Millard Erickson on Subordination in the Trinity

Roman Catholic theologian James Bellord
writes:

In nature, the offspring is inferior to, and dependent on the parent, and owes a duty of submission. This is not the case in the Blessed Trinity. The Son is, and always has been, equal to the Father in all things (emphases in original).

See Matthew Alfs, Concepts of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, page 9.

With these preliminary observations, I will now review Millard Erickson's discussion of subordination found in his
Making Sense of the Trinity.

MILLARD ERICKSON AND DIVINE SUBORDINATION

I. The Eternal Subordinationist View

Erickson describes Trinitarian subordination as the
view that "there is an eternal, asymmetrical
relationship within the Trinity between the Father and
the Son, and by extension, the Spirit as well"
(Making Sense of the Trinity, page 85).

This theological position is based (in part) on
biblical passages that speak of the Father generating
the Son. Such Bible verses are construed as applying
to the Son, not simply during his time on earth, but
from all eternity. Since the Father has putatively
been generating the Son from all eternity and continues generating the Son eternally (according to some ancient fathers), "The subordination of the Son to the Father was therefore not simply during his earthly life. It is from all time" (ibid., 85).

Erickson also notes that those advocating this view "take considerable pains to disclaim an inferiority of the Son to the Father," avidly contrasting their position with that of Arianism (ibid).

II. The Eternal Equality View

Contra this intra-trinitarian model, there are other
trinitarians who contend that the three persons are
eternally equal and symmetrical in relation to one
another. Therefore,

The biblical statements about the
Father begetting the Son are to be applied to the
earthly incarnation, when the second person of the
Trinity stepped down to earth and added humanity to
his deity. Similarly, his statements of apparent
subordination, such as 'the Father is greater than I'
(John 14:28), are to be interpreted within this
framework. This subordination is to be understood as a
subordination of function, not of essence (ibid).

Note that those advocating an eternal equality view with reference to the tres personae generally argue that Jn 14:28 only applies to the incarnate Son. They speak of functional subordination in the sense that God's Son is subordinate to the Father while incarnate on earth. This type of subordination is thus viewed as temporary (i.e. economic) and ceases once Christ ascends back to the Father. Whereas some Trinitarians use the terminology "functional subordination" to reference the Son's pre-incarnate status and incarnate mode of being, others strictly limit the nomenclature to the incarnate Christ. Erickson, Making Sense of the Trinity, 85-86.

At any rate, an important point that should not be overlooked is what Erickson writes next:

On this latter view, there is NOT an asymmetrical
relationship of generation. Not only do the Son and
Spirit derive their being from the Father, but they
also derive it from one another, as does the Father
from each of them. Beyond that, this view claims that
each member of the Trinity serves each of the others.
There is a mutual subordination of each to the other
(ibid., 86).

According to Erickson, the eternal equality view
posits an intra-trinitarian model wherein the three
persons are mutually subordinate to one another in
that the three relations (i.e. persons) serve each other or
derive their very being from one another. I read "mutually
subordinate" here as co-equal in view of what Erickson
later writes. However one interprets Erickson at this
point, one can definitely say that the author of the
work promoting understanding of the Trinity favors the
latter view and affirms the fact that orthodoxy has
traditionally maintained that the Son is not eternally
subordinate to the Father:

The interpretations the orthodox gave to the passages
appealed to by the Arians are basically that these
should be taken as referring to Jesus' earthly
ministry, rather than his eternal status. The logic of
the argument would seem to apply to the passages
marshaled in support of the subordinationist view as
well. Thus, the begetting passages should be seen as
referring to the earthly residence of Jesus, rather
than some everlasting continuous generation by the
Father (ibid).

III. Erickson Highlights A Difficulty With the Eternal Subordinationist View

Erickson argues that the eternal subordinationist view
finds it difficult to prevent eternal subordination of
the Son to the Father and the Holy Spirit to the
Father and/or Son from "lapsing into the inferiority
of the Son," a position synonymous with Arianism
(ibid., 86-87).

Erickson then alludes to Geoffrey Bromiley's article
in the Baker Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, which avers, based on the eternal generation theory, that there is an eternal "superiority and subordination of order" in
the triune Godhead. See page 368 of Evangelical
Dictionary of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984).

Bromiley further qualifies his statement by noting
that eternal subordination does not imply inferiority
amongst the three opposed relations of the Trinity.
Yet, Erickson thinks that Bromiley's position seems
logically absurd. Why is this the case?

Bromiley's position is evidently that "The Father is superior to
the Son and the Son is subordinate to the Father but
without being inferior" to the Father (Erickson,
Making Sense of the Trinity, 87).
But Erickson suggests that Bromiley is working with "some ambiguity of
superiority and inferiority that enables A to be
superior to B without B being inferior to A. Without
justification of this distinction of meaning we have a
logical contradiction. And I would contend that if
that distinction were to be made clear, the
significance of the Father's superiority would vanish.
In other words, if the ambiguity is not removed, there
is a logical contradiction. If it is removed, the
meaning of the assertion is lost" (ibid).

Erickson's point is that the Son cannot simultaneously
be subordinate to the Father (and the Father superior to him) without the Son being inferior to the Father. The only way that such a situation can obtain is
if one uses the term "subordinate" or "superior" in an ambiguous or
non-standard fashion. But if the word "subordinate" is
not used ambiguously, there is a logical
contradiction. For how can a personal entity be
subordinate to another entity and have another entity be superior to it without being inferior to the said entity in some way? On the other hand, if
one defines "subordinate" in a manner that
disambiguates the term, then the Son's putative
eternal subordination to the Father disappears. Either
way, there seems to be an unsolvable problematic feature
associated with the eternal subordinationist view.
Erickson therefore favors the temporary
subordinationist model to account for Jesus'
subordination to the Father.

In conclusion, I believe that Erickson's discussion
demonstrates the position that orthodoxy has
traditionally maintained concerning intra-trinitarian
relations. Church creeds, councils, and post-Nicene
fathers have generally expressed themselves in the way
that Owen Thomas describes. To recap his observation:

God the Father is the ground or presupposition of God
the Son, and God the Father and God the Son are the
ground or presupposition of God the Holy Spirit. God
the Son is of or from God the Father, and God the Holy
Spirit is of or from God the Father and God the Son.
But the Church interpreted this in such a way that
there is no temporal priority or subordination
(Thomas, Introduction to Theology, page 68).

Regards,
Edgar

My Short Amazon Review of Kevin Giles' Book

Kevin Giles has written a provocative work entitled
The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downer's Grove: IVP,
2002). While I disagree with him doctrinally, I concur with Giles' overall assessment of Christian history concerning the status that the post-Nicene church assigned to the Son.

Giles' book is divided into three parts and contains
three appendices along with subject and author
indices. He packs so much historical information into
his 282-page book that scholars should be able to benefit from his study. Yet, students and laypersons will also find this book a delightful read since it is accessible and flows because of its quality prose.

Giles further appears to have a broad knowledge of
church history and his erudition is on full display in
The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate. Buy it today!

I did a longer review of the book in a series on my yahoogroup, Greektheology.

Jason on John 1:1 and Parallelism

Jason writes:

Hi Hollis,
If hO GEGONEN is to be taken as belonging to what follows it instead of what
precedes it, then why is it that it is not preceded by KAI, as is the case with
all of the other 'connected' phrases in John 1:1-5? Also, note that if hO
GEGONEN is taken as belonging to what follows it instead of what precedes it,
then St. John's otherwise perfectlyconsistent [SIC] usage in John 1:1-4 of only
one tense of verb, not only per clause, but also per series of 'connected'
clauses, is thereby 'broken'.

In view of these remarks, I find the following observation from the Catholic NAB interesting (see the notes for the Johannine Prologue):

The prologue states the main themes of the gospel: life, light, truth, the world, testimony, and the preexistence of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos, who reveals God the Father. In origin, it was probably an early Christian hymn. Its closest parallel is in other christological hymns, Col 1:15-20 and Philippians 2:6-11. Its core (John 1:1-5, 10-11, 14) is poetic in structure, with short phrases linked by "staircase parallelism," in which the last word of one phrase becomes the first word of the next. Prose inserts (at least John 1:6-8, 15) deal with John the Baptist.

The operative portion of this quote above is how the NAB defines the expression "staircase parallelism." The definition is important in view of Jason's claim. But contra the assertions of Jason, we read further in the NAB notes:

What came to be: while the oldest manuscripts have no punctuation here, the corrector of Bodmer Papyrus P75, some manuscripts, and the Ante-Nicene Fathers take this phrase with what follows, as staircase parallelism. Connection with John 1:3 reflects fourth-century anti-Arianism.

Let one assume that John 1:1ff does contain staircase parallelism. Notice that the Ante-Nicene Fathers or the pre-Nicenes took the phrase in John 1:3 with what follows, yet they understood this passage to contain "staircase parallelism." Hence, the fact that this verse may contain the poetic features of staircase parallelism does not subvert the notion that hO GEGONEN goes with what follows rather than with what precedes it.Notice that the NAB points out that connecting hO GEGONEN with what precedes the phrase resulted from "fourth-century anti-Arianism."

For the record, I have done extensive research on this issue before. Jason need not try to upbraid this post since I am quoting another source.Those familiar with the relevant issues admit in which direction the textual evidence points.

Theophilus of Antioch on the Trinity

First, we will give quotes from the primary literature:

And first, they taught us with one consent that

God made all things out of nothing; for nothing was coeval with God: but He being His own place, and wanting nothing, and existing before the ages, willed to make man by whom He might be known; for him, therefore, He prepared the world. For he that is created is also needy; but he that is uncreated stands in need of nothing. God, then, having His own Word internal within His own bowels, begat Him, emitting Him along with His own wisdom before all things. He had this Word as a helper in the things that were created by Him, and by Him He made all things. He is called "governing principle" [arkh], because He rules, and is Lord of all things fashioned by Him. He, then, being Spirit of God, and governing principle, and wisdom, and power of the highest, came down upon the prophets, and through them spoke of the creation of the world and of all other things. For the prophets were not when the world came into existence, but the wisdom of God which was in Him, and His holy Word which was always present with Him (Ad Autolycum 2.10).

For the sun is a type of God, and the moon of man. And as the sun far surpasses the moon in power and glory, so far does God surpass man. And as the sun remains ever full, never becoming less, so does God always abide perfect, being full of all power, and understanding, and wisdom, and immortality, and all good. But the moon wanes monthly, and in a manner dies, being a type of man; then it is born again, and is crescent, for a pattern of the future resurrection. In like manner also the three days which were before the luminaries, are types of the Trinity, of God, and His Word, and His wisdom. And the fourth is the type of man, who needs light, that so there may be God, the Word, wisdom, man. Wherefore also on the fourth day the lights were made (Ad Autolycum 2.15).

But as to what relates to the creation of man, his own creation cannot be explained by man, though it is a succinct account of it which holy Scripture gives. For when God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, after Our likeness," He first intimates the dignity of man. For God having made all things by His Word, and having reckoned them all mere bye-works, reckons the creation of man to be the only work worthy of His own hands. Moreover, God is found, as if needing help, to say, "Let Us make man in Our image, after Our likeness." But to no one else than to His own Word and wisdom did He say, "Let Us make." And when He had made and blessed him, that he might increase and replenish the earth, He put all things under his dominion, and at his service; and He appointed from the first that he should find nutriment from the fruits of the earth, and from seeds, and herbs, and acorns, having at the same time appointed that the animals be of habits similar to man's, that they also might eat of an the seeds of the earth (Ad Autolycum 2.18).

Certain scholars write (in agreement with my assessment of Theophilus):

I think that all of this Trinitarian language is derived from the modern historian's anticipation of later theological developments and, therefore, is anachronistic when directed towards Theophilus. Theophilus does not speak of plurality within the so-called Godhead, let alone present a primitive or alternative form of the Trinity.

Quoted from Rick Rogers, Theophilus of Antioch: The Life and Thought of a Second Century Bishop (Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2000), 75.

Robert M. Grant states:

A passage in Theophilus of Antioch is sometimes invoked for the doctrine of the Trinity, but it proves nothing. He is offering symbolical exegesis of the 'days' of creation in Genesis (Grant 156).

Stanley Burgess comments about Theophilus' so-called Trinity as follows:

The members of the Trinity are not named as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, however; rather, they are God, His Word (Logos), and His Wisdom (Burgess 32).

Jason and Subordinationism (Weinandy)

Jason writes:

Hi again Allen,
I am most happy to read Edgar's most recent posts on his blog concerning St.
Justin Martyr and Athenagoras of Athens, because what Edgar has to say
here provides extremely clear examples of the kinds of AMBIGUITIES which he
HABITUALLY uses as the primary basis for his frequent EQUIVOCATIONS. "Less
divine"? Well, in WHAT SENSE, precisely? Edgar doesn't tell us. Though what
he is trying to imply (hiding behind what other people have written, as is his
'style' - which serves his purposes quite well, in that when juxtaposing two or
more authors with each other, one can easily create the appearance that they are
using the same terms in PRECISELY the same 'sense' as eachother) is quite
obviously, that St. Justin taught that the Son was 'subordinate' to the Father
as respects ESSENSE, when, in fact, St. Justin not only taught no such thing,
but EXPLICITLY stated in his writings that the Son is INSEPARABLE from the
ESSENCE of the Father; and in the same context spoke of the Son as being 'numerically distinct' from the Father:

Jason shows his tendency to be a dogmatist and also demonstrates that he is not capable of sticking to the subject matter of a thread. No worries, for I am getting used to it. He is playing a game that is as old as Jesus. Whatever I say (as long as it does not comport with his "orthodox" worldview) is wrong. If I quote Trinitarians I am relying on other people or misrepresenting them. If I quote the pre-Nicenes, I am twisting their words. Whatever! It is actually Weinandy who uses the phrasing "less divine." In what sense he uses the wording, we are not told. But in the same work, Weinandy speaks of the "subordinationism" of Justin Martyr. I assume that he is employing that term in its standard technical manner. If Jason fails to understand what Weinandy means by "subordinationism," maybe Jason would like to ask Weinandy. As for me, I am familiar with what such words mean in this discourse context. Subordinationism generally does refer to creaturehood concerning its referent or to inferiority vis-a-vis essence. That Justin Martyr speaks of the Son being "numerically distinct" from the Father does not prove that he believed the Son is hOMOOUSION with the Father. That proposition "The Son is consubstantial with the Father" does not logically follow from the proposition "The Son is numerically distinct from the Father." Additionally, it did not escape my notice that Jason had nothing to say about Justin's words in 1 Apology 6.1-2. That text clearly implies that Justin possibly adhered to a form of subordinationism. There are other texts at my disposal whenever Jason is ready to discuss the primary literature produced by the Martyr.

Jason continues:

his meaning, once again, as is READILY discerned from the CONTEXT, being that the Son is PERSONALLY distinct, BUT MOST DEFINITELY NOT 'essentially' distinct
from the Father.

Assertions do not cut it in this game. Where is the evidence that supports your asseverations?

Again, we read:

"In touch with the creation"? Well, of course! (Col. 1:15-20
with Eph. 1:3-14; also Rev. 3:14 and Prov. 8:22-31 LXX with Gen. 1:1-5 and John
1:1-5) But hardly in the same sense in which Foster is attempting to imply!
For, the doctrine of the distinction between the "internal Logos' and the
'uttered Logos' which Athenagoras explicitly held to (as Foster's quotation of
him demonstrates) is implicitly - but nonetheless CLEARLY - contained in St.
Justin's writings. (And Eastern Christian theology, to this day, STILL has a
'place' for these concepts, as it, differentiates just as clearly as Athenagoras
did, between the Trinity in Its 'Essence' and the Trinity in that which
'surrounds' Its Essence, namely the Divine 'Energies'/'Operations'.) And, to
use a modern day analogy borrowed from science, which corresponds very closely
to what the Fathers were trying to convey via usage of the 'science' of their
times, one can think in terms of what physicists have to say concerning the
'initial singularity' at which the universe begins. It is INCLUDED within
space-time as a 'boundary' or a 'limit' to space-time, yet in such a manner as
to form neither any actual spatial nor actual temporal PART of it.

If memory serves me correctly, Weinandy articulates the view that Justin's doctrine of the Son or Logos places God's Son in touch with the created order. What Weinandy means, for those not versed in church history or historical scholarship, is that Justin views the Son as the intermediary or mediator of creation. Like Philo, Justin appears to believe (in some sense) that while God the Father cannot be in touch with creation, the Logos or Son can be. See Dialogus cum Tryphone 127. Justin believes that the Father absolutely transcends the created order and necessarily mediates creation through the Son. As for Athenagoras' remarks concerning the internal/external Logos and the comments on the "initial singularity," I know these subjects all too well. I fail to see their relevance, however, with respect to the present discussion.

Trinitarian 'in utero'? 'Precursor' to trinitarianism? What is that supposed to MEAN? EITHER Athenagoras held to the homoousion OR he did not. (Law of excluded middle) If the homousion, then Athenagoras was DEFINITELY trinitarian by anybody's standards EXCEPT that of Foster's EXTREME view of what 'authentic'
trinitatianism consists in, based upon his preferred radical interpretation of
the 'Athanasian' Creed (which, BTW, doesn't even use the term homoousios! - What could be a surer sign than this that it does not originate from the 'Athanasian' tradition?!). If, against the homousion, then surely not in any sense a 'precursor' representing 'trinitarianism' 'in utero'; but RATHER - if anything - an implicit ARIAN! The wonderful thing about 'ambiguity' is that Foster can have it both ways - he can have his cake and eat it too! On the one hand, he can trace the alleged 'development' of 'trinitarianism'; while on the other hand, he can avoid being honest in admitting that the ante-Nicenes were ACTUALLY 'trinitarians'. He can attribute the 'subordinationism' of the ante-Nicenes to the 'influence' of Hellenistic philosophy WHEN this 'subordinationism' allegedly LEADS to 'trinitarianism', while at the same time denying this attribution, WHEN - in his opinion - the very same ante-Nicenes were simply following biblical 'revelation' (or, RATHER, Foster's heretical interpretation of that 'revelation'.) And, of course, here's the clincher: The more PRECISE in their usage of language the Fathers become - and thus, the less susceptible they become to being ABUSED for the purpose of 'supporting' Foster's interpretation of ISOLATED statements in their writings,
all the more this becomes taken by Foster as positive evidence of their
'Hellenization' - the impact of the conflicts first with Gnosticism and
Sabellianism, and then later with Arianism (all of which 'systems' were clearly
PAGAN to the core) being regarded, to all appearances, as a 'negligible' factor
to take into consideration when considering WHY it is that the Fathers 'slowly
BUT SURELY' become more and more precise in their manners of expression as
regards the Trinity and the Incarnation, as far as Foster is concerned!

I do not see what is so difficult to understand about Trinitarianism in utero. First, I do not believe that Athenagoras adhered to the belief that the Son or Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father. But what "in utero" means can be discerned by reading R.M. Grant's book Gods and the One God. In the context of discussing Theophilus and other pre-Nicenes, he observes that one does not find a doctrine of the Trinity in these early writers, but what we have rather than a doctrine of God's triunity as such are "materials" for the Trinity doctrine. Grant defines the Trinity doctrine as a doctrine "that tries to explain the relation of three Persons to the one God" which is not what we evidently find in the early pre-Nicenes (See Gods and the One God, p. 156).

To make sure that Jason does not misunderstand my point again, I want to make it clear that I have not said Athenagoras was "against" the hOMOOUSION formula: he simply did not affirm anything like it. Nor have I referred to Athenagoras as an "implicit Arian." These categories are just more fictions attributed to me by Jason. Jason seems to have a hard time understanding that just because the materials for Trinitarianism exist in a certain writer does not mean that the writer is Trinitarian simpliciter or Trinitarian in the proper sense of the term. It is really quite simple: when the Fathers make statements that are completely incompatible with the basic claims of Trinitarianism (e.g. the Son is omnipotent, omniscient, fully God), then it is fair to conclude that they adhered to a form of subordinationism. As R.P.C. Hanson noted:

"With the exception of Athanasius virtually every theologian, East and West, accepted some form of subordinationism at least up to the year 355" (The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988, p. xix.).

Victorinus on Revelation 12:1

And there was seen a great sign in heaven. A woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. And being with child, she cried out travailing, and bearing torments that she might bring forth.”] The woman clothed with the sun, and having the moon under her feet, and wearing a crown of twelve stars upon her head, and travailing in her pains, is the ancient Church of fathers, and prophets, and saints, and apostles, which had the groans and torments of its longing until it saw that Christ, the fruit of its people according to the flesh long promised to it, had taken flesh out of the selfsame people. Moreover, being clothed with the sun intimates the hope of resurrection and the glory of the promise. And the moon intimates the fall of the bodies of the saints under the obligation of death, which never can fail. For even as life is diminished, so also it is increased. Nor is the hope of those that sleep extinguished absolutely, as some think, but they have in their darkness a light such as the moon. And the crown of twelve stars signifies the choir of fathers, according to the fleshly birth, of whom Christ was to take flesh (Victorinus, Commentary on the Apocalypse of the Blessed John, dates are 270-303 CE).

Jason's Latest Reply and My Response

My comments will be interspersed with Jason's remarks:

1)In his book on the Trinity, Edgar equivocates on the terms 'subordinate'and='subordination' so many times that it is hardly necessary to list
specific instances of his doing so. On the one hand, he admits to there being a
variety of types of 'subordinationism', some of which do not involve a
subordination with respect to either essence or essential attributes; while on
the other hand, he wishes to maintain that ANY form of subordinationism
whatsoever does indeed involve a subordination with respect to essence and
essential attributes. And, this in turn is connected with his equivocation on
the terms 'trinitarian' and 'trinitarianism'. For, on the one hand, he admits
to there being a variety of types (or 'interpretations') of trinitarianism, some
of which include a'functional' subordinationism, or even a relational or
a personal subordination -note Foster's references to Eastern Orthodoxy's
'version' of trinitarianism in this connection; while, on the other hand, he wishes to hold up the Athanasian Creed(or rather, an extreme' hyper-Augustinian' interpretation of it, allowing for no sense of inequality or subordination whatsoever) as the standard by which to judge to what extent any given theology is truly 'trinitarian' or not.

If Jason would actually read my work on Christology and the Trinity in full, then he might not labor under such misunderstandings of it. I will admit that the distinction between subordination and subordinationism could have been clearer; nonetheless, I did offer definitions of the terms I was using. Moreover, as I later discovered, Trinitarians themselves are not consistent in their use of the terms "subordination" and "subordinationism" which adds to the confusion. For example, Trinitarian scholar Edmund Fortman is not always consistent in the way he employs the terms. Be that as it may, I think my general point stands. The pre-Nicenes were not Trinitarians: they pioneered the Trinity at best. Jason also puts words in my mouth when he says that I connect Eastern Orthodoxy's interpretation of the Trinity doctrine with personal or functional subordination. I do no such thing.

2) To restate my contention against Foster:�It is not only the ante-Nicene Fathers who held to a position which is�located somewhere in the middle between Foster's EXTREME subordinationism and Foster's�EXTREME 'trinitarianism'; but the same is also just as true of the Nicene Fathers (East and West)�and the
post-Nicene Eastern Fathers.� Indeed, by Foster's standards - if he would be
consistent with himself instead of equivocating so often - the�(absurd)
conclusion would be reached that the theology of the Christian East�NEVER has
been 'trinitarian'�at any time at all�during the past two millenia.��

There are a number of passages which I have quoted and cited that show the extent to which the pre-Nicenes were beholden to subordinationism. It is clear that the Son or the Holy Spirit was viewed as less than fully God by these early church writers. That is not only my assessment of the pre-Nicene state of affairs, but of able scholars (including some Trinitarians) actually familiar with church history.

3)�As regards the�Immutability�and the Incarnation, Foster just simply doesn't 'get it'.� For, what he is doing here�amounts to�assuming that there is a
'temporal relation' between 'atemporality' and 'temporality'.��Additionally,
inasmuch as Foster treats the question of�change 'involving'�the�Person of�the
Son WITHOUT respect to IN WHICH NATURE the Person of the Son changed in becoming
Incarnate (as though the question of 'in which nature' did the change occur to
the Person of the Son�were irrelevant when treating of the 'first moment' of the
existence of the�Hypostatic Union), there is a kind MONOPHYSITISM�by default
involved in Edgar's conception of the Hypostatic Union.� (Even more�clearly so,
Allen,�is this the case in your conceptualization of the Union.� Remember when
you declared� that the Incarnation must involve a change to God's NATURE, and I
asked you: WHICH nature?� And you still haven't answered that question!� I can't
really fault you for your 'silence' on this matter, seeing that the very
question you asked implies that you are thinking in terms of some third 'nature'
- whether resulting from the Union or not- which is neither the�Divine
Nature�nor�a human nature.)

I refuse to tolerate Jason's question begging which is getting old by now. The fallacious use of ipse dixit is also on display here. Where have I assumed a temporal relation between atemporality and temporality? That is absurd and there is no evidence to substantiate this odd claim. Firstly, it begs the question to ask "in which nature" did the Son of God change insofar he became incarnate. The way that Jason has framed the question ASSUMES that the Son has more than one nature (simultaneously) and that he "became incarnate" with "becoming incarnate" being defined as "the act of God or a fully divine being assuming humanity." I do not grant either assumption. Rather, I am content to affirm along with the apostle that the Word became flesh (John 1:14). John writes that God's Son "became" a human or flesh. The question begging of Jason aside, a question is thereby raised as to the mode in which the Son experienced this form of becoming. How could the Son become flesh without undergoing some type of change as God qua God? And what is interesting about this issue is that I did not originally raise this question, I read it in Trinitarian literature. For example, Owen Thomas writes:

Now Middle Platonist philosophy
involved a doctrine of God as impassible,
completely transcendent and immutable.
Thus on these terms it is extremely
difficult to understand how God and humanity could be
united in one person. But the fundamental thing we
know from Christ is that God can be perfectly united
with humanity. This is where we begin in speaking
about God and humanity. The problem is not how a union
of God and humanity in one person is possible, but
given the union manifest in Christ what perfect
godhead and humanity are.

The "problem" that Jason is overlooking is HOW an impassible or immutable God (in the absolute sense) adds humanity to his supposed deity. Before talking about "in which nature" did a purported change occur, we must first deal with the question concerning how an unchangeable or impassible God experiences MOTUS in any fashion or unites perfect manhood with perfect godhood.

Brian Hebblethwaite (a Trinitarian) also discerns the problem that Jason purports not to see:

The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless ACT of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a potentiality.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes:

The Incarnation is an especially knotty problem for DDI's Christian friends. In general, these argue that all change it involved occurred in the human nature God the Son assumed rather than in God; God was eternally ready to be incarnate, and eternally had those experiences of the earthly Christ which the Incarnation makes part of his life. Through changes in Mary and the infant she bore, what was eternally in God eventually took place on earth.

Some in the early church tried to handle this difficulty of the Word becoming flesh by reworking the apostolic language of John. See http://books.google.com/books?id=k3CeAZtgwY8C&pg=PA220&dq=immutability+and+john+1:14&lr=

4) Foster wishes that in this context I would appeal to 'mystery'.� Yet, it is Foster who is 'de-mystifying' my statements by treating them as though I had made some attempt to define in POSITIVE terms, the relation between
'atemporality' and 'temporality', when in fact, all my statements on this
question are purely NEGATIVE, and thus, do not dissolve or rationalize away the
mystery of the Incarnation.� Indeed, in order to even begin to attempt a
POSITIVE definition of the relation obtaining betwen atemporality and
temporality, one would need to know what the positive content is�of God's
'atemporality'.� Although Foster is most likely unaware that he is 'filling in
the blanks' here by speaking as though it were some kind of 'given' that the
'relation' in question is of a 'temporal' nature, he is doing so nonetheless.�
And, as by doing so, this necessarily compromises the distinction between
atemporality and temporality, he can't help it but wind up
with what amounts to a monophysite view of the Incarnation whereby the Divine
Person of the Son IN HIS DIVINE NATURE ITSELF�(not just merely in His human
nature)�is somehow 'changed' by virtue of the Hypostatic Union.��And,�this in
turn�necessarily causes Edgar to become confused by my statements,�judging them
to be 'practically unintelligible'.� For, of course, once the two natures are�so
'blurred' together with each other that the Divine Nature�Itself loses its
distinctive properties - for what Edgar is basically saying is that�since the
Person of the Son in His human nature is�changeable, it follows that by virtue
of the Union, the Person of the Son in His Divine Nature thereby�'receives' the
property of 'chageability' - so that, for all practical purposes one may just as
well speak of there being only one nature of the Incarnate Son, it then becomes
impossible to understand anything of what I am saying here.� For, the coherence
of my statements depends upon maintaining a firm distinction�('uncompromised' by the
Union) between the TWO natures�of the One and the�Same Divine Person of�the Son,
just as much as�the coherence of my statements also�depends�upon�NEVER
conceiving of�either of the natures�APART FROM THEIR BEING�the natures OF THE
DIVINE PERSON in question�whose natures they are.��(Yes, contrary to the heretic
Nestorius and his -often unwittingly- modern-day followers,�'the�PERSON of the
Union'�is none other than God the Son Himself, the Second Person of the Trinity;
NOT�some kind of�'Christ' differentiated from�'God the Son'�and considered as
though�'he' - i.e., this Nestorian 'Christ' - were�some sort of 'product' of the
Union, and�which therefore, does not exist�apart from�the Union.)�

Jason has so distorted my actual position on this issue that I don't even recognize it. I have nowhere assumed or asserted that there is a temporal relation between atemporality and temporality. Who is reading between the lines here? Rather, I have employed the language of classical Trinitarianism which contends that the Son of God (the Logos) added humanity to his putative deity. Moreover, I utilized the language of the apostle John (John 1:14) who writes that the Word (Logos) "became" flesh. But as opposed to dealing with the issues, Jason chooses to misrepresent my position through some figment of his own imagination. My comments do not assume that the Son has one nature. I actually grant the premise that the Son of God added humanity to his deity. So how can Jason make such a misleading statement? All I see in the paragraph above, however, is more question begging or the ipse dixit fallacy being committed by Jason.

Now to get back to reality, I can summon another witness in my favor. Trinitarian Wolfhart Pannenberg also demonstrates that John 1:14 presented a difficulty for early post-Nicene Christians. Athanasius was so troubled by Arian arguments based on John 1:14 that he saw the need to rework John's language regarding the Word "becoming" flesh. See http://books.google.com/books?id=qh3adJfET7QC&pg=PA436&dq=immutability+and+john+1:14&lr=#PPA437,M1

Athanasius writes:

This being so understood, it is parallel also respecting the Son, that whatever, and however often, is said, such as, 'He became' and 'become,' should ever have the same sense: so that as, when we hear the words in question, 'become better than the Angels' and 'He became,' we should not conceive any original becoming of the Word, nor in any way fancy from such terms that He is originate; but should understand Paul's words of His ministry and Economy when He became man. For when 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us' and came to minister and to grant salvation to all, then He became to us salvation, and became life, and became propitiation; then His economy in our behalf became much better than the Angels, and He became the Way and became the Resurrection. And as the words 'Become my strong rock' do not denote that the essence of God Himself became, but His loving kindness, as has been said, so also here the 'having become better than the Angels,' and, 'He became,' and, 'by so much is Jesus become a better surety,' do not signify that the essence of the Word is originate (perish the thought!), but the beneficence which towards us came to be through His becoming Man; unthankful though the heretics be, and obstinate in behalf of their irreligion (Contra Arianos 1.64).

Nice ad hominem fallacy at the end.

Alvan Lamson on Athenagoras

See http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=SG4Jzs2RSUcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=athenagoras+and+the+trinity+doctrine&ots=voLTQLM27G&sig=jirBpr-GPU6z5aomp9EH2TjFCQI#PPA100,M1

I have also written:

In the book Gods and the one God, Robert Grant writes that Athenagoras constructed his theological concepts from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (Athenagoras also incorporated Stoic thought when systematizing the nature of God). Grant provides compelling evidence that Athenagoras' ideas are Trinitarian concepts in utero that simultaneously employ Platonic and Pythagorean philosophical notions to explain Christian theology (Grant 158).

An example of Athenagoras' Platonic tendencies is witnessed from this passage:

But the Son of God is the Logos of the Father, in idea and in operation; for after the pattern of Him and by Him "Or, by Him and through Him" were all things made, the Father and the Son being one. And, the Son being in the Father and the Father in the Son, in oneness and power of spirit, the understanding and reason (νοῦς καὶ λόγος) of the Father is the Son of God. But if, in your surpassing intelligence, it occurs to you to inquire what is meant by the Son, I will state briefly that He is the first product of the Father, not as having been brought into existence (for from the beginning, God, who is the eternal mind [νοῦς], had the Logos in Himself, being from eternity instinct with Logos [λογικός]); but inasmuch as He came forth to be the idea and energizing power of all material things, which lay like a nature without attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser particles being mixed up with the lighter. The prophetic Spirit also agrees with our statements. "The Lord," it says, "made me, the beginning of His ways to His works" (A Plea for Christians).

Athenagoras seems to believe that the Logos of God gives form to matter which lacks attributes. He applies Proverbs 8:22 to this activity of the Logos as the Reason of God. The Logos appears to provide intelligibility to the world. At most, what Athenagoras writes can be interpreted as a precursor to Trinitarianism.

Thomas G. Weinandy on Subordinationism in Justin Martyr

Thomas G. Weinandy on Justin Martyr and
Subordinationism (from his book _Does God Suffer?_)

"Because Justin conceives the Logos as emanating out
from the Father, he holds that the Logos is divine.
However, since he does emanate out from the Father, as
the spatial intermediary between the Father and the
created order, he is not as divine as the Father is
divine. See Dialogus, 56 and Apologia 1,63" (_Does God
Suffer_, page 86, note 20).

"It would seem, for Justin, that the Logos must be
less divine than the Father not only because he
emanates out from the Father, but also because he is
'in touch' with the created order" (Ibid., note 21).

"Edwards argues that Justin's understanding of the
Logos is primarily founded upon the scriptural
tradition and not upon Platonic thought. I believe
Edwards is correct, but this does not seem to have
mitigated his subordinationism nor his understanding
that the Logos acts as an intermediary who bridges the
gap between God and the world" (Ibid., p. 87, note
21).

Edmund J. Fortman (_The Triune God_) defines
"subordinationism" as "a doctrine that makes the Son
and/or the Holy Spirit an inferior deity or a
creature."

Justin Martyr himself writes:

Hence are we called atheists. And we confess that we are atheists, so far as gods of this sort are concerned, but not with respect to the most true God, the Father of righteousness and temperance and the other virtues, who is free from all impurity. But both Him, and the Son (who came forth from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good angels who follow and are made like to Him), and the prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore, knowing them in reason and truth, and declaring without grudging to every one who wishes to learn, as we have been taught

(1 Apology 6.1-2)

Subordinationism and the Trinity Doctrine

A member of the evangelicals-jws yahoogroup named Jason has attempted to impugn my scholarship by arguing that I am simply wrong in contending that subordinationism and Trinitarianism are incompatible. Jason writes:

So, in that I have demonstrated sufficiently that Foster's contention that trintarianism is incompatible with ANY form of subordinationism WHATSOEVER is manifestly ABSURD (surely the great 'Minstrel of the Trinity', St. Gregory Nazianzen, was NOT a 'non-trinitarian'!), I have - in the very act of doing so - also demonstrated sufficiently that Foster's contention that the ante-Nicenes were non-trinitarians is also manifestly ABSURD, and hence FALSE. Nevertheless, I WILL - in future posts - offer positive PROOF that Foster has grossly misinterpreted St. Justin, Athenagoras of Athens, St. Theophilus of Antioch, St. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, and Lactantius: the eight ante-Nicenes whom Edgar appeals to for the perverse purpose of attempting to overthrow Holy O/orthodoxy.

Jason evidently fails to understand the technical denotation of subordinationism. Fortman defines "subordinationism" as the belief that God's Son is a creature or inferior in essence vis-a-vis the Father. Leonard Hodgson also writes: "Subordinationism, as I have indicated earlier, attempts to preserve the [divine] unity by making one person ultimately the real God and the others divine because of their relation to him" (The Doctrine of the Trinity, 100).

Based on these definitions, which have been included in my studies, how could Jason get his analysis of my work so wrong? Let him tell me how Trinitarianism is compatible with subordinationism when Trinitarianism both denies that the Son is a creature and it contends that the Son is not inferior in essence to the Father. Furthermore, according to the Trinity doctrine, one divine person is not the real God while the others are only divine in relation to him. I believe the problem is that Jason fails to understand the terminology being used in this discussion. For if he comprehended the terminology employed in discussions of this kind, he would not have made such an egregious mistake respecting my scholarship. As for his contention that the pre-Nicenes were Trinitarians, I will address this misleading statement in other posts. I just wanted to establish the error contained in Jason's statements before demonstration other mistakes committed by him.

Monolatry, Monotheism and Henotheism

I believe that we must keep in mind that such terms as monolatry, monotheism or even henotheism are all attempts to delineate, circumscribe or define certain religious phenomena that one encounters in Scripture. In other words, the Bible itself never uses such terminology to describe the ways in which people of ancient times worshiped. One can only arrive at such descriptive words by prescinding from that which is explicitly contained in Holy Writ. Another thing that we must do, however, is render precise that which we are concerned with here.

(1) Henotheism has been defined as the act of worshiping one God (in particular, a national or tribal deity) while simultaneously refusing to rule out the existence of other gods. It has well been said that henotheism defined thus "certainly does not fit the universal and cosmic conception implicit in the Old Testament" (Ralph L. Smith, Old Testament Theology, page 232). I would also argue that Witnesses of Jehovah are
not henotheists since Jehovah is not viewed as a tribal god, nor are other beings recognized as "gods" by Witnesses accorded the same ontological status as Jehovah.

(2) One online source defines monolatry as follows: "worship of one god only out of many believed to exist."

Witnesses worship (in the sense of latreia) one God (not "god") and we believe that there are others that can be called "gods" in a functional or an ontological sense (i.e. angels and judges). But what does it mean to say that one believes there are many gods that exist? Does it not all depend on how one defines the term God/god? To illustrate what I mean, notice what Smith says about monotheism.

(3) Ralph L. Smith quotes from three scholars who all
define monotheism in slightly different ways. The
point I want to draw attention to now, however, is
what G.E. Wright states, as quoted by Smith. Wright
notes that monotheism is "the exclusive exaltation of
the one source of all power, authority, and
creativity" (Smith, page 232).

Now, if one defines monotheism in the foregoing
manner, it is safe to say that recognizing what Wright
calls "subordinate divine beings" (i.e. gods) does not
mean that one is not a monotheist. In fact, D.S.
Russell ("The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic") writes:

"There is ample evidence to show that [OT] conception
of monotheism was held in conjunction with a belief in
a spiritual world peopled with supernatural and
superhuman beings who, in some ways, shared the
nature, though not the being, of God" (page 235).

While I am not totally sure what Russell means when
he writes that the angels were depicted as sharing the "nature"
but not the "being" of God, I nonetheless conclude
that it is appropriate for Jehovah's Witnesses to identify themselves
as monotheists rather than monolaters or henotheists. Witnesses
worship "the only true God" (Jn 17:3) but realize that
images of this one God subsist in the spirit realm and
some men (and angels) have represented the one God on earth.

The Relational God of the Bible

I came across a quote today and thought I would post it here. A theologian named Norman Geisler, who usually favors Thomism, writes that a God

who cannot act or interact with the world would be less than significantly personal. Prayer and service possess little meaning unless there is a real, personal relationship between God and men. The God of the Bible is responsive to human needs and actions. There is no existential appeal in an impersonal and unrelatable Being. The doctrine of God's relationality is a biblical and vital teaching which is neglected or lost in some expressions of traditional theism.

Best wishes,

Edgar

Cyril Lucaris on the Place of Scripture in the Ecclesia

Cyril Lucaris was a Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople. His dates are 1572-1638 CE. He evidently produced an 18 point synopsis of his beliefs, which certain scholars have claimed was influenced by Calvinism. I now quote chapter 2 of Cyril's Confessions:

We believe the Holy Scripture to be given by God, to have no other author but the Holy Spirit. This we ought undoubtedly to believe, for it is written. We have a more sure word of prophecy, to which you do well to take heed, as to light shining in a dark place. We believe the authority of the Holy Scripture to be above the authority of the Church. To be taught by the Holy Spirit is a far different thing from being taught by a man; for man may through ignorance err, deceive and be deceived, but the word of God neither deceives nor is deceived, nor can err, and is infallible and has eternal authority.

Regards,
Edgar

Did God the Son Change?

A yahoogroup member who participates on an Evangelical-Jehovah's Witnesses forum and sometimes on this blog was asked:

If a divine person takes on a human nature, is that not a change

His answer:

Hi R--,
Only if the Divine Person in question already existed BEFORE taking on human
nature. But, for those of us who believe in Divine Timelessness, it just simply
is not true that the Son existed first for a certain length of time without His
human nature, and then LATER took on human nature. Also, the Divine Person of
the Son is BOTH unchangeable AND changeable: In His divinity, He is
unchangeable, while in His humanity, He is changeable. Likewise, the Divine
Person of the Son is both timeless AND temporal: In His divinity, He is
timeless, while in His humanity, He is temporal. So, yes, it is true that a
change occurred in that the human nature of the Son first did not exist, and
then afterwards came to exist (for the Incarnation is a temporal event). BUT,
it does not follow from this that the Person of the Son first existed without
His human nature, and then afterwards came to have His human nature.
For, BEFORE the time of the Incarnation, i.e., APART from the Incranation [SIC], there is no temporal succession involved in the existence of the Person of the Son of which one can speak. Thus, the Incarnation does not in any manner whatosever [SIC] either contradict or weaken the absolute nature of the Divine Unchangeability

If I may borrow a term from another participant on the Evangelical-Witnesses forum, this explanation is practically unintelligible. Moreover, it begs the question (petitio principii) by asserting that which should be demonstrated through the use of logic in one form or another. But to talk about the Son adding humanity to his deity without a change or event occurring is unintelligible. It contradicts the principles of basic logic and it flies in the face of our bodily experience in the phenomenal realm. In his answer, the aforementioned forum participant claims that the human nature of "God the Son" did not exist, but then subsequently came to exist since the Incarnation is a putative temporal event. But even if we prescind from the question of whether God is temporal or atemporal, we must nevertheless ask how motion occurs without a state of affairs being altered. Motion (understood in its broad sense of any change whatsoever like the Latin motus can signify) cannot occur without a state of affairs being altered which involves a person in given state of affairs undergoing some type of alteration or change.

Yet, how is it possible for a timeless or immutable God (in the absolute sense) to undergo change or experience motus? The previous claim that God the Son becomes incarnate, thereby adding humanity to his deity, is unintelligible without invoking change. Other theologians have admitted the "mystery" that attends this "temporal" event. O how blessed we would be to have such an admission from the person who tried to answer the question above.

According to A.W. Pink, there are at least three ways in which God is immutable:

1)

First, God is immutable in His essence. His nature and being are infinite, and so, subject to no mutations. There never was a time when He was not; there never will come a time when He shall cease to be. God has neither evolved, grown, nor improved.

2)

Secondly, God is immutable in His attributes. Whatever the attributes of God were before the universe was called into existence, they are precisely the same now, and will remain so forever. Necessarily so; for they are the very perfections, the essential qualities of His being. Semper idem (always the same) is written across every one of them. His power is unabated, His wisdom undiminished, His holiness unsullied.

3)

Thirdly, God is immutable in His counsel. His will never varies. Perhaps some are ready to object that we ought to read the following: "And it repented the Lord that He had made man" (Gen 6:6). Our first reply is, Then do the Scriptures contradict themselves? No, that cannot be. Numbers 23:19 is plain enough: "God is not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent." So also in 1 Samuel 15:19, "The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for He is not a man, that He should repent."

See http://www.albatrus.org/english/theology/god/immutability%20of%20god.htm

But if God is absolutely immutable, then how did God "become" incarnate? How would Pink explain God the Son adding humanity to his deity? Furthermore, does not the language of "becoming" suggest that motion (motus) or change occurs? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states:

The Incarnation is an especially knotty problem for DDI's [the doctrine of divine immutability's] Christian friends. In general, these argue that all change it involved occurred in the human nature God the Son assumed rather than in God; God was eternally ready to be incarnate, and eternally had those experiences of the earthly Christ which the Incarnation makes part of his life. Through changes in Mary and the infant she bore, what was eternally in God eventually took place on earth.

God eternally experienced what the earthly Christ would undergo when he "became" flesh? How could God have those experiences without change occurring in his preexistent state?

Brian Hebblethwaite makes an interesting point regarding the Incarnation and change in God. In his book entitled Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (page 45), he writes:

The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless act of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a
potentiality.

In a nutshell (in nuce), Hebblethwaite is saying that it is difficult to understand how a timeless, immutable God becomes man or creates the universe. For the Incarnation doctrine implies that the LOGOS became flesh, whereas the doctrine of creation indicates that God acted to bring creation into being ex nihilo. Both notions appear problematic in the light of divine atemporality.

Old Email Concerning Aquinas' Use of the Term "Person" for God

Hi,

I once wrote this email to a colleague of mine who is an atheist. I
have a good relationship with this individual, but we greatly disagree
when it comes to matters that concern theology. :)

Hi Sue [name inserted to replace the original one],

I've been reading a book entitled "After Aquinas"
written by Fergus Kerr and I think it contains some interesting
remarks on divine personhood that I'd like to share with you.

Kerr writes that in ordinary modern usage, the term "person" is
"co-extensive" with "human being" (After Aquinas, 193). Philosophy
students influenced by the Cartesian turn to subjectivity, however, no
doubt think of a person in terms of "a self-conscious or rational
being," a usage which was also quite familiar to the British
Empiricist John Locke.

However, Thomas Aquinas holds that the term "person"
when applied to God actually refers to "an individual substance of a
rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as
one carefully nuances or qualifies what is meant by "individual"
(i.e., incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual)
and "substance" ('self-grounded existing').

Kerr closes the paragraph I took this information from by noting:

"Of course, as Thomas keeps insisting, this concept of person [i.e.,
rationalis naturae individua substantia] applies in discourse about
God only analogically" (After Aquinas, 193).

See the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, particularly ST 1.13.5;
1.29.3.

If I don't communicate with you between now and Friday, have a good
week.

Cheers,
Edgar

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason-Part 3

I will now list some objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity that make it an unlikely candidate for buttressing the Trinity doctrine or accounting for its conceptual feasibility.

The doctrine of God's simplicity (simplicitas Dei) does not fail to encounter its own logical problematics. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig argue that it "seems patently false" to make the claim that God does not exemplify properties that are objectively distinct from one another since the property of being good apparently is objectively distinct from the property of being omniscient, just as the property of being omnipotent is not metaphysically identical with the abstract property of being omnibenevolent. Moreover, Christopher Stead maintains that it is problematic to insist that God's action toward the world is "simple and uniform." He maintains that divine simplicity does not seem to explain adequately how God loves numerous creatures simultaneously or providentially guides the multitudinous events that repeatedly and continuously occur in creation; nor does the doctrine evidently account for the notion of an immanent God, who personally acts in creation. Those who advocate this doctrine, however, contend that the supposed difficulties associated with God's simplicity emanate from dissimilar ontological emphases between the medieval and contemporary period, not from the concept of divine simplicity itself. They insist that medieval thinkers stress constituent ontology (i.e. entities are what they are as such) whereas contemporary thinkers are inclined to emphasize relational ontology (i.e. entities have essences, properties or sets of properties). In the light of relational ontology, Alvin Plantinga has contended that divine simplicity possibly leads to the logical conclusion that God is a property. Plantinga writes:

In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property … In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property.

See http://74.6.239.67/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=plantinga+and+divine+simplicity&y=Search&fr=yfp-t-501&u=web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Making%2520Sense%2520of%2520Divine%2520Simplicity.pdf&w=plantinga+divine+divining+simplicity&d=cSuEHA-YSNrd&icp=1&.intl=us

Yet, there are other logical objections to divine simplicity that seem to function as sound defeaters for the doctrine. The next blog post will review some of these objections.

Philo on Parents as Gods

In his study _The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts
in Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews Under the
Early Roman Empire as Described by Philo Judaeus_ (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1929) Erwin
R. Goodenough relates that Philo evidently depicts
parents as QEOI EMFANEIS since they "create" (as it
were) in the manner of Almighty God. The ancient
writer from Alexandria contends that parents are "gods
only to their own children" and that parenthood always
implies "divinity" or "a rank between the divine and
human," as De Specialibus Legibus 2.225 suggests. Cf.
De Decalogo 120 as well.

This data can be found on page 67 of Goodenough's
work.

De Specialibus Legibus 2.225 states: "For parents
themselves are something between divine and human
nature, partaking of both; of human nature, inasmuch
as it is plain that they have been born and that they
will die; and of divine nature, because they have
engendered other beings, and have brought what did not
exist into existence: for, in my opinion, what God is
to the world, that parents are to their children;
since, just as God gave existence to that which had no
existence, they also, in imitation of his power, as
far at least as they were able, make the rest of
mankind everlasting."

I find it interesting that Philo could posit these
ideas without breaching his monotheistic stance.

Best regards,
Edgar

Lactantius on God's Instantiated Emotions

Lactantius reasons that God the Father must be passible (in a certain sense) if he is going to treat both his good and bad servants (i.e. human beings) in a just manner. He insists that a righteous God and Father must find pleasure regarding the pious acts of his servants but feel wrath for those acts which are not in accordance with divine law, those acts that do not promote human flourishing (De ira Dei 5). But if the Father is literally going to make a distinction in terms of the treatment that good and bad servants receive, then he must instantiate certain emotions. These states must be objectively differentiated in God lest he proves to be inanimate (Divinae institutiones 5.22.13). Since Lactantius is persuaded that some creatures—by dint of their actions—merit being hated or loved, he maintains that the Father must have actual emotions to qualify as a righteous deity (De ira Dei 6; Divinae institutiones 6.19.8). The only impassible entities
are those beings that are inanimate or dead. Neither rocks nor trees nor sand
can show emotions. However, Lactantius believes that the living God does
experience such variations within himself (De ira Dei 4). Furthermore, he
contends that where emotions do not exist, virtue cannot exist (Divinae
institutiones 6.15.9). The virtuous Father of all is thus moved (internally) as
he responds to virtuous or vicious human actions. His well-ordered experience of
phenomenal subjectivity ensures that evil will not obtain forever since God
apparently will treat evil and goodness in proportion to their respective dues
(De ira Dei 16).

Edgar

Wagner on Full God Christology

This material is taken from a book written by Walter Wagner entitled After the Apostles (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1994), page
112:

Frankly, the 'full God Christology' has problems.
More passages in the New Testament reflect adoptionist
and angelic positions than the full God option. It may
assure those who are convinced that human free will is
unable to obey God, but it makes no philosophical
sense, invites forced interpretations of the
Scriptures, and raises questions. For example, the
Gospels reported that Jesus prayed, but if he was hO
QEOS to whom did he pray? If God is one, how could a
section of God be sent out on an earthly mission? Is
God divisible? In the event that Jesus was a
manifestation of the supreme God, does that mean God
is subject to change with all philosophical risks such
a view entails? If God became enfleshed in Jesus, did
God-as-Jesus sweat, hunger, and have bowel movements?
Doesn't such a view degrade the holy and transcendent
God? If the enfleshed God did not participate in human
grubbiness as well as nobility, then what kind of
humanity did Jesus-God have?

Walter H. Wagner was associate professor at Muhlenberg
College in Allentown, PA.

ERRWSO,
Edgar Foster

Lenoir-Rhyne University
Russell House, no. 7

The Myth of Objective Science

Greetings,

The old Neo-Kantian bifurcation of facts and values is simply untenable. While it may seem tempting to state that science deals with "facts" while religion concerns itself with "values," this assertion cannot withstand serious analysis and a number of scientists have admitted that science is not cold or dispassionate but sometimes ideological and always informed by human presuppositions or a priori concepts. As Paul Davies points out, it seems that scientists have to start with certain "givens," which may not be necessary (in the Kantian sense) but probably are not objectionable either (The Mind of God, pp. 186-187).

Modern thought on science and cognition indicates that "there are no unfiltered facts." While I think this proposition might overstate the case somewhat, it does capture an important truth: science is not and cannot be dispassionate ex toto. Scientists may deal with factual data, but that data is not filtered through blank slates. The myth of the blank slate (tabula rasa) has been exposed thoroughly by contemporary epistemologists. Moreover, those intimately acquainted with the workings of the human brain or sapient cognitive structures will concede that feeling is an integral part of thinking. One who thinks without the presence of emotions or feelings cannot adequately think. Neurologist Antonio Damasio has shown that rationality without emotion or feeling makes prudent decision-making difficult or perhaps impossible. See his work Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. Ergo, science cannot be dispassionate or presupposition-free: it does not come to us mere mortals from the land of nowhere.

Astronomer Robert Jastrow also exposes the myth of objective science, writing:

"Theologians generally are delighted with the proof that the Universe had a beginning, but astronomers are curiously upset. Their reactions provide an interesting demonstration of the response of the scientific mind--supposedly a very objective mind--when evidence uncovered by science itself leads to a conflict with the articles of faith in our profession. It turns out that the scientist behaves the way the rest of us do when our beliefs are in conflict with the evidence. We become irritated, we pretend the conflict does not exist, or we paper it over with meaningless phrases" (God and the Astronomers, page 16).

XAIREIN KAI ERRWSQAI,
Edgar Foster

Paul Tillich on the Incarnation

Greetings!

Speaking about those who like to employ the term
"Incarnation" with some frequency, the late systematic
theologian Paul Tillich writes:

"They forget that this is not an especially Christian
characteristic, because incarnation is something which
happens in paganism all the time. The divine beings
always incarnate in different forms. That is very easy
in paganism. This is not the real distinction between
Christianity and other religions" (See pg. 363 of
_Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings_ edited by
Michael Peterson, William Hasker, et. al.).

Proof of Tillich's observation can be found in Greek
and Roman mythology and in the sacred works of
Hinduism. The Incarnation may well be a product of
antecedent non-Christian thought.

Best regards,
Edgar

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

BDAG states:  εὐτραπελία, ας, ἡ (s. τρέπω; Hippocr. et al., mostly in a good sense: ‘wittiness’, ‘facetiousness’ [cp. our ‘turn a phrase’]; so also Posidipp. Com. fgm. 28, 5; Diod. S. 15, 6, 5; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 361; Jos., Ant. 12, 173; 214. Acc. to Aristot., EN 2, 7, 13 it is the middle term betw. the extremes of buffoonery [βωμολοχία] and boorishness [ἀγροικία]; acc. to Aristot., Rhet. 2, 12 it is πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις) in our lit. only in a bad sense coarse jesting, risqué wit (for sim. sense cp. εὐτράπελος Isocr. 7, 49) Eph 5:4.—HRahner, LexThK III 1212. PvanderHorst, Is Wittiness Christian? A Note on εὐτραπελία in Eph 5:4: Miscellanea Neotestamentica, ed. AKlŸn/WvanUnnik ’78, 163-77.—DELG s.v. τρέπω. M-M. TW. Spicq. Sv.

"* εὐτραπελία, -ας, ἡ, 1. Versatility, wit, facetiousness (Hippocr., Plt., al.). 2. = μωρολογία, coarse jesting, ribaldry (Abbott, Essays, 93): Eph 5:4" (Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament, page 190).

"εὐτραπελία, ας, f: coarse jesting involving vulgar expressions and indecent content-'vulgar speech, indecent talk.' καὶ αἰσχρότης καὶ μωρολογία ἢ εὐτραπελία, ἃ οὐκ ἀνῆκεν 'nor is it fitting for you to use shameful, foolish, or vulgar language' Eph 5:4" (Louw-Nida Greek & English Lexicon 33.34).

"εὐτραπελία (#2365) coarse jesting. It implies the dexterity of turning a discourse to wit or humor that ends in deceptive speech, so formed that the speaker easily contrives to wriggle out of its meaning or engagement (Eadie). After a banquet the guests would sit and talk making jokes; often there was a jester (scurra, coprea) who knew how to make plays on words . . ." (Rogers and Rogers, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 443).

Scurra = "A city buffoon, droll, jester" (Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary).

Coprea-"A low buffoon, a filthy jester (post-Aug.), Suet. Tib. 61; id. Claud. 8; cf. Dio Cass. 50, 28" (Lewis and Short).

See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eutrapelia

Does the Triune God Transcend Reason?

A goodly number of Trinitarians have contended that the Trinity doctrine cannot be conclusively demonstrated by rational thought because it is above reason or transrational. Now assuming that God is triune and God as such transcends reason, then it would seem to follow logically that the triune God (if he exists) would also transcend reason (i.e. the law of transitivity). Therefore, one question that seemingly needs to be addressed is whether God in se is transrational or "metarational."

To briefly address some of these issues, I will admit from the outset that there has long been a tension concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason. Certain thinkers have contended that God or his dealings with humanity are not amenable to reason. There is also the famous axiom in theology that God may be apprehended, but he cannot be comprehended. And even a rigorous theologian like Duns Scotus ultimately argues that when reason leads us to a place where faith does not, we should let faith take precedence over reason.

However, it cannot be the case that God utterly transcends reason. This suggestion is nonsensical and patently false in the light of church history and Scripture. For example, Tertullian writes:

Reason, in fact, is a thing [property] of God, inasmuch as there is nothing which God the Maker of all has not provided, disposed, ordained by reason-nothing which He has not willed should be handled and understood by reason (De Paen 1).

The Latin text reads:

Ceterum a ratione eius tantum absunt quantum ab ipso rationis auctore. Quippe res dei ratio quia deus omnium conditor nihil non ratione providit disposuit ordinavit nihilque non ratione tractari intellegique voluit.

And Origen of Alexandria (in opposition to Celsus) maintains that humans are able to comprehend or describe God in the sense that familiarity with divine attributes may conceivably guide one who heeds God's truth toward a partial knowledge and understanding of the deity:

But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God's attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He can be described by name.'

See Contra Celsum 6.65ff.

Origen affirms that there is a sense in which rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God. Such comprehension is not exhaustive but relative (i.e. to a degree). Therefore, the often heard maxim "God may be apprehended, but not comprehended" probably needs to be qualified. Origen indicates that rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God—to an extent.

Finally, from the ecclesiastical history perspective, it seems that Richard of St. Victor (a Medieval theologian) makes a critical distinction between a doctrine being "above reason" and a doctrine being "beyond reason." He seems to apply both distinctions to the Trinity doctrine, even implying that the doctrine of God's triunity seems contrary to reason. However, Richard of St. Victor qualifies his remarks by writing that "almost all the things that we are commanded to believe about the Trinity of persons" are above or seem contrary to reason. The qualifier "almost" is not without importance since Richard himself posits a natural proof for God's triunity on the basis of love, a rational demonstration which resembles Augustine's attempt to show the reasonableness of the Trinity doctrine. But Richard's rational proof continued to be tethered to the Church. That is, it probably cannot be sustained rationally apart from that Trinitarian legacy which has been handed down by various and sundry ecclesiastics. See http://books.google.com/books?id=9d-IA72wfyYC&pg=PA262&dq=trinity+beyond+reason#PPA262,M1

The point of the preceding data has been to show that it is untenable to hold that God in se completely transcends reason. And I believe that this point is not only sustained by examining church history, but Scripture also indicates that God does not utterly transcend reason. See 1 John 5:20. For comments on the potential meaning of dianoia in 1 John 5:20, see http://books.google.com/books?id=2Zd4nTorV9QC&pg=PA560&dq=1+john+5:20+and+dianoia&lr=#PPA560,M1

In closing this blog entry, I leave my readers with a thought from John Locke:

Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith.

Addressing Jason's Trinitarian Arguments -Part I

Before I wrap up my series on the Trinity doctrine in the light of reason, I want to address a few objections posed by some Trinitarian objectors. An Orthodox apologist named "Jason" submits the following reply:

Jason:

Before making any further pronoucements [sic] on the alleged 'unreasonableness' of the doctrine of the Trinity, you might want to reflect on the following answer to the question which Edgar raised on his blog. The reason why human beings cannot be one and many at the same time involves the following observations.

Edgar: the first mistake that Jason makes is to deal with a question that is not identical to the one that I posed. My question concerns how it is factually possible for three persons (however one defines the term "person") to exist as one being rather than three beings. But Jason chooses to frame my question in terms of the One and Many problem. In this way, he basically sidesteps my initial query.

Jason continues to quote Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas:

(a) In human existence, nature precedes the person. When John or George or Basil are born, the one human nature precedes them; they, therefore represent and embody only part of the human nature. Through human procreation humanity is divided, and no human person can be said to be the bearer of the totality of human nature. This is why the death of one person does not automatically bring about the death of the rest — or conversely, the life of one such person the life of the rest.

Edgar:
The term "nature" is ambiguous. One should clearly define what he or she means by the term. (For instance, see Christopher Stead's work Divine Substance.)Granted, there is a sense in which "nature" (understood as the complex of properties that inform X) is existentially prior to X (= an entity that instantiates a determinate complex of properties). But "nature" can be analyzed in more ways than Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas or Jason suggest. For instance, Aristotle makes a distinction between primary and secondary substance (SUBSTANTIA) and John Duns Scotus is known for analyzing "nature" in terms of an entity's "thisness" or HAECCEITAS (i.e. Peter not only instantiates a nature that is like John's, but Peter also instantiates a haecceity or thisness). Hence, the analysis presented above is inadequate or at best incomplete. Besides, Jason's source does not refute what I have hitherto stated. He does not satisfactorily explain how three persons do not = three beings in the divine sphere. Even the Cappadocians recognized the difficulties with speaking of three persons as one being. See Gregory of Nyssa's attempt to handle this logical difficulty: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf205.viii.v.html

Compare his words with Gregory of Nazianzius in Migne PG 35:1220-1221 here: http://books.google.com/books?vid=0tmDvO1QXd96vX6yL5KO5a5&id=QPBUZQVRy9IC&pg=PP13&lpg=PP13&dq=migne+%22in+hoc+tomo+XXXV#PRA1-PT562,M1

Jason:

(b) Because of this, each human person can be conceived as an individual, i.e. as an entity independent ontologically from other human beings. The unity between human beings is not ontologically identical with their diversity or multiplicity. The one and the many do not coincide. It is this existential difficulty that leads to the logical difficulty of saying 'one' and 'many' with the same breath.

Edgar:
My argument is not regarding the One and the Many. It concerns the difficulty that both Gregory of Nazianzius and Gregory of Nyssa discerned in their treatises, namely, how is it factually possible for three persons to = one being? Gregory of Nyssa tried to address the logical difficulty by insisting that human language incorrectly refers to Peter, James, and John as "three men" since human nature is not divisible nor capable of increase or decrease. He writes:

But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of those who are exhibited in the same nature as “many men”?—indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the prevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results from the mistaken use of the name

Compare Jaroslav Pelikan's The Christian Tradition 1:218-224.

Jason:

Now, if we contrast this with God's existence, we see immediately that this existential and hence logical difficulty is not applicable to God. Since God by definition has not had a beginning, and space and time do not enter His existence, the three persons of the Trinity do not share a pre-existing or logically prior to them divine nature, but coincide with it. Multiplicity in God does not involve a division of His nature, as happens with man." - Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas, The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution.

Edgar:
I have already noted the irrelevance of this answer, so I will not repeat what I have pointed out above. I will conclude by noting that question begging in abundance is occurring here. Firstly, I like the way that "individual" is redefined in an ad hoc manner. After all, Boethius had no problem using the expression "individual substance of a rational nature" to describe a divine person. Thomas Aquinas was amenable to Boethius' definition of PERSONA although he saw the need to nuance each term belonging to the Boethian definition.

Secondly, while I agree with Zizioulas that God has no beginning, God's relationship to time is more debatable. Additionally, whether there is a triune God or a nature with which these supposed three persons coincide is the question. This kind of circular reasoning should be avoided at all costs. Thirdly, multiplicity in God has yet to be proved (quod erat demonstrandum). Why is Jason employing a priori reasoning to supposedly refute my views?

I will address Jason's other "arguments" in another submission.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason: Part 2

In this post, I want to define the expression "divine simplicity" before attempting to refute it. According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, "God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence" (See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/)

David Burrell tries to illuminate this seemingly obscure or abstruse doctrine. He explains that (generally) no entity is identical with its nature (e.g., a square is not identical with squareness, nor is a rectangle identical with rectangularity, nor is a human being identical with the abstract property of being human). God is supposedly the only exception to this "rule" in Burrell's estimation. See his text Aquinas: God and Action, pp. 5-7. Thomas Aquinas himself insists that God is non-compositional or wholly simple in his Summa Theologica. Aquinas emphasizes this datum within the prima pars of his Summa: ST I.3.1: "I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways." ST I.3.2: "I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God." ST I.3.3: "I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature." ST I.3.4: "I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways." ST I.3.5: "I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways." ST I.3.6: "I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown." ST I.3.7: "I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His 'suppositum'; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple."

Another way of making the same point as Burrell and Aquinas is to affirm that God is non-mereological. In other words, the doctrine of divine simplicity contends that God is timeless and non-spatial or utterly non-compositional: God has no parts whatsoever. And if God's essence is identical with God's existence, then the three Persons of the Trinity presumably are not three beings, but one being. Trinitarians assert that the Persons are supposedly one being although they putatively are not identical to one another (i.e., the Father is not the Son nor is the Son the Holy Spirit or the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son). But how is it possible for three Persons to constitute one Being? In the next post, I will answer this question and offer reasons why a Christian probably should eschew the simplicitas dei doctrine.

My Amazon Review Of Nancey Murphy's Book

I used Murphy's Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies for two classes this past semester. I then had my classes to compose reviews that outlined their basic impressions of this book. Certain remarks were common in their reviews. I will list some of those comments in this review of Murphy's book. First, let me say that I was surprised at how many students recommended this book for future courses. Nancey Murphy explicitly advocates and offers arguments for a thoroughgoing form of non-reductive physicalism. She does not denigrate opposing positions, but her view of the body and soul is not the popular or traditional religious view of the body or soul. Murphy ultimately contends that we are spirited bodies (i.e. we do not have souls, but we are purely physical). Now I thought that my students (attending a Lutheran university) would immediately say that this book should not be used in future courses at Lenoir-Rhyne University. Boy, was I mistaken!

Along with their enthusiastic recommendations for using Murphy's book, whether they hated or loved it or felt lukewarm about it, some oft-heard criticisms regarding the text were as follows:

Murphy's work is too detailed for those who are just beginning to undertake a study of philosophy or theology. Moreover, it is too redundant, inconsistent, and unclear at points. The least favorite part of the book (for the professor and students) was the information-engineering diagrams that Murphy included on pages 86, 89, and 101. These diagrams were supposed to shed light on non-reductive physicalism. Unfortunately, they left most students scratching their heads and wonder what was the point of the diagrams. Even I had to read those pages three times to understand what each thing stood for in the diagrams. However, I understand why Murphy included those diagrams. But in my opinion, they were only helpful to a point.

In addition to the numerous criticisms of Murphy's book, there were statements that reflected praise for her work. Some students wrote that her text contained a clear statement of her physicalist thesis, they thought the book was well-written, and they expressed praise for her efforts to substantiate her general thesis by the employment of manifold scholarly sources. Most students offered a hearty recommendation for the book, although most took issue with her thesis or felt that she relied too much on science or reason as opposed to relying on Scripture. Finally, while most students did not find Murphy's arguments compelling enough to make them change their minds, certain students did begin to entertain non-reductive physicalism, and others at least began to question the traditional body and soul view. My overall goal was achieved. I wanted to critique dualism, trichotomism and physicalism for a semester with my students help. I believe that we all walked away with a deeper knowledge of the issues. Furthermore, they now are more familiar with an alternative worldview vis-a-vis human nature.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason

Okay, let us get down to brass tacks regarding the Trinity doctrine. Both Trinitarians and non-Trinitarians appeal to the Tanakh or Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament) to substantiate their respective beliefs. But one hardly witnesses any gain from such discussions. For instance, it seems that something as simple as examining the Johannine Prologue (Gospel of John 1:1-18) ultimately proves unproductive in debates about the deity of Christ. Does John 1:1c say that the Logos "was God" or "a god" (NWT) or some derivation thereof? And the debate goes on.

Since I do not believe that most Trinitarians in cyberspace, at any rate, will ever cease being Trinitarians based on the preponderance of evidence from Scripture, I would like to put a somewhat basic question to Trinitarians.

In the case of humans, 3 persons = 3 beings or entities. But in the case of the three divine persons, we are led to believe that 3 persons = 1 God (i.e. one divine being or entity). How does this whole process work? How is it possible for 3 persons to equal 1 being?

One explanation that I have found for this question is that God is simple (i.e. God has no parts or composition, that is, God is non-mereological) whereas human persons are complex (i.e. mereological or they have parts). Due to the fact that God is simple, it is said that the only acceptable distinctions in God are the three persons. Yet this defense obviously evokes the question, how do we know that God is simple?

Thomas Aquinas certainly provides a rejoinder to this question in the Summa Theologica. But are his rejoinders satisfactory? Are there valid or sound arguments against divine simplicity? Can we find compelling arguments that seem to refute divine simplicity? I will address these questions in a separate post.

Romans 8:16: Bearing Witness

The Spirit Bears Witness with Our Spirit (Comments on SUMMARTUREW)

Research gathered by Dr. Edgar Foster

Here are some thoughts on Romans 8:16 from various sources.

The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament (Moulton-Milligan) states:

"SUNMARTUREW, 'bear witness with' (Rom 2:15 al.): cf. BGU I. 86.41ff (A.D. 155), where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words SUNMARTURW KAI SUNSFRAKIW."

Rogers and Rogers (The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 330) says: "SUMMARTUREI pres. ind. act. SUMMARTUREW (#5210) to bear witness w. someone, to confirm, to testify in support of someone. Used in the papyri where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words, 'I bear witness w. and I seal w.'" (MM).

"Beareth witness with our spirit [summarturei tōi pneumati hēmōn]. See on Ro 2:15 for this verb with associative instrumental case. See 1Jo 5:10f. for this double witness" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

We also have these words from John Chrysostom:

"Ver. 16. 'The Spirit Itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.'

For it is not from the language merely, he says, that I make my assertion, but from the cause out of which the language has its birth; since it is from the Spirit suggesting it that we so speak. And this in another passage he has put into plainer words, thus: 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba Father.'(Gal. iv. 6.) And what is that, 'Spirit beareth witness with spirit?' The Comforter, he means, with that Gift, which is given unto us. For it is not of the Gift alone that it is the voice, but of the Comforter also who gave the Gift, He Himself having taught us through the Gift so to speak. But when the 'Spirit beareth witness' what farther place for doubtfulness? For if it were a man, or angel, or archangel, or any other such power that promised this, then there might be reason in some doubting. But when it is the Highest Essence that bestoweth this Gift, and 'beareth witness' by the very words He bade us use in prayer, who would doubt any more of our dignity? For not even when the Emperor elects any one, and proclaims in all men's hearing the honor done him, does anybody venture to gainsay."

See the patristic commentary on Romans at http://books.google.com/books?id=yVs2SQkeZEoC&pg=PA211&dq=commentary+on+romans+8:16&sig=cqytt-06pOgp92zUNtmpuhyuYKk

The NET Bible renders Romans 8:16: The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are God’s children.

The footnote to that texts reads:

Or possibly “with.” ExSyn 160-61, however, notes the following: “At issue, grammatically, is whether the Spirit testifies alongside of our spirit (dat. of association), or whether he testifies to our spirit (indirect object) that we are God’s children. If the former, the one receiving this testimony is unstated (is it God? or believers?). If the latter, the believer receives the testimony and hence is assured of salvation via the inner witness of the Spirit. The first view has the advantage of a σύν- (sun-) prefixed verb, which might be expected to take an accompanying dat. of association (and is supported by NEB, JB, etc.). But there are three reasons why πνεύματι (pneumati) should not be taken as association: (1) Grammatically, a dat. with a σύν- prefixed verb does not necessarily indicate association. This, of course, does not preclude such here, but this fact at least opens up the alternatives in this text. (2) Lexically, though συμμαρτυρέω (summarturew) originally bore an associative idea, it developed in the direction of merely intensifying μαρτυρέω (marturew). This is surely the case in the only other NT text with a dat. (Rom 9:1). (3) Contextually, a dat. of association does not seem to support Paul’s argument: ‘What standing has our spirit in this matter? Of itself it surely has no right at all to testify to our being sons of God’ [C. E. B. Cranfield, Romans [ICC], 1:403]. In sum, Rom 8:16 seems to be secure as a text in which the believer’s assurance of salvation is based on the inner witness of the Spirit. The implications of this for one’s soteriology are profound: The objective data, as helpful as they are, cannot by themselves provide assurance of salvation; the believer also needs (and receives) an existential, ongoing encounter with God’s Spirit in order to gain that familial comfort.

Regards,
Edgar