Paul Tillich on the Incarnation

Greetings!

Speaking about those who like to employ the term
"Incarnation" with some frequency, the late systematic
theologian Paul Tillich writes:

"They forget that this is not an especially Christian
characteristic, because incarnation is something which
happens in paganism all the time. The divine beings
always incarnate in different forms. That is very easy
in paganism. This is not the real distinction between
Christianity and other religions" (See pg. 363 of
_Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings_ edited by
Michael Peterson, William Hasker, et. al.).

Proof of Tillich's observation can be found in Greek
and Roman mythology and in the sacred works of
Hinduism. The Incarnation may well be a product of
antecedent non-Christian thought.

Best regards,
Edgar

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

BDAG states:  εὐτραπελία, ας, ἡ (s. τρέπω; Hippocr. et al., mostly in a good sense: ‘wittiness’, ‘facetiousness’ [cp. our ‘turn a phrase’]; so also Posidipp. Com. fgm. 28, 5; Diod. S. 15, 6, 5; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 361; Jos., Ant. 12, 173; 214. Acc. to Aristot., EN 2, 7, 13 it is the middle term betw. the extremes of buffoonery [βωμολοχία] and boorishness [ἀγροικία]; acc. to Aristot., Rhet. 2, 12 it is πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις) in our lit. only in a bad sense coarse jesting, risqué wit (for sim. sense cp. εὐτράπελος Isocr. 7, 49) Eph 5:4.—HRahner, LexThK III 1212. PvanderHorst, Is Wittiness Christian? A Note on εὐτραπελία in Eph 5:4: Miscellanea Neotestamentica, ed. AKlŸn/WvanUnnik ’78, 163-77.—DELG s.v. τρέπω. M-M. TW. Spicq. Sv.

"* εὐτραπελία, -ας, ἡ, 1. Versatility, wit, facetiousness (Hippocr., Plt., al.). 2. = μωρολογία, coarse jesting, ribaldry (Abbott, Essays, 93): Eph 5:4" (Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament, page 190).

"εὐτραπελία, ας, f: coarse jesting involving vulgar expressions and indecent content-'vulgar speech, indecent talk.' καὶ αἰσχρότης καὶ μωρολογία ἢ εὐτραπελία, ἃ οὐκ ἀνῆκεν 'nor is it fitting for you to use shameful, foolish, or vulgar language' Eph 5:4" (Louw-Nida Greek & English Lexicon 33.34).

"εὐτραπελία (#2365) coarse jesting. It implies the dexterity of turning a discourse to wit or humor that ends in deceptive speech, so formed that the speaker easily contrives to wriggle out of its meaning or engagement (Eadie). After a banquet the guests would sit and talk making jokes; often there was a jester (scurra, coprea) who knew how to make plays on words . . ." (Rogers and Rogers, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 443).

Scurra = "A city buffoon, droll, jester" (Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary).

Coprea-"A low buffoon, a filthy jester (post-Aug.), Suet. Tib. 61; id. Claud. 8; cf. Dio Cass. 50, 28" (Lewis and Short).

See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eutrapelia

Does the Triune God Transcend Reason?

A goodly number of Trinitarians have contended that the Trinity doctrine cannot be conclusively demonstrated by rational thought because it is above reason or transrational. Now assuming that God is triune and God as such transcends reason, then it would seem to follow logically that the triune God (if he exists) would also transcend reason (i.e. the law of transitivity). Therefore, one question that seemingly needs to be addressed is whether God in se is transrational or "metarational."

To briefly address some of these issues, I will admit from the outset that there has long been a tension concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason. Certain thinkers have contended that God or his dealings with humanity are not amenable to reason. There is also the famous axiom in theology that God may be apprehended, but he cannot be comprehended. And even a rigorous theologian like Duns Scotus ultimately argues that when reason leads us to a place where faith does not, we should let faith take precedence over reason.

However, it cannot be the case that God utterly transcends reason. This suggestion is nonsensical and patently false in the light of church history and Scripture. For example, Tertullian writes:

Reason, in fact, is a thing [property] of God, inasmuch as there is nothing which God the Maker of all has not provided, disposed, ordained by reason-nothing which He has not willed should be handled and understood by reason (De Paen 1).

The Latin text reads:

Ceterum a ratione eius tantum absunt quantum ab ipso rationis auctore. Quippe res dei ratio quia deus omnium conditor nihil non ratione providit disposuit ordinavit nihilque non ratione tractari intellegique voluit.

And Origen of Alexandria (in opposition to Celsus) maintains that humans are able to comprehend or describe God in the sense that familiarity with divine attributes may conceivably guide one who heeds God's truth toward a partial knowledge and understanding of the deity:

But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God's attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He can be described by name.'

See Contra Celsum 6.65ff.

Origen affirms that there is a sense in which rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God. Such comprehension is not exhaustive but relative (i.e. to a degree). Therefore, the often heard maxim "God may be apprehended, but not comprehended" probably needs to be qualified. Origen indicates that rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God—to an extent.

Finally, from the ecclesiastical history perspective, it seems that Richard of St. Victor (a Medieval theologian) makes a critical distinction between a doctrine being "above reason" and a doctrine being "beyond reason." He seems to apply both distinctions to the Trinity doctrine, even implying that the doctrine of God's triunity seems contrary to reason. However, Richard of St. Victor qualifies his remarks by writing that "almost all the things that we are commanded to believe about the Trinity of persons" are above or seem contrary to reason. The qualifier "almost" is not without importance since Richard himself posits a natural proof for God's triunity on the basis of love, a rational demonstration which resembles Augustine's attempt to show the reasonableness of the Trinity doctrine. But Richard's rational proof continued to be tethered to the Church. That is, it probably cannot be sustained rationally apart from that Trinitarian legacy which has been handed down by various and sundry ecclesiastics. See http://books.google.com/books?id=9d-IA72wfyYC&pg=PA262&dq=trinity+beyond+reason#PPA262,M1

The point of the preceding data has been to show that it is untenable to hold that God in se completely transcends reason. And I believe that this point is not only sustained by examining church history, but Scripture also indicates that God does not utterly transcend reason. See 1 John 5:20. For comments on the potential meaning of dianoia in 1 John 5:20, see http://books.google.com/books?id=2Zd4nTorV9QC&pg=PA560&dq=1+john+5:20+and+dianoia&lr=#PPA560,M1

In closing this blog entry, I leave my readers with a thought from John Locke:

Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith.

Addressing Jason's Trinitarian Arguments -Part I

Before I wrap up my series on the Trinity doctrine in the light of reason, I want to address a few objections posed by some Trinitarian objectors. An Orthodox apologist named "Jason" submits the following reply:

Jason:

Before making any further pronoucements [sic] on the alleged 'unreasonableness' of the doctrine of the Trinity, you might want to reflect on the following answer to the question which Edgar raised on his blog. The reason why human beings cannot be one and many at the same time involves the following observations.

Edgar: the first mistake that Jason makes is to deal with a question that is not identical to the one that I posed. My question concerns how it is factually possible for three persons (however one defines the term "person") to exist as one being rather than three beings. But Jason chooses to frame my question in terms of the One and Many problem. In this way, he basically sidesteps my initial query.

Jason continues to quote Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas:

(a) In human existence, nature precedes the person. When John or George or Basil are born, the one human nature precedes them; they, therefore represent and embody only part of the human nature. Through human procreation humanity is divided, and no human person can be said to be the bearer of the totality of human nature. This is why the death of one person does not automatically bring about the death of the rest — or conversely, the life of one such person the life of the rest.

Edgar:
The term "nature" is ambiguous. One should clearly define what he or she means by the term. (For instance, see Christopher Stead's work Divine Substance.)Granted, there is a sense in which "nature" (understood as the complex of properties that inform X) is existentially prior to X (= an entity that instantiates a determinate complex of properties). But "nature" can be analyzed in more ways than Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas or Jason suggest. For instance, Aristotle makes a distinction between primary and secondary substance (SUBSTANTIA) and John Duns Scotus is known for analyzing "nature" in terms of an entity's "thisness" or HAECCEITAS (i.e. Peter not only instantiates a nature that is like John's, but Peter also instantiates a haecceity or thisness). Hence, the analysis presented above is inadequate or at best incomplete. Besides, Jason's source does not refute what I have hitherto stated. He does not satisfactorily explain how three persons do not = three beings in the divine sphere. Even the Cappadocians recognized the difficulties with speaking of three persons as one being. See Gregory of Nyssa's attempt to handle this logical difficulty: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf205.viii.v.html

Compare his words with Gregory of Nazianzius in Migne PG 35:1220-1221 here: http://books.google.com/books?vid=0tmDvO1QXd96vX6yL5KO5a5&id=QPBUZQVRy9IC&pg=PP13&lpg=PP13&dq=migne+%22in+hoc+tomo+XXXV#PRA1-PT562,M1

Jason:

(b) Because of this, each human person can be conceived as an individual, i.e. as an entity independent ontologically from other human beings. The unity between human beings is not ontologically identical with their diversity or multiplicity. The one and the many do not coincide. It is this existential difficulty that leads to the logical difficulty of saying 'one' and 'many' with the same breath.

Edgar:
My argument is not regarding the One and the Many. It concerns the difficulty that both Gregory of Nazianzius and Gregory of Nyssa discerned in their treatises, namely, how is it factually possible for three persons to = one being? Gregory of Nyssa tried to address the logical difficulty by insisting that human language incorrectly refers to Peter, James, and John as "three men" since human nature is not divisible nor capable of increase or decrease. He writes:

But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of those who are exhibited in the same nature as “many men”?—indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the prevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results from the mistaken use of the name

Compare Jaroslav Pelikan's The Christian Tradition 1:218-224.

Jason:

Now, if we contrast this with God's existence, we see immediately that this existential and hence logical difficulty is not applicable to God. Since God by definition has not had a beginning, and space and time do not enter His existence, the three persons of the Trinity do not share a pre-existing or logically prior to them divine nature, but coincide with it. Multiplicity in God does not involve a division of His nature, as happens with man." - Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas, The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution.

Edgar:
I have already noted the irrelevance of this answer, so I will not repeat what I have pointed out above. I will conclude by noting that question begging in abundance is occurring here. Firstly, I like the way that "individual" is redefined in an ad hoc manner. After all, Boethius had no problem using the expression "individual substance of a rational nature" to describe a divine person. Thomas Aquinas was amenable to Boethius' definition of PERSONA although he saw the need to nuance each term belonging to the Boethian definition.

Secondly, while I agree with Zizioulas that God has no beginning, God's relationship to time is more debatable. Additionally, whether there is a triune God or a nature with which these supposed three persons coincide is the question. This kind of circular reasoning should be avoided at all costs. Thirdly, multiplicity in God has yet to be proved (quod erat demonstrandum). Why is Jason employing a priori reasoning to supposedly refute my views?

I will address Jason's other "arguments" in another submission.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason: Part 2

In this post, I want to define the expression "divine simplicity" before attempting to refute it. According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, "God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence" (See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/)

David Burrell tries to illuminate this seemingly obscure or abstruse doctrine. He explains that (generally) no entity is identical with its nature (e.g., a square is not identical with squareness, nor is a rectangle identical with rectangularity, nor is a human being identical with the abstract property of being human). God is supposedly the only exception to this "rule" in Burrell's estimation. See his text Aquinas: God and Action, pp. 5-7. Thomas Aquinas himself insists that God is non-compositional or wholly simple in his Summa Theologica. Aquinas emphasizes this datum within the prima pars of his Summa: ST I.3.1: "I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways." ST I.3.2: "I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God." ST I.3.3: "I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature." ST I.3.4: "I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways." ST I.3.5: "I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways." ST I.3.6: "I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown." ST I.3.7: "I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His 'suppositum'; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple."

Another way of making the same point as Burrell and Aquinas is to affirm that God is non-mereological. In other words, the doctrine of divine simplicity contends that God is timeless and non-spatial or utterly non-compositional: God has no parts whatsoever. And if God's essence is identical with God's existence, then the three Persons of the Trinity presumably are not three beings, but one being. Trinitarians assert that the Persons are supposedly one being although they putatively are not identical to one another (i.e., the Father is not the Son nor is the Son the Holy Spirit or the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son). But how is it possible for three Persons to constitute one Being? In the next post, I will answer this question and offer reasons why a Christian probably should eschew the simplicitas dei doctrine.

My Amazon Review Of Nancey Murphy's Book

I used Murphy's Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies for two classes this past semester. I then had my classes to compose reviews that outlined their basic impressions of this book. Certain remarks were common in their reviews. I will list some of those comments in this review of Murphy's book. First, let me say that I was surprised at how many students recommended this book for future courses. Nancey Murphy explicitly advocates and offers arguments for a thoroughgoing form of non-reductive physicalism. She does not denigrate opposing positions, but her view of the body and soul is not the popular or traditional religious view of the body or soul. Murphy ultimately contends that we are spirited bodies (i.e. we do not have souls, but we are purely physical). Now I thought that my students (attending a Lutheran university) would immediately say that this book should not be used in future courses at Lenoir-Rhyne University. Boy, was I mistaken!

Along with their enthusiastic recommendations for using Murphy's book, whether they hated or loved it or felt lukewarm about it, some oft-heard criticisms regarding the text were as follows:

Murphy's work is too detailed for those who are just beginning to undertake a study of philosophy or theology. Moreover, it is too redundant, inconsistent, and unclear at points. The least favorite part of the book (for the professor and students) was the information-engineering diagrams that Murphy included on pages 86, 89, and 101. These diagrams were supposed to shed light on non-reductive physicalism. Unfortunately, they left most students scratching their heads and wonder what was the point of the diagrams. Even I had to read those pages three times to understand what each thing stood for in the diagrams. However, I understand why Murphy included those diagrams. But in my opinion, they were only helpful to a point.

In addition to the numerous criticisms of Murphy's book, there were statements that reflected praise for her work. Some students wrote that her text contained a clear statement of her physicalist thesis, they thought the book was well-written, and they expressed praise for her efforts to substantiate her general thesis by the employment of manifold scholarly sources. Most students offered a hearty recommendation for the book, although most took issue with her thesis or felt that she relied too much on science or reason as opposed to relying on Scripture. Finally, while most students did not find Murphy's arguments compelling enough to make them change their minds, certain students did begin to entertain non-reductive physicalism, and others at least began to question the traditional body and soul view. My overall goal was achieved. I wanted to critique dualism, trichotomism and physicalism for a semester with my students help. I believe that we all walked away with a deeper knowledge of the issues. Furthermore, they now are more familiar with an alternative worldview vis-a-vis human nature.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason

Okay, let us get down to brass tacks regarding the Trinity doctrine. Both Trinitarians and non-Trinitarians appeal to the Tanakh or Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament) to substantiate their respective beliefs. But one hardly witnesses any gain from such discussions. For instance, it seems that something as simple as examining the Johannine Prologue (Gospel of John 1:1-18) ultimately proves unproductive in debates about the deity of Christ. Does John 1:1c say that the Logos "was God" or "a god" (NWT) or some derivation thereof? And the debate goes on.

Since I do not believe that most Trinitarians in cyberspace, at any rate, will ever cease being Trinitarians based on the preponderance of evidence from Scripture, I would like to put a somewhat basic question to Trinitarians.

In the case of humans, 3 persons = 3 beings or entities. But in the case of the three divine persons, we are led to believe that 3 persons = 1 God (i.e. one divine being or entity). How does this whole process work? How is it possible for 3 persons to equal 1 being?

One explanation that I have found for this question is that God is simple (i.e. God has no parts or composition, that is, God is non-mereological) whereas human persons are complex (i.e. mereological or they have parts). Due to the fact that God is simple, it is said that the only acceptable distinctions in God are the three persons. Yet this defense obviously evokes the question, how do we know that God is simple?

Thomas Aquinas certainly provides a rejoinder to this question in the Summa Theologica. But are his rejoinders satisfactory? Are there valid or sound arguments against divine simplicity? Can we find compelling arguments that seem to refute divine simplicity? I will address these questions in a separate post.

Romans 8:16: Bearing Witness

The Spirit Bears Witness with Our Spirit (Comments on SUMMARTUREW)

Research gathered by Dr. Edgar Foster

Here are some thoughts on Romans 8:16 from various sources.

The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament (Moulton-Milligan) states:

"SUNMARTUREW, 'bear witness with' (Rom 2:15 al.): cf. BGU I. 86.41ff (A.D. 155), where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words SUNMARTURW KAI SUNSFRAKIW."

Rogers and Rogers (The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 330) says: "SUMMARTUREI pres. ind. act. SUMMARTUREW (#5210) to bear witness w. someone, to confirm, to testify in support of someone. Used in the papyri where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words, 'I bear witness w. and I seal w.'" (MM).

"Beareth witness with our spirit [summarturei tōi pneumati hēmōn]. See on Ro 2:15 for this verb with associative instrumental case. See 1Jo 5:10f. for this double witness" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

We also have these words from John Chrysostom:

"Ver. 16. 'The Spirit Itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.'

For it is not from the language merely, he says, that I make my assertion, but from the cause out of which the language has its birth; since it is from the Spirit suggesting it that we so speak. And this in another passage he has put into plainer words, thus: 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba Father.'(Gal. iv. 6.) And what is that, 'Spirit beareth witness with spirit?' The Comforter, he means, with that Gift, which is given unto us. For it is not of the Gift alone that it is the voice, but of the Comforter also who gave the Gift, He Himself having taught us through the Gift so to speak. But when the 'Spirit beareth witness' what farther place for doubtfulness? For if it were a man, or angel, or archangel, or any other such power that promised this, then there might be reason in some doubting. But when it is the Highest Essence that bestoweth this Gift, and 'beareth witness' by the very words He bade us use in prayer, who would doubt any more of our dignity? For not even when the Emperor elects any one, and proclaims in all men's hearing the honor done him, does anybody venture to gainsay."

See the patristic commentary on Romans at http://books.google.com/books?id=yVs2SQkeZEoC&pg=PA211&dq=commentary+on+romans+8:16&sig=cqytt-06pOgp92zUNtmpuhyuYKk

The NET Bible renders Romans 8:16: The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are God’s children.

The footnote to that texts reads:

Or possibly “with.” ExSyn 160-61, however, notes the following: “At issue, grammatically, is whether the Spirit testifies alongside of our spirit (dat. of association), or whether he testifies to our spirit (indirect object) that we are God’s children. If the former, the one receiving this testimony is unstated (is it God? or believers?). If the latter, the believer receives the testimony and hence is assured of salvation via the inner witness of the Spirit. The first view has the advantage of a σύν- (sun-) prefixed verb, which might be expected to take an accompanying dat. of association (and is supported by NEB, JB, etc.). But there are three reasons why πνεύματι (pneumati) should not be taken as association: (1) Grammatically, a dat. with a σύν- prefixed verb does not necessarily indicate association. This, of course, does not preclude such here, but this fact at least opens up the alternatives in this text. (2) Lexically, though συμμαρτυρέω (summarturew) originally bore an associative idea, it developed in the direction of merely intensifying μαρτυρέω (marturew). This is surely the case in the only other NT text with a dat. (Rom 9:1). (3) Contextually, a dat. of association does not seem to support Paul’s argument: ‘What standing has our spirit in this matter? Of itself it surely has no right at all to testify to our being sons of God’ [C. E. B. Cranfield, Romans [ICC], 1:403]. In sum, Rom 8:16 seems to be secure as a text in which the believer’s assurance of salvation is based on the inner witness of the Spirit. The implications of this for one’s soteriology are profound: The objective data, as helpful as they are, cannot by themselves provide assurance of salvation; the believer also needs (and receives) an existential, ongoing encounter with God’s Spirit in order to gain that familial comfort.

Regards,
Edgar

The Ontological Argument by Anselm

The Ontological Argument

The argument was formulated by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109 CE)

(1) God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived.
(2) Now that which exists in the understanding (in intellectu) and in reality (in re) is greater than that which exists in the understanding alone (in solo intellectu).
(3) If that than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in the understanding (in intellectu) and not in reality (in re), then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived (reductio ad absurdum).* But surely that cannot be.
(4) Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be conceived without a doubt exists both in the understanding (in intellectu) and in reality (in re).

*The logical move "reductio ad absurdum" (reduction to absurdity) involves proving an utterance (U) by showing that its denial (not-U) leads to or entails a contradiction or absurd conclusion (Alvin Plantinga).

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the following about reductio ad absurdum:

“In its most general construal, reductio ad absurdum - reductio for short – is a process of refutation on grounds that absurd - and patently untenable consequences would ensue from accepting the item at issue. This takes three principal forms according as that untenable consequence is:

1. a self-contradiction (ad absurdum)
2. a falsehood (ad falsum or even ad impossibile)
3. an implausibility or anomaly (ad ridiculum or ad incommodum)”

Trinitarian Redactors and Novatian of Rome

One of the most important works on the Trinity
doctrine is Novatian's De Trinitate. This work has
been admired in the western church and became somewhat
of a manual or handbook in ancient times. In English, we
usually call Novatian's treatise On the Trinity. However, one wonders whether Novatian himself appended
the word "Trinity" to the title of this document?
Alternatively, is it possible that early copies of the
text were edited or redacted and the word "Trinity"
was added to Novatian's work?

Russell J. DeSimone (in his translation of De
Trinitate) points out that we do not know the
original title of what is now known as De Trinitate. He suggests that the "correct title" of the work
appears to have been De regula veritatis or De regula fidei (DeSimone 23). The latter title is probably more likely in view of what Novatian writes in De Trinitate 21 regarding the general thesis of his
work. In any event, Novatian the Presbyter never
utilizes the term "Trinity." DeSimone thus notes that
an amanuensis living after 381 probably altered the
title in view of what transpired in 325 and 381 CE at
the first two ecumenical councils (DeSimone 23).

Joseph M. Hallman (The Descent of God, page 70) similarly observes that De regula fidei may have been the original title of De Trinitate. Again, the possible work of a redactor is acknowledged.

One may also find evidence for Trinitarian redaction in the Latin versions of Origen's Peri Archon. See Basil Studer's Trinity and Incarnation, page 84.

Regards,
Edgar

Thoughts on the Tetragrammaton

Taken from the book edited by Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. (editor) This Is My Name Forever: The Trinity & Gender Language for God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001). See page 26:

"The notion that God has a proper name and can be differentiated from other deities with proper names is absolutely clear in the Old Testament. Other gods (ELOHIM) lay claims on humanity, but Israel is to have no god (ELOHIM) before or beside YHWH (Ex 20:3). Moreover, the character of the name is itself a matter of reverence, since the name really coheres with the God it names (20:7). One cannot therefore malign the name or substitute for the name another name, and somehow leave untouched the deity with whom the name is attached . . . Not taking the name of YHWH in vain implies, at a minimum, understanding that YHWH is not an 'accident' [non-essential property] detachable from a deeper 'substance,' that is, 'God himself.'"

Contrast the early church fathers, who believed God did not have a proper name or did not need to be distinguished from other entities since he is SUI GENERIS.

Here is another quote taken from a work titled Guide for the Perplexed which is written by the medieval thinker Maimonides. In 1.61 of that work, he writes:

"It is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are derived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton, which consists of the letters yod, hé, vau [or vav, waw] and hé. This name is applied exclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash, 'The nomen proprium.' It is the distinct and exclusive designation of the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are derived from actions, to which some of our own are similar, as we have already explained."

Best regards,
Edgar

Exodus 3:14 and The Ontological View

The Ontological View and Exodus 3:14

Exodus 3:14 is one of the most thought-provoking and highly debated
scriptures in all of Christian history. A question that immediately
comes up in connection with Exodus 3:14 is--what does Moses mean when he
records the authoritative words of God: 'tell them that I AM THAT I AM
has sent you'. Does this verse embody information that connotes
God's atemporality? Is God delineating His necessary existence (His ESSE A
SE) in this passage? Does this passage deal with ontological aspects of
God, or is there some other point that the writer wants us to glean from the
Hebrew phrase EHYEH ASHER EHYEH?

The second century (as I have contended elsewhere) was a time when Hellenistic religio-philosophical ideas permeated the church (ecclesia). One idea that trickled into the early Christian community was the notion of Divine Impassibility (APAQEIA). The notion of
impassibility seems to have distorted (conceptually) the biblical view of God's immutability. The ancient philosophical doctrine of divine impassibility chiefly stated that:

God was free of the changes and sufferings that characterize human life
and feeling, although derivatively it could also mean impassivity--that
God was indifferent to the changes and sufferings of man. It is
significant that Christian theologians customarily set down the doctrine
of the impassibility of God as an axiom, without bothering to provide
very much biblical support or theological proof . . . Even Tertullian,
for all his hostility to metaphysics, argued this way against Praxeas.
For Athanasius it was "an admitted truth about God that he stands in
need of nothing, but is self-sufficient and filled with
himself...Didymus the Blind took it for granted that the Holy Spirit, as
God, had to be "impassible, indivisible, and immutable." According to
Theodore of Mopsuetia, "it is well known...that the gulf between [the
Eternal One and a temporal being] is unbridgeable"; and again, "it is
known that variety belongs to creatures and simplicity to the divine
nature....The doctrine of the absoluteness and impassibility of God came
to form one of the presuppositions of the trinitarian and christological
issues; and the doctrine of the atonement in Anselm of Canterbury was
based on the axiom "that the divine nature is impassible, and that it
can in no sense be brought down from its loftiness or toil in what it
wills to do. (Pelikan, Jaroslav, The Christian Tradition I:52-4).

The idea of divine impassibility might seem as if it accurately elucidates
God's immutability. Such a conclusion apparently would be mistaken, however. For while the philosophical idea of divine impassibility seemed to articulate the nature of God, it appears to have distorted our understanding of it. The God of the Bible is not presented as an impassible deity. God is neither comparable to the First Mover of Aristotle nor can he be equated with The Good (the inexhaustible Ground of all Being) in Plato's Republic. To the contrary:

"Implicit in the biblical view of God as the Creator [is] the
affirmation of his sovereign independence: God [is] not dependent on his
creatures as they are on him . . . in their assertion of the freedom of
God, the prophets emphasized at the same time his involvement with the
covenant people in love and wrath. Therefore the Old Testament doctrine
of the sovereign freedom of God [cannot] be synonymous with the
philosophical doctrine of divine impassibility (APAQEIA)" (Pelikan, Christian Traditon, 52).

Impassibility denotes that God is free from the quality of becoming or
not subject to the vicissitudes concomitant with life in the finite
sphere of existence. In contrast, the Hebrew prophets affirm the active presence and power of God in their lives. They affirm a God who is living and
dynamic: EHYEH ASHER EHYEH. Exodus 3:14 contributes to this dynamic
view of YHWH. With the aforementioned information in mind, we will now
review this passage.

In the church of antiquity, Exodus 3:14 was believed
to be the supreme proof of God's impassibility. The hermeneutic views on this
text were divergent, yet there were numerous attempts to interpret
Exodus 3:14 in an ontological manner. Clement of Alexandria wrote that the verse meant that "God is one, and beyond the one and above the monad itself."
Hilary exclaims that Exodus 3:14 is "an indication concerning God so
exact that it expresses in the terms best adapted to human understanding
an unattainable insight into the mystery of the divine nature" (Pelikan, Christian Tradition,
54). Thomas Aquinas interpreted Exodus 3:14 in accordance with the Vulgate rendering "Qui est" (He Who Is). But is this view accurate? Should Exodus 3:14 be
understood in an ontological sense?

While I believe that all of the aforementioned ideas have some merit, it seems that that are only shadows pointing to the reality of God. Exodus 3:14 evidently is not an ontological statement of God's deity. It does not tell us so much about God's nature (His ONTWS), as it informs us about His purposes and functions with regard to the divine purposes. I would contend that the phenomenological view of Exodus 3:14 comes much closer to telling us what
the verse means. The phenomenological construal of the passage espouses the idea that God is the One who will "be" in the sense of carrying out His purposes (i.e. "he is the one causing to be"). In this exegetical paradigm, what God is to "be" is left unstated. He will become whatsoever he has to "become" in order to accomplish his purposes or manifest his presence. In Bibliotheca Sacra, Charles Gianotti offers some pertinent criticism regarding the ontological view of Exodus 3:14. He himself espouses either the phenomenological or the covenantal view. Concerning Exodus 3:14 and the ontological view, Gianotti writes:

This view seems to rest on the Septuagint translation of Exodus 3:14
(EGW EIMI hO WN). On the face of it, the use of eijmi seems to support
his view. This view is untenable for a number of reasons. Though the
Septuagint is a serviceable translation of the Pentateuch, the
Septuagint is not inspired; it is a human translation by Jewish
scholars. The primary understanding of Exodus 3:14 should come, rather,
from a contextual understanding of the passage as well as from an
analysis of the meaning and usage of the Hebrew term hy*h* and its
imperfect form hy#h=a# . . . Significantly, most interpreters translate
hy#h=a# in Exodus 3:12 as future (i.e.. "I will be [hy#h=a#] with you").
Yet, two verses later, why should not the same translation suffice?

Gianotti sums up matters by writing:

One may safely conclude that Exodus 3:14 does not support an
"ontological" or "existence" view; the name YHWH therefore is not rooted
in that view, by virtue of its close relation to Exodus 3:14.

In view of the Scriptural framework wherein Exodus 3:14 was originally
written, I espouse the phenomenological view of this verse. The passage
does not appear to support the ontological view favored by the early church writers.

Owen Thomas on the Incarnation

Note what systematic theologian Owen Thomas writes regarding the Incarnation or hypostatic union. The following is taken from his _Introduction to Theology_ (page 150):

"H.W. Montefiore has indicated an even more
fundamental problem in the Chalcedonian definition.
The formula asserts of Christ, 'the same perfect in
Godhead and the same perfect in manhood, truly God and
truly man . . .' The implication is that apart from
Christ we know what perfect godhead [sic] and perfect
humanity are, and that on the basis of the New
Testament testimony we are affirming that Jesus
possessed both. But in fact the Christian faith is
that it is precisely in Christ and nowhere else that
we see what perfect godhead and perfect humanity are.
Now Middle Platonist philosophy involved a doctrine of
God as impassible, completely transcendent and
immutable. Thus on these terms it is extremely
difficult to understand how God and humanity could be
united in one person. But the fundamental thing we
know from Christ is that God can be perfectly united
with humanity. This is where we begin in speaking
about God and humanity. The problem is not how a union
of God and humanity in one person is possible, but
given the union manifest in Christ what perfect
godhead and humanity are."

Jehovah's Witnesses and Globalization by Chryssides

Here is a link for an article written by George D. Chryssides. I believe that he attempts to be objective or fair when writing about the religious movement known as Jehovah's Witnesses. One criticism that I have of his work, however, is that he is sloppy or careless with historical details. But maybe he is not a historian. Anyway, his article isn't that difficult to read. One more criticism might be that what is mentioned in the abstract is not fully developed by the author in his actual writing.

http://www.cesnur.org/2007/bord_chryssides.htm

Rise in STDs Among Older Folks

Sex and older generations: it's not a topic that gets discussed much, not even in the doctor's office. But some physicians say that needs to change, because older patients are leading active sex lives - and their rates of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) may be on the rise.

Whatever the cause - Viagra, midlife divorce, online dating or simple ignorance - studies suggest that STDs are no longer just an affliction of the young. A study published online last week by the journal Sexually Transmitted Infections adds to that growing body of evidence. Researchers at England's West Midlands Health Protection Agency found that in less than a decade, STD rates had more than doubled among people ages 45 and older. And Dr. Babatunde Olowokure, an author of the study, thinks that figure may be low. "These observations are based on a small proportion of people who actually attend clinics," he says. While that proportion of the population has increased overall over the past decade, Olowokure points out that middle-aged and older people tend to delay visiting a doctor for treatment of an STD, or they avoid it altogether, in large part due to the stigma associated with sexually transmitted infections.

In their study, Olowokure and his team counted 4,445 infections (excluding HIV) reported to 19 clinics in the region. From 1996 to 2003, total cases of chlamydia, genital herpes, gonorrhea, syphilis and genital warts among people over 45 increased 127%, from 344 cases in 1996 to 780 in 2003. Rates of STDs increased in patients under age 45 as well, by 97%, during the same time period. In the U.S. the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention figures - which include prevalence of syphilis, chlamydia and gonorrhea - reflect relatively stable rates of infection in people ages 55 and older, but that data relies on self-reporting, and in many parts of the country it is out of step with what physicians are seeing. "Our rates of syphilis and chlamydia are up across all ages," says Dr. Sharon Lee, a Kansas City, Mo., family physician and medical director of HIV Wisdom for Older Women. According to a 2000 study of Washington State residents, one of the only comprehensive analyses of STD infection among the middle-aged and older, cases of gonorrhea increased 18.2% between 1997 and 1998 among people ages 45 and older; in younger people, that increase was 17.3%.

See http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20080708/hl_time/moremidlifeandolderstds

A Supposed Silver Lining to High Gas Prices?

WASHINGTON - Today's high gas prices could reduce auto deaths by nearly a third as driving decreases, with the effect particularly dramatic among price-sensitive teenage drivers, the authors of a new study said.

Professors Michael Morrisey of the University of Alabama-Birmingham and David Grabowski of Harvard Medical School found that for every 10 percent increase in gas prices there was a 2.3 percent decline in auto deaths. For drivers ages 15 to 17, the decline was 6 percent, and for ages 18 to 21, it was 3.2 percent.

The study looked at fatalities from 1985 to 2006, when gas prices reached about $2.50 a gallon. With gas now averaging over $4 a gallon, Morrisey said he expects to see a drop of about 1,000 deaths a month.

With annual auto deaths typically ranging from about 38,000 to 40,000 a year, a drop of 12,000 deaths would cut the total by nearly a third, Morrisey said.

"I think there is some silver lining here in higher gas taxes in that we will see a public health gain," Grabowski said. But he cautioned that their estimate of a decline of 1,000 deaths a month could be offset somewhat by the shift under way to smaller, lighter, more fuel-efficient cars and the increase in motorcycle and scooter driving.

See the whole story at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080711/ap_on_he_me/auto_deaths_gas_prices

My Amazon Review of Hal Flemings Book

Hal Flemings has presented a persuasive case for the reasonableness of God's existence. Flemings' approach is innovative, refreshing and hardly ever encountered in other books belonging to this genre. He initiates his discussion of theistic and atheistic arguments by seeking to clarify what the term "God" means. I believe you will find the answers that he supplies in the first chapter of his work to be quite informative. Flemings then proceeds to review what deists, theists, pantheists and agnostics have argued with respect to God's existence. These arguments are handled in an objective and balanced way: the author is not interested in simply pontificating. This part of his work also makes the book a pleasure to read. Flemings' book contains 10 chapters including a discussion of holy books that different religions use and there is a chapter dealing with the problem of evil. I especially enjoyed the chapter about the various arguments that have been posited to prove God's existence. Flemings handles the ontological, teleological, anthropological and scientific arguments for God with the utmost care and skill. I encourage you to purchase this book, if you have ever wondered whether there is logical, scientific or theological evidence that points to the existence of a loving and benevolent or all wise Creator. The information contained in this work can also be employed to help non-theists seriously reflect on the question as well as the reality of God.

Edgar Foster

graduate of the University of Glasgow (Ph.D.)

Revelation 15:8 and Christology

In Revelation 15:8, John reports that when the glory and power of God was fully manifest in his temple, OUDEIS EDUNATO EISELQEIN EIS TON NAON AXRI TELESQWSIN hAI hEPTA PLHGAI TWN hEPTA AGGELWN.

What did John mean by the words OUDEIS EDUNATO EISELQEIN? Who are included in the pronoun functioning as a substantive OUDEIS?

Uriah Smith (a Seventh Day Adventist commentator) writes:

"While the seven angels are performing
their fearful mission, the temple is filled
with the glory of God, and no man, OUDEIS, no one,
no being, referring to Christ and his heavenly
assistants, can enter therein. This shows that the
work of mercy is closed, and there is no ministration
in the sanctuary during the infliction of the plagues ;
hence they are manifestations of the wrath of God,
without any mixture of mercy" (Thoughts, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Revelation, page 308, published 1881).

Notice that Smith includes Christ and his "heavenly assistants" as referents of the term OUDEIS. It does not seem that Smith draws any ontological inferences from the language of Revelation 15:8. However, it seems to me that John is pointing out that not only were beings not in the holy NAOS in heaven--they COULD NOT enter because of the manifested glory and power of God the Father. What do you readers of this blog think?

Josef Stern on Identifying Metaphors

The following is taken from the first chapter of my dissertation on metaphor and divine paternity:

How does one undertake the task of identifying a metaphor? What
linguistic markers signal that an utterance or
proposition is metaphorical? Donald Davidson
maintains:

There are no instructions for devising
metaphors; there is no manual for determining what a
metaphor 'means' or 'says'; there is no test for
metaphor that does not call for taste.

But Josef Stern appears to posit compelling
evidence that may successfully militate against Davidson's thesis.
He initially presents a semantic account of metaphors,
comparing them to demonstrative or deictic signifiers
(i.e. indexicals) that linguistically point to
noetically intended objects. Nevertheless, Stern
recognizes that there is a linguistic pragmatic
element involved in the detection of metaphors. Two
such pragmatic features of human discourse are the
Sitz-im-Leben (life situation) and the koinonoetic context (shared social situation) of communicative agents. Therefore, knowledge of how language works in its real life social or contextual setting is essential for metaphor recognition; it forms an essential part of the
diagnostic criterion for metaphoricity.

Stern rigorously develops this point in his seminal study on metaphor and context. Deciphering indexicals requires that a discourse agent possess both semantic competence and the knowledge of a particular discourse situation since demonstratives are apparently context-dependent. Juxtaposing deictic terms and metaphors, Stern maintains that in order to construe metaphors adequately, a speaker belonging to a given discourse community must also have semantic competence and intimate knowledge of the situational context in which communicative agents utter or write specific metaphors. Metaphors (like demonstratives) are also context-dependent: "Metaphors do not function in isolation. They exist in both a rhetorical context and a cultural context."

Recognizing a metaphorical locution thus requires being acquainted with a specified Sitz-im-Leben. When one is conversant with a certain social, cognitive, political, rhetorical, literary, intellectual or religious context, inter alia, he or she evidently is capable of discerning metaphors as such.

Predestination and Free Will

There is certainly a tension in the early church fathers between human free will (which they universally affirm) and foreordination. Moreover, the pre-Nicenes allude to the topic of foreordination, but they do not really elucidate their beliefs concerning it: predestination does not become a major issue until Augustine's time period (see Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. London: Banner of Truth, 1971, page 109).

In his authoritative work, The Christian Tradition (1:280), historian Jaroslav Pelikan points out that Augustine's spiritual predecessors [i.e. the pre-Nicenes and post-Nicenes] "leaned noticeably to one side of the dilemma, namely, the side of free will and responsibility rather than the side of inevitability and original sin."

Augustine argued that the reason those who preceded him did not adequately deal with the issue of human free will and divine foreordination was because their historical circumstances did not necessitate that they deal with the issue in a satisfactory manner (On the Predestination of the Saints 14.27; On the Gift of Perseverance 2.4). In other words, heresy had not yet made it necessary to deal with this problematic question (according to Augustine of Hippo).

One important caveat to mention at this point, however, is that Augustine did not reject free will in toto. According to what he writes in De Civitate Dei 5.9, God "knows all things before they come to pass," yet we will or act freely, of our own choosing. Nevertheless, the ancient bishop claims, free will is included in "a certain order of causes" that has been determined or decreed by God. Such a view can be aptly described as "soft determinism" since it does not affirm a libertarian version of human voluntas. William Hasker discusses these points in God, Time, and Knowledge (pp. 5-6).