Did the Early Christians Offer Prayers to Jesus Christ?

Dear Lady,

You write:

"Dear Prof. Foster,
Which are the first episodes of prayers addressed to Christ?"

In answering your question, I will assume that prayer to Christ was not a first century practice. Even certain systematic theologians like Owen Thomas have pointed out that traditional Christian prayer follows the schema of "to the Father, through the Son and in [i.e. through] the holy spirit." See Thomas' _Theological Questions: Analysis and Argument_ (Wilton, Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow, 1983. P. 71).

Ignatius of Antioch, who was martyred between the years 98-117 CE, may possibly indicate that Christians invoked Jesus Christ in his time (To the Ephesians 20). However, one could no doubt understand his words as a reference to believers praying to the Father through the Son qua High Priest and Intercessor. While the middle recension of the Ignatian letters evidently does not contain the reading that explicitly speaks of praying to God through Christ, another recension does speak of the Son interceding for worshipers of God in his capacity as High Priest. At any rate, Ignatius of Antioch may well have advocated or espoused prayer to Christ.

Some slightly ambiguous evidence is also available for us in the Epistles of Pliny the Younger, who is known for writing to the Roman Emperor Trajan in 112/113 CE regarding Christians in Asia Minor, who would sing psalms to the Lord Jesus Christ quasi Deo. Did such hymns also include prayers to the Son of God? It is possible that this may have been the case, though I don't think one can say for certain, based on Pliny's letters alone (see the letters of Pliny X.96.7).

Origen too addresses the subject of prayer in De Oratione 15.1. There, he insists that, properly speaking, prayer should be addressed to "God the Father alone," although he also invokes Christ, "the very Logos himself." Nevertheless, in Contra Celsum 5.4, Origen demonstrates that he does not believe prayer in the absolute sense should be directed toward God's Son. See Jaroslav Pelikan's _The Christian Tradition_ 1:198-199.

You might also want to reference Arnobius of Sicca's Adversus nationes 1.36.

I hope these thoughts are helpful.

Best regards,

Professor Foster

Justin Martyr on the Soul

Greetings all!

Someone has written to me as follows:

"I reached the conviction Justyn [sic] believed in a anthropological concept constituted by three elements:

- body
- soul
- spirit

The first two are subjected to the death.

Could you please tell me if my vision of this matter can be considered wrong? If so, why?"

I reply:

First, I would say that when one reads Justin's Dialogue, he or she must distinguish between the words of Justin, those of Trypho and those of the man who helped to convert Justin to Christianity. Second, as I read Justin, he does seem to espouse a tripartite anthropological theologia. However, he clearly appears to argue that the soul is able to survive death and subsist for all eternity.

In 1 Apology 20, Justin contends that Christians in his day affirmed that "the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and that those [souls] of the good being delivered from punishment spend a blessed existence" in eternity.

Also, in 1 Apology 44, we read:

"And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories."

In the Dialogue with Trypho, Justin does indicate that he rejected the Platonic immortality of the soul doctrine, as did Tatian. Nevertheless, there seems to be no doubt that he thought the soul survives the death of the body.

Finally, in the Fragments of the Lost Work of Justin on the Resurrection 10, there is this fateful passage:

"The resurrection is a resurrection of the flesh which died. For the spirit dies not; the soul is in the body, and without a soul it cannot live. The body, when the soul forsakes it, is not. For the body is the house of the soul; and the soul the house of the spirit. These three, in all those who cherish a sincere hope and unquestioning faith in God, will be saved."

Best regards,

Professor Edgar Foster

Origen of Alexandria on XARAKTHR in Hebrews 1:3

Taken from Peri Archon (De Principiis) I.2.8:

'But since He is called by the apostle not only the brightness of His glory, but also the express figure of His person or subsistence, it does not seem idle to inquire how there can be said to be another figure of that person besides the person of God Himself, whatever be the meaning of person and subsistence. Consider, then, whether the Son of God, seeing He is His Word and Wisdom, and alone knows the Father, and reveals Him to whom He will (i.e., to those who are capable of receiving His word and wisdom), may not, in regard of this very point of making God to be understood and acknowledged, be called the figure of His person and subsistence; that is, when that Wisdom, which desires to make known to others the means by which God is acknowledged and understood by them, describes Himself first of all, it may by so doing be called the express figure of the person of God. In order, however, to arrive at a fuller understanding of the manner in which the Saviour is the figure of the person or subsistence of God, let us take an instance, which, although it does not describe the subject of which we are treating either fully or appropriately, may nevertheless be seen to be employed for this purpose only, to show that the Son of God, who was in the form of God, divesting Himself (of His glory), makes it His object, by this very divesting of Himself, to demonstrate to us the fullness of His deity. For instance, suppose that there were a statue of so enormous a size as to fill the whole world, and which on that account could be seen by no one; and that another statue were formed altogether resembling it in the shape of the limbs, and in the features of the countenance, and in form and material, but without the same immensity of size, so that those who were unable to behold the one of enormous proportions, should, on seeing the latter, acknowledge that they had seen the former, because it preserved all the features of its limbs and countenance, and even the very form and material, so closely, as to be altogether undistinguishable from it; by some such similitude, the Son of God, divesting Himself of His equality with the Father, and showing to us the way to the knowledge of Him, is made the express image of His person: so that we, who were unable to look upon the glory of that marvellous light when placed in the greatness of His Godhead, may, by His being made to us brightness, obtain the means of beholding the divine light by looking upon the brightness. This comparison, of course, of statues, as belonging to material things, is employed for no other purpose than to show that the Son of God, though placed in the very insignificant form of a human body, in consequence of the resemblance of His works and power to the Father, showed that there was in Him an immense and invisible greatness, inasmuch as He said to His disciples, "He who sees Me, sees the Father also;" and, "I and the Father are one." And to these belong also the similar expression, "The Father is in Me, and I in the Father."'

Michael V. Fox on Proverbs 8:22ff

Greetings:

"The word's [QANAH] lexical meaning, the semantic content it brings to context, is 'acquire,' no more than that. But one way something can be acquired is by creation. English 'acquire' implies that the object was already in existence, but this is not the case with QANAH. To avoid misunderstanding, the better translation in context is 'created.'

While both 'created' and acquired' are legitimate contextual translations of this verb, 'possessed' (Vul, KJV) is not. Though this mutes the theologically difficult implication that prior to creation God did not have wisdom, it does not really fit the context. The verbs in vv 22-25 relating to Wisdom's genesis describe a one-time action, whereas possession is continuous. Subsequent possession may be assumed, though prior possession is indeed excluded. God acquired/created wisdom as the first of his deeds. Wisdom was 'born' (vv 24, 25) at that time. She did not exist from eternity. Wisdom is therefore an accidental attribute of godhead, not an essential or inherent one" (Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Bible. New York and London: Doubleday, page 279).

Regards,
Edgar

Thomas Aquinas on the Trinity in relation to Natural Reason

"The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason" (SCG 1.3).

The Problematic Nature of the Trinity Doctrine (A Paper in the Works)

The Problematic Nature of the Trinity Doctrine

Trinitarians and non-trinitarians alike have noted the problematic
nature of the Trinity doctrine. In the Aquinas lectures of 1969,
Bernard Cooke stated his disapproval of the arbitrary abstractness of
the Trinity, saying: "one must ask whether the revelation of Father,
Son, and Spirit can then be fitted into the formalities of thought set
up by such [philosophical] reflection" (16). The philosophical
reflection that Cooke references is the learned cogitation of men like
Thomas Aquinas and Anselm of Canterbury. In the writings of Aquinas,
the unicity of God is so neatly distinguished from the triunity of God,
Cooke worried that the divine nature might be viewed as "an infinite
neutrality" (16). This thought world, exclaims Cooke, is very different
from the Weltanschauung of the apostle John.

Cooke is not the only theologian to worry about deep-seated problems of
the Trinity. Cyril C. Richardson has also expressed his personal
reservations about the doctrine of God's triunity. According to
Richardson, the Trinity is "an artificial construct" (Richardson 148).
It arbitrarily tries to resolve the perennial problem of God's
simultaneous absoluteness and relatedness to the world, by formulating
a doctrine of necessary threeness in the Godhead. In fact, Richardson
writes: "there is no necessary threeness in the Godhead" (149). He
concedes that there are immanent distinctions in the godhead; but the
Trinity does not exhaust all of the distinctions that need to be made,
nor does it resolve the numerous antinomies associated with the
absoluteness and relatedness of God. Richardson asserts that this has
been true of every Trinitarian theory ever formulated. Is Richardson
correct? Does an analysis of the Trinity doctrine show that there are
insoluble difficulties connected with it? Is it indeed possible to
postulate a coherent statement of God's supposed threefoldness? The
purpose of this essay is to provide an answer to these questions, and
carefully analyze both terminological and logical problems related to
the Trinity. After scrutinizing the doctrine, I will briefly evaluate
the arguments on both sides and state my thoughts regarding the
Trinity.

The question of how to refer to the three persons (tres personae)
united in one divine substance (substantia) has been an ongoing debate
in Christian theology for centuries. Normally, when we moderns think of
a person, we envision reasoning, responsible, thinking centers of
consciousness--distinct and individuated from other centers of
consciousness. Nevertheless, if we apply such terminology to the three
persons of the Godhead, ineluctable conundrums result. The idea of God
subsisting as three centers of consciousness in one substance is a
notion repugnant to most Trinitarians. Karl Rahner writes, "this is the
very thing which is excluded by the dogmatic teaching on the single and
unique essence of God" (135). That is, the three persons cannot be
three separate centers of consciousness because: "this unicity of
[God's] essence implies and includes the unicity of one single
consciousness and one single freedom" that is determined by the
"mysterious threeness" of the triune Godhead (135). While this approach
eliminates the threat of tritheism, however, other problems ominously
hover above the orthodox dogma of the Trinity.
Not only have most modern theologians been disturbed by the implication
of the term "person," with reference to the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit; the word "person" also bothered Augustine of Hippo.
Consequently, the famed bishop formulated a psychological model of the
Trinity, likening the divine substantia to human memory, imagination
and will. Furthermore, Augustine wrote that the whole of the Godhead
resided in each persona. Thus, the Father is fully God, the Son is
fully God, and the Holy Spirit is fully God. Yet, there are not three
gods, but one God. While Augustine's model obviates the threat of
tritheism, Rahner suggests that his formulation is deficient because it
does not sufficiently explain the Father's begettal of the Son, or the
spiration of the Holy Spirit. Additionally, Augustine's analogy does
not give enough weight to the "historical and salvific experience of
the Son and of the Spirit" (135). It woefully fails to explain the
Trinity's relation to God's dealings within history (His economic
dealings). This renders the doctrine incomprehensible from an economic
(oikonomia) standpoint.

A third criticism of Rahner's is that Augustine's metaphor fails to
teach us that the God revealed in the oikonomia, is the same God of the
ontological Trinity. Consequently, if the ontological Trinity (God as
He is in Himself) is not equivalent to the economic Trinity, we can not
assume that God has disclosed Himself in the person of Jesus Christ (a
conclusion radically at odds with the revelation deposited in the New
Testament). Rahner thus concludes that interpretations of the Trinity
like Augustine's are gnostic in nature: they put forth the idea of a
God "behind" the God that Jesus Christ "explained" (exegesato). In an
effort to solve problems associated with the psychological analogy of
the Trinity, Rahner proposes viewing the persons of the Godhead in
terms of relations. However, does this positing of three "relations,"
as opposed to three persons, really solve the problematic implications
that attend the triune doctrine of God? For the following reasons, we
must answer 'no'.

For one, from Rahner's frame of reference, to think of the Trinity
numerically (one nature, etc.) is ipso facto not to think of God's
triunity at all! Rahner further insists that "the three persons are not
three distinct things per se but are three distinct things only in and
through their relations with each other" (Davis 139). He frequently
employs such terms as "relative realities" or 'mere and opposed
relations' to describe the personae of the Godhead, all the while
insisting that the Trinity is a "unity of three divine persons"
subsisting in "three distinct manners of subsisting" (qt. In Davis
139). The tres personae "are identical to the Godhead but only
virtually distinct from each other" (Davis 139). In this regard,
Stephen Davis comments:

Rahner calls relations 'the most unreal of realities' but insists that
they are absolutely real as other determinations. But I do not see how
this helps. There is nothing in my experience that helps me understand
the concepts Rahner is working with; thus they do not help me
understand the doctrine of the Trinity (140).

Novatian's De Trinitate 7 and Metaphoric God-talk

Greetings,

"But when the Lord says that God is a Spirit, I think
that Christ spoke thus of the Father, as wishing that
something still more should be understood than merely
that God is a Spirit. For although, in His Gospel, He
is reasoning for the purpose of giving to men an
increase of intelligence, nevertheless He Himself
speaks to men concerning God, in such a way as they
can as yet hear and receive; although, as we have
said, He is now endeavouring to give to His hearers
religious additions to their knowledge of God. For we
find it to be written that God is called Love, and yet
from this the substance of God is not declared to be
Love; and that He is called Light, while in this is
not the substance of God" (De Trinitate 7).

Notice that propositions such as "God is love" or "God is light" are not metaphysical pronouncements (according to this passage), which is to say, Novatian thinks that they do not speak to the divine essence in se. One can find similar reasoning in orthodox writers belonging to the ancient and medieval period.

XAIREIN KAI ERRWSQAI,

Edgar Foster

Lactantius on the "Brightness" of Divine Truth

Hello all,

This is taken from Divine Institutes 1.5.1 (Numbering based on Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey's
Translation):

"the effect of the actual truth is too strong for even
a blind man not to see divine brightness when it
forces itself on his eyes."

Regards,
Edgar

Andrei Orlov on Metatron (the lesser YHWH)

Dr. Orlov is pretty good about making some of his works available online:

http://www.marquette.edu/maqom/metatronyhwh.html

Bavinck on the Proper Name of God

"By means of proper names, especially by means of the name Jehovah, God made himself known unto Israel. Through the Mal'akh in whom his name abides, Ex. 23:20, he revealed himself to Israel" (Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, 84).

Alexander R. Pruss on the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God

I am going to be editing this post, but I wanted to go ahead and submit it to my blog. It has been my contention that without the doctrine of divine simplicity being presupposed, the Trinity doctrine falls. Conversely, other Trinitarians have argued that it is difficult to make sense of the Trinity doctrine if one presupposes or believes in a simple or non-mereological deity. But it seems to me that without the presupposition or belief that God is simple while also being three persons in one God (one divine substance), what one has with the doctrine of God's triunity is really tritheism or modalism (depending on the respective formulation of the dogma). In any event, a number of thinkers have taken issue with the simplicity doctrine. One of these individuals is Dr. Alexander R. Pruss. You can reference his entire discussion at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html

Pruss' first objection to the divine simplicity doctrine is that it does not seem to allow for a meaningful predication of those attributes which distinctly characterize God. Let A = "God's perfect justice" and B = "God's perfect mercy." If the divine simplicity doctrine is correct, then A is ontologically identical with B such that it appears that it is not meaningful to discourse about God's perfect justice or perfect mercy since the two attributes would be identical in this case.

Clement of Alexandria on 1 John 3:2

These remarks are taken from Cassiodorus' Latin translation of the Fragmenta from Clemens Alexandrinus. Cassiodorus lived in the sixth century CE, whereas Clemens lived approximately 150-215 CE.

'“Beloved,” says he, “now are we the sons of God,” not by natural affection, but because we have God as our Father. For it is the greater love that, seeing we have no relationship to God, He nevertheless loves us and calls us His sons. “And it hath not yet appeared what we shall be;” that is, to what kind of glory we shall attain. “For if He shall be manifested,”—that is, if we are made perfect,—“we shall be like Him,” as reposing and justified, pure in virtue, “so that we may see Him” (His countenance) “as He is,” by comprehension.'

Regards,
Edgar

Reply to Jason on Matthew 12:5ff

Hi Jason,

You write:

"Edgar, how does one account for the words 'not lawful' in Matt. 12:4 and 'profane' or 'desecrate' in Matt. 12:5, if Jesus was in fact arguing that His disciples were not breaking the sabbath, instead of arguing that He has the authority to dispense them from the obligation of keeping the sabbath?"

I do not believe that Jesus is agreeing with his opponents, who charge the disciples with practicing what is "unlawful" on the Sabbath (Matthew 12:1-2). The Lord is replying to the baseless aspersions of the Pharisees who suggest that what the disciples of Jesus are doing on the Sabbath is unlawful or forbidden. But Christ uses the examples of David and the priests who work on the Sabbath to prove that God allows those engaged in his work to do what could be viewed as "unlawful" or could be seen as technically profaning the Sabbath. However, notice that Christ says the priests who work on the Sabbath are blameless (Matthew 12:5). A fortiori, why should not Christ's disciples also be considered blameless while they carry out God's work and pluck grain from the fields through which they walk (Matthew 12:6)?

There are some interesting observations found on this account in Aquinas' Catena Aurea. John Chrysostom states that the disciples broke the Sabbath law, but not "absolutely." They were given an "out," so to speak, because they were hungry. Jerome thinks that the disciples "broke the letter of the Sabbath," but he appears to believe that the charge of the Pharisees was false. Jerome writes:

"But the laws of God are never contrary one to another; wisely therefore, wherein His disciples might be accused of having transgressed them, He shews that therein they followed the examples of Achimelech [sic] and David; and this their pretended charge of breaking the sabbath He retorts truly, and not having the plea of necessity, upon those who had brought the accusation."

John Nolland (The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text) notes that the first mention of the Sabbath in Matthew's Gospel is found at our text in 12:1. After providing commentary that centers on what ancient Jewish writings (including the Philonic texts) stated about the Sabbath, Nolland then writes:

"a sympathetic viewpoint on the situation of the needy is likely to have treated their [the disciples'] eating in the fields on the sabbath as not constituting work that would violate the sabbath. Such was not the view of Philo or of the Pharisees we meet in the Gospels. But it clearly is the view of Jesus" (p. 482).

Commenting on Matthew 12:5, Nolland also maintains:

"Again what is established in that the non-work requirement of the sabbath is not absolute . . . Once more at best the comparison creates a space in which apparently unlawful behavior may be justified on other grounds" (p. 484).

Some Recommended Books

Armstrong, Karen. _A History of God_. New York: Ballantine, 1993.

Black, David A. _Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A
Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,
1995.

Brooks, James A. and Winbery, Carlton L. _A Morphology of New Testament
Greek_. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.

Grant, Robert M. _Heresy and Criticism: The Search for Authenticity in
Early Christian Literature_. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John
Knox, 1993.

Porkorny, Petr. _Die Entstehung der Christologie_ (The Genesis of
Christology). Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd., 1987.

Russell, D.S. _The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Old
Testament Library)_. Philadelphia, PN: Westminster, 1964.

Silva, Moises. _Philippians_ (Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary). Chicago,
Ill: Moody, 1988.

______ _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_.
Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1996.

Trakatellis, Demetrius C. _The Pre-Existence of Christ in Justin Martyr:
An Exegetical Study with Reference to The Humiliation and Exaltation
Christology_. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976.

Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and
Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.

The Didache on Baptism

One question that comes up with regard to the Didache is, when was it written? Is it a first or second century document? While there is no unanimous consensus on this question, a number of scholars believe that the Didache was actually produced in the second century. If so, this would comport with the observations of Origen and Tertullian regarding infant baptism taking place in their day.

Stanley Burgess observes that the Didache is "an early second century document" (The Holy Spirit: Ancient Christian Traditions, page 21).

Howard Vos simply writes that the Didache "is also believed to have originated in Alexandria (though some think it came from Syria), probably during the first decades of the second century" (Exploring Church History, Page 12).

Moreover, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology states that the Didache "comes from the late first to mid-second century, and is more in the style of a compilation of practices for a group of churches than the work of a single theologian-author" (page 100).

But the magisterial study by W. H. C. Frend dates the Didache circa A.D. 70 (See The Rise of Christianity, page 29). So we have respected scholars from both sides offering (as usual) possible, but contrary opinions on this important matter. Personally, I think the evidence favors the second century dating. I am certain that some would heavily dispute this conclusion or question my motivation for deciding on that date. But as I said earlier, the contents belonging to the work incline me to assign second-century dating for the Didache. This factor along with what other writers say about the practice of infant baptism in antiquity influences my decision.

I think that baptism started out as the immersion of believing adults (Mt 28:18-20; Acts 8:12-13). However, in time, infants began to be baptized on what Jaroslav Pelikan calls "biblical warrants that [are] somewhat ambiguous." This famed and late ecclesiastical historian argues that "the first incontestable evidence for the practice [of infant baptism] appeared around the end of [the second] century" (Cf. The Christian Tradition 1:290-292 and 1:316-318). As is well known, Tertullian vehemently rejected the practice of infant baptism (Baptism 18.5).

So I would say that the historical evidence indicates that there were different kinds of baptism from the second century onward, though it seems that the Primitive Christians started out immersing new believers under water when they baptized them (Acts 8:34-39).

Harold O.J. Brown writes that "Although a critical reaction against its [the Didache's] significance took place in the earlier part of this century, its place as a valuable composition of the earliest of Apostolic Fathers texts is secure."

I would add that the Didache does help us to understand what was happening in second century Christianity. This does not mean, however, that all
Christians practiced infant baptism in the second century. It also seems
highly unlikely that all believers in Christ practiced sprinkling at that time (Compare Hermas, ANF Series, 2.49; Apostolic Constitutions 7.53, Tertullian ANF Series, 3.669-671).

Regards,
Edgar

Revelation 1:1 and SHMAINW

Regarding Rev 1:1: for SHMAINW, BDAG has

(1) to make known, report, communicate

(2) to intimate someth[ing] respecting the future, indicate, suggest, intimate

(3) to provide an explanation for someth[ing] that is enigmatic, mean, signify.

Rev 1:1 is categorized under (1) in this lexicon.

On the other hand, _The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament_ explains that ESHMANEN (the aor indicative active of SHMAINW) can mean "to signify." Moreover, we read that "The word strictly means to show by some sort of sign, and it is esp[ecially] used of any intimation given by the gods to men, esp[ecially] concerning the fut[ure]" (page 610).

David Aune provides substantial textual evidence that suggests the NWT (New World Translation] is most certainly on the right track in its handling of ESHMANEN at Rev 1:1. After reviewing how the Greek verb SHMAINW is employed in extra-biblical literature and the NT, he writes:

"In Rev 1:1, SHMAINEIN cannot mean 'to indicate clearly.' By using the term SHMAINEIN, the author expresses the difficulty in understanding the revelation narrated in the text that follows, and perhaps even emphasizes the necessity of informed interpretation" (Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation 52A:15).

One pivotal classic text in this regard is Plutarch's De Pyth orac which reads:

OUTE LEGEI, OUTE KRUPTEI, ALLA SHMAINEI

"[Apollo] neither declares, nor conceals but signifies."

Aune comments:

"This [text' refers to the fact that the Delphic oracle gave ambiguous advice using images and riddles and that such advice required interpretation (see Kahn, Heraclitus, 121-23)."

Quoted from Aune, ibid.

Best regards,
Edgar

Mellone on Tertullian's Christology

Sydney H. Mellone on Tertullian's Subordinationist Christology

"He [Tertullian] has not avoided a subordination not only in the order of revelation to mankind but in essential being. Even if we set aside his purely metaphorical illustrations, we find it clearly stated that the Father is the originating principle of the Son and the Spirit, and therefore holds in relation to them a certain superiority: 'The Father is wholly essential being (SUBSTANTIA): the Son is derived from the Whole as part thereof (PORTIO TOTIUS): the Father is greater than the Son, as One who begets, who sends, who acts, is greater than the One is begotten, who is sent, through whom He acts," (Leaders of Early Christian Thought, London: The Lindsey Press, 1954, Page 178).

The salient point that I wish to extract from Mellone's writing is the one that he makes about Tertullian subordinating the Son "in essential being" and not simply in the order of divine revelation. In Adversus Praxean 12 and Adversus Praxean 3, Tertullian suggests that the Father is superior to the Son in essential being, not just in the order of Heilsgeschichte.

Sydney H. Mellone (M.A., D.Sc.) was external examiner in Philosophy at the University of London.

Best regards,
Edgar

Justin Martyr and the Soul

"And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories" (1 Apology 44).

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Among some of the books that I have reviewed, the most up to date review is the book written by R.M. Grant Gods and the One God. Please check out my reviews on amazon.

Best,
Edgar

Brief Thoughts on ALHQINOS/ALHQHS

Here are some brief thoughts on the ALHQINOS/ALHQHS:

Louw-Nida point out that ALHQHS and ALHQINOS may possibly denote that which pertains to actual existence, "real, really, true, truly." See John 6:55.

This source comments on John 17:3 (in semantic domain 70.3), noting that this Johannine passage could be rendered "that they may know you, the only one who is really God." We are then told that the rendering "the only one who is really God" could be understood in some languages as "the only God who exists" or "who is God and there are no other gods."

In semantic domain 72.1 of Louw-Nida, we also read ALHQHS may signify: "pertaining to being in accordance with historical fact" or "true, truth." Cf. John 4:18. Compare John's use of ALHQINHOS (ALHQINH) in John 19:35.

LSJ observes that ALHQHS (the Doric form is ALAQHS) can mean "unconcealed, true, real" with its opposite being "false" or "apparent." On the other hand, in classical Greek, ALHQINOS can mean "agreeable to truth." When used of persons, it may denote "truthful, trusty"; when employed with respect to things, "true, genuine."

I would encourage our brothers and sisters on this site to study the entry for ALHQINOS in BDAG. It is very informative, especially if one also consults the entry for MONOS in BDAG.

Your brother,
Edgar

Plotinus and Birthdays

"Plotinus was so fervently committed to his Platonic ideas regarding the imperfection of his physical body, in contrast to the perfection of his eternal soul, that he refused to celebrate his birthday. His reasoning was that he was ashamed that his immortal soul had to be contained in such an imperfect vessel as his body, and that celebrating its birth was a cause for regret, not celebration" (John Chaffee, The Philosopher's Way: A Text with Readings, page 105).

Now I'm not citing this information to prove that we should not celebrate our day of birth (although I believe that celebrating birthdays is not a biblically based practice). However, I never knew that Plotinus did not celebrate his birthday and I found his reason for not celebrating his it to be an interesting one.

Regards,
Edgar

Thomas Hobbes on Genesis 3

Taken from Hobbes' work Leviathan (chapter XX):

Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them God's office, which is judicature of good and evil, but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said that, having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain that it was then they first judged their nakedness (wherein it was God's will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed did tacitly censure God Himself. And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten," etc., as if He should say, doest thou that owest me obedience take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is clearly, though allegorically, signified that the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured nor disputed.

Walter Kasper on the Son of God Concept in the Old Testament

The following is taken from Jesus the Christ (page 164):

"Although the Old Testament uses the title of Son for
the people of Israel (cf., among other texts, Exod
4.22-3; Hos 11.1), for the king as representative of
the people (cf., among other texts, Ps 2.7; 2 Sam
7.14) or - as in late Judaism - for any devout and
righteous Israelite (cf., among other texts, Ecclus
4.10), this usage is not based either on the
background of mythological-polytheistic thinking or on
the pantheistic background of Stoic philosophy,
according to which all men in virtue of their common
nature have the one God as Father and are therefore
called sons of God. The title Son or Son of God in the
Old Testament must be understood against the
background of election-faith and the theocratic ideas
based on it. Consequently, divine sonship is not
founded on physical descent, but is the result of
God's free, gracious choice. The person so chosen as
Son of God receives a special mission within salvation
history, binding him to obedience and service. The
title of Son of God therefore is understood, not as
natural-substantial, but functionally and personally."

I would add that the title "son of God" is also used as a scriptural metaphor for Jesus Christ and others.

John Gill on Divine Omnipotence

Here is part of what Gill has to say about the almightiness or omnipotence of God:

The power of God reaches to all things, and therefore is, with propriety, called Omnipotence; all things are possible with God, and nothing impossible; this is said by an angel, and confirmed by Christ, (Luke 1:37; Mark 14:36) what is impossible with men is possible with God; what cannot be done according to the nature of things, the laws, rules, and course of nature, may be done by the God of nature, who is above these, and not bound by them, and sometimes acts contrary to them; as when he stopped the sun in its course, in the times of Joshua; made iron to swim by the hands of the prophet Elisha; and suffered not fire to burn in the furnace of Nebuchadnezzar, so that the three persons cast into it were not hurt by it, nor their clothes so much as singed, nor the smell of fire upon them: whereas, it is the nature of the sun to go on in its course, without stopping, nor can any creature stop it; and for ponderous bodies, as iron, to sink in water; and for fire to burn. There are some things, indeed, which God cannot do, and which the Scriptures express as, that "he cannot deny himself", (2 Tim. 2:13) nor do anything that is contrary to his being, his honour and glory, or subversive of it; thus, for instance, he cannot make another God, that would be contrary to himself, to the unity of his Being, and the declaration of his Word; "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", (Deut. 6:4) he cannot make a finite creature infinite; that would be to do the same, and there would be more infinites than one, which is a contradiction; he cannot raise a creature to such dignity as to have divine perfections ascribed to it, it has not, which would be a falsehood; or to have religious worship and adoration given it, which would be denying himself, detracting from his own glory, and giving it to another, when he only is to be served and worshipped: in such manner it is also said of him, that he "cannot lie", (Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18) for this would be contrary to his truth and faithfulness; he can do nothing that is contrary to his attributes; he cannot commit iniquity, he neither will nor can do it; for that would be contrary to his holiness and righteousness; (see Job 34:10,12, 36:23) he cannot do anything that implies a contradiction; he cannot make contradictions true; a thing to be, and not to be at the same time; or make a thing not to have been that has been[4]; he can make a thing not to be, which is, or has been; he can destroy his own works; but not make that not to have existed, which has existed; nor make an human body to be everywhere; nor accidents to subsist without subjects; with many other things which imply a manifest contradiction and falsehood: but then these are no prejudices to his omnipotence, nor proofs of weakness; they arise only out of the abundance and fulness of his power; who can neither do a weak thing nor a wicked thing, nor commit any falsehood; to do, or attempt to do, any such things, would be proofs of impotence, and not of omnipotence.

See http://www.pbministries.org/books/gill/Doctrinal_Divinity/Book_1/book1_08.htm

Death of My Dad (Correction)

Hello friends, I just experienced a deep loss. My dad passed away this Saturday afternoon (9/19/09): he was almost 78, so I got to enjoy his loving presence for many years. I'll miss him dearly. He taught me about God and opened the way up
(ultimately) for there to be an Edgar Foster who was interested in biblical Greek and
theology. Thanks to all of you! If you reply personally, I probably will not
have the ability to respond to every email, but please know that I appreciate you
all. What did the Romans say? Memento mori? At least I have my mother who has faithfully served Jehovah for more than 30 years. As for my dad-I trust in the God who can raise up redeemable humans from the dead (2 Cor 1:9).

Have a nice day,
Edgar

Dialogue on Christian Materialism

A friend and I had a discussion not too long ago about "Christian materialism." Since that conversation is already public, I reproduce a portion of our dialogue for your consideration.

My friend writes:

> Although the view of those "Christian materialists"
> might be
> practically the same as ours, I always saw us (or
> myself) more
> as "idealists".

I reply:

The term "materialist" admittedly is somewhat confusing in this context. When thinking about a materialist, those who espouse atheism might come to mind. However, what the "Christian materialist" wants to assert (among other things) is that while the human body is not identical with what we are as persons--it does *constitute* what we are as persons. Think of "Christian materialism" in this way. The marble of a statue may not be identical with the statue; nevertheless, the marble does constitute the statue. Similarly, it is possible that our bodies constitute what we are as persons without being identical to our respective personalities. Maybe conscious states arise from neurobiological processes (started by God) and only neurobiological processes. It is possible that what we are as persons is primarily determined by synaptic connections and sensory experiences. I am speaking with respect to humans and not with regard to the angels.

Revelation 5:10 and EPI

Greetings everyone,

What I've written below was addressed to an interlocutor who believes that the decision to translate Revelation 5:10 as "over" rather than "on" is not a Greek but an English issue. I would like to see what the members of Bible Translation think. I wrote the foregoing to my interlocutor:

Dear ****,

There are scholars who prefer to render EPI in Revelation 5:9-10 as "on" even though the context has reference to the authority of men and women, whom God (through Christ) has bought or redeemed from the earth.

Robert L. Thomas does not offer a justifying explanation for why he chooses to translate EPI as "on" rather than "over," but he does render this portion of Revelation 5:10: "and they shall reign on the earth" (Revelation 1-7: An Exegetical Commentary, page 402).

David Aune (in his Word Biblical Commentary on Revelation) prefers the translation "on" for EPI in Revelation 5:10. See his text Revelation 1-5, page 362. But this scholar also does not offer an explanation for his rendition of the verse.

However, both Charles B. Williams (New Testament in the Language of the People) and William F. Beck (New Testament in the Language of Today) choose to translate EPI as "over." I reproduce those renderings below:

"and they will rule over the earth" (Williams)

"and they will rule as kings over the earth" (Beck)

Is this issue simply one of how English treats [Greek] prepositions that function within the context of descriptions about authority or rulership? That is not what I glean from reading Greek grammars. Moreover, BDAG Greek-English lexicon (the authoritative NT Greek lexicon) states that EPI can be a "marker of power, authority, control of or over someone or [something], over." The examples that are listed in the lexicon include Revelation 5:10; 17:18, 20:6; 2:26. It doesn't seem like this is a matter of how English treats [Greek] prepositions within the context of authority (cf. Matthew 24:45-47; Acts 12:20; Ephesians 4:6).

Louw-Nida Greek-English Lexicon (semantic domain 37.9) also notes that
EPI (in particular contexts) can function as "a marker of the object
over which someone exercises a control or authority." This resource
suggests the rendering "over, with responsibility for." The examples
given in this work are Acts 8:27; Luke 1:33. Again, I do not see how
it is just a matter of English idiom. However, it is possible that I
am not seeing matters clearly. Nevertheless, let us consider some other sources.

William Douglas Chamberlain writes: "A metaphorical use [of EPI] with
the idea 'over,' in the sense of ruling, grows quite naturally out of
'upon': hO WN EPI PANTWN (Rom 9:5), 'the one who is over (rules) all
things.'"

See _An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament_, pages 122-123.

"EPI with any of its cases can express the object of one's control,
authority, or rule. Jesus gave his disciples authority over the power
of the enemy (Luke 10:19 acc.)" is what one finds in Richard A.
Young's _Intermediate New Testament Greek_ grammar, page 98.

LSJ states that EPI can be used with the causal sense "over, of
persons in authority, EP' hOU ETAXQHMEN Hdt. 5.109; hOI [EPI] TWN
PRAGMATWN the public officers, D 18.247." See the entry for EPI (A.III.1).

Finally, I will quote Max Zerwick: "The accusative and the genitive are found together and in a quite similar sense in Mt 25,21: 'because thou wast faithful over little (EPI OLIGA) I will set thee over much (EPI POLLWN).' This example, however, belongs to the metaphorical use, where e.g. of rule 'over' we find in the NT, alongside the classical genitive, the accusative as in BASILEUSEI EPI TON OIKON IAKWB Lk 1,33." See Zerwick's _Biblical Greek, page 42.

Best wishes,
Edgar Foster

NAOS and hIERON

Ralph Earle (when discussing Matt. 24:1) says that NAOS finds it etymological roots in the verb NAIW ("dwell"). This Greek word was used in classical Greek to delineate the "dwelling place of the gods," and it was also used in the LXX to describe God's temple at Jerusalem (Earle 21). Earle then quotes Thayer, who writes that NAOS is "used of the temple at Jerusalem, but only of the sacred edifice (or sanctuary) itself, consisting of the Holy place and the Holy of Holies" (Qt. in Earle 21). So this source seems to indicate that NAOS is confined to the sanctuary of the temple (the Holy and Most Holy place). But let's continue our examination before we come to any set conclusion.

About hIERON, Earle exclaims that it is the "substantive neuter of the adjective hIEROS, 'sacred.'" The adjective hIEROS is used of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (Acts 19:27); twice in the LXX for the Temple at Jerusalem (Ezek. 45:19; 1 Chron. 29:4); "71 times in the NT--45 in the Gospels, 25 in Acts, and only once elsewhere" (1 Cor. 9:13). After this analysis, Earle concludes that "hIERON in the Gospels and Acts . . . refers to the whole Temple area" (Earle 21). He claims that "only the priests could go into the NAOS, the sanctuary itself."

In the interest of fairness, Earle cites Michel (TDNT 4:882) who believes that there is "no real distinction between the terms [NAOS and hIERON] in either meaning or range," although Michel appears to temper this comment somewhat on page 4:885. So Earle says, but I do not interpret Michel in the same way. Please read the TDNT entry and decide for yourself. At any rate, Michel appears to believe that Matt. 27:5 supports the view that NAOS can also be used of the whole temple area (i.e., it is not limited to the sanctuary).

BAGD has an extensive examination of NAOS that I'm not about to post in full here. Nevertheless, some of the observations found in this lexicon bear repeating. NAOS means, "temple," says BAGD. It refers to the temple at Jerusalem--to the "whole temple precinct" in Matt. 23:17, 35; 27:5, 40 (BAGD 533). But cf. Matt. 27:51; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45.

Some more important references to the "heavenly sanctuary" are Rev. 14:15; 15:6; 16:1, 17. BAGD also lists Rev. 7:15; 11:19b; 15:5 (cf. Rev. 3:12; 21:22, 23). There is more to be said in BAGD under figurative uses. I suggest that this information be read and analyzed by all interested parties.

Louw-Nida reads: "NAOS . . . a building in which a deity is worshiped (in the case of the Temple in Jerusalem, a place where God was also regarded as dwelling)--'temple, sanctuary.' " (See Mt 23:35; John 2:21).

"hIERON . . . a temple or sanctuary . . . and the surrounding consecrated area." See John 10:23; Mt 21:12; 1 Cor. 9:13. Note an apparent exception at Acts 19:27. "hIERON in the NT refers to the Temple in Jerusalem, including the entire temple precinct with its buildings, courts, and storerooms."

I'm going the leave the matter at this right now.

Best regards,

Edgar Foster

"A logic must work in some way, and it must be possible to show how it
operates and to characterize this operation" (John M. Ellis).

John Locke on the Soul

Greetings to all:

I have been reading John Locke's (1632-1704) The
Reasonableness of Christianity and found the foregoing comments interesting. The text that I own is edited by I.T. Ramsey. Concerning Gen 2:17, Locke reasons (on p. 26):

"I shall say nothing more here, how far, in the
apprehensions of men, this [the idea of eternal
torment] consists with the justice and goodness of
God, having mentioned it above; but it seems a strange
way of understanding a law [such as the one found in
Gen 2:17], which requires the plainest and directest
words, that by death should be meant eternal life in
misery. Could any one be supposed, by a law, that
says, 'For felony thou shalt die', not that he should
lose his life, but kept alive in perpetual exquisite
torments? And would any one think himself fairly dealt
with, that was so used?"

The obvious answer to both questions for Locke is
"no." He then defines what the word "death" as used in Gen
2:17 means to him:

"I must confess by death here, I can understand
nothing but a ceasing to be, the losing of all actions
of life and sense" (p. 27).

Warm regards,
Edgar

Richard Kearney on Exodus 3:14

Richard Kearney's text The God Who May Be discusses the controversial passage found at Exodus 3:14. I believe that what he has to say about EHYEH ASHER EHYEH is pertinent for this blog. The following quote can also be found at http://iupress.indiana.edu/textnet/0-253-33998-7/0253109167.htm:

'The great medieval Jewish commentator Rashi (Rabbi
Solomon ben Isaac, 1040–1105) renders the burning-bush
encounter as follows: "And God said unto Moses, 'I
shall be what I shall be.' And he said, 'so shall you
say to the children of Israel, I shall be has sent me
to you.'" And lest there be any lingering doubt, God
adds the binding promise: "This is my name for ever
and this is my remembrance from generation to
generation."

Rashi interprets the "name" in terms of mandate and
mission. He offers this daring commentary on God’s
address to Moses on Mount Horeb: "the vision that you
have seen at the thornbush is the sign for you that I
have sent you—and that you will succeed in My mission,
and that I have the wherewithal to save you. Just as
you saw the thornbush performing My mission without
being consumed, so too, you will go on My mission and
you will not be harmed." And Rashi adds, tellingly,
that this mandate itself prefigures the fact that
three months later Moses and his followers would
receive the Torah upon the very same mountain. Going
on to render the key passage of Exodus 3:14, he
writes, in very much the same spirit of futural
promise: "I shall be what I shall be—I shall be with
them during this trouble what I shall be with them at
the time of their subjugation at the hands of other
kingdoms." In other words, Rashi tells us, the
transfiguring God of the burning bush is pledging to
remain with those who continue to suffer in future
historical moments, and not just in the present
moment. Rashi attributes a similar sense to the phase
"This is My Name forever, and My Remembrance from
generation to generation" (Exodus 3:15). The
transfiguring God is not a once-off deity but one who
remembers the promises of the past and remains
faithful to them into the eschatological future.'

END OF QUOTE

Kearney's own translational preference for Exodus 3:14
is stated thus:

'My ultimate suggestion is that we might do better to
reinterpret the Transfiguring God of Exodus 3 neither
as "I who am" nor as "I who am not" but rather as "I
am who may be"—that is, as the possibility to be,
which obviates the extremes of being and non-being.
EHYEH ASHER EHYEH might thus be read as signature of
the God of the possible, a God who refuses to impose
on us or abandon us, traversing the present moment
while opening onto an ever-coming future.'

END OF QUOTE

Yet, Kearney concedes that Rashi's "eschatological"
reading of Exodus 3:14 is "arguably more attuned to the
original biblical context of meaning."

Lily Ross Taylor on PROSKUNHSIS

The following is taken from Lily Ross Taylor's _The Divinity of the Roman Emperor_, Philological Monographs, no. 1 (Middletown, Conn: American Philological Association, 1931).

This post deals with PROSKUNHSIS

"The Greek word PROSKUNHSIS denotes an act of devotion to a god that consisted either in kissing the hand toward the image or--less often--in kissing the ground before it. The Greeks used the word to describe the Persian custom of greeting the king by bowing down and kissing the earth. Alexander's conquest of the great Persian empire had brought him into close contact with Persian customs and manners, and in general he found it wise to adopt them" (pp. 18-19).

"Of course the PROSKUNHSIS did not always imply 'worship' in our sense of the word. It was a form of greeting extended among the Persians by inferiors to those far above them (Hdt. 1.134). For an analysis of the material on the PROSKUNHSIS, see Schnabel, Klio, XIX, 118ff."

The full reference for the article to which Taylor refers is
Paul Schnabel, "Die Begründung des hellenistischen Königskultes durch Alexander," Klio 19 (1925) 113-27.

Frederick Danker on the Greek word BLASFHMEW

"Distortion of the source text can also occur when a translator uses an expression that loads the source text with a negative intensity derived from a receptor's term that has acquired a specialized sense. For example, the Greek verb BLASFHMEW means 'to speak in a disrespectful way that demeans, denigrates, maligns.' The word is thus used in Greek about humans or transcendent beings, whereas in English the transliteration 'blaspheme' has acquired an exclusive association with sacral aspects, and when used in translations of the Bible obscures the cultural breadth of the Greek term" (Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography: Essays in Honor of Frederick W. Danker. Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), page 26.

Danker also proffers remarks on how one should understand the Greek verb rendered "blaspheme" in Acts 19:26-27. See the aforementioned publication.

Regards,
Edgar

The 24 Elders and Golden Crowns

Why do the 24 elders (older persons) depicted in Revelation 4:4 have golden crowns on their heads? I am not sure, but certain suggestions have been set forth. They are:

"Emblematic of the fact that they sustained a kingly office. There was blended in the representation the idea that they were both 'kings and priests'" (Barnes NT Notes).

"An emblem of their dignity. The Jewish writers represent human souls as being created first; and before they enter the body, each is taken by an angel into paradise, where it sees the righteous sitting in glory with crowns upon their heads. Rab. Tanchum, fol. 39, 4" (Adam Clarke's Commentary).

"they had on their heads crowns of gold, signifying the honour and authority given them of God, and the glory they have with him. All these may in a lower sense be applied to the gospel church on earth, in its worshipping assemblies; and, in the higher sense, to the church triumphant in heaven" (Matthew Henry, Commentary on the Whole Bible).

"Four and twenty elders sitting. These ancients were (1) twenty-four in number; (2) they were clothed in white, the color of victory and purity; (3) on their heads were golden crowns, not the diadem which means a kingly crown, but the golden crown of honor (Stephanos). Critics are not agreed as to the signification of these elders, but most of them think that they symbolize the glorified church of God gathered round the throne. They disagree as to the significance of the number twenty-four. There were twenty-four courses of priests. There were twelve tribes, and twelve apostles" (People's NT).

Any other suggestions? I am particularly interested in why the crowns of the 24 elders are "golden."

Genesis 22:1-18: Abraham and Isaac

There has been a lot of hand-wringing over the narrative found in Genesis 22:1-18. Skeptics and critics have wondered how a loving God could ask a parent to sacrifice his or her child up to a divine being. Some even accuse God of playing a "trick" on Abraham. Others, while considering themselves believers in God, have also spent countless pages trying to analyze and somewhat explain how God (YHWH) could make such a request from his beloved servant. I have also spent hours teaching this account, trying to understand it and mulling it over. There are numerous ways that one could understand the account of Abraham and Isaac, but two things seem clear to me. First, Genesis 22:1 says that God was testing Abraham, not tricking him. As Jamieson, Fausset and Brown state:

"God did tempt Abraham--not incite to sin ( Jam 1:13 ), but try, prove--give occasion for the development of his faith ( 1Pe 1:7 )."

The writer of Genesis (traditionally viewed as Moses) states from the outset that what is about to be read in the narrative is a "test": God is trying to see what is in Abraham's heart. That is why YHWH later utters the words "now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only [son] from me" (Genesis 22:12 KJV).

Open theist Gregory Boyd writes concerning this passage:

"if the classical understanding of foreknowledge is true, God's statement 'now I know' seems disingenuous. The meaning of God's explanation for this knowledge — 'since you have…' — is also obscured. Indeed, if the future is exhaustively settled there would be no point in his test of Abraham, because God would never have to find out anything."

So, Genesis 22:1 seems to offer firm evidence that God did not trick Abraham but tested his faith. The account must be read with Genesis 22:1 in mind. Secondly, the Hebrew-Aramaic Scriptures (the Old Testament or Tanach) make it abundantly clear that God does not want nor did he ever want or desire child sacrifices. Read Micah 6:1-8; Jeremiah 7:31. The account of Abraham and Isaac (also known as the Akedah or Aqedah) is understood more easily when read in context.

Theodoret on The Death of Arius

Theodoret relates the words of Athanasius:

"The followers of Eusebius were covered with shame, and buried him whose belief they shared. The blessed Alexander completed the celebration, rejoicing with the Church in piety and orthodoxy, praying with all the brethren and greatly glorifying God. This was not because he rejoiced at the death of Arius—God forbid; for 'it is appointed unto all men once to die'; but because the event plainly transcended any human condemnation. For the Lord Himself passing judgment upon the menaces of the followers of Eusebius, and the prayer of Alexander, condemned the Arian heresy, and shewed that it was unworthy of being received into the communion of the Church; thus manifesting to all that, even if it received the countenance and support of the emperor, and of all men, yet by truth itself it stood condemned."

See The Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret (Book 1, Extract from the Letter of Athanasius on the Death of Arius)

Augustine of Hippo on 2 Thessalonians 2:8-13

Why they are called signs and lying wonders [in 2 Thess. 2:8-13], we shall then be more likely to know when the time itself arrives. But whatever be the reason of the name, they shall be such signs and wonders as shall seduce those who shall deserve to be seduced, "because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." Neither did the apostle scruple to go on to say, "For this cause God shall send upon them the working of error that they should believe a lie." For God shall send, because God shall permit the devil to do these things, the permission being by His own just judgment, though the doing of them is in pursuance of the devil's unrighteous and malignant purpose, "that they all might be judged who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." Therefore, being judged, they shall be seduced, and, being seduced, they shall be judged. But, being judged, they shall be seduced by those secretly just and justly secret judgments of God, with which He has never ceased to judge since the first sin of the rational creatures; and, being seduced, they shall be judged in that last and manifest judgment administered by Jesus Christ, who was Himself most unjustly judged and shall most justly judge.

See Augustine's City of God (De Civitate Dei), Chapter 19.

Reflections on the Eastern Idea of Theosis (QEWSIS)

Personally, I think that QEWSIS [deification] is a doctrine that has a certain element of truth, but it is also capable of being distorted.

In the New Testament, there are scriptures that support the idea of deification
(at least, in a limited sense). 2 Pet. 1:4 speaks of Christians
becoming "partakers of the divine nature" (GENHSQE QEIAS KOINWNOI
FUSEWS). 1 John 3:2 also says that the sons of God will "see God and
be LIKE him." These Scriptures indicate that at least some Christians
will experience QEWSIS.

The doctrine of QEWSIS is a beautiful teaching insofar as it is delineated in
the NT. The only danger is that it could be misconstrued to imply that
humans will become equal to God. MH GENOITO! There is a sharp eternal
[ontological] distinction between the Creator and the creature.
For this reason, Alister McGrath has suggested that we speak
of deification as QEIWSIS rather than QEWSIS. That is,
those deified will be godlike, but not God.

At any rate, I think that QEWSIS for those Christians privileged to
inherit it, will entail being clothed with immortality and
incorruption--with self-existence. They will also share in ruling with
Christ Jesus for 1000 years, transforming the present world order into
a new age devoid of death, sickness, and crime (Revelation 20:6; 21:1-5).

My thoughts,

Edgar

Note: I wrote these reflections a number of years ago. At the time I quoted McGrath but did not document where I found his distinction between QEIOSIS and QEOSIS. I went to Googlebooks, however, and found two references. See http://books.google.com/books?id=DvPMFcGIZgkC&pg=PA171&dq=mcgrath+and+theiosis&lr= and http://books.google.com/books?id=AEtIlaWp9foC&pg=PA392&dq=mcgrath+and+theiosis&lr=

Saul Kripke on Necessity, Possibility and Rigidity

The following dialogue is one that I had with a friend and colleague back in 2004. I am not including his name in order to protect his identity:

Saul Kripke is speaking the language of modal logic when he uses the operator "possibly" in Naming and Necessity. He appears to have in mind counterfactual situations (i.e., counterfactual conditionals) or possible worlds such that if P is logically or modally possible in one or more possible world, then there is a counterfactual situation [a possible world] in which P is evidently not logically or modally impossible. In other words, it could have been the case (possibly) that mental states obtain without brain states. It also might have been the case that my arms were white instead of "black." One Kripkean example of possibility addressing this issue is that there is a counterfactual situation (call it W1) in which the first Postmaster General is not identical with the inventor of bifocals. He doesn't come right out and say that he is using "possibility" thus; however, Naming and Necessity
turns on counterfactual situations and possible worlds. And I now know that Kripke basically ignores the question
about whether something might have existed or not.

Concerning "necessity," Kripke writes, "Thus the identity of pain with the stimulation of C-fibers, if true, must be necessary" (N & N, 149).

What does he mean by "necessary" here? Hasker makes a
distinction between logical (i.e. conceptual)
necessity and metaphysical necessity, noting that
statements such as the one above are metaphysically
necessary, meaning that they are true in all possible
worlds. Kripke also asserts that "This table is not
made of ice," IF TRUE, is necessarily true or true in
all possible worlds (i.e. counterfactual situations).
so necessity evidently means "true in all
counterfactual situations or possible worlds."

For "rigid," Kripke simply writes that the RD or "rigid designator"
(which is apparently stipulative) names the same object in
all possible worlds. The RD, Nixon, names the same
object in W1, W2, W3 . . .

Now here is what I also found on a website article written by
Quentin Smith:

<<[Tyler] Burge then identifies Kripke's essays as the first "account of names [in terms of] a theory of necessity. He counted names as 'rigid designators' - expressions that maintained a certain constancy of reference through variation in the possible worlds by reference to which modal sentences might be evaluated" [1992: 25]. However, these ideas about names and rigid designators were not presented first by Kripke, but earlier presented by Plantinga [1967], Føllesdal [1961] and Marcus [1961].>>

See
http://www.qsmithwmu.com/direct%2C_rigid_designation_and_a_posteriori.htm

Smith thinks that Kripke posits a similarity of
identity between logical and metaphysical necessity.
Nevertheless, he still defines it [i.e. necessity] as "true in all
possible worlds."

Regards,
Edgar

The Anonymous God Tradition

John Cooper argues that the term "name" can have four basic denotations: (1) a personal name (e.g. Jehovah or Peter); (2) a proper noun (e.g. Father, God, King); (3) a general designation (e.g. dog, cat, slanderer); (4) any linguistic reference (e.g. "God is light" or "the greatest possible being").

While it seems that the pre-Nicenes generally acknowledged that God had a name in the sense of (3) or (4) above, the early church writers often appear to be denying that God has a name in the sense of (1) or (2) above. I am reminded of Marcus Minucius Felix, who writes in Octavius 18:

"Nor should you seek a name for God: God is His name. We have need of titles in cases where we want to separate individuals from a large group; we use, then the distinguishing mark of personal names. But God is unique; all He has for title is God" (Nec nomen deo quaeras: Deus nomen est. Illic vocabulis opus est, cum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est: deo, qui solus est, dei vocabulum totum est).

There is an anonymous God tradition in early Christianity that is manifested in the East and West. The tradition asserted that God does not have a proper name.

Alister McGrath on Understated Tritheism in the Cappadocians

The notable writer Alister McGrath (a Trinitarian himself) writes concerning the Cappadocian notion of God in three persons:

"We are asked to imagine three human beings. Each of
them is distinct; yet share a common humanity. So it
is with the trinity: There are three distinct persons,
yet with a common divine nature. When all is said and
done, this analogy leads directly to understated
tritheism. Yet the treatise in which Gregory of Nyssa
develops this analogy is entitled That There Are Not
Three Gods! In fact, Gregory develops his analogy with
a degree of sophistication which blunts the prima
facie charge of tritheism; however, even the most
studious reader of the work is often left with the
lingering impression of three distinct independent
entities within the trinity" (Christian Theology: An
Introduction, page 302).

New Ads

Greetings,

I am trying the Google AdSense to generate extra income which means that discreet ads will be placed to the side of this blog. Currently, I am changing my preferences from interest generated to non-interest generated ads. I prefer not to direct people toward religions other than my own. :) Please bear with me on the transition. Nothing else about this blog will change. Thank you.

Animals, Language and Speech (A Short Paper)

Animals, Language, and Speech

Dr. Edgar Foster

Is language strictly a human activity or do animals also use language? What is language? Is there a difference between speech and language? The following brief treatment of these questions in no way claims to be comprehensive or exhaustive. It is merely a short reply to specific claims regarding language and animals.
Rodolfo R. Llinas (author of I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self) claims that language simpliciter, but particularly human language, "arose as an extension of premotor conditions, namely, those of the increasing complexities of intentionality as abstract thinking grew richer" (242). Llinas defines intentionality as "the premotor detail of the desired result of movement through which a particular emotional state is expressed: the choice of what to do before the doing of it" (228). Notice that intentionality, as opposed to being primarily mentalistic, is associated with "a motor representation of what is happening inside our heads" (ibid). Intentionality expressed in premotor activity essentially predicts or adumbrates genuine motor patterns, according to Llinas. Language, he argues, arose because premotor activity increasingly grew more complex as abstract cerebration became richer.

The upshot of Llinas' analysis is that language is not simply a human possession (228-230). He contends that non-rational animals also use language. For language, on this view, is "the given methodology by which one animal may communicate with another" (229). Is Llinas correct? Do animals really implement or deploy language in their daily activities? Did non-rational animal language precede the use of language by Homo sapiens?

Most psycholinguists now believe that human language acquisition is not based on external stimuli. Scientific studies of “language” deployed by apes and by children indicate that human language is somehow innate since there evidently is such a discrepancy between the lingual performance of apes and that of humans. This difference is so profound that it moved Noam Chomsky to argue that humans possess a "language acquisition device"(LAD). Based on the foregoing, is it accurate to say that animals utilize language?

Linguist and NT scholar Moises Silva thinks that non-rational animals do communicate with one another and this point seems hard to deny. Nevertheless, Silva also holds that "the most successful experiments to date serve, if anything, to emphasize the enormous difference between the 'language' of the most intelligent animals—even after extensive training—and the linguistic competence of even a three-year old human being" (Silva, "God, Language and Scripture" in Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, 207). At any rate (Silva insists) animals do not use speech. This leaves us with two questions to consider. What is language? Secondly, what is the difference, if any, between language and speech?

Ferdinand Saussure famously made a distinction between la langue and la parole. The former refers to an abstract system of different phonological signs, whereas the latter has reference to the use of abstract language in communication. La langue additionally has both an internal and external aspect in that phonology, morphology, syntax (internal features) and semantics (external feature) all constitute language. Ergo, if we define language as Saussure and other linguists or philosophers have defined the phenomenon, then it seems that animals possess neither langue nor parole. The matter will no doubt remain controversial, yet there are good scientific and logical reasons to doubt that animals use language, as one commonly understands that term.

In conclusion, I affirm the uniqueness of human language and speech. I will close with quotes from Sophocles and King David to support my case:

"And speech, and wind-swift thought, and all the moods
that mould a state, hath he [i.e. man] taught himself;
and how to flee the arrows of the frost, when 'tis
hard lodging under the clear sky, and the arrows of
the rushing rain; yea, he hath resource for all;
without resource he meets nothing that must come: only
against Death shall he call for aid in vain; but from
baffling maladies he hath devised escapes"(Antigone 332-340).

"What are humans that you are mindful of them, mere
mortals that you care for them? Yet you have made them
little less than a god, crowned them with glory and
honor" (Psalm 8:5ff NAB).

Pouring Out of the Spirit as a Metaphor (Joel 2:28-29)

I have not researched this point thoroughly but I have been wondering if the language that Scripture employs regarding God pouring out his spirit of holiness is metaphorical or not. For example, Joel 2:28 states:

"It will come about after this That I will pour out My Spirit on all mankind; And your sons and daughters will prophesy, Your old men will dream dreams, Your young men will see visions" (NASB).

We also read in Isa 32:15:

"Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest" (KJV).

The argument is sometimes made that a "person" of the triune Godhead cannot be poured out. But the thought has crossed my mind lately that a "force" also cannot be literally "poured out" in the manner described by the prophets, can it? If a force or person cannot be "poured out" it seems that the language employed by the holy prophets and apostles is metaphorical.

The Early Church Fathers on John 1:3-4

Jason (my self-made nemesis) has insisted that my view of the way John 1:3-4 was understood by the pre-Nicenes is wrong. He has adduced no textual evidence to support his conclusion but he has been critical of the note I posted from the Catholic NAB and I do not believe he has replied to the quote I posted from Clement of Alexandria concerning John 1:3-4. Now I present more quotes from the pre-Nicenes on this subject:

"Understand now for me the mystery of the truth, granting pardon if I shrink from advancing further in the treatment of it, by announcing this alone: 'All things were made by Him, and without Him was not even one thing.'" (Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.11)

"But it is said Providence, from above, from what is of prime importance, as from the head, reaches to all, 'as the ointment,' it is said, 'which descends to Aaron's beard, and to the skirt of his garment'(that is, of the great High Priest, 'by whom all things were made, and without whom not even one thing was made' not to the ornament of the body; for Philosophy is outside of the People, like raiment." (Stromata 6.17)

"Ruling, then, over himself and what belongs to him, and possessing a sure grasp, of divine science, he makes a genuine approach to the truth. For the knowledge and apprehension of intellectual objects must necessarily be called certain scientific knowledge, whose function in reference to divine things is to consider what is the First Cause, and what that 'by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made'" (Stromata 7.3)

“ 'And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.' Immediately there appears the Word, 'that true light, which lighteth man on his coming into the world,' and through Him also came light upon the world. From that moment God willed creation to be effected in the Word, Christ being present and ministering unto Him: and so God created. And God said, 'Let there be a firmament . . . and God made the firmament;' and God also said, 'Let there be lights (in the firmament); and so God made a greater and a lesser light.' But all the rest of the created things did He in like manner make, who made the former ones—I mean the Word of God, 'through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made.' Now if He too is God, according to John, (who says,) 'The Word was God,' then you have two Beings—One that commands that the thing be made, and the Other that executes the order and creates." (Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 12).

"Let him who is inclined to entertain this suspicion hear the undoubted declaration of Scripture pronouncing, 'In wisdom hast Thou made them all,' and the teaching of the Gospel, that 'by Him were all things made, and without Him nothing was made;'" (Origen, De Principiis I.2)

"John also, who lived after him, said, 'That which was in the Logos was life, and the life was the light of men;'" (Contra Celsum 6.5)

Revelation 16:21

The following is a message from my old yahoogroup named greektheology:

Revelation 16:21

Hi [you guys],

Thanks for posting to this thread. Your comments were quite helpful.

I also found the following data:

TALANTON: "a weight ranging from about 108 to 130 lbs., or a sum of money equivalent to a talent in weight" (Vocabulary of the Greek Testament, p. 624).

"TALANTIAIOS (#5418) talent. The talent varied in weight among different peoples at different times. The range seems to be about sixty pounds to over a hundred (Mounce)." (See The New Linguistic Key to the Greek New Testament, p. 642.)

"Even an abnormal hailshower (cf. the fourth Egyptian plague) fails to bring pagans to their senses. hWS TAL., i.e., literally about sixty times the weight of even the enormous hailstones (MNAAIAI) which Diodorus Siculus (XIX. 45) records" (Expositor's Greek Testament, 5:449).

"There was a terrible hailstorm, and hailstones weighing seventy-five pounds fell from the sky onto the people below" (NLT).

"And huge hailstones, about one hundred pounds each, *came down from heaven upon men; and men blasphemed God because of the plague of the hail, because its plague *was extremely severe" (NASB).

"and great hailstones, heavy as a hundred-weight, dropped on men from heaven, till men cursed God for the plague of the hail, so fearful was that plague" (RSV).

Joe wrote:

"But maybe I need to read up on non-metric weights in the UK and US. :-)

lb = pound, < libra. Pound sterling, £, was a lb of silver. Can someone explain me me if the usual lbs are pounds troy or pounds avoirdupois?" Joe, one website says: <>

Yb,
Edgar Foster

My Dialogue with An Atheist or Skeptic

Greetings:

A skeptic writes:

I understand your viewpoint, but I was hinting at 2 distinctly
different ideas. First, that if God does in fact, as they say, have infinite
ability, then he most definitely could have (could have and can) will G [good]
out of E [evil] if he wants. According to Christian beliefs at least. Infinite
ability would imply ANYTHING is possible, including a real Utopia.
That, in my eyes, would be more desirable than Earth as-is. I'd be more apt
to say it was a product of "love" than what we've got now. The idea
that a world with free will is much more desirable than a Utopian world
is absurd. Free will spawns good AND evil, but in a Utopian world, only
good come about. Free will is enjoyable because it does hold the
potential to spawn good. In Utopia, life would be enjoyed to its utmost and
one would ALWAYS feel good. I can't imagine anyone who would pass up the
opportunity to live in such a paradise for "free will." I would
sacrifice free will to live in a controlled Utopian world in a heartbeat!

Part of my response to his remarks is:

The term "infinite" is ambiguous. It seems to me that Christians have been wont to deny that God is quantitatively infinite but they have usually contended that God is qualitatively infinite. Moreover, although God is by hypothesis (EX HYPOTHESI) omnipotent or has maximal power [omnipotence], God evidently cannot do that which is logically or conceptually impossible. That is to say, God cannot do that which results in a contradictory state of affairs. Hence, certain "Christian" philosophers argue that it is logically possible that God cannot bring it about that a rational creature has free will, yet always unequivocally does what is right. Be that as it may, you raise another issue. Is a utopian world in which people always do what is right because of being determined to do X or Y (certain actions) preferable to a world in which people are free and have the ability to do what is morally wrong or what is morally right? You suggest that option A is superior or preferable to option B. But I submit that it is difficult for you to know how you would like a [deterministic] utopia in comparison to the world we have now since neither you nor I have ever experienced a utopia. Moreover, if we lived in a world where everything was determined (including our actions), would we really prefer [or have the ability to prefer] that world to a world where free will obtained? I might add that as a parent, I can tell you--and this is the testimony of a number of parents--that I prefer my child to love me because he or she wants to, not because he or she has been programmed to love me. I submit that God also wills that his creatures love him freely, not because they have been programmed or determined to love him.

Augustine on the Trinity and A Person Being Able to Love Himself or Herself

The following is from an email I wrote to a colleague some time ago.

I quote Augustine of Hippo:

"But what if I love none except myself? Will there not

then be two things--that which I love, and love? For

he who loves and that which is loved are the same when

any one loves himself; just as to love and to be

loved, in the same way, is the very same thing when

any one loves himself. Since the same thing is said,

when it is said, he loves himself, and he is loved by

himself. For in that case to love and to be loved are

not two different things: just as he who loves and he

who is loved are not two different persons. But yet,

even so, love and what is loved are still two things.

For there is no love when any one loves himself,

except when love itself is loved. But it is one thing

to love one's self, another to love one's own love.

For love is not loved, unless as already loving

something; since where nothing is loved there is no

love. Therefore there are two things when any one

loves himself--love, and that which is loved. For then

he that loves and that which is loved are one. Whence

it seems that it does not follow that three things are

to be understood wherever love is" (De Trinitate

9.2.2).



Augustine then proceeds with an argument about mind

and love to establish his case for the triunity of

God. But notice that he insists it is possible for one to

have a love of self in the absence of an alterior

beloved.


Regards,

Edgar

Divine Exemplification Theory

From time to time, I review my notebooks to see what projects I started and never finished or may never finish. One such project is what I have called (for lack of a better term) "divine exemplification theory." I might one day go forward with work on this idea, concept or theory, but what I am trying to figure out is how one can intelligibly and accurately talk about forms or abstract concepts without being a Platonist of one stripe or the other.

Concepts or properties like treeness, rockness, doghood or humanity seem fairly "easy" to discuss intelligibly or coherently. But where the waters become rough is when one discusses justice, goodness, courage and wisdom (inter alia). Aside from the difficulties that come from trying to define these terms (as anyone who has read Plato can attest to), a problem also resides in trying to explain the primordial locus of these concepts/properties/attributes.

Are the aforementioned "qualities" Forms that "exist" in some transcendent realm of Being (Plato)? Do putative "Forms" like justice obtain in acts performed by free agents rather than in some intelligible sphere of Being? Or do the Forms reside in God's mind (Philo, Augustine). Or should one say that the Forms have their locus in the human mind?

I humbly submit--more work needs to be done here--that what have been called "Forms" do not reside in some intelligible (i.e. noetic) realm nor do they reside in the mind of God. But the "Forms" (especially things like justice or wisdom and beauty) reside and have been everlastingly exemplified by God Himself. Notice, I am not limiting the Forms to the mind of God. Nor do I think they are immutable, even though they are everlasting. I am suggesting that the so-called Forms like justice or goodness have been everlastingly exemplified by God in his actions and eternal purpose. They have not just resided in the mind of God. Hence, the name, Divine exemplification theory.

The Early Fathers on John 1:3-4

The evidence from the pre-Nicenes suggests that they took the expression hO GEGONEN in Jn 1:3-4 with what follows rather than with what precedes. For example, Clement of Alexandria evidently writes:

Ver. 2. "The life was manifested." For in the Gospel he thus speaks: "And what was made, in Him was life, and the life was the light of men."

See his Comments on the Epistle of John in Fragments of Clemens Alexandrinus.

Also see Contra Celsum 6.5 by Origen of Alexandria

Abstaining from Blood and The Council of Gangra (343 CE)

Canon II. If anyone shall condemn him who eats flesh
which is without blood and has not been offered to
idols nor strangled, and is faithful and devout, as
though the man were without hope of salvation because
of his eating, let him be anathema.

Quoted in The Evolution of the Late Antique World by Peter Garnsey and Caroline Humfress (page 193).

Best regards,
Edgar

The Lord's Evening Meal as Sacrifice

One Scriptural passage that has really helped me to
appreciate tomorrow night's upcoming Memorial of Christ's
death on Nisan 14 is 1 Corinthians 10:18:

"Look at that which is Israel in a fleshly way: Are
not those who eat the sacrifices sharers with the
altar?"

When posing this rhetorical query, Paul alludes to the
OT practice of communion sacrifices. One can find a
lovely description of such offerings in Leviticus
7:1-38. I want to recount briefly what that Biblical
chapter says and apply it to the apostolic words found in 1
Corinthians 10:18ff.

The communion sacrifices were peace offerings designed
to restore the broken relationship that obtained
between God and His ancient worshipers. It was a holy
presentation to Almighty God (YHWH), and when offering
a communion sacrifice, the Israelites were fittingly
obligated to give their best to Jehovah (YHWH).

Leviticus 7:28-30 mandates that one presenting a
communion sacrifice to Jehovah should offer the "fat
upon the breast" to God as a wave offering.
(Leviticus 7:30 briefly explains what a wave offering
entailed.) In addition to offering the fat and the
blood to Jehovah or YHWH (Leviticus 7:33), the one presenting
peace offerings to God was also commanded to give "the
right leg" of his sacrifice as "a sacred portion" to
the officiating priests. Furthermore the High Priest
and his sons were to have a share in this communion
offering. What a privilege all those who offered
communion presentations enjoyed! Paul rightly said
that those who sacrificed upon the altar became (by
their respective gifts to God) sharers in the altar.
But how does this levitical practice apply to
Christians today?

As Paul intimates, the Lord's Evening Meal (1
Corinthians 11:20) is the antitype of the OT peace
offerings. Just as ancient worshipers of God brought
their sacrifices to Jehovah in order to repair the
breach that obtained between themselves and God, so
anointed Christians annually observe the Memorial of
Jesus' death in order to remember how God repaired the
figurative breach between God and sinful humanity and
thus fully reconciled His sons to Himself.

Anointed Christians share in the antitypical communion
meal by partaking of Christ's blood (the cup of wine)
and his body (the bread). The emblems at the Memorial
are emblems or signs of the spiritual reality effectuated
by God and Christ. Those who partake of the cup and wine
today share with God's altar as they partake
of a meal, in effect, with Jehovah, His High Priest
(Jesus) and other fellow anointed ones (underpriests). It
is still an inestimable privilege to sit down for a
meal with God. Anointed Christians therefore esteem
the undeserved kindness that has been shown to them
through the Son of God's ransom sacrifice. However
they are not the only ones who benefit from being
present at the yearly communion meal.

The great crowd of other sheep who possess a hope of
living forever, while not partaking of the emblems and
thus sharing in the altar, still have their
appreciation for Christ's sacrifice deepened as they
listen to the discourse given about Jesus' death and
watch the symbols of his death being passed around the
Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. I thus hope that everyone attending the
Memorial this year reflects on what Christ's death
means. May you continue to grow in love and
appreciation for Jehovah God (YHWH) and His Son.

Brotherly love,
Edgar

Reductio ad Absurdum

A little more on this type of argumentation. Stephen F. Barker in The Elements of Logic points out that the type of argumentation which contains a conditional premise and which is known as reductio ad absurdum ("reduction to the absurd" or "reduction to absurdity") can be illustrated as follows. Assuming p is true,

If p, then not p (e.g., If there is a largest integer (a positive number), then there is not a largest integer.)

Conclusion: Therefore, not p (e.g., Therefore, it is not the case that there is a largest integer.)

The reasoning above is valid because the antecedent of the proposition "If p then not p" is false. By reducing the antecedent of the proposition "If p then not p" to absurdity, it shows that the antecedent is false. For if the antecedent were true, then the consequent of the proposition "If p, then not p" would be inconsistent with the propositional antecedent. So the antecedent must be false.

Dogs in Scripture

Concerning dogs: In Philippians 3:2, Paul told the Christians living in that Roman outpost to be wary of the dogs (βλέπετε τοὺς κύνας), that is, "those who mutilate the flesh" (or those who practice circumcision for the purpose of salvation). His words reflect the common Jewish view of dogs (particularly scavenger dogs).

Also, in Rev. 22:15, "dogs" (οἱ κύνες) are debarred from the heavenly city of New Jerusalem. They are left outside of the gates along with those who practice spiritism and fornication, as well as idolators and liars and murderers. Bible commentator David Aune has a very informative section in his Revelation commentary. He notes that the MT (Masoretic Text) has the term KELEB for dog (Cf. Deut. 23:18 which has כֶּ֗לֶב).

Aune writes that κύων (dog) is ambivalent in Greco-Jewish literature, even though a number of pejorative references appear vis-a'-vis dogs. For while dogs were "economically beneficial" as "watch dogs and herding dogs," and while they were not necessarily considered unclean in halachic traditions--the term is clearly used pejoratively in 1 Sam. 17:43; 24:14; 2 Kings 8:13; Isa. 56:10-11; Matthew 7:6; 2 Pet. 2:22; Didache 9:5; Ignatius, Eph. 7:1.

Norman Hillyer (in his commentary on 2 Peter) likewise observes that κύων in 2 Pet. 2:22 denotes: "the wild scavenger of the streets and rubbish tips, not a pet house-dog" (208).

Subordinationism in Clement of Alexandria

Here is what scholarship says about subordinationism in Clement of Alexandria:

The Son is EPEKEINA TOU NOHTOU, Strom, v. 6. 38. He is PANTOKRATWR, Paed. i. 5. 24; iii. 7. 39 ; Protrep. viii. 81; Strom, iv. 3. 148 : KURIOS, Paed. i' 7- 56, 57 : the Father alone is perfect, for in Him is the Son, and in the Son the Father, Paed. \. 7. 53. The passages usually quoted as showing Clement's tendency to Subordinationism are Strom, vii. I. 2, PRESBUTERON EN GENESEI; vii. 2. 5, the Father is hO MONOS PANTOKRATWR; Strom, v. I. 6, the Son is DUNAMIS, vii. 2. 8 an ENERGEIA, Paed. iii. I. 2 a DIAKONOS of the Father; Protrep. x. no He is made equal to the Father; Paed. iii. 12. 98 He is the AGAQON BOULHMA of the Father; Strom, vi. 7. 59 Creation runs up to the Father, Redemption to the Son. Rufinus, Epil. in Apol. Pamphili, Clement sometimes ' filium Dei creaturam dicit.' This must refer to the word KTIZEIN used of Wisdom (Prov. viii. 22), Strom, v. 14. 89. Even POIEIN might be used, Strom, vi. 7. 58 (in a quotation from the PETROU KHR.), hOS ARXHN TWN APANTWN EPOIHSEN. Cp. Adumb. in I Joan. p. 1009, ' hae namque primitivae virtutes ac primo creatae ' of the Son and Holy Spirit. On the interpretation of this passage of the Book of Proverbs, see Huet, Origeniana, ii. 2. 21 (Lomm. xxii. 176); Rosenmiiller, Hist. Interp. iii. 216, 229; Baur, Dreieinigkeit. Bull and Domer do not regard Clement as a Subordinationist. Huet maintains the opposite view. Redepenning occupies an intermediate position. The statement of Photius that Clement spoke of two Logi must rest upon a blunder ; see Dr. Westcott, Clement of Alexandria, in Diet. Christ. Biog.; Zahn, Forsch. iii. 144; and Lect. viii.

The above quotation is from The Christian Platonists of Alexandria by Charles Bigg. See pp. 69-70. This work can also be accessed online at http://books.google.com/books?id=K1ZbAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA69&dq=clement+of+alexandria+and+subordinationism#PPA69,M1

Another quote is taken from a work entitled History of Dogmas (pp. 248-249) by Joseph Tixeront:

And yet some have thought that in his works there are traces of subordinationism: for he not only applies to the Son the appellations Philo gives to the Word : but he also declares that the Father is PRESBUTEROS EN GENESEI, that the Son's nature (FUSIS) is the nearest to Him who alone is all powerful, that the Son can be demonstrated and known, while the Father can be neither known nor demonstrated. Nay, if Photius is to be believed, Clement looked upon the Son as a creature; and it must be said that the Alexandrian doctor has, on this subject, expressions somewhat perplexing. These, however, can be explained and do not destroy the impression that results from his doctrine taken as a whole. Even, some authors are unwilling to believe that he was truly subordinationist.

See http://books.google.com/books?id=9_UrAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA437&dq=clement+of+alexandria+and+subordinationism#PPA248,M1

See John Patrick's work on Clement of Alexandria here and what he writes about subordinationism in Clement:

http://books.google.com/books?id=3ohAAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA102&dq=clement+of+alexandria+and+subordinationism&lr=#PPA102,M1