Understanding Acts 2:24

"Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death: because it was not possible that he should be holden of it" (KJV).

"But God raised him from the dead, freeing him from the agony of death, because it was impossible for death to keep its hold on him" (NIV).

The more I look at this passage, the more it seems that it could be an example of deliberate ambiguity. WDINAS can refer to either "cords" or "pains," and both meanings seem appropriate here. But the stress may be on the cords--without excluding the notion of "birth pangs."

In this regard, Richard Longenecker writes: "The imagery is of 'death pangs' (WDINAS TOU QANATOU; NIV, 'agony of death') and their awful clutches (cf. 2 Sam. 22:6; Pss. 18:4-6; 116:3), from which God is 'freeing' Jesus 'because it was impossible to keep its hold on him' (Acts. The Expositor's Bible Commentary. P. 75).

The last part of 2:24 that is marked by KAQOTI seems to show where Peter placed the stress at, namely, on the idea of cords constricting Jesus while at the same time causing figurative pain (i.e., Jesus, did not literally suffer while in hADHS).

Louw-Nida note: "hOTI, KAQOTI: markers of cause or reason, based on an evident fact - 'because, since, for, in view of the fact that'" (Sec. 89.33). See Luke 1:7.

Arnobius of Sicca Regarding Human Lingual Conventions

Arnobius of Sicca writes: "Yet, if you consider the true state of the case, no language is naturally perfect, and in like manner none is faulty. For what natural reason is there, or what law written in the constitution of the world, that PARIES [i.e. 'wall'] should be called HIC, and SELLA [i.e. 'chair'] HOEC?-since neither have they sex distinguished by male and female, nor can the most learned man tell me what HIC and HOEC are, or why one of them denotes the male sex while the other is applied to the female. These conventionalities are man's, and certainly are not indispensable to all persons for the use of forming their language; for PARIES might perhaps have been called HOEC, and SELLA HIC without any fault being found, if it had been agreed upon at first that they should be so called, and if this practice had been maintained by following generations in their daily conversation" (Adversus nationes 1.59).

My Remarks: HIC is a Latin masculine pronoun applied to words like PARIES (meaning 'wall') whereas the pronoun HOEC [SIC] is applied to words that are grammatically feminine. But Arnobius expresses the idea that these are mere human conventions. We can't read too much into grammatical gender.

Genesis 2:3 (NWT)

The NWT renders Gen 2:3: "And God proceeded to bless the seventh day and make it sacred, because on it he has been resting from all his work that God has created for the purpose of making."

The Hebrew SHAVATH is perfect state. Now the NWT elsewhere consistently renders Hebrew perfects as indicative of complete action and imperfect states as significative of ongoing or continuous action. For example, Gen 2:2 in the NWT reads:

"and he [God] proceeded to rest on the seventh day from all the work that he had made."

Now, if you study the footnotes for Gen 2:2-3 and the
appendix for the imperfect and perfect states in the
NWT, I believe it will help you to see why Gen 2:3 is
rendered "he has been resting."

Brenton's LXX has hOTI EN AUTHN KATEPAUSEN APO PANTWN TWN ERGWN AUTOU. KATEPAUSEN is aor ind act 3rd sg. This is interesting since the aorist tense generally delineates action as a whole:

"Since the aorist tense simply denotes occurrence without reference to initiation, progress, completion, or any such thing, it is usually translated from the indicative mood into English by a past tense" (Greek Enchiridion, W.G. MacDonald, page 9).

This is also what the qal perfect highlights (i.e.,
undefined action). The same morphological form,
KATEPAUSEN, appears in Heb 4:4. Therefore, it is
possible that Gen 2:3 may simply describe an action in
its entirety, leaving its temporal reference somewhat
undefined.

As regards the qal stem, it is normally divided into
two classes: "verbs that represent action (fientive)
and verbs that describe a state of being (stative)"
(The Complete Word Study: Old Testament, page 2282).
Some sources that I have consulted say that there is
no "passive counterpart" to the qal stem; others
debate this point. At any rate, the qal perfect in Gen
2:3 seems to describe "simple, perfective action
viewed as a whole" (ibid., 2283).

What Are the Potential Implications of Special Relativity Theory?

A. Michael Guillen believes that special relativity is one of the "five equations that changed the world." Professor A. P. French (MIT) also is convinced that Einstein’s scientific achievements deeply affected the intellectual development of modern physics. The special theory of relativity has unalterably changed how we perceive the world; moreover, it has ushered in an era of science called the new physics.

B. Albert Einstein postulated his theory of special relativity in 1905. It deals with bodies that move at ultra-high speeds (near the speed of light). Einstein used thought experiments (Gedanken experiments) to test his ideas. In one of his these experiments, the renowned physicist mentally explores relative simultaneity by using the example of a train and lightning striking within the view of observers on the train. According to special relativity theory, if a train is traveling West, then lightning appears to strike first in the West and subsequently in the East. On the other hand, if the train is headed East, the lightning appears to strike first in the East and then in the West for an observer riding on the train. But if the train is in a position of rest, the bolts of lightning—relative to the observers' frame of reference—strike simultaneously in the East and in the West. Einstein's theory accordingly does not abolish the notion of simultaneity altogether. It only says that a "rigid reference body" or coordinate system must be shared in order for simultaneity to obtain. The train is just such a coordinate system. Simultaneity for Einstein is thereby relative as opposed to being absolute. And the operative equation for special relativity is e = mc2.

I. Some Implications of Special Relativity for the World

A. When a person accelerates, his or her perception of time and space shrinks by a factor involving two quantities. These two quantities are v (velocity) and c (light). While acceleration makes time and space appear to shrink, it actually causes mass and energy to expand: only the perception of space and time shrinks.

B. When someone is at rest, no reductive percepts transpire. But movement that takes place near the speed of light results in percepts being significantly altered. The faster that objects move, the smaller that impressions of inches and seconds become. If one travels near the speed of light, the entire cosmos apparently shrinks ad nihilum for him or her. Reciprocally, however, a person's mass and energy seems to expand ad infinitum (since zero is the reciprocal of infinity).

C. Yet before these effects start to occur, spatial objects must be moving close to the speed of light (300,000 km/sec). Stephen Hawking points out that at 10% the rate of light-speed, an object's mass only increases .5%. At 90% light-speed, however, the same object would assume more than twice its normal mass.

II. Further Implications of Special Relativity

A. Special Relativity implies that energy and mass are two sides of the same coin. Brain Greene writes: "From e=mc², we know that mass and energy are interchangeable; like dollars and euros, they are convertible currencies (but unlike monetary currencies, they have a fixed exchange rate, given by the speed of light times itself, c²" (The Fabric of the Cosmos, page 354).

B. Mass can be converted into energy and energy can be converted into mass.

C. We now know that it's possible to split an atom and generate power from this act of fissioning. Moreover, successive fission, fusion and fission is possible. The atom bomb and the sun demonstrate how hydrogen fusion works.


Bibliography

French, A. P. Special Relativity. New York: Norton, 1968.

Guillen, Michael. Five Equations That Changed the World: The Power and Poetry of Mathematics. New York: MJF Books, 1995.

Hawking, S. W. A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam Books, 2011.

ANDRES in Acts 17:34

Wayne Grudem and Vern Poythress argue that ANDRES is not used generically in Acts 17:34. In part, they write:

"We could go on with further examples from the New Testament, but the analysis would be similar. There are many cases in which the context by itself would not require the meaning "man." But in all of these cases the meaning "man" makes sense and is not foreign to the context. Our approach here is just the same that Greek lexicographers regularly use in studying the meanings of word. We are not arguing that ANHR could never lose its male semantic component in specialized idioms, but only that the argument that it loses its male marking in any New Testament examples is based on very doubtful evidence, and is not sound lexicography."




See http://www.bible-researcher.com/aner.html

Moulton and Milligan on BASILEUS

This discussion is based on M-M's Vocabulary of the New Testament.

BASILEUS was a title adopted by Alexander the Great and it was used by his successors "in the Syrian and Egyptian monarchies." It was a title known to Jews of the Diaspora and later came to be applied to the Roman Emperor.

Concerning the title BASILEUS BASILEWN (Rev 17:14; 19:16), Deissmann presented evidence that this phrase was "in very early Eastern history a decoration of actual great monarchs and also a divine title." Furthermore, "Dittenberger (p. 648) contests Strack's attempt to claim BASILEUS as well as BASILISSA as a term applicable to non-regnant members of a royal family: he notes that there is all the difference between BASILEUS and its feminine. Wilcken Archiv iii. p. 319 supports him, and notes inscriptions where BASILEUS is promptly dropped when a mere H. R. H. is named after the king and his consort. He also commends Dittenberger's remark that Augustus and Augusta had the same difference after Domitian's time."

BDAG on BASILEUS

I have the BDAG Greek-English Lexicon in print, but do not own the electronic form. It's a little much to type out. So I'll just post a brief snippet and those who want to consult BDAG may do so at their convenience.

BDAG notes that BASILEUS denotes "one who rules as possessor of the highest office in a political realm, king, [generally] of a male ruler who has unquestioned authority (exceptions are client rulers who owe their power to the grace of Rome) in a specific area POIEIN TINA B. make someone king J[ohn] 6:15."

The word is applied to human kings, Christ, God and Abaddon (Rev 9:11).

I also found an interesting reference in LSJ where Aristotle calls the queen bee "BASILEUS." But there are good reasons why this fact does not necessarily prove that BASILEUS was used generically (of males and females) in ancient Greece or in Scripture.

Melek Links

I've been arguing that MELEK means "king" and not "king or queen." It's interesting that Melek is also a Hebrew name for boys. Hebrew girls are evidently not named MELEK although I have not researched that particular issue with any semblance of thoroughness yet.

Here are some links that appear to support my position on MELEK:

http://www.ancient-hebrew.org/42_lesson01.html

From this site: "Every noun is either masculine or feminine. An obvious masculine noun is אישׁ (iysh - man) and an obvious feminine noun would be אשׁה (iyshah - woman). As can be seen in this example the suffix ה (ah) can be added to a masculine noun to make it feminine. Another example is the word מלך (melek - king), a masculine noun whereas מלכה (mal'khah - queen) is the feminine form."

http://biblesuite.com/hebrew/4428.htm (See BDB at this link)

Commentary on Revelation 14:4

From Barnes' Notes on the Bible:

For they are virgins - παρθένοι parthenoi. This is the masculine form, but this form is found in the later Greek and in the Christian fathers. See Suidas and Suicer, Thes. The meaning of the word, when found in the feminine form, is well understood. It denotes a virgin, a maiden, and thence it is used to denote what is chaste and pure: virgin modesty; virgin gold; virgin soil; virgin blush; virgin shame. The word in the masculine form must have a similar meaning as applied to men, and may denote:

(a) those who are unmarried;

(b) those who are chaste and pure in general.

The word is applied by Suidas to Abel and Melchizedek. "The sense," says DeWette, in loco, "cannot be that all these 144,000 had lived an unmarried life; for how could the apostle Peter, and others who were married, have been excluded? But the reference must be to those who held themselves from all impurity - "unkeuschheit und hurerei" - which, in the view of the apostles, was closely connected with idolatry." Compare Bleek, Beitr. i. 185. Prof. Stuart supposes that the main reference here is to those who had kept themselves from idolatry, and who were thus pure. It seems to me, however, that the most obvious meaning is the correct one, that it refers to the redeemed as chaste, and thus brings into view one of the prominent things in which Christians are distinguished from the devotees of nearly every other form of religion, and, indeed, exclusively from the world at large.

From Vincent's Word Studies:

Virgins (παρθένοι)

Either celibate or living in chastity whether in married or single life. See 1 Corinthians 7:1-7, 1 Corinthians 7:29; 2 Corinthians 11:2.

From Clarke's Commentary on the Bible:

These are they which were not defiled with women - They are pure from idolatry, and are presented as unspotted virgins to their Lord and Savior Christ. See 2 Corinthians 11:2. There may be an allusion here to the Israelites committing idolatry, through the means of their criminal connection with the Midianitish women. See Numbers 25:1-4; Numbers 31:16.

John Gill also writes:

for they are virgins; for their beauty and comeliness in Christ, chastity, sincerity of their love, uncorruptness in doctrine and worship, and for the uprightness of conversation

Revelationcommentary.org provides some helpful information too:

Some have suggested that spiritual celibacy be intended here. That is, the 144,000 remained faithful to the Lord and did not commit spiritual immorality with the woman presented in Revelation 17-18. However, the text refers to women and not the woman. For they have kept themselves chaste further defines this unique group. Literally, the Greeks [SIC] says, For they are virgins (parthenoi). Parthenoi usually refers to women exclusively. Here it refers to men only. These men have not engaged in sexual intercourse. They are Jewish celibates. Some have attempted to make "the women" refer to "the woman" of Revelation 17. However, this is unlikely. There is both a ritual and moral purity ascribed to the 144,000.

Anselm of Canterbury on the Divine Emotions or Lack Thereof

BUT how art thou compassionate, and, at the same time, passionless? For, if thou art passionless, thou dost not feel sympathy; and if thou dost not feel sympathy, thy heart is not wretched from sympathy for the wretched; but this it is to be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence cometh so great consolation to the wretched? How, then, art thou compassionate and not compassionate, O Lord, unless because thou art compassionate in terms of our experience, and not compassionate in terms of thy being.

Truly, thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not so in terms of thine own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experience the effect of compassion, but thou dost not experience the feeling. Therefore, thou art both compassionate, because thou dost save the wretched, and spare those who sin against thee; and not compassionate, because thou art affected by no sympathy for wretchedness.

Taken from Proslogium (CHAPTER VIII).

Arguments from Silence and Exegesis (BIOS)

Without getting into the issue of what constitutes an argument from silence, let's just say that I don't think I'm guilty of one where the application of BIOS is concerned. The Greek term BIOS does not simply mean "life" but it refers to a particular kind of life. It is possible to conceive of life in abstract or concrete terms: Hebrew makes this kind of distinction. On the other hand, we can refer to spiritual and physical life. In that case, Jehovah would fit into the former category, but not the latter one. But let me explain why my refusal to apply BIOS to God at present is not an argument from silence.

Let's imagine that we were never told men should be family heads. Suppose that the term KEPHALH (or its Hebrew equivalent) was never applied to men in the scriptures. Imagine that the concept of a male family head also was never introduced in the Bible. Do you think we would be justified in applying KEPHALH to males in that case? I personally would have a problem, if that were the case.

But now, let's move from the counterfactual to a factual situation. There are many people today who refer to certain buildings as "churches" or they call them churches. Granted, the word EKKLHSIA does appear in scripture, and I have no problem rendering it as "church, congregation" or "assembly." One problem, however, is that no first-century Christian ever understood the word church to signify a building. That use of the word comes much later in Greek history. So would you consider it an argument from silence, if a Christian today refused to apply the term "church" to a building in which people worship? IMO, it's just a matter of trying to do the scriptural terms justice. Use and usage are integral aspects of lexicography, semantics, exegesis and hermeneutics. I can't just decide to call an object (O) by a signification (S) with no lexical justification. Well, I guess that I could. But the speech act would mean very little to anyone except me.

David Conway and the Logical Problem of Evil

David Conway argues that the proposition "evil is omni-preventable" is true, regardless of whether it is necessarily or contingently true. He chides those who might make such modal distinctions regarding truth as necessarily or contingently true (at least, in this case he does). For a truth to be necessarily true means that it's true in all possible worlds. Contingent truths are true in some possible worlds, but could be false in others.

Let's accept Conway's claim that the proposition "evil is omni-preventable" is true although I have reservations about his approach since the modal distinctions make a huge difference here. I do not believe that it will suffice to say that the aforegoing utterance is true. Why is that the case? Imagine S (a 3 pack a day smoker) who has made a choice which could be described as "evil" (morally speaking) which leads to yet another evil, namely, lung cancer. Granted, one might argue that God could have prevented S from smoking 3 packs a day and he could have prevented S from getting lung cancer by dint of this "evil" habit. Yet, in order for God (the omnipotent and omniscient being of Christianity and Judaism, etc) to prevent these two evils, it seems that God could not have created S with the ability to perform (or refrain from performing) the action (A) which brought it about that S suffered the evil of lung cancer.

Even if Conway wants to argue that God could have made the world such that S could never have made the decision to smoke, etc, I truly do not see how that God's not preventing the aforementioned evils work to disprove his existence.

In summary, one of my objections to Conway's claim regarding the omni-preventability of evil is that he has failed to flesh out what he means by "evil" (moral or natural). It is not sufficient to say that the proposition "evil is omni-preventable" is true, even if one accepts Conway's point about the modal distinctions. We now have to make subtle distinctions regarding evil and show why God should bring it about that S cannot choose to smoke 3 packs a day, drink alcohol in great quantities or drive 120 mph on I-40, all actions which could be characterized as "evil" insofar as they have the potential to wreak great harm.

Concerning Isaiah 7:14 (ALMA/ALMAH)

I wrote this post over ten years ago. It has been slightly edited to make sense for this blog.

I have been reviewing John Meier's work entitled A Marginal Jew and I am trying to share thoughts with you while working my way through the book. On pp. 221-222, Meier writes:

"We have no clear evidence that the famous passage of Isa 7:14 cited by Matthew ('behold, a virgin shall conceive') was ever taken to refer to a virginal conception before NT authors used it. The Hebrew text refers simply to a woman called an 'ALMA^, a young woman of marriageable age. Even the [LXX] of Isa 7:14 need not refer to virginal conception. While PARQENOS, the word the [LXX] uses to translate 'ALMA^, does often mean 'virgin,' it can also carry the more general meaning of a young girl of marriageable age and is so used at times in the [LXX]."

Admittedly, one has to look at the extensive footnotes in Meier's monograph to comprehend his line of thought fully here. Is there solid linguistic evidence for rendering Isa 7:14 with the term "virgin"? Frankly, I have no objection to the NWT rendering of Isa 7:14 ("maiden"), but it seems that 'ALMA^ could very well refer to a virgin.

I think you make a good point about the Hebrew word OTH ("sign"). OTH is often used to delineate wondrous works (i.e., miracles) of YHWH in the OT. The appearance of OTH in Isa 7:14 is thus a good indicator that something was unusual or supernatural about the "maiden" conceiving ('bearing a son').

I guess the only problem with translating it "virgin" is the historical circumstances surrounding the prophecy of Isaiah. It is quite possible that a married woman, namely, Isaiah's wife, fulfilled the prophecy in ancient Judah. We cannot be dogmatic about the identity of the "maiden" in ancient times, but the point is that she probably did not conceive and give birth to a son while a virgin. Nevertheless, I think the semantic range of 'ALMA^ certainly allows for the translation "virgin." The prophet could have actually used the term 'ALMA^ in an ambiguous way since his words were ultimately propleptic in nature. That is, he could be talking about a young girl of marriageable age in the minor fulfillment and a literal virgin in the antitypical fulfillment of this prophecy. But I tend to lean toward the "virgin" shade of meaning for the word 'ALMA^.

To be fair to Meier, PARQENOS does not necessarily refer to a virgin. But the synchronic evidence suggests that the LXX translators had a literal virgin in mind when they used PARQENOS. LSJ has this information on PARQENOS:

parqe/nos, Lacon. parse/nos Aristoph. Lys. 1263 (lyr.). h(, maiden, girl, Hom. Il. 22.127, etc. ; ai( a)/qliai p. e)mai/ my unhappy girls, Soph. OT 1462, cf. Aristoph. Kn. 1302 ; also gunh\ parqe/nos Hes. Th. 514; p. ko/ra, of the Sphinx, dub. in Eur. Phoen. 1730 (lyr.); quga/thr p. Xen. Cyrop. 4.6.9 ; of Persephone, Eur. Hel. 1342 (lyr.), cf. S.Fr.804; virgin, opp. gunh/, IDEM=Soph. Trach. 148, Theoc.27.65.

2. of unmarried women who are not virgins, Hom. Il. 2.514, Pind. P. 3.34, Soph. Trach. 1219, Aristoph. Cl. 530.

3. *parqe/nos, h(, the Virgin Goddess, as a title of Athena at Athens, Paus. 5.11.10, au=Paus. 10.34.8 (hence of an Att. coin bearing her head, E.Fr.675); of Artemis, Eur. Hipp. 17 ; of the Tauric Iphigenia, Hdt. 4.103 ; of an unnamed goddess, SIG46.3 (Halic., v B.C.), IG12.108.48,au=IG 12.108.54=lr (Neapolis in Thrace); ai( i(erai\ p., of the Vestal Virgins, D.H.1.69, Plu.2.89e, etc. ; ai( *(estia/des p. IDEM=Plu.Cic.19; simply, ai( p. D.H.2.66.

4. the constellation ti=D.H. Virgo, Eudox.ap.Hipparch. 1.2.5, Arat.97, etc.

5. = ko/rh III, pupil, X.ap.Longin.4.4, Aret. SD1.7.

II. as Adj., maiden, chaste, parqe/non yuxh\n e)/xwn Eur. Hipp. 1006, cf. Porph. Marc.33 ; mi/trh p. Epigr.Gr.319 : metaph., p. phgh/ Aesch. Pers. 613.

III. as masc., parqe/nos, o(, unmarried man, Apoc.14.4.

IV. p. gh= Samian earth (cf. parqe/nios III), PMag.Berol.2.57.

Acts 1:8 Read As An Imperatival Sentence

Acts 1:8 reads:

ALLA LHMYESQE DUNAMIN EPELQONTOS TOU hAGIOU PNEUMATOS EF' hUMAS KAI ESESQE MOU MARTURES EN TE IEROUSALHM KAI EN PASAi THi IOUDAIAi KAI SAMARIAi KAI hEWS ESXATOU THS GHS.

While studying the NT use of the future tense, I ran across something I had not thought about before. Daniel B. Wallace says that Acts 1:8 is an example of the predictive future. But he goes on to point out that the second future in the passage, namely, LHMYESQE DUNAMIN EPELQONTOS TOU hAGIOU PNEUMATOS EF' hUMAS KAI ESESQE MOU MARTURES, may be imperatival (Wallace, GGBB, 568). In fact, John Polhill contends that the future tense in Acts 1:8 does have "an imperatival sense" (Polhill, Acts, 85). He words the passage: "you will [must] receive power" and "you WILL be my witnesses."

Morphologically, the futures in Acts 1:8 could be construed as predictives or imperativals.

The Denotation of the Biblical Term for Soul

The word "soul" (Hebrew nepes and Greek psyche) apparently has three primary meanings in the Bible:

(1) A human person.

(2) An animal.

(3) The life enjoyed by a person or animal.

Genesis 2:7 describes Adam becoming a "living being" (Amplified Bible) or a "living soul" (New World Translation). The apostle Paul also invokes this account when reproving some in the Corinthian ecclesia (1 Cor. 15:45). Furthermore, animals are called "souls" in Numbers 31:28; Ezekiel 47:9; Revelation 8:9; 16:3. For an example of psyche denoting "life," see Matthew 16:25; 20:28.

Technically, I do not believe that there is any dichotomy between the body and the soul in the OT or NT. A number of biblical commentators have also noted this point:

"The Jewish origin of the word [YUXH] is determinative: NEPES is the living quality of the flesh. The soul belongs to man's earthly existence. It does not exist without physical life. It is not, say, freed by death, then to live its untrammeled purity. Death is its end. The word YUXH can also mean the person, and this is related to SWMA, SARX and PNEUMA (Rom. 16:4: hUPER THS YUXHS MOU 'For my life')" (Conzelmann, Hans. An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, 179).

The Next Few Days (Memorial)

I'm not going to be blogging much for the next few days because of the Memorial of Christ's death (Nisan 14) and I also have a talk dealing with Jesus' resurrection this week. So, those of you who observe the Memorial, have a wonderful observance. Everybody is invited. Our observance will be tonight, starting at 7:30 PM.

All the best,

Edgar

Edited Review of Daniel B. Wallace's Greek Grammar

I have to laud and simultaneously criticize Daniel B. Wallace's book Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing, 1996). If I have ever written an ambivalent book review, this is it.

Wallace's grammar merits a five star rating in terms of what it teaches about biblical Greek. It is probably one of the best New Testament Greek grammars on the market. The author is to be commended for his scientific approach to Greek grammar and linguistics in general. For the most part, past decisions about what constitutes a subjective genitive or an objective gentive, an ablative of separation or a dative of reference in a particular Bible verse have been highly subjective. Wallace tries to improve the process and he should praised for his efforts.

A laudable aspect of Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics is Wallace's ability to implement recent works on aspect and Aktionsart. He also gives plenty of examples throughout his grammar that illustrate Greek voice, mood, and aspect. The author is generally level-headed in his approach and anyone reading this work cannot help but improve his or her proficiency in Greek. The professor's discussion on demonstrative and relative pronouns is excellent and the section concerning the Granville Sharp Rule is probably one of the most enlightening and lucid treatments of the subject, although I disagree with Wallace's conclusion on the famed rule. Overall, Wallace's work is a welcome addition to any scholar's library. The only drawback to this grammar is his failure to interact fully with the many possibilities of the New Testament Greek text.

At this point, I do not want to sound like a broken record, but I must object to Wallace's dogmatic assertions about the Witnesses' understanding of John 1:1c; 8:58 and Titus 2:13. Despite his "learned" protestations to the contrary, Jehovah's Witnesses are on solid ground regarding their understanding of the aforesaid passages.

For example, Margaret Davies poses the question: "Is Jesus' remark, 'Before Abraham was, I am he' a reminder that he is the eternal LOGOS?" (Davies 86). She concludes that this reading of Jn 8:58 "is neither an obvious nor a necessary reading" (86). She also writes: "We should conclude, therefore, that the Johannine Jesus' use of the 'I am' form draws on Wisdom declarations from its Scripture, and does not assert Jesus' divinity" (Davies 87).

Lastly, I think Wallace also overlooks some key information when he analyzes the demonstrative pronoun hOUTOS in 1 John 5:20. The bias appears to shine through clearly in this case: he dismisses the alternate view too hastily. While I do not necessarily fault Wallace for taking a doctrinal stand based on how he reads the Greek of the New Testament, I think he needs to let his readers know (more fully) that there are other ways to understand the text.

In A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament written by Max Zerwick and Mary Grosvenor, they say regarding 1 John 5:20 and hOUTOS:

"the ref. is almost certainly to God the real, the true, op. paganism (v 21)."

Overall, despite the few shortcomings that I believe Wallace's grammar contains, I can still recommend it with a clear conscience. As with any work, I suggest reading it critically and trying to research the examples he gives, for yourself.

Are Christians Still Under the Mosaic Law?

Concerning Eph 2:14-15:

The International Critical Commentary on Ephesians and Colossians (T. K. Abbott) has this to say:

"The Mosaic law as such, not merely certain aspects of it, has come to an end in Christ. He is the 'end of the law,' Rom 10:4. Faith having come, we are no longer hUPO PAIDAGWGON" (page 64).

Abbott adds:

"NOMOS here is not to be limited to the ceremonial law; there is nothing in the connexion to show such a limitation, which on the contrary, would make the statement very weak . . . The moral law retains its obligation, not, however, because the Jewish law is only partially annulled, but because its obligation was independent of the law and universal (Rom 2:14)" (64-65).

He goes on to show that Christians now fulfill the "moral law" of the Mosaic Code since a life governed by the spirit is in direct conformity with the moral precepts of the ancient Jewish Law mediated by Moses. Abbott makes an astute observation when he also notes the Pauline contrast between works of law and fruit
of the spirit. We also do well to recall the apostle's words found at Gal 5:18: "Furthermore, if you are being led by spirit, you are not under law" (EI DE PNEUMATI AGESQE OUK ESTE hUPO NOMON).

If THN EXQRAN is in apposition to NOMON TWN ENTOLWN EN DOGMASIN, which I think it is, then Eph 2:14-15
indicates that the entire Mosaic Code was made inoperative via the death of our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. I must therefore reject R. Schnackenburg's suggestion (The Epistle to the Ephesians. T & T Clark: Edinburgh, 1991) when he contends that only the ceremonial aspects of the Law were abolished by means of Christ's death. Paul, on the other hand, clearly teaches that Christians are not under Law, but serve God under the loving assurance of His manifested and benevolent unmerited kindness (Rom 6:14-15).

Richard Longenecker (in his Word commentary on Galatians) likewise writes that Paul delivers the 'coup de grace' to the Judaizers whom he theologically opposes since he teaches that the Law "no longer has validity as a PAIDAGWGOS regulating the life of [Christian] faith" (149). No longer are Jewish precepts (moral or ceremonial) required for Christian faith. So Longenecker observes, when commenting on Galatians 3:25.

I find that James Dunn also has to concede this point in some way, namely, that Paul teaches the Law has been fulfilled and rendered inoperative through Christ. While he apparently wants to avoid a type of dualism that is evidently posited by Lutherans, Dunn has to treat Paul's letter to the Romans with a certain amount of scholastic integrity. He thus believes that the traditional antithesis between law and grace (undeserved kindness) can withstand scrutiny, but "not in the overdrawn terms of the classic Lutheran formulation" (Romans 1-8. Dallas: Word Books, 1988, pp. 340-341).

Regardless of how Dunn exegetes Rom 6:14-15 and other such texts, I think the Pauline teaching on Law is quite clear: Christians are no longer bound by the Torah, although they conduct lives in harmony with its moral precepts. Paul wrote: "So, my brothers, you also were made dead to the Law through the body of the Christ, that you might become another's, the one who was raised up from the dead, that we should bear fruit to God" (Rom 7:4).

Also:

"For Christ is the end of the Law, so that everyone exercising faith may have righteousness" (Rom 10:4).

Peter van Inwagen on God's Maleness or Lack Thereof

Professor van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame) writes:

"Before leaving the topic of the personhood of God, I should say a word about sex--not sex as the vulgar use the word, not sexual intercourse, but sexual dimorphism--what people are increasingly of late, and to my extreme annoyance, coming to call 'gender.' We haven't yet officially said this, but, as everyone knows, God does not occupy space, so he can't have a physical structure; but to have a sex, to be male or female, is, among other things, to have a physical structure. God, therefore, does not have a sex. It is literally false that he is male, and literally false that he is female" (The Problem of Evil, page 21).

Although van Inwagen does not think God is male or female, he uses the third-person singular pronoun "he" to avoid calling God "it."

What Makes Language and Consciousness Possible?

Concept-formation can be explained without appealing to non-physical factors. I am not arguing that perceptions are conceptions. But what I am suggesting is that conceptions are possible representations of percepts by dint of natural language and neural networks. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (based on the work of Eleanor Rosch) have argued that we categorize things (e.g. birds, chairs, tables, and teapots) according to fuzzy prototypical characteristics (cf. Metaphors We Live By). However, the prototypes by means of which we classify various objects emanate from our somatic experiences. For example, although I had never seen a Highland Cow until the year 2002, I knew that it was a cow upon first sight. Yet the Highland Cow was unlike any cow I had ever seen before.

Lakoff and Johnson would say that I was able to associate the Scottish cow with my prototype of such animals based on past somatic experiences. But my concept of cowness is nothing more than the result of what I've perceived with my sense organs (inter alia) and how my brain represents the usual properties of bovines which it derives from distal and proximal stimuli. There is no need to posit a soul in order to account for concept-formation, language or consciousness.

Why I Developed the Father as Metaphor Argument

My dissertation is entitled "Metaphor and Divine Paternity." I started forming the ideas for the work after talking with a friend about the possibility that God might be an emblematic father rather than a literal father.

The research that I undertook moved me in the direction of God's metaphorical fatherhood. The divine metaphor "Father" is old and it seems to harmonize with other figures used to reference God. But I also believe that the metaphorical view undermines the eternal generation idea. If Jehovah is a symbolic father of the Son as opposed to being a literal father, then the eternal generation idea loses its force. If Father is a metaphor for how God relates to his Son or to creation, then the Son's eternal generation becomes a moot point since Jehovah has not literally fathered anyone.

2 Sam 7:14 teaches us that God fathered the Davidic line of rulers in ancient Israel. Did Jehovah literally sire those men? I think it's not hard to see how the use of Father within the text is metaphorical.

We've been discussing this point for a little while now. I'm going to move on soon, but just wanted to provided a fuller description of my viewpoint.

Repost of How the Term "Father" is a Metaphor

Since the issue of God's paternity is the subject of my dissertation and has been a recent topic for discussion on this blog, I want to direct our readers to this blog entry. Thanks everyone.


http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2011/09/metaphorical-use-of-father-for-god.html

Edgar

Acquitted from Sin (Romans 6:7 NWT)

The passage in Romans 6:7 is an arresting text.

"For he who has died has been acquitted from [his] sin" (NWT).

"for he who has paid the penalty of death stands absolved from his sin"
(Weymouth).

"For he that is dead is freed from sin" (Webster's).

"for a dead man can safely be said to be immune to the power of sin" (Phillips).

Certain scholars and theologians understand the language of justification/being declared righteous to signify that God has actually made a Christian righteous, whereas most would probably say (including Jehovah's Witnesses) that worshipers of Jehovah are imputed righteous upon the basis of Christ's sacrifice (not actually made righteous). To quote Romans 4:4-8:

"Now to the man that works the pay is counted, not as an undeserved kindness, but as a debt. On the other hand, to the man that does not work but puts faith in him who declares the ungodly one righteous, his faith is counted as righteousness. Just as David also speaks of the happiness of the man to whom God counts righteousness apart from works: 'Happy are those whose lawless deeds have been pardoned and whose sins have been covered; happy is the man whose sin Jehovah will by no means take into account'" (NWT).

Paul apparently teaches that Christians are accounted righteous--they are reckoned as being righteous in this life (not actually made righteous by the divine act of justification). Furthermore, in order to maintain a right standing in the sight of God, one must produce works that show evidence of his/her faith.

Romans 6:7 also indicates that one who has already been acquitted of his/her sin has undergone a symbolic death whereby imputation of guiltlessness has been effected (brought about). See Hebrews 10:14.

These words from Acts 13:38-39 might bear on the matter at hand:

"Let it therefore be known to YOU, brothers, that through this One a forgiveness of sins is being published to YOU; and that from all the things from which YOU could not be declared guiltless by means of the law of Moses, everyone who believes is declared guiltless by means of this One" (NWT).

"As a man that is dead is acquitted and released from bondage among men, so a man that has died to sin is acquitted from the guilt of sin and released from its bondage" (Henry Alford on Romans 6:7).

Christian Materialism, Neuroscience and Personal Identity

I have been reading various works on consciousness, from both the substance dualist and materialist perspective. Psychology usually teaches us that consciousness is simply awareness: it involves awareness of one's thought and feelings. Consciousness involves visual awareness, auditory awareness, gustatory awareness, olfactory and tactile awareness.

Charles G. Morris (Understanding Psychology) defines consciousness as the human awareness of mental processes such as making decisions, remembering, daydreaming, concentrating, reflecting, sleeping, and dreaming. It is also good to remember that consciousness evidently obtains on a graded continuum such that a person in a vegetative state or a young newborn may be aware, even though both entities experience awareness at different places on the graded continuum.

There are also two books I'd like to mention that you might find interesting. One is Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are by Joseph LeDoux. This work is very challenging to read because LeDoux writes in a somewhat technical manner at times. However, he makes a profound point about the "self" in the opening portion of his work.

LeDoux does not deny that an aesthetic, moral or social self possibly exists. However, he contends that one's feeling of self-awareness or one's ability to reason morally is rooted in the neural or synaptic self. In his own words, "My notion of personality is pretty simple: it's that your 'self,' the essence of who you are, reflects patterns of interconnectivity between neurons in your brain . . . Given the importance of synaptic transmission in brain function, it should practically be a truism to say that the self is synaptic" (LeDoux, Synaptic Self, page 2).

The other book I have in mind is The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul written by Francis Crick. This book is even more difficult to read because of its demanding content. Nevertheless, it is of interest that Crick believes the notion of a "soul" (an immaterial aspect of humans) which gives us a sense of self-awareness or feeling of subjectivity is superfluous, redundant or pleonastic. Most scientists now think that the brain takes care of all things that were once attributed to the soul. Crick thus maintains:

"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'You,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules" (The Astonishing Hypothesis, page 3).

Yes, it seems that experiences, heredity and memories make us what we are. Long-term memories probably are coded and stored in the hippocampal area of the brain. Other parts of the brain play their role in storing and retrieving memory. Nurture and nature wire our synapses; our synapses, in turn, make us who we are.

But does the foregoing mean that the same brain must be placed in an individual, who is deemed worthy of the resurrection? In view of what we now believe as Jehovah's Witnesses, the answer cannot be in the affirmative. Firstly, those who receive an earthly resurrection will have new bodies, including presumably different brains. Yet, we believe that resurrected Job (supplied with a different body) will be the same PERSON that we read about in the OT book bearing his name. And what about those who will be granted immortal and incorruptible life in the heavens (2 Corinthians 5:1-2). Once again, they will have or already have different bodies of a spiritual nature. But it seems reasonable to suppose that Paul, Peter, and John are the same persons they were in the first century. Hence, restoring personhood to S1 or S2 (with S representing a subject/person) does not appear to be dependent on providing S1 or S2 with their original brains. What seems most important in this case is the memory of God rather than man. Even if God gives someone a different body or brain, he can still bring it about that the same person rises from the dead on the "last day." Nancey Murphy skillfully explains how personal identity is fulfilled by a various number of distinct criteria. In other words, not just one criterion determines personal identity or the persistence conditions for human personhood.

Slight Absence

Greetings to all readers!

I haven't blogged much lately because of a minor illness. But I'm recovering now and should post something by this weekend. Hope everyone is doing well.

All the best,

Edgar

Lactantius on the "Brightness" of Divine Truth

Hello all,

This is taken from Divine Institutes 1.5.1 (Numbering based on Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey's Translation):

"the effect of the actual truth is too strong for even a blind man not to see divine brightness when it forces itself on his eyes."

Regards,

Edgar

Revelation 6:14-17 and Variant Readings

This passage could potentially be used by a Trinitarian and likely has been utilized to prop up the idea that Christ is Almighty God. It reads:

And the heaven departed as a scroll when it is rolled together, and every mountain and island were moved out of their places. And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every bondman, and every free man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains; and they said to the mountains and rocks, "Fall on us, and hide us from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb! For the great Day of His wrath is come, and who shall be able to stand?" (21st Century KJV)

Notice the use of "His" in 6:17. But other translations contain the following lectio:

for the great day of their wrath is come; and who is able to stand? (ASV)

Either way, the verse does little to support Trinitarianism.

The NET Bible provides these remarks:

Most mss (A Ï bo) change the pronoun “their” to "his" (αὐτοῦ, autou) in order to bring the text in line with the mention of the one seated on the throne in the immediately preceding verse, and to remove the ambiguity about whose wrath is in view here. The reading αὐτῶν (autwn, "their") is well supported by א C 1611 1854 2053 2329 2344 pc latt sy. On both internal and external grounds, it should be regarded as original.

Two Ways to Argue for God's Existence

1) Logical evidence is limited in what it can prove regarding the existence of God. One reason is because of our limited experience with the material world and God.

Examples of logical arguments for God's existence are the ontological (Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes), cosmological (Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) and teleological arguments. My favorite line of reasoning for God's existence is the Kalam cosmological argument. The Kalam argument says that everything which begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore, the universe has a cause. Now the cause of the universe is either personal or impersonal. But, based on what we know about how complex entities come into existence, it is plausible to believe that the universal cause of all things is personal.

2) Scientific arguments for God revolve around the universe's structure, its laws and constants. There are four basic physical forces that operate in the cosmos: gravity, electromagnetism, strong nuclear force and weak nuclear force. It has been observed that if electromagnetism were significantly weaker, then electrons would not be combine with atoms to form molecules. Furthermore, if the four basic forces were not fine-tuned as they appear to be, life as we know it would not be possible.

3) One argument that I've used recently with atheists has been the moral argument for God's existence, which was developed quite effectively by Immanuel Kant and suggested by Fyodor Dostoevski. The gist of this argument is that one must believe in God to make sense of morals or ethics. If God does not exist, or if we do not at least believe in God, then there is no foundation for absolute morality. It's also hard to make sense of similar morals that exist in diverse cultures, if God does not exist.

Thomas F. Torrance on Divine "Father" Terminology

Torrance indicates that "Father" (a divine epithet for the Christian deity or first person of the tripersonal Godhead) is a relation rather than a description of God's essence or substance. He then continues:

"Hence Gregory Nazianzen like Athanasius insisted that they [the terms 'Father' and 'Son'] must be treated as referring imagelessly, that is in a diaphanous or 'see through' way, to the Father and the Son without the intrusion of creaturely forms or sensual images into God. Thus we may not think of God as having gender nor
think of the Father as begetting the Son or the Son as begotten after the analogy of generation or giving birth with which we are familiar among creaturely beings."

Quote taken from Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 158.

See Nazianzen's Orationes 29.16; 31.7, 31ff.

How to Arrive at the Truth Without an Infallible Body of Humans

How can we know (with a high degree of certainty) whether our understanding of the Scriptures is correct? I propose a threefold answer.

(1) Rely on what the Scriptures themselves say.

In Acts 17:10-12, Luke records that the Jews in Beroea were "more noble-minded than those in Thessalonica" because they not only received the apostolic witness eagerly, but they also "carefully examined the Scriptures daily" to verify the evangelical message of Paul and Silas.

Louw-Nida observe that the Greek term (ANAKRINW) can denote: "to try to learn the nature of truth of something by the process of careful study, evaluation and judgment--to examine carefully, to investigate, to study thoroughly" (See Semantic Domain 27.44). John B. Pohill also writes: "This was no cursory investigation either, no weekly Sabbath service, as at Thessalonica. They met daily to search the Scriptures" (Pohill 363). And what was the result? POLLOI MEN OUN EX AUTWN EPISTEUSAN.

Question: If we cannot reach a certain understanding of the Scriptures by consulting them and thoroughly studying them, then how did the Beroeans become believers through this method? Why didn't they need an infallible human authority to teach them the truth?

My next case example is Apollos. Luke says that this man "thoroughly proved the Jews to be wrong publicly, while he demonstrated by the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ" (Acts 18:24-28).

Question: If sharing Scripture with a person who subscribes to a different interpretation only results in "biblical ping-pong," then how did Apollos prove the Jews to be wrong publicly? How did he "demonstrate" (EPIDEIKNUS) by the Scriptures that Jesus was the Messiah if we can't prove anything by comparing Scripture?

(2)Though I believe the previously mentioned examples clearly show the fallacy of thinking that one cannot arrive at the true understanding of Scripture by consulting and comparing Scripture, as I mentioned hitherto, discussing Scripture is not the only way to attain truth. If we want to really understand God's will as set forth in Scripture, we must also offer ebullient and sincere prayers. The psalmist earnestly supplicated God: "Teach me to do as is acceptable to you, because you are my God. Your spirit is good; let it lead me over level ground" (Ps. 143:10 Byington). See also Ps. 43:3.

Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ also taught us the way to comprehend Scripture. He encouraged humans to 'keep on asking, seeking and knocking' because "everyone asking receives, and everyone seeking finds, and to everyone knocking it will be opened" (Matt. 7:7-11 NWT). So diligent prayer is a second requisite for authenticating one's understanding of Scripture. But there is yet a third way.

(3) The Primitive EKKLHSIA also relied upon apostolic teaching and the older men and apostles in Jerusalem to accurately understand Scripture (Acts 2:40ff; 15:1ff). Today I believe one must be in frequent association with the organization God is using to fully perceive the Divine written Revelation. So, far from believing that studying Scripture is enough, I contend that the way to guarantee one's view of Scripture is correct is by employing the three methods I have delineated above. Study, meditate, pray and find the true Christian EKKHLSIA.

The Meaning of Aktionsart (K. L. McKay and Stanley Porter)

Here is part of an old dialogue written to a friend:

Keep in mind that different grammarians or linguists use the term Aktionsart in bewildering and disparate ways. But older grammars often employ Aktionsart as a reference to action that is delineated by the verbal stem.

Stanley Porter points out that K. Brugmann (in 1885) was the first writer who employed the German term Aktionsart to describe: "the kind of action indicated objectively by the verb" (Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the NT, Stanley Porter, 29). So when I talk about "kind of action" in this context, I mean action in terms of completed, durative, ingressive or conative (inchoative) activities that are objectively signaled by the respective verb stem (root + affix) or in some other fashion.

For example, K.L. McKay (when discussing the conative and inceptive use of the Greek present "tense") provides an example from Jn 10:32:

DIA POION AUTWN ERGON EME LIQAZETE: "for which of these deeds are you trying to stone me?"

McKay thinks that the present verb LIQAZETE in this passage, "has the effect of so emphasizing the incompleteness of the activity that the most natural English equivalent is try to do" in this case.

So in Jn 10:32 we evidently have an example of the conative present. Certain scholars would argue that the conative "kind of action" is signaled by the verbal stem (Aktionsart). Others would contend that we know LIQAZETE is conative present (imperfective aspect) in view of contextual features that mark the action of the verb (still referring to Aktionsart). I hope the example from Jn 10:32 helps you to see how Aktionsart is applied by graammarians and linguists.

Addressing Stuckenbruck's Treatment of Greek Pronouns

Loren T. Stuckenbruck, in Angel Veneration and Christology: A Study in Early Judaism and the Christology of the Apocalypse of John (Tubingen: JCB Mohr, 1995),lists a number of biblical passages in which the singular Greek pronoun or third person singular verbs seem problematic.

He apparently concludes that the Lamb is being worshiped alongside God in a "monotheistic framework" when we encounter such usages. But I am not so sure the examples that he provides support his point. Let us examine Revelation 11:15 as a case example:

"The kingdom of the world did become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and HE will rule as king forever."

Grammatically, John's use of BASILEUSEI ("will rule") could refer to God or Christ. Stuckenbruck thinks that it refers to both the Messiah and the Lord Almighty (Jehovah) as a unit. But grammar does not necessitate that we read the text in a Trinitarian manner. Furthermore, the context suggests that it is YHWH (the Father), who will rule as King forever and ever (Rev 11:16-17).

Even if one objects to the NWT's use of the Tetragrammaton in Rev 11:16-17, the surrounding verses still manifestly indicate that KURIE, hO QEOS or hO PANTOKRATWR takes up HIS great power and begins to rule as King through His Messiah, who clearly is not the Lord in this context.

Porter's "Three Planes of Discourse"

Stanley Porter is famous for the work he's done on Greek aspect. His Idioms of the Greek New Testament outlines the "three planes of discourse." I summarize Porter's discussion below; the full treatment of aspect prominence can be found in Idioms. I include the relevant bibliographical information at the conclusion of this post.

1. The aorist is supposedly the background tense: it's analogous to a bookshelf since the aorist "forms the basis for discourse" or it structures narratives and sketches background events.

2. Porter reckons that the present is the foreground tense. It is analogous to one shelf rather than the whole bookshelf. Present tense verbs evidently introduce significant characters within narratival material and they make "appropriate climactic references" to particular circumstances.

3. Finally, the perfect is the frontground tense. It's comparable to a book. This tense introduces elements of a narrative in "an even more discrete, defined, contoured and complex way." See how the perfect functions in Matthew 4:2 (epeinasen).

Robertson thinks that the aorist verb in Matthew 4:2 functions ingressively.

Stanley Porter. Idioms of the Greek New Testament (Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 23ff.

The Didache, Fasting and Prayer

Taken from Didache 8:

But let not your fasts be with the hypocrites, for they fast on the second and fifth day of the week. Rather, fast on the fourth day and the Preparation (Friday). Do not pray like the hypocrites, but rather as the Lord commanded in His Gospel, like this:

Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven. Give us today our daily (needful) bread, and forgive us our debt as we also forgive our debtors. And bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one (or, evil); for Thine is the power and the glory for ever.

Pray this three times each day.

See http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/didache-roberts.html

Comparing the Tenses of Matt 24:45-47 and Lk 12:41-44

Matthew 24:45 uses the Greek verb κατέστησεν to describe Jesus' appointment of the faithful and discreet slave. But καταστήσει appears in Luke 12:42.

So the Apostle Matthew employs the aorist indicative tense while Luke conscripts the future καταστήσει. Why is there a difference in tenses between the two Gospels? Is the difference substantive?

Regarding the aorist, modern studies in New Testament Greek now tell us that the aorist does not necessarily signify that an action is performed once for all time. The punctiliar nature of an act is derived from the context of a verse and not the aorist tense alone. The aorist is an example of what grammarians and linguists call, perfective aspect. What this means is that the writer (in this case, Matthew) evidently visualizes and subsequently presents the action described by the verb (aorist form) as an undivided whole, without much concern for the progression of the action or its telicity.

A reader can discern whether an action delineated by the aorist is punctiliar or otherwise by taking note of contextual or other linguistic features (also known as affected vs. unaffected meaning). As a side point, some grammarians classify the aorist as external rather than perfective aspect.

Daniel B. Wallace ("Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics," page 501) also classifies the future tense as perfective or "external" (his terminology) aspect. If this is the case, then it would apparently mean that there is no theological significance in Luke employing the future instead of the aorist form of the verb. I think the result is the same, regardless of which morphological formation the writer used. Both writers portray Jesus as appointing the faithful and discreet slave, then augmenting his authority once the Master arrives (see Luke 12:44).

Notes on the Aorist Participle (Luke 10:18)

Edited on 8/10/18.

Ernest De Witt Burton writes regarding aorist participles on page 67 of his syntax (section 146):

"The Aorist Participle used as an integral part of the object of a verb of perception represents the action which it denotes as a simple event without defining its time. The action may be one which is directly perceived and hence coincident in time with that of the principal verb, or it may be one which is ascertained or learned, and hence antecedent to the action of the principal verb. In the latter case it takes the place of a clause of indirect discourse having its verb in the Aorist Indicative.

Acts 9:12; καὶ εἶδεν ἄνδρα . . . Ἁνανίαν ὀνόματι εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἐπιθέντα αὐτῷ χεῖρας, and he has seen a man named Ananias come in and lay hands upon him. See also Luke 10:18; Acts 10:3; 11:3; 26:13; 2 Pet. 1:18.

Luke 4:23; ὅσα ἠκούσαμεν γενόμενα, whatever things we have heard to have been done."

The foregoing is what Burton says verbatim.

Looking at the NWT 1984 rendering, "I began to behold Satan already fallen like lightning from heaven," it seems that NWT construes Ἐθεώρουν (1st person singular imperfect indicative active) ingressively: this strategy is fine since K.L. McKay writes in A Syntax of the Verb in NT Greek (pages 29-30):

"The imperfective aspect presents an activity as going on, in process, without reference to its completion. This may consist of a single activity in process at the time of reference, or a series of repetitions of an action, whether consecutively by one agent or distributively by a number of agents, regarded as parts of a wider whole activity. According to its context an activity in process may imply a notion of attempting, continuing, setting about, beginning or the like, and a variety of English translations may be needed to represent one Greek form."

See Mt 5:2.

As for the "already fallen" rendering of πεσόντα, it appears that the NWT simply construes the aorist participle as denoting antecedent action (i.e., Jesus began to see an event that had already occurred [began to occur] before he started to perceive it) by using the English past participle "fallen" coupled with the adverbial "already."

I must admit that after reading Stanley Porter's works and consulting Buist Fanning, my understanding of aorist participles has shifted somewhat. If you care to read Porter's dense monograph on aspect, see Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the NT, With Reference to Tense and Mood (New York: Peter Lang, 1989). Frankly I think he provides one of the most "scientific" accounts of aorist participles. Having said the foregoing, I believe the NWT rendering is not problematic from a translational standpoint.

As an update to this old post, I must point out that Porter has been thoroughly criticized by Chrys Caragounis. The latter scholar argues (somewhat convincingly) that Porter has misrepresented how Greeks understand tense and aspect.

Evangelical Change in Outlook Regarding the Trinity Doctrine?

Theologian Kevin Giles contends that Evangelicals have altered their view of the Trinity doctrine based on certain cultural presuppositions. He maintains that a Christian's reading of the Bible or his/her formulation of doctrine is always historically conditioned. Giles therefore insists orthodox Christians have traditionally believed that the three Persons of the Godhead are all ontologically and functionally equal (i.e. not subordinate with respect to the AD INTRA or AD EXTRA works of the Trinity). However, after the suffrage movement or the advent of the birth control pill (INTER ALIA), Evangelicals began to claim that the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father, yet equal to Him as respects the one nature that they either share with the Father or are with Him (according to the SIMPLCITAS DEI doctrine).

The analogy used to support such thinking (Giles points out) was the husband and wife relationship, which he believes is theologically innovative: it is not rooted in historical Trinitarian orthodoxy. The upshot of his analysis is that Evangelicals tend to read the Bible or formulate doctrine through particular cultural lenses. Just as they changed their views on the social, familial or ecclesiastical role of women, so many professed Christians (whether Evangelical or Catholic) have altered their beliefs on slavery and the Trinity doctrine.

See The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downer's Grove: IVP, 2002).

Raymond E. Brown and John 20:17

"The traditional exegesis, repeated even by such penetrating scholars as Loisy, Bernard, Hoskyns, and Lightfoot, is that Jesus says 'your Father' and 'my Father,' rather than 'our Father,' because he wants to keep distinct his special relationship to the Father . . . from that of his followers (adopted sons). Catharinet, art. cit., has proved just the opposite. To understand the 'my Father and your Father, my God and your God' pattern, one should recall Ruth 1:16. Urged by Naomi to stay behind in Moab, Ruth insists that, even though not an Israelite, she will come to Israel with Naomi; for from this moment, 'Your people shall be my people, and your God my God.' Similarly the statement of the Johannine Jesus is one of identification and not of disjunction. Jesus is ascending to his Father who will now become the Father of his disciples (Anchor Bible, Gospel According to John XIII-XXI, Raymond Brown, p. 1016-1017).

My Review of Edward Feser's work The Last Superstition (Abbreviated)

Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Feser for producing a work that effectively (for the most part) dismantles the fragile straw house of ideas that has been constructed by the so-called "new atheists" (Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens). Feser employs wit, mental acuity and reason to refute the claims made by Dawkins and company. I have enjoyed reading his work, although like any other book, it has strong points and weaknesses. In reviewing this publication, I have pointed out what I perceive to be strengths or weaknesses.

1. The discussion on nominalism versus realism (theory of universals) was one of the best parts of Feser's book. While I do not agree with his depiction of nominalism in toto, I believe that the discussion is relatively simple. The author's illustration of realism which involves the example of a rubber ball was excellent. Since I teach undergraduates, I really appreciated his approach and how it helps one to understand the Aristotelian or Platonic claims regarding universals. See pages 57-62 for Feser's treatment of Aristotelian hylomorphism along with a discussion of both moderate and extreme realism.

2. Feser also critiques the Humean "attack" on causation/causality (pages 105-110). David Hume (1711-1776) argues that he is able to conceive a thing (a bowling ball, for example) coming into existence without a cause. However, Feser addresses this "argument" by noting that Hume is conflating or confusing the verb "conceive" with the verb "imagine." But the two actions delineated by the respective verbs "conceive" and "imagine" clearly are not the same acts. It is conceptually possible to grasp the concept of a "chiliagon" (a thousand-sided figure) but that does not mean it is conceptually possible to form a distinct mental image of a chiliagon. Hume's argument suggests that he fails to understand this important distinction.

3. The Last Superstition continuously exploits the notion of Aristotelian final causality. The final cause is the telos (i.e. end, result, goal, function or purpose) of a thing. One might say that an oak tree is the final cause of an acorn or that the final cause of a human embryo is a full grown adult. Aristotle believed that most everything in our natural world has a final cause: trees, humans, animals, and artificial objects all have a telos. Thomas Aquinas thus used Aristotle's thought on causes to build a case for the existence of God via unaided natural reason. See pages 114-119 of Feser's work.

4. Having mentioned some positive things about Feser's work, please allow me to include some critical feedback in this portion of my review. Feser has a wry sense of humor. Sometimes his jokes hit the mark and sometimes they do not. There are paragraphs in this book wherein the sarcasm and cockiness just drips like water. Some of the remarks are indeed amusing. Moreover, Dawkins and company probably deserve the sarcasm directed at them. Nevertheless, I would have loved to see less sarcasm, less of a smart-alecky tone and more seriousness pertaining to the task at hand.

5. Feser might also have stayed on task a little more rather than being diverted by political issues or didactic moralizing about contemporary moral topics. The arguments that he makes, for example, against abortion do not contribute directly to his general thesis, although I concur with his take on the issue.

6. Finally, Feser responds to the new atheists on the subject of mind. He contends that universals must exist and if they do in fact exist, then our thoughts about triangularity or squareness (two universals) must be immaterial. After making these observations, Feser maintains that neuroscientific findings cannot rightly be used to refute this Aristotelian and Thomist concept since Aquinas is not doing science (understood in the modern sense of the word) but metaphysics when he insists that universals especially qua concepts and the mind cannot be material things. I do not agree when Feser says that the findings of neuroscience (for instance) should not count against Aristotelian metaphysical demonstrations. Nor does it seem that one must construe mental concepts as immaterial, based on what neuroscience and reflections from modern philosophy of mind have yielded. The findings of neuroscience (like other forms of human knowledge) are provisional. But accounts regarding consciousness being a higher-level brain process have already been developed by philosophers and neuroscientists.

See http://www.amazon.com/Last-Superstition-Refutation-New-Atheism/dp/1587314525/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1356106647&sr=1-1&keywords=the+last+superstition

Gospel of Mark's Rhetorical Style

The Gospel of Mark is generally portrayed as being plain or uncultivated and even ungrammatical at points. In his NIB commentary on Mark, Larry Hurtado observes:

"To begin with basics, Mark's account is heavily narrative, conveying the feeling of fast-paced action. His Greek style is simple and unsophisticated, using many simple sentences connected by the word for 'and.' A comparison of events found in Mark and in the other Gospels will show that his version often seems wordy and less well constructed" (page 11).

However, Hurtado offers this qualification of his opening statements regarding the literary style of Mark:

"Yet, Mark did employ certain techniques that demonstrate some skill and literary intent. As we shall see, he sometimes quotes, but more frequently alludes to, the OT and seems to have expected his readers to be sufficiently familiar with it to appreciate these allusions" (ibid.).

(1) According to Hurtado, Mark's Gospel is "heavily narrative" and fast-paced. Therefore, we would expect certain literary devices or discourse markers to be present in Mark and they are. Indeed, one feature of the Gospel of Mark that is striking is the writer's continual use of the Greek EUQUS. It is no wonder that A. T. Robertson (A Grammar of the Greek NT) writes:

"broken and parenthetic clauses are frequent (cf. 7:19 KAQARIZWN); at times he is pleonastic (2:20 TOTE EN EKEINH TH hHMERA); he uses EUQUS (W. H.) 41 times; he is emotional and vivid, as shown by descriptive adjectives, questions and exclamations (cf. 1:24; 2:7); the intermingling of tenses (9:33ff., EPHRWTA . . . LEGIE . . . EIPEN) is not due to ignorance of Greek or to artificiality, as Swete well says, but to 'a keen sense of the reality and living interest of facts; there are 151 historic presents in the W. H. text against 78 in Matthew and 4 in Luke; there is frequent and discriminating use of prepositions (2:1, 2, 10, 13); the connective is usually KAI rather than DE, seldom OUN; there is little artistic effect, but much simplicity and great vividness of detail; the vernacular KOINH is dominant with little literary
influence, though EIPEN, PAIDIOQEN and OYIA are held so by Norden" (pp. 118-119).

(2) It has often been said that Mark's account of Jesus' life contains ungrammatical constructions. But one scholar, who challenges this charge, is David A. Black. Black faces this oft-mentioned criticism of Mark by utilizing the tools of discourse analysis and descriptive linguistics. Black's essay can be found in Linguistics and NT Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis. Nashville: Broadman
Press, 1992.

The name of Black's study is "Discourse Analysis, Synoptic Criticism, and Markan Grammar: Some Methodological Considerations" on pp. 90-98 of the above referenced publication, which he edits along with Katharine Barnwell and Stephen Levinsohn.

Discourse analysis refers to the inspection of macrostructures (i.e. phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs and entire compositions) as opposed to lexemes or individual units of sound-meaning (otherwise known as words). Richard A. Young points out that discourse analysis examines genre, structure, cohesion, propositions, relations, prominence, and setting as well.

Discourse analysis is a top-down approach to communicative situations. It probes context (the socio-political and religious climate or Sitz im Leben), the co-text (literary context of a text) and the text itself rather than simply focusing on the potential significations of sound-forms.

In any event, Black avails himself of discourse analytical principles and a descriptivist approach (linguistically) to refute the charge that Mark's Greek is ungrammatical at times. I highly recommend his essay along with Robertson's big grammar which contains information on each NT book and its style. Moreover, Nigel Turner has penned a book on style that also deserves consideration.

Revelation 22:3 and Daniel 7:27

George W. Buchanan contends that the singular third person pronoun in Rev 22:3 (AUTWi) could refer to God or to the Lamb: he does not argue that the pronoun must refer to both referents or antecedents.

One line of reasoning that indicates God receives LATREIA, writes Buchanan, is the fact that the hOI DOULOI could potentially be priests of God, and then they would be rendering LATREIA to the God whom they serve as priests and "slaves" (Rev 1:5-6).

On the other hand, Buchanan continues, Dan 7:27 (LXX) shows that the present nations and governments will one day become "subject to the saints and, of course, also to their leader, the Son of Man, who is here [Rev 22:3] called the Lamb" (Buchanan 612ff).

Buchanan thus seems to argue that strictly speaking the "saints" (holy ones) of the Most High actually receive the honor and obedience mentioned at Dan 7:27; but it seems that he wants to suggest that by the nations subjecting themselves to the holy ones, they also by default render homage to the leader of the holy ones. In this regard, Buchanan may be correct. But this line of reasoning does not seem to demonstrate that the Son of Man is the one who receives LATREIA in Rev 22:3. LATREIA is evidently not mentioned in Dan 7:27.

As Buchanan continues, however, it becomes clear that he is not claiming that the Messiah technically is worshiped or is ever ontologically on par with the Divine One. He appeals to his notion of forensic agency in which one has a principal and a legal agent to establish this point.

The legal agent may receive deference that is really directed toward the principal. But this fact does not indicate that the legal agent is equal (ontologically) to the principal. The concept of legal agency may well illustrates the relationship between the Father and the son of God. At any rate, it is clear that Buchanan is in no way arguing that the Lamb receives worship as the Father receives worship (LATREIA). But as we have also established hitherto, God is the most likely referent of AUTWi in Rev 22:3. He is the one whose face will be seen by those who are part of the first resurrection (1 Jn 3:1-3; Rev 20:4-6). God likely is the object of priestly LATREIA.

As a side note: Edward J Young (The Prophecy of Daniel: A Commentary) writes that the antecedent of the pronoun in the latter part of Dan 7:27 "is people, not Most High."

Louis Hartman and Alexander Di Lella (Anchor Bible Commentary on Daniel) also note that the pronominal suffix of MALKUTEH refers to 'AM ('people') and not to the Most High. It thus seems possible that both the Hebrew text and the LXX say the "holy ones" are obeyed in Dan 7:27.

Source: Buchanan's Mellen Series Commentary on Revelation

Regards,
Edgar

Does Revelation 20:9 Necessarily Rule Out the Heavenly Hope?

In his 3-volume commentary on Revelation, David Aune delineates the hermeneutical possibilities for the Greek expression τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὼν ἁγίων in Revelation 20:9a. They are

1) The heavenly city.
2) The encampment of the people of God which is identical with "the beloved city."
3) The encampment of the people of God stationed outside the city in expectation of the impending attack.
4) The martyrs with Christ in Jerusalem (Revelation 14:1-5).
5) An army of angels (perhaps the force mentioned in Revelation 19:14) that is "bivouacked" in Jerusalem's vicinity. In fact, Eichhorn renders the phrase with the Latin wording "castra angelorum" (cf. 2 Kings 6:17; 1QM 7:6 and 19:1).

Number 1) is taken from the commentary on Revelation by R. H. Charles. He argues that the heavenly city descends to the earth, but as I've noted previously, his interpretation is not necessarily the correct one. The heavenly city could be under attack insofar as its representatives are being assailed. Jesus taught that if you harm his brothers, you hurt him. Remember the words, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me"?

Number 5) might also be a viable possibility.

The Etymological Significance of the Preposition DIA

Romans 11:36 has DIA + the genitive which can be translated either as "through" or "by." Either translation is able to communicate the notion of intermediate agency, I would say. Colossians 1:16 is also DIA + genitive and Hebrews 2:10 is DIA + the genitive case (DI' hOU). What will determine how one renders the construction should be context or translator preference. But, as I see it, nothing is wrong with communicating agency with "through" or "by." BDAG shows that DIA may be used as a "marker of instrumentality or circumstance whereby someth. is accomplished or effected, by, via, through" (page 224); DIA can also be a "marker of pers. agency, through, by" (BDAG, 225).

In John 1:3, 10; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Colossians 1:16, DIA is used of "Christ as intermediary in the creation of the world" (BDAG, 225).

I examined a number of grammars that I own and one helpful resource I found was A.T. Robertson's A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research. On p. 580, Robertson quotes Delbruck who has "nothing to say" about the origin of DIA. Nevertheless, Robertson proceeds to offer a number of illuminating comments on this Greek preposition, wherein he notes that "there is no doubt about DIA being kin to DUO, DIS. (cf. Sanskrit DVIS, Greek DIS, b = v or U); German ZWEI; English two (fem. and neut.), twain (masc.), twi-ce, twi-light, be-tween, two-fold, etc."

A Discussion on 1 Peter 3:19

[Edgar]
Paul J. Achtemeier has a very thorough discussion on 1 Pet. 3:19 in his commentary on Peter's First Epistle that you can find in the Hermeneia series. He carefully reviews the explanations that have been posited vis-a'-vis 1 Pet. 3:19 and he then writes: "There is a clear Jewish tradition, however, in which the angelic beings of Gen. 6:1-6, whose disobedience caused the flood, were subsequently imprisoned" (Achtemeier 256). He adds: "That it is this tradition which underlies the reference to 'spirits' in our verse seems therefore likely to be the case" (256).

So while Achtemeier is not really dogmatic about the identity of the spirits in 1 Pet. 3:19--he does suggest that the view which I have advanced is probably the least problematic approach.

[Harry]
My questions to you would be, what is the point of introducing angels at 3:19, and what was Jesus accomplishing by going to a special group of angels already in prison?

[Edgar]
According to the discourse structure or context of 1 Pet. 3:19, there are a number of good reasons why Peter introduced the wicked spirits or angels in his discussion. Keep in mind that Peter is trying to show his brothers and sisters why they should suffer for the sake of righteousness (1 Pet. 3:16,17). In 3:18, he employs the example of Christ as a (the) model for all Christian believers. Since Christ suffered and subsequently died for our sins, though he was and is righteous, and since his ignominious and painful death opened the way for humans to approach God with a clean conscience, since he was also put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit and in this state (as the NWT says) he went and assured the angels of their doom--we too should suffer as Christ did and desist from sins, while asking God for a good conscience by being baptized in water through the resurrection of Christ from the dead (1 Pet. 3:18-4:1, 2). So the example of the fallen angels helps us to see the consequences of apostatizing from God. The mention of these rebellious spirits also impresses on us the fact that the waters of baptism (the antitype of the flood) can either serve as a salvific step to those who avail themselves of this godly provision. But baptism will not profit those who refuse to be immersed through the resurrection of Christ. Achtemeier thus suggests that Peter employs the story about the angels so that "Christians can face their future with confidence, despite whatever suffering that future may portend, because Christ has triumphed over the most powerful forces of the universe. The salvation Christ promises is therefore sure, and confidence in that Lord can sustain Christians until the final judgment, whose coming is sure and whose advent will rescue Christians from their tormented lives" (Achtemeier 246).

[Edgar continued]
As I will show later, KHRUSSW does not always refer to proclaiming the Gospel.

[Harry]
I said that it does so when Jesus is used with it, that is when he is the
one doing it in the NT. I did not say that it always referred to
proclaiming the Gospel.

[Edgar]
In your message dated 00-11-26 17:15:20 EST, you wrote: "i think of Jesus' preaching as positive because the Greek word kerussw, when used with Jesus in the NT, always has a positive connotation of a preaching of the Gospel."

But please notice that Jesus himself evidently used the word KHRUGMA to describe the message that Jonah preached to the men of Nineveh (Matt. 12:41; Lk. 11:32). The LXX also has KHRUSSW at Jonah 1:2 in delineating Jonah's message of doom. Achtemeier concludes that KHRUSSW "does not automatically mean that the content of the proclamation is forgiveness or salvation" (262).

Another work states: "In 1 Peter 3:19 there is no reference to evangelizing, but to the act of Christ, after his resurrection, in proclaiming His victory to fallen spirits"(Zodhiates, Complete Word Study: NT, page 928).

Answering Objections to the New Jerusalem Post

Certain objections have been set forth in reply to my New Jerusalem blog entry that I will now address:

1) I have written that the New Jerusalem (Revelation 21:1-5) descends from heaven in John's vision, but it does not light upon earth in the vision. That view may be logically inferred; however, it's not exactly what the text itself says. Revelation 21:2 states: "I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband" (NIV). Later, we read: "One of the seven angels who had the seven bowls full of the seven last plagues came and said to me, 'Come, I will show you the bride, the wife of the Lamb.' And he carried me away in the Spirit to a mountain great and high, and showed me the Holy City, Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God." In both sets of passages, we have the Greek structure καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ which includes the present active participle καταβαίνουσαν. The present morphology of the verb suggests progressive (not completed) action. The visionary never claims that the city became situated on earth. Some have interpreted the city's descent as an ongoing thing, whereas Gregory K. Beale understands the descent as a reference to the future because of how participles function in relation to finite verbs. In either case, we don't have to understand the city's descent in terms of completed action.

2) A further objection contends that the city and its descent are literal "within the apocalyptic imagery" of John's revelation. Revelation 3:12 supposedly buttresses this line of reasoning. But the language contained in 3:12 can be interpreted figuratively. One can become a symbolic "pillar" in the temple of God (Galatians 2:9) and emblematically have the name of God's holy city written upon one's person (Revelation 14:1). There's no need to interpret the discourse literally. For notice that Christ also promises to write his new name and the name of his God upon the loyal overcomer. Are we to construe all of these promises literally? Beale (The Book of Revelation, 295) writes that the pillar imagery of Revelation 3:12 "is a metaphor for the believer."

3) It's clear that we're talking about a symbolic visionary city (Revelation 21:9). If the city is actually the Lamb's bride, then a literal polis is not the focus of John's discourse. Additionally, this city has representatives on earth who suffer attack in the city's behalf. Just as Jehovah is personally distressed when opposers persecute his people, so the holy city is affected by attacks that are launched against its representatives. Compare Zechariah 2:8; Revelation 12:13. I thank "a servant of Jehovah" for reminding me of that last reference.

4) My criticism of Middleton invoking Revelation 5:9-10 is that he prefers the rendering "on the earth" whereas it should more likely be "over the earth." As I have written elsewhere, I do not understand the translation "over the earth" as a reference to location. Rather, it signifies authority: the kings and priests will exercise authority towards the earth. The text is not communicating the idea that Christian kings and priests will be located above the earth in terms of spatial orientation.

But Middleton renders the verse incorrectly, IMO. And while Exodus 19:5-6 may constitute a hermeneutical lens through which Revelation 5:9-10 may be read and understood, the latter text does not technically quote the former. It's an allusion at best. Finally, my interlocutor accepts the inference that since Exodus 19:5-6 is probably a restatement of the promise to Abraham, therefore, the blessing promised to Abraham must entail living forever on earth without any hope of heavenly life. But no such logical entailment necessarily follows from any of these premises.

Historian Brian Tierney on Papal Infallibility

"If the popes have always been infallible in any meaningful sense of the word--if their official pronouncements as heads of the church on matters of faith and morals have always been unerring and so irreformable--then all kinds of dubious consequences ensue. Most obviously, twentieth century popes would be bound by a whole array of past papal decrees reflecting the responses of the Roman church to the religious and moral problems of former ages . . . To defend religious liberty would be 'insane' and to persecute heretics commendable. Judicial torture would be licit and the taking of interests on loans a mortal sin. The pope would rule by divine right 'not only the universal church but the whole world.' Unbaptized babies would be punished in Hell for all eternity. Maybe the sun would still be going around the earth. All this is impossible of course. No one understands the fact better than modern theologians of infallibility. If past popes have always been infallible--again, we must add, in any meaningful sense of the word--then present popes are hopelessly circumscribed in their approaches to all the really urgent moral problems of the twentieth century, problems involving war, sex, scientific progess, state power, social obligations, and individual liberties . . . Real infallibility has regrettable implications. In the years since 1870, therefore, theologians have devoted much ingenuity to devising a sort of pseudo-infallibility for the pope, a kind of Pickwickian infallibility" (Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility: 1150-1350, pages 2-3).

Will New Jerusalem Literally Descend to the Earth?

J. Richard Middleton has written an article in which he posits the view that earth will be the only eternal home for mankind post-eschaton.

While I obviously agree with Middleton concerning the hope for everlasting or eternal life on earth, I could not disagree with him more when he argues that no Christian will find his/her everlasting dwelling place in heaven (Daniel 7:13-14, 27; 2 Corinthians 5:1-2).

First, I believe that much of his problem derives from weak exegesis in connection with the relevant texts. I am not a professional exegete but I have been reading the Scriptures for over twenty years with an intense desire to understand what they say. I find that Middleton arrives at sweeping conclusions based on a hasty analysis of the germane Biblical verses he discusses.

For instance, it is true that Revelation 21:2, 10 speaks of New Jerusalem "coming down out of heaven from God" (KATABAINOUSAN EK TOU OURANOU TOU QEOU) arrayed as a bride. However, the text does not explicitly say that the city lands on earth, even if that is a valid inference that one might derive from its language. Moreover, we must remember that John was beholding a vision of things that would occur in the Lord's day. Revelation 21:10 tells us that the apostle was taken to a mountain on which he saw New Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God. The curious thing about the city, however, is that one wonders how it could ever fit on earth in view of its dimensions (Revelation 21:15-17). It is obvious that the city is figurative (Revelation 21:9) and that the motif of descent (KATABASIS) should not be literally
construed (Compare Exodus 19:11). Other commentators have interpreted this passage in similar ways.

Bruce Malina notes that the "holy city" is "of astronomical proportions, since it measures 12,000 stadia in length, width, and height" (_The New Jerusalem in the Revelation of John_, 54).

After pointing out that the city of New Jerusalem is a cube, Malina cites Pliny's Natural History which tells us that a Greek stadion is equivalent to 125 Roman paces or 625 feet. The holy city, if measured in accordance with Pliny's comments, would thus extend through half of the USA and "reach the height of 260 Mount Everests (the top of Mount Everest stands 29,028 feet above sea level). Furthermore, the city was of transparent gold, 'gold like pure crystal'" (Ibid).

John does not seem to be saying that the city, even in a metaphorical sense, would land on earth. This interpretation seems to be a misreading of the text.

Albert Barnes says the following about Revelation 21:2:

"On the phrase 'new Jerusalem,' See Barnes 'Galatians 4:26'; See Barnes 'Hebrews 12:22.' Here it refers to the residence of the redeemed, the heavenly world, of which Jerusalem was the type and symbol. It is here represented as 'coming down from God out of heaven.' This, of course, does not mean that this great city was literally to descend upon the earth, and to occupy any one part of the renovated world; but it is a symbolical or figurative representation, designed to show that the abode of the righteous will be splendid and glorious. The idea of a city literally descending from heaven, and being set upon the earth with such proportions--three hundred and seventy miles high, (Revelation 21:16,) made of gold, and with single pearls for gates, and single gems for the foundations--is absurd. No man can suppose that this is literally true, and hence this must be regarded as a figurative or emblematic description. It is a representation of the heavenly state under the image of a beautiful city, of which Jerusalem was, in many respects, a natural and striking emblem."

Another problem that I have with Middleton is his use of Revelation 5:9-10 to demonstrate his point. EPI in that verse probably should be rendered "over" based on how it is employed in that particular context (See BDAG Lexicon and Richard A. Young's intermediate grammar).

Ancient Ecclesiastical Views on Proverbs 8:22

Many more examples could be provided [EF]

I added: "You perceive, my hearers, if you bestow attention, that the Scripture has declared that this Offspring was begotten by the Father before all things created; and that which is begotten is numerically distinct from that which begets, any one will admit." (Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, CXXIX).

This power and disposition of the Divine Intelligence is set forth also in the Scriptures under the name of Σοφία, Wisdom; for what can be better entitled to the name of Wisdom than the Reason or the Word of God? Listen therefore to Wisdom herself, constituted in the character of a Second Person: "At the first the Lord created me as the beginning of His ways, with a view to His own works, before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled; moreover, before all the hills did He beget me;" that is to say, He created and generated me in His own intelligence. Then, again, observe the distinction between them implied in the companionship of Wisdom with the Lord. "When He prepared the heaven," says Wisdom, "I was present with Him; and when He made His strong places upon the winds, which are the clouds above; and when He secured the fountains, (and all things) which are beneath the sky, I was by, arranging all things with Him; I was by, in whom He delighted; and daily, too, did I rejoice in His presence." Now, as soon as it pleased God to put forth into their respective substances and forms the things which He had planned and ordered within Himself, in conjunction with His Wisdom's Reason and Word, He first put forth the Word Himself, having within Him His own inseparable Reason and Wisdom, in order that all things might be made through Him through whom they had been planned and disposed, yea, and already made, so far forth as (they were) in the mind and intelligence of God. This, however, was still wanting to them, that they should also be openly known, and kept permanently in their proper forms and substances. (Against Praxeas VI)

See also http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.ix.vii.html#v.ix.vii-p7.1

Compare http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.v.xviii.html#v.v.xviii-p15.1

Question Regarding Athenagoras

Hello Matt13,

My replies will appear below. You wrote:

Hello Edgar.

I would like to ask your advice on a translation question once again please.

GREEK TEXT: “...πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρί, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον...” - (Legatio Chapter 10, MPG)

ATHENAGORAS (circa 177 C.E.): “...the first offspring of the Father. I do not mean that he was created...” ” - (Legatio Chapter 10. Library Of Christian Classics)

ATHENAGORAS (circa 177 C.E.): “...the first product of the Father, not as having been brought into existence...” - (Chapter X. Pages 133-134, Roberts & Donaldson ANF.)

It is in regard to this word Gk., ( γενόμενον ) in particular.

The Persus Lexicon gives this information:

γίγνομαι
come into a new state of being
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut acc
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut nom
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid neut voc
γενόμενον
part sg aor mid masc acc
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=%CE%B3%CE%B5%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BD&la=greek

My question is, could Gk., ( γενόμενον ) be translated as:

“...[then] coming-into-a-new-state-of-being/existence...”

I'm not sure how the aorist tense works in this construction.

Is adding "...then..." inaccurate?

REPLY: Of course, you have to account for the presence of οὐχ. Therefore, the translation must include some form of negation. With aorist participles, translated woodenly literal, the rule is usually "having Xed" or "having been Xed" as in Philippians 2:6-7 (see the KIT). So, "having come into being" or "having come into a new state of being" might work. James A. Brooks and Carlton Winbery (Syntax of New Testament Greek, page 146) also point out that aorist participles may be rendered by "when," "since" or "after." We could use "as" or "while" to render aorist participles too. But I'm wondering what the reason might be for using "then" in translation. It could be possible, but I just wonder about the rationale for using it.

You wrote further:

One reason I think that Athenagoras ( possibly ) meant this ( sense ) is the close context where he quotes Proverbs 8:22 LXX just a few lines later saying the Logos was Gk., ( ekitzen ) "....created..."!

Which appears to be self-contradictory.

A second reason is perhaps the text has been tinkered with. Although I'm pushing that.

REPLY: I'm not sure that Athenagoras is alluding to Proverbs 8:22 in order to establish the created status of Christ. According to Donaldson's rendition, "The Lord," it says, "made me, the beginning of His ways to His works." It seems that Athenagoras understands the Son to have been generated rather than created (strictly speaking). He believes that the Son of God is also the beginning of God's works. Notice his statement regarding the holy spirit being "an effluence of God, flowing from Him, and returning back again like a beam of the sun." The ideals found in Athenagoras are reflected in other early writings as well.

A third reason for my interpretation is the internal ( non )-personal existence with-in the mind of God --- verses --- the external-projection theory which is shared among the Apologists. In which he, (the Logos), ( then ) with-in God's mind, did not have a real or substantial ( personal ) existence, but ( later ) before the creation of the Universe/Kosmos came into existence as an inteligent living being when he was projected.

REPLY: It does seem that this kind of distinction can be ascertained in Athenagoras. There is probably a difference in his mind between the internal and external Logos.