Old Interpreter's Bible Explanation of 1 Corinthians 2:10

An often used text to support the Trinity doctrine is 1 Corinthians 2:10ff. This blog entry seeks to address some of the arguments that revolve around that passage.

The Holy Spirit In The NT

by Edgar Foster

Concerning 1 Cor. 2:10ff, we read:

"Paul turns next to the place of the Spirit in imparting this true wisdom. He does not say that the Spirit teaches all things; but that he searches everything or investigates. The only other place where Paul uses the word is in Rom. 8:27, where he speaks of the searching of the hearts of men by God. That activity is an aspect of the omnipresence of the Spirit. Yet we must not make the mistake of confusing Paul's idea of the Spirit, the supernatural gift to believers, and to them only, with the Stoic idea of a reality permeating the entire natural universe. Paul uses the word PNEUMA in a wise variety of ways. sometimes it seems more like an impersonal power. Here it is the self-consciousness of God, by analogy to the human PNEUMA, which is man's self-consciousness. The passage suggests the possibility of a psychological interpretation of the Trinity, paving the way for Augustine's approach. In these verses the word PNEUMA is used in more than the usual variety of ways. Paul speaks of the spirit of man, the spirit of the world (KOSMOS, not AIWN) and the Spirit of God. The English texts attempt to make the distinction clear by the use of capitals for the last. But since the Greek has no such indication, we cannot be sure when Paul means the divine Spirit and when he means simply this faculty in human nature. He nevertheless makes a tremendous claim in this passage. In the bestowal of the Spirit men have received nothing less than God's self- consciousness. Therefore they are able to understand his secret wisdom"
(Interpreter's Bible, Vol. 10, pp. 39-40, Emphases Mine).

Analysis

1 Cor. 2:10ff was one of Rudolph Bultmann's favorite passages, and it is also one of mine. In 1 Cor. 2:10, Paul makes it very plain that God--that is, the Father--teaches Christians (cf. John 6:45). The Father does not teach us, however, apart from His holy spirit: "It was to us that God made known his secret." How? "By means of his spirit" (TEV).

Continually throughout the book of 1 Corinthians, the apostle Paul identifies God as the Father (1 Corinthians 8:5-6; 11:3; 15:24-28). To Paul and the entire Primitive church, there was one God (the Father). This deity conveys His divine secret to those who worship God in spirit and truth. The holy spirit is the omnipotent God's vehicle for teaching. God's dynamic invisible force acting powerfully upon Christians discloses the will of God in a lucid manner. The Father lovingly reveals Himself and discloses information about His Son and eternal purposes through the power of the spirit. 1 Cor. 2:10 suggests that the spirit is not a person, but a force or potentially consciousness.

The Greek word translated "searches" (TEV) is EREUNAO. This word, according to J.H. Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon means "[to] search, examine into." In Rom. 8:27 we read: "And He Who searches [EREUNAO] the hearts of men knows what is in the mind of the [Holy] Spirit [what His intent is], because the Spirit intercedes and pleads [before God] in behalf of the saints" (Amplified Bible. Words in brackets found in the original Amplified Bible).

In Rom. 8:26, 27, the Father is said to be the one who searches and hears the figurative pleas of the holy spirit. God searches the human heart, as the spirit examines the "depths of God's purposes." While the Interpreter's Bible may choose to view 1 Cor. 2:10ff as a precursor to Augustine's psychological Trinity, I personally see no such import within this Pauline account.

Dates for Some of Tertullian's Works (According to FL Cross)

From F. L. Cross, The Early Christian Fathers (London: Penguin, 1993), 141-142.

1. Adversus Marcionem (circa 208-211 CE)

2. Adversus Hermogenem (circa 200 CE)

3. De Carne Christi (210-213 CE)

4. De Carnis Resurrectione (210-212 CE)

What Does the Hebrew Word "Azazel" Mean?

See http://books.google.com/books?id=7Vh1Ozo3QHMC&pg=PA126&dq=leviticus+16+azazel&cd=1#v=onepage&q=leviticus%2016%20azazel&f=false

Clicking on the title will also take you to the relevant Google Books page.

Regards,

Edgar

PROS in John 1:1b and Divine Personhood

Knowing that PROS implies "being with" or "toward" or even in proximate communion with someone else, certain theologians have tried to explain Jn 1:1b-c by resorting to a priori categories of person and substance. However, John McKenzie has pointed out that John did not differentiate between the divine substance and divine Persons who are identical with the divine substance. John simply used QEOS to describe the Being he identified as the only true God (John 17:3). This Being is distinct from the man who was called Jesus Christ on earth, and He is also set apart from the LOGOS who was with the only true God before the world was (John 17:5).

The problem that has not been satisfactorily addressed by Trinitarian theology accordingly involves in what sense the Son and Spirit are Persons. To be sure, theologians have endeavored to cut the Gordian knot of this troublesome antinomy. Nevertheless, not one thinker has satisfactorily explained how Persons who are not Persons in the Cartesian sense (COGITO ERGO SUM) can subsist with (PROS) one another
and enjoy meaningful communion or love one another.

G. R. B. Murray says that PROS TON QEON (Jn 1:1b) means: "in the presence of God" or "in the fellowship of God." He probably is suggesting that God the Son communed with God the Father. B.M Newman and E.A. Nida reject the "in the presence of God" understanding for this construction and opt for the notion of "a kind of interactive reciprocality between the Word and God."

None of these explanations make sense to me within the context of a non-social Trinity doctrine. Of course, if one posits a social Trinity, then tritheism must be avoided or the idea that there are three "I thinks" within God. Trinitarians, please don't multiply antinomies beyond necessity. With apologies to Ockham!

Best,
Edgar

Another Response to Philippians 2:6-7 Questions

Some years ago, this question came my way:

The second question is in reference to Philippians 2:6-8. You seem to follow the standard approach of the kenosis happening in eternity past or at least at the time of Jesus' birth. Is there anything in the text itself which requires the emptying of Jesus to be then? There is only one time specific reference in the whole passage, as I see it, and that is the reference to Jesus' death. Is it not possible for the emptying to have taken place in the Garden of Gethsemane or even on the cross (stake)?

My response:

I personally think that it is possible Paul could have been referring to the Christ Event [Jesus becoming human] or to the death of Jesus when he spoke of the Messiah emptying himself. But I do not find that interpretation [i.e. the death of Jesus representing his emptying] as compelling for the following reasons.

(1) Phil. 2:5-11 seems to be modeled after Isa. 52-53, where we read about the preexistent Messiah (the Suffering Servant of YHWH) who humbles himself and is subsequently exalted. See L. Gregory Bloomquist's excellent and detailed treatment of Phil. 2:5-11 in The Function of Suffering in Philippians (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), pp. 160-168.

(2) EN MORFH QEOU appears to be a dative of indirect object that describes "an exalted heavenly figure very close to God," but not one who possesses absolute divinity (Osiek, Carolyn. Philippians, Philemon. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000). See page 60. Furthermore, "This interpretation is enhanced by the rest of verse 6: he did not consider it a hARPAGMOS, something to be seized or exploited, to be ISA QEWi, equal or of equal status to God" (Osiek 60). The semantic value of MORFH in relation to QEOU may also strengthen the connection with preexistence. [That is, the term probably means "external appearance" or "shape." I.e., the Son appears to reflect the divine glory in his preexistence.]

(3) EN MORFH DOULOU seems to be contrasted with EN MORFH DOULOU. EN MORFH DOULOU appears to juxtapose Christ's earthly mode of being with his heavenly heavenly manner of existence.

(4) Phil 2:5-11 also appears to bear some resemblance
to Col 1:15-16 and Heb 1 & 2 as well as Jn 1:1-18,
which also speak to Christ's pre-existence and his
katabasis as well as his subsequent anabasis.
Moreover, the katabasis/anabasis themes in Second
Temple Judaism normally involve a heavenly figure
becoming human (e.g., the Son of Man).

But, I will concede that the text could be read in the
way that you suggest. I just do not think that is a
likely reading when one considers all of the relevant
exegetical factors, however.

Best regards,
Edgar

More on hARPAGMOS (Philippians 2:6-7)

The following is taken from my book Christology and the Trinity:

To attribute a passive sense to harpagmos appears to be unwarranted. Exploring this issue further before coming to any definite conclusions, however, we will note the exegesis of Moises Silva:

The ambiguous phrase in v. 6, [ouch harpagmon hegesato], has created a literature far more extensive than it probably deserves. In particular, one is impressed by the futility of trying to reach a decision regarding Jesus' preexistence and deity on the basis of whether harpagmon has an active meaning or a passive meaning . . . if one opts for the passive idea, is the nuance positive ("windfall, advantage") or negative ("booty, prize")? Further, if it carries a negative nuance, we must decide whether it speaks of a thing already possessed, which one is tempted to hold on to . . . or a thing not possessed, which one may be tempted to snatch. (Silva 117)

In the end, Silva concludes that a sense of retaining may be the most likely meaning of harpagmos in Philippians 2:6ff. But he is forced to admit that such a conclusion is uncertain and not central to the "hymn" of Philippians 2:6-11 (117). Furthermore, he adds that the few instances of harpagmos outside of Christian literature are all active and not passive (as is the case with harpagma). Consulting Abbott-Smith also reveals that "there is certainly a presumption in favour of the active meaning here" since the apostle does not use the LXX form harpagma. Paul thus speaks of an act of seizing: not a thing seized or a prize (A-S 60).

Though being a firm advocate of Trinitarianism, Greek Professor Daniel B. Wallace also openly admits that while it may be theologically "attractive" to construe harpagmos as having a passive sense (in Phil. 2:6), "it is not satisfactory" (Wallace 634). Wallace convincingly demonstrates that we must interpret the verse in the light of the phrase heauton ekenosen. He concludes that the only translation harmonious with Philippians 2:7 is "a thing to be grasped" (an active meaning for harpagmos). We can thus see that an objective look at the usage of harpagmos in the NT leads one to conclude that harpagmos in Phil 2:6 evidently carries the active meaning of snatching (i.e., a usurpation). This apostolic passage therefore appears to be affirming the fact that Jesus did not aspire to equality with God. To the contrary, completely antithetical to the first Adam, the one who existed en morphe theou contentedly subjected himself to his Father in heaven: "What Christ emptied himself of was his right to be served, his privileged position as the Son of God, and his visible glory [morphe] by taking the form of a slave" (Wannamaker 188).

Notes on Philippians 2:6-7 (MORFH, Participles, etc)

From the first century, the evidence is overwhelming that μορφή denoted the outward shape or form of an entity. LSJ (a Classical Greek resource) provides examples of how μορφή meant "shape" or "form" in Homer and Plato. Homer uses the word to signify "beauty, grace" (Cunliffe), and even in Aristotle, we may find the meaning "form or shape."

Richard R. Melick Jr (NA Commentary on Philippians, Colossians and Philemon) points out that ὑπάρχω once meant "to exist originally." However, the term later came to signify "really exist" (102). BDAG contains pretty much the same information. It just adds that ὑπάρχω eventually became a "widely used substitute" for εἶναι in Hellenistic Greek "[with] a predicate noun." Moreover, ὑπάρχω occurs quite frequently "in the [participle with] a predicate noun."

I would say that ἁρπαγμὸν carries an active sense in Philippians: better to understand it as "grasping" or "snatching." But see BDAG under ἁρπαγμός and ὑπάρχω.

Keep in mind that words change in time. So while etymologically, ὑπάρχω may have (at one time) meant "under beginning," it eventually came to denote "existence."

I might just add that there is a debate in Biblical scholarship over whether ἁρπαγμός/ἁρπαγμὸν is passive or active (RES RAPTA vs. RES RAPIENDA) in Philippians. If it is active, it would probably imply grasping after that which one does not already possess. The word may also imply a violent seizure (as in a robbery) though it does not necessarily refer to the act of robbery at all times.

(1) Remember that ὑπάρχων is probably a concessive participle in 2:6. So you might render it as "although he was existing" or something to that effect.

(2) ὑπάρχω, by NT times, does not simply refer to a beginning or coming to be.

(3) Although μορφή is anarthous, I would be inclined to definitize "external appearance" since there is only one form of God.

(4) The phrase "taking by force an equality with God" might also be a little awkward. Maybe you should construe ἁρπαγμὸν as a direct object (i.e., he did not consider "a seizure" or "snatching").

See http://www.thegoodbookblog.com/2012/sep/11/in-the-form-of-god-phil-26/

The phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ presents the first crux in our passage. Μορφή (here dat. sg. fem.) is best trs. “form” (most EVV; BDAG 659c). The NIV’s “in very nature God” (“truly God” [CEV]; “God” [NLT]; “possessed of the very nature of God” [H-M 114]) constitutes an interpretation that is neither well supported by the usage of the term in HGk. nor particularly suitable to the surrounding context. Although the term can be used substantially (Plato Phaed. 103e; Resp. 381c; Aristotle Met. 11.1060b; Phys. 2.1.193b; Plut. Quaest. plat. 1003b; Def. orac. 429a; Philo Spec. 1.327–28), there is no semantic component in μορφή that necessarily involves a corresponding “nature” (NIV) or ontology (pace Fee 204; H-M 114). The great majority of instances where μορφή and its cognates occur in HGk. mean simply “outward appearance” (Dan Fabricatore, Form of God, Form of a Servant: An Examination of the Greek Noun μορφή in Philippians 2:6-7 [University Press of America, 2009]; “form, outward appearance, shape” [BDAG 659c]; that “which may be perceived by the senses” [J. Behm, TDNT 4:745-46]).

The comments from the linked blog have been written by J. Hellerman.

Tertullian's Use of the Latin Term "Substantia"

(1) Aristotle makes a distinction between PRIMA SUBSTANTIA and SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA. Think of the former as an individual substance (i.e. a dog, cat or lamb) and the latter as a reference to an essential classification of being (i.e. essences). However, as Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz point out in The Divine Attributes (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pages 23-24, it is probably more accurate to think of Aristotle's developed theory of SUBSTANTIA as a delineation of form and matter.

(2) Tertullian's use of SUBSTANTIA in Adversus Praxean is fraught with many conceptual difficulties. Harnack proposed juristic definitions for SUBSTANTIA and PERSONA that have pretty much been rejected by modern scholars. One of the best studies I consulted for my M.Th. thesis was George Stead's "Divine Substance in Tertullian," JTS N.S. 14 (1963): 44-66. Another writer who addresses Tertullian's use of SUBSTANTIA is Eric Osborn. See Tertullian: First Great Theologian of the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). In my thesis, I argued (based on Tertullian's De Anima 32) that the apologist utilizes SUBSTANTIA vis-a-vis the Godhead to mean "a concrete particular." That is to say, Tertullian is primarily conscripting the Stoic notion of SUBSTANTIA, as opposed to the Aristotelian concept of PRIMA or SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA. Stuart G. Hall writes that Tertullian uses "substance" (in the context of Adversus Praxean) to mean "a being." See his study Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992).

My thesis later became the book Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian's Adversus Praxean. I hope that it contributes to an understanding of Tertullian's use of substantia, among other things.

The NIV Rendering of Luke 18:14

Luke 18:14 (NIV) reads: "I tell you that this man, rather than the other, went home justified before God" rather than the wording "justified by God."

But knowledge of the NIV's theological orientation suggests that the NIV is not trying to say the tax collector was proved righteous by his actions. With all due respect, I believe that the NIV is trying to convey the idea that God (as the implicit agent of the verb DEDIKAIWMENOS) justified the tax collector. I also checked my commentary on Luke written by Alfred Plummer and he writes concerning the Greek wording KATEBH hOUTOS DEDIKAIWMENOS: " 'This despised man went down justified in the sight of God,' i.e. 'accounted as righteous, accepted'" (see p. 419).

Studying this verse has also helped me to understand what the NWT is doing in Luke 18:14: it is treating DEDIKAIWMENOS as a passive used reflexively whereas other translations appear to be treating it as a passive simpliciter. The comparison of the passage in Luke with Genesis 44:16 and Revelation 22:11 is interesting. The KJV and the NWT both render Genesis 44:16 in a way that suggests the brothers of Joseph want to know how they might justify themselves or prove themselves righteous. But see BDAG for Genesis 44:16 and Luke 18:14.

I have no real problem with the NWT rendering. However, it helps to review translational possibilities for this verse.

Translating Greek (2 Corinthians 3:16-17)

There is hardly one way that a text must be understood in Greek. There are usually numerous options given to one who translates ancient Greek. For example, A.T. Robertson (in his big grammar) argues that both substantives (κύριος and πνεῦμα) in 2 Cor 3:17 are definite and interchangeable. He bases his remarks on the fact that the subject and predicate in this passage both have the definite article. However, as Maximilian Zerwick says concerning the way he understands 2 Cor 3:17, that is only one interpretation of this construction.

Zerwick thinks that both articles in 2 Cor 3:17 are anaphorical, speaking of that which precedes rather than what follows. Therefore, he views ὁ δὲ κύριος as continuing the thought expressed in 2 Cor 3:16, whereas τὸ πνεῦμά references the spirit mentioned in the preceding context. But he notes that this is one way of many to interpret the Bible verse. See section 169 of Zerwick's Biblical Greek.

Petr Pokorny on Colossians 1:16

"This is a confession-like formula that describes in good Jewish fashion the one God as the only creator, but who, from the Christian perspective, created everything through Jesus Christ. The purpose of the accumulation of prepositions, which is elsewhere documented as a linguistic phenomenon accompanying Stoic pantheism, is to emphasize creation's total dependence upon the creator, whose purpose Jesus Christ represents. Since God the Father is the initiator of creation, the preposition 'from' is not used here. Otherwise it is difficult to distinguish the functions of the various prepositions from one another. They, as a whole, are to have a cumulative effect. 'In' (instrumental EN) and 'through' mean almost the same thing; only the phrase 'for him' is capable of pointing to the eschatological goal of creation (cf. Rom. 11:36)."

See Pokorny, Colossians: A Commentary. Trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), p. 78-79.

Questions on the Gospel of John

A reader poses these questions. If anyone can provide some helpful input, it would be appreciated. I'll try to do the same. She writes:

Can anyone answer these questions for me please. Thanks

What was it that Jesus had said or done that caused the Pharisees to say that He was claiming to be God in John 10:33?

What was it about what Jesus said in John 8:58 that caused the Pharisees to want to kill Him?

From the New World Translation perspective, what is it about saying, "I have been" (John 8:58) that would motivate the Jews to want to kill Jesus?

Do we see any prior account of anyone in the Bible being killed for claiming to pre-exist if Jesus was merely claiming pre-existence?

Could you please explain what it was the Pharisees misunderstood and what they were misunderstanding to cause them to say what they did about Jesus' claim?

Jane
sorry for choosing anon but i do have a facebook account

DIA in Colossians 1:15-17 Rather Than hUPO

One of my favorite books is Emil Brunner's Dogmatics (Volume I) entitled "The Christian Doctrine of God."
On page 308 of his work, Brunner writes concerning Colossians 1:15-17:

"In this connexion the truth which we have already seen acquires new significance, that the world, it is true, was created THROUGH--DIA--the Son, but not BY--hUPO--the Son, that it has been created IN Him and UNTO Him, but that He Himself is never called the Creator. It has pleased God the Creator to create the world in the Son, through the Son, and unto the Son. The fact that between the Creator and the Creation there stands the Mediator of creation means that the world is an act of the freedom of God, that it does not proceed from the Logos."

While Brunner thinks that the Son of God is "eternal," he does not reason that Christ is ever called "Creator" in Scripture. He argues that the LOGOS is the mediate agent of creation or the one through whom God brings forth the KOSMOS. But the Son is never referred to as Creator in Scripture. Furthermore, not only does the apostle Paul describe the role of the LOGOS in passive verbal terms at Col 1:15-17--he does not employ hUPO to delineate the LOGOS' office vis-à-vis creation.

Brunner insists the Greek preposition hUPO demonstrates that Christ is not being identified as the Creator in Col 1:15-17. I concur with his assessment and suggest that a comprehensive study of Greek literature will support this specific point. If Paul had wanted to identify Jesus as the Creator in Col 1:15-17, it seems that he would have employed hUPO instead of DIA.

Kermit Titrud on the Granville Sharp Rule

Hi everyone,

Based on Rev. 2:8, Kermit Titrud offers the following "modification" to the
Granville Sharp rule:

"If two substantives are connected by KAI and both have an article, they refer to two different persons or things unless the immediate or even broader context strongly suggests that they refer to the same person or thing [Rev. 2:8; 2:26]. In this case, we are to understand that different aspects of that which is being described are being stressed. If the first substantive has an article and the second does not, the second refers to the same person or thing as the first unless the context suggests otherwise. In this case, we should understand that they are being considered as a unit in some sense. (This could also be applied to a series of three or more.)" (Titrud's article is found in D.A. Black's (Ed.) Linguistics and NT Interpretation pp. 249-250).

Although he modifies Sharp's rule thus, Titrud still believes that 2 Pet. 1:1 identifies Jesus as God (even though the context suggests otherwise!). Interesting indeed.

Best regards,

Edgar

Was Justin Martyr in Ephesus?

Greetings,

Some have wondered whether Justin Martyr was ever in
Ephesus. Testimony concerning this matter is given by
Eusebius of Caesarea in his Ecclesiastical History 4.18.6:

"He [Justin] composed also a dialogue against the
Jews, which he held in the city of Ephesus with
Trypho, a most distinguished man among the Hebrews of
that day. In it he shows how the divine grace urged
him on to the doctrine of the faith, and with what
earnestness he had formerly pursued philosophical
studies, and how ardent a search he had made for the
truth."

Was Clement of Rome a Trinitarian?

An Interlocutor once wrote:

'Saint Clement of Rome and his Letter to the
Corinthians [c. 80-96 AD]: “The Apostles received
the Gospel for us from the Lord Jesus Christ; and
Jesus Christ was sent from God…they went forth in
the complete assurance of the Holy Spirit…Do we not
have one God, one Christ, and one Holy Spirit poured
out upon us?...For as God lives, and as the Lord Jesus
Christ lives, and the Holy Spirit…”. Clearly, in
the mind of Clement there is a firm conviction of the
distinction of Persons, and yet the interrelatedness
of each of these 3 Persons'

My Reply:

One thing that is "clear" from reading this electronic
submission is that the person who wrote this piece
allows his/her biases to shine forth distinctly. The
comments from Clement of Rome do not demonstrate his
belief in a triune or tripersonal God. Granted, he may
refer to God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. But mere
mention of these ascriptive designata does not prove
that Clement is a trinitarian qua trinitarian.
Moreover, notice that he speaks of "God," Christ and
the Holy Spirit. He does not use language such as God
the Son or God the Holy Spirit. For Clement of Rome,
the Father is the one true God (i.e. the maximally
excellent being).

JND Kelly analyzes a number of early church writers to
ascertain their perspectives on the divine triad in
his magisterial _Early Christian Doctrines_.
Concerning Clement of Rome, Kelly notes that "little
can be gleaned from the first" of the Apostolic
Fathers (page 90). Then, after he alludes to a few
passages found in Clement's work, he writes: "The Holy
Spirit Clement regarded as inspiring God's prophets in
all ages, as much the Old Testament writers as
himself. But of the problem of the relation of the
Three to each other he seems to have been oblivious"
(page 91). Hence, according to this authority, Clement
is not concerned with how the Three Persons relate one
to another. Little pertaining to the Trinity can be
gleaned from his work.

While Edmund Fortman thinks the divinity of Christ and
the Holy Spirit are "implied" in Clemens Romanus and
that there is a "clear trace of trinitarian belief" in
1 Clement, he concludes nonetheless:

"There is, however, no stress on the three. The stress
is on Christ, and only rarely are the three mentioned
together. There is obviously no doctrine of the
Trinity, no explicit affirmation of the divinity of
the Son and Holy Spirit but only an echo of the data
of Scripture" (_The Triune God_, page 38).

Notice that neither Christ nor the Holy Spirit are
called QEOS by Clement. Rather, the relationship
between God and His Son is delineated thus:

1 Clement 42:1:

"The Apostles received the Gospel for us from the Lord
Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent forth from God."

1 Clement 42:2:

"So then Christ is from God, and the Apostles are from
Christ. Both therefore came of the will of God in the
appointed order."

How Long Was Christ in the Tomb?

The following quote is taken from Albert A. Bell Jr.'s
Exploring the New Testament World (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), p. 13-14:

"Herbert W. Armstrong, founder of the Worldwide Church
of God and Ambassador College and publisher of the
Plain Truth magazine, argued that Jesus could not have
been crucified on Friday and resurrected on Sunday
because three days won't fit between Friday and
Sunday. Any grade-school child can see that his
arithmetic makes sense. Given the way we count, from
Friday afternoon to Sunday morning is a day and a
half, at most. But not if you count like Jesus and the
Romans did. They lacked a zero in their mathematical
systems: the zero was not used as a numeral until the
early seventh century A.D., by an Indian mathematician
named Brahmagupta (cf. 1.85:69-72). Without a zero,
the Jews and Romans counted the day on which something
occurred as the first day. In Luke 13:32, Jesus counts
in exactly this fashion: 'Listen, I am casting out
demons and performing cures today and tomorrow, and on
the third day I finish my work.' Furthermore,
a portion of a day was counted as a whole day.
So, if Jesus spent any part of a day in the
tomb, it would count as a full day. He was placed in
the tomb before sunset on Friday, and the day began on
sunset. Thus, by the counting system in use in New
Testament times, Friday was the first day, Saturday
the second, and Sunday--which began at sundown on
Saturday--was the third, no matter how small a part of
each day Jesus was in the tomb."

Regards,
Edgar

Pauline PERIODOI

Hi everyone,

The long sentences that sometime appear in the Apostle Paul's letters is one reason that I am led to believe that he intentionally employs rhetorical devices in his theopneustic missives. For instance, long "sentences" in Greek are called PERIODOI. Rhetoricians and orators use them liberally in Classical treatises. Aristotle also provides explicit details on PERIODOI in his famed work, _Rhetoric_.

Richard A. Lanham (_A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms_, pages 112-113) discusses Classical and Renaissance views on periodic sentences. He notes that there are two kinds of periodic sentences (per Quintilian), namely, structured and unstructured types. We usually find PERIODOI that are more loosely structured in dialogues and letters. This could well explain why Paul's epistles often contain protracted SENTENTIAE.

According to Aristotle, PERIODOI must contain whole thoughts and avoid being too short or too long. The usual parts of a PERIOD are called COLA. That is because the colon is the basic constituent of a PERIOD. Lanham has much to say about the PERIOD that is of interest. I particularly like Cicero's remark that a PERIOD must not be longer than "four iambic trimeters." I'm sure that you poetry buffs will immediately apprehend the gist of Tully's thought.

Finally, the reason for a PERIOD is to suspend syntax. In other words, a reader doesn't know the writer's complete thought until he/she arrives at the end of the PERIOD.

A Little More on Michael the Archangel

"Not only did several of the references to angels in the Shepherd evidently mean the preexistent Christ, but Christ was also identified with the archangel Michael, 'who has the power over this people and is their captain. For this is he that puts the law into the hearts of believers'" (Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:183).

Pelikan is quoting from Similitudes 8.3.3.

"The counterpart to this is afforded by an identification of Christ with the archangel Michael, an identification which is made in the Shepherd of Hermas, if not in a wholly consistent manner (Martin Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma, 135).

"In a number of passages we read of an angel who is superior to the six angels forming God's inner council, and who is regularly described as 'most venerable', 'holy', and 'glorious'. This angel is given the name of Michael, and the conclusion is difficult to escape that Hermas saw in him the Son of God and equated him with the archangel Michael . . . There is evidence also, as we observed in the preceding paragraph, of attempts to interpret Christ as a sort of supreme angel; here the influence of Jewish angelology is discernible" (J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 95).

Cardinal Jean Danielou on the Identification of Michael in the Shepherd

The late Cardinal Jean Danielou was known as one of the foremost authorities on the ante-Nicene fathers. His landmark study of Greek, Jewish and Latin Christianity--while being justly criticized in some respects--is well worth the read. It is from his work on Jewish Christianity that I will now quote.

Discussing the Shepherd of Hermas, Danielou points out that this early Christian work plainly identifies Michael the archangel with the LOGOS. He writes:

"A characteristic feature of the theology of _Hermas_ is to call the Word 'glorious (ENDOXOS) angel' or 'most venerable (SEMNOTATOS) angel.' He distinguishes very clearly the angel who visits him, whom he calls variously 'shepherd' and 'angel of repentance' from the supreme being, whom he also calls an angel, but who is quite different from the other since it is he who sends that other" (Danielou 119).

Danielou here hints at the fact that the LOGOS is identified with Michael in Hermas although angel, according to the late Cardinal, in this case evidently means one who bears the very substance of God. Regardless of whether Danielou is correct here, the main point I am concerned with is what he has to say about Michael.

Quoting from the Fifth Similitude of Hermas, Danielou informs us that "the holy angel and the Kyrios are placed on the same footing" (Danielou 119). This conclusion seems warranted by Similitude 5.4.4 which reads in part:

"thou who hast been strengthened by the holy one (hAGIOS) angel, and hast received from him such powers of intercession . . . wherefore dost thou not ask understanding of the Lord? (KURIOS)."

Another part of Hermas that also points to Christ as Michael is Similitudes 8.2:1-3:

"the angel of the Lord commanded crowns to be brought, made as it were of palm-branches; and he crowned the men that had given up rods which had shoots and some fruit, and sent them away into the tower. And the others also he sent into the tower, even those who had given up rods green and with shoots, but the shoots were without fruit; and he set a seal (SFRAGIS) upon them. And all they that went into the tower had the same raiment, white as snow."

See also Similitudes 9.12.

From both the eighth and ninth Similitude, Danielou views Michael as being synonymous with the LOGOS in Hermas. The relevant passages from his book are as follows:

"The designation of Christ as the seventh day may be compared to another, which comes in Hermas, in which Christ is identified with the archangel Michael" (Danielou, 123).

"The comparison of the two texts [Similitudes 78.1 and 8.3.3.] shows
that it is really the Word who is called Michael" (124).

"Paul contrasts with this [the promulgation of the OT by angels] the new Law communicated by the Word himself (Gal. 3:20; Heb. 2:3). In Hermas this function is performed by Michael. This name must therefore be regarded as a name of the Word" (124).

"The assimilation of Michael to the Word is not, however, peculiar to Hermas. It occurs in other Jewish Christian texts which show up still more clearly the unskillful christianisation of the Jewish theme" (124).

The aforementioned quotes do not mean that Danielou rejects the Trinity doctrine. My point is simply that he supplies evidence that at least some early professed Christians regarded the LOGOS as Michael the archangel.

These quotes were taken from A History of Early Christian Doctrine: The Theology of Jewish Christianity (Jean Danielou).

Regards,

Edgar

Michael the Archangel as Christ?

The information below was once submitted to a yahoogroup that I used to moderate which is now inactive. I have changed the names of those who participated in this discussion; however, I have not edited the material itself.

To help you appreciate the context, a question had been asked regarding Michael's possible identity with Christ.

[BEGIN DIALOGUE]

Quadratus said:

Aurelius, I'd like to take your second question. I don't know of anyone who
says that the Bible EXPLICITLY calls the Christ, Michael.

However, I believe that there are a number of lines of evidence that point
to this conclusion. Here is one.

1) The Resurrection: ONLY ONE VOICE CAN COMMAND THE DEAD TO RISE

a) There is only ONE VOICE that can raise the dead in the coming
resurrection. This authority has been given to the Christ by
his Father. (John 5:25-28).

b) It is the VOICE of an ARCHANGEL that raises the dead during
the unique SINGULAR act of the resurrection at the time of
the end. (1Th 4:16; cf Da 12:2 ).

c) Since the archangel shares the unique characteristic that only
Christ posesses, the authority to raise the dead with his voice,
Christ is an archangel.

Vine's Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words -- Topic:
Archangel says regarding the character of the Lord Jesus' voice

"In 1 Thess. 4:16 the meaning seems to be that the voice of the
Lord Jesus will be of the character of an 'archangelic' shout."

1Th 4:16 NWT
"because the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a
commanding call, with an archangel's voice and with God's
trumpet, and those who are dead in union with Christ will
rise first."

Vines assigns the voice of Jesus with the character of
the archangel, because the grammar demands it.

Thayers calls the voice that raises the dead at John 5:28 "the
Resurrection-Cry" and "Christ's voice that raises the dead" at
1Th 4:16 as "an awakening shout". The Greek for 'with an archangel's voice'
is literally 'EN FWNHi ARXAGGELOU', in the oblique dative case.

In all other occurences of this idiom in the Greek New Testament it
describes the voice of the subject in the clause.

TO ATTRIBUTE THE VOICE OF A LESSER BEING TO CHRIST WOULD NOT HONOR HIM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
It is only logical that the voice expressing this commanding call be
described by a word that would not diminish or detract from the great
authority that Christ Jesus now has as King of kings and Lord of
lords. (Mt 28:18; Re 17:14). If the designation "archangel" applied,
not to Jesus Christ, but to other angels, then the reference to "an
archangel's voice" would be describing a voice of lesser authority
than that of the Son of God.

Protestant Reformer JOHN CALVIN said regarding "Michael" in its occurence at
Daniel 12:1:

"I embrace the opinion of those who refer this to the person of
Christ, because it suits the subject best to represent him as
standing forward for the defense of his elect people." J. Calvin,
COMMENTARIES ON THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET DANIEL, trans. T. Myers
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979), vol. 2 p. 369.


John A. Lees, The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, 1930, Vol. 3,
page 2048 states:

"The earlier Protestant scholars usually identified Michael
with the preincarnate Christ, finding support for their view,
not only in the juxtaposition of the "child" and the archangel
in Rev 12, but also in the attributes ascribed to him in Dnl"

John Sanders Remarks Upon the Putative Divine Use of Evil

This excerpt is taken from John Sanders' book, The God Who Risks:

"After my conversion some Christians informed me that my brother's death was ordained for the purpose of bringing me to faith in Christ. What? God killed my non-Christian brother so that I would become a Christian? But without middle knowledge God could not have known that this would happen. This would mean that God kills people and causes disasters in the hope that some may repent and confess Christ. However, the model of general sovereignty does not allow for each and every such evil to be explained this way, since God is only responsible for the structures within which we operate and for those specific acts in history God elects to do" (page 262).

Sanders explains "middle knowledge" on pp. 196-198 of his study. In short, middle knowledge in this context has reference to the divine awareness of all "counterfactuals of creaturely freedom" which means that, according to this theory, God knows what would happen in the world He chose to create if possible world W1 obtained. A possible world may denote a counterfactual situation. Sanders illustrates this somewhat abstruse notion with a concrete example about requesting a child to do some necessary chore around the house.

If anyone here has ever asked a son or daughter to take out the trash or wash the car, he/she can pretty much understand how different conditions (X, Y, Z) influence a child's willingness to do A (i.e., a certain action). Furthermore, most of us are aware of the fact that if S (a particular rational subject or moral agent) had been raised in a developed country instead of a developing land, then S might have performed A instead of ~A. But we could not infallibly guarantee that A would be performed instead of ~A. Nonetheless, the "counterfactuals of creaturely freedom" notion indicates that if S were in possible world (counterfactual situation) W1, then God knows what S would freely do.

Luis de Molina (advocate of middle knowledge) writes that middle knowledge is that

"by which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, He [God] saw in His own essence what each such will would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things--even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite" (On Divine Knowledge, Part IV of the Concordia).

What are some possible criticisms of middle knowledge?

Lactantius on the Worship of God (DI 5.8)

"But if God only were worshipped, there would not be
dissensions and wars, since men would know that they
are the sons of one God; and, therefore, among those
who were connected by the sacred and inviolable bond
of divine relationship, there would be no plottings,
inasmuch as they would know what kind of punishments
God prepared for the destroyers of souls, who sees
through secret crimes, and even the very thoughts
themselves. There would be no frauds or plunderings if
they had learned, through the instruction of God, to
be content with that which was their own, though
little, so that they might prefer solid and eternal
things to those which are frail and perishable. There
would be no adulteries, and debaucheries, and
prostitution of women, if it were known to all, that
whatever is sought beyond the desire of procreation is
condemned by God" (Divinae institutiones 5.8).

Must Evil Exist In Order That We Might Experience The Good?

I once wrote the following to a colleague and friend:

Undergrads often claim that evil must obtain in order
for good to exist. However, I'd like to run this less than
wholly ruminated thought by you to get some feedback:

Let us imagine that there is a possible world in which
the only existent is God. God, according to the
Judeo-Christian tradition, is wholly good: evil is
neither coextensive nor coterminous with God (please
overlook the issue of temporality vis-a-vis God for
now). In this possible world, it seems that one could
say good exists in this case. But would evil obtain in a
possible world wherein God is the only (possible)
existent? In what way could evil exist (i.e. obtain)
in such a possible world? If only good obtained in
this world and evil did not obtain, would it not be
true to say that good could exist without the
concomitant existence of evil? If what I am proposing
is logically possible, then it is not necessarily true
(maybe even untrue) that one needs evil in order for
good to exist.

Avo,
Edgar Foster

Justin Martyr on the Causative Force behind the Virgin Birth

Greetings,

What caused the Virgin to conceive and give birth to Jesus of Nazareth? How was a woman "not knowing any man" able to have a child? Here is Justin Martyr's reasoning on the matter:

"But lest some, not understanding the prophecy now
cited [Isa 7:14], should charge us with the very
things we have been laying to the charge of the poets
who say that Jupiter went in to women through lust,
let us try to explain the words. This, then, 'Behold,
a virgin shall conceive,' signifies that a virgin
should conceive without intercourse. For if she had
had intercourse with any one whatever, she was no
longer a virgin; but the power of God having come upon
the virgin, overshadowed her, and caused her while yet
a virgin to conceive. And the angel of God who was
sent to the same virgin at that time brought her good
news, saying, 'Behold, thou shalt conceive of the Holy
Ghost, and shalt bear a Son, and He shall be called
the Son of the Highest, and thou shalt call His name
Jesus; for He shall save His people from their
sins,'--as they who have recorded all that concerns
our Saviour Jesus Christ have taught, whom we
believed, since by Isaiah also, whom we have now
adduced, the Spirit of prophecy declared that He
should be born as we intimated before. It is wrong,
therefore, to understand the Spirit and the power of
God as anything else than the Word, who is also the
first-born of God, as the foresaid prophet Moses
declared; and it was this which, when it came upon the
virgin and overshadowed her, caused her to conceive,
not by intercourse, but by power" (1 Apology 33).

"But who, through the power of the Word, according to
the will of God the Father and Lord of all, He was
born of a virgin as a man, and was named Jesus, and
was crucified, and died, and rose again, and ascended
into heaven, an intelligent man will be able to
comprehend from what has been already so largely said"
(1 Apology 46).

Interesting Thought From Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles 1.8)

I don't necessarily agree with Aquinas here, but I find his remarks noteworthy:

Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith

"THE things of sense, from whence human reason takes its beginning of knowledge, retain in themselves some trace of imitation of God, inasmuch as they are, and are good; yet so imperfect is this trace that it proves wholly insufficient to declare the substance of God Himself. Since every agent acts to the producing of its own likeness, effects in their several ways bear some likeness to their causes: nevertheless the effect does not always attain to the perfect likeness of the agent that produces it. In regard then to knowledge of the truth of faith, which can only be thoroughly known to those who behold the substance of God, human reason stands so conditioned as to be able to argue some true likenesses to it: which likenesses however are not sufficient for any sort of demonstrative or intuitive comprehension of the aforesaid truth. Still it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasonings, however feeble, provided there be no presumptuous hope of perfect comprehension or demonstration. With this view the authority of Hilary agrees, who says (De Trinitate, ii, 10), speaking of such truth : 'In this belief start, run, persist; and though I know that you will not reach the goal, still I shall congratulate you as I see you making progress. But intrude not into that sanctuary, and plunge not into the mystery of infinite truth; entertain no presumptuous hope of comprehending the height of intelligence, but understand that it is incomprehensible.'"

See http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc1_8.htm

Granville Sharp Rule and Maximus of Tyre's Dissertatio 2.10

I once posted this question to an electronic Greek forum with little response. If anyone has some input on this question, I'd love to hear it:

Speaking of Granville Sharp's Rule, I came across a passage in

Maximus of Tyre (Dissertatio 2.10) and I wonder whether it has any relevance to the issues involving the rule:

hO MEN GAR QEOS, hO TWN ONTWN PATHR KAI DHMIOURGOS, [hO] PRESBUTEROS MEN hHLIOU . . .

Of course, Maximus is extracting concepts from Timaeus

28C: TON MEN OUN POIHTHN KAI PATERA TOUS hEUREIN. . .

Plato seems to have one entity in mind, although Numenius of Apamea interprets Timaeus 28C as a reference to a transcendent Father along with a separate Demiurge. But it seems more likely that one entity is meant in the passage written by Maximus and the one composed by Plato. What do you think?

Best regards,

Edgar Foster

Early Remarks on the "Last Days" (Patristics)

"Accordingly, therefore, prophesying concerning the
temple, He said: 'See ye these buildings? Verily I say
to you, There shall not be left here one stone upon
another which shall not be taken away; and this
generation shall not pass until the destruction begin.
For they shall come, and shall sit here, and shall
besiege it, and shall slay your children here.' And in
like manner He spoke in plain words the things that
were straightway to happen, which we can now see with
our eyes, in order that the accomplishment might be
among those to whom the word was spoken. For the
Prophet of truth utters the word of proof in order to
the faith of His hearers" (Clementine Homily 3.15).

"'But immediately after the affliction of those days
the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give
her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and
the powers of heaven shall be moved: and then shall
appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven: and all
the tribes of the earth shall lament, and shall see
the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with
great power and glory. And He shall send His angels
with a great trumpet, and they shall gather together
His elect from the four winds, from the heights of
heaven, even into the farthest bounds thereof.' And
these are not new or sudden things which are now
happening to Christians; since the good and righteous,
and those who are devoted to God in the law of
innocence and the fear of true religion, advance
always through afflictions, and wrongs, and the severe
and manifold penalties of troubles, in the hardship of
a narrow path" (Cyprian, Treatise 11.11).

"For in the last days false prophets and corrupters
shall be multiplied, and the sheep shall be turned
into wolves, and love shall be turned into hate; for
when lawlessness increaseth, they shall hate and
persecute and betray one another, and then shall
appear the world-deceiver as Son of God, and shall do
signs and wonders, and the earth shall be delivered
into his hands, and he shall do iniquitous things
which have never yet come to pass since the beginning.
Then shall the creation of men come into the fire of
trial, and many shall be made to stumble and shall
perish; but they that endure in their faith shall be
saved from under the curse itself. And then shall
appear the signs of the truth; first, the sign of an
out-spreading in heaven; then the sign of the sound of
the trumpet; and the third, the resurrection of the
dead; yet not of all, but as it is said: The Lord
shall come and all His saints with Him. Then shall the
world see the Lord coming upon the clouds of heaven"
(Didache 16).

"But as the conquering power of things evil is on the
increase-which is the characteristic of the last times
-things good are now not allowed either to be born, so
corrupted are the seminal principles; or to be
trained, so deserted are studies; nor to be enforced,
so dined are the laws" (Tertullian, On Modesty 1).

Paulo F. M. Goncalves Critique of Thomas V. Morris' "Logic of God Incarnate"

Paulo F. M. Goncalves is lecturer in religious studies
at the University of Derby. His online essay is
entitled "A Critique of Thomas V. Morris's Use of
Natural Kind Terms in The Logic of God Incarnate."
This critique is nine pages long, including
endnotes. I'll try to state the gist of Goncalves'
analysis in a few pages.

Goncalves notes that his analysis of Morris' book is
not concerned with the "historical and theological
propriety" of the attempt to demonstrate the logical
coherence of the Incarnation. Instead of focusing on
such matters, he primarily concentrates on
critiquing Morris' use of natural kind terminology and
theory. In particular, he observes that Morris makes a
theoretical distinction between individual natures and
kind natures as well as a distinction between "common"
and "essential" properties found within a natural
kind.

The mention of natural kinds or "predicative
universals" calls to mind the debates on natural terms
contained in studies produced by Saul Kripke, Hilary
Putnam and W. V. O. Quine. Of course, Goncalves points
out that these thinkers all elaborate, "with extensive
qualification," what might be called a certain type of
nominalism. Conversely, Morris' view seems to be a
form of "conceptual realism." Goncalves thus provides
an overview of Morris' argument, distills the
aforesaid contentions and putatively clarifies Morris'
use of natural kind terms. He subsequently picks apart
Morris' view, concluding that Morris "does not
adequately deal with his relation to such recent
studies [those of Kripke and Putnam] and assumes a
conceptual realism on a fragile theoretical basis."
Goncalves ultimately charges Morris with incoherence
at crucial points and suggests that his methodology is
also "vulnerable." At this point, we will now review
one serious criticism that the lecturer in religious
studies makes concerning Morris' employment of natural
kind terms and theory. It involves Morris' theory of
human properties.

Detractors of the Incarnation doctrine contend that
the proposition:

(A) Jesus is God the Son

is incoherent and false a priori since this assertion
endeavors to unite two entities that are
seemingly, by definition, complementary
which can be defined as "mutually
exclusive." Morris criticizes this view, arguing that
while terms such as "bachelor," "doctor" or "lawyer"
are nominal kinds, "gold," "tiger," and "humanity" are
not. Instead, Morris thinks that the latter kinds are
natural terms. In other words, he seems to be
maintaining that the properties of
tigers or humans are necessary, but they are known a
posteriori. However, once the necessary properties of
a particular kind are known a posteriori, then certain
notional positions can be discounted a priori. But how does this
theoretical approach taken by Morris affect his construal of (A)?

Goncalves observes that Morris does not seem to be
that forthcoming vis-a-vis necessary a posteriori
properties of humanity. The latter does include "being conscious
at some time or another" as an indispensable property
of humanity. Nevertheless, Goncalves argues, it
quickly becomes clear that Morris is not willing to
let any properties that might possibly be "logical
complements of essential divine properties"
constitute his definition of what it means to be
human. Aside from this putative approach manifested in
Morris' book, Goncalves has another criticism that
pretty much sums up his objection to Morris' overall methodology.

How does one go about determining what is essential
with relation to human nature? What are the necessary
properties an entity must instantiate to be considered
essentially human? Goncalves argues that Morris
wrongly excludes certain properties that are commonly
associated with being human, to wit, properties that
serve as complements to the divine nature or qualities
that logically disallow a divine incarnation.

Morris avers that contingency, being created, being
non-eternal and finite with regard to knowledge and
power as well as being non-ubiquitous are not
complementary with respect to human nature. He claims that a
all such properties may characterize those entities that are
"merely human" but they are not necessary properties
that belong to one who is "fully human." Being "fully
human," according to Morris, involves assuming "a
human body and a human mind, no more and no less."
Jesus Christ, even though he subsists as God, can
simultaneously be fully human since human properties
that one would normally regard as complementary in
relation to divine properties are excluded based on
Morris' view of kind terms as they apply to humanity.

In conclusion, Goncalves finds Morris' use of natural
kind term theory problematic. Since the task of
relating individual objects to other members in a set
is fraught with seemingly insurmountable difficulties,
Goncalves wonders how Morris can develop a coherent
notion of the Incarnation. Goncalves indicates that
other strategies for rendering the doctrine of the
Incarnation coherent may possibly work. But Morris' use of
natural kind terms seems to miss the theoretical mark.

See http://www2.derby.ac.uk/multifaith-new/images/content/seminarpapers/ACritiqueofThomasV_Morris%27sUseofNaturalKindTermsinTheLogicofGodIncarnate.htm

Hebrews 1:1 (Brief Remarks)

Greek text (Hebrews 1:1): πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως πάλαι ὁ θεὸς λαλήσας τοῖς πατράσιν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις.

The passage has been rendered: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets" (KJV). The nominal phrase ὁ θεὸς is the grammatical subject. The alliterative construction πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως is "a familiar literary figure" whose matter-of-fact sense could be understood as "in many parts and in many ways" (F. F. Bruce, Hebrews, 44). Bruce also opts for the translation, "at various days and in many ways" which preserves the alliteration found in the original text. The fivefold use of the phoneme π principally accentuates the rhetorical nature of Hebrews 1:1. The overall effect of the construction found in the opening verse of the Epistle is to emphasize how ὁ θεὸς speaks to the forefathers of Israel: it is by means of or through the prophets (ἐν τοῖς προφήταις).

See Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1993), 91.

More on the Logical/Moral Consequences of Atheism

While introducing Dostoevsky's classic work Brothers Karamazov, Charles Guignon reasons that "if God does not exist [as Ivan Karamazov believes], then the picture of the universe formulated by mechanistic materialism must be true. But, in this case, given the point of view of modern science (what Ivan calls 'Euclidean reason'), the universe consists of nothing but meaningless material objects in causal interaction, effects follows cause according to the laws of physics, people are determined to do what they do, no one is guilty of anything, and so there are no such things as right or wrong, good or bad. Or, more precisely, the ideals of justice, goodness, benevolence, dignity, and so on turn out to be purely human inventions, the results of projecting our needs and wishes onto brute, meaningless matter, and so they are illusions lacking any basis in the order of things" (Dostoevsky: The Grand Inquisitor with Related Chapters from The Brothers Karamazov, page xxx).

Tertullian's Attitude Toward the Shepherd of Hermas

It seems that Tertullian (after he became a Montanist) did not like the work known as the Shepherd of Hermas because of his stance on repentance and adultery. Tertullian neither regarded the Shepherd as Scripture nor as law (LEX). He wrote:

"It [the Shepherd of Hermas] is a story, not a law" (De Orat XVI, 2). This comment shows that Tertullian did not view the Shepherd in the same light that he viewed Scripture, and his view of this work appears to have been correct in certain respects. (See Jean Danielou 3:153.)

I say, in certain respects, since the Shepherd is not a part of inspired Scripture and never was--yet Tertullian apparently had an unbalanced view of godly repentance. Moreover, I am not so sure he was right to believe that the Shepherd condones adultery. See Mandate 4 of the Shepherd.

Tertullian also writes in De Pudicitia X,12:

"These (pleas) you (will urge) to me, most benignant
interpreter of God. But I would yield my ground to
you, if the scripture of 'the Shepherd,' which is the
only one which favours adulterers, had deserved to
find a place in the Divine canon; if it had not been
habitually judged by every council of Churches (even
of your own) among apocryphal and false (writings);
itself adulterous, and hence a patroness of its
comrades; from which in other respects, too, you
derive initiation; to which, perchance, that Shepherd
will play the patron whom you depict upon your
(sacramental) chalice, (depict, I say, as) himself
withal a prostitutor of the Christian sacrament, (and
hence) worthily both the idol of drunkenness, and the
brize of adultery by which the chalice will quickly be
followed, (a chalice) from which you sip nothing more
readily than (the flavour of) the 'ewe' of (your)
second repentance!"

What makes this text so intriguing is that Tertullian writes about the "Divine canon" which implies that he already knew about some type of canon generally
accepted by most Christians in his day. Additionally, he indicates that "every council of Churches" decided not to view the Shepherd as canonical. While Danielou suggests that Tertullian's language is a wee bit strong, since not every church council (or early church) thought the Shepherd was false, they did not usually view it as Scripture either. Tertullian's words may indicate that claims about the biblical canon being formed in the forth century or later are a little exaggerated, to say the least. One also needs to distinguish between the word "canon" referring to a list of authoritative books and that same term which references the inspired books themselves.

Margaret Davies and the EGW EIMI Sayings in John's Gospel

Dear blog readers,

I would like to draw your attention to a scholarly work produced by Margaret Davies entitled Rhetoric and Reference in the Fourth Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992) which contains a discussion INTER ALIA concerning the Johannine EGW EIMI sayings. The section I have in mind runs from pp. 82-87. In these pages, Davies shows how the Wisdom writings have probably influenced the EGW EIMI pronouncements in John's Gospel, and she thinks the Johannine sayings should be read in the light of such texts as Prov. 8:12-21 and Sirach 24:3-31. The book also critiques R.E. Brown's treatment of the sayings and concludes that EGW EIMI (in Jn 8:58 and elsewhere in John) serves as a marker of self-identification. Davies' study assumes this position for a few reasons that I will briefly delineate.

(1) Davies argues that EGW EIMI in Jn. 13:19 identifies Jesus as the Messiah since it evidently refers back to Jn. 13:14 and 18, and I might add Jn. 13:13 where we read: "You address me, 'Teacher,' and, 'Lord,' and you speak rightly, for I am such."

Also:

"I am not talking about all of you; I know the one I have chosen. But it is in order that the Scripture might be fulfilled, 'He that used to feed on my bread has lifted up his heel against me.'" (Jn. 13:18)

The context of Jn 13:19 thus suggests that Jesus is identifying himself as Lord, Teacher, and Messiah--the one who was foretold in Ps. 41:9 among other places in the Tanakh.

(2) Davies thinks that Jn 8:58 refers back to Jn 8:12
and that Jesus is ultimately identifying himself as
the light of the world, that is, the promised seed of
Abraham by means of whom all nations of the earth will
be blessed (Gn 12:3; 22:18). However she notes that
other scholars (Lindars 1972) think that Jn 8:58
actually points back to 1:5, which deals with the
light that apparently was shining prior to Abraham, the
father of all those having faith. But at this point, Davies asks:

"Is Jesus' remark, 'Before Abraham was, I am he' a
reminder that he is the eternal LOGOS?" (Davies 86).
She thinks that this reading of Jn 8:58 "is neither an
obvious nor a necessary reading." (86). The scholar
accordingly rejects the Jn 8:58/1:5 connexion since if John
wanted to highlight a thematic nexus
between the two texts, he would have used the
imperfect tense of the verb 'to be' at Jn 8:58 and not
the present. Since John does employ the present in
8:58, however, "The use of the present tense, 'I am',
connects with its use in Jn 8:12" (86).

Conclusion

Davies contends that Jesus (in Jn 8:58) is
answering a question about time, but does so by
identifying himself as the seed of Abraham (the light
of the world). She writes: "We should conclude,
therefore, that the Johannine Jesus' use of the 'I am'
form draws on Wisdom declarations from its Scripture,
and does not assert Jesus' divinity" (Davies 87).

C.A. Wannamaker's Remarks Concerning Philippians 2:6ff

Hi everyone,

Just a short quote from C.A. Wannamaker's article on Phil. 2:6ff.

"In this passage Paul maintains that Christ's universal sovereignty derives
from the Father and that ultimately the Son shall be subject to the Father
when he returns his present sovereignty to God. The subordinationist
character of 1 Cor. 15:24-28 demonstrates quite clearly that Paul did not
believe in Christ's absolute equality with God" (Wannamaker 187-188).

Observations from Wannamaker's article are found in my Christology and Trinity book, which can be purchased on amazon.com. See the links on this blog to obtain further details.

Cf. C.A. Wannamaker (NT Stud. Vol. 33, 1987, pp. 179-193).

Take care,

Edgar Foster

Samuelsson's Description of Jesus' "Crucifixion"

See http://e-homoreligiosus.blogspot.com/2011/10/samuelsson-description-of-jesus.html

Just click on the title of this blog post.

A Copy of My CV (October 2011)

E-mail: edgar.foster@lr.edu

Curriculum Vitae

Education:

Ph.D. University of Glasgow (2003-2008) in Theology and Religious Studies.

Area of Specialization: Ecclesiastical History

Dissertation: Metaphor and Divine Paternity: The Concept of God's Fatherhood in the Divinae institutiones of Lactantius (250-325 CE).

Supervisor: Dr. Ian Hazlett

M.Th. University of Glasgow (2001-2002) in Theology and Religious Studies.

B.A. Lenoir-Rhyne College (1998 – 2001) in Classical Languages and Philosophy, graduated cum laude.

Awards Received:

Voigt Cromer Award for outstanding work in Classical Languages (2001).

Lenoir-Rhyne College President's Award for promoting intercultural understanding on campus (2001).

Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholar to the University of Glasgow (2001-2002).

One of only ten students nationally who attended the Summer Institute of Philosophy at Rutgers University (2000).

Claudia Kincaid Academic Achievement Award (1998).

Teaching Experience and Positions Held:

Catawba Valley Community College (2008-Present):

Adjunct Instructor

Courses taught: Old Testament and New Testament

Lenoir-Rhyne College (2006-Present)

Visiting Assistant Professor

Adjunct Assistant Professor

Courses Taught: Ethics, Philosophy of Human Nature, Medieval Philosophy, African-American Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind.

University of Glasgow/GOALS Program (2001-2003)

Worked as a Tutor (Teacher)

Taught critical thinking and essay writing skills to incoming university students. Presented historical surveys on influential ethical theories (existentialism, deontology and utilitarianism).

Conducted university seminars on ethics.

Delivered lectures on ethics to groups of more than 200 students.

Languages: Latin, Greek, and German (reading proficiency).

Publications: Introduction to Ethics. A packet used by the University of Glasgow's GOALS Program (2003).

Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian's Adversus Praxean. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

Metaphor and Divine Paternity: The Concept of God's Fatherhood in the Divinae institutiones of Lactantius (250-325 CE). Edwin Mellen Press (Forthcoming).

Book Review of Tom Christenson's book Questioning Assumptions (Forthcoming in Dialog Journal).

Conference Presentations

"Setting the Stage: Daniélou and Angelomorphic Christology," presented at the Burn in Edzell, Scotland on March 15-17, 2002.

"The Doctrine of God the Father in the Thought of Lactantius" (250-325 CE). University of Edinburgh ecclesiastical history conference in Perth, Scotland on February 22, 2003.

"Metaphors, Symbols, Analogies and God the Father," presented at Lenoir-Rhyne College, Center for Theology Colloquium, March 10, 2005.

References:

Dr. Larry Yoder
Lenoir-Rhyne University
School of History, Philosophy and Religion
P.O. Box 7349
Hickory, N. C. 28601

Dr. David Ratke
Lenoir-Rhyne University
School of History, Philosophy and Religion
P.O. Box 7210
Hickory, N. C. 28601

Dr. Ian Hazlett
Professor of Ecclesiastical History
School of Divinity
University of Glasgow
Glasgow G12 8QQ
Scotland U.K.
Tel. 44-141-330-4223
Email: I.Hazlett@arts.gla.ac.uk

Is the Moral Law Evidence for A Creator?

One line of evidence for a reality that transcends human existence and grounds morality is the moral law itself. Relativists deny the existence of moral absolutes. "There is no moral black and white," they say, "only shades of gray." However, the apostle Paul speaks of an inward law that governs Christians, Jews and pagans--believers and non-believers alike (Romans 2:14-16). This law is capable of accusing or excusing humans since it bears witness between their motives and thoughts. Frank Turek and Norman L. Geisler discuss this moral principle while making an observation that has not gone unnoticed by others:


"So the Moral Law is not always apparent from our actions, as evidenced by the terrible things human beings do to one another. But it is brightly revealed in our reactions--what we do when we personally are treated unfairly" (I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, page 175).


When someone steals from us or does not exercise justice in our case, it often shows that even moral relativists believe at least some absolutes exist. Assuming that some human acts either are objectively wrong or right, good or bad, evil or virtuous, it seems that the only way to ground absolute morals is to posit a supreme being who is a transcendent statute-giver.


Immanuel Kant argued that one must believe in God to ground morality; even Nietzsche conceded that if God is dead, there are no absolutes. It does, in fact, seem that morals cannot obtain without the existence of a divine being. The apostle Paul argues that even those who do not have law, do by nature the things of the law. What or who is responsible for the strong feelings of justice that humans time and again express? Has evolution brought it about that righteous indignation or grief are commonly displayed over agreed upon injustices or atrocities? Has the "blind watchmaker" of evolution caused humans to conduct themselves altruistically (i.e., selflessly, with no regard for one's own benefit) toward others or to universally oppose the heinous act of murder?


Maybe some individuals can bring themselves to accept such naturalistic explanations of morality. However, it seems that no natural immanent force could ever "cause" morals to obtain, much less bring it about that unselfishness or altruistic behavior exist. It certainly appears that no blind natural force caused life to obtain in the material order since life usually begets life.

From Ockham to Wyclif Link

See http://www.boydellandbrewer.com/store/viewItem.asp?idProduct=8844

Was John Wycliffe A Heretic?

I think it could safely be said that Wycliffe played
a major role in making the Bible available to
the common person. He also raised a number of
important theological issues that provoked
the ire of some of those among his contemporaries. I simply do
not think that one can easily dismiss Wycliffe as a
heretic, although I know there are aspects of his system
that many would no doubt criticize. The
foregoing having been stated, I want to cite
information from a study that takes an extensive look
at Wycliffe's accomplishments. For the sake of time, I'm going to summarize some points made in this work.

The book I am quoting from is entitled
"From Ockham to Wyclif," edited by Anne Hudson and
Michael Wilks (it's an anthology).

The points I want to make are as follows:

(1) Wycliffe thought that popes function as the CAPUT
PARTICULARIS ECCLESIAE: I.e. a pope is head of the
Roman Catholic Church, and this church is one among
many. Wycliffe therefore maintained that a Christian
should obey the Pope as long he submitted to
God and faithfully expounded God's Law (LEX). In this
way, Wycliffe was militating against the notion that
the Pope is appointed head of both Church and
state as well as of the Church Universal. He
instead proposed a notion of ECCLESIA REGIS, which
has its own set of problems (pp. 154-158).

(2) Wycliffe also insisted that the Church is comprised of
the "body of the saved." He denied that the Church is
an institution or that the Pope and his curia are
the EKKLHSIA TOU QEOU. This view undoubtedly angered
those who viewed the Pope as the Universal Church's head (CAPUT).

(3) While Wycliffe did not deny the "real presence"
in the Eucharist, he did reject the belief that
the elements of the Eucharist change per their
substance but not per accidens. He reasoned that
accidents must have a subject. For otherwise,
how could the bread change as to its substance and still maintain the
appearance (i.e. accidents) of bread without a subject?
Wycliffe thus delineated what would later become known as
consubstantiation(pp. 218-219, 292).

(4) Wycliffe was also surely condemned for preaching
in the vernacular, especially since he spoke about the
Eucharist in the vulgar tongue. The putative heretical nature of
this act is clearly observed when one reads a 15th century work by a
certain Dominican who is thought to be Thomas Palmer.
Whoever the Dominican is or was, he writes that the
"holy mysteries" should not be exposed to the
"unsophisticated language of the laity." In other
words, the writer of the document urges that the
English language is incapable of communicating the
"opacity of the eucharistic doctrine." Some examples
that he cites are ENS, SUBSTANTIA, QUANTITAS, QUALITAS
and a few others. At any rate, the point is that a
common attitude among clerics of the time was that any
discussion about the Eucharist had to be done in Latin
in order to keep the common folk from discussing such
holy mysteries. But Margaret Aston writes: "It is
surely one of the most remarkable achievements of the
Wycliffites that in the course of a generation they
changed all this." Yes, Wycliffe pointed to
Acts 4:13 as a model for all Christians (pp. 303-314).
Thus, he paved the way for other vernacular
translations of the entire Bible. A heretic? Probably
not.

Seven Reasons for Excluding the Deuterocanonicals from the Biblical Canon

I have found Neil R. Lightfoot's work about the Bible canon to be a helpful resource. (But for a more detailed account, see Bruce Metzger's work on the NT canon.) Lightfoot outlines seven reasons to "reject" the Deuterocanonicals (also known as the Apocrypha):

1. The books "were never" included in the OT canon.
2. Lightfoot also writes: "These books, as far as the evidence goes, were
never accepted as canonical by Jesus and his apostles." Neither the apostles
nor Jesus quoted from the Apocrypha.
3. No Jewish writer of the first century (such as Philo or Josephus) accepted these books as genuine. Jerome (translator of the Latin Vulgate) likewise believed that these books were "apocryphal."
4. The apocryphal writings contain historical, chronological, and geographical
errors. See Judith 1:1.
5. "There is no evidence that the [LXX] ever had a fixed or closed canon of
books."
6. The books cannot be maintained "on a compromise basis." I.e. The Deuterocanonicals may possibly supplement (at times) or conversely be at odds with Scripture. Therefore, these works must not be accepted at all.
7. The "Roman Catholic Church" pronounced the OT Apocrypha (except 2 Esdras
and the Prayer of Manasseh) as "authoritative and canonical Scripture" at the Council of Trent. Yet conciliar authority is not a sufficient condition for determining a work to be canonical. Prior to Trent, Lightfoot states, there were officials of the "Roman Church" who spoke out against the canonicity of apocryphal works.

These points can be found on pp. 121-122 of Lightfoot's book, the Second edition which was published by the Baker Pub Group in August 1988. The work has since been updated.

Regards,
Edgar

Origen of Alexandria Interpreting Ecclesiastes 12:12

For, to judge by the words of the phrase, 'My son, beware of making many books,' two things appear to be indicated by it: first, that we ought not to possess many books, and then that we ought not to compose many books. If the first is not the meaning the second must be, and if the second is the meaning the first does not necessarily follow. In either case we appear to be told that we ought not to make many books. I might take my stand on this dictum which now confronts us, and send you the text as an excuse, and I might appeal in support of this position to the fact that not even the saints found leisure to compose many books; and thus I might cry off from the bargain we made with each other, and give up writing what I was to send to you. You, on your side, would no doubt feel the force of the text I have cited, and might, for the future, excuse me. But we must treat Scripture conscientiously, and must not congratulate ourselves because we see the primary meaning of a text, that we understand it altogether. I do not, therefore, shrink from bringing forward what excuse I think I am able to offer for myself, and to point out the arguments, which you would certainly use against me, if I acted contrary to our agreement. And in the first place, the Sacred History seems to agree with the text in question, inasmuch as none of the saints composed several works, or set forth his views in a number of books. I will take up this point: when I proceed to write a number of books, the critic will remind me that even such a one as Moses left behind him only five books.

Quote taken from Commentary on the Gospel of John V.2

The Semantics of the Greek Term LOGOS

Many of you are probably quite familiar with the listings and examples in BAGD Greek-English Lexicon [now BDAG] for the word LOGOS. But for the benefit of others, here is what this lexicon has to say:

1a. Speaking (generally, a word). See Matt. 22:46; 1 Pet. 3:1.

1B. Statement, question, pastoral counseling, preaching, prophecy, command, report, story, proclamation, instruction (1 Tim. 5:17; Tit. 1:9; James 3:2).

1g. A statement of definite content (Matt. 12:32).

1d. "The [plural] (oi) LOGOI is used (1) either of words uttered on various occasions, of speeches made here and there (Matt. 12:37a).

1e. The subject under discussion (Acts 8:21).

1z. Of written words and speeches and of the separate books of a particular

work (Acts 1:1).

1b. Of revelation by God (and of the divine disclosure through Christ).

Cf. Heb. 13:7.

2. Computation or reckoning (1 Pet. 3:15).

2b. Settlement of an account (Matt. 18:23; 25:19).

2c. Respect, regard (1 Samuel 10:1 LXX).

2d. Reason, motive (Matt. 5:32).

2e. "With whom we have to do" (Heb. 4:13).

2f. Have a concern for wisdom (possible meaning). Cf. Col. 2:23.

3. The Logos. This sense needs to be quoted directly from BAGD: "Our lit. shows traces of a way of thinking that was widespread in contemporary syncretism, as well as in Jewish wisdom lit. and Philo, the most prominent feature of which is the concept of the Logos, the independent, personified 'Word' (of God): J 1:1a, b, c, 14. It is the distinctive teaching that this divine 'Word' took on human form in a historical person, that is, in Jesus."

On this last point, John Burnet cites the famous Heraclitean fragment that he lists as R.P. 32, in which Heraclitus of Ephesus uses the term LOGOS in this way:


"Though the Word [LOGOS] is true evermore, ye men are as unable to understand it when they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word [LOGOS], men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other men know not what they're doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep."

Burnet then makes the following remarks:

"The LOGOS is primarily the discourse of Heraclitus himself; though, as he is a prophet, we may call it his 'word.' It can neither mean a discourse addressed to Heraclitus nor yet 'reason'" (Early Greek Philosophy, P. 133).

Burnet adds: "In any case, the Johannine doctrine of the LOGOS has nothing to do with Heraclitus or with anything at all in Greek philosophy, but comes from the Hebrew Wisdom literature."

See Rendel Harris, "The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel," in The Expositor, 1916, pp. 147 sqq.

Hopefully these comments will shed light on the LOGOS definition.

APANTHSIS as a TERMINUS TECHNICUS (1 Thessalonians 4:17)

The Greek term APANTHSIS is used in the ancient Hellenistic world as a technical term (TERMINUS TECHNICUS) to describe citizens who would go out to meet a visiting dignitary and escort him back to the city from which the citizens emanated. See The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament by Rogers and Rogers (page 479); Vocabulary of the Greek Testament (J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan), page 53; Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 1:380-381.

I think we should not read too much into the metaphorical language in 1 Thessalonians 4:17. The imagery that Paul uses regarding APANTHSIS should probably be correlated with John 14:2-3, which suggests that Christ the bridegroom goes away to prepare a place for his bride (the EKKLHSIA), then returns to carry his figurative bride home. A.T. Robertson (Word Pictures) thus states that there is not enough evidence (based on APANTHSIS alone) to tell us whether the risen holy ones continue heavenward with the Lord or continue descending to the earth. F.F. Bruce argues similarly and R.L. Thomas unequivocally contends that one should not infer too much from Paul's utilization of a word that functioned as a technical term in other ancient documents.

In conclusion, I would submit that it is ill-advised to construe or apply every little aspect of a metaphor. As Max Black maintains, metaphors both emphasize and suppress meaning. They also possibly create new meaning through an interaction of what Black calls the "frame" and "focus." For Black, a metaphor constitutes a sentence (the frame) in which primary and secondary subjects (i.e., concepts) appear. One example of a metaphor that might illustrate Black's distinction is "Man is a wolf." The sentence is the frame, "man" is the primary subject and "wolf" is the secondary subject. The term "wolf" emphasizes and suppresses meaning about wolves and man. Most people interpret the turn of phrase to mean that man is ferocious or ravenous. However, wolves have a number of positive traits (e.g., altrusism, social traits) that we frequently overlook due to what Black calls "associated commonplaces" (ENDOXA) about wolves.

Interesting Blog Post About Pietersma's View of the Tetra

See http://e-homoreligiosus.blogspot.com/2011/09/g-kilpatricks-review-of-pietersma.html

Regards,

Edgar

The Metaphorical Use of "Father" for God

One friend once asked me: "Why the reticence about its [the term "Father"] applying to God's being? Why think that it couldn't?"

I replied:

First, let us prescind from the matter of God being
"Father" with respect to the eternal generation of the
Son or the Son's creation, as I believe. In whatever
sense God is Father, and we both agree that He is
"Father" in some sense, let's agree to bracket such
notions and consider the concept of divine fatherhood
IN SE.

I hesitate to think of "Father" as an ontological
designation because I don't believe one can hold this
position consistently when it comes to theological
metaphors. Let's also be clear what I mean by saying
the title "Father" does not apply ontologically. I
mean to say that God is not masculine (which I
distinguish from maleness) ontologically nor has the
deity somehow brought forth (in a manner closely
resembling the human reproduction process) a Son.

When I state that it seems one cannot consistently
believe God is Father in that the divine one is
transcendently masculine, some examples may explain my
position better than propositions would detail it.
Consider that Ps 23:1 refers to YHWH as David's
Shepherd. If we think of God as a Shepherd in His very
being, what sense does that make? Are we to believe
that God exemplifies the properties of a shepherd,
whatever they are to some eminent and transcendent
degree? Moreover, the apostle John's Apocalypse speaks
of God and the Lamb as the temple of New Jerusalem. To
me, the description is a metaphor of God and the
Lamb's function in relation to the figurative
eschatological city. Do you believe that Revelation
21:23 refers to God ontologically as the temple of New
Jerusalem? That is, is God more of a temple than the
temple in Jerusalem was? Stated another way, does the
Christian deity instantiate the properties of a temple
more transcendently than Solomon's Temple did?
Finally, Paul refers to Jerusalem above [edited] as the "mother"
of Christians. Please explain to me how Galatians 4:26
applies to the Church's being [ontos], rather than to its
function. In what sense is the Church ontologically
feminine?

[Note: My interlocutor believes that Jerusalem above is the ecclesia.-EF]

John Cooper writes:

"From the time of the Church Fathers, teachers of the
faith have used this doctrine [of divine genderlessness]
to explain that calling God Father does not imply that God is MASCULINE.
Thus the doctrine helps us rightly to interpret Scripture. It
prevents us from wrongly inferring from the gendered
language in Scripture that God is MASCULINE while we
work to understand what this language does mean . . ."
(_Our Father in Heaven_, page 188-189).

On this issue, I must concur with Arnobius of Sicca (a
somewhat controversial early church figure) who
evidently is not being unorthodox when he queries:

"For who, however mean his capacity, does not know
that the sexes of different GENDER have been ordained
and formed by the Creator of the creatures of earth,
only that, by intercourse and union of bodies, that
which is fleeting and transient may endure being ever
renewed and maintained?" (Against the Nations 3.8)

IN NUCE, there is no need of gender where there is no
reproductive activity. God doesn't need to be
masculine or feminine QUOAD SE because God doesn't
literally produce little boys and girls, wee angels
and angelettes. :)

Origen's Commentary on John (Regarding the Deity of Christ)

Taken from Commentary on John II.2:

We next notice John's use of the article in these sentences. He does not write without care in this respect, nor is he unfamiliar with the niceties of the Greek tongue. In some cases he uses the article, and in some he omits it. He adds the article to the Logos, but to the name of God he adds it sometimes only. He uses the article, when the name of God refers to the uncreated cause of all things, and omits it when the Logos is named God. Does the same difference which we observe between God with the article and God without it prevail also between the Logos with it and without it? We must enquire into this. As the God who is over all is God with the article not without it, so "the Logos" is the source of that reason (Logos) which dwells in every reasonable creature; the reason which is in each creature is not, like the former called par excellence The Logos. Now there are many who are sincerely concerned about religion, and who fall here into great perplexity. They are afraid that they may be proclaiming two Gods, and their fear drives them into doctrines which are false and wicked. Either they deny that the Son has a distinct nature of His own besides that of the Father, and make Him whom they call the Son to be God all but the name, or they deny the divinity of the Son, giving Him a separate existence of His own, and making His sphere of essence fall outside that of the Father, so that they are separable from each other. To such persons we have to say that God on the one hand is Very God (Autotheos, God of Himself); and so the Saviour says in His prayer to the Father, [John 17:3] "That they may know You the only true God;" but that all beyond the Very God is made God by participation in His divinity, and is not to be called simply God (with the article), but rather God (without article). And thus the first-born of all creation, who is the first to be with God, and to attract to Himself divinity, is a being of more exalted rank than the other gods beside Him, of whom God is the God, as it is written, "The God of gods, the Lord, has spoken and called the earth." It was by the offices of the first-born that they became gods, for He drew from God in generous measure that they should be made gods, and He communicated it to them according to His own bounty. The true God, then, is "The God," and those who are formed after Him are gods, images, as it were, of Him the prototype. But the archetypal image, again, of all these images is the Word of God, who was in the beginning, and who by being with God is at all times God, not possessing that of Himself, but by His being with the Father, and not continuing to be God, if we should think of this, except by remaining always in uninterrupted contemplation of the depths of the Father.

Cotterell and Turner on KEFALH

While actually looking for something else,
I found some helpful information concerning
KEFALH in Peter Cotterell and Max
Turner's Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation(London: SPCK, 1989). See pp. 141-145.

Turner and Cotterell review GNT examples such as Col
2:19; 1 Cor 11:3 and Eph 5:23. They write:

"Now contextually it is by no means certain that Col
2:19 presents Christ as the origin, rather than as the
Lord of the Church, but clearly it would considerably
weaken the thesis if the sense 'source' was part of
the lexical meaning of the Greek word KEFALH ('head');
that is, if it were one of its established senses"
(page 141).

But is "source" one of the established senses of
KEFALH? After discussing LXX and Classical examples
where KEFALH is employed by ancient writers, these
scholars conclude:

"In other words, as far as we can tell, 'source' or
'origin' was NOT a conventional sense of the word
KEFALH in Paul's time. This does not preclude the
possibility that Paul himself began to use the word in
such a way, but we would need very strong evidence to
support such a view, and in our judgment nothing like
such strength of evidence is forthcoming" (145).

While, as Cotterell and Turner show, there does not
appear to be enough evidence in favor of
"source" being one of the lexical senses of KEFALH in
Paul's time, we do have attestation for the meaning
"ruler" or "authority over." Paul apparently used
KEFALH in this way, when he penned these inspired
words to the Ephesians:

KAI PANTA hUPETAXEN hUPO TOUS PODAS AUTOU KAI AUTON
EDWKEN KEFALHN hUPER PANTA THi EKKLHSIAi (Eph 1:22).

Paradoxes of Jesus, Bowman and a Possible Sleight of Hand

On pp. 74-76 of Why You Should Believe in the
Trinity, Robert M. Bowman, Jr. includes a section dealing with so-called "paradoxes of Jesus." Bowman seemingly puts a nail in the coffin of non-Trinitarians
(particularly, Jehovah's Witnesses) who think that the Incarnation of Christ concept is notionally meaningless or incoherent (i.e contradictory). Bowman argues that since Christ was both 100% God and 100% man (fully God and fully human) while on earth, we should not be surprised to read Bible verses that picture the Son of God both professing ignorance of the "day and hour" in Mk 13:32 and knowing "all things" in Jn 16:30.

Bowman also contends that while it is true that God cannot be tempted (James 1:13) and Jesus could be (and was) tempted in the days of his flesh (Heb 4:15)--Jesus could not sin (Jn 5:19).

There are other texts that Bowman appeals to in order to support the Incarnation as a biblical concept. I pick these two arguments to focus on though because they seem blatantly problematic to me.

Firstly, Jesus' disciples did say that he knew "all things" (OIDAS PANTA) in the Johannine verse mentioned by Bowman (Jn 16:30). As with other biblical texts, however, we must not only note what the Bible says; we must also seek to ascertain what a given scriptural utterance means. Were Jesus' disciples actually saying that they believed he was omniscient? If so, this would be a remarkable confession from a group of first century monotheistic Jews. In fact, it is highly unlikely that Jesus' followers were attributing omniscience to him. Mr. Bowman seems to be engaging in what a friend of mine has called "prestidigitation." His handling of Jn 16:30 does not appear to be all that rigorous, and it is evidently driven by some type of personal ideology. Simply put,
Jn 16:30 does not teach that Christ was or is omniscient.

PANTA is apparently not employed in an absolute sense at Jn 16:30. John's use of the Greek word should be construed in a relative sense, meaning that Christ knew "all things" to a degree. To illustrate what I am saying about Jn 16:30, I appeal to 1 Jn 2:27:

ALL' hWS TO AUTOU XRISMA DIDASKEI hUMAS PERI PANTWN . . .

In this passage, John informs his readers that God's "anointing" teaches spirit-begotten Christians about "all things." Yet, John is not employing PANTWN here in an absolute sense. The spirit of God does not teach those whom God anoints about physics, geometry, logic, foreign languages or marine biology. The children of God are taught subject matter that concerns everlasting life or salvation (1 Jn 2:25), not knowledge associated with the famed quadrivium or trivium (et al.).

Trinitarian commentator Gerald Borchert explains Jn 16:30 thus:

They [the disciples] were partly correct in their
assumption that Jesus had great knowledge . . . Their
generalization of how much knowledge Jesus had ('all
things,' PANTA) was, however, a typical human
overstatement that was far beyond their actual
capacity to comprehend. It was merely one of their
assumptions. Such an assumption has often become part
of our theological assumptions about the incarnate
Jesus' knowledge, even though elsewhere, for example,
he states that he did not know the time of the end
(cf. Mark 13:32). Moreover, Paul states that he
'emptied himself' ('made himself nothing,' NIV;
hEAUTON EKENWSEN, Phil 2:7), although we are not quite
sure of the full implications of that statement
(John 12-21, page 180).

In Alford's Greek testament, we read this paraphrase
of Jn 16:30:

Thou hast spoken so clearly of our feeling towards
Thee and of Thyself, that we have no occasion to ask
Thee anything;--and this was what Thou didst announce
would be;--we know therefore, by its being so, that
Thou knowest the secrets of our hearts (PANTA by
inference),--and hence believe that Thou camest forth
from God.'

Notice that Alford limits PANTA to the "secrets" of the disciples' hearts. Bowman may claim that only God can read hearts, but the disciples did not necessarily believe that only God could discern hearts. They affirmed that Christ was "from God" and it is conceivable that they believed Christ had knowledge of human thoughts based on the things he learned from his Father (Jn 7:16-18) In any event, it seems clear that the disciples were not imputing omniscience to Christ. A "great knowledge" of many things or an intimate acquaintance with a vast array of facts does not make one omniscient in the absolute sense of the term. Contra Borchert, I tend to believe that the words of Jn 16:30 simply constitute an idiomatic way to use a Greek term that can mean "all things." It is not necessarily an "overstatement," but Borchert nonetheless illustrates why one need not interpret the text as an apostolic declaration of Christ's omniscience.

As a closing note, has anyone else noticed how problematic it is to use Jn 5:19 as a proof that Christ was sinless or could not sin? The context of the passage is dealing with Christ observing and emulating the works of the Father toward the creation. The text has nothing to do with Christ's ability or inability to sin.

Regards,
Edgar