This post is so long that I'm starting another thread. The following remarks constitute my final word on this subject for now. I will then reply to the questions about time. But my time is limited. Therefore, I'll let Jason have the last word on the Vermes' subject. I've made a clear distinction below in terms of my remarks and Jason's.
Hello Jason:
[Jason]
Regarding John 5:18, I am failing to see how your responses answer the question as to how Jesus' first century Jewish opponents managed to construe (whether rightly or wrongly is besides the point) His statement in John 5:17 as a claim to equality with God if Geza Vermes is correct that first century Jews had no concept of any such thing as natural divine sonship? If Vermes is correct would it not follow then that it would have been contrary to their categories of thought for them to have taken Jesus' statement as affirming something more than a claim to be at the very most either the Messiah or to having pre-existed as a created angel?
[Edgar]
I do not agree that a possible misconstrual of Jesus' words is tangential. But (to answer your question) Vermes does not say that the first century Jews had no concept of "natural divine sonship." He writes that a Jew would not have applied the noun phrase "son of God" to the offspring of deities, defied kings or to apotheosized rulers; moreover, he argues that Jews understood the phrase "son of God" to be metaphorical-a term that Vermes does not define but the context of his statement indicates that the speaker meaning of the term "metaphor" does not simply refer to rhetorical tropes or to conceptual domains (as that term is understood in cognitive semantics).
[Jason]
However, if Jesus' response in the verses which follow John 5:18 was intended for the purpose of clarifying that He was not breaking the Sabbath and that He was not calling God His own Father in such a way that would entail His being in some sense equal with God, then it would seem to me that He did a very poor job of expressing Himself here. For, given the conclusion His opponents drew from what He said in John 5:17, why would they be less inclined to take the words: "the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing" as an affimation that the Son has no will or operation of His own distinct and independent from that of that Father, and is therefore essentially inseparable from the Father? (Certainly, the angels can do things of their own accord: if they were not able to do so, how could it be that some of them have sinned?)
[Edgar]
I don't think you want to say that Christ was actually "making himself" equal to God. Christ legitimately would have been considered a blasphemer by making himself equal to God: "In rabbinic teaching a rebellious son is said to make himself equal [with] his Father (Lightfoot). Breaking the Law concerning the Sabbath was serious, but claiming God as his own Father was blasphemy" (Cleon L. Rogers, Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, p. 193). If Jesus was/is equal to God, I don't think that the writer of the Fourth Gospel desires to portray him as making himself equal to the Father. Additionally, it is important not to read post-4th century meanings into 1st century texts. Jesus was not necessarily stating that he had no will or operation of his own in the sense that you ascribe to him.
In The Christology of the Fourth Gospel, Paul N. Anderson (pp. 3, 267) observes that Jesus is asserting that he "can do nothing on his own authority" or is "totally dependent" on his Father. For Anderson, John 5:19 is a Johannine "subordinationist" passage; in other words, Christ is evidently stating that he does not have the ability (OU DUNATAI) or authority to act on his own initiative. He is not suggesting that he could never act on his own. Such an understanding of the text is much too strong and misrepresents the intentional (i.e. pragmatic) meaning of Jesus' words. Moreover, when Jesus says that he does that which he beholds the Father doing, hA (in the Greek text) is delimited by the context. In particular, the things that Jesus' Father does have to do with sustaining the creation: hA does not refer to all things in an absolute sense. A. T. Robertson also offers these remarks:
"Can do nothing by himself (OU DUNATAI POIEIN AF' hEAUTOU OUDEN). True in a sense of every man, but in a much deeper sense of Christ because of the intimate relation between him and the Father. See this same point in Joh_5:30; Joh_7:28; Joh_8:28; Joh_14:10. Jesus had already made it in Joh_5:17. Now he repeats and defends it" (Word Pictures).
[Jason]
"...whatever [the Father] does, that the Son does likewise." Interpretation: Just as the Father "works" on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it, so also the Son works on the Sabbath, not being bound to keep it either. There is nothing that the Father can do that the Son also cannot do: Claim to equality of power with God."
[Edgar]
The Son is Lord of the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-8). Hence, he could probably labor on the Sabbath--doing God's work--without being considered a violator of this sacred day (Genesis 2:2-3). However, Jesus did not limit working on the Sabbath to the Father or himself. He demonstrated that works of mercy could be performed on the Sabbath by devout Jews or by men accomplishing God's will like the Levitical priests of old or men such as his ancestor David. Christ had been given the authority to work on the Sabbath by his Father (John 5:20-22). Without being given that authority, the Son would objectively have been a blasphemer.
[Jason]
Why would they not conclude from the words in John 5:21 that Jesus is asserting an equality of authority with God, making the giving of life just as dependent upon His will as it is dependent upon the Father's will? From verse 22, they could easily misconstrue Jesus' words as a claim that the Father has relinquished His own authority in giving it to the Son, leading to the charge that Jesus was claiming to be in at least one respect actually greater than God. Why would they not charge him with claiming to be worthy of equal honor with God, in view of the statement in verse 23: "that all may honor the Son, EVEN AS they honor the Father"? Finally, verse 26: The very unoriginated life of Father is communicated by the Father to the Son, and thus the Son has the same unoriginated life equally with the Father.
[Edgar]
John does not tell us how the Jews reacted to the rest of Jesus' words in chapter five of the Fourth Gospel. It is a little difficult to make an argument from silence. But none of what Jesus says in John 5 has to be interpreted as you suggest. While God (YHWH) is the one who grants life to men of all sorts (1 Samuel 2:6; Psalm 36:9), it is nonetheless his prerogative to allow others to perform resurrections or bring others back to life (e.g. God used Elijah and Elisha to bestow life on others) by means of the Holy Spirit. Luke relates that Christ was able to perform miracles or heal others because he was anointed with Holy Spirit and power (Luke 10:38). Christ resurrected others in his capacity as Messiah (Isaiah 11:1-5). As for John 5:23, compare John 6:57; 17:20-22. With all due respect, it seems that you are reading Nicene Christology into John 5:26. The context of 5:26 does not indicate that God has communicated his "unoriginated life" to his Son. What is at issue is bringing humans back to life by means of a resurrection; what is not at issue is God communicating his unoriginated life to the Son. See the chapter on aseity in my work Christology and the Trinity.
[Jason]
It would seem to me that the most natural reading of John 5:19-26 is that Jesus is affirming that as the Son of God He is not only equal but also identical with the Father in every respect EXCEPT that of being unoriginated. (I do not accept the implied interpretation of John 14:28 in the Athanasian Creed as being adequate to account for Jesus' statement about the Father being greater than the Son. Following Alexander, Athanasius, Hilary, Chrysostom, and the Cappadocians, I hold that the Father is eternally greater than the Son in that He alone is Unoriginated and in that He is the Cause of the Son's existence.)
[Edgar]
The text cannot bear the weight that you're assigning to it: John did not wear 4th century doctrinal lenses. Why not try appealing to the grammar or historical circumstances of the text? Jesus does not claim (ontological) equality with God nor does he imply that he is identical with the Father in every respect (ontologically) with the exception of being unoriginated (John 5:28-30; 17:3).
[Jason]
In view of Heb. 1:5, how can you maintain that Jesus is the Son of God in the same sense as the angels are? Does not 'only-begotten' imply 'without brothers or sisters' so that, even if Jesus' sonship were metaphorical, it would still have to be a category of metaphorical sonship unique to Him?
[Edgar]
I've addressed Hebrews 1:5 in my book Christology and the Trinity. As for the term "only-begotten" (MONOGENHS), there is much debate concerning its semantics. Does it mean "unique, one-of-a-king" or "only" or the only child born to X or Y? Without getting into that debate now, for which I recommend BDAG Greek-English Lexicon as a good start. Suffice it to say that "without brothers or sisters" is not a definition per se of MONOGENHS. For how the term is used in the LXX, see Genesis 22:2, 12, Judges 11:34 and see Ps. Solomon 18:4.
[Jason]
In all of Luke 3:23-38 the term 'son' occurs but once, it being understood only by implication after its initial occurence. Since this is the case, how can its definition change in verse 38? Does this not necessitate understanding Luke 3:23-38 (as opposed to Matt. 1 which due to the word beget can only be taken as a biological genealogy) as giving a 'legal' genealogy, so that one and the same definition of the term 'son' can be consistently applied all throughout the passage, including its final statement? Doesn't the genealogy in Gen. 5 appear to purposely avoid speaking of Adam as being 'begotten' by God?
[Edgar]
Are you insisting that Luke means to imply that God is the literal father of Adam in Luke 3:38? Is that what you really want to say here? My point was merely that the term "son" can be employed metaphorically. I also appealed to the book of Job, where the angels seem to be called "sons of God" as well (Job 38:1-7, etc.). I believe that there is a different contextual setting in Genesis 5:1ff. Notice how the term "Adam" is used in the first two verses of that chapter. The first pentateuchal work also concentrates on who begat whom; it does not employ the understood term "son" throughout the text.
[Jason]
Given the inherent nature of poetry, it is not surprising that the term 'born' would be used in place of the more accurate 'made' or 'created' in Ps. 90:2 in reference to the origin of the mountains? (But is not the expression itself 'before the mountains' a metaphor for 'from olam', so that the literal origin of literal mountains is not directly in view here?) Are there any non-poetic passages in Scripture in which 'made' or 'created' can justifiably be substituted for 'born' or 'begotten'?
[Edgar]
Why should we construe "before the mountains" as a metaphor? What contextual indicators suggest that we have a metaphor in this psalm? I don't see why the writer would not have literal mountains in mind since we read: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world . . . (KJV). For uses of "born" for "created," see Genesis 2:4 (consult the Hebrew text); Deuteronomy 32:6, 18; Psalm 7:14 (RSV); Proverbs 27:1; Isaiah 33:11; Zephaniah 2:2 (YLT). See Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon and BDB Lexicon.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Reply to Jason on Time and God
Jason posted some thoughts at the evangelicals and jws yahoogroup. I wish to interact with some of his remarks.
[Jason]
At one time I also conceived of God's eternal
existence in terms of 'unbounded temporality'.
Whereas I now speak of God (and His Son) as being
'ageless', back then I spoke of God (and His Son) as
having an 'infinite age.' The transition from
thinking in terms of 'unbounded temporality' to
'timelessness' occured for me through the realization
that God's 'age' is a constant; it always remains the
same; it does not increase with the passing of time;
and so, also, it is indivisible. Whatever the correct
answer is to the question: 'How old is God?' the exact
same answer will still be true ten minutes, ten years,
or ten thousand years from now. (Infinity + 1 =
Infinity; Infinity + 2 = Infinity; ect.)
[Edgar]
Job 36:26 states: "How great is God—beyond our understanding!
The number of his years is past finding out (NIV)."
Most theologians would probably contend that the language used in Job is metaphorical. God literally does not have years that can be counted, even AD INFINITUM. One might reason that the author of Job is employing poetic turns of phrase. While there is probably the use of metaphor or poetic imagery in Job, I believe that it might make sense to speak of God's "years" in terms of his infinite or boundless existence. Talk of infinity quickly becomes problematic. Aristotle makes a distinction between a potential and actual infinite. He argues that the former may exist, but the latter most assuredly does not for the very reason that Jason states (among other reasons). Since it is possible to successively add numbers AD INFINITUM, Aristotle suggests that potential infinites exist. However, actual [quantitative] infinites do not exist. I would thus content that God's "age" cannot constitute an actual quantitative infinite. At best, the "years" of God represent a potential infinite that can be counted potentially AD INFINITUM.
[Jason]
By reflecting further on this, I came to the
conclusion that God exists both 'independently' of
time (for his 'age' is unaffected by the passing of
time) and 'within' every individual moment of time
'simultaneously' and 'ever-presently' (for, whereas
infinity is indivisible, and the 'present' - i.e., the
unmeasurable, elusive 'instant' of time that 'now' is
- is also indivisible, the past and the future are, by
contrast, divisible, so that what is temporally
indivisible cannot have a past or a future distinct
from its 'present' existence). In other words, I
believe that God is both 'timeless' and 'temporally
omnipresent'. I also hold that it not despite God's
timelessness that He is temporally omnipresent, but
rather that it is precisely because of His
timelessness that He is able to be simultaneously
ever-present in every individual moment of time. I
believe that the one implies the other, and that,
therefore, the question as to how a timeless God can
act in time has no force as an argument against the
position that God is timeless and ageless. I do
believe, however, that the question: 'How can a
time-bound God know the future free actions of His
creatures?" does present a major difficulty for the
'unbounded temporality' conception of God's eternity.
For, I believe that the Scriptures teach both the
omniscience of God (which I understand is denied by
Open Theists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the free
will of rational creatures.
[Edgar]
PACE Jason's position, I submit that the foregoing account that he has presented is a confused delineation of God's temporality or His atemporality. It seems to me that one cannot have it both ways. Either God is atemporal or God is temporal (i.e. sempiternal). It is confusing to posit both that God is timeless and within time. Nelson Pike and Stephen T. Davis argue that a timeless God has neither temporal location (it does not make sense to posit a "before" or "after" of a timeless being) nor temporal extension (a timeless being does not have any duration). Yet, it seems that anything existing within time does have duration of some kind such that it makes sense to say that a temporal entity has lived for 80 years or existed during the entire tenure of the Bush administration. See Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, pp. 10-24.
I'm not going to enter into a discussion of God's foreknowledge and free will now. I believe that this question has already been addressed on the evangelicals and jws board.
[Jason]
Regarding Ps. 90:2, I think that the 'unbounded
temporality' interpretation would be more convincing
if the verse had said: "from olam you have (always)
been God and to olam you will (continue to) be God."
As the text stands however, with its present tense
verb 'are' I believe supports the 'timelessness'
interpretation by way of affirming God's 'temporal
omnipresence'. Don't you think it would be an odd
manner of expression if I were to state: 'from 1977 to
2008, I am Jason'?
[Edgar]
First, I believe that the lexical semantics of the text (i.e. the meaning of words used in a text) are on the side of those who believe in an limitlessly temporal or sempiternal God. OLAM can mean hidden or concealed time, that is, concealed from the standpoint of the present. In the case of God, it most certainly does not refer to God's timelessness. Second, you are placing the verb of the text in the wrong place. Psalm 90:2 actually says "from OLAM to OLAM, you ARE God." The writer is not attempting to tell us that God IS from OLAM to OLAM per se. The verb should be construed with the words "you" and "god." Do you see the difference regarding where one places the verb in the text?
To conclude, I offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Best regards,
Edgar
[Jason]
At one time I also conceived of God's eternal
existence in terms of 'unbounded temporality'.
Whereas I now speak of God (and His Son) as being
'ageless', back then I spoke of God (and His Son) as
having an 'infinite age.' The transition from
thinking in terms of 'unbounded temporality' to
'timelessness' occured for me through the realization
that God's 'age' is a constant; it always remains the
same; it does not increase with the passing of time;
and so, also, it is indivisible. Whatever the correct
answer is to the question: 'How old is God?' the exact
same answer will still be true ten minutes, ten years,
or ten thousand years from now. (Infinity + 1 =
Infinity; Infinity + 2 = Infinity; ect.)
[Edgar]
Job 36:26 states: "How great is God—beyond our understanding!
The number of his years is past finding out (NIV)."
Most theologians would probably contend that the language used in Job is metaphorical. God literally does not have years that can be counted, even AD INFINITUM. One might reason that the author of Job is employing poetic turns of phrase. While there is probably the use of metaphor or poetic imagery in Job, I believe that it might make sense to speak of God's "years" in terms of his infinite or boundless existence. Talk of infinity quickly becomes problematic. Aristotle makes a distinction between a potential and actual infinite. He argues that the former may exist, but the latter most assuredly does not for the very reason that Jason states (among other reasons). Since it is possible to successively add numbers AD INFINITUM, Aristotle suggests that potential infinites exist. However, actual [quantitative] infinites do not exist. I would thus content that God's "age" cannot constitute an actual quantitative infinite. At best, the "years" of God represent a potential infinite that can be counted potentially AD INFINITUM.
[Jason]
By reflecting further on this, I came to the
conclusion that God exists both 'independently' of
time (for his 'age' is unaffected by the passing of
time) and 'within' every individual moment of time
'simultaneously' and 'ever-presently' (for, whereas
infinity is indivisible, and the 'present' - i.e., the
unmeasurable, elusive 'instant' of time that 'now' is
- is also indivisible, the past and the future are, by
contrast, divisible, so that what is temporally
indivisible cannot have a past or a future distinct
from its 'present' existence). In other words, I
believe that God is both 'timeless' and 'temporally
omnipresent'. I also hold that it not despite God's
timelessness that He is temporally omnipresent, but
rather that it is precisely because of His
timelessness that He is able to be simultaneously
ever-present in every individual moment of time. I
believe that the one implies the other, and that,
therefore, the question as to how a timeless God can
act in time has no force as an argument against the
position that God is timeless and ageless. I do
believe, however, that the question: 'How can a
time-bound God know the future free actions of His
creatures?" does present a major difficulty for the
'unbounded temporality' conception of God's eternity.
For, I believe that the Scriptures teach both the
omniscience of God (which I understand is denied by
Open Theists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the free
will of rational creatures.
[Edgar]
PACE Jason's position, I submit that the foregoing account that he has presented is a confused delineation of God's temporality or His atemporality. It seems to me that one cannot have it both ways. Either God is atemporal or God is temporal (i.e. sempiternal). It is confusing to posit both that God is timeless and within time. Nelson Pike and Stephen T. Davis argue that a timeless God has neither temporal location (it does not make sense to posit a "before" or "after" of a timeless being) nor temporal extension (a timeless being does not have any duration). Yet, it seems that anything existing within time does have duration of some kind such that it makes sense to say that a temporal entity has lived for 80 years or existed during the entire tenure of the Bush administration. See Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, pp. 10-24.
I'm not going to enter into a discussion of God's foreknowledge and free will now. I believe that this question has already been addressed on the evangelicals and jws board.
[Jason]
Regarding Ps. 90:2, I think that the 'unbounded
temporality' interpretation would be more convincing
if the verse had said: "from olam you have (always)
been God and to olam you will (continue to) be God."
As the text stands however, with its present tense
verb 'are' I believe supports the 'timelessness'
interpretation by way of affirming God's 'temporal
omnipresence'. Don't you think it would be an odd
manner of expression if I were to state: 'from 1977 to
2008, I am Jason'?
[Edgar]
First, I believe that the lexical semantics of the text (i.e. the meaning of words used in a text) are on the side of those who believe in an limitlessly temporal or sempiternal God. OLAM can mean hidden or concealed time, that is, concealed from the standpoint of the present. In the case of God, it most certainly does not refer to God's timelessness. Second, you are placing the verb of the text in the wrong place. Psalm 90:2 actually says "from OLAM to OLAM, you ARE God." The writer is not attempting to tell us that God IS from OLAM to OLAM per se. The verb should be construed with the words "you" and "god." Do you see the difference regarding where one places the verb in the text?
To conclude, I offer some observations from Dr. Allan Padgett:
"the OT knows nothing of a timeless God in the Boethian sense” (God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Padgett even makes the stronger claim that "the Bible knows nothing of an absolute timeless divine eternity" (p. 35). He settles for what he calls "relative divine timelessness" which he admits the Bible does not explicitly teach. Yet, Padgett believes that his view is compatible with biblical statements about God's "eternity" (OLAM) or everlasting nature.
Padgett also writes:
"The everlasting (or at best relatively timeless) nature of God's eternity has been clearly implied in Ps. 90:2,Isa. 40:28, 41:4, 43:10, and 44:6; while Isa. 48:3 allows any view. Eccl. 3:11, too, will not support an absolute timelessness. Thus Schmidt's thesis that the OT supports a Boethian understanding of non-durational timeless eternity cannot be maintained. We can conclude with the vast majority of scholars that Yahweh is understood by OT writers to be everlasting, or at best 'timeless' in a relative sense" (God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, p. 29).
Best regards,
Edgar
CREATIO EX NIHILO
The following is a reproduction of something that I posted to a yahoogroup forum.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Dear list-members,
A couple of years ago--I do not remember the exact
year--Rob Bowman and I engaged in a dialogue
concerning CREATIO EX NIHILO. Since then I have given
the subject a lot of thought and engaged in extensive
research on this topic. The present author has
subsequently concluded that the expression CREATIO EX
NIHILO is permissible as long as we qualify what we
mean by such language. This point is forcefully
brought out by Richard Creel, who argues that
something can never come from an absolute void (i.e.
nothing) as Athanasius argued. Such a process is ruled
out by the basic principle of logical necessity [EX
NIHILO NIHIL FIT].
On the other hand, if one interprets CREATIO EX NIHILO
as creating from nothing except God's "omnipotent
resources" then I find no personal objection to the
terminology. (See Creel's _Divine impassibility: an
essay in philosophical theology_, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986. The one downside to this work
is Creel's unnecessary postulation of a "plenum" of
uncreated possibilities to explain how God creates TA
PANTA without doing so EX NIHILO or EX DEO.)
Now Rob argued that Jehovah's Witnesses may
(unwittingly) teach that the cosmos is a product of
God's very being since JWs say that God created the
universe by means of His own dynamic energy (i.e. His
omnipotent resources). Rob finds the idea of God using
His personal emanative energies to create the cosmos,
seemingly unorthodox and problematic. The Witnesses
obviously [seem to] disagree.
While I do not plan on resolving this issue now, I
wonder what Rob thinks of the words from Tertullian's
treatise Against Hermogenes (section 45.1ff). Does he
think that Tertullian is also some type of pantheist
or panentheist since he writes:
"Do not be willing so to cover God with flattery, as
to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and
simple approach so many vast substances, instead of
rather forming them by His own energies. For this is
proved by Jeremiah when he says, 'God hath made the
earth by His power, He hath established the world by
His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven by His
understanding.' These are the energies by the stress
of which He made this universe. His glory is greater
if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested
from His works. Both one and the other were after His
manner. If, on the contrary, He made this world simply
by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the
completion of His work, cease to appear and approach
it any more. Nay rather, God began to appear more
conspicuously and to be everywhere accessible from the
time when the world was made."
Tertullian adds that God also made the world by
"applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His
wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His
Spirit, His might. Now these things were not necessary
to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and
approaching."
Yet Tertullian can still affirm the truthfulness of
CREATIO EX NIHILO in the sense that God did not employ
any primordial matter to bring forth all things:
"Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than
that all things were made out of nothing? They are
incapable of being found out or investigated, except
by God alone."
Regards,
Edgar
__________________________________________________________________________________
Dear list-members,
A couple of years ago--I do not remember the exact
year--Rob Bowman and I engaged in a dialogue
concerning CREATIO EX NIHILO. Since then I have given
the subject a lot of thought and engaged in extensive
research on this topic. The present author has
subsequently concluded that the expression CREATIO EX
NIHILO is permissible as long as we qualify what we
mean by such language. This point is forcefully
brought out by Richard Creel, who argues that
something can never come from an absolute void (i.e.
nothing) as Athanasius argued. Such a process is ruled
out by the basic principle of logical necessity [EX
NIHILO NIHIL FIT].
On the other hand, if one interprets CREATIO EX NIHILO
as creating from nothing except God's "omnipotent
resources" then I find no personal objection to the
terminology. (See Creel's _Divine impassibility: an
essay in philosophical theology_, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986. The one downside to this work
is Creel's unnecessary postulation of a "plenum" of
uncreated possibilities to explain how God creates TA
PANTA without doing so EX NIHILO or EX DEO.)
Now Rob argued that Jehovah's Witnesses may
(unwittingly) teach that the cosmos is a product of
God's very being since JWs say that God created the
universe by means of His own dynamic energy (i.e. His
omnipotent resources). Rob finds the idea of God using
His personal emanative energies to create the cosmos,
seemingly unorthodox and problematic. The Witnesses
obviously [seem to] disagree.
While I do not plan on resolving this issue now, I
wonder what Rob thinks of the words from Tertullian's
treatise Against Hermogenes (section 45.1ff). Does he
think that Tertullian is also some type of pantheist
or panentheist since he writes:
"Do not be willing so to cover God with flattery, as
to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and
simple approach so many vast substances, instead of
rather forming them by His own energies. For this is
proved by Jeremiah when he says, 'God hath made the
earth by His power, He hath established the world by
His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven by His
understanding.' These are the energies by the stress
of which He made this universe. His glory is greater
if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested
from His works. Both one and the other were after His
manner. If, on the contrary, He made this world simply
by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the
completion of His work, cease to appear and approach
it any more. Nay rather, God began to appear more
conspicuously and to be everywhere accessible from the
time when the world was made."
Tertullian adds that God also made the world by
"applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His
wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His
Spirit, His might. Now these things were not necessary
to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and
approaching."
Yet Tertullian can still affirm the truthfulness of
CREATIO EX NIHILO in the sense that God did not employ
any primordial matter to bring forth all things:
"Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than
that all things were made out of nothing? They are
incapable of being found out or investigated, except
by God alone."
Regards,
Edgar
Sunday, March 09, 2008
Geza Vermes on the Expression "Son of God"
I found this quote from Geza Vermes to be informative:
"To a Greek speaker in Alexandria, Antioch or Athens
at the turn of the eras, the concept hUIOS QEOU, son
of God, would have brought to mind either one of the
many offspring of the Olympian deities, or possibly a
deified Egyptian-Ptolemaic king, or the divine emperor
of Rome, descendant of the apotheosized Julius Caesar.
But to a Jew, the corresponding Hebrew or Aramaic
phrase would have applied to none of these. For him,
son of God could refer, in an ascending order, to any
of the children of Israel; or to a good Jew; or to a
charismatic holy Jew; or to the king of Israel; or in
particular to the royal Messiah; and finally, in a
different sense, to an angelic or heavenly being. In
other words, 'son of God' was always understood
metaphorically in Jewish circles. In Jewish sources,
its use never implies participation by the person
so-named in the divine nature. It may in consequence
safely be assumed that if the medium in which
Christian theology developed had been Hebrew and not
Greek, it would not have produced an incarnation
doctrine as this is traditionally understood" (Jesus
in His Jewish Context, page 66).
"To a Greek speaker in Alexandria, Antioch or Athens
at the turn of the eras, the concept hUIOS QEOU, son
of God, would have brought to mind either one of the
many offspring of the Olympian deities, or possibly a
deified Egyptian-Ptolemaic king, or the divine emperor
of Rome, descendant of the apotheosized Julius Caesar.
But to a Jew, the corresponding Hebrew or Aramaic
phrase would have applied to none of these. For him,
son of God could refer, in an ascending order, to any
of the children of Israel; or to a good Jew; or to a
charismatic holy Jew; or to the king of Israel; or in
particular to the royal Messiah; and finally, in a
different sense, to an angelic or heavenly being. In
other words, 'son of God' was always understood
metaphorically in Jewish circles. In Jewish sources,
its use never implies participation by the person
so-named in the divine nature. It may in consequence
safely be assumed that if the medium in which
Christian theology developed had been Hebrew and not
Greek, it would not have produced an incarnation
doctrine as this is traditionally understood" (Jesus
in His Jewish Context, page 66).
Thomas Aquinas and Divine Paternity
In the Summa Theologica I.33.2, reply to objection 3, Thomas Aquinas writes:
"In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father."
Aquinas contends that the Logos is a Son "properly" not metaphorically. The implication is that the Word of God literally is God's Son. Thomas clarifies this point by noting that the Father is the Son's "principle" or "origin" (i.e. loosely speaking, the Father is the "cause" of the Son or the one who communicates the divine nature to the Son. Hence, there is no doubt that Thomas thinks of God as a "proper" or literal Father of the Son. I will concede that Aquinas is not imputing the biological status of paternity to God. But what does it mean to say that God the Father communicates the divine nature to God the Son? How does God communicate the divine nature to the Son timelessly or continuously such that God never began to communicate the divine nature nor will God ever cease to communicate the divine nature? Moreover, is this how the earliest Christians understood God's paternity? The argument in my dissertation is that most early Christian writers thought of "Father" as a metaphor; in fact, it was a very familiar metaphor used in Judaism and in writings penned by Greeks and Romans. LSJ and BDAG Greek-English lexica document these uses. It appears to me that Thomas' treatment of the term "Father" raises more questions that it solves. The utilization of divine atemporality just deepens the mystery of eternal generation.
"In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father."
Aquinas contends that the Logos is a Son "properly" not metaphorically. The implication is that the Word of God literally is God's Son. Thomas clarifies this point by noting that the Father is the Son's "principle" or "origin" (i.e. loosely speaking, the Father is the "cause" of the Son or the one who communicates the divine nature to the Son. Hence, there is no doubt that Thomas thinks of God as a "proper" or literal Father of the Son. I will concede that Aquinas is not imputing the biological status of paternity to God. But what does it mean to say that God the Father communicates the divine nature to God the Son? How does God communicate the divine nature to the Son timelessly or continuously such that God never began to communicate the divine nature nor will God ever cease to communicate the divine nature? Moreover, is this how the earliest Christians understood God's paternity? The argument in my dissertation is that most early Christian writers thought of "Father" as a metaphor; in fact, it was a very familiar metaphor used in Judaism and in writings penned by Greeks and Romans. LSJ and BDAG Greek-English lexica document these uses. It appears to me that Thomas' treatment of the term "Father" raises more questions that it solves. The utilization of divine atemporality just deepens the mystery of eternal generation.
Metaphor and God the Father
It is my position that the term "Father" when used of God in relation to His only-begotten Son (John 3:16; 14:28) or when employed with respect to those whom God has imbued with His Spirit (Galatians 4:6-7) is a metaphor or as-if structure. While it is not always feasible to contrast the metaphorical with the literal, I would contend that God is not the literal Father of His only-begotten Son nor is God the literal Father of those whom He has regenerated through the Holy Spirit (Titus 3:5-6). Some have wondered why I would deny that God is literally the Father of the Son since the Trinity brochure published by Jehovah's Witnesses clearly appears to state that God is literally the Father of the Logos.
It is not my intent to take exception to what the Trinity brochure expresses. Much depends on what is meant by the term "literal." By "literal," (in this context), I mean "a usage of speech whereby the properties that are predicated of a subject actually are exemplified by the subject." For instance, if I attribute the property "burgundy" to my 2001 Ford Focus (the subject in this case), then I am using the predicate "burgundy" in a literal manner. Conversely, if I say that my 2001 Ford Focus is "cool," I'm probably not employing the predicate "cool" in the same way that I utilize the predicate "burgundy." One word is being used literally whereas the other term is metaphorical; that is, my car does not actually exemplify or instantiate the property of being cool. It does not exemplify the property of coolness in a matter-of-fact way. Similarly, when I utter the words, "God is the Father of the Son," my contention is that the proposition is not attributing properties to the subject "God" that God (as the subject of the proposition) literally exemplifies since the definition of a literal "father" in English is "A man who begets or raises or nurtures a child; a male parent of an animal; A male ancestor" (American Heritage Dictionary).
But God is not a male (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9) nor does God literally beget, raise or nurture children. As Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, there is a dialectical tension that exists between the "is" and the "is not" when we talk about God the Father: there is a sense in which God both is and is not Father. In English, to speak of a literal father pretty much equates to speaking of a biological male who either nurtures or engenders children. But these descriptions do not appertain to Almighty God.
It is not my intent to take exception to what the Trinity brochure expresses. Much depends on what is meant by the term "literal." By "literal," (in this context), I mean "a usage of speech whereby the properties that are predicated of a subject actually are exemplified by the subject." For instance, if I attribute the property "burgundy" to my 2001 Ford Focus (the subject in this case), then I am using the predicate "burgundy" in a literal manner. Conversely, if I say that my 2001 Ford Focus is "cool," I'm probably not employing the predicate "cool" in the same way that I utilize the predicate "burgundy." One word is being used literally whereas the other term is metaphorical; that is, my car does not actually exemplify or instantiate the property of being cool. It does not exemplify the property of coolness in a matter-of-fact way. Similarly, when I utter the words, "God is the Father of the Son," my contention is that the proposition is not attributing properties to the subject "God" that God (as the subject of the proposition) literally exemplifies since the definition of a literal "father" in English is "A man who begets or raises or nurtures a child; a male parent of an animal; A male ancestor" (American Heritage Dictionary).
But God is not a male (Numbers 23:19; Hosea 11:9) nor does God literally beget, raise or nurture children. As Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, there is a dialectical tension that exists between the "is" and the "is not" when we talk about God the Father: there is a sense in which God both is and is not Father. In English, to speak of a literal father pretty much equates to speaking of a biological male who either nurtures or engenders children. But these descriptions do not appertain to Almighty God.
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
John 17:3 and ALHQINOS
Here are some brief thoughts on the ALHQINOS/ALHQHS:
Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon points out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly" (see John 6:55).
This source comments on John 17:3 (semantic domain 70.3), noting that this passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read that ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth" (cf. John 4:18). Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form of the word is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, its denotation may be "true, genuine."
Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon points out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly" (see John 6:55).
This source comments on John 17:3 (semantic domain 70.3), noting that this passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."
In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read that ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth" (cf. John 4:18). Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.
LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form of the word is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, its denotation may be "true, genuine."
Sunday, March 02, 2008
Galatians 5:22
Concerning Galatians 5:22 and ἀγάπη:
(1) The postpositive δὲ likely functions as a "switch-reference" or transitional device in this verse; notice the presence of the article ὁ which when accompanying δὲ in such contexts normally signals transition. Therefore, the NWT (1984 and 2013) renders the passage: "On the other hand . . ."
"The Spirit, on the other hand, brings a harvest of love, joy, peace; patience towards others, kindness, benevolence" (Weymouth NT)
(2) ὁ καρπὸς is nominative singular masculine. Ergo, strictly speaking, Paul is not listing the "fruits" of the spirit, but the "fruit" or fruitage of God's spirit of holiness. Commentators (including Martin Luther) have pointed out that all other "fruits of the spirit" are simply manifestations of the first fruit mentioned, that is, ἀγάπη. This point seems to be borne out when one compares Galatians 5:22-23 with 1 Corinthians 13:1-8.
(3) The fruit or fruitage listed in Galatians 5:22-23 can only be produced via the activity of God's holy spirit: note the contrast that Paul makes with his use of τὰ ἔργα in 5:19-21. So Jehovah God works in his people that we may both will and act to his praise and glory (Philippians 2:13).
(4) God is ἀγάπη with respect to His essence; He is love (1 John 4:8). Some theologians have thus called ἀγάπη, God's "primal ethical attribute" (I. Dorner). That is, some who study God's essence/nature perceive the need to distinguish between God's "ethical" and His "ontological" attributes. While God cannot not love, there is a sense in which He shows divine love freely (Hosea 14). YHWH does not merely love on "automatic pilot" as it were. The Bible and the pre-Nicenes affirm God's free will, not just the freedom of humans, which includes the divine ability to love because Jehovah God voluntarily demonstrates affection for His creatures.
(5) Love is the hallmark of true Christianity (John 13:34-35). No one has greater love than that someone should lay down his or her life for friends (especially other worshipers of God). See John 15:13; 1 John 3:16-18.
(1) The postpositive δὲ likely functions as a "switch-reference" or transitional device in this verse; notice the presence of the article ὁ which when accompanying δὲ in such contexts normally signals transition. Therefore, the NWT (1984 and 2013) renders the passage: "On the other hand . . ."
"The Spirit, on the other hand, brings a harvest of love, joy, peace; patience towards others, kindness, benevolence" (Weymouth NT)
(2) ὁ καρπὸς is nominative singular masculine. Ergo, strictly speaking, Paul is not listing the "fruits" of the spirit, but the "fruit" or fruitage of God's spirit of holiness. Commentators (including Martin Luther) have pointed out that all other "fruits of the spirit" are simply manifestations of the first fruit mentioned, that is, ἀγάπη. This point seems to be borne out when one compares Galatians 5:22-23 with 1 Corinthians 13:1-8.
(3) The fruit or fruitage listed in Galatians 5:22-23 can only be produced via the activity of God's holy spirit: note the contrast that Paul makes with his use of τὰ ἔργα in 5:19-21. So Jehovah God works in his people that we may both will and act to his praise and glory (Philippians 2:13).
(4) God is ἀγάπη with respect to His essence; He is love (1 John 4:8). Some theologians have thus called ἀγάπη, God's "primal ethical attribute" (I. Dorner). That is, some who study God's essence/nature perceive the need to distinguish between God's "ethical" and His "ontological" attributes. While God cannot not love, there is a sense in which He shows divine love freely (Hosea 14). YHWH does not merely love on "automatic pilot" as it were. The Bible and the pre-Nicenes affirm God's free will, not just the freedom of humans, which includes the divine ability to love because Jehovah God voluntarily demonstrates affection for His creatures.
(5) Love is the hallmark of true Christianity (John 13:34-35). No one has greater love than that someone should lay down his or her life for friends (especially other worshipers of God). See John 15:13; 1 John 3:16-18.
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Deaths in the 20th Century
Professor R. J. Rummel writes:
<<
I have changed my estimate for colonial democide from 870,000 to an additional 50,000,000. Details here.
Thus, the new world total: old total 1900-1999 = 174,000,000. New World total = 174,000,000 + 38,000,000 (new for China) + 50,000,000 (new for Colonies) = 262,000,000.
Just to give perspective on this incredible murder by government, if all these bodies were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5', then they would circle the earth ten times. Also, this democide murdered 6 times more people than died in combat in all the foreign and internal wars of the century. Finally, given popular estimates of the dead in a major nuclear war, this total democide is as though such a war did occur, but with its dead spread over a century.>>
See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
<<
I have changed my estimate for colonial democide from 870,000 to an additional 50,000,000. Details here.
Thus, the new world total: old total 1900-1999 = 174,000,000. New World total = 174,000,000 + 38,000,000 (new for China) + 50,000,000 (new for Colonies) = 262,000,000.
Just to give perspective on this incredible murder by government, if all these bodies were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5', then they would circle the earth ten times. Also, this democide murdered 6 times more people than died in combat in all the foreign and internal wars of the century. Finally, given popular estimates of the dead in a major nuclear war, this total democide is as though such a war did occur, but with its dead spread over a century.>>
See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
Monday, January 21, 2008
Dialogue on Christmas and Birthdays
[My interlocutor]
"Jesus may not have been born on Dec. 25, but for all we know He was born on Dec. 25, or on a date close to that. But then it makes no difference whether or not Jesus was born on Dec. 25. The Catholic Church still has a divine right to institute a nativity festival if it deems fit, and the date of Dec. 25 is founded on an ancient tradition that reportedly is attested to as early as Tertullian and possibly St. Hippolytus in the first half of the 200s A.D., so that date is as good as any."
[Foster]
If you do not know the date that someone was born, then any date will do, right? The whole system for deriving December 25 in ancient times was faulty. First, Bible prophecy (Daniel 9:24-27) suggests that Christ was not born on December 25 or in the winter season. If Christ was 33 1/2 years old when he died, then he could not have been born in December. The account found at Luke 2:8-11 also indicates that Christ was not born in winter since the shepherds are spoken of as having their flocks out of doors then. What sane shepherd would have been keeping his flock in the fields during rough Palestinian winters? M'Clintock and Strong's _Cyclopaedia_ wisely observes:
"The day of Christ's birth cannot be ascertained from the NT, or indeed, from any other source" (II:276).
[My interlocutor]
"Wow. What are you talking about?? Saturn wasn't the sun god, Fos, and Saturnalia wasn't celebrated on Dec. 25. Even that Kelly quote doesn't make that mistake. "Christians" also didn't worship the sun god, though sometimes Christians apostatised during persecutions."
[Foster]
Maybe you need to give the inet a rest in order to do some research. The Saturnalia was a festival to Saturn and the unconquered sun. Moreover, it took place on December 25 and many of its customs are evidently retained in the Christmas celebration. The NET Bible (a non-JW source found at bible.org) notes:
"December 25 as the celebrated date of Jesus' birth arose around the time of Constantine (ca. a.d. 306-337), though it is mentioned in material from Hippolytus (a.d. 165-235). Some think that the reason for celebration on this date was that it coincided with the pagan Roman festival of Saturnalia, and Christians could celebrate their own festival at this time without fear of persecution."
While the NET Bible does not give an opinion one way or the other on this issue, it does mention that it some scholars do associate Christmas with the Roman Saturnalia.
[My interlocutor]
"Oh, I agree that the fact that Origen's opinions about birthdays are erroneous has no bearing on the point at hand. I do wonder, though, why you seemed to suggest that Origen's erroneous arguments were correct, if you don't think Origen was right."
[Foster]
I did not say that Origen's arguments were erroneous or incorrect. If you will read carefully, you will find that my point was that it does not matter whether his arguments are sound or valid (TERMINI TECHNICI in logic). The point is that Origen, Arnobius and other Christians manifested antipathy toward birthdays. That is the salient *historical* point.
[My interlocutor]
"Yes, I know what your argument is. We know that the early Christians did not usually celebrate birthdays, and therefore it is likely they did not celebrate the birth of Jesus during those early times. However, we don't know that the early Christians opposition to celebrating birthdays was universal, and we don't know that, even if they didn't celebrate birthdays, they didn't begin to make an exception in the case of Jesus' birth, say, by 250-300 A.D. In fact it would be surprising if Christians waited until 300 A.D. to start celebrating Christmas, given the fact that even in the early 200s A.D. Christians were quite interested in determining the date of His birth. To make the dogmatic and bold claim that "it is ludicrous to contend that they would have celebrated the feast of Jesus' birth at this time" is simply going much, much, much further than the evidence can justify."
[Foster]
You have it all wrong. Show me evidence that Christians prior to the fourth century celebrated birthdays at all. Indeed, their opposition to birthdays does seem to have been universal. The practice of observing Christ's birthday evidently began with fourth century Christians, who considered the sun an object of veneration or who saw a nexus between the Son and the Sun. You cannot successfully date the observance of Christ's birth before the fourth century. Read Paul Johnson's work [referenced in an earlier dialogue] for an account of how sun worship affected the "Christian" observance of Jesus' supposed birthday. The [historical] evidence from the time of Constantine and Julian the Apostate favors Johnson's narratival account.
"Jesus may not have been born on Dec. 25, but for all we know He was born on Dec. 25, or on a date close to that. But then it makes no difference whether or not Jesus was born on Dec. 25. The Catholic Church still has a divine right to institute a nativity festival if it deems fit, and the date of Dec. 25 is founded on an ancient tradition that reportedly is attested to as early as Tertullian and possibly St. Hippolytus in the first half of the 200s A.D., so that date is as good as any."
[Foster]
If you do not know the date that someone was born, then any date will do, right? The whole system for deriving December 25 in ancient times was faulty. First, Bible prophecy (Daniel 9:24-27) suggests that Christ was not born on December 25 or in the winter season. If Christ was 33 1/2 years old when he died, then he could not have been born in December. The account found at Luke 2:8-11 also indicates that Christ was not born in winter since the shepherds are spoken of as having their flocks out of doors then. What sane shepherd would have been keeping his flock in the fields during rough Palestinian winters? M'Clintock and Strong's _Cyclopaedia_ wisely observes:
"The day of Christ's birth cannot be ascertained from the NT, or indeed, from any other source" (II:276).
[My interlocutor]
"Wow. What are you talking about?? Saturn wasn't the sun god, Fos, and Saturnalia wasn't celebrated on Dec. 25. Even that Kelly quote doesn't make that mistake. "Christians" also didn't worship the sun god, though sometimes Christians apostatised during persecutions."
[Foster]
Maybe you need to give the inet a rest in order to do some research. The Saturnalia was a festival to Saturn and the unconquered sun. Moreover, it took place on December 25 and many of its customs are evidently retained in the Christmas celebration. The NET Bible (a non-JW source found at bible.org) notes:
"December 25 as the celebrated date of Jesus' birth arose around the time of Constantine (ca. a.d. 306-337), though it is mentioned in material from Hippolytus (a.d. 165-235). Some think that the reason for celebration on this date was that it coincided with the pagan Roman festival of Saturnalia, and Christians could celebrate their own festival at this time without fear of persecution."
While the NET Bible does not give an opinion one way or the other on this issue, it does mention that it some scholars do associate Christmas with the Roman Saturnalia.
[My interlocutor]
"Oh, I agree that the fact that Origen's opinions about birthdays are erroneous has no bearing on the point at hand. I do wonder, though, why you seemed to suggest that Origen's erroneous arguments were correct, if you don't think Origen was right."
[Foster]
I did not say that Origen's arguments were erroneous or incorrect. If you will read carefully, you will find that my point was that it does not matter whether his arguments are sound or valid (TERMINI TECHNICI in logic). The point is that Origen, Arnobius and other Christians manifested antipathy toward birthdays. That is the salient *historical* point.
[My interlocutor]
"Yes, I know what your argument is. We know that the early Christians did not usually celebrate birthdays, and therefore it is likely they did not celebrate the birth of Jesus during those early times. However, we don't know that the early Christians opposition to celebrating birthdays was universal, and we don't know that, even if they didn't celebrate birthdays, they didn't begin to make an exception in the case of Jesus' birth, say, by 250-300 A.D. In fact it would be surprising if Christians waited until 300 A.D. to start celebrating Christmas, given the fact that even in the early 200s A.D. Christians were quite interested in determining the date of His birth. To make the dogmatic and bold claim that "it is ludicrous to contend that they would have celebrated the feast of Jesus' birth at this time" is simply going much, much, much further than the evidence can justify."
[Foster]
You have it all wrong. Show me evidence that Christians prior to the fourth century celebrated birthdays at all. Indeed, their opposition to birthdays does seem to have been universal. The practice of observing Christ's birthday evidently began with fourth century Christians, who considered the sun an object of veneration or who saw a nexus between the Son and the Sun. You cannot successfully date the observance of Christ's birth before the fourth century. Read Paul Johnson's work [referenced in an earlier dialogue] for an account of how sun worship affected the "Christian" observance of Jesus' supposed birthday. The [historical] evidence from the time of Constantine and Julian the Apostate favors Johnson's narratival account.
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
The Divine Triangle
The third key doctrine of historical Christianity or Christendom (in addition to the Atonement and Incarnation) is the Trinity doctrine. The Trinity is the foundational teaching of so-called orthodox Christianity. It is putatively the mystery of God and the mystery of salvation (mysterium dei et mysterium salutis). This teaching is a mystery in that it is supposedly a product of divine revelation. In the words of Karen Armstrong, the triune Godhead lies "beyond words, concepts and human powers of analysis" (Armstrong 1993:118). God's triunity is utterly incapable of being understood by human reasoning.
a) The Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Old or the New Testament. Nevertheless, those who consider themselves orthodox Christians believe that there are subtle intimations of the doctrine in the Holy Scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity (Genesis 1:26; John 1:1). For example, the creation account recorded in Genesis depicts God uttering the words: "Let us make humankind in our image." Why is the Hebrew deity depicted as utilizing the plural pronouns "us" and "our"? Is the Genesis text suggesting that God is not a bare monad but a differentiated triad? Those who consider themselves orthodox Christians generally answer this question in the affirmative.
b) Despite such scriptural "intimations," however, the Trinity as a doctrine qua doctrine did not become a historical reality until 381 A. D. In that fateful year, the First Council of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) decided that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally have a "single Godhead, power and substance in three divine persons." In other words, God is ontologically (in his very being) triangular. Nevertheless, in what sense is the Christian God triangular?
c) A triangle by definition has three sides or angles. According to most logicians, triangularity is a necessary property of a triangle. Trinitarians similarly insist that God is necessarily Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The "Christian" God did not gradually come to possess three sides, as it were. He is immutable and atemporal (i.e., timeless), Trinitarians contends. God thus has always been "three-sided" in the estimation of orthodox Christians: he is eternally triangular.
a) The Trinity is not explicitly taught in the Old or the New Testament. Nevertheless, those who consider themselves orthodox Christians believe that there are subtle intimations of the doctrine in the Holy Scriptures of both Judaism and Christianity (Genesis 1:26; John 1:1). For example, the creation account recorded in Genesis depicts God uttering the words: "Let us make humankind in our image." Why is the Hebrew deity depicted as utilizing the plural pronouns "us" and "our"? Is the Genesis text suggesting that God is not a bare monad but a differentiated triad? Those who consider themselves orthodox Christians generally answer this question in the affirmative.
b) Despite such scriptural "intimations," however, the Trinity as a doctrine qua doctrine did not become a historical reality until 381 A. D. In that fateful year, the First Council of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) decided that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit eternally have a "single Godhead, power and substance in three divine persons." In other words, God is ontologically (in his very being) triangular. Nevertheless, in what sense is the Christian God triangular?
c) A triangle by definition has three sides or angles. According to most logicians, triangularity is a necessary property of a triangle. Trinitarians similarly insist that God is necessarily Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The "Christian" God did not gradually come to possess three sides, as it were. He is immutable and atemporal (i.e., timeless), Trinitarians contends. God thus has always been "three-sided" in the estimation of orthodox Christians: he is eternally triangular.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
The Focal Point of My Dissertation
The Focal Point of Study for My Dissertation
This study's focal point is the Lactantian concept of God the Father in the light of classical and contemporary metaphor theory. Accordingly, it has four primary goals: (1) This investigation will determine the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to apply the paternal metaphor "Father" to God; (2) it will explore what Lactantius and other Christian writers possibly mean by "Father"; (3) moreover, this study will scrutinize how Lactantius conceives the relationship between the Father and the Son; (4) it will probe the eschatological significance that "Father" possibly has for Lactantius.
The introductory portion of this study is structured as follows. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of Lactantian studies. In the overview, a marked contrast between common preoccupations of patristic scholars or historians and the focus of this work will be established. Second, the overview will supply an outline of Lactantius' conception of God the Father. In that portion of this investigation, the seeming heterodox Christology of Lactantius will also be contextualized. Third, a synopsis of each chapter contained in this study will be furnished. In contrast to other works that have elected to research non-theological aspects of the early apologist's work, this study will scrutinize Lactantian thought pertaining to God the Father. Its chief aim is to ascertain whether Lactantius employs "Father" as a metaphor for God rather than as a proper name for an immutable and eternal distinction of the triune Godhead. Furthermore, this study proposes that by using the divine epithet "Father" as a metaphor, Lactantius apparently downplays the role of gender in his conceptualization of God. It is possible that Lactantius believes that gender is not an intrinsic property of God or a category of being whose primordial exemplar is divine. Therefore, while it might not be possible to apodictically discern Lactantian intent regarding divine gender, this investigation will argue that at the very least Lactantius is not preoccupied with the reputed gender of God the Father when he employs this venerable concept.
This study's focal point is the Lactantian concept of God the Father in the light of classical and contemporary metaphor theory. Accordingly, it has four primary goals: (1) This investigation will determine the possible conceptual or ecclesiastical antecedents that motivated Lactantius to apply the paternal metaphor "Father" to God; (2) it will explore what Lactantius and other Christian writers possibly mean by "Father"; (3) moreover, this study will scrutinize how Lactantius conceives the relationship between the Father and the Son; (4) it will probe the eschatological significance that "Father" possibly has for Lactantius.
The introductory portion of this study is structured as follows. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of Lactantian studies. In the overview, a marked contrast between common preoccupations of patristic scholars or historians and the focus of this work will be established. Second, the overview will supply an outline of Lactantius' conception of God the Father. In that portion of this investigation, the seeming heterodox Christology of Lactantius will also be contextualized. Third, a synopsis of each chapter contained in this study will be furnished. In contrast to other works that have elected to research non-theological aspects of the early apologist's work, this study will scrutinize Lactantian thought pertaining to God the Father. Its chief aim is to ascertain whether Lactantius employs "Father" as a metaphor for God rather than as a proper name for an immutable and eternal distinction of the triune Godhead. Furthermore, this study proposes that by using the divine epithet "Father" as a metaphor, Lactantius apparently downplays the role of gender in his conceptualization of God. It is possible that Lactantius believes that gender is not an intrinsic property of God or a category of being whose primordial exemplar is divine. Therefore, while it might not be possible to apodictically discern Lactantian intent regarding divine gender, this investigation will argue that at the very least Lactantius is not preoccupied with the reputed gender of God the Father when he employs this venerable concept.
Wednesday, January 02, 2008
The Didache and Baptism
One question that arises with regard to the Didache is, when was it
written? Is it a first or second century document? While there
is no unanimous consensus on this question--I note that a number of scholars
believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If this belief is accurate, this fact would comport with either Origen or Tertullian's comments regarding the subject of infant baptism.
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century
document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have
originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably
during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History,
page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70
(See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think that the evidence favors the second century dating. (I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation in deciding on that date. But the contents in the work make me incline toward the second century dating for the Didache. This along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my perspective.)
I believe that Christian baptism first involved the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." He argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (See The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that different kinds of baptism occurred from the second century onward, though it seems that Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts
8:34-39).
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening
in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. Therefore, it seems
highly unlikely that all Christians practiced sprinkling then (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53). The Bible itself appears to clearly teach baptism by water immersion.
Regards,
Edgar
written? Is it a first or second century document? While there
is no unanimous consensus on this question--I note that a number of scholars
believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If this belief is accurate, this fact would comport with either Origen or Tertullian's comments regarding the subject of infant baptism.
Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century
document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).
Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have
originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably
during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History,
page 12).
Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).
But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70
(See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think that the evidence favors the second century dating. (I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation in deciding on that date. But the contents in the work make me incline toward the second century dating for the Didache. This along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my perspective.)
I believe that Christian baptism first involved the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." He argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (See The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).
So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that different kinds of baptism occurred from the second century onward, though it seems that Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts
8:34-39).
I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening
in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. Therefore, it seems
highly unlikely that all Christians practiced sprinkling then (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53). The Bible itself appears to clearly teach baptism by water immersion.
Regards,
Edgar
Monday, December 03, 2007
New HIV Cases Could be Increasing
This report was taken from http://tinyurl.com/3xwmry
When reading this report, we encourage you to consult Revelation 6:1-8.
According to data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2001 to 2005 (the latest years available), the number of new cases of HIV infection diagnosed among 15-to-19-year-olds in the United States rose from 1,010 in 2001, held steady for the next three years, then jumped 20 percent in 2005, to 1,213 cases.
For young people aged 20 to 24, cases of new infection have climbed steadily, from 3,184 in 2001 to 3,876 in 2005.
Newer infection numbers set to be released soon by the CDC may be even higher, the Washington Post reported Saturday. According to the Post, sources close to scientists preparing the new statistics have confirmed that rates of new infection in the United States may be 50 percent higher than previously believed -- a jump from 40,000 new infections per year to up to 60,000. The increase is based on new blood testing methods, the Post said, and whether it signifies a growth in actual cases remains to be seen.
Experts say a number of factors may be at play, including the fact that many HIV-infected patients are now being kept healthy with powerful drugs -- making AIDS seem like less of a threat to young people than it did in the past.
When reading this report, we encourage you to consult Revelation 6:1-8.
According to data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2001 to 2005 (the latest years available), the number of new cases of HIV infection diagnosed among 15-to-19-year-olds in the United States rose from 1,010 in 2001, held steady for the next three years, then jumped 20 percent in 2005, to 1,213 cases.
For young people aged 20 to 24, cases of new infection have climbed steadily, from 3,184 in 2001 to 3,876 in 2005.
Newer infection numbers set to be released soon by the CDC may be even higher, the Washington Post reported Saturday. According to the Post, sources close to scientists preparing the new statistics have confirmed that rates of new infection in the United States may be 50 percent higher than previously believed -- a jump from 40,000 new infections per year to up to 60,000. The increase is based on new blood testing methods, the Post said, and whether it signifies a growth in actual cases remains to be seen.
Experts say a number of factors may be at play, including the fact that many HIV-infected patients are now being kept healthy with powerful drugs -- making AIDS seem like less of a threat to young people than it did in the past.
Saturday, November 24, 2007
Russians, Drug Abuse and Death
In addition to factors (crime and alcohol abuse) that account for a life expectancy of 59 years for males and 73 years for females, Russia is now faced with another problem that is wiping out its population. According to Wikipedia, Russia has the highest growth rate of HIV/AIDS outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. But that is not what I am going to say is wiping out its population. Drug addiction is killing approximately 80,000 Russians per year. Because of its geography, Russia is an optimum place for drug trafficking to occur. As a result, many people are becoming addicted to drugs and dying from the abuse of controlled substances. Human Rights Watch is very concerned about the situation in Russia. They want the government of Russia to improve drug treatment schemes which include counseling and medicating patients in an appropriate manner. The death rate from drug abuse in Russia is evidently just another indication that we are living in the last days of this depraved world (2 Timothy 3:1-5).
See http://tinyurl.com/2nxbje
See http://tinyurl.com/2nxbje
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Infant Deaths and the United States
The Associated Press has reported that the United States is among the worst nation in terms of infant deaths. Despite the fact that America has "more neonatologists and newborn intensive care beds per person than Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom," the death rate for infants is still among the worst. Granted, the rate for infant mortality in the United States has decreased over the past 50 years. However, it seems hard to believe that a developed nation like America has 7 babies to die for every 1,000 births. Why is infant death such a problem in the United States? Experts attribute the problem to socioeconomic disparities which affect the type of health care that minorities and other poor folks receive. Despite the bleak picture in the United States, however, Africa has an even worse situation when it comes to infant mortality. In some parts of Africa, the infant mortality rate is 144 per 1,000 births. Could infant mortality be another indication that the times in which we live are "critical"?
See http://tinyurl.com/yo5bfy
See http://tinyurl.com/yo5bfy
Sunday, November 11, 2007
World War II and Matthew 24:6-7
Some people think that the world is getting better. They argue that we are far from seeing the fulfillment of Jesus' eschatological prophecy contained in Matthew 24. However, historians and other students of world events think that something momentous happened in the twentieth century, even if these academics do not agree on the significance of particular events that transpired during the twentieth century. For instance, we read:
"Although World War I has been described as a total war, World War II was even more so and was fought on a scale unprecedented in history. The entire populations of warring countries were involved: as combatants; as workers in wartime industries; as civilians who suffered invasion, occupation, and aerial bombing; or as victims of persecution and mass extermination. The world had never witnessed such widespread human-made death and destruction" (_Western Civilization_, Jackson J. Spielvogel, 973).
Not only were World Wars I or II signs that humanity was in for a drastic change, but subsequent events would imply that we are living in a significant time period. In the future, I will submit other posts that will demonstrate that life in this world is not getting qualitatively better.
"Although World War I has been described as a total war, World War II was even more so and was fought on a scale unprecedented in history. The entire populations of warring countries were involved: as combatants; as workers in wartime industries; as civilians who suffered invasion, occupation, and aerial bombing; or as victims of persecution and mass extermination. The world had never witnessed such widespread human-made death and destruction" (_Western Civilization_, Jackson J. Spielvogel, 973).
Not only were World Wars I or II signs that humanity was in for a drastic change, but subsequent events would imply that we are living in a significant time period. In the future, I will submit other posts that will demonstrate that life in this world is not getting qualitatively better.
Sunday, November 04, 2007
Lewis Ayres on the Cappadocian Use of TROPOS hUPARXEWS
One of the most recent historical studies on the Trinity doctrine has this to say about the terminology TROPOS hUPARXEWS as it is utilized by the Cappadocians:
"In Chapter 8 I noted that in Basil the phrase TROPOS hUPARXEWS served
to identify not a metaphysically dense notion of personhood but merely
the mode of origination of the persons. In Gregory of Nyssa the phrase
is more frequently used, but with equal austerity of meaning (and
directly still only of Son and Spirit). What we know of the persons is
their modes of origination and the characteristics attributed to them
by Scripture--as long as all attributes are understood to be those of
the one simple Godhead" (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004, page 359).
"In Chapter 8 I noted that in Basil the phrase TROPOS hUPARXEWS served
to identify not a metaphysically dense notion of personhood but merely
the mode of origination of the persons. In Gregory of Nyssa the phrase
is more frequently used, but with equal austerity of meaning (and
directly still only of Son and Spirit). What we know of the persons is
their modes of origination and the characteristics attributed to them
by Scripture--as long as all attributes are understood to be those of
the one simple Godhead" (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004, page 359).
Friday, November 02, 2007
PAROUSIA and ERXOMAI
My studies have suggested that PAROUSIA and ERXOMAI
are not semantically identical nor are they interchangeable per se.
But I do believe that PAROUSIA, like ERXOMAI, may mean "arrival" in
certain contexts. It certainly refers to the visit of
important personages in the papyri.
BDAG points out that PAROUSIA can mean (1) "the state
of being present at a place, presence" or (2) "arrival
as the first stage in presence, coming, advent."
Sense (1) is clearly found at Phil 2:12 where Paul
contrasts his own PAROUSIA with his APOUSIA. 1 Cor
16:17; 2 Cor 10:10 also seem to be examples of
PAROUSIA being used to mean "presence," though some
think it may signify "arrival" in Paul's first letter
to the Corinthians. See _The New Linguistic and
Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_, pg. 391.
But compare Marion L. Soards _1 Corinthians_ (New
International Biblical Commentary), p. 364.
BDAG suggests that PAROUSIA in 2 Cor 7:6 and Phil 1:26
refers to the "coming" of Titus or Paul. However, one
can just as well understand PAROUSIA in the said
verses as "presence" or "the state of being present at
a place." See Moises Silva's _Philippians (The
Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary), pp. 86-87. To see
examples of PAROUSIA employed as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for both Christians and non-Christians, consult
Moulton-Milligan, p. 497.
Regarding the use of PAROUSIA as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for the "presence" of Jesus Christ, I find N.T.
Wright's comments enlightening:
"But why should we think--except for reasons of
ecclesiastical and scholarly tradition--that PAROUSIA
means 'the second coming,' and/or the downward
travel on a cloud of Jesus and/or the 'son of man'?
PAROUSIA means 'presence' as opposed to APOUSIA,
'absence'; hence it denotes the 'arrival' of
someone not at the moment present; and it is
especially used in relation to the visit 'of a royal
or official personage.' Until evidence for a different
meaning is produced, this should be our starting-point"
(_Jesus and the Victory of God_, page 341).
What does Wright mean by the "arrival" of Christ,
however. In that same publication, he makes it clear
that he is referring to the "enthronement" of Christ
and not to his Second Advent:
"For the ordinary sense of 'arrival', cf. 1 Cor.
16:17; 2 Cor. 7:6, 7; 10:10; Phil. 1:26; 2:12. From
this, the most natural meaning for the word as applied
to Jesus would be something like 'arrival on the
scene,' in the sense of enthronement" (ibid).
TDNT makes the point even clearer in its treatment of
PAROUSIA.
Finally, Louw-Nida shows that ERXOMAI can denote: "to
move from one place to another, either coming or
going." Abbott-Smith has similar comments.
Regards,
Edgar
are not semantically identical nor are they interchangeable per se.
But I do believe that PAROUSIA, like ERXOMAI, may mean "arrival" in
certain contexts. It certainly refers to the visit of
important personages in the papyri.
BDAG points out that PAROUSIA can mean (1) "the state
of being present at a place, presence" or (2) "arrival
as the first stage in presence, coming, advent."
Sense (1) is clearly found at Phil 2:12 where Paul
contrasts his own PAROUSIA with his APOUSIA. 1 Cor
16:17; 2 Cor 10:10 also seem to be examples of
PAROUSIA being used to mean "presence," though some
think it may signify "arrival" in Paul's first letter
to the Corinthians. See _The New Linguistic and
Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_, pg. 391.
But compare Marion L. Soards _1 Corinthians_ (New
International Biblical Commentary), p. 364.
BDAG suggests that PAROUSIA in 2 Cor 7:6 and Phil 1:26
refers to the "coming" of Titus or Paul. However, one
can just as well understand PAROUSIA in the said
verses as "presence" or "the state of being present at
a place." See Moises Silva's _Philippians (The
Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary), pp. 86-87. To see
examples of PAROUSIA employed as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for both Christians and non-Christians, consult
Moulton-Milligan, p. 497.
Regarding the use of PAROUSIA as a TECHNICUS TERMINUS
for the "presence" of Jesus Christ, I find N.T.
Wright's comments enlightening:
"But why should we think--except for reasons of
ecclesiastical and scholarly tradition--that PAROUSIA
means 'the second coming,' and/or the downward
travel on a cloud of Jesus and/or the 'son of man'?
PAROUSIA means 'presence' as opposed to APOUSIA,
'absence'; hence it denotes the 'arrival' of
someone not at the moment present; and it is
especially used in relation to the visit 'of a royal
or official personage.' Until evidence for a different
meaning is produced, this should be our starting-point"
(_Jesus and the Victory of God_, page 341).
What does Wright mean by the "arrival" of Christ,
however. In that same publication, he makes it clear
that he is referring to the "enthronement" of Christ
and not to his Second Advent:
"For the ordinary sense of 'arrival', cf. 1 Cor.
16:17; 2 Cor. 7:6, 7; 10:10; Phil. 1:26; 2:12. From
this, the most natural meaning for the word as applied
to Jesus would be something like 'arrival on the
scene,' in the sense of enthronement" (ibid).
TDNT makes the point even clearer in its treatment of
PAROUSIA.
Finally, Louw-Nida shows that ERXOMAI can denote: "to
move from one place to another, either coming or
going." Abbott-Smith has similar comments.
Regards,
Edgar
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Notes on Colossians 2:9
Notes on Colossians 2:9
Robertson's Word Pictures states: "Paul here asserts that 'all the
PLHRWMA of the Godhead,' not just certain aspects, dwells in Christ
and in bodily form (SWMATIKWS, late and rare adverb, in Plutarch,
inscription, here only in N.T.), dwells now in Christ in his glorified
humanity (Philippians 2:9-11), 'the body of his glory' (TWi SWMATI THS
DOXHS)."
Louw-Nida (8.2) notes: "SWMATIKWS: EN AUTWi KATOIKEI PAN TO PLHRWMA
SWMATIKWS: 'in him all the fullness of deity dwells bodily' or . . .
in physical form' Col 2.9. It is also possible to interpret SWMATIKWS
in Col 2.9 as meaning 'in reality,' that is to say, 'not symbolically'
(see 70.7)."
BDAG suggests that SWMATIKWS (adverbial of SWMATIKOS) bears the
potential sense "bodily, corporeally" and probably should be
understood from Col 2:17 "as = in reality, not fig." See page 984.
Roger and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key agrees with
Robertson concerning SWMATIKWS: "The word [in Col 2:9] refers to the
human body of Christ (Johnson, 310), indicating also the full humanity
of Jesus a humanity which was not simply a covering for His deity
(Lohse; TDNT; Moule; Lohmeyer; O'Brien).
But Petr Pokorny is most certainly right when he concludes: "The
concept SWMA has a further meaning that comes to light especially in
---> 2:17. SWMA is also the archetype (---> 1:15), the reality in
contrast to the shadow and copy. This is the most probable meaning
here, given the framework of the interpretation of 2:19" (Colossians:
A Commentary, 122).
Regards,
Edgar
Robertson's Word Pictures states: "Paul here asserts that 'all the
PLHRWMA of the Godhead,' not just certain aspects, dwells in Christ
and in bodily form (SWMATIKWS, late and rare adverb, in Plutarch,
inscription, here only in N.T.), dwells now in Christ in his glorified
humanity (Philippians 2:9-11), 'the body of his glory' (TWi SWMATI THS
DOXHS)."
Louw-Nida (8.2) notes: "SWMATIKWS: EN AUTWi KATOIKEI PAN TO PLHRWMA
SWMATIKWS: 'in him all the fullness of deity dwells bodily' or . . .
in physical form' Col 2.9. It is also possible to interpret SWMATIKWS
in Col 2.9 as meaning 'in reality,' that is to say, 'not symbolically'
(see 70.7)."
BDAG suggests that SWMATIKWS (adverbial of SWMATIKOS) bears the
potential sense "bodily, corporeally" and probably should be
understood from Col 2:17 "as = in reality, not fig." See page 984.
Roger and Rogers New Linguistic and Exegetical Key agrees with
Robertson concerning SWMATIKWS: "The word [in Col 2:9] refers to the
human body of Christ (Johnson, 310), indicating also the full humanity
of Jesus a humanity which was not simply a covering for His deity
(Lohse; TDNT; Moule; Lohmeyer; O'Brien).
But Petr Pokorny is most certainly right when he concludes: "The
concept SWMA has a further meaning that comes to light especially in
---> 2:17. SWMA is also the archetype (---> 1:15), the reality in
contrast to the shadow and copy. This is the most probable meaning
here, given the framework of the interpretation of 2:19" (Colossians:
A Commentary, 122).
Regards,
Edgar
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
The Immortal Soul in Ancient Pre-Nicene Thought
An interlocutor once asked me,
"Dear Prof. Foster,
I'd like to know when the concept of immortal soul was adopted by early christians and which Church-Father rejected it."
My reply:
The concept of the immortal soul appears rather early in the second century CE writings of pre-Nicene writers. One of the most notable delineations of this teaching is found in Letter to Diognetus 6. There, we read:
"To sum up all in one word-what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world. The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world, but their godliness remains invisible."
Justin Martyr, Melito, Athenagoras, Methodius, Irenaeus, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius and Tertullian all affirmed the immortality of the soul (see Divinae institutiones 7.20ff for statements from Lactantius). Tertullian thinks that the soul is corporeal, though not constituted of gross matter or flesh. See his work De Anima.
It seems that the teaching of the immortal soul was consistently believed and taught in the early church, though an early Assyrian apologist named Tatian, posited an interesting theory in his Oration to the Greeks 13, namely, that the soul "is not in itself immortal . . . but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die."
In other words, the human soul (according to Tatian) is not inherently immortal. Eternal or everlasting life is only possible, provided one has a good relationship with God, who can cause the soul to subsist forever by investing it with the gift of immortality. It is no wonder that Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition 1:30) speaks of the immortal soul teaching as a "standard element in [early] Christian teaching" since the pre-Nicene and post-Nicene church uniformly affirmed this doctrine.
"Dear Prof. Foster,
I'd like to know when the concept of immortal soul was adopted by early christians and which Church-Father rejected it."
My reply:
The concept of the immortal soul appears rather early in the second century CE writings of pre-Nicene writers. One of the most notable delineations of this teaching is found in Letter to Diognetus 6. There, we read:
"To sum up all in one word-what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world. The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world, but their godliness remains invisible."
Justin Martyr, Melito, Athenagoras, Methodius, Irenaeus, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius and Tertullian all affirmed the immortality of the soul (see Divinae institutiones 7.20ff for statements from Lactantius). Tertullian thinks that the soul is corporeal, though not constituted of gross matter or flesh. See his work De Anima.
It seems that the teaching of the immortal soul was consistently believed and taught in the early church, though an early Assyrian apologist named Tatian, posited an interesting theory in his Oration to the Greeks 13, namely, that the soul "is not in itself immortal . . . but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die."
In other words, the human soul (according to Tatian) is not inherently immortal. Eternal or everlasting life is only possible, provided one has a good relationship with God, who can cause the soul to subsist forever by investing it with the gift of immortality. It is no wonder that Jaroslav Pelikan (The Christian Tradition 1:30) speaks of the immortal soul teaching as a "standard element in [early] Christian teaching" since the pre-Nicene and post-Nicene church uniformly affirmed this doctrine.
Saturday, August 18, 2007
Jehovah's Witnesses and Monotheism
The post below is taken from my old yahoogroup, greektheology:
As has already been suggested, I think we must keep in mind that such terms as monolatry, monotheism or even henotheism are all attempts to delineate, circumscribe or define certain religious phenomena that one encounters in Scripture. In other words, the Bible itself never uses such terminology to describe the ways in which people of ancient times worshiped. One can only formulate such descriptive expressions by prescinding from that which is explicitly contained in Holy Writ. Another task, however, is to precisify the relevant terminology of this discussion.
(1) Henotheism has been defined as the act of worshiping one God--in particular, a national or tribal deity--while simultaneously refusing to rule out the existence of other gods. It has well been said that henotheism defined thus "certainly does not fit the universal and cosmic conception implicit in the Old Testament" (Ralph L. Smith, Old Testament Theology, page 232). I would also argue that Jehovah's Witnesses are not henotheists since Jehovah is not a tribal god, nor are other beings recognized as "gods" by Witnesses accorded the same ontological status as Jehovah. Only one Being exemplifies the properties requisite for being identified as God (ontologically) with no qualifications: that deity is Jehovah the God and Father of all.
(2) One online source defines monolatry as follows: "worship of one god only out of many believed to exist."
Witnesses worship (in the sense of LATREIA) one God--not "god"-- and we believe that there are others that can be called "gods" in a functional or (possibly) ontological sense (i.e., angels and judges). But what does it mean to say that one believes there are many gods that exist? Does it not all depend on how one defines the term God/god? To illustrate what I mean, notice what Smith says about monotheism.
(3) Ralph L. Smith quotes from three scholars who all
define monotheism in slightly different ways. The
point I want to draw attention to now, however, is
what G.E. Wright states, as quoted by Smith. Wright
notes that monotheism is "the exclusive exaltation of
the one source of all power, authority, and
creativity" (Smith, page 232).
Now, if one defines monotheism in the foregoing
manner, it is safe to say that recognizing what Wright
calls "subordinate divine beings" (i.e. gods) does not negate
monotheism. In fact, D.S. Russell
("The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic") writes concerning Old Testament theology:
"There is ample evidence to show that conception
of monotheism was held in conjunction with a belief in
a spiritual world peopled with supernatural and
superhuman beings who, in some ways, shared the
nature, though not the being, of God" (page 235).
I thus conclude that it is appropriate to refer to
ourselves as monotheists rather than monolaters. We
worship "the only true God" (Jn 17:3) but realize that
images of this one God subsist in the spirit realm. Moreover,
some men (and angels) have represented God on earth. Hence,
they also can be called ELOHIM.
Agape,
Edgar
As has already been suggested, I think we must keep in mind that such terms as monolatry, monotheism or even henotheism are all attempts to delineate, circumscribe or define certain religious phenomena that one encounters in Scripture. In other words, the Bible itself never uses such terminology to describe the ways in which people of ancient times worshiped. One can only formulate such descriptive expressions by prescinding from that which is explicitly contained in Holy Writ. Another task, however, is to precisify the relevant terminology of this discussion.
(1) Henotheism has been defined as the act of worshiping one God--in particular, a national or tribal deity--while simultaneously refusing to rule out the existence of other gods. It has well been said that henotheism defined thus "certainly does not fit the universal and cosmic conception implicit in the Old Testament" (Ralph L. Smith, Old Testament Theology, page 232). I would also argue that Jehovah's Witnesses are not henotheists since Jehovah is not a tribal god, nor are other beings recognized as "gods" by Witnesses accorded the same ontological status as Jehovah. Only one Being exemplifies the properties requisite for being identified as God (ontologically) with no qualifications: that deity is Jehovah the God and Father of all.
(2) One online source defines monolatry as follows: "worship of one god only out of many believed to exist."
Witnesses worship (in the sense of LATREIA) one God--not "god"-- and we believe that there are others that can be called "gods" in a functional or (possibly) ontological sense (i.e., angels and judges). But what does it mean to say that one believes there are many gods that exist? Does it not all depend on how one defines the term God/god? To illustrate what I mean, notice what Smith says about monotheism.
(3) Ralph L. Smith quotes from three scholars who all
define monotheism in slightly different ways. The
point I want to draw attention to now, however, is
what G.E. Wright states, as quoted by Smith. Wright
notes that monotheism is "the exclusive exaltation of
the one source of all power, authority, and
creativity" (Smith, page 232).
Now, if one defines monotheism in the foregoing
manner, it is safe to say that recognizing what Wright
calls "subordinate divine beings" (i.e. gods) does not negate
monotheism. In fact, D.S. Russell
("The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic") writes concerning Old Testament theology:
"There is ample evidence to show that conception
of monotheism was held in conjunction with a belief in
a spiritual world peopled with supernatural and
superhuman beings who, in some ways, shared the
nature, though not the being, of God" (page 235).
I thus conclude that it is appropriate to refer to
ourselves as monotheists rather than monolaters. We
worship "the only true God" (Jn 17:3) but realize that
images of this one God subsist in the spirit realm. Moreover,
some men (and angels) have represented God on earth. Hence,
they also can be called ELOHIM.
Agape,
Edgar
Friday, August 17, 2007
Can a Timeless God ACT in Time?
Robert Bowman has recently argued that "Unfortunately, Andy [a member of his yahoogroup], you are making the mistake of reasoning that if God is eternal, he cannot act in time."
See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evangelicals_and_jws/message/
35280
By "eternal," I understand Bowman to mean "timeless" or atemporal. I thus suggest that he is overlooking the difficulties that attend the timeless God doctrine. For it does indeed seem that a timeless God cannot act in time. For temporal categories do not apply to a timeless deity. Such a deity has no temporal location or temporal duration (see Stephen T. Davis' _Logic and the Nature of God_).
Moreover, I recently encountered a quote regarding God's
atemporality in a book written by Brian Hebblethwaite.
The book is entitled _Philosophical Theology and Christian
Doctrine_. This quote is taken from p. 45 of that
work:
"The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless ACT of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a
potentiality."
Best,
Edgar
See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evangelicals_and_jws/message/
35280
By "eternal," I understand Bowman to mean "timeless" or atemporal. I thus suggest that he is overlooking the difficulties that attend the timeless God doctrine. For it does indeed seem that a timeless God cannot act in time. For temporal categories do not apply to a timeless deity. Such a deity has no temporal location or temporal duration (see Stephen T. Davis' _Logic and the Nature of God_).
Moreover, I recently encountered a quote regarding God's
atemporality in a book written by Brian Hebblethwaite.
The book is entitled _Philosophical Theology and Christian
Doctrine_. This quote is taken from p. 45 of that
work:
"The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless ACT of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a
potentiality."
In a nutshell (IN NUCE), Hebblethwaite is saying that it is difficult
to understand how a timeless, immutable God becomes man or creates the
universe or acts at all. For the Incarnation doctrine implies that the LOGOS became
flesh, whereas the doctrine of creation indicates that God acted to
bring creation into being EX NIHILO. Both notions appear problematic
in the light of divine atemporality concepts. Scripture indicates that YHWH is from OLAM to OLAM (Psalm 90:2). Some thinkers have construed OLAM (in this context) as unbounded temporality.to understand how a timeless, immutable God becomes man or creates the
universe or acts at all. For the Incarnation doctrine implies that the LOGOS became
flesh, whereas the doctrine of creation indicates that God acted to
bring creation into being EX NIHILO. Both notions appear problematic
Edgar
Friday, August 10, 2007
Historian Paul Johnson on Hell
I would now like to post some quotations from Paul Johnson's book entitled _A History of Christianity_ and obtain your input:
He writes: "Ambrose [of Milan] was a superstitious and credulous man, with a weird cosmology. He distinguished between paradise and the superior Kingdom of Heaven, already inhabited by Constantine and (after his death) Theodosius. He thought, in fact, there were seven heavens. Then there was Hades, where people waited for the last judgment, and purgatory, a place of second baptism or furnace of fire, where the precious metal in a soul was tested to rid it of the base alloy. Finally, there was Hell, divided into three regions, of increasing horror" (p. 107).
On pages 340-342, Johnson's comments are a bit long to type at this point, so I will just summarize them. The historian points out that Scotus Eriugena denied the existence of an eternal or material hell, and substituted "pangs of conscience" in its place. But despite having misgivings about an eternal hell, he refused to believe that such ideas should be taught pastorally. Why not? So that the parishioners would be frightened into serving God by being told that an eternal hell existed (whether it, in fact, did exist or not). This is why "the three most influential medieval teachers, Augustine, Peter Lombard, and Aquinas, all insisted that the PAINS of hell were PHYSICAL as well as mental and spiritual, and that REAL FIRE played a part in them" (caps. for emphasis).
Johnson also reports that "the general theory was that Hell included any horrible pain that the human imagination could conceive of, plus an infinite variety of others . . . Jerome said that Hell was like a huge winepress. Augustine said it was peopled by ferocious flesh-eating animals, which tore humans to bits slowly and painfully, and were themselves undamaged by the fires." In view of the observations above (1) how can some professed Christians say that Catholicism does not presently espouse a different view than what has been expressed in the past, when one reads about contemporary discussions concerning Hell which exclusively refers to it in terms of separation from God? (2) What kind of God is this described by the previously-mentioned writers? What type of God could carry out such punishments? The God of the Bible evidently could not torture souls for eternity (Jeremiah 7:31; 1 John 4:8).
He writes: "Ambrose [of Milan] was a superstitious and credulous man, with a weird cosmology. He distinguished between paradise and the superior Kingdom of Heaven, already inhabited by Constantine and (after his death) Theodosius. He thought, in fact, there were seven heavens. Then there was Hades, where people waited for the last judgment, and purgatory, a place of second baptism or furnace of fire, where the precious metal in a soul was tested to rid it of the base alloy. Finally, there was Hell, divided into three regions, of increasing horror" (p. 107).
On pages 340-342, Johnson's comments are a bit long to type at this point, so I will just summarize them. The historian points out that Scotus Eriugena denied the existence of an eternal or material hell, and substituted "pangs of conscience" in its place. But despite having misgivings about an eternal hell, he refused to believe that such ideas should be taught pastorally. Why not? So that the parishioners would be frightened into serving God by being told that an eternal hell existed (whether it, in fact, did exist or not). This is why "the three most influential medieval teachers, Augustine, Peter Lombard, and Aquinas, all insisted that the PAINS of hell were PHYSICAL as well as mental and spiritual, and that REAL FIRE played a part in them" (caps. for emphasis).
Johnson also reports that "the general theory was that Hell included any horrible pain that the human imagination could conceive of, plus an infinite variety of others . . . Jerome said that Hell was like a huge winepress. Augustine said it was peopled by ferocious flesh-eating animals, which tore humans to bits slowly and painfully, and were themselves undamaged by the fires." In view of the observations above (1) how can some professed Christians say that Catholicism does not presently espouse a different view than what has been expressed in the past, when one reads about contemporary discussions concerning Hell which exclusively refers to it in terms of separation from God? (2) What kind of God is this described by the previously-mentioned writers? What type of God could carry out such punishments? The God of the Bible evidently could not torture souls for eternity (Jeremiah 7:31; 1 John 4:8).
Saturday, July 28, 2007
Recent Stats on Divorce
Time Magazine reports:
05f0ddab-cf09-4fa8-9c2c-0d6a63eab54a%40SRCSM1
The annual national divorce rate has dropped to 3.6 per 1,000 people, the lowest since 1970 and well off its peak of 5.7 in 1981. But marriage is down 30% since 1970, with the number of unmarried couples living together up 10-fold since 1960
*First nine months of 2006 at annual rate. SOURCES: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
DIAGRAM: The State of Divorce: You May Be Surprised
Source: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=9&hid=4&sid=05f0ddab-cf09-4fa8-9c2c-0d6a63eab54a%40SRCSM1
Thursday, July 19, 2007
God is not the Great Santa Clause in the Sky
The OT tells us that God hears prayers (Psalm 65:2). However, the NT book of 1 John (5:14-15) qualifies the type of prayers that God hears. Prayer that is divinely efficacious must be offered in accordance with God's will in faith (James 1:5-8). Saying a prayer is not like articulating a magical formula. Prayer works because God answers it, not simply because we utter the right words. Yes, the power of life and death are in the tongue. But God is the one who brings it about that the requests contained in prayers come to fruition: it is not magic (Philippians 4:6-7).
Another fallacious notion under which many minds labor is the mistaken idea that God is comparable to some great Santa Clause in the sky. Some persons might be inclined to think that God dispenses answers to petitionary invocations like the mythical Santa dispenses gifts on December 25. Aside from the fact that Santa does not exist, God is not some great Santa in the sky. Prayer is not about what we can get from God, although he does answer prayers that conform to his will. To the contrary, prayer is about (primarily) what we can do for God. It is about selflessness or about expressing our praise and loyalty to God. As Merold Westphal points out (in his book _God, Guilt, and Death_, page 141), prayer is not a crutch nor a "support system" for those who are weak or cowardly. Prayer "pulls us away from self-preoccupations" or "from an easy support system to a risky surrender."
While I do not mean to suggest that it is wrong or unbiblical to request that God do X or Y, I just want to stress that those making petitions to God must approach him with the right attitude in faith. Our prayers must be in harmony with the will of God and we must have the type of faith that can move mountains. As the writer James states, the prayer of the righteous man or woman avails much.
Another fallacious notion under which many minds labor is the mistaken idea that God is comparable to some great Santa Clause in the sky. Some persons might be inclined to think that God dispenses answers to petitionary invocations like the mythical Santa dispenses gifts on December 25. Aside from the fact that Santa does not exist, God is not some great Santa in the sky. Prayer is not about what we can get from God, although he does answer prayers that conform to his will. To the contrary, prayer is about (primarily) what we can do for God. It is about selflessness or about expressing our praise and loyalty to God. As Merold Westphal points out (in his book _God, Guilt, and Death_, page 141), prayer is not a crutch nor a "support system" for those who are weak or cowardly. Prayer "pulls us away from self-preoccupations" or "from an easy support system to a risky surrender."
While I do not mean to suggest that it is wrong or unbiblical to request that God do X or Y, I just want to stress that those making petitions to God must approach him with the right attitude in faith. Our prayers must be in harmony with the will of God and we must have the type of faith that can move mountains. As the writer James states, the prayer of the righteous man or woman avails much.
Monday, July 16, 2007
John 14:13-14 and Prayer
What did Jesus mean when he told his followers that "whatever" they asked in his name would be granted? Did he literally mean that Christians could pray for "anything" and the prayer would be answered? That would not seem to make sense in view of 1 John 5:14-15. Furthermore, here is what certain exegetes have to say about the passage in the Gospel of John:
"Joh 14:13 -
Whatsoever ye shall ask - This promise referred particularly to the apostles in their work of spreading the gospel; it is, however, true of all Christians, if what they ask is in faith, and according to the will of God, Jam_1:6; 1Jo_5:14" (Albert Barnes).
How, then, are we to understand "Whatsoever you shall ask, I will do it," if there are some things which the faithful ask, and which God, even purposely on their behalf, leaves undone? Or ought we to suppose that the words were addressed only to the apostles? Surely not. For what He has got the length of now saying is in the very line of what He had said before: "He that believes in me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do;" which was the subject of our previous discourse. And that no one might attribute such power to himself, but rather to make it manifest that even these greater works were done by Himself, He proceeded to say,"For I go to the Father; and whatsoever you shall ask in my name, I will do it." Was it the apostles only that believed on Him? When, therefore, He said, "He that believes in me," He spoke to those, among whom we also by His grace are included, who by no means receive everything that we ask. And if we turn our thoughts even to the most blessed apostles, we find that he who labored more than they all, yet not he, but the grace of God that was with him, besought the Lord thrice that the messenger of Satan might depart from him, and received not what he had asked. What shall we say, beloved? Are we to suppose that the promise here made, "Whatsoever you shall ask in my name, I will do it," was not fulfilled by Him even to the apostles? And to whom, then, will ever His promise be fulfilled, if therein He has deceived His own apostles?
The last quote is from Augustine's _Tractate_ 73.2.
Regards,
Edgar
"Joh 14:13 -
Whatsoever ye shall ask - This promise referred particularly to the apostles in their work of spreading the gospel; it is, however, true of all Christians, if what they ask is in faith, and according to the will of God, Jam_1:6; 1Jo_5:14" (Albert Barnes).
How, then, are we to understand "Whatsoever you shall ask, I will do it," if there are some things which the faithful ask, and which God, even purposely on their behalf, leaves undone? Or ought we to suppose that the words were addressed only to the apostles? Surely not. For what He has got the length of now saying is in the very line of what He had said before: "He that believes in me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do;" which was the subject of our previous discourse. And that no one might attribute such power to himself, but rather to make it manifest that even these greater works were done by Himself, He proceeded to say,"For I go to the Father; and whatsoever you shall ask in my name, I will do it." Was it the apostles only that believed on Him? When, therefore, He said, "He that believes in me," He spoke to those, among whom we also by His grace are included, who by no means receive everything that we ask. And if we turn our thoughts even to the most blessed apostles, we find that he who labored more than they all, yet not he, but the grace of God that was with him, besought the Lord thrice that the messenger of Satan might depart from him, and received not what he had asked. What shall we say, beloved? Are we to suppose that the promise here made, "Whatsoever you shall ask in my name, I will do it," was not fulfilled by Him even to the apostles? And to whom, then, will ever His promise be fulfilled, if therein He has deceived His own apostles?
The last quote is from Augustine's _Tractate_ 73.2.
Regards,
Edgar
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Metaphors and the Son's Begettal
The last three years of my life have been occupied by a study of paterology (doctrine of God's fatherhood), Christology and metaphorology (theory of metaphor). One thing that has become fairly clear to me is that much confusion often arises when Trinitarians discuss the eternal generation of the Son doctrine because they seem to be construing this concept in a literal fashion. The difficulties that purportedly arise from a Christian believing that the Son was not eternally generated no longer exist when the language of Scripture is interpreted metaphorically. God is not a literal Father of the LOGOS or of those who have been renewed by means of his spirit. The fatherhood of God is metaphorical which means that God does not have the matter-of-fact properties that one commonly associates with a literal or biological father. God is not a male, the Father has not literally generated a Son continuously or eternally. Such metaphors help us to apprehend somewhat the reality that is God. See Hosea 12:11.
Monday, July 02, 2007
Metaphors Qua As-If Structures and Scripture
Metaphors deployed in Holy Writ and corporate worship express spiritual truths by means of reality depicting terminology.[1] Biblical nomenclature is evidently “reality depicting” in that it mediates ultimate states of affairs by means of literary similitudes (Hosea 12:11). Additionally, it appears that scriptural imagery delineates reality insofar as it postulates a veridical context of being between God and the world.[2] Tropes or conceptual domains such as King or Father assume personal agency; personal agency in turn furnishes a logical basis for affirming God’s legitimate rapport (= a relationship founded on mutual understanding and trust) with the rational created order.[3] It seems that God authentically interacts with rational creatures as “Father” (Matthew 6:9) “King” (1 Timothy 1:17) or “Friend” (James 2:23). Whether God’s relation to the created order is real or mixed (according to the language of Thomism),[4] each of the foregoing appellations for God appear to be metaphorical “as-if” (als ob) constructs[5] that mediately portray God’s affinity for and sovereignty over rational finite entities subsisting in both the material and spiritual realm of being, namely, angels and humans.
[1] Fretheim, The Suffering of God, 5-12.
[3] Ibid. Caird discusses the role of low and high correspondence in metaphorical tropes (e.g. Aaron’s beard dripping with oil and family unity versus God being called a Father). See Psalm 133:1-3. Low correspondence restricts how far that one can press a metaphor. On the other hand, God as Father is the Source of life, cares for His people as does a parent, has affection for his people (Hosea 11:3-4), exercises authority and metes out discipline. This metaphor thus emphasizes familial unity (Ephesians 3:14) and the mutual love that obtains between God and Christians. See Biblical Imagery, 153-154. There is a very high correspondence between God and human fathers in Caird’s estimation.
[4] Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ: A Study of the God-Man Relationship in the Whole of Creation and in Jesus Christ (New York: The Seabury Press, 1971), 83-86, note 16.
[5] See Bernhard Debatin, Die Rationalität der Metapher: eine sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 124-126.
Sunday, June 17, 2007
Lonergan on Tertullian
The contention that there was a time when the Son as such was not has caused Bernard Lonergan to question the logical coherence of Tertullian’s Christology. Although Lonergan avoids reproaching the pre-Nicenes for their ostensible need to excise incongruous logical elements from distinct theological notions which they espoused regarding the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, he points out that Tertullian’s argument concerning a time when the Son was not in existence conflicts with his fundamental theological case made against Praxeas respecting the three persons.[1] Tertullian supposedly holds that the Son is God as the Father is God. But this does not mean that he believes the Father and Son have every divine-constituting property in common.[2] The Latin apologist is convinced that the Son, being derivative of the divine substance is God (Adversus Praxean 9).[3] Nevertheless, Tertullian also believes that the entity who generates the preexistent Christ is eternal or everlasting, whereas the Son qua Son is not. But Lonergan insists that this position is logically untenable. For if God is everlasting and the Son is God, then the Son must also be everlasting; furthermore, if God is the whole divine substance and Christ is God, then Christ too is identical with the whole divine substance.[4] A claim to the contrary simply appears incoherent, based on the law of transitivity. The logical law of transitivity states that if A=B and B=C, then A=C. Stated non-formally, if Marcus is Tullius and Tullius is Cicero, then Marcus is Cicero.[5] If the term “God” identifies a referent as opposed to predicating divinity of a subject, then Lonergan’s argument seems convincing. However, it is possible that “God” is not a term marking absolute identity, but one that predicates relative identity. And relative identity is most closely associated with terms that philosophers consider “sortal.”
The chief objection to Lonergan’s syllogisms is probably the theory of sortal-relative identity, which certain thinkers view as suspect.[6] The theory of sortal-relative identity claims that it is logically possible for two entities (A and B) to be the same F without being the same G.[7] For example, a couch and chair may have the same color (F) but still be different pieces of furniture (G).[8] Advocates of sortal-relativity thus contend that identity is never absolute. A piece of clay (F) is not the same G as a statue of which it is the material cause. Two entities (A and B) are always discernible in some crucial aspect or relativized with respect to a sortal noun (e.g. bird, dog, cat, chair, star, couch or tree). John Feinberg, Christopher Hughes, Saul Kripke, Peter Geach, Thomas V. Morris and Peter van Inwagen adequately treat the topic of sortal-relative over against absolute identity in their respective studies.[9] While a deeper exploration of identity (relative, absolute, qualitative or numerical) is outside the bounds of this work, this investigation espouses the position that Lonergan’s syllogisms fittingly comport with the theory of absolute identity.
[1] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology: a Translation [from the Latin] by Conn O'Donovan from the First Part of De Deo Trino (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1976), 48.
[2] What are here called “divine-constituting properties” are similar to what others call great-making properties. Thomas V. Morris defines a “great-making property as “any property, or attribute, or characteristic, or quality which it is intrinsically good to have, any property which endows its bearer with some measure of value, or greatness, or metaphysical stature, regardless of external circumstances,” in Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1991), 35. The difference between a divine-constituting property and a great-making property is that while non-divine beings can possess the latter, only a being that is fully divine can possess the former. See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, Divine Attributes, 13-20.
[3] Seeberg, History of Doctrines, 1:126.
[5] See Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1970), 33; Simon Blackburn, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 134.
[6] See Richard Cartwright, Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Hughes, Complex Theory of a Simple God, 157.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid. 158.
[9] Ibid. 156-161; Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 3; Peter Geach, “Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity,” in Logic and Ontology, ed. Milton Karl Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1973); Peter van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 494-496.
Wednesday, June 06, 2007
Longer Lifespan?
Is the world getting better? Is the world becoming less violent? Are humans now living longer due to medical advances?
While some might be tempted to think that modern scientific medicine has increased the current lifespan for those of us living in the 21st century, the truth is more complex than often heard claims about an increase in the human lifespan.
In his book Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA, geneticist Richard C. Lewontin points out that we certainly live longer than our ancestors who lived in 1890 did. However, what has contributed to our seeming increased lifespan?
While Lewontin's book was first published in 1991, his research on this issue still comports with present-day work done on these issues. Lewontin argues that modern medicine has not "prolonged the life of elderly and sick people" (page 42). A reduction in infant mortality is what accounts for the expected life span, not an increase on the upper end of the age continuum. As for those have reached maturity, Lewontin notes that science has done "little to add years" to their lives (ibid).
So, while it is true that we now generally live to be at least 75 rather than 45 (as was the case in the 19th century), it seems important not to exaggerate what has actually happened. Certain diseases have become non-factors for a number of people and decreased infant mortality. But as history has shown, these diseases can also return with a vengeance. There are many reasons to believe that the world is not getting better. I hope to touch on some of these issues in the future.
While some might be tempted to think that modern scientific medicine has increased the current lifespan for those of us living in the 21st century, the truth is more complex than often heard claims about an increase in the human lifespan.
In his book Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA, geneticist Richard C. Lewontin points out that we certainly live longer than our ancestors who lived in 1890 did. However, what has contributed to our seeming increased lifespan?
While Lewontin's book was first published in 1991, his research on this issue still comports with present-day work done on these issues. Lewontin argues that modern medicine has not "prolonged the life of elderly and sick people" (page 42). A reduction in infant mortality is what accounts for the expected life span, not an increase on the upper end of the age continuum. As for those have reached maturity, Lewontin notes that science has done "little to add years" to their lives (ibid).
So, while it is true that we now generally live to be at least 75 rather than 45 (as was the case in the 19th century), it seems important not to exaggerate what has actually happened. Certain diseases have become non-factors for a number of people and decreased infant mortality. But as history has shown, these diseases can also return with a vengeance. There are many reasons to believe that the world is not getting better. I hope to touch on some of these issues in the future.
Saturday, June 02, 2007
Arnobius and Theological Discourse
Since rational creaturely essences seem capable of knowing by means of general revelation whether God exists but utterly incapable of fathoming his essence (i.e. his immanent being), Justin and Philo insist that rational creatures should utilize expressions such as “He That Is” or “The Being” (o` w;n) which signify authentic divine existence.[1] Nevertheless, on this view, created entities cannot verbally reveal anything pertaining to God’s quiddity since to do so would define the Most High’s whatness; the act of defining, in turn, would ontologically limit the boundless Creator.[2] Therefore, Arnobius contends that the only legitimate alternative to defining God is reverential silence: “There is but one thing man can be assured of regarding God’s nature, to know and perceive that nothing can be revealed in human language concerning God.”[3] However, is reverential quietude a plausible option for devout theists seeking understanding (quaerens intellectum) of the deity, whom they religiously profess? Frank Kilpatrick ostensively addresses this question when he remarks that hardly any theist withdraws into theolinguistic silence when referring to the Christian divinity. Rather, theists usually choose to articulate something definitive about the divine one through corporate worship or theological discourse: “As the language about God as ‘act-of-being’ makes clear, some words continue to be used with respect to God.”[4] Deferential silence thus does not appear to be a viable theolinguistic option.[5]
[1] Carabine, Unknown God, 209.
[2] Sanders, The God Who Risks, 27.
[3] Adversus nationes 3.19: Unus est hominis intellectus de dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi.
[4] Kilpatrick, Together Bound, 35. One is here reminded of Wittgenstein’s concluding proposition in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen).
[5] Compare ST Ia.13.1. See Vincent Brümmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 36-37.
Sunday, May 27, 2007
Sam Harris on the Naturalness of Rape
On page 90-91 of his Letter to a Christian Nation, Sam Harris tries to argue that religion possibly helped prehistoric humans to "socially cohere" in the past, but it no longer serves this purpose now. He then draws a parallel between religion and rape by writing: "There is, after all, nothing more natural than rape. But no one would argue that rape is good, or compatible with a civil society, because it may have had evolutionary advantages for our ancestors."
I am not sure what Harris mean when he says that rape is "natural." In the context of this utterance, it seems that he is trying to say that rape is part of our so-called evolutionary heritage or that it had certain advantages vis-a-vis our evolutionary development in prehistoric times. I am not sure what advantages rape supposedly had at one time nor is it easy to figure out what Harris fully means by "natural." Once I find out, I will edit this post to more adequately address his comments.
I am not sure what Harris mean when he says that rape is "natural." In the context of this utterance, it seems that he is trying to say that rape is part of our so-called evolutionary heritage or that it had certain advantages vis-a-vis our evolutionary development in prehistoric times. I am not sure what advantages rape supposedly had at one time nor is it easy to figure out what Harris fully means by "natural." Once I find out, I will edit this post to more adequately address his comments.
Friday, May 25, 2007
Comparison Theory of Metaphor and Theology
Those who advocate comparison theory generally claim that metaphors “help us to make sense of things with which we are initially unfamiliar by making comparisons.”[1] Thinking metaphorically (according to this model) means perceiving similarities between two otherwise divergent objects, events or structures (e.g. “Man is a puppet.”).[2] Moreover, comparison theory assumes that metaphorical constructions of the form “S is P” condense the locutionary forms “S is like P.” According to the comparison view, metaphorical constructs tend to make implicit or explicit comparisons.[3]
Comparison theory further suggests that metaphors provide an innovative portrayal of reality by combining “a dialectic of the familiar and the strange.”[4] It thereby implies that metaphors are both tools of discovery and lingual stratagems that presage interpretations of human experience in more adequate terms. Additionally, metaphors are iconoclastic in that they now and again eradicate unsatisfactory construals of lived existence.[5] For instance, tropes occasionally militate against prevailing social institutions,[6] their ongoing maintenance and meaning-constituting plausibility structures (i.e. foundations that legitimate socially constructed worlds).[7] Combes fittingly deems metaphors “dangerous things.”[8] They are capable of altering the existing status quo; moreover, communicative agents evidently preserve or slay each other in accordance with metaphors that comprise social discourse.[9] It also seems that metaphors have the ability to shape one’s belief or disbelief in God. Fretheim thus argues that “metaphors matter” when one is formulating theology.[10]
In addition to having a sociogenic function (i.e. metaphors have the ability to constitute or influence societal institutions), tropes appear capable of disclosing that which is ineffable, abstract, supersensible or transcendent.[11] The process of phenomenological unconcealing generally transpires by means of a speaker or discourse agent interchanging familiar and strange concepts, nominals or genera in order to make comparisons.[12] This function ultimately plays an integral role in theology or the formulation of theoretical thought. For instance, the Gospel of John identifies Christ as “the lamb of God” (John 1:29). The imagery that the author employs conveys profound religious truths that are best understood within the cultural context of the Gospel. The “lamb” metaphor evokes images of ritual or sin-atoning practices carried out in ancient Israel. The Gospel of John does not just utilize the metaphor based on natural properties indigenous to a lamb.[13] One also witnesses the revelatory nature of tropic speech in substitution theories of metaphor. The most celebrated substitution theory is that model wrought by Aristotle of Stagira.
[2] McFague 15; Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 171; Duck, Gender and the Name of God, 14; Kjärgaard, Metaphor and Parable, 44-45.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 93. Sokolowski argues: “Metaphor rearranges the potentials of our sensibility and provokes a new way of perceiving” (Husserlian Meditations, 227). The verb “perceive,” here means “any unarticulated intuition at all,” not just intentional activities such as seeing or touching.
[5] Kasper, God of Jesus Christ, 93.
[6] See Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” for an example of this phenomenon.
[7] Sanders, God Who Risks, 11-12. Authors such as Maureen Tilley, The Bible in Christian North Africa, 5-7; Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 45-47, Lewis R. Gordon, Her Majesty’s Other Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neocolonial Age (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 38-39 and Richard C. Lewontin, Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 7 discuss social construction and the role of social plausibility structures.
[8] I. A. H. Combes, The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church: From the New Testament to the Beginning of the Fifth Century (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 11.
[9] See “Metaphors We Kill by.”
[10] The Suffering of God, 1.
[12] Kittay, Metaphor, 4.
[13] Francis J. Moloney, The Gospel of John. Sacra Pagina (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1998), 58-59; Gerald Borchert, John 1-11, 135-136; Aune, Revelation 1-5, 52A: 367-373.
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