Analyzing Grammatical and Ungrammatical Greek in the Apocalypse (Revelation 1:4)

Ἰωάνης ταῖς ἑπτὰ ἐκκλησίαις ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ· χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ Πνευμάτων ἃ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θρόνου αὐτοῦ (Revelation 1:4)

Readers of the Apocalypse frequently claim that the syntax (word order) and grammar of Revelation 1:4 (among other places in the work) overtly violates standard rules of Koine Greek. Dionysius of Alexandria reportedly verbalized his criticisms of the Greek found in Revelation--his appraisal is taken from Eusebius of Caesarea's Church History (7.25.24-27):

Moreover, it can also be shown that the diction of the Gospel and Epistle differs from that of the Apocalypse. For they were written not only without error as regards the Greek language, but also with elegance in their expression, in their reasonings, and in their entire structure. They are far indeed from betraying any barbarism or solecism, or any vulgarism whatever. For the writer had, as it seems, both the requisites of discourse—that is, the gift of knowledge and the gift of expression—as the Lord had bestowed them both upon him. I do not deny that the other writer saw a revelation and received knowledge and prophecy. I perceive, however, that his dialect and language are not accurate Greek, but that he uses barbarous idioms, and, in some places, solecisms. It is unnecessary to point these out here, for I would not have any one think that I have said these things in a spirit of ridicule, for I have said what I have only with the purpose of showing clearly the difference between the writings.

One could translate Revelation 1:4: "from the one who is, the one who was, and the one who is coming." I will now examine whether the grammatical evidence indicates that this expression is an instance of nonstandard Greek forms in the Apocalypse.

Descriptivist and Prescriptivist Views of Language

Grammarians dutifully inspect extant literature, then take note of consistent patterns in order to formulate various rules regarding syntax or morphology (word formation). But it is possible to differentiate between a prescriptivist view of language and a descriptivist approach. By "prescriptivist" I am referring to a normative view of language in which grammatical rules are prescribed or outlined.

Descriptivism is the approach to language that just notes how people use abstract signifiers. With this distinction in mind, we can see how imperative it becomes to recall Ferdinand De Saussure's distinction between speech (la parole) and language (la langue). This differentiation of concepts posits a measure of disparity between the formal rules of a language and the way that people actually speak at home and work, or while shopping.

Saussure's observations indirectly shed light on the importance of Greek papyri: these documents provide evidence of how Koine Greek was used in daily ancient affairs. The papyri from Egypt were not intended to be literary or metaphysical documents per se; all such factors must be considered before we talk about anyone breaking grammatical rules. Rather than discuss grammatical rule-breaking in general, however, I will focus on Revelation 1:4.

Concerning Revelation 1:4

Daniel B. Wallace thinks that the syntax of Revelation 1:4 is intentionally violated. He argues that it's unlikely any audience would view this passage's grammar as a standard way of expressing Greek utterances. However, Richard A. Young takes a descriptivist approach to this issue. He realizes that cultures may communicate ideas in variously accepted ways:

"Charles (1920:10) calls John's use of the nominative in Revelation 1:4 a deliberate violation of the rules of grammar. Yet it can only be a violation if grammar is viewed prescriptively. With a descriptive view of grammar, it merely illustrates the range of expression that koine Greek tolerates. Thus John's use of the nominative is not a mistake in grammar" (Richard A Young, Intermediate New Testament Greek, 13).

While a number of ancient manuscripts did apparently try to correct John's grammar, scholar David Aune makes a persuasive case that Revelation 1:4 possibly regards the threefold attribution to God as "an indeclinable divine name" (Revelation 52A:24).

Aune suggests that John's usage is influenced by the Septuagint Version (LXX) of the Bible and its handling of the divine name. My conclusion: There is no need for us to believe that John's apocalyptic lingual patterns are not grammatical. David A. Black also proffers that "there is nothing wrong" with the phrase in Revelation 1:4 (Black, 13). Of course, more work needs to be done in order to develop a satisfactory account that explains the Greek of Revelation.

Sources
David Aune. Revelation: 1-5. Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1997.

David Black. Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988.

Is It Possible to Know and Comprehend God?

There is much that one could say about knowing and comprehending God. What I write below is just an initial reply to some arguments posed by Trinitarians regarding God's cognoscibility.

(1) I think that Augustine of Hippo was wrong when he said that it's easier to know what God is not, as opposed to knowing what or who God is. This type of theology is clearly apophatic: it is an insidious form of "Christian" agnosticism that fails to treat the divine revelation found in the Bible justly. Matthew 11:27 proclaims that "No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (NIV).

Additionally, John 1:18 informs us that the Son of God came and "explained" or "revealed" (EXHGHSATO) the Father. These verses indicate that we do in fact know God by means of the Son. If we do not know what God is, this would invalidate the fact that God has been revealed through His Son. Compare John 17:3; 1 John 5:20.

(2) Some persons may assert that God can be known in his economy, but not immanently (in his essence). Systematic theologian Gordon Kaufman insists that the distinction between God's "essence" and his "economy" is a misleading one. God is who he has revealed himself to be in his economy (OIKONOMIA). If God has been revealed in a certain way through his Son, then we can expect that the revelation conforms to God's essence. For example, if God has revealed that he is triune by means of his Son, then it would seem that God is triune in ESSENTIA. On the other hand, if God has not revealed himself to be three in one through the Son, then the divine one is likely not triune with respect to his ESSENTIA.

(3) Lastly, while I would agree that God is incomprehensible--we can never understand or know everything there is to know about God--I would also contend that there is no biblical evidence to suggest that the Supreme God is triune or that his essence is unknowable. The point can be illustrated by a story which the late historian Jaroslav Pelikan (who was a Trinitarian) tells. He relates a narrative about rabbi Herbanus who debated with the sixth century Orthodox Bishop Gregentius.

(a) Herbanus reasoned that "God is one, and not two or three, as you [Gregentius] say." He added that the Old Testament refers to "sons of God," who are not of the same OUSIA as the Father (i.e. they are not from the OUSIA of the Father, yet they are "sons"). Gregentius responded by quoting Genesis 1:26, where God utters the fateful words, "Let us make man in our image." Herbanus applied this passage to the angels but Gregentius disagreed. To this day the problem has not been resolved from an exegetical perspective, and it will undoubtedly serve as a perennial cause for debate in this AIWN. Be that as it may, certain Trinitarians have written essays demonstrating that neither the Old Testament nor the New Testament explicitly states or even implies that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one. Alan J. Hauser of Appalachian State University concluded that the Trinity doctrine is a "later development" in Christian history. He does not reject the doctrine for this reason, but Hauser's candor about the Biblical testimony is refreshing.

See The Christian Tradition (Vol. II:204-206) by Jaroslav Pelikan.

Early Christian Thinkers By Foster, Paul (EDT)

Is Abraham Already A Son of God?

The answer to this question may seem obvious to some on this forum. One may either choose to say that Abraham is either a son of God right now or that he is not. Things may not be quite so simple when one reexamines Lk 20:34-36, however. For now, I want to focus on 20:36:

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται, ἰσάγγελοι γὰρ εἰσιν καὶ υἱοί εἰσιν θεοῦ τῆς ἀναστάσεως υἱοὶ ὄντες.

The text above typed in 'Greek' is made in a context involving certain Sadducees disputing with Jesus about the resurrection from the dead. After these men had posed a 'stumper' for the Christ, he in turn referred them to the Pentateuch, which the Sadducees accepted as authoritative, in order to overturn their fallacious use of Scripture and logic. As one reads Jesus' skilled use of the thornbush account to confute his adversaries, one cannot help but be astounded at his manner of teaching in the face of such formidable opposition.

For instance, Jesus points out that while people in this age marry and are often given in marriage, those whom God deems worthy of the resurrection will neither marry nor be given in marriage. Without trying to explain that perplexing statement, I will move on to Lk 20:34-36.

The context makes it clear that Jesus has Abraham in mind when he exclaims that the children of the resurrection will not be able to die anymore since they will be like angels, being children of God by virtue of the resurrection. A few points now merit our attention.

(1) Luke employs a hapax legomenon (ἰσάγγελοι) that is equivalent to ὡς ἄγγελοι as Matthew 22:30 shows (see Matthew Vellanickal. The Divine Sonship of Christians in the Johannine Writings. Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977, page 62).

a) More importantly, however, Luke also utilizes the participial ὄντες which should no doubt be construed as a "causal circumstantial participle here" (NET Bible ftn on Lk 20:36). Vellanickal rightly contends that ὄντες in Lk 20:36 "is very significant" (page 63). We offer full consent to his observation. Yet, one is justified in asking, in what way is this participle highly significant?

b) Vellanickal argues that ὄντες is important in Lk 20:36 because the writer's use of this participial form shows that Jesus is saying it is by virtue of the resurrection that ones such as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob become sons of God: "thus the resurrection becomes the cause and condition of the 'divine sonship' and the 'equality to the angels'"(Vellanickal, 63).

2) The author referenced above ultimately argues that it is only when Abraham and others are resurrected that they truly become children of God "in the full sense of the term." However, to be fair to the author and Luke's text, we must say that Abraham on one level is not a child of God yet; for he has not been raised from the dead. Still, there is a sense in which Abraham must be a child of God already. This is in the sense in that his resurrection has already occurred in the eyes of God. As Jesus exclaimed to the Sadducees: "He is a God, not of the dead, but of the living, for they are all living to him" (Lk 20:38).

a) So while I think it is technically correct to maintain that Abraham is not literally a son of God but only becomes one by virtue of the resurrection from the dead, he is still now a son since Jehovah God will certainly raise Abraham and others from the dead at the divinely appointed time. Abraham evidently became a son of God, in a sense, after he died. This still means that he was not technically one of God's children while he walked the earth. To the contrary, Abraham was one of God's friends, as Scripture indicates (Isa 41:8; James 2:23). In the resurrection, he will assuredly become one of God's earthly sons.

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Greek Grammatical Aids

From time to time folks ask me to recommend some good Greek grammars. I have sent out bibliographies previously, but I like to update them from time to time. Here is one of my latest bibliographies that includes both Greek works and religious ones.

Recommended Religious and Grammatical Works

Aune, David. Revelation. Word Biblical Commentary, vols. 52a-c. Dallas, TX: Word Book, 1997.


Bauer, Walter. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Christian Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.


Baugh, S.M. _A First John Reader_: Intermediate Greek Reading Notes and Grammar_. Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1999.


Black, David A. (Editor). _Linguistics and New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis_. Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1992.


Blackwelder, Boyce W. _Light From the Greek New Testament_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1976.


Brooks, James A., and Carlton L. Winbery. _Syntax of New Testament Greek_. Lanham, MD, 1979.


Conybeare, F.C. and St. George Stock. _Grammar of Septuagint Greek: With Selected Readings, Vocabularies, and Updated Indexes_. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995.


Dana, H.E. and Julius R. Mantey. _A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament_. Toronto: Macmillan, 1955.


Earle, Ralph. _Word Meanings in the New Testament_. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997.


Hawthorne, Gerald F. _Philippians_. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 43. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983.


Kennedy, George A. _New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism_. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1984.


Longenecker, Richard N. _Acts_: The Expositor's Bible Commentary_. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995.


Louw, Johannes and Eugene A. Nida. _Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains_. 2 vols. New York: United Bible Societies, 1988.


Mastronarde, Donald J. _Introduction to Attic Greek_. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993.


Murray, George R. Beasley. _John_. Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 36. Waco, TX, 1987.


Robertson, A.T. and W. Hershey Davis. _A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research_. Nashville, Broadman Press, 1934.


Silva, Moises. _Explorations in Exegetical Method: Galatians As a Test Case_. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996.


Young, Richard A. _Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach_. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.


Zerwick, Maximilian. _Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples_. Rome: Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1963.

Notes on Revelation 6:4

KAI EXHLQEN ALLOS hIPPOS PURROS KAI TWi KAQHMENWi EP' AUTON EDOQH AUTWi LABEIN THN EIRHNHN EK THS GHS KAI hINA ALLHLOUS SFAXOUSIN KAI EDOQH AUTWi MAXAIRA MEGALH.

"Then another horse came out, a fiery red one. Its rider was given power to take peace from the earth and to make men slay each other. To him was given a large sword" (NIV).

"And another, a red horse, went out; and to him who sat on it, it was granted to take peace from the earth, and that men would slay one another; and a great sword was given to him" (NASB).

"And another horse came forth, a red horse: and to him that sat thereon it was given to take peace from the earth, and that they should slay one another: and there was given unto him a great sword" (ASV).

"The second [horseman], who rides a fiery red horse, is intent to engage the enemy in battle. God has given earth over to itself to engage in a global, civil war, preventing its inhabitants from attaining the very things that make for peace and security" (Robert W. Wall, Revelation, p. 110).

"A red horse (hIPPOS PURROS). Old adjective from PUR(fire), flame-coloured, blood-red (2 Kings 3:22), in N.T. only here and Revelation 12:3, like Zechariah 1:8; Zechariah 6:2 (roan horse). To take peace from the earth (LABEIN THN EIRHNHN EK THS GHS). Second aorist active infinitive of LAMBANW, and here the nominative case, the subject of EDOQH (see verse Zechariah 2), "to take peace out of the earth." Alas, how many red horses have been ridden through the ages. And that they should slay one another (KAI hINA ALLHLOUS SFAXOUSIN). Epexegetical explanatory purpose clause with hINA and the future active of SPAZW(Zechariah 5:6) instead of the more usual subjunctive (verse Zechariah 6:2). Cf. Robertson, Grammar, p. 998f. This is what war does to perfection, makes cannon fodder (cf. John 14:27) of men. A great sword (MAXAIRA MEGALH). MAXAIRA may be a knife carried in a sheath at the girdle (John 18:10) or a long sword in battle as here. ROMFAIA, also a large sword, is the only other word for sword in the N.T. (Revelation 1:16; Revelation 2:12,16; Revelation 6:8; Revelation 19:15,21)" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

"The color red may symbolize blood, representing the death and destruction caused by the second cavalier" (David Aune, Revelation 6-16, p. 395).

"PURROS, A, ON . . . (s[ee] prec. entry; Aeschyl., Hdt. +; ins, pap, LXX; En 18:7. On the double R s[ee] B-D-F Section 34, 2; Mlt-H. 101) fiery red as the apocalyptic color of a horse (Theocr. 15, 53, of a fox standing on its hind legs) Rv 6:4 . . . In Rv, prob. because of the influence of the hIPPOS PURROS of Zech 1:8 and 6:2, the word ER. has been changed to its practical equivalent PURR" (BDAG, p. 900).

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More on the Greek Tense (Aorist)

For years, exegetes, pastors and Biblical translators "abused" the aorist tense by emphasizing the once-for-all-time understanding of the Greek tense. That was until Frank Stagg's groundbreaking article in JBL ("The Abused Aorist." Journal of Biblical Literature 91 (1972) 222-231.

Donald A. Carson highlights some of these abuses and briefly discusses the scholarship that resulted in a demythologization of the aorist. We now know that the AORISTOS generally delineates action as a whole and does not necessarily portray one act for-all-time over against the continuous action of the present tense, although the present tense (imperfective aspect) may at times depict continuous action (note how the aorist is also used in John 3:16 when the apostle stresses the Father's love manifested in sending His only-begotten Son for the sake of humanity).

Other factors such as context and lexis will also help us to discern the aspect or Aktionsart of a particular verb instead of loading a certain "tense" with a meaning such as the one discussed above.

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Alvin Plantinga Meets the Logical Problem of Evil (Updated Version)

This paper will discuss logician Alvin Plantinga's approach to the logical problem of evil. My position is that Plantinga successfully rebuts the charges of this well-known challenge to theism (belief in God).

What the Logical Problem of Evil Tries to Accomplish

The logical problem of evil is a puzzle for both the theistic and non-theistic mind--a conundrum that has its roots in times of antiquity. The "problem" can be formulated thus:

(1) God is omnipotent.

(2) God is omnibenevolent.

(3) Evil exists.

The atheologian J.L. Mackie argues that 1-3 constitute an inconsistent set of (formally) contradictory propositions. Worded simply, Mackie contends that God cannot be omnipotent (almighty) or omnibenevolent (wholly good) if evil obtains. He insists that it is logically problematic for God and evil to exist or obtain simultaneously: Mackie believes that it is not a case of both-and, but either-or. Either God exists or evil exists and ne'er the twain shall meet:

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.)

Quote is from J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind, New Series, 64.254. (April 1955): 200-212.

Plantinga's Reply to the Logical Problem of Evil

Conversely, Alvin Plantinga, taking a cue from Augustine of Hippo insists that it is logically possible for God to possess the objective properties of omnipotence and omnibenevolence although evil obtains. He systematically appeals to human free will and modal logic to rebut the atheistic charges of Mackie. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity: it distinguishes between possible and necessary truths. In summary, Plantinga maintains that 1-3 above are not formally inconsistent propositions when we account for the appropriate modal distinctions. For example, he states that the following proposition is not necessarily true: "A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can."

The modal term "necessarily" is important in this argument since the next proposition also does not appear to be necessarily true: "There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do." Yet, in order for Mackie's contention to hold, Plantinga maintains that the aforesaid propositions must be not only true, but necessarily true (i.e., they cannot not be true). These claims must be true in every possible world if Mackie's argument is going to be sustained.

While S (a certain person or subject) might be a good doctor, it does not mean that S always eliminates evil (E) as far as S can. A proposition of this sort does not appear to be necessarily true since there might be substantive reasons why S (a good doctor, in this case) would not eliminate evil insofar as it's possible for S to eliminate E. For example, a doctor who has the power to remove cataracts might not immediately perform surgery on a needful patient until a later time. But this reticence would not mean that the medical professional lacks the ability or the desire to remove the cataracts.

Moreover, it seems that an all-powerful (omnipotent) being might have certain limits, believe it or not. Can an omnipotent entity bring about a contradictory state of affairs such that 2 + 2 = 5 and square circles as well as married bachelors begin to obtain? Not if the law of logical necessity holds. Nor does it seem that a maximally powerful being can change the past without violating the law of noncontradiction. So, while there might be some possible world in which an omnipotent being eliminates suffering or evil altogether, it's possible that there are other worlds in which an omnipotent being does not remove evil, even though such a being would have the requisite power to eradicate evil.

Logical Outcome of Plantinga's Argument in the Light of Scripture

There are evidently good reasons why God has permitted evil. He made rational creatures upright, but we choose our respective paths (Ecclesiastes 7:29). God evidently allows creation to exist in a state of futility until a Messianic figure should arrive to liberate creation from bondage to slavery and corruption (Romans 8:19-21). That is a plausible account of God's permission of evil based on the New Testament and logic. In any event, there are apparently good reasons why God has not eliminated evil at this time (2 Peter 3:9). Plantinga makes a similar case based on his use of modal logic.

Conclusion

God apparently vouchsafed free will to human beings. So does there exist a possible world (counterfactual situation) in which creatures always freely do what is right and never violate the beneficent laws of deity? In the future (based on my reading of Scripture), humans will freely do what is right for all eternity. However, at that time, there will be no devil, no Satanic world nor any sin (Revelation 20:1-10; 21:1-5).

The bottom line: 1-3 do not constitute an inconsistent propositional set. It is logically possible that God would permit evil to obtain for reasons primarily known to God. But we have been given some plausible reasons why evil persists from the pages of Judeo-Christian Scripture.

Sources

Peterson, Michael L. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977.

Is Time Grammaticalized in New Testament Greek?

A burning question in New Testament Greek studies revolves around the grammaticalization of time and Greek tenses. Scholars use the terms Aktionsart (a German word that can denote "kind of action") and "aspect" to discuss this issue. This paper will explore whether Greek grammaticalizes time in the light of analyses undertaken by David Black and Rolf Furuli.

David Black on Tense and Aktionsart

Black insists that lexemes (minimal units of language having semantic content) possess "inherent aspect": they are intrinsically "durative" or "punctiliar" with regard to their aspect (80). By his use of the word "punctiliar" Black evidently means that lexical units (in some cases) may be aspectually aoristic: "The most important element of tense in the Greek verb system is the kind of action being referred to. This is called aspect or Aktionsart, and it is where the major distinction between the different tenses lies" (84).

Elsewhere, he continues: "A special morpheme indicates that the action of a verb refers to past time. This is a past time morpheme or augment, which is found in Sanskrit, Iranian, Armenian, and Greek, and only in the past tenses of the indicative mood" (Ibid., 81).

However, it's possible to distinguish verbal aspect from verbal Aktionsart. This German term refers to the kind of action being delineated by a Greek verbal tense or relation without necessarily grammaticalizing time. But the indicative mood in Greek probably does grammaticalize time, although this view certainly lends itself to more linguistic abnormalities when actual Greek constructs are studied.

Black argues that the imperfect, the aorist, and pluperfect tense "all refer to the past; the only difference between them is the kind of action, or aspect, that they indicate" (84). Therefore, we see that not every Greek scholar believes the concept of time is wholly absent from the imperfect or aorist tense. Additionally, Black speaks of time and aspect, then links aspect with Aktionsart (kind of action). But other grammarians and linguists make a clear distinction between the two categories; they do not believe that either the aorist, imperfect or pluperfect tense inherently refer to past action. Nonetheless, if Black is correct, then his comments would illuminate some anomalies encountered when reading New Testament Greek.

Rolf Furuli and the Grammaticalization of Time

On the other hand, Furuli observes that the Aktionsart of a particular verb is associated with its meaning. He reasons that the verb's contents (in this case) are not capable of being canceled. He connects Aktionsart to a word's lexical properties. That is, the verb's "kind of action" refers to the objective features conveyed by a determinate action word. The term Aktionsart also signifies that features of a particular verb retain their meaning in almost every contextual situation with hardly any exceptions.

Furuli provides the example of the verb "sing" which he notes is inherently punctiliar regarding its Aktionsart. Whether one thus says "he sang" or "he was singing," how Aktionsart is emphasized remains the same. The word "singing" is no less durative than "he sang" because of each term's intrinsic properties. Furuli defines tense as "the grammaticalization of location in time" (a definition found in Comrie). He accordingly seems to contend that Greek (with the exception of the future tense) may not have "tense" in the relevant sense discussed here. Nonetheless, a question that deserves future exploration is, what does the New Testament evidence reveal about this issue?

Conclusion

I have read the studies on Greek aspect and Aktionsart published by Furuli, Buist Fanning, Kenneth McKay and Stanley Porter. Yet I have been hesitant to concur with the non-temporal view of Greek tenses as a whole. There does not appear to be a good reason for completely removing the notion of time from Greek tenses, even when the future tense is not under consideration. But I do believe that verbal aspect is more prominent than the concept of time when it comes to Greek tenses. Furthermore, Daniel B. Wallace seems to have a point when he contends that a number of factors (i.e. affected and non-affected meaning) provide temporal information where Greek verbal relations are concerned.

Sources

Black, David A. Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications. Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Book House, 1988.

Furuli, Rolf. The Role of Theology and Bias in Bible Translation: With a Special Look at the New World Translation of Jehovah's Witnesses. Huntington Beach, Calif: Elihu Books, 1999.

Did John Calvin Oppose Michel Servetus Over 1 John 5:7?

I once had someone ask me whether Calvin decided to push for the death of Servetus based on 1 John 5:7. Here is my answer to that question.

Servetus was executed 1553 CE in Geneva. Harold O.J. Brown (in his book "Heresies") notes that the driving impetus behind Servetus' execution was actually the imperial decree known as the Justinian Code which made it clear that heresy was a crime against the state. Although Justinian I ruled from 527-65 CE, the code bearing his name was not promulgated until a millennium later. Nevertheless, this code allowed Servetus to be executed and burned at the prosecutorial hands of Calvin. See page 186 of Brown's study.

Brown writes: "As a young man, Servetus propounded the distinctive views that ultimately led him to the stake: his On the Errors of The Trinity appeared in 1531. He held God to be one Person only; this God was the literal, natural father of Jesus Christ, who was therefore God's natural Son . . . Although Servetus denied the deity and preexistence of Christ, he too was evidently trying to grapple with Christ's overwhelming majesty; he was unable to conceive of him as a mere man, even as one adopted by God, but had to postulate a direct, natural relationship with God. Servetus was condemned to death in Geneva for his denial of the Trinity" (Brown 330).

Servetus died with the words "O Jesus, Son of the eternal God, have mercy on me," on his lips. Brown concludes that "his execution in Geneva represents a stain that Reformed Protestantism has never quite been able to efface" (330).

Now back to your original question--did 1 John 5:7 influence Calvin to have Servetus executed? I do not think that we can limit Calvin's resistance to Servetus' ideas and his subsequent prosecution of Servetus to one biblical verse. Now Erasmus' Greek New Testament (1516 CE) contained the Comma Johanneum and it may have played some part in Calvin's fury. I just do not think we can say that Calvin's actions were solely based on 1 John 5:7. I would suggest that you also read Paul Johnson's A History of Christianity. On pp. 289-290, he also discusses the Servetus case and provides some information regarding how Calvin reacted after the debacle of 1553 CE.

Biblical Languages and Grammatical Gender (Holy Spirit)

Just because a Hebrew or Greek noun/pronoun is grammatically neuter does not mean that the referent of the noun/pronoun is neuter. In other words, grammatical gender does not always correspond to the sex or gender of a person or thing being thus described. So, for instance, the holy spirit is delineated by a feminine term in the Hebrew-Aramaic scriptures (ruah). However, in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament), the writers use masculine and neuter morphological forms when referring to the spirit of God. But this language is a result of linguistic accidents (morphology). It technically does not speak to the being or ontological constitution of an entity which, in this case, is the holy spirit. After all, Qoheleth of Ecclesiastes is a feminine term. Yet it evidently describes the son of David. So I would tend to believe that not much can be gained by arguing from grammatical gender to ontological gender, although Romans 8:16 (KJV) represents an interesting verse of comparison:

"The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God"

Notice how the KJV uses "itself" (a neuter pronoun) rather than "himself" (masculine).

Revised Version of the Moral Argument for God's Existence

Greetings everyone,

I'm now posting some of my writings on yahoo voices or their contributor network. If you get a chance, please check out some of my pieces that are contained there. For example, I've revised my moral argument for God's existence. You can see that paper at this link: http://voices.yahoo.com/moral-evidence-existence-god-11351918.html?cat=9

Thanks for all your support!

Edgar

Ontological Argument Roots Found in Cyprian of Carthage

The ontological argument for God's existence often is attributed to Anselm of Canterbury (circa 1033-1109 CE). If by "argument" we mean a systematic and developed case made for a belief or set of beliefs, then yes, Anselm might be credited with the first theistic argument based on the concept of perfect existence. However, I believe the roots for the ontological argument can be found in writers like Cyprian of Carthage. For instance, he writes:

"To God who alone is, belongs the whole name of God;
therefore He is one, and He in His entirety is
everywhere diffused. For even the common people in
many things naturally confess God, when their mind and
soul are admonished of their author and origin. We
frequently hear it said, 'O God,' and 'God sees,' and
'I commend to God,' and 'God give you,' and 'as God
will,' and 'if God should grant'; and this is the very
height of sinfulness, to refuse to acknowledge Him
whom you cannot but know" (On The Vanity of Idols 9).

I have yet to see an author make this connection although someone has possibly associated Cyprian with Anselm before. I'd like to advance this idea to see if it can float.

Frederic Louis Godet's Reading of John 14:14

Frederic Louis Godet argues that the "me" in John 14:14 seems to be an "absolutely impossible" reading since it makes little sense to ask Jesus something in his own name. Compare John 15:16; 16:23-24. This commentator also insists that Tischendorf, Weiss and Westcott defend the indefensible when they argue for the genuineness of the reading "me."

See Godet's Commentary on the Gospel of John, With an Historical and Critical Introduction (page 154). It is available on Google Books for free.

Carl Conrad's Remarks on Philippians 2:6-7 (MORFH)

From Carl Conrad. Originally appeared on B-Greek forum. I now quote Carl:

Like Bob Fuller, I'm hoping we may have a fruitful discussion of the question Edgar has presented to us (where have you been, Edgar; long time, no hear from!); I hope too that we can keep the discussion focused on lexical evidence and clear indicators deriving from immediate context of passages in which the word MORFH is found, both in the GNT and in extra-biblical literature. For my part I don't see any justification whatsoever for the definition of MORFH cited above, "the outward display of the inner reality or substance."


The word is found only in two texts in the GNT, once in the questionable "late-ending" of Mark's gospel, Mk 16:12, where the word pretty clearly means "external appearance"--and we'd have to assume, I think, that hETERAi certainly indicates that this MORFH is NOT identical with the inner reality of the risen Jesus.


Mk 16:12 META DE TAUTA DUSIN EX AUTWN PERPATOUSIN EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi POREUOMENOIS EIS AGRON.



The other passage is the Christ-hymn of Phil 2, where the word appears in successive verses 6 (EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN) and 7 (MORFHN DOULOU LABWN).



Phil 2:6 hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN OUC hARPAGMON hHGHSATO TO EINAI ISA QEWi. 7 ALLA hEAUTON EKENWSEN MORFHN DOULOU LABWN, EN hOMOIWMATI ANQRWPWN GENOMENOS; KAI SCHMATI hEUREQEIS hWS ANQRWPOS ...


And here, of course, the real problem is that, if MORFH means "essential form" in verse 6 for MORFH QEOU, it does not SEEM to mean the same thing in verse 7 for MORFHN DOULOU. It seems to me that Louw & Nida have a clear sense of what the problem here is but they have some problem in applying their perspective to Phil 2:6-7, inasmuch as they deem MORFH to have the sense "nature or character" as opposed to discernible form. With respect to MORFHN DOULOU they understand not "guise of a servant" but rather being and doing what a servant is and does as MORFH QEOU is supposed by them to mean "being and doing what God is and does."



58.2 MORFHa, HS, f: the nature or character of something, with emphasis upon both the internal and external form - 'nature, character.' hOS EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN 'he always had the very nature of God' Php 2:6; MORFHN DOULOU LABWN 'he took on the nature of a servant' Php 2:7. In view of the lack of a closely corresponding lexical item such as 'nature,' it may be necessary to restructure the form of Php 2:7 as 'he became truly a servant.'


58.15 MORFHa, HS, f: a visual form of something - 'visual form, appearance.' EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi 'he appeared in a different form' Mk 16:12.


The problem, it seems to me, as evidently it did to Edgar, that this sense of "nature" is not readily found attested elsewhere for the noun MORFH. Although Aristotle's metaphysics/ontology is sometimes called "hylomorphism" because it involves the interrelations of hULH (matter) and MORFH (form) at the various levels of the Scala Naturae, Aristotle himself doesn't use the term MORFH of "essential form" but speaks rather of OUSIA
or TO TI HN EINAI, which latter phrase (lit. something like "being what it(in fact) is") comes close to the phrase I've used above, "being and doing what X is and does."


LSJ doesn't even HINT at any sense of MORFH as "nature" or "essential form":

MORFH, HS, hH , form, shape, twice in Hom. (not in Hes.), SOI D' EPI MEN MORFH EPEWN thou hast comeliness of words, Od.11.367 (cf. Eust. ad loc.); so prob. ALLOS MEN ... EIDOS AKIDNOTEROS PELEI ANHR, ALLA QEOS MORFHN EPESI STEFEI ? God adds a crown of shapeliness to his words, Od.8.170: freq. later, MORFAS DUO ONOMAZEIN Parm.8.53 ; MORFHN ALLAXANTA Emp.137.1 ;MORFAN BRACUS Pi.I.4(3).53 ; MORFHS METRA shape and size, E.Alc.1063: periphr., MORFHS FUSIS A.Supp.496 ; MORFHS SCHMA,TUPWMA, E.Ion992, Ph.162; THN AUTHN TOU SCHMATOS MORFHN Arist.PA640b34 ; KAI GAIA, POLLWN ONOMATWN MORFH MIA A.Pr.212 ; ONEIRATWN ALIGKIOI MORFAISIN ib.449; NUKTERWN FANTASMATWN ECOUSI MORFAS Id.Fr.312 ; PROUPEMYEN ANTI FILTATHS MORPHS SPODON S.El.1159 ; of plants, Thphr.HP1.1.12 (pl.); esp. with ref. to beauty of form, hUPERFATON MORFAi Pi.O.9.65 ; hOIS POSTISTAXHi CARIS EUKLEA MORFH ib.6.76, cf. IG42 (1).121.119 (Epid., iv B. C.), LXX To.1.13, Vett.Val.1.6, etc.; SWMA MORFHS EMHS OGI383.41 (Commagene, i B. C.); MORFHS EIKONAS ib.27; CARAKTHRA MORFHS EMHS ib.60.

2. generally, form, fashion, appearance, A.Pr.78, S.Tr.699, El.199 (lyr.); outward form, opp. EIDOS, HEKATERW TW EIDEOS POLLAI MORFAI Philol.5; ALLATTONTA TO AUTOU EIDOS EIS POLLAS MORFAS Pl.R.380d ; MORFH QEWN X.Mem.4.3.13 , cf. Ep.Phil.2.6, Dam.Pr.304; hHRWWN EIDEA KAI MORFAS A.R.4.1193 ; KATA TE MORFAS KAI FWNAS gesticulations and cries, D.H.14.9; THN MORFHN MELAGCROUS, THi MORFHi MELICROAS, in complexion, Ptol.Tetr.143,
144.

3. kind, sort, E. Ion 382, 1068 (lyr.), Pl.R.397c, etc.

The meanings cataloged in LSJ seem then to range from a more fundamental "aesthetically gratifying guise" through "outward form" to "discernible variety." The focal element seems to be "discernible framework" or "Gestalt" or "pattern."

When we turn to Fred Danker's latest revision of Bauer (BDAG), we have:

MORFH, HS, hH (Hom.+) form, outward appearance, shape gener. of bodily form 1 Cl 39:3; ApcPt 4:13 (Job 4:16; ApcEsdr 4:14 p. 28, 16 Tdf.; SJCh 78, 13). Of the shape or form of statues (Jos., Vi. 65; Iren. 1, 8, 1 [Harv. I 67, 11]) Dg 2:3. Of appearances in visions, etc., similar to persons(Callisthenes [IV BC]: 124 fgm. 13 p. 644, 32 Jac. [in Athen. 10, 75, 452b] LIMOS ECWN GUNAIKOS MORFHN; Diod. S. 3, 31, 4 EN MORFAIS ANQRWPWN; TestAbr A 16 p. 97, 11 [Stone p. 42] ARCAGGELOU MORFHN PERIKEIMENOS; Jos., Ant. 5, 213 a messenger fr. heaven NEANISKOU MORFHi): of God's assembly, the church Hv 3, 10, 2; 9; 3, 11, 1; 3, 13, 1; s 9, 1, 1; of the angel of repentance hH MORFH AUTOU HLLOIWQH his appearance had changed m 12, 4, 1. Of Christ(EN MORFHi ANQRWPOU TestBenj 10:7; Just., D. 61, 1; Tat. 2, 1; Hippol., Ref. 5, 16, 10. Cp. Did., Gen. 56, 18; of deities EN ANQRWPINHi MORFHi:Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 6, 30; cp. Philo, Abr. 118) MORFHN DOULOU LABWN he took on the form of a slave=expression of servility Phil 2:7 (w. SCHMA as Aristot., Cat. 10a, 11f, PA 640b, 30-36). This is in contrast to expression of divinity in the preëxistent Christ: EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN although he was in the form of God (cp. OGI 383, 40f: Antiochus' body is the framework for his m. or essential identity as a descendant of divinities; sim. human fragility [Phil 2:7] becomes the supporting framework for Christ's servility and therefore of his KENWSIS [on the appearance one projects cp. the epitaph EpigrAnat 17, '91, 156, no. 3, 5-8]; on MORFH QEOU cp. Orig., C. Cels. 7, 66, 21; Pla., Rep. 2, 380d; 381bc; X., Mem. 4, 3, 13; Diog. L. 1, 10 the Egyptians say; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 80; 110; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 190; Just., A I, 9, 1; PGM 7, 563; 13, 272; 584.-Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 357f) Phil 2:6. The risen Christ EFANERWQH EN hETERAi MORFHi appeared in a different form Mk 16:12 (of the transfiguration of Jesus: EDEIXEN hHMIN THN ENDOXON MORFHN hEAUTOU Orig., C. Cels. 6, 68, 23). For lit. s. on hARPAGMA and KENOW 1b; RMartin, ET 70, '59, 183f.-DSteenberg, The Case against the Synonymity of MORFH and EIKWN: JSNT 34, '88, 77-86; GStroumsa, HTR 76, '83, 269-88 (Semitic background).-DELG. Schmidt, Syn. IV 345-60. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

The first several lines of the above accounting are consistent in pointing in the same direction as LSJ: an outward form that may change, as in the compound verb and noun METAMORFOW and METAMORFWSIS. But when it comes to
our text in Phil 2:6, I'm frankly not quite sure what is intended by what is said: is it that the pre-existent Jesus somehow "expressed" or "manifested" God? And if so, is that really quite the same thing as the "nature" that Louw & Nida seem to understand MORFH to convey?

The end of the BDAG offering points us to Spicq, _Theological Lexicon of the New Testament_ (tr. James Ernest). Spicq has a fuller, more articulate discussion of MORFH, one that is, on the one hand, thoughtful and illuminating, and on the other hand, not as conclusive as one might perhaps have hoped. In the first place he offers the following as potential senses: "stature, form, condition, feature, external appearance, reproduction"--and note that this doesn't include "nature" or "being and doing what X is and does." Here are the key pair of paragraphs:

"Although MORFH is often very close in meaning to EIKWN, 9 and later on even becomes synonymous with it in Gnosticism,10 the texts cited disallow identifying them, as does this inscription from Laodicea, which distinguishes the two terms: "I bear the (bodily) form of Docticius, but the image of his divine virtue is carried on the lips of each person."11 This should be taken into account in the translation of Phil 2:6-7 (hOS EN MORFHi QEOU ... MORFHN DOULOU LABWN), which the Bible de Jérusalem correctly renders "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave."12 It is characteristic of MORFH to be modified, to appear to be changed, to take on new features,13 like the risen Lord appearing to the disciples at Emmaus en hETERA MORFH. 14 He had a new mode of being and a new appearance, analogous to that at the transfiguration (METAMORFOUSQAI, Matt 17:2). This is why in epiphanies of heavenly beings the MORFH is indeed said to be different, but not without affinities with earthly forms.15
"This changing of MORFH is to be compared on the one hand with the theme of "descent and ascent" because of the double MORFH in Phil 2:6-7(MORFH QEOU, MORFH DOULOU )-which owes nothing to the gnostic redeemer myth, which had not yet been concocted-and on the other hand with the consistent meaning of this term in the magical papyri. Whereas the Christian faith affirms that God is invisible and that no human has seen him or can see him (John 1:18; 6:46; 1John 4:12; Rom 1:20; 1Tim 1:17;6:16), the magicians call upon the deity as having a "form"16 and pray him
to appear in his "true form."17 This is a signal favor, for the Eight Books of Moses acknowledge that no one has been able to see this true divine form.18 The devotee of Hermes Trismegistos knows that his god appears in the East in the form of an ibis, in the West in the form of a dog's head,in the North in the form of a serpent, and in the south in the form of a wolf.19 What the mystic wishes to contemplate and be united with is "the sacred form" (Pap.Graec.Mag. 4, 216; vol. 1, p. 78; cf. XIII, 271; vol. 2, p. 101), the "gracious or joyous form,"20 and in the case of Aphrodite, her beauty made manifest: EPIKALOUMAI SE . . . DEIXASA THN KALHN SOU MORFHN.211"

Spicq cites the French Jerusalem Bible here with approval, "Lui, de condition divine . . . prenant la condition d'esclave." I don't know whether English "condition" is quite equivalent to the French "condition." Perhaps better would be "circumstances, terms of existence." Certainly he's right to call attention to the fact that the usage of MORFH in Phil 2:6-7 is closely bound up with the context of "transformation" or METAMORFWSIS. If that's the case, then MORFH in 2:6 EN MORFHi QEOU hUPARCWN and in 2:7 MORFHN DOULOU LABWN are indeed to be understood in the same sense, something like "mode of existence," the underlying assumption being that "mode of existence" is something that can undergo alteration. This is a notion that does seem consistent with other usages of MORFH, and it certainly doesn't approach the sense that Edgar cites: "the outward display of the inner reality or substance." "Outward display" is right, but if we say "outward display of the inner reality or substance," then we'd have to accept that the OUTWARD DISPLAY may mislead the one who views it regarding the "inner reality or substance" of what one beholds.

To sum up, Spicq writes, "It is clear from all of these examples that the use of MORFH in the hymn in Phil 2 is entirely to be expected in a context of metamorphosis or incarnation, but that it would be risky to give it a precise theological meaning."

And that seems like an appropriate imprecise formulation in which to end this endeavor to "divide the word."
--

Carl W. Conrad
Department of Classics, Washington University (Emeritus)
1989 Grindstaff Road/Burnsville, NC 28714/(828) 675-4243
cwconrad@artsci.wustl.edu
WWW: http://www.ioa.com/~cwconrad/

Robert Bowman, Philippians 2:13 and QEOS as Subject

Contra Robert M. Bowman, there is sufficient reason to construe QEOS in Philippians 2:13 as the subject rather than the predicate of the syntactical construction. Rogers and Rogers Linguistic and Exegetical Key points out that QEOS (Philippians 2:13) is fronted which indicates that it's the subject rather than the predicate (see p. 452).

John Calvin also seems to understand QEOS as the subject in this verse. Calvin writes: "God,'says he, 'is hO ENERGWN TO ENERGEIN he that worketh in us to do.' He brings, therefore, to perfection those pious dispositions which he has implanted in us, that they may not be unproductive, as he promises by Ezekiel, --'I will cause them to walk in my commandments.'"

(Ezekiel 11:20.) See his commentary on Philippians.

The Cry of Dereliction in Luke's Gospel

In his commentary on Acts, Professor Richard Longenecker makes this comment on Acts 2:25:

"It should be remembered that only Luke among the synoptists omitted the cry of dereliction from the cross: 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt 27:46; Mark 15:34); and only Luke has included the more filial, final word: 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit' (Luke 23:46). Both the omission and the inclusion are in line with the quotation of Ps 16:8 here [in Acts 2:25]: 'I saw the Lord always [DIA PANTOS] before me. Because he is at my right hand, I will not be shaken'" (Longenecker 77-78).

My Slightly Revised Amazon Review of Richard Young's Intermediate New Testament Greek Grammar

Richard A. Young has produced a useful work that certainly provides assistance to students of intermediate NT Greek. Being an intermediate Greek textbook, it predictably deals with syntax and not morphology or phonology. One particularly distinctive feature of Young's work is that he mixes modern linguistic findings and insights based on classical rhetoric with his discussions of syntax. For instance, he supplies brief discussions on metaphors, "kernels," figurative language in general, and speech acts. Moreover, Young has included a helpful chapter on discourse analysis and he also references the prominent theories of aspect formulated by Stanley Porter and Buist Fanning. In many ways, he is also fair with his presentation of syntactical possibilities as illustrated by his approach to 1 Cor 15:29. However, it seems that more than a few of his explanations regarding word order are driven by certain theological preapprehensions. For example, on page 66, he criticizes the New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures' rendering of Jn 1:1c as "a god" rather than the traditional "God."

His criticisms are based (in part) on his notion of what constitutes a "monadic noun." Young utterly misunderstands the thrust behind the NWT rendering when he implies that the "a god" translation is polytheistic--which it is not, when rightly understood. Even worse, he depends on the inadequate (often abused) rule of E. C. Colwell to buttress his opposition to the NWT reading. Regardless of whether the NWT is justified in treating the Johannine text as it does, it is clear that Young sometimes allows theology to govern his syntactical judgments. He unfortunately overlooks the possibility that "a god" just might be a very plausible way to translate Jn 1:1c. In the final analysis, there is really no need for him to read polytheistic notions into the NWT rendering. Despite some issues that I have with Young's intermediate text, however, I recommend it and say, caveat emptor!

The Abuse of Colwell's Rule (John 1:1c)

I want to make it known from the outset that I think Colwell's rule has generally been abused by NT exegetes and GNT grammarians. But the following quotes primarily are for informational purposes: 

"Although there are exceptions, the Colwell rule does seem to be correct for the majority of cases. Colwell (1933:13) states, 'A definite predicate nominative has the article when it follows the verb; it does not have the article when it precedes the verb.' For example, a definite predicate nominative with the article follows the linking verb in John 8:12 EGW EIMI TO FWS TOU KOSMOU, whereas the same predicate nominative without the article precedes the verb in John 9:5 FWS EIMI TOU KOSMOU. The problem in applying the Colwell rule is to determine when the predicate nominative is definite. The rule itself does not establish the definiteness of a noun, an observation sometimes ignored when applying it to John 1:1. We have already mentioned that monadic and proper nouns are definite. The same applies to nouns qualified with a genitive. Colwell notes that proper names in the predicate regularly do not have the article. Other examples of the Colwell rule include Matthew 13:37 (cf. John 5:27), 27:42, John 1:49, and 19:21" (Intermediate NT Greek, p. 65). 

The next quote is taken from Daniel B. Wallace's GGBB, page 260, ftn. 18: "This is not to say that his [Colwell's] rule is invalid. Rather, it is to say that its validity is for TEXTUAL CRITICISM rather than for grammar. Textual criticism was Colwell's real love anyway (he is frequently regarded as the father of modern American NT textual criticism). The rule's validity for textual criticism is as follows: If it is obvious that a pre-verbal PN is definite, the MSS that lack the article are more likely to support the original reading. The issue of meaning is not in view; rather, the presence or absence of the article is."

Matt13 Weedhacker Post on Matthew 24:36; Mark 13:32 (Etc) Textual Issues

Hi Edgar.

I did a post touching what your talking about. It has the earliest references I could find to Matt 24:36, Mark 13:32, Acts 1:7, in Patristic writers.

It may or may not be of use.

http://matt13weedhacker.blogspot.co.nz/2011/11/matt-2436-mark-1332-acts-17-nor-son-but.html

Origen in his Commentary On Matthew 55, has a big section on Matt 24:36. I haven't been able to find an English translation of the text. I think it would make an interesting read.

Big hat tip to Matt13. This information is very useful. Please check out his blog.

Translating 1 Clement 11:1 (The Last Part)

Greek: τοὺς δὲ ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν τίθησιν

The version of Lightfoot that I'm using translates this passage: "but appointeth unto punishment and torment them which swerve aside."

He's translating:

δὲ = "but"
τοὺς = "them"
τίθησιν = "appointeth"
εἰς κόλασιν καὶ αἰκισμὸν = "unto punishment and torment"
ἑτεροκλινεῖς ὑπάρχοντας = "which swerve aside"

I would probably not change much about Lightfoot's rendering. Maybe "but set [placed, assigned] to punishment [pruning, mutilation, cutting-off] and harm them which are inclined to other loyalties."

1. κόλασιν can denote "punishment" (BDAG, Robertson's WP). See http://www.biblestudytools.com/commentaries/robertsons-word-pictures/matthew/matthew-25-46.html as an example. While I do not agree with Robertson's overall explanation for Mt 25:46, I believe that the Greek word may denote "punishment" which is not the same as the verb "punishing." See 1 John 4:18. BDAG includes the definition "retribution" as well.

2. BDAG points out that when αἰκισμὸν is used with κόλασιν (or their related lexical forms) that αἰκισμὸν evidently means "punishment." It cites 1 Cl 11:1. So what we appear to have in this passage is a redundancy or pleonasm. The words essentially communicate the same idea.

3. BDAG also cites 1 Cl 11:1 for the entry ἑτεροκλινεῖς. The word may convey notions of "leaning to one side" or "inclined to, having a propensity for" but in 1 Cl 11:1 probably means "having other allegiance" since it's used in the context of rebellious or apostate peoples.

By the way, ὑπάρχοντας is a present active participle ("being") in the accusative form.

Hope this helps,

Edgar

Apparent Sexism in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Donald Bloesch (Is the Bible Sexist?, pages 94-95) thinks that "later Judaism" manifested an increasingly hardened attitude toward women as indicated by daily prayers like "I thank thee, O Lord, that thou hast not created me a woman." However, this disposition apparently was not limited to ancient Jews since Augustine of Hippo believed that man chiefly, not woman, is the image and glory of God, while Ambrosiaster considers women inferior to men and even Thomas Aquinas evidently thinks that women are (in one sense) defective males within whom reason does not predominate. Of course, I've read articles that try to ameliorate Thomas' position. But such arguments don't seem all that convincing in light of the ST 1.91.1, Reply 1:

"As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the
masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2)."

Was Christ Absolutely Ignorant of the Day and Hour? (Matthew 24:36)

The following was once posted on greektheology by me:

Dear list-members,

While we were talking about the dual nature of Christ the past few days, something crossed my mind: the issue of Christ's Omniscience or lack thereof. In Mark 13:32, we read: PERI DE THS hHMERAS EKEINHS H THS hWRAS OUDEIS OIDEN OUDE hOI AGGELOI EN OURANWi OUDE hO hUIOS EI MH hO PATHR.

The NIV translates the Greek:

"No one knows about that day or hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father."

My question is--does this passage teach that the LOGOS become flesh was absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour mentioned in Mark 13:32 (Matt. 24:36)? First, it would be helpful to define "absolute ignorance." But before we do that, let me pose my query in this way. If Jesus existed in two natures in the days of his enfleshment (and still does subsist in this manner, according to orthodoxy), how could he have been absolutely ignorant of the day and the hour that is only privy to the Father? If he did not know as man, it seems that he should have known the day and the hour as God. But there is an escape hatch, some may say.

Commenting on Matt. 24:36, Ralph Earle writes:

"The oldest Greek manuscripts add this ["Nor the Son"] after "angels of heaven," so Matthew agrees with Mark (13:32) in reporting Jesus as saying that He did not know the time of his second coming. This is part of His KENOSIS--His self-emptying (see Phil. 2:7, NASB)--connected with his incarnation" (Earle 22).

Thus Earle's "escape hatch" is that Jesus did not know the day or the hour because he emptied himself when he came to be in the likeness of finite men and women. In the incarnation--the Son supposedly did not subtract his deity, but simply added humanity. His "ignorance" of the time when his Father would initiate pivotal eschatological events associated with his PAROUSIA was due to his self-emptying: it did not mean that the Son was not Almighty God the second Person of the Trinity). But does this "escape hatch" really serve Earle's purpose?

There are two objections that I have to Earle's proposition. One, if Jesus existed in two natures and had two wills, how could he be totally ignorant (as Mark 13:32 implies) of the day and the hour known only by the Father? Secondly, there seems to be indirect proof that Christ was not Omniscient in his pre-existence. This fact would seem highly problematic for those who affirm Christ's "Deity." Besides, I have argued elsewhere that the temporary relinquishing of divine attributes is highly problematic.

As for absolute ignorance, I will expound on that term if others want to discuss this issue. Suffice it to say for now that I define "absolute ignorance" (in this case) as total unawareness of a fact or some particular datum (or set of data).

Best regards,

Edgar Foster

How Does "Chance" Exist, If We Live in a Deterministic World?

A list-member of greektheology once said:

"I agree with you, there are definite paradoxes with omniscience in correlation with and predestination verses free will. But, with respect to omniscience (in the classic sense) and foreknowledge (which actual is rather redundant); I think that if you have the free will to choose T1 to cut the grass and change your mind to T2; T2 is ultimately your choice. T2 is what would have always been known to God, not T1. Now how does that answer a verse like Luke 10:31? One possibility, that it is the perception of chance. There are instances where God appears to change his mind. But, does the Alpha and the Omega, say one thing and later decide not to follow through? An example could be found in Jonah chapter 3. God tells Jonah again to go to Nineveh but on this time he goes. Jonah tells the people of Nineveh that if they will keep sinning, Nineveh will be destroyed in 40 days. After a little while the whole city became religious and started obeying God. Did God know all along or did he change his mind and spare them? Or is this "change of heart" simply how we understand the incident?"

I replied:

I have given thoughtful consideration to your question and it is another good one. While I don't want this conversation to stray too far into Hebrew (Scripture) theology, I think we need to address this vital issue.

Initially, I wonder if "chance" is our perception or if its an objective reality. In Eccl. 9:11, Qoheleth writes: "time and chance happeneth to them all" (ASV). This passage indicates that at least some events in our lives happen by "chance." This view also seems to be corroborated by the Scripture in Luke that was referenced heretofore (Luke 10:31). That verse says in part: KATA SUGKURIAN DE hIEREUS TIS KATABAINEN EN THi hODWi. Again, "by chance," the priest happened to be traveling along the road. There is no indication within this pericope that God foreordained the priest's actions. In fact, I actually wonder what purpose would be served by God foreknowing or foreordaining everything. For example, let's say that one day I was driving down the road imbibing a fifth of liquor (MH GENOITO!) and I lost control of my vehicle which led to me hitting a bridge.

Did God foreordain my actions? Were my actions seen long before there was ever a human race? What would have happened if I had not been drinking and driving? Would I have been involved in this horrible accident? Maybe, but it would not have been as a result of driving while intoxicated. In this case, I would put the blame on my present actions. I believe that God would choose not to know whether I would do such a foolhardy thing. At least, that's the way I see it. :-)

Conversely, as I read the OT and NT, I find that chance is possibly modified by God's intervention. A case example is Ruth 2:4: "And she went, and came and gleaned in the fields after the reapers: and her hap was to light on the portion of the field belonging unto Boaz" (ASV).

The writer of this particular OT account states that Ruth happened to "light on the portion of the field belonging unto Boaz." We are thus informed that Ruth coincidentally (fortuitously) began working in the field of Boaz. But the rest of the narrative assures us that God's ENERGEIA is at work in the life of Ruth. Now it is quite possible that God could have used Ruth if she would have lit upon another field belonging to someone else. The fact is, however, that she landed on Boaz's plot of land. Was this mere chance? Was it pure coincidence that Ruth began to work for Boaz? Personally, I think not. At the same time, I don't believe that God foreordained this event before there was ever a Ruth or a Boaz. Similarly, I find it quite implausible that God foreordains every event that happens throughout the KOSMOS. But I am not saying that the account is wrong when it attributes Ruth's fate to chance. My point is that God is also at work in Ruth's life (compare Ecclesiastes 9:1).

Regarding your question about Jonah 3. True, some wish to view the account anthropomorphically. I have reservations about such an approach for the following reasons. The Hebrew word used to describe God's "change of mind" is NaHaM. Concerning this lingual symbol, J.G. Wenham writes:

'"Regret" or "repent" may suggest a change of attitude, but when God "repents," he starts to act differently. Here [Gen. 6:6] and in 1 Sam. 15:11 and Jer. 18:10 he regrets some good thing he has done for his people, whereas in Exod. 32:12, 14; 2 Sam. 24:16; Amos 7:3, 6 he repents of some evil he is carrying out. That God should change his mind might lead to his being accused of capriciousness, which Scripture firmly denies: "God is not a son of man that he should repent" (Num 23:19; Cf. 1 Sam. 15:29). Such remarks obviously raise various questions for the doctrine of divine sovereignty and its correlate human responsibility, but theological systematization is hardly the concern of the biblical narrators. For them divine repentance is a response to man's changes of heart, whether for better or worse" (Wenham, JG. _Genesis_ Waco, Texas: Word, 1987. P. 144).

I concur with Wenham when he writes that God responds to the changes of men, "for better or worse." That is, when God changes, He is simply responding to the actions of his creatures. To illustrate, before I began to exercise faith in Christ as Savior and King, I was one of God's enemies (Rom. 5:8ff); the wrath of God remained upon me (John 3:36). After taking the necessary steps to become reconciled to God, God's attitude toward me changed from one of wrath to one of love and kindness. When God made this change, however, it was not a change of essence: it was a relational change. I would contend that it was an actual, not just a perceptual change. In sum, I think that chance is real, and change in God is real (as explained above)--"accidents" (i.e. things not foreordained) do happen. At the same time, it is important to remember that everything is in the hand of God (Eccl. 9:1ff). Nothing can happen without His permission.

The Greek of Galatians 4:10

See the remarks made in Vincent's Word Studies and Robertson's Word Pictures at http://www.godrules.net/para/gal/parallelgal4-10.htm

Compare how the NWT reads.

Regards,

Edgar

More on God and TEMPUS (God in Time)

Here is a dialogue that I once had on greektheology (my old yahoogroup). I will distinguish between my dialogue partner's remarks and mine.

[Dialogue partner]
Part of the problem with you, Blackman and others in this discussion is you have
a priori decided what "timeless/eternal" means without regard for the actual biblical revelation. This forces you to multiply a few entities yourself as you
seek to explain away the several Scriptures that clearly teach teach that God is in fact infinite with regard to space and time.

[Edgar]
Maybe I missed the data that you presented to back your arguments, but it certainly doesn't seem that the writers of Scripture presuppose or acknowledge God's timelessness. The term "infinity" (as far as I can tell) is not used in Scripture. What it means when applied to God is still a question of dispute among theologians. So, how can we dogmatically contend that God is timeless or that His infinity somehow obviates His being temporal?

In an essay entitled "God is Everlasting," Nicholas
Wolterstorff writes:

"God is spoken of as calling Abraham to leave Chaldea and later instructing Moses to return to Egypt. So does not the event of God's instructing Moses succeed that of God's calling Abraham? And does not this sort of succession constitute a change on God's time-strand--not a change in his 'essence,' but nonetheless a change on his time-strand."

Wolterstorff concludes:

"Though God is within time, yet he is the Lord of time. The whole array of contingent temporal events is within his power. He is Lord of what occurs. And that,
along with the specific pattern of what he does, grounds all authentically biblical worship of, and obedience to, God."

I might also add that William Lane Craig makes an important distinction between metaphysical time and Einsteinian space-time, between infinite space/time
and finite space-time. Based on these conceptual distinctions, it is possible that God has always subsisted in infinite space/time without being constrained or confined by or to (finite) space-time. The only real reason that I can see for rejecting Craig's distinction is an insalubrious attachment to the, for all intents and purposes, now defunct positivistic worldview of yore.

[Debate partner]
However, I would like you to address the question: in what sense can God foreknow and elect his people from before the foundation of the world, and yet still seek them? You will go one of two directions in your response (though it is possible you could a go a third, unexpected [by me] direction): either you will in someway so define foreknowledge and predestination/election to fit your concept of God as finite, or you will find someway to make the "seek" fit with those concepts.

[Edgar]
(1) I think that most exegetes today explain Eph 1:4 as a reference to a group of people, that is, the elect, and not to individuals composing that group. In other words, God knows that some will accept His offer of salvation and others will reject it. However, God wills that all men be saved and come to an accurate knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4). Men and women are therefore not passive objects or pawns in the divine work of salvation. We are free to choose God or spurn Him (Heb 3:12-14). Ergo, God, since He evidently knows all that it is possible to know, is aware that
there is an indeterminately numbered group of persons who will respond to His free unmerited gift. Nevertheless, He either chooses not to know or knows as indeterminate the decision that men and women will
make vis-a-vis His glorious person.

(2) How do you think the writer of Hebrews is employing the expression APO KATABOLHS KOSMOU in Heb 4:3?

Thanks,
Edgar

Translating OLAM in NWT: God and TEMPUS

As you are well aware, the NWT translates OLAM in Psalm 90:2 and elsewhere as "time indefinite" and I think this is enlightening since the etymology for the Hebrew term suggests that the writer is possibly referring to "hidden time." It seems to me that Psalm 90:2 is not just enunciating God's "eternal" past but also the fact that God's existence is endless or boundless. That is, I take the writer of Psalm 90:2 to be saying that God has always existed in time and always will exist in time: God has no temporal beginning nor will he have a temporal end.

I concede that the attempt to plumb God's eternal psyche is probably futile. Of course, Trinitarians will say that God was never alone in the first place, although Tertullian does venture a theological opinion regarding God's solitary existence and what God was possibly doing before he generated his own Word, thereby making that impersonal Word the Son of God. Tertullian's account can be found in Adversus Praxean 5-7; it is undoubtedly based partly on Genesis 1 and Proverbs 8:22ff. His suggestion is that God conducted discourse within himself when alone much like a man or woman thinks or deliberates when by him/herself.

The mode in which God knew prior to creation or knows now is a tough question. But I'll just say that I'm very much opposed to the absolute divine timeless idea when it comes to Jehovah since a number of unseemly implications flow therefrom. If God is timeless, God does not--probably cannot--change ontologically or cognitively. Furthermore, if God is timeless, he does not have genuine emotional states. Additionally, if God is atemporal, then Jehovah knows all things as present: all events whether past, present or future to us are all present to him. I have fleshed out these implications at other times.

Regards,
Edgar

Richard Swinburne on Deriving Doctrine from Scripture

Greetings to all,

I once came across something in Richard Swinburne's Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy that might interest my blog readers.

The Oxford University professor writes:

"There are scriptural passages which taken with their
normal meanings imply doctrines contrary to later
orthodoxy: for example Christ's statement in St John's
Gospel (14:28) that 'the Father is greater than I.'
There are other scriptural passages which are
ambiguous, but which perhaps more naturally seem to
imply doctrines contrary to later orthodoxy, for
instance the reference to Christ in the Epistle to the
Colossians (1:15) as 'the first born of all creation.'
What rather has happened is that one party in the
Church proposed, and eventually a Church proclaimed as
official doctrine, one interpretation which they claim
is the most plausible interpretation of the Message of
Scripture and Church tradition as a whole. This forces
them to claim that certain past ways of worship were
misleading, and certain statements of past theologians
false, and that certain passages of Scripture have to
be interpreted with other than their normal meanings
(i.e. their meanings if taken in isolation)."

See page 138 of Revelation. This quote is taken from the Clarendon Press, 1992 edition.

Old Interpreter's Bible Explanation of 1 Corinthians 2:10

An often used text to support the Trinity doctrine is 1 Corinthians 2:10ff. This blog entry seeks to address some of the arguments that revolve around that passage.

The Holy Spirit In The NT

by Edgar Foster

Concerning 1 Cor. 2:10ff, we read:

"Paul turns next to the place of the Spirit in imparting this true wisdom. He does not say that the Spirit teaches all things; but that he searches everything or investigates. The only other place where Paul uses the word is in Rom. 8:27, where he speaks of the searching of the hearts of men by God. That activity is an aspect of the omnipresence of the Spirit. Yet we must not make the mistake of confusing Paul's idea of the Spirit, the supernatural gift to believers, and to them only, with the Stoic idea of a reality permeating the entire natural universe. Paul uses the word PNEUMA in a wise variety of ways. sometimes it seems more like an impersonal power. Here it is the self-consciousness of God, by analogy to the human PNEUMA, which is man's self-consciousness. The passage suggests the possibility of a psychological interpretation of the Trinity, paving the way for Augustine's approach. In these verses the word PNEUMA is used in more than the usual variety of ways. Paul speaks of the spirit of man, the spirit of the world (KOSMOS, not AIWN) and the Spirit of God. The English texts attempt to make the distinction clear by the use of capitals for the last. But since the Greek has no such indication, we cannot be sure when Paul means the divine Spirit and when he means simply this faculty in human nature. He nevertheless makes a tremendous claim in this passage. In the bestowal of the Spirit men have received nothing less than God's self- consciousness. Therefore they are able to understand his secret wisdom"
(Interpreter's Bible, Vol. 10, pp. 39-40, Emphases Mine).

Analysis

1 Cor. 2:10ff was one of Rudolph Bultmann's favorite passages, and it is also one of mine. In 1 Cor. 2:10, Paul makes it very plain that God--that is, the Father--teaches Christians (cf. John 6:45). The Father does not teach us, however, apart from His holy spirit: "It was to us that God made known his secret." How? "By means of his spirit" (TEV).

Continually throughout the book of 1 Corinthians, the apostle Paul identifies God as the Father (1 Corinthians 8:5-6; 11:3; 15:24-28). To Paul and the entire Primitive church, there was one God (the Father). This deity conveys His divine secret to those who worship God in spirit and truth. The holy spirit is the omnipotent God's vehicle for teaching. God's dynamic invisible force acting powerfully upon Christians discloses the will of God in a lucid manner. The Father lovingly reveals Himself and discloses information about His Son and eternal purposes through the power of the spirit. 1 Cor. 2:10 suggests that the spirit is not a person, but a force or potentially consciousness.

The Greek word translated "searches" (TEV) is EREUNAO. This word, according to J.H. Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon means "[to] search, examine into." In Rom. 8:27 we read: "And He Who searches [EREUNAO] the hearts of men knows what is in the mind of the [Holy] Spirit [what His intent is], because the Spirit intercedes and pleads [before God] in behalf of the saints" (Amplified Bible. Words in brackets found in the original Amplified Bible).

In Rom. 8:26, 27, the Father is said to be the one who searches and hears the figurative pleas of the holy spirit. God searches the human heart, as the spirit examines the "depths of God's purposes." While the Interpreter's Bible may choose to view 1 Cor. 2:10ff as a precursor to Augustine's psychological Trinity, I personally see no such import within this Pauline account.

Dates for Some of Tertullian's Works (According to FL Cross)

From F. L. Cross, The Early Christian Fathers (London: Penguin, 1993), 141-142.

1. Adversus Marcionem (circa 208-211 CE)

2. Adversus Hermogenem (circa 200 CE)

3. De Carne Christi (210-213 CE)

4. De Carnis Resurrectione (210-212 CE)

What Does the Hebrew Word "Azazel" Mean?

See http://books.google.com/books?id=7Vh1Ozo3QHMC&pg=PA126&dq=leviticus+16+azazel&cd=1#v=onepage&q=leviticus%2016%20azazel&f=false

Clicking on the title will also take you to the relevant Google Books page.

Regards,

Edgar

PROS in John 1:1b and Divine Personhood

Knowing that PROS implies "being with" or "toward" or even in proximate communion with someone else, certain theologians have tried to explain Jn 1:1b-c by resorting to a priori categories of person and substance. However, John McKenzie has pointed out that John did not differentiate between the divine substance and divine Persons who are identical with the divine substance. John simply used QEOS to describe the Being he identified as the only true God (John 17:3). This Being is distinct from the man who was called Jesus Christ on earth, and He is also set apart from the LOGOS who was with the only true God before the world was (John 17:5).

The problem that has not been satisfactorily addressed by Trinitarian theology accordingly involves in what sense the Son and Spirit are Persons. To be sure, theologians have endeavored to cut the Gordian knot of this troublesome antinomy. Nevertheless, not one thinker has satisfactorily explained how Persons who are not Persons in the Cartesian sense (COGITO ERGO SUM) can subsist with (PROS) one another
and enjoy meaningful communion or love one another.

G. R. B. Murray says that PROS TON QEON (Jn 1:1b) means: "in the presence of God" or "in the fellowship of God." He probably is suggesting that God the Son communed with God the Father. B.M Newman and E.A. Nida reject the "in the presence of God" understanding for this construction and opt for the notion of "a kind of interactive reciprocality between the Word and God."

None of these explanations make sense to me within the context of a non-social Trinity doctrine. Of course, if one posits a social Trinity, then tritheism must be avoided or the idea that there are three "I thinks" within God. Trinitarians, please don't multiply antinomies beyond necessity. With apologies to Ockham!

Best,
Edgar

Another Response to Philippians 2:6-7 Questions

Some years ago, this question came my way:

The second question is in reference to Philippians 2:6-8. You seem to follow the standard approach of the kenosis happening in eternity past or at least at the time of Jesus' birth. Is there anything in the text itself which requires the emptying of Jesus to be then? There is only one time specific reference in the whole passage, as I see it, and that is the reference to Jesus' death. Is it not possible for the emptying to have taken place in the Garden of Gethsemane or even on the cross (stake)?

My response:

I personally think that it is possible Paul could have been referring to the Christ Event [Jesus becoming human] or to the death of Jesus when he spoke of the Messiah emptying himself. But I do not find that interpretation [i.e. the death of Jesus representing his emptying] as compelling for the following reasons.

(1) Phil. 2:5-11 seems to be modeled after Isa. 52-53, where we read about the preexistent Messiah (the Suffering Servant of YHWH) who humbles himself and is subsequently exalted. See L. Gregory Bloomquist's excellent and detailed treatment of Phil. 2:5-11 in The Function of Suffering in Philippians (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), pp. 160-168.

(2) EN MORFH QEOU appears to be a dative of indirect object that describes "an exalted heavenly figure very close to God," but not one who possesses absolute divinity (Osiek, Carolyn. Philippians, Philemon. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000). See page 60. Furthermore, "This interpretation is enhanced by the rest of verse 6: he did not consider it a hARPAGMOS, something to be seized or exploited, to be ISA QEWi, equal or of equal status to God" (Osiek 60). The semantic value of MORFH in relation to QEOU may also strengthen the connection with preexistence. [That is, the term probably means "external appearance" or "shape." I.e., the Son appears to reflect the divine glory in his preexistence.]

(3) EN MORFH DOULOU seems to be contrasted with EN MORFH DOULOU. EN MORFH DOULOU appears to juxtapose Christ's earthly mode of being with his heavenly heavenly manner of existence.

(4) Phil 2:5-11 also appears to bear some resemblance
to Col 1:15-16 and Heb 1 & 2 as well as Jn 1:1-18,
which also speak to Christ's pre-existence and his
katabasis as well as his subsequent anabasis.
Moreover, the katabasis/anabasis themes in Second
Temple Judaism normally involve a heavenly figure
becoming human (e.g., the Son of Man).

But, I will concede that the text could be read in the
way that you suggest. I just do not think that is a
likely reading when one considers all of the relevant
exegetical factors, however.

Best regards,
Edgar

More on hARPAGMOS (Philippians 2:6-7)

The following is taken from my book Christology and the Trinity:

To attribute a passive sense to harpagmos appears to be unwarranted. Exploring this issue further before coming to any definite conclusions, however, we will note the exegesis of Moises Silva:

The ambiguous phrase in v. 6, [ouch harpagmon hegesato], has created a literature far more extensive than it probably deserves. In particular, one is impressed by the futility of trying to reach a decision regarding Jesus' preexistence and deity on the basis of whether harpagmon has an active meaning or a passive meaning . . . if one opts for the passive idea, is the nuance positive ("windfall, advantage") or negative ("booty, prize")? Further, if it carries a negative nuance, we must decide whether it speaks of a thing already possessed, which one is tempted to hold on to . . . or a thing not possessed, which one may be tempted to snatch. (Silva 117)

In the end, Silva concludes that a sense of retaining may be the most likely meaning of harpagmos in Philippians 2:6ff. But he is forced to admit that such a conclusion is uncertain and not central to the "hymn" of Philippians 2:6-11 (117). Furthermore, he adds that the few instances of harpagmos outside of Christian literature are all active and not passive (as is the case with harpagma). Consulting Abbott-Smith also reveals that "there is certainly a presumption in favour of the active meaning here" since the apostle does not use the LXX form harpagma. Paul thus speaks of an act of seizing: not a thing seized or a prize (A-S 60).

Though being a firm advocate of Trinitarianism, Greek Professor Daniel B. Wallace also openly admits that while it may be theologically "attractive" to construe harpagmos as having a passive sense (in Phil. 2:6), "it is not satisfactory" (Wallace 634). Wallace convincingly demonstrates that we must interpret the verse in the light of the phrase heauton ekenosen. He concludes that the only translation harmonious with Philippians 2:7 is "a thing to be grasped" (an active meaning for harpagmos). We can thus see that an objective look at the usage of harpagmos in the NT leads one to conclude that harpagmos in Phil 2:6 evidently carries the active meaning of snatching (i.e., a usurpation). This apostolic passage therefore appears to be affirming the fact that Jesus did not aspire to equality with God. To the contrary, completely antithetical to the first Adam, the one who existed en morphe theou contentedly subjected himself to his Father in heaven: "What Christ emptied himself of was his right to be served, his privileged position as the Son of God, and his visible glory [morphe] by taking the form of a slave" (Wannamaker 188).

Notes on Philippians 2:6-7 (MORFH, Participles, etc)

From the first century, the evidence is overwhelming that μορφή denoted the outward shape or form of an entity. LSJ (a Classical Greek resource) provides examples of how μορφή meant "shape" or "form" in Homer and Plato. Homer uses the word to signify "beauty, grace" (Cunliffe), and even in Aristotle, we may find the meaning "form or shape."

Richard R. Melick Jr (NA Commentary on Philippians, Colossians and Philemon) points out that ὑπάρχω once meant "to exist originally." However, the term later came to signify "really exist" (102). BDAG contains pretty much the same information. It just adds that ὑπάρχω eventually became a "widely used substitute" for εἶναι in Hellenistic Greek "[with] a predicate noun." Moreover, ὑπάρχω occurs quite frequently "in the [participle with] a predicate noun."

I would say that ἁρπαγμὸν carries an active sense in Philippians: better to understand it as "grasping" or "snatching." But see BDAG under ἁρπαγμός and ὑπάρχω.

Keep in mind that words change in time. So while etymologically, ὑπάρχω may have (at one time) meant "under beginning," it eventually came to denote "existence."

I might just add that there is a debate in Biblical scholarship over whether ἁρπαγμός/ἁρπαγμὸν is passive or active (RES RAPTA vs. RES RAPIENDA) in Philippians. If it is active, it would probably imply grasping after that which one does not already possess. The word may also imply a violent seizure (as in a robbery) though it does not necessarily refer to the act of robbery at all times.

(1) Remember that ὑπάρχων is probably a concessive participle in 2:6. So you might render it as "although he was existing" or something to that effect.

(2) ὑπάρχω, by NT times, does not simply refer to a beginning or coming to be.

(3) Although μορφή is anarthous, I would be inclined to definitize "external appearance" since there is only one form of God.

(4) The phrase "taking by force an equality with God" might also be a little awkward. Maybe you should construe ἁρπαγμὸν as a direct object (i.e., he did not consider "a seizure" or "snatching").

See http://www.thegoodbookblog.com/2012/sep/11/in-the-form-of-god-phil-26/

The phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ presents the first crux in our passage. Μορφή (here dat. sg. fem.) is best trs. “form” (most EVV; BDAG 659c). The NIV’s “in very nature God” (“truly God” [CEV]; “God” [NLT]; “possessed of the very nature of God” [H-M 114]) constitutes an interpretation that is neither well supported by the usage of the term in HGk. nor particularly suitable to the surrounding context. Although the term can be used substantially (Plato Phaed. 103e; Resp. 381c; Aristotle Met. 11.1060b; Phys. 2.1.193b; Plut. Quaest. plat. 1003b; Def. orac. 429a; Philo Spec. 1.327–28), there is no semantic component in μορφή that necessarily involves a corresponding “nature” (NIV) or ontology (pace Fee 204; H-M 114). The great majority of instances where μορφή and its cognates occur in HGk. mean simply “outward appearance” (Dan Fabricatore, Form of God, Form of a Servant: An Examination of the Greek Noun μορφή in Philippians 2:6-7 [University Press of America, 2009]; “form, outward appearance, shape” [BDAG 659c]; that “which may be perceived by the senses” [J. Behm, TDNT 4:745-46]).

The comments from the linked blog have been written by J. Hellerman.

Tertullian's Use of the Latin Term "Substantia"

(1) Aristotle makes a distinction between PRIMA SUBSTANTIA and SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA. Think of the former as an individual substance (i.e. a dog, cat or lamb) and the latter as a reference to an essential classification of being (i.e. essences). However, as Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz point out in The Divine Attributes (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pages 23-24, it is probably more accurate to think of Aristotle's developed theory of SUBSTANTIA as a delineation of form and matter.

(2) Tertullian's use of SUBSTANTIA in Adversus Praxean is fraught with many conceptual difficulties. Harnack proposed juristic definitions for SUBSTANTIA and PERSONA that have pretty much been rejected by modern scholars. One of the best studies I consulted for my M.Th. thesis was George Stead's "Divine Substance in Tertullian," JTS N.S. 14 (1963): 44-66. Another writer who addresses Tertullian's use of SUBSTANTIA is Eric Osborn. See Tertullian: First Great Theologian of the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). In my thesis, I argued (based on Tertullian's De Anima 32) that the apologist utilizes SUBSTANTIA vis-a-vis the Godhead to mean "a concrete particular." That is to say, Tertullian is primarily conscripting the Stoic notion of SUBSTANTIA, as opposed to the Aristotelian concept of PRIMA or SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA. Stuart G. Hall writes that Tertullian uses "substance" (in the context of Adversus Praxean) to mean "a being." See his study Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992).

My thesis later became the book Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian's Adversus Praxean. I hope that it contributes to an understanding of Tertullian's use of substantia, among other things.

The NIV Rendering of Luke 18:14

Luke 18:14 (NIV) reads: "I tell you that this man, rather than the other, went home justified before God" rather than the wording "justified by God."

But knowledge of the NIV's theological orientation suggests that the NIV is not trying to say the tax collector was proved righteous by his actions. With all due respect, I believe that the NIV is trying to convey the idea that God (as the implicit agent of the verb DEDIKAIWMENOS) justified the tax collector. I also checked my commentary on Luke written by Alfred Plummer and he writes concerning the Greek wording KATEBH hOUTOS DEDIKAIWMENOS: " 'This despised man went down justified in the sight of God,' i.e. 'accounted as righteous, accepted'" (see p. 419).

Studying this verse has also helped me to understand what the NWT is doing in Luke 18:14: it is treating DEDIKAIWMENOS as a passive used reflexively whereas other translations appear to be treating it as a passive simpliciter. The comparison of the passage in Luke with Genesis 44:16 and Revelation 22:11 is interesting. The KJV and the NWT both render Genesis 44:16 in a way that suggests the brothers of Joseph want to know how they might justify themselves or prove themselves righteous. But see BDAG for Genesis 44:16 and Luke 18:14.

I have no real problem with the NWT rendering. However, it helps to review translational possibilities for this verse.

Translating Greek (2 Corinthians 3:16-17)

There is hardly one way that a text must be understood in Greek. There are usually numerous options given to one who translates ancient Greek. For example, A.T. Robertson (in his big grammar) argues that both substantives (κύριος and πνεῦμα) in 2 Cor 3:17 are definite and interchangeable. He bases his remarks on the fact that the subject and predicate in this passage both have the definite article. However, as Maximilian Zerwick says concerning the way he understands 2 Cor 3:17, that is only one interpretation of this construction.

Zerwick thinks that both articles in 2 Cor 3:17 are anaphorical, speaking of that which precedes rather than what follows. Therefore, he views ὁ δὲ κύριος as continuing the thought expressed in 2 Cor 3:16, whereas τὸ πνεῦμά references the spirit mentioned in the preceding context. But he notes that this is one way of many to interpret the Bible verse. See section 169 of Zerwick's Biblical Greek.

Petr Pokorny on Colossians 1:16

"This is a confession-like formula that describes in good Jewish fashion the one God as the only creator, but who, from the Christian perspective, created everything through Jesus Christ. The purpose of the accumulation of prepositions, which is elsewhere documented as a linguistic phenomenon accompanying Stoic pantheism, is to emphasize creation's total dependence upon the creator, whose purpose Jesus Christ represents. Since God the Father is the initiator of creation, the preposition 'from' is not used here. Otherwise it is difficult to distinguish the functions of the various prepositions from one another. They, as a whole, are to have a cumulative effect. 'In' (instrumental EN) and 'through' mean almost the same thing; only the phrase 'for him' is capable of pointing to the eschatological goal of creation (cf. Rom. 11:36)."

See Pokorny, Colossians: A Commentary. Trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), p. 78-79.

Questions on the Gospel of John

A reader poses these questions. If anyone can provide some helpful input, it would be appreciated. I'll try to do the same. She writes:

Can anyone answer these questions for me please. Thanks

What was it that Jesus had said or done that caused the Pharisees to say that He was claiming to be God in John 10:33?

What was it about what Jesus said in John 8:58 that caused the Pharisees to want to kill Him?

From the New World Translation perspective, what is it about saying, "I have been" (John 8:58) that would motivate the Jews to want to kill Jesus?

Do we see any prior account of anyone in the Bible being killed for claiming to pre-exist if Jesus was merely claiming pre-existence?

Could you please explain what it was the Pharisees misunderstood and what they were misunderstanding to cause them to say what they did about Jesus' claim?

Jane
sorry for choosing anon but i do have a facebook account

DIA in Colossians 1:15-17 Rather Than hUPO

One of my favorite books is Emil Brunner's Dogmatics (Volume I) entitled "The Christian Doctrine of God."
On page 308 of his work, Brunner writes concerning Colossians 1:15-17:

"In this connexion the truth which we have already seen acquires new significance, that the world, it is true, was created THROUGH--DIA--the Son, but not BY--hUPO--the Son, that it has been created IN Him and UNTO Him, but that He Himself is never called the Creator. It has pleased God the Creator to create the world in the Son, through the Son, and unto the Son. The fact that between the Creator and the Creation there stands the Mediator of creation means that the world is an act of the freedom of God, that it does not proceed from the Logos."

While Brunner thinks that the Son of God is "eternal," he does not reason that Christ is ever called "Creator" in Scripture. He argues that the LOGOS is the mediate agent of creation or the one through whom God brings forth the KOSMOS. But the Son is never referred to as Creator in Scripture. Furthermore, not only does the apostle Paul describe the role of the LOGOS in passive verbal terms at Col 1:15-17--he does not employ hUPO to delineate the LOGOS' office vis-à-vis creation.

Brunner insists the Greek preposition hUPO demonstrates that Christ is not being identified as the Creator in Col 1:15-17. I concur with his assessment and suggest that a comprehensive study of Greek literature will support this specific point. If Paul had wanted to identify Jesus as the Creator in Col 1:15-17, it seems that he would have employed hUPO instead of DIA.