkers taught that in the Incarnation, Christ did not exercise his divinity (as the 17th-century Giessen kenotics claimed), or that he renounced certain divine attributes, specifically omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence (as in the 19th century with Thomasius, Bensow, and many Anglicans even today).
The Son of God’s becoming human is a mystery in the strict sense. The axis of Paul’s theology is Christ. But no matter what he says about him, in various contexts he always returns to the conclusion that he is faced with an unfathomable mystery: “He made known to us, according to his good pleasure, the mystery of his will, which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him” (Ephesians 1:9; cf. Colossians 1:26). “We declare God’s wisdom, a mystery that has been hidden and that God destined for our glory before time began. None of the rulers of this age understood it, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Corinthians 2:7–11; cf. Ephesians 3). Moreover, Christ himself says: “No one knows the Son except the Father” (Matthew 11:27). The Church Fathers unanimously agree with Pope Leo the Great's assertion: “The union of the two natures in one person is a mystery that cannot be explained by words, but can only be accepted by faith.” Saint Augustine also professes that just as with the Trinity, neither proof nor example can be provided for this mystery.
A mystery of faith in the strict sense is characterized by the fact that the human mind cannot independently establish its existence, and even if it becomes aware of it, it cannot comprehend its possibility, nor can it prove its existence through positive reasoning. Both elements are present in the Incarnation.
Let me quote from the dogmatic book, which I find the best:
The difficulties that the mystery of Christ’s incarnation and dual nature must be defended against are clustered around two poles: A) Empirical rationalism always stumbles over the idea of how a human nature can exist without also having a human person. The heretical manifestation of this difficulty is Nestorianism. B) Transcendental rationalism, which does not want to deny or diminish God, will always question how the infinite God can become a finite creature, how the immutable, immortal God can become a mutable, mortal man. This is the difficulty from which Monophysitism and Unitarianism draw their sustenance. Similarly, the tasks of speculation also revolve around these two poles: how can a fully substantial human nature exist without its own person? And what is the real bond of Christ’s unity? And: how can God’s becoming man occur without compromising His divinity, immutability, and simplicity?
A) The difficulties of empirical rationalism concerning the Incarnation: Empirical rationalism clings to the empirical fact that in the world of existing beings, every self-contained unit of being, or nature, also possesses a corresponding individual independence and selfhood. Therefore, nature and person are inseparable. It is inconceivable that there could exist a thought that is not someone's thought, a sorrow that is not felt by someone, or generally any activity or quality that does not have a bearer, a subsistence. Thus, in Jesus Christ, either the humanity possesses a natural bearer of existence, in which case the Incarnation must be understood in a Nestorian way rather than a Catholic one; or the Incarnation is metaphysically impossible, insofar as human nature without a natural person is a metaphysical absurdity. Person and nature cannot be separated without annihilating the individual being. Moreover, it would be morally impossible to violently mutilate humanity by assuming that the eternal Word took on an impersonal, or incomplete, humanity, thereby failing to elevate what is most valuable in man: the person, the principle of individual responsibility, merit, and independence. Consequently, this would ultimately shift redemption from the realm of personal moral effort and individual activity to the domain of mere nature, that is, to physical or even mechanical processes.
Philosophical reflection, independent of dogma, also finds that nature and person are not identical in a concrete individual being; the difference between the two is greater than merely conceptual. For a) nature expresses the essence (quidditas), the content of being, while personhood articulates the selfhood, incommunicability, and independence of this content. b) It is not logically contradictory to conceive of two beings who have completely identical natures but possess two distinct selves, two centers of life, naturally with entirely identical content. This is a reality in the Trinity. Therefore, nature and person are not identical.
c) The rational creature often experiences, even with shame, that many of its activities are not the result of personal reflection and responsible decision-making, not the fruit of personal resolve and conviction, but rather manifestations of a barely restrained nature. Therefore, the two are clearly not the same reality. Consequently (metaphysically speaking), there is a difference between nature and person, similar to that between content and container, property and owner, material and arranger, or unifier. In other words, this difference is more than merely conceptual; at least it is a difference in value (virtualis adaequata); it is likely metaphysical, meaning we are dealing with two distinct entities here, not just one entity that counts as two. And even if we have never experienced such a metaphysical property existing without its natural possessor, no one can prove that what is not identical cannot be separated by God in reality. This is even more so because, according to Catholic dogma, it cannot be said that Christ's humanity is entirely without personality, but only that it lacks a natural human person. The Savior’s human thoughts are also thought by someone, His joys and sorrows are felt by someone, His decisions are also made by someone: the second divine person. Since the difference between nature and person is more than conceptual, divine omnipotence can assume the role of a created personality if it does not grant a creature its proper created personality. The absolute First Cause can directly do what, according to the order of creation, it accomplishes through created causes.
2. Even if Christ’s humanity is without natural personality, it cannot be said that Christ assumed an incomplete or mutilated humanity. The metaphysical purpose of personality is not to add a positive reality to a being’s content that would enrich its existence, but to give an already fully realized content selfhood, incommunicable independence. Its metaphysical role is exhausted in providing a being with the ultimate actuality, by which it can no longer receive any essential element of being, nor can it be made into an element of another being. With personality, the chain of communicating elements of being is closed: personalitas (subsistentia) est actus terminativus entis. Therefore, the person operates in a different order of being than nature: it gives a mode of existence, not content or qualification, to nature. In a faint analogy: the person is the possessor who does not bring anything new to the property; its vocation is not to augment the existing estate but to consolidate, unify, and effectively protect and preserve it against any alienating external intention.
3. The dignity of Jesus Christ’s humanity is not diminished by the fact that it does not possess natural personality. The eternal Word’s personality not only compensates for the lack of natural human personality but also grants greater dignity to the assumed humanity. It is a great dignity to be the crowning form of a being. However, it is a greater dignity to come under the dominion of a higher form and share in the higher dignity of this form than to remain an independent form in a lower order of being. Thus, for animality, it is a greater dignity to be assumed into human existence and thereby share in the greater dignity and rank of the human soul than to remain on the level of mere animality. Moreover, man is driven by his deepest and noblest desire for the fullest possible union with God. The strength (but not the correct measure) of this desire is shown by the fact that some mystics have seen the highest peak of divine communion for the God-seeking person as the complete union with God by shedding personal identity. What is described here as the most desirable distinction for man became a reality in the highest degree for the humanity of Christ.
4. The mystery of the Incarnation does not diminish, and indeed does not endanger, the values and validity of personal moral effort and initiative, as shown by the philosophical appreciation of redemption. The Catholic dogma of hypostatic union proclaims on a grand scale that redemption is not the work of a human person, but that even in the human activity of Christ, it is divine grace, the instrument of which is the nature assumed into the unity of the person. Moreover, it is a sign of divine wisdom that just as original sin is the sin of nature, so too is the work of redemption the work of human nature.
B) Transcendental rationalism contrasts the absoluteness of God with the finiteness of the creature and raises the following difficulties:
1. Objection: If the eternal God became man in time and lived a true human life, He would be subject to change; yet God is immutable.
Solution: God would undergo change through the Incarnation if He became man in such a way that He ceased to remain God, or if, according to the Protestant doctrine of kenosis, He renounced some of His divine attributes, or if He absorbed humanity into His nature, that is, into His divine sphere of life (Monophysitism). According to the Catholic truth, however, the Incarnation consists in God assuming a complete humanity into the unity of His person, thereby enabling a true, complete human life, but not mixing this sphere of life with His divine sphere of life. In the Incarnation, God indeed enters into a new relation with a creature; however, this, like the relations between God and creatures in general (creation, preservation, governance), is only real from the creature's side. God, from all eternity, effectively willed the Incarnation with all its details; when it occurs at the appointed time determined from eternity, no change takes place in God, just as no change occurs in Him through the act of creation or the preservation of the world. “The characteristic of a relation is that it can be newly affirmed of someone without that person undergoing any change; just as someone can become a right-hand neighbor without moving at all, merely because the person who becomes their left-hand neighbor changes position.” (Thom III 16, 6 ad 2.)
2. Objection: Through the Incarnation, God takes a creature into the unity of His person, that is, into His innermost being, thereby entering into a composite, which contradicts His simplicity, and increases in being, which contradicts His infiniteness.
Solution: According to the Catholic understanding, in the Incarnation, the Divinity remains entirely what it was before the union. The becoming man is a new relation between God and a human being; however, this is only real from the human side. Christ’s humanity indeed experiences an unparalleled increase in being (gratia unionis); but not the Divinity. For God, in His infinite perfection, is the fullness of all being and the source of all created being; therefore, whatever reality is in the human Christ is His conception and realization, and thus in a preeminent degree, it has always been in Him. Just as creation does not signify an increase in perfection for God, neither does the personal unity. The Incarnation does not blemish God's simplicity. For God does not enter the personal unity as a part, nor does He receive completion from the whole resulting from the Incarnation, nor does He acquire perfection from it. In Christ, the relationship between divinity and humanity (in terms of the elements of being, which are the only ones at issue here) is precisely the relationship between Creator and creature. Just as God’s simplicity is not compromised by creating the world and maintaining constant intimate connection with it, so His simplicity is not obscured by entering into personal unity with a human nature.
3. Objection: There is an infinite distance between God and man. For the infinite God to become a finite man is like trying to turn a circle into a square (Spinoza).
Solution: God, as Creator, is not distant from His creatures; in Him, we live, move, and have our being. Every creature is entirely God’s conception and a reflection of His perfection, and therefore, each bears that mysterious mark by which it is most intimately akin to God, by which He can grasp it and elevate it to the fullest possible communion with God that is compatible with the concept of the creature. This is the supernatural receptivity (potentia obedientialis), which also makes personal unity possible.
4. Objection: Christ's humanity is a created reality. However, the act of creation is directly aimed at giving existence to a creature. Consequently, Christ's humanity is created, that is, it exists with human existence.
Solution: The act of creation is not precisely aimed at the existence of the creature but rather at the existing creature itself, where it remains undecided whether the existence of the existing creature is created together with its substantial content or if it is transferred to an already existing fact of existence. The latter is the case with the humanity of Jesus Christ; so, strictly speaking, it should not be said that Christ's humanity is created, but rather that the humanity of the eternal Logos is created (Billot).
5. Objection: If Christ's humanity participates in the existence of the Son of God, then the finite creature shares in the infinite divine existence, which is impossible.
Solution: The fact of existence is not substantial being but rather the metaphysical fact that sustains and unifies substantial being. If God assumes a creature into this bond of existence, this does not at all imply that He imparts any of His divine substance to it. Due to our imperfect understanding of God's existence, we naturally cannot fully comprehend how this is possible. However, through analogies drawn from God's works, we can gain some insight:
a) If God, in creation, can give existence to beings outside of His own sphere of existence, in the form of relative, created existence, why could He not sustain a being within His own sphere of existence? After all, every being is constantly and essentially dependent on God for its existence; the mode of Christ's humanity's existence merely represents the highest degree and intimacy of this dependence.
b) If God can sustain beings in existence through His power, as He does in the creation and preservation of the world, why not with His essence, His own subsistence, or the power by which He sustains Himself in existence?
c) If the subsistence of the Son of God is powerful enough to give existence and self-sufficiency to the infinite divine nature, on what grounds could we deny it the power to give existence and self-sufficiency to a finite nature as well? It is true that a finite subsistence is incapable of this. In a finite being, nature and subsistence form a whole, and the role and power of that being's subsistence are exhausted in sustaining the nature assigned to it; it cannot extend further. However, in the case of God, whose subsistence is of infinite power, no such limitation can be conceived. Therefore, theologians rightly conclude that the Divinity could have, and indeed might have, entered into hypostatic unity with other creatures, either simultaneously or successively, with anynumber of created individuals or worlds, as He pleased.
Nincsnevem, i posted your reply to my piece and knew what would be said before you replied because I've heard it before.
I will allow replies to your points, but I feel that 8 Trinitarian posts is enough for this thread. I like discussion, but that way of replying does not facilitate discussion. However, I was willing to let the other side be heard. But 8 is enough.
Thank you, actually it only became 8 posts because of the 4,000 character limit. I hope it is useful because it accounts for the metaphysical explanation. As I said, I think the hypostatic unity is much more incomprehensible than the Trinity. Because it is easy to accept that God is infinite and a mystery, and we cannot expect to understand His inner being, until then the humanity of Christ is tangible, but how the finite can be united with the infinite is not.
Regarding the point raised in the post, my point is that Jesus' need for sleep, food, and other human experiences underscores the reality and fullness of his humanity. He did not merely appear to be human; he truly took on human nature, with all its limitations and experiences, except sin. This was necessary for several reasons:
1) To identify with humanity: By fully embracing human nature, Jesus could fully identify with human beings, sharing in their experiences and suffering. This identification is central to Christian soteriology, where Jesus represents humanity in his life, death, and resurrection.
2) To fulfill the role of the perfect mediator: In order to mediate between God and humanity, Jesus needed to be both fully divine and fully human. His human experiences were essential to his role as the mediator who could bridge the gap between God and people. As the God-man, Jesus Christ is uniquely qualified to be the mediator. His dual nature means that He can represent both parties: as fully divine, He can represent God to humanity; as fully human, He can represent humanity to God. This does not diminish His divinity but rather affirms His unique role in the economy of salvation.
You also raise a valid concern about actions that might seem to not "befit the dignity of God," such as basic biological functions. The Christian response here is that the Incarnation involves God humbling Himself to enter into the human condition fully (Philippians 2:6-8). This humility does not detract from God's dignity; rather, it demonstrates the extent of God's love and willingness to engage with creation on its own terms. By assuming human nature, God in Christ sanctified the entirety of human experience, showing that even the most mundane aspects of human life are not beneath the dignity of God when they are undertaken in the person of Christ.
The need for sleep, food, and other human experiences does not diminish Jesus' divinity; instead, it highlights the mystery and wonder of the Incarnation. The fact that God would take on human nature, with all its limitations, out of love for humanity, is central to the Christian understanding of who Jesus is. It is a profound expression of God’s willingness to fully enter into the human experience, which is at the heart of Christian faith.
Sorry, bad translation for the quote from Augstine, correctly: "Let us acknowledge the twofold substance of Christ; to wit, the divine, in which he is equal with the Father, and the human, in respect to which the Father is greater."
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701078.htm
All this guy does is use philosophy to try and explain this false doctrine.
Colossians 2:8
"Look out that no one takes you captive by means of the philosophy and empty deception according to human tradition, according to the elementary things of the world and not according to Christ;"
Ephesians 5:6
"Let no man deceive you with empty words, for because of such things the wrath of God is coming upon the sons of disobedience."
Jehovah willing may he open this person eyes before it is too late.
There is no mystery as to who Jesus is and who Jehovah is they are not part of the trinity and never were. The excuse of the expression mystery is because the holy spirit never revealed the truth to the apostates.- 1Cor.2:10 the spirit searches into all things, even the deep things of God. -Amos 3:7 For the sovereign Lord Jehovah will not do a thing
Unless he has revealed his confidential matter to his servants the prophets. His true worshipper know he is not a trinity as apostates teach. That's it for now.
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