Dialogue on Mortality (Prima Secundae Partis)

Interlocutor:
There is no "replacement" in view. It is not "my immortal soul must put on a different body" but rather "this mortal body, this corruptible must be changed..."

Edgar:
Up to this point, I have said nothing about an "immortal soul" putting on a different body. This is what I mean when I say that you erroneously impute certain views to me and then you shadow-box with strawmen. Where did I ever say that I believe in the doctrine of the immortal soul? My position is that spirit anointed Christians resurrected from the dead will have a "spiritual body." That spiritual body is not synonymous with an immortal soul.

Interlocutor:
The figure of "eternal in the heavens" [2 Corinthians 5:1-2] refers to origin, not destination. He explains exactly what he means:

1 For we know that if our earthly house of this
tabernacle were
dissolved,
we have a building of God, an house not made with
hands, eternal in the
heavens.
2 For in this [earthly house] we groan, earnestly
desiring to be
clothed
upon with our house which is **from heaven**:
3 If so be that being clothed we shall not be found
naked.
4 For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being
burdened: **not
for
that we would be unclothed**, but clothed upon, **that
mortality might be swallowed up of life**.

Crystal clear. There is no room for the traditional reading.

Edgar:
You quoted four verses but did absolutely nothing to refute what I believe. Of course I would agree that the "building" Paul is talking about comes from God and is not an immortal soul, but you totally overlook the fact that the building remains "eternal in the heavens." You ignore the fact that the apostle indicates at least some Christians will live forever in the heavens for all eternity. Additionally the verse says nothing about a body "descending" from
God. It simply shows that God is the source of the new body.

Interlocutor:
The phrase "from heaven" indicates that it comes to us. It occurs in the process of resurrection, not in a later ascent, since it is "raised incorruptible."

Edgar:
The phrase 'from heaven' (EX OURANOU) in 2 Corinthians 5:1-2 is what I would call an ablative of source. It tells from whence the new "building" comes, not wither it is going. There is no indication that spatial movement is being discussed in this passage. Paul is simply making us aware that the body emanates/derives--not descends--from the Divine One. See 1 Cor 8:5-6 and note how EX is used there:

"Thus, the heavenly dwelling of 2 Cor 5:1, no less than the heavenly commonwealth of Phil 3:19, would be an image for that new age. Not even death, the final proof of mortality, need cause the apostles to shrink back (4:16a), for they, like all believers, know that their true home is in heaven" (V.P. Furnish. II Corinthians; translated with introduction, notes and commentary. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984).

Interlocutor:
This "true home" is "from heaven" and "swallows up mortality." In referring to a "heavenly body" he refers to the image that we shall bear:

35 But some man will say, How are the dead raised up?
and with what
body do
they come?
36 Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not
quickened, except it die:
37 And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that
body that shall
be, but
bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other
grain:
38 But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him,
and to every seed
his
own body.
39 All flesh is not the same flesh: but there is one
kind of flesh of
men,
another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and
another of birds.
40 There are also celestial bodies, and bodies
terrestrial: but the
glory
of the celestial is one, and the glory of the
terrestrial is another.
41 There is one glory of the sun, and another glory
of the moon, and
another glory of the stars: for one star differeth
from another star in
glory.
42 So also is the resurrection of the dead. It [the
body] is sown in
corruption; it [the body] is raised in incorruption:
43 It [the body] is sown in dishonour; it [the body]
is raised in
glory: it
[the body] is sown in weakness; it [the body] is
raised in power:
44 It [the body] is sown a natural body; it [the
body] is raised a
spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is
a spiritual body.
45 And so it is written, The first man Adam was made
a living soul;
the
last Adam was made a quickening spirit.
46 Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but
that which is
natural; and afterward that which is spiritual.
47 The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second
man is the Lord
from
heaven.
48 As is the earthy, such are they also that are
earthy: and as is the
**heavenly**, such are they also that are heavenly.
49 And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we
shall also **bear
the
image of the heavenly**.
50 Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood
cannot inherit the
kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit
incorruption.

Edgar:
Bearing the image of the heavenly one, Jesus Christ, does not prove that 'the heavenly body' is simply the body of flesh swallowed up by life. If the body of flesh is sown, then according to Paul, it cannot rise up again as a 'bare grain' (as it was when it was planted). See 1 Cor 15:45. Secondly, if the body of flesh is dissolved or broken down, then it cannot be the building that Paul says Christians will receive from God. Bruce then adds:

"He is there as His people's forerunner, the surety of their admission to the dwelling place of God; He is there, too, as their perpetual high priest, 'after the order of Melchizdek'" (132).

Interlocutor:
"Perpetually" refers to a continuous, or unbroken preisthood, rather than an annual one. But it is temporary.

Edgar:
The main reason I cited Bruce was to show what he had to say about Jesus being the 'forerunner' (PRODROMOS) for anointed Christians. The context suggests that Jesus served as a forerunner in that he entered the Most Holy in order that others might follow him and appear before the Person of God, in the heavens of his presence. See Bruce, Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews: with introduction, exposition and notes. London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1964.

What Does It Mean To Be a Person? (Preliminary Thoughts)

There is an ontological problem associated with defining what it means to be a "person." Being a human person could mean having the capacity for a specific range of intentional states, and intentionality is here defined as object-directedness or object-aboutness. John Searle distinguishes between three kinds of intentionality: original, derived, and metaphorical aboutness. A thought could be intentional insofar as it is about one's beloved or one's consciousness might be directed toward--or be about--God.

It's also possible that the capacity for self-referentiality adequately defines personhood (i.e., I have the ability to think and reference myself by using a first-person singular pronoun); however, persons are also constituted by relations (according to Kevin Corcoran).

One traditional definition of personhood has also been "individual substance of a rational nature" (Boethius, et al). But it seems that this definition of "person" might not work unless one nuances the definiens. What does it mean to be an individual, to be a substance, and to be or have a rational nature? Is it possible to consider babies as persons based on this classical definition?

Maybe another defining criterion that we could suggest for the word "person" is incommunicability. That is to say, a person is unique or cannot be reproduced without loss of personhood (i.e., cloning). One's own personhood is not something that can be shared or communicated.

Whatever a suitable definition of "human person" turns out to be, it seems that a Christian must view personhood through the lens of Genesis 1:26.

Giles Discusses the Ecclesiastical View of Women As Expressed Historically

There have been many writers in church history, who have published less than commendatory perspectives concerning women. Here are quotes from Kevin Giles' work Trinity and Subordinationism:

"Having become disobedient, she [Eve] was made the cause of death, both to herself and the whole human race" (Irenaeus qt. in Giles 153).

"And do you not know that each of you [women] is Eve? . . . You are the devil's gateway: you are the first deserter of the divine law" (Tertullian).

John Chrysostom claims that women are "captivated by appetite"--as if men aren't!--"weak and fickle" (collectively) and "ruined." See Giles 153-154.

Woman is responsible for the ruin of the whole human race (John Calvin). It is no wonder that woman was "the first deserter of the divine law" since she was outmatched in the wisdom department by man, says Luther (Giles 154). Even Matthew Henry wrote that the devil assaulted the "weaker" person in the Garden of Eden:

"We may suppose her [Eve] inferior to Adam in knowledge, and strength, and presence of mind" (ibid).

"The tradition is uniform. Once more, we have seen that the best of past theologians interpreted the Bible to be teaching that women are more prone than men to sin and error" (ibid).

Martin Luther made extremely offensive comments that I have not posted. You can find the remarks in his collected "Works."

Denizens of Paris and Terror

My condolences go out to the people of Paris. It's hard to see how some can think that the world is constantly improving (2 Timothy 3:1-5).

Matthew 5:18 (Ulrich Luz)

Due to limited time, I will not be presenting opposing viewpoints in this post. I will simply give my take on Mt 5:18 and cite one scholar, who seems to put forth a view that's in harmony with the NWT rendering of the Matthean text. There is plenty of material out there on this verse; some agree with the rendering found in the NWT while others do not (cf. Hagner's Word Commentary on Matthew).

Firstly, let us compare how different Bible translations render this passage:

"For assuredly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle will by no means pass from the law till all is fulfilled" (NKJV).

"For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not the smallest letter or stroke shall pass from the Law until all is accomplished" (NASB).

"For truly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all is accomplished" (RSV).

"for, verily I say to you, till that the heaven and the earth may pass away, one iota or one tittle may not pass away from the law, till that all may come to pass" (YLT).

"I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished" (NIV).

"Amen, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not the smallest letter or the smallest part of a letter will pass from the law, until all things have taken place" (Catholic NAB).

"I assure you, heaven and earth may as well cease to be, as that one jot or one tittle of the law should fail of its completion" (Mace NT of 1729).

"Truly I say to you that sooner would heaven and earth pass away than for one smallest letter or one stroke of a letter to pass away from the Law until all things take place" (NWT 2013 Revision).

As you can see, translators often choose to translate the first occurrence of ἕως ἂν in a manner that suggests "heaven and earth" will or might eventually pass away. But the NWT treats the language of Mt 5:18 as an example of hyperbole.

The Greek of Mt 5:18 reads:

ἀμὴν γὰρ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ, ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ μία κεραία οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἕως ἂν πάντα γένηται.

Ulrich Luz (Matthew 1-7: A Commentary. Translated by Wilhelm C. Linss. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989) reviews the translational possibilities for the Greek of Mt 5:18. He observes that the words ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ can either be a periphrastic way of saying "never" (see Luz, p. 265ff) or it may "limit the validity of the law until the end of the world."

Luz points out that the decision between these two alternatives is "very difficult" since in Mt 24:35, Jesus is reported to have said: "Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away." Elsewhere, however, we read:

"But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one stroke of a letter in the law to be dropped" (Lk 16:17 NRSV).

The Hebrew Scriptures also teach us concerning the Messiah:

"In his days may the righteous flourish, And abundance of peace till the moon is no more" (Ps 72:7 NASB).

Yet we read in Jeremiah 31:35-36 (ASV):

"Thus saith Jehovah, who giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night, who stirreth up the sea, so that the waves thereof roar; Jehovah of hosts is his name: If these ordinances depart from before me, saith Jehovah, then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before me for ever."

The passages in Matthew 24:35; Lk 16:17 and the OT usage of ἕως ἂν in the LXX might have influenced the NWT handling of Mt 5:18--however, going back to Luz' discussion, knowing exactly how to construe the language of Mt 5:18 does seem extremely difficult. As he says:

"Does the evangelist mean that--in contrast to the words of Jesus--the law is to be valid only until the passing of heaven and earth? Matthew then would follow a sparsely documented Jewish idea that the law would be abolished in the future eon" (ibid).

In order to resolve the apparent or imagined difficulties associated with translating and understanding Mt 5:18, Luz goes into a number of text-critical and source issues that I will not concern myself with here. Suffice it to say that he thinks ἕως ἂν παρέλθῃ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ likely means "never." This view is based, in part, on a comparison of both material and linguistic parallels found in the LXX. To find out each example referred to in the commentary, see Luz 265ff.

Linguistic parallels to Mt 5:18 are scanty, but Luz cites two places from the OT: Job 14:12; Ps 72:5, 7, 17. The verse at Job 14:12 is really good. Even if one translated ἕως ἂν there as "until," it could still carry the meaning "never."

You might also want to check out BDAG and Louw-Nida on this point.

Divine Simplicity and God's Emotions

A great number of the early fathers maintained that God
has no emotions whatsoever. Not only the ancients,
but especially medieval theologians reasoned this way.
For instance, Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas
both state that God does not instantiate any emotions.
But even Bishop Augustine of Hippo believed that God
is emotionless--in fact, I believe Jurgen Moltmann
(The Trinity and the Kingdom of God)
writes that only one ancient theologian
believed God is passible. That was Origen.

Augustine of Hippo writes:

"God's repentance is not because of error; his anger
has no ardor of a perturbed mind; his mercy does not
have the compassionate misery suggested by the Latin
term; the jealously of God has no spite of mind. But
the repentance of God refers to things ruled by his
power which change unexpectedly for us; the anger of
God is the punishment of sin; the mercy of God is the
goodness of helping; the jealously of God is
providence, which does not allow those which it has
subdued to love with impunity what it prohibits"
(Contra Advers. Legis et Prophet 1.20.40 quoted in
J. Hallman's Descent of God).

But some Fathers in antiquity think God has emotions
while others insist that He is totally devoid of them.
Yet it is probably more accurate to say that their ideas
subsist in a dialectical tension along a
continuum between impassibility and passibility.
Moreover, we also have to keep in mind the theological
development of certain patristic thinkers. Arnobius of
Sicca certainly thought that God is emotionless and
so did Clement of Alexandria, although there is a
passage in Clement's writings that suggests he may have
thought God can possibly show emotion by means of condescension.

An example of someone believing in divine emotions that are
qualitiative different from ours is Tertullian. He reckons that
God has emotions that befit the divine nature:

"And this, therefore, is to be deemed the likeness of God in man, that the human soul have the same emotions and sensations as God, although they are not of the same kind; differing as they do both in their conditions and their issues according to their nature. Then, again, with respect to the opposite sensations—I mean meekness, patience, mercy, and the very parent of them all, goodness,— why do you form your opinion of the divine displays of these (from the human qualities)? For we indeed do not possess them in perfection, because it is God alone who is perfect. So also in regard to those others—namely, anger and irritation, we are not affected by them in so happy a manner, because God alone is truly happy, by reason of His property of incorruptibility. Angry He will possibly be, but not irritated, nor dangerously tempted; He will be moved, but not subverted. All appliances He must needs use, because of all contingencies; as many sensations as there are causes: anger because of the wicked, and indignation because of the ungrateful, and jealousy because of the proud, and whatsoever else is a hinderance to the evil" (Adversus Marcionem 2.16.6).

Novatian also writes:

"For that God is angry, arises from no vice in Him.
But He is so for our advantage; for He is merciful
even then when He threatens, because by these threats
men are recalled to rectitude. For fear is necessary
for those who want the motive to a virtuous life, that
they who have forsaken reason may at least be moved by
terror. And thus all those, either angers of God or
hatreds, or whatever they are of this kind, being
displayed for our medicine,-as the case teaches,-have
arisen of wisdom, not from vice, nor do they originate
from frailty; wherefore also they cannot avail for the
corruption of God. For the diversity in us of the
materials of which we consist, is accustomed to arouse
the discord of anger which corrupts us; but this,
whether of nature or of defect, cannot subsist in God,
seeing that He is known to be constructed assuredly of
no associations of bodily parts. For He is simple and
without any corporeal commixture, being wholly of that
essence, which, whatever it be,-He alone
knows,-constitutes His being, since He is called
Spirit. And thus those things which in men are faulty
and corrupting, since they arise from the
corruptibility of the body, and matter itself, in God
cannot exert the force of corruptibility, since, as we
have said, they have come, not of vice, but of
reason."

Cursory Thoughts on Divine Temporality

Most orthodox theologians affirm the eternity (i.e., atemporality) of God ex professo. For instance, Paul Helm claims: "it makes no sense to ask how long God has existed, or to divide up his life into periods of time." Helm believes that God is eternal; the adjective "eternal" (in this context) refers to a presumed intrinsic property of the omnipotent Christian God whereby this deity is supposed to be outside of time. He is purportedly a divine being that transcends duration of time and temporal location (tempus).

Additionally, Thomas Aquinas reasons that God's timelessness is a fundamental truth: “From what we have said it is further apparent that God is eternal. Everything that begins to be or ceases to be does so through motion or change. Since, however, we have shown that God is absolutely immutable [i.e., not experiencing motion or change], He is eternal, lacking all beginning or end.” So God’s immutability (unchangeableness) ostensibly entails divine atemporality and the objective absence of de re potentiality in God.

This study will briefly examine two theories of divine atemporality posited by Boethius (ca. 475-526 CE) and Aquinas (1225-1274 CE). Both of the theories have been influential and they continue to mold contemporary discourse pertaining to God and time. After reviewing how Boethius and Aquinas construe the doctrine of absolute divine timelessness, I will talk about the observations of contemporary philosopher, Stephen T. Davis, then offer a provisional answer to the question, is God's putative eternity (atemporality) logically possible? The first issue that merits attention, however, is the relationship between God’s atemporality, divine foreknowledge and our human freedom. The first heading of this study will discuss the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge before undertaking an exploration of the Boethian and Thomistic views of God’s atemporality followed by Davis’ critique, an examination of objections to Davis, then my considered thoughts on the debate.

God and Time (for Sean K.)

Stephen T. Davis writes: "Time, perhaps, is an eternal aspect of God's nature rather than a reality independent of God. But the point is that God, on this view, is a temporal being" (Reason, Logic, and the Nature of God, 23).

Davis also notes that John of Damascus set forth another possibility, namely, that "time has always existed . . . yet is only measurable when things like the sun and moon exist" (Davis 23).

The Bible itself states that God is "from concealed time (OLAM) to concealed time" (Gesenius). Thorleif Boman also notes that OLAM denotes "boundless time."

Moreover, the Complete Word Study: Old Testament avers that OLAM in relation to God does not necessarily mean that God is outside of time:

"Temporal categories are inadequate to describe the nature of God's existence. The Creator has been from "everlasting to everlasting" (Ps 90:2). Even then, it [OLAM] still expresses the idea of a continued, measurable existence, rather than a state of being independent of time considerations" (The Complete Word Study: OT, page 2348).

MORE NOTES:

According to Boethius (in De Consolatio 5), on the metaphysical level, there is no such thing as "divine forevision" or foreknowledge. Boethius writes:

"If you will weigh the foresight with which God discerns all things, you will rightly esteem it to be the knowledge of a never fading instant rather than a foreknowledge of the 'future.' It should therefore rather be called provision than prevision because, placed high above all things, it looks out over all as from the loftiest mountain top."

In other words, while humans may rightly call God's knowledge of that which is future "foreknowledge," in reality, it is not foreknowledge, but intimate awareness of the present insofar as the present is nunc stans.

But why would an orthodox Christian be tempted to make
this move? There are at least two reasons that readily
spring to my mind. First, Boethius believes that if
God actually foresees future events or states, then He
also causes them. Second, Boethius reasons that
"Without doubt . . . all things which God foreknows do
come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free
will."

Boethius argues that something known "cannot be
otherwise than it is known to be," though free acts
viewed IN SE, "do not lose the perfect freedom of
their nature" (See William Hasker's _God, Time, and
Knowledge_, page 7).

Boethius is not alone in this regard since Thomas
Aquinas further writes:

"Hence what is known by us must be necessary even as
it is in itself; for what is future contingent in
itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known
by God must be necessary according to the mode in
which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as
already stated, but not absolutely as considered in
their own causes" (S.T. I. 14. 13, Reply Obj. 3. See
also Hasker, p. 10).

Notice that Thomas too escapes the possible dilemmas
that may arise from positing divine foreknowledge by
appealing to the notion of God's eternal present. But
if God subsists in timeless eternity, above time,
which both Boethius and Aquinas believe, then He
doesn't really see future events or behold future
states before they occur, bnut as they occur.

Tertullian's Angelomorphic Christology (Addressed to a Friend and Brother)

Written and submitted to a public forum on 11/5/2001:

Tertullian's Christology can be confusing at first.
But one thing that helps is to note his distinction
between the eternal Word or Reason of God and the
"created" or "begotten" Son. While Tertullian might
have written that the RATIO DEI or divine SERMO is/was
eternal, he did not say that the Son is/was eternally
generated. Adv Prax 7 makes this point very clear when
it speaks of the complete nativity of the Word. In
other words, the generation of the Son is a temporal
process that occurs prior to and for the purpose of
God's act of creation. By virtue of his begettal AND
the OT 'theophanies' that he performs, the Son
(according to Tertullian) shows himself to be lower
than the angels. But the minoration of the Son is only
for a time. Tertullian employs 1 Cor 15:25ff in Adv
Prax IV to show that the Son will eventually hand over
the MONARXIA TOU QEOU to the Father in order that God
may be all in all. Jurgen Moltmann (The Trinity and
the Kingdom of God)thus quips that Tertullian teaches
the begotten Son, who is lower than the angels
(Moltmann does not note this point about the angels),
will be subsumed into the One: he will evidently once
again function as the RATIO DEI just as he did before
his complete heavenly nativity. Tertullian's "Trinity"
is therefore much different from later formulations of
the Trinity.

Stump, Kretzmann, Time and God

Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann argue that God's duration is atemporal. Their joint concept of divine "eternal-simultaneity" is based on Boethius' account of divine eternity (understood as timeless duration) and Einsteinian relativity, which contributes to the simultaneity part of their general thesis.

Nonetheless, even some who advocate divine timelessness have found glaring weaknesses in Stump and Kretzmann's argument. The infirmities constituting this idea evidently are so profound that Stump and Kretzmann have even seen fit to revise their understanding of eternal-simultaneity. It seems that in order to have duration, we need time (tempus) or temporal parts. The concept of "atemporal duration" does not seem to be coherent. Paul Fitzgerald deals with this subject matter in "Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity," The Journal of Philosophy, 82.5. (May 1985): 260-269. He contends that it appears difficult to maintain a belief in atemporal duration without simultaneously proposing (finite) temporal parts for this supposed divine property:

"So we can opt for a doctrine of God's eternality as not involving in se any duration or mode of extension at all (the point rather than the line). Or we get E-duration in God, in which case there are subphases at which distinct particulars of the divine life have their locations and E-durations (or could at least, even if in fact the divine duration is absolutely monotone, as would be suggested by the doctrine of divine immutability)."

See p. 264 of the aforementioned article.

1 John 5:13 (A Few Syntactical Observations)

Text: Ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ. (1 John 5:13)

After using the epistolary aorist (ἔγραψα), John next employs the ἵνα or purpose clause. Therefore, his words might properly read: "I write you these things [in order] that . . ."

Next, we encounter εἰδῆτε. εἰδῆτε is a present subjunctive active form (not an infinitive which = to + the verb). Therefore, this verb should ideally not be rendered "to know," etc. It is more literally, "you might/may know" since it's also second person plural.

Furthermore, the additional utilization of the ὅτι clause and the preposition εἰς emphasize the point that the addresses of the letter "are having" (ἔχετε) eternal life.

Dialogue on Mortality and Immortality (Prima Pars)

Edgar:
The apostle Paul suggests that his earthly tent will undergo dissolution and it will then be replaced by a sturdy house, "eternal in the heavens" (2 Corinthians 5:1-2).

Interlocutor:
Nope. His mortal will be swallowed up by life.

Edgar:
You talk about an explicit assertion hermeneutic, when you are in fact reading ideas into the apostle's language. In 2 Corinthians 5:1-5, Paul does not say that his "mortal body" will be swallowed up by life. To the contrary, he writes that if his mortal body is "torn down," then he and other Christians will receive a "building from God" not made by human hands: a figurative structure that is eternal in the heavens. He says nothing about his mortal "body" being swallowed up by life. His exact words are: "In fact, we who are in this tent groan, being weighed down; because we want, not to put it off, but to put on the other, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (2 Cor 5:4).

Notice that he says nothing about his body being swallowed up by life: only what is mortal is "swallowed up" with life. And lest you construe Paul's paradoxical language in 2 Cor. 5:4 as proof that he desired to have his fleshly body clothed in immortality, see Philippians 1:21-26. We could read his words at 2 Cor. 5:1ff this way: "I want my mortal condition to be replaced with an immortal one." The context supports just such a reading.

To substantiate this point, check out what Paul writes in 2 Corinthians 5:8: "But we are of good courage and are well
pleased rather to become absent from the body and to make our home with the Lord."

Here it seems that Paul is referring to being absent from the mortal body (our current body of flesh); however, the apostle likely does not mean that he would be bodiless or incorporeal in toto. See 1 Corinthians 15:42ff. Paul would assume a spiritual body as opposed to a body of flesh (1 Corinthians 15:35-49).

Interlocutor:
1 Cor 15:50 Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.
51 Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed,
52 In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be **raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed**.
53 For **this corruptible** must put on incorruption, and **this mortal** must put on immortality.
54 So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory.
55 O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy
victory? {grave: or, hell}

Edgar:
Read the passage in context. Notice that Paul says nothing in the verses you cite about bodily alterations. Instead, he writes πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα (1 Cor 15:51). Where is there any mention of a body being changed in this verse? It simply is not there. Moreover, your interpretation of this Pauline unit ignores the entire context of 1 Cor 15:35ff where Paul assuredly makes it plain that "What you sow is not made alive unless first it dies; and as for what you sow, you sow, not the body that will develop, but a bare grain, it may be, of wheat or any one of the rest; but God gives it a body just as it has pleased him, and to each of the seeds its own body" (1 Cor. 15:35-38).

In other words, the body that is sown is not the identical body that will be raised. One is rooted in the other, but they are different bodies.

Interlocutor:
If the mortal body is not raised, but dissolved in death and corruption, then the saying does not come to pass, and the Adamic fall is not undone.

Edgar:
What saying does not come to pass? Surely you don't mean "the saying" in 1 Cor. 15:50-55 since the apostle plainly shows that the body that is raised is not the same as the body that was sown. Additionally, 2 Cor. 5:1-2 could not be clearer in what it has to say about the earthly tent being dissolved (καταλυθῇ) to make way for the building from God.

Interlocutor:
There is no "replacement" in view. It is not "my immortal soul must put on a different body" but rather "this mortal body, this corruptible must be changed..."

Stichworten (Haraz)--Rabbinic Interpretation

George Guthrie (The Structure of Hebrews, page 61) discusses the literary device Stichworten (haraz). The device refers to a practice whereby ancient rabbis or Qumran sectaries would "chain" a number of biblical texts together (in particular, from the Pentateuch, the Prophets and the Writings) via multiple quotations from scripture. Guthrie says that Paul does not follow this exact pattern of haraz in Romans and neither does Heb. 1:5-14 although a different approach to Stichworten (haraz) is evidently utilized in both places.

De Trinitate 1.8.15-16 and 1.11.22 (Augustine on 1 Corinthians 15:28)

Concerning 1 Cor. 15:28, here are some quotes from Augustine's De Trinitate:

but if some affirm even further, that the man Christ
Jesus has already been changed into the substance of
God, at least they cannot deny that the human nature
still remained, when He said before His passion, "For
my Father is greater than I;" whence there is no
question that it was said in this sense, that the
Father is greater than the form of a servant, to whom
in the form of God the Son is equal. Nor let any one,
hearing what the apostle says, "But when He saith all
things are put under Him, it is manifest that He is
excepted which did put all things under Him," think
the words, that He hath put all things under the Son,
to be so understood of the Father, as that He should
not think that the Son Himself put all things under
Himself. For this the apostle plainly declares, when
he says to the Philippians, "For our conversation is
in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour,
the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change our vile body,
that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body,
according to the working whereby He is able even to
subdue all things unto Himself." For the working of
the Father and of the Son is indivisible. Otherwise,
neither hath the Father Himself put all things under
Himself, but the Son hath put all things under Him,
who delivers the kingdom to Him, and puts down all
rule and all authority and power. For these words are
spoken of the Son: "When He shall have delivered up,"
says the apostle, "the kingdom to God, even the
Father; when He shall have put down all rule, and all
authority, and all power." For the same that puts
down, also makes subject (De Trinitate 1.8.15).

neither may we think that Christ shall so give up
the kingdom to God, even the Father, as that He shall
take it away from Himself. For some vain talkers have
thought even this. For when it is said, "He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father," He
Himself is not excluded; cause He is one God together
with the Father (Ibid. 1.8.16).

Wherefore, having mastered this rule for
interpreting the Scriptures concerning the Son of God,
that we are to distinguish in them what relates to the
form of God, in which He is equal to the Father, and
what to the form of a servant which He took, in which
He is less than the Father; we shall not be disquieted
by apparently contrary and mutually repugnant sayings
of the sacred books. For both the Son and the Holy
Spirit, according to the form of God, are equal to the
Father, because neither of them is a creature, as we
have already shown: but according to the form of a
servant He is less than the Father, because He Himself
has said, "My Father is greater than I;" and He is
less than Himself, because it is said of Him, He
emptied Himself;" and He is less than the Holy Spirit,
because He Himself says, "Whosoever speaketh a word
against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but
whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall
not be forgiven Him (Ibid. 1.11.22).

1 Corinthians 7:36

Louw-Nida's lexicon has the following for ὑπέρακμος:

"pertaining to being of an age beyond the prime of life (in 1 Cor 7:36 a reference to a woman beyond the normal marriageable age) 'past one's prime, past marriageable age'" (Semantic Domain 67.158).

While Louw-Nida's definition of ὑπέρακμος is quite plausible, it is good to keep in mind that the prefix ὑπέρ possibly refers to "intensity" which means that one could understand Paul's language as a reference to intense sexual desires.

"If someone with strong passions thinks that he is behaving badly towards his fiance'e and that things should take their due course, he should follow his desires. There is no sin in it; they should marry" (1 Cor. 7:36, New Jerusalem Bible).

I also found a substantial and relatively long discussion in Anthony C. Thiselton's commentary on the Greek text of The First Epistle to the Corinthians: he provides both pertinent diachronic and synchronic details concerning ὑπέρακμος. See Thiselton, 593-598.

Finally, Will Deming has produced a very detailed study of 1 Corinthians 7 entitled Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Matthew 16:19 and Greek Aspect

On p. 162 of his exegetical and linguistic Greek grammar, Richard A. Young discusses the future perfect periphrastic (which is constructed with a future form of εἰμί and a perfect passive participle), and how it relates to the exegesis of Matt. 16:19. This Matthean passage reads:

δώσω σοι τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ ὃ ἐὰν λύσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. (WH)

One question that arises in connection with this passage might be whether Matthew is saying that Peter is to proclaim what has previously been decreed in heaven or does he decree first, thereby binding "heaven" to his judicial "enactments"? Young points out that if the English future perfect is pressed, then Peter does not "dictate heavenly ordinances."

But Stanley Porter asserts that the perfect formation only conveys the state without telling us about the verbal action's inception or permanence.

On the other hand, Spiros Zodhiates writes that in Matt. 16:18, 19: "The two verbs DEDEMENON (from DEW [1210] ) and LELUMENON (from LUW [3089] ), are both perfect passive participles which should have been translated respectively 'having been bound' and 'having been loosed' already in the heavens." (The Complete Word Study: New Testament. Chattanooga, TN: AMG Publishing, 1992.)

NET Bible: "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatever you bind on earth will have been bound in heaven, and whatever you release on earth will have been released in heaven.”

Matt. 18:18 and Heb. 2:13 are other examples of this construction. There are certainly some profound biblical and grammatical issues at play here.

More on EPISKOPOS

One thing that we do know from the historical and
linguistic data--the term "bishop" was not used in the
early Christian community. Yes, EPISKOPOS and
PRESBUTEROS were employed, but these terms did not (at
that time) mean "bishop."

1 Clement is dated circa 96 C.E. So, it does not tell us much about the authority structure of the church discussed in the NT. One thing that we do know from the historical and linguistic data is that "bishop" was not used in the early Christian community. Granted, EPISKOPOS and PRESBUTEROS were employed; but these terms did not, at that time, mean "bishop."

After providing classical, septuagintal and NT
denotations for EPISKOPOS, Ralph Earle observes:

"When we come to Ignatius early in the second century
(about A.D. 115), we find a very different picture.
Now there is one bishop over each local church,
together with several elders and several deacons. The
bishop is supreme in authority . . . Here we see the
beginnings of the episcopal hierarchy that flowered
during the second century. But 'in the beginning it
was not so'" (Word Meanings in the NT, page 389).

"For the distinctive NT use of EPISKOPOS it must be
sufficient to refer to Hort's Christian Ecclesia,
where it is shown that the word is descriptive of
function, not of office, thus Phil 1:1 SUN EPISKOPOIS
KAI DIAKONOIS, 'with them that have oversight, and
them that do service [minister]'" (Moulton-Millgan
Vocabulary of the Greek NT, page 245).

"The ecclesiastical loanword 'bishop' is too technical
and loaded with late historical baggage for precise
signification of usage of EPISKOPOS and cognates in
our lit., esp. the NT" (BDAG, page 379).

This reference work (BDAG) does nevertheless say that EPISKOPOS
"In the Gr-Rom world" frequently "refers to one who
has a definite function or fixed office of guardianship
and related activity within a group . . ." (ibid).

"The monarchical bishop appears first in Ignatius. It is not certain, however, whether Ignatius describes existing conditions or sets up ideal requirements that do not correspond to reality" (J. Rohde, Exegetical Dictionary of the NT, Vol. 2:36).

Karl Rahner on the Trinity Qua Relations (Weedhacker)

I've posted this materal before as part of a larger project. This time, I'm just submitting a portion of the larger research project:

From Rahner's frame of reference, to think of the Trinity numerically (one nature, etc.) is ipso facto not to think of God's triunity at all! Rahner further insists that "the three persons are not three distinct things per se but are three distinct things only in and through their relations with each other" (Davis 139). He frequently employs such terms as "relative realities" or "mere and opposed relations" to describe the tres personae of the Godhead, all the while insisting that the Trinity is a "unity of three divine persons" exemplified in "three distinct manners of subsisting" (qt. in Davis 139). The tres personae "are identical to the Godhead but only virtually distinct from each other" (Davis 139). In this regard, Stephen Davis comments:

Rahner calls relations "the most unreal of realities" but insists that they are absolutely real as other determinations. But I do not see how this helps. There is nothing in my experience that helps me understand the concepts Rahner is working with; thus they do not help me understand the doctrine of the Trinity (140).

After this observation, Davis tries to illustrate what he thinks Rahner is attempting to say, but the problems apparently remain. Davis asks us to suppose that there are two persons--call them A and B--who are qualitatively identical (there are no substantial differences between them), but who differ vis-a'-vis their spatial relations (A B). In such a case, we would normally conclude that A and B are qualitatively or substantially identical beings yet numerically distinct non-identical beings. But what if A and B are immaterial beings? They would therefore have no spatial location. How then, would we distinguish A from B? Using Rahner's approach, we might say that A and B are possibly distinguished by their relations to and through each other. What though is their relation to one another? Is it
not one of "non-numerical identity," based on Rahner's thesis? Since
this is the case, Davis concludes that "obviously we cannot use this
relationship to distinguish A and B; it is the very relationship we are
trying to find grounds for" (Davis 140). Davis therefore concludes that
Rahner's attempt to elucidate the mystery of the Trinity fails to
render the doctrine coherent. While Davis feels that it is possible
for a philosopher or theologian to achieve a coherent treatment of the
Trinity, he admits that he presently does not know of any such
achievement.

Episkopos and Presbuteros

Ralph Earle's discussion of the words EPISKOPOS and PRESBUTEROS is linked to the passage in 1 Timothy 3:1. The operative word there is EPISKOPHS, which is commonly translated "the office of a bishop" or overseer. In 1 Tim. 3:2, Paul employs TON EPISKOPON as he delineates the qualifications of "the overseer" who is appointed to humbly and lovingly shepherd God's congregation.

EPISKOPOS apparently occurs five times in the NT (1 Tim. 3:1, 2; Acts 20:28; Phil. 1:1; Tit. 1:7; 1 Pet. 2:25), and its "basic meaning" is "overseer." Earle states: "The ancient Greeks thought of their gods as EPISKOPOI. This usage is found in Homer's Iliad and many later writings."

BAGD also notes that EPISKOPOS in Pre-Christian usage denoted an overseer. The word is used of a transcendent being in Iliad 22:255; in Aeschylus, Sept. 272; Sophocles, Antigone 1148; Plato, Leg. 4, 717D. BAGD also cites 1 Pet. 2:25 and says the following: "guardian of the souls 1 Pt 2:25. The passages IMg [Ignatius to the Magnesians] 3:1 QEWi TWi PANTWN E.; Cf. 6:1 show the transition to the next mng" (299).

Concerning the word PRESBUTEROI, Earle uses Tit. 1:5-7 to show that an EPISKOPOS and a PRESBUTEROS are the same. True, PRESBUTEROS evidently has a Jewish background--although this point does not mean that the elder arrangement (the "presbytery") was confined to early Jewish congregations: "The name 'elders' emphasizes the fact that the leaders of the church were to be older men, as was the case with the elders of Israel" (Earle 412). It was "older men" whom Paul told Titus to appoint on the isle of Crete, so that they might correct the things that were defective (Tit. 1:5-7).

To prove that the "elders" and the overseers are identical, however, Earle cites Lightfoot--who gives six proofs showing us that PRESBUTEROI and EPISKOPOI are applied to the same referents in the NT. Not only Lightfoot, but Jerome and John Chrysostom can also be invoked to demonstrate the truthfulness of Lightfoot's claims. EPISKOPOS did not originally mean "bishop": it did not denote a hierachy, nor was there simply one ANHR in the early ecclesiae who served as a "bishop." All congregations evidently submitted to the "older men and apostles" in Jerusalem who faithfully communicated apostolic teaching to every congregation in the Mediterranean world (Acts 15:1, 2).

Etymology: An Overview and Caveat

Etymology: An Overview

The term "etymology" may refer to the branch of linguistics that deals with word formations (origins): etymologists customarily trace a signifier's development through time since they primarily want to know the diachronic aspects of a word as opposed to its synchronic facets. However, this project does not mean that etymologists know nothing about synchrony. It's just that etymological studies naturally let diachrony take precedence over synchrony.

Yet linguists generally recognize that language is not static--it changes over time and morphic substances (words) thus acquire new meanings as they come to signify varying concepts or referents. For instance, the English word "salary" derives from the Latin salarium. The Latin term once referred to "money allowed to Roman soldiers for the purchase of salt" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology). Today, the word signifies a form of pay (a stipend) without denoting what salarium once meant.

We can make the same claim for the Greek word μῦθος. At one time, μῦθος simply denoted a "word," "speech," "tale," or "story" without any necessary connotations of falsehood (cf. Classical Mythology by Mark P.O. Morford and Robert J. Lenardon). In Homer, μῦθος clearly has reference to a truthful account (a trustworthy report) of eagerly anticipated details. By the first century BCE-CE, however, μῦθος starts to be employed pejoratively by both Philo of Alexandria and the Christian-Greek scriptural writers (2 Peter 1:16ff). We also note a semantic shift vis-à-vis other Greek words such as ἁμαρτία and μορφή. Therefore, it should not take us aback if we find that ἁρπαγμός also underwent change per its lexicality.

At this point, I would encourage the reader not to conclude that etymology (the study of primary word forms) is never helpful: such thinking is far from accurate. Besides, understanding how compound signifiers work can be useful when learning Greek vocabulary, and etymology also comes in handy when one is trying to decipher an unfamiliar English word. The person who knows the origins of adjectives like "doxastic," "alethic," "logocentric" and "heliocentric" can easily decode such esoteric speech; this blog post is thus not meant to downgrade all types of etymologizing. But one must use caution when undertaking word studies. Etymology can be a blessing if used aright--it can also be a misleading when employed otherwise.

For instance, D.A. Carson gives some pertinent examples of what he calls "the root fallacy" on pp. 28-33 of his Exegetical Fallacies (Second Edition). Some common instances of the root fallacy are popular explanations that we find for the etymological derivation of the words ἀπόστολος, ὑπηρέτης, ἀγαπάω, and I will add, ἐκκλησία.

One often hears that ἐκκλησία means "called out ones." That is an explanation given based on the word's etymology, but it's not what ἐκκλησία signifies in the Christian-Greek Scriptures (GNT). The word denotes an "assembly" or "congregation." It does not refer to those called out per se, nor does the word signify a building in the GNT. Etymology and/or semantic anachronism can deceive us in this case, if we let diachrony take precedence over synchrony.

The Trinity Is Not a Triplicity (John Burnaby)

Trinitarians normally do not say that the Father, Son, or the Holy Spirit are "parts" of the God since the Almighty is supposed to be non-complex or absolutely simple. Describing the Augustinian conception of the Trinity, John Burnaby writes: "The Trinity is not a 'triplicity,' an organism of parts: the equality of the 'Persons' means that each possesses the whole substance of Godhead" (Burnaby 22).

Porneia (A Brief Diachronic and Synchronic Exercise)

LSJ Greek-English Lexicon provides the definitions "fornication" or "prostitution" for the Greek noun PORNEIA. While I do not take exception to LSJ's treatment of PORNEIA in toto, one problem is the issue of synchronicity over against diachronicity. In other words, we need to focus on how the word(s) in question were used in the first century and honestly examine such usages in the NT and in secular first-century writings to ascertain their possible meanings in a determinate usus loquendi. For instance, Timothy George observes that PORNEIA originally denoted "prostitution" (cf. the terms PORNH and PERNHMI), but by the mid-first century CE, PORNEIA came to mean (potentially and generally) "sexual immorality or irregularity" (George, Galatians, 392). I think that Matt. 5:32 and Jude 7 demonstrate the accuracy of George's construal.

Louw-Nida makes this comment on PORNEIA: "To engage in sexual immorality of any kind, often with the implication of prostitution-'to engage in illicit sex, to commit fornication, sexual immorality, fornication, prostitution" (88.71). Though no examples are given of this usage, L-N also says that PORNEIA may refer to incest in the NT. (Sed vide 1 Cor. 5:1ff.)

While I would not restrict PORNEIA to homosexual activity, it seems that that the term encompasses such activity (based on Jude 7). For ARSENOKOITHS, the new BDAG gives the following information: "a male who engages in sexual activity w. a pers. of his own sex, pederast 1 Cor 6:9." Cf. Soph. Lex.

Philippians 2:7-8 and LABWN

There are four instances of the aorist participle that appear in Phil. 2:7-8, namely, λαβών, γενόμενος, εὑρεθεὶς, and a second occurrence of γενόμενος. Donald Mastronarde points out that the aorist participle "conveys the aspect of the aorist stem, that is, simple occurrence or completion of an action" and "most often refers to an action antecedent to that of the main verb of the sentence and is usually translated in English by a past participle." So in the case of the four aorist participles presently under discussion, they would literally be rendered in English: 'having taken,' 'having become,' having been found,' and 'having become.' λαβών would thus possibly refer to an action antecedent to the main verb ἐκένωσεν--hence, it would not describe the instrumentality of the "emptying" delineated in Phil. 2:7.

Moises Silva also makes the same observation in his commentary on Philippians, when he writes: "If we were to press this rule [for aorist participles], we would need to translate each clause [in Phil. 2:7-8] somewhat woodenly: for example, 'having taken (or, after he had taken) the form of a servant' " (Silva 120). But Silva then goes to say that this rule has many exceptions and he is right (see Mastronarde 199ff). But I think that he is possibly wrong when he goes on to insist that the best way to handle the aorist participles λαβών and γενόμενος in Phil. 2:7 is to treat them as participles of means. It seems that both Silva and Daniel B. Wallace primarily favor the participle of means in Phil. 2:7 (outside of theological considerations) because of the supposed "poetic quality" of Philippians. Yet this "quality" is questionable since this verse might not be derived from an older hymn as commonly supposed.

Furthermore, construing λαβών as a participle of means does not do justice to ἐκένωσεν, which normally denotes an act of negation (subtraction), not the act of addition (as even Wallace admits). So the NWT rendering seems to make the most sense out of the context and it is well within the parameters of Greek grammar when it translates Phil. 2:7: "No, but he emptied himself and took a slave's form and came to be in the likeness of men."

"No, but he emptied himself and took a slave's form and became human" (2013 Revision).


"But himself emptied, taking a servant's form" (Rotherham).

At one time, I favored the antecedent view for the participle λαβών in Phil 2:7. After talking with a friend and studying Stanley Porter's Idioms, however, I must concede that λαβών may be referring to consequent action or, more likely, subsequent action. At any rate, it is by no means certain that the aorist verbal adjective here is a participle of means. While categorizing Phil 2:7 as an instance of the instrumental participle (i.e., participle of means), Brooks and Winbery admit that λαβών and γενόμενος "may indicate manner rather than means" (Syntax of NT Greek, 150). To be fair, they also say that there's little difference between a participle of manner and one of means.

It also just dawned on me that NWT renders 2:7 polysyndetically, but Rotherham and some others, render the verse asyndetically.

Meaning of "Spirit" in 1 Corinthians 2:11 (David Hill)

"At 1 Cor. 2:11 'spirit' connotes something like 'human consciousness,' the organ of self-knowledge. A similar use is evidenced at Rom. 8:16--'The Spirit of God beareth witness to (or, with) our spirit that we are the children of God'--where the human spirit is considered as that part of man which receives spiritual knowledge" (Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings: Studies in the Semantics of Soteriological Terms, page 284).

Is There A Possible Connection Between Daniel 8:10 (LXX) and Revelation 12:4?

Henry Alford makes a comparison between Daniel 8:10 and Revelation 12:4:

καὶ ἐμεγαλύνθη ἕως τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων, καὶ συνεπάτησαν αὐτά (Daniel 8:10 LXX)

καὶ ἡ οὐρὰ αὐτοῦ σύρει τὸ τρίτον τῶν ἀστέρων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἔβαλεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν γῆν. καὶ ὁ δράκων ἕστηκεν ἐνώπιον τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς μελλούσης τεκεῖν, ἵνα ὅταν τέκῃ τὸ τέκνον αὐτῆς καταφάγῃ. (Revelation 12:4 Nestle)

Irenaeus and John 14:28

"For if any one should inquire the reason why the
Father, who has fellowship with the Son in all things,
has been declared by the Lord alone to know the hour
and the day [of judgment], he will find at present no
more suitable, or becoming, or safe reason than this
(since, indeed, the Lord is the only true Master),
that we may learn through Him that the Father is above
all things. For 'the Father,' says He, 'is greater
than I.' The Father, therefore, has been declared by
our Lord to excel with respect to knowledge; for this
reason, that we, too, as long as we are connected with
the scheme of things in this world, should leave
perfect knowledge, and such questions [as have been
mentioned], to God, and should not by any chance,
while we seek to investigate the sublime nature of the
Father, fall into the danger of starting the question
whether there is another God above God" (Irenaeus, Adv. Haer.
2.28.8).

Divine APAQEIA and DEUS SIMPLICITAS

I think the question of God's apathy or lack thereof is highly significant. The holy writings of ancient Judaism and Christianity do not seem to describe a God who is utterly unchangeable or unmoved by events in the world. To the contrary, the God of the Bible is distressed when His people are distressed (Isa 63:9) and hurt when He beholds humans engaging in courses of action that are self-destructive (2 Pet 2:12-13). The God of the Bible (as the apostle John tells his first-century readers) is love (1 Jn 4:8). A loving person is usually moved by the plight of another.

One objection that has been submitted against the doctrine of divine passibility is the notion that God is A SE ESSE and thus does not depend on anyone. As Karl Barth worded matters, God is absolute freedom (Cf. Ps 36:9; Dan 4:35; Jn 5:26ff; 2 Cor 3:17-18).

The present writer thinks that the doctrine of aseity
can be formulated in a way that does not render the
divine One impassible. God's aseity does not mean that
He cannot be moved by distressing or heartening
terrestrial events. For if I am moved by the sight of
a child, who has been struck by a car and who now lies
in the street helplessly waiting for an ambulance as
he or she vigorously fights for his/her precious life, in what
way am I dependent on the child who is almost
devoid of life? Similarly, I fail to see how God becomes
dependent on His creatures simply because He is moved
by our individual plights.

At any rate, in an online article, Dr. Kelly James
Clark (an advocate of divine impassibility) admits
that the ecclesiastical reasons for affirming an
impassible God have generally been Platonic or
neo-Platonic and, I might add, Aristotelian. The
Church (according to Clark) has basically determined
that Almighty God is impassible for the following five
reasons:

(1) The absolute Cause of the transitory realm of
becoming must be a changeless Being.

(2) God does not depend on any external source AD
EXTRA; He only depends on Himself (A SE ESSE).

(3) God cannot change, since any change would be a
change for better or worse. Since God is perfect, He
cannot change for the better and He clearly cannot
change for the worst. Ergo, He does not change at all.

(4) God is DEUS SIMPLICITAS. That is, He is
un-compounded or non-composite. Since only composite
things change, God is incapable of change.

(5) God is ACTUS PURUS and thus has no potential for
change. Consequently He cannot change.

While Clark does evidently affirm a number of these
principles that early Church councils employed to
shape their notion of God, even he has to concede the
following: "Some conciliar pronouncements are based on
philosophical assumptions that are not binding on the
church." He subsequently goes on to note:

"Although the church has prima facie obligation to
treat seriously the philosophical presuppositions of
the councils, it has a right to reconsider such a
pronouncement if the philosophical commitment violates
their understanding of Scripture, religious experience
or intuitions."

While I cannot completely concur with Clark's
statement as it stands, I think he does show that a
Christian is not bound to accept the philosophical
presuppositions of any church council. One may even
ask if a Christian should cloud his or her theological
perspective with philosophical presuppositions at all
(Col 2:8).

But putting aside that issue for now, my point is that
church councils have often relied on philosophy when
making pronouncements instead of the Bible. When
councils have depended on Plato or Aristotle rather than
Holy Writ, is a Christian theologically bound to a
council's decision? Furthermore, if (as Kelly James
Clark writes) a council makes logical errors and thus
presents unsound or invalid arguments, it certainly
makes one wonder whether a Christian should place his
or her unqualified trust in such putative infallible
decisions. May the reader make an informed decision in
the light of Jehovah's wise and everlasting counsels.

Boethius on God, Time and Foreknowledge

According to Boethius (De Consolatio 5), there is no such thing as "divine forevision" or foreknowledge on the metaphysical level:

"If you will weigh the foresight with which God discerns all things, you will rightly esteem it to be the knowledge of a never fading instant rather than a foreknowledge of the 'future.' It should therefore rather be called provision than prevision because, placed high above all things, it looks out over all as from the loftiest mountain top."

While humans may rightly call God's knowledge of that which is future "foreknowledge," in reality (from the perspective of ultimate reality), it is not foreknowledge, but an intimate awareness of the present qua nunc aeterna.

But why would a Catholic thinker be tempted to make this move? There are at least two reasons that readily spring to mind. Firstly, Boethius believes that if God actually foresees future events or states, then He might also cause them (i.e., foreknowledge stems from foreordination). Secondly, Boethius reasons: "Without doubt . . . all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."

So libertarian free will only seems possible if God does not "foreknow" future free actions. The way out of this problem for Boethius is to posit an atemporal deity.

Nevertheless, De Consolatio 5 also maintains that something known "cannot be otherwise than it is known to be," such as God knowing a future free act. Free actions remain free IN SE even though God foreknows them--they "do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature" just because of divine foreknowledge (William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 7). That seems to be the position of Boethius.

Thomas Aquinas writes in support of what Boethius contends:

"Hence what is known by us must be necessary even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes" (ST I.14.13, Reply to Obj. 3. See also Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 10).

Notice that Aquinas likewise escapes the possible dilemmas that may arise from positing divine foreknowledge by appealing to the notion of God's eternal present (NUNC AETERNAE). But if God subsists in timeless eternity (above and beyond time), which both Boethius and Aquinas believe, then He doesn't really see future events or behold future states before they occur, but rather as they occur.

Does The World Ensemble Postulation Harmonize with Ockham's Razor? (WL Craig)

Not that I desire to fully explore this issue now, but I wanted to post the video while time permitted:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5R0EFPRlr_8

1 Thessalonians 5:10ff (Sweet Sleep)

οἱ γὰρ καθεύδοντες νυκτὸς καθεύδουσιν, καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι νυκτὸς μεθύουσιν· (1 Thessalonians 5:7)

τοῦ ἀποθανόντος περὶ ἡμῶν ἵνα εἴτε γρηγορῶμεν εἴτε καθεύδωμεν ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν. (1 Thessalonians 5:10)

BAGD and Thayer understand Paul to be discussing literal death in 1 Thess. 5:10. Additionally, Ralph Earle writes:

"The verb GRHGOREW means 'to be awake,' as well as 'watch.' In view of the previous part of the verse--'Therefore let us not sleep, as do others'--it seems evident that the best translation here [in v. 6] is 'keep awake' (RSV). The same verb is translated 'wake' in verse 10, where it means 'alive,' not sleeping in death" (Earle, ,372).

So it appears that Earle understands καθεύδω in v. 10 to denote the literal death condition of those in Christ.

David J. Williams also insists: "It is inconceivable that Paul should suggest that whether we are morally alert or moribund will make no difference in the end. KAQEUDO is here synonymous with KOIMAW in 4:13ff (for this sense of KAQEUDW as physcial death, cf. Mark 5:39; also LXX Ps. 87:6; Dan. 12:2; for similar statements concerning Christ's death and its outcome, see Rom. 14:8f; 2 Cor. 5:15, 21; Gal. 1:4; 2:20). Paul ends as he began the section by assuring the Thessalonians that in whatever their physical condition at the Parousia, whether dead or alive, they will not be disadvantaged" (Williams 91).

We also have these comments from Henry Alford:

who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep (in what sense? surely not in an ethical sense, as above: for they who sleep will be overtaken by Him as a thief, and His day will be to them darkness, not light. If not in an ethical sense, it must be in that of living or dying, and the sense as Romans 14:8. (For we cannot adopt the trifling sense given by Whitby, al.,—‘whether He come in the night, and so find us taking our natural rest, or in the day when we are waking.’) Thus understood however, it will be at the sacrifice of perspicuity, seeing that γρηγορεῖν and καθεύδειν have been used ethically throughout the passage. If we wish to preserve the uniformity of metaphor, we may (though I am not satisfied with this) interpret in this sense: that our Lord died for us, that whether we watch (are of the number of the watchful, i.e. already Christians) or sleep (are of the number of the sleeping, i.e. unconverted) we should live, &c. Thus it would = ‘who died that all men might be saved:’ who came, not to call the righteous only, but sinners to life. There is to this interpretation the great objection that it confounds with the λοιποί, the ἡμᾶς who are definitely spoken of as set by God not to wrath but to περιποίησιν σωτηρίας. So that the sense live or die, must, I think, be accepted, and the want of perspicuity with it. The construction of a subjunctive with εἴτε … εἴτε is not classical: an optative is found in such cases, e.g. Xen. Anab. ii. 1. 14, καὶ εἴτε ἄλλο τι θέλοι χρῆσθαι εἴτʼ ἐπʼ Αἴγυπτον στρατεύειν.… See Winer, edn. 6, § 41, p. 263, Moulton’s Engl. transl. 368, note 2.

ἅμα] all together: not to be taken with σύν, see reff.

For another viewpoint, see M. Lautenschlage in ZNW 81 (1-2, 1990), pp. 39-59.

Just Musing About Categorical Syllogisms: Nothing Overly Serious

While discussing categorical syllogisms today in medieval class, I made the statement that the major premise "All humans are mortal" technically contains an adjective in the predicate slot (i.e., "mortal") although this adjective is capable of functioning as a noun. But it doesn't seem to be functioning as a noun (substantivally) in this example, and indeed, the dictionaries confirm that when mortal is used this way in the predicate slot, then it's functioning adjectivally. Yet categorical syllogisms or categorical statements are supposed to name categories or classes, not qualities. So why does the world's most famous major premise have an adjective in the predicate position rather than a noun?

Pronouncing Greek Words

More on pronouncing Greek words:

"There are different systems in use for deciding which syllable of a word is to be stressed. It is best simply to take care to pronounce each syllable clearly (particularly to be careful to distinguish the long and short vowels), and then let stress take care of itself" (J.W. Wenham, Elements of NT Greek, p. 23).

Donald Mastronarde gives the following examples of accentuation in Attic Greek:
ἀγαθός- "Short U[ltima] accented with acute, in isolation (no mora) follows the contonation on U[ltima]."

A "mora" is the so-called standard "length of a short vowel" such as A, E, I, O, U and final AI and OI in most cases (p. 17-18).

ψυχή-"Long U accented with acute, in isolation (no mora follows the contonation on U)" (Mastronarde, p. 18).

For what it is worth, I was taught that pronouncing accents is not an exact science. We are so far removed from Koine or Attic Greek that there is no way to be sure just how the syllables were stressed (pace Caragounis). Like Wenham, I'm inclined to say that one should place stress on Greek syllables, as best he or she can. Nevertheless, I must say that it is somewhat fun to read Greek poetry metrically.

In my Greek poetry undergrad class, we used to scan meter and that really helped us to stress syllables precisely, but it was difficult to me. The exercises we did were akin to breaking down English words like to-day or diff-i-cult and then marking these signifiers with stress marks before saying these words to a timed beat. This exercise was invaluable for helping me pronounce Greek, Latin or English terms (e.g., the famed Kittel is pronounced Kitt-el/Kit-l, not Kit-tel). In closing, I'll just say that D.A. Carson also has a useful book on accents that can be found at amazon.com

WL Craig on the Trinity

"The ontological Trinity concerns God as He is in Himself, unrelated to the world, while the economic Trinity concerns God as He stands in relation to creatures. Ontologically, the three persons, being underived and perfectly equal, do not stand in any relations of subordination. But in relation to creatures, for the sake of our salvation the second person of the Trinity submits to the first, taking on a human nature, and the third person acts in the place of the second, continuing the ministry of the Son between his ascension and return. So in the economic Trinity there are relations of subordination among the persons of the Trinity.

What's important to understand is that subordination does not imply inferiority. The Son and the Father are in every respect co-equal, but out of love for us and for the sake of our salvation, the Son submits to the Father. The Trinity thus provides a beautiful model of the family, in which the wife, though co-equal with her husband, willingly submits to him. Feminists who denounce such submission on grounds of inequality have failed to understand that functional submission need not spring from inferiority but can be undertaken among equals for the sake of some overriding aim."

See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/subordination-of-god-the-son-to-the-father

Thomas Aquinas and the Incarnation--Could the Father or the Holy Spirit Have Become Flesh?

From Summa Theologica (also known as Summa Theologiae) Part Three, Question 3, Article 5, Response:

"I answer that, As was said above (1,2,4), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son."

1 Cor 15:54 (Death swallowed up in victory)

"Now when this perishable puts on the imperishable, and this mortal puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will happen,

'Death has been swallowed up in victory.'"(1 Corinthians 15:54 NET Bible)

I cannot help but wonder what went through the minds of early Greeks in Corinth or Athens when Paul proclaimed the message that humans would one day "put on" immortality (ἀθανασία). For recall that the Greek gods were described as "the immortals" (Ἀθάνατοι); however, now mortals would assume immortality as a gift from God.

One question I also have about this text--although I remember the answer to my own question, I think--is what text does Paul quote in this verse. Do you remember, my friends?

1 Corinthians 15:51-52 and the First Resurrection

"Behold, I tell you a mystery: We all shall not sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed" (1 Corinthians 15:51-52 ASV).

The Apostle Peter spoke of Paul's letters being "hard to understand" at certain points (2 Peter 3:16). For me, these verses have long caused the same feeling that Peter evidently had.

Paul seems to distinguish "we" (including himself?) from the dead, who shall be raised incorruptibly. Since he says that "we" shall be changed instantaneously ("at the last trump"), would it be proper to call this instant change a resurrection? Rev. 20:4-6 suggests that those surrounding God's throne in heaven (as they too sit upon thrones) are all part of the first resurrection.

Romans 12:1: "Logical" or "Spiritual"?

Paul exhorted the Christians in Rome: Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν· (Romans 12:1 WH)

The operative phrase here is τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν. λογικὴν may be rendered as "spiritual" or "logical." The signifier λατρείαν references service that is offered to God. Therefore, the apostle was either telling the Roman Christians to render a "spiritual" or "logical service" to the Most High Deity; but in this context, "logical" seems to be the best choice.

Contexually, Paul is evidently contrasting the sacrifices made under the Mosaic Law with the Christian sacrifice given when a worshiper of God offers himself or herself to YHWH (Jehovah) and His beloved Son. While the animals offered by the ancient Israelites were non-rational sacrifices--the sacrifices being employed under the law of Moses could not reason and they had no choice in the matter--when we offer ourselves to God, it is capable of being and should be a rational decision. But not only should the initial offering be made on the basis of RATIO--Paul also implies that Christian worship, doctrine, and belief should be marked by the quality of rationality. How apt is Anselm's slogan, FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM ("faith seeking understanding"). To put matters succinctly, faith and reason might be considered two sides of the same coin; they are possibly not dichotomous functions of the Christian intellect and will. If a belief is irrational, its validity becomes highly questionable, although we certainly must allow for transrational aspects of true worship since God's thoughts are immensely higher than our thoughts.

John 17:3 and John Behr

Dated 5/24/2002

Greetings all,

I have been perusing a book here lately by John Behr entitled The
Way to Nicaea. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001.

This monograph provides an interesting historical account of how the
Trinity dogma developed through time. Of course, the author is pro-
Trinitarian and concludes what one a priori thinks he will conclude.

But I found this passage in his work to be of interest:

"There are no applications of the term 'God' (hO QEOS) to Jesus
Christ in the Synoptics, while the Gospel according to John, on the
other hand, both categorically affirms and explicitly denies the
applicability of this term, so presenting, again, a heightened,
profound, antithetical tension. The most striking use of the
term 'God' occurs in Christ's own statement, 'this is eternal life,
that they might know you, the only true God (TON ALHQINON QEON), and
Jesus Christ, whom you have sent' (Jn 17:3). Despite associating the
knowledge of Jesus Christ with the knowledge of God in the
identification of eternal life, and how could it be otherwise when
John repeatedly affirms that there is no other way to the Father but
through the Son, nevertheless only the Father merits the title 'God'
(ho QEOS). The description of this only true God as 'Father' is
frequent in John" (page 60).

However, Behr goes on to contend that Jn 1:1c says that the Word is
fully God. But I think he makes this assumption on a faulty premise,
namely, Colwell's rule. He also appeals to Jn 1:18 which is riddled
with many textual issues as we have discussed on this list. But at
any rate, it does not appear that 1:18 is saying that the Son is
fully God in the same way that the Father is hO QEOS: he is the
unique or brought-forth god.

Finally Behr references Jn 20:28. He then writes: "This is the most
categorical and explicit affirmation of Jesus Christ as God, in the
fullest (articular) sense, in the pages of the New Testament. Yet it
must hold inseparably together with the affirmation that it is the
Father of Jesus who alone is the one true God; on this basis, it is
possible to affirm that Jesus is as divine as his Father is, and as
such can be addressed as himself God" (61).

Philippians 1:23ff: "I am torn between the two" (NIV, 2011)

συνέχομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν δύο, τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων εἰς τὸ ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι, πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον (Philippians 1:23)

"I am torn between the two: I desire to depart and be with Christ, which is better by far" (NIV 2011)

"I am torn between these two things, for I do desire the releasing and the being with Christ, which is, to be sure, far better" (NWT 2013).

συνέχομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν δύο demonstrates the inner struggle that Paul was having as he wrote these inspired words to the Philippians. Moisés Silva observes:

"The spontaneity of Paul's writing (that bubbling forth out of the heart that Wilamowitz spoke of) sometimes find expression in anacolutha and disjointed clauses" (Silva, "Philippians," page 81).

Of course, this statement does not mean that Paul's writing is technically ungrammatical since anacoluthon is a common rhetorical device in Biblical and Classical literature. The emotional wording and the anacolutha present in 1:21-24 are not lines of evidence against the authenticity of Philippians, but rather they show: "the apostle is not making an objective, detached theological statement" (Silva 81).

On the other hand, as Gerald Hawthorne demonstrates in his commentary, Paul lays out two options in Philippians 1:21 (Ἐμοὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῇν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρδος) "in a perfectly balanced construction obscured by punctuation and by most, if not all, translations" (Hawthorne, "Philippians," 48). Hawthorne then sets out the apostle's desires as follows:

depart and to be with Christ

which is a far better thing [for me]

having the desire to and

remain alive in this body

which is a more urgent need for you

In other words, Paul equally desires both living and dying (or being with Christ); he cannot decide which option to choose. The context thus lends support to the rendering of Philippians 1:22 as "Now if I am to live on in the flesh, this is a fruitage of my work; yet what I would choose, I do not make known" (NWT) or maybe "but if to live in flesh [is my lot], this is for me worth the while: and what I shall choose I cannot tell" (Darby).

Hawthorne concludes: "there is no good reason to translate [γνωρίζω in Phil. 1:22 as] 'I do (not) know' " (47). But to be fair, this view does not lead him to suggest a third possibility in 1:23 besides life or death (i.e., being with Christ).

Dale Tuggy on Latin and Social Trinitarianism

Dale Tuggy and the Trinity Doctrine

Edgar Foster
Jan 6, 2003

There is a young philosophy scholar named Dale Tuggy, who evidently has taken an avid interest in Social and Latin Trinitarianism (ST and LT). This professor claims that there are serious logical difficulties with ST and LT. One problem that Tuggy says exist with ST is mentioned below.

In the manner of Richard Cartwright, he lists six propositions which do not seem to cohere logically. These propositions are:

1. God is divine.
2. The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
3. The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
4. The Holy Spirit is divine.
5. The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God.

That is, these four - Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God - are numerically distinct persons.

Tuggy then contends that (5) can be broken into two parts:

5a. These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

5b. God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

5a-b are then followed by the proposition:

6. Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the
Holy Spirit.

Tuggy is working with a particular definition of "divine" that he makes clear at the outset of his study. Tuggy observes that there are two senses of the adjective "divine," but he is working with the primary adjectival sense in his study:

"The word 'divine' has primary and secondary uses. In
the primary sense, the word 'divine' refers to the
property of being a divinity or being a god, some sort
of supernatural personal being. In secondary senses,
'divine' is used to describe things somehow related to
or associated with things which are 'divine' in the
primary sense. Thus the church, the scriptures,
angels, and various people may be called 'divine'.
According to the biblical writers, God is divine in
the primary sense. Thus, if we accept their testimony,
we must accept 1, understanding 'divine' in this way."

However, when discussing LT, Tuggy reworks (5). Since the claims of LT differ significantly from ST, Tuggy now introduces what he calls 5I in order to adequately
delineate LT.

LT posits:

5I. The Father is identical to God, the Son is
identical to God, and the Holy Spirit is identical to
God, but the Father is not identical to the Son, the
Son is not identical to the Holy Spirit, and the
Holy Spirit is not identical to the Father.

Tuggy then writes:

"All of 1-6 can't be true because 5I is a
contradiction, and so a necessary falsehood. By its
very structure, it is false, because the identity
relation (=) is transitive. For any a, b, and c
whatever, if a=b, and b=c, then a=c. By this rule of
inference, it follows from 5I that the Father is the
Son, the Son is the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit
is the Father, all of which are expressly denied in
5I. In other words, 5I is equivalent to this
statement: 'The Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and God are
just one thing, and they are not.'"

What do you think of Tuggy's argument against LT? Does LT wind up positing that a=b, and b=c, therefore a=c?

1 Timothy 3:16--How It Should Read

The Western Church tradition has never overly relied on 1 Tim. 3:16 as a proof-text for the Trinity. In fact, the Catholic NAB reads: "who was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in the spirit, seen by angels, proclaimed to the Gentiles, believed in throughout the world, taken up in glory."

Footnote from NAB on 1 Tim. 3:16: "Who: the reference is to Christ, who is himself 'the mystery of our devotion.' Some predominantly Western manuscripts read 'which,' harmonizing the gender of the pronoun with that of the Greek word for mystery; many later (eighth/ninth century on), predominantly Byzantine manuscripts read 'God,' possibly for theological reasons.

Here is how the Douay-Rheims and Vulgate handle the passage:

"And evidently great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the spirit, appeared unto angels, hath been preached unto the Gentiles, is believed in the world, is taken up in glory" (DR).

"Et manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, justificatum est in spiritu, apparuit angelis, praedicatum est gentibus, creditum est in mundo, assumptum est in gloria" (Vg).

Gordon D. Fee reports: "This reading ["God"] came to predominate in the Greek church (never in the West, since the translation into Latin happened before the variant arose)."

See his NIB Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, Page 95.

NET Bible: "He was revealed in the flesh, vindicated by the Spirit, seen by angels, proclaimed among Gentiles, believed on in the world, taken up in glory."

See the long note (24) in NET Bible here: https://net.bible.org/#!bible/1+Timothy+3

Wolfhart Pannenberg Discusses Using Divine Love as Proof of the Trinity

The Trinitarian argument from love is straightforward and familiar. Many who affirm the existence of a triune God claim:

(1) God is love.
(2) In order for love to obtain, there must exist love and a lover as well as an object of love (a beloved).
(3) Therefore, God must be tripersonal with the Father as lover (subject), the Son as beloved (object) and the Holy Spirit as the bond of love obtaining between Father and Son.

However, German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (who is also a Trinitarian) rejoins:

Any derivation of the plurality of trinitarian persons from the essence of the one God, whether it be viewed as spirit or love, leads into the problems of either modalism on the one hand [i.e., as in the case of Karl Barth] or subordinationism on the other. Neither, then, can be true to the intentions of the trinitarian dogma. The derivation from love is closer to the Christian concept of God and the doctrine of the Trinity than is derivation from the idea of divine self-consciousness, since it leaves more room for a plurality of persons in the unity of the divine life. Yet this plurality cannot be deduced from an idea of love without relapse into a pretrinitarian monotheism, that of the subjectivity of the one God as the one who generates the other persons. In the concept of divine love it can find only their comprehensive unity (Systematic Theology, 1:298).

Pannenberg would rather believe that God as a whole is love (1 John 4:8)--Almighty God does not simply love or have love in his estimation. This approach eradicates any notions (Pannenberg argues) of one divine subject loving a divine object or one divine person being the love that obtains between the Father and the Son. It seems Pannenberg wants to argue that the whole Godhead is love; hence, he appears to take exception to the line of argumentation employed by Augustine of Hippo or Richard of Saint Victor. Moreover, he appears to mention the Father generating the other divine persons in a less than commendatory way.

But the Father is the referent of ὁ θεὸς in 1 John 4:8: let's not forget that point. For example, 1 John 4:9 reads: "This is how God showed his love among us: He sent his one and only Son into the world that we might live through him" (NIV). The "God" (ὁ Θεὸς) mentioned in that verse who sent his Son is the Father, not the Son or the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the whole argument from love approach is ill-fated for yet another reason.

For a sound Trinitarian critique of the eternal generation idea, see John Feinberg's work No One Like Him.

More on Trinitarians and a Single Consciousness in God

The orthodox Trinitarian works that I've read all deny that there are three "I thinks" in God. Granted, the Trinity doctrine may allow room for the "God-man" Jesus Christ to possess a human consciousness and a divine consciousness simultaneously, but if we prescind from the Incarnation, then I think you'll find that Trinitarians generally do not believe there are three consciousnesses in the Godhead. This belief would normally constitute tritheism:

"The philosophical input from Descartes, Kant, and John Locke (1632-1704) led to the emergence of a (but not THE) typically modern notion of person as the subject of self-awareness and freedom--in brief, person as a conscious and autonomous self ('I think and am free, therefore I am a person'). This notion, when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, readily produces what looks suspiciously like tritheism: three autonomous subjects living and working together in a quasi-social unity" (Gerald O'Collins, The Tripersonal God, 155-156).

"In contemporary parlance, person is spontaneously identified as centre of consciousness and freedom. However, if we bring these pre-reflective categories to theology, we are immediately confronted with a problem. For if we say that God is one being in three persons, and if we understand by person centres of consciousness and freedom, then God becomes three centres of consciousness and there are three I think's in God. But such an understanding is the same as tritheism" (John J. O'Donnell, The Mystery of the Triune God, 103).

So O'Donnell attempts to effect a synthesis between the differing trinitarian notions of person. He observes that trinitarians have either viewed the tres personae as distinct subsistent relations (Karl Rahner), or interpreted the "persons" as separate centers of consciousness. As an alternative to the previous accounts, he suggests viewing the triune God as "one divine consciousness . . . shared by three persons" (110). Analogically, this means that "whereas in human experience, person and community are not identical, in God they are" (110).

While O'Donnell's analogical language does make some distinctions not hitherto made by trinitarians in the past, its shortcomings are that it seems to employ meta-experiential and meta-rational methods to accomplish its task. If, as O'Donnell intimates, community and individuality are the same thing in God--is there truly an analogy of being (analogia entis) between God and man?

Addendum: of course, there is debate regarding whether there is one or there are three consciousnesses in the Godhead, but I often find that the one consciousness view wins out, for the most part.

John 20:28-Further Reflections

[Written a number of years ago, but somewhat edited now]

Maybe Jesus did not correct Thomas in John 20:28ff because the apostle did not render "worship" to him, but rather just acknowledged him as God's Shaliach (in so many words). While it is possible that John used a nominative Ὁ Κύριός and ὁ Θεός for the vocative forms κύριε and θεέ, Max Zerwick observes that the construction Ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου is "nom. w. art. for voc. sec. 34; if not rather an exclamation" (A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament)

While I have traditionally tended to view Ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου as an example of one NT writer employing nominatives for vocatives, I now think that there is good evidence for possibly understanding this construction as a nominative of exclamation. Firstly, out of the approximately 88 times that Jesus is addressed as "Lord" in Scripture, the vocative form κύριε is utilized. Never is Κύριός used when Jesus is addressed--Jn 20:28 would be the only exception. Moreover, the papyrological evidence also tends to favor the nominative of exclamation idea. Κύριός (as a nominative of address) is not used in the papyri, as far as I know, when one person is addressing another. Even if Thomas called Jesus "my God and Lord" though, the text still does not present a genuine problem for Jehovah's Witnesses in view of how ELOHIM/QEOS is used elsewhere in Scripture and extra-biblical writings.

Quick Post on Luke's Quality of Greek

Scholars are usually agreed that Luke's Greek is quite refined at times. I don't believe it's correct to view it as non-standard Greek.

See http://www.mycrandall.ca/courses/ntintro/luke.htm

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/story/luke.html

Bonaventure's View of the Triune God

"If then God is perfect spirit, He has memory, intelligence, and will; and He has both the begotten Word and spirated Love. These are necessarily distinguished, since one is produced from the other--distinguished, not essentially or accidentally, but personally. When therefore the mind considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror to the contemplation of the Blessed Trinity--Father, Word, and Love--three persons coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial; so that each one is in each of the others, though one is not the other, but all three are one God" (Journey of the Mind to God 3.5).

See https://www.crossroadsinitiative.com/library_article/666/Journey_of_the_Mind_into_God_St_Bonaventure.html

What Do Trinitarians Mean By A Divine "Person"? (Quotes)

Here are some statements from Trinitarians that
illustrate the tension obtaining between modalism,
Trinitarianism and tritheism.

"For, in truth, as the Father is not the Son, and the
Son is not the Father, and that Holy Spirit who is
also called the gift of God is neither the Father nor
the Son, certainly they are three. And so it is said
plurally, 'I and my Father are one.' For He has not
said, 'is one,' as the Sabellians say; but, 'are one.'
Yet, when the question is asked, What three? human
language labors altogether under great poverty of
speech. The answer, however, is given, three
'persons,' not that it might be [completely] spoken,
but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken"
(Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 5.9).

"It is generally admitted that the word 'person' is
but an imperfect expression of the idea. In common
parlance it [the word "person"] denotes a separate
rational and moral individual, possessed of
self-consciousness, and conscious of his identity amid
all changes. Experience teaches that where you have a
person, you also have a distinct individual essence.
Every person is a distinct and separate individual, in
whom human nature is individualized. But in God there
are no three individuals alongside of, and separate
from, one another, but only personal self-distinctions
within the Divine essence, which is not only
generically, but also numerically, one" (Louis
Berkhof, Systematic Theology. London: Banner of Truth,
1971. Page 87).

"But to say nothing more of words, let us now attend
to the thing signified. By person, then, I mean a
subsistence in the Divine essence, - a subsistence
which, while related to the other two, is
distinguished from them by incommunicable properties.
By subsistence we wish something else to be understood
than essence. For if the Word were God simply and had
not some property peculiar to himself, John could not
have said correctly that he had always been with
God.When he adds immediately after, that the Word was
God, he calls us back to the one essence. But because
he could not be with God without dwelling in the
Father, hence arises that subsistence, which, though
connected with the essence by an indissoluble tie,
being incapable of separation, yet has a special mark
by which it is distinguished from it" (John Calvin,
Institutes of the Christian Religion 1.13.6).

"If these [i.e. the three persons] are taken as three
separate centers of consciousness in an
individualistic way, as some modern thought seems to
do, then one would end up with tritheism, a denial of
the Trinity. Equally, one can overemphasize the unity
to the detriment of the persons" (John Thompson,
Modern Trinitarian Perspectives. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994. Page 6).

"We have employed the term 'person' and must
unavoidably do so, but hopefully we have indicated
that this word should be used of Father, Son, and
Spirit with full awareness of the analogous nature of
this predication, therefore with stress on the radical
distinctiveness of 'person,' not just differentiating
divine from human personhood, but distinguishing the
reality of personhood as it applies to Father, Son,
and Spirit" (Bernard Cooke, Beyond Trinity. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1969. Page 58).

See also http://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/search?q=o%27donnell