Subordinationism and the Trinity Doctrine

A member of the evangelicals-jws yahoogroup named Jason has attempted to impugn my scholarship by arguing that I am simply wrong in contending that subordinationism and Trinitarianism are incompatible. Jason writes:

So, in that I have demonstrated sufficiently that Foster's contention that trintarianism is incompatible with ANY form of subordinationism WHATSOEVER is manifestly ABSURD (surely the great 'Minstrel of the Trinity', St. Gregory Nazianzen, was NOT a 'non-trinitarian'!), I have - in the very act of doing so - also demonstrated sufficiently that Foster's contention that the ante-Nicenes were non-trinitarians is also manifestly ABSURD, and hence FALSE. Nevertheless, I WILL - in future posts - offer positive PROOF that Foster has grossly misinterpreted St. Justin, Athenagoras of Athens, St. Theophilus of Antioch, St. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, and Lactantius: the eight ante-Nicenes whom Edgar appeals to for the perverse purpose of attempting to overthrow Holy O/orthodoxy.

Jason evidently fails to understand the technical denotation of subordinationism. Fortman defines "subordinationism" as the belief that God's Son is a creature or inferior in essence vis-a-vis the Father. Leonard Hodgson also writes: "Subordinationism, as I have indicated earlier, attempts to preserve the [divine] unity by making one person ultimately the real God and the others divine because of their relation to him" (The Doctrine of the Trinity, 100).

Based on these definitions, which have been included in my studies, how could Jason get his analysis of my work so wrong? Let him tell me how Trinitarianism is compatible with subordinationism when Trinitarianism both denies that the Son is a creature and it contends that the Son is not inferior in essence to the Father. Furthermore, according to the Trinity doctrine, one divine person is not the real God while the others are only divine in relation to him. I believe the problem is that Jason fails to understand the terminology being used in this discussion. For if he comprehended the terminology employed in discussions of this kind, he would not have made such an egregious mistake respecting my scholarship. As for his contention that the pre-Nicenes were Trinitarians, I will address this misleading statement in other posts. I just wanted to establish the error contained in Jason's statements before demonstration other mistakes committed by him.

Monolatry, Monotheism and Henotheism

I believe that we must keep in mind that such terms as monolatry, monotheism or even henotheism are all attempts to delineate, circumscribe or define certain religious phenomena that one encounters in Scripture. In other words, the Bible itself never uses such terminology to describe the ways in which people of ancient times worshiped. One can only arrive at such descriptive words by prescinding from that which is explicitly contained in Holy Writ. Another thing that we must do, however, is render precise that which we are concerned with here.

(1) Henotheism has been defined as the act of worshiping one God (in particular, a national or tribal deity) while simultaneously refusing to rule out the existence of other gods. It has well been said that henotheism defined thus "certainly does not fit the universal and cosmic conception implicit in the Old Testament" (Ralph L. Smith, Old Testament Theology, page 232). I would also argue that Witnesses of Jehovah are
not henotheists since Jehovah is not viewed as a tribal god, nor are other beings recognized as "gods" by Witnesses accorded the same ontological status as Jehovah.

(2) One online source defines monolatry as follows: "worship of one god only out of many believed to exist."

Witnesses worship (in the sense of latreia) one God (not "god") and we believe that there are others that can be called "gods" in a functional or an ontological sense (i.e. angels and judges). But what does it mean to say that one believes there are many gods that exist? Does it not all depend on how one defines the term God/god? To illustrate what I mean, notice what Smith says about monotheism.

(3) Ralph L. Smith quotes from three scholars who all
define monotheism in slightly different ways. The
point I want to draw attention to now, however, is
what G.E. Wright states, as quoted by Smith. Wright
notes that monotheism is "the exclusive exaltation of
the one source of all power, authority, and
creativity" (Smith, page 232).

Now, if one defines monotheism in the foregoing
manner, it is safe to say that recognizing what Wright
calls "subordinate divine beings" (i.e. gods) does not
mean that one is not a monotheist. In fact, D.S.
Russell ("The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic") writes:

"There is ample evidence to show that [OT] conception
of monotheism was held in conjunction with a belief in
a spiritual world peopled with supernatural and
superhuman beings who, in some ways, shared the
nature, though not the being, of God" (page 235).

While I am not totally sure what Russell means when
he writes that the angels were depicted as sharing the "nature"
but not the "being" of God, I nonetheless conclude
that it is appropriate for Jehovah's Witnesses to identify themselves
as monotheists rather than monolaters or henotheists. Witnesses
worship "the only true God" (Jn 17:3) but realize that
images of this one God subsist in the spirit realm and
some men (and angels) have represented the one God on earth.

The Relational God of the Bible

I came across a quote today and thought I would post it here. A theologian named Norman Geisler, who usually favors Thomism, writes that a God

who cannot act or interact with the world would be less than significantly personal. Prayer and service possess little meaning unless there is a real, personal relationship between God and men. The God of the Bible is responsive to human needs and actions. There is no existential appeal in an impersonal and unrelatable Being. The doctrine of God's relationality is a biblical and vital teaching which is neglected or lost in some expressions of traditional theism.

Best wishes,

Edgar

Cyril Lucaris on the Place of Scripture in the Ecclesia

Cyril Lucaris was a Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople. His dates are 1572-1638 CE. He evidently produced an 18 point synopsis of his beliefs, which certain scholars have claimed was influenced by Calvinism. I now quote chapter 2 of Cyril's Confessions:

We believe the Holy Scripture to be given by God, to have no other author but the Holy Spirit. This we ought undoubtedly to believe, for it is written. We have a more sure word of prophecy, to which you do well to take heed, as to light shining in a dark place. We believe the authority of the Holy Scripture to be above the authority of the Church. To be taught by the Holy Spirit is a far different thing from being taught by a man; for man may through ignorance err, deceive and be deceived, but the word of God neither deceives nor is deceived, nor can err, and is infallible and has eternal authority.

Regards,
Edgar

Did God the Son Change?

A yahoogroup member who participates on an Evangelical-Jehovah's Witnesses forum and sometimes on this blog was asked:

If a divine person takes on a human nature, is that not a change

His answer:

Hi R--,
Only if the Divine Person in question already existed BEFORE taking on human
nature. But, for those of us who believe in Divine Timelessness, it just simply
is not true that the Son existed first for a certain length of time without His
human nature, and then LATER took on human nature. Also, the Divine Person of
the Son is BOTH unchangeable AND changeable: In His divinity, He is
unchangeable, while in His humanity, He is changeable. Likewise, the Divine
Person of the Son is both timeless AND temporal: In His divinity, He is
timeless, while in His humanity, He is temporal. So, yes, it is true that a
change occurred in that the human nature of the Son first did not exist, and
then afterwards came to exist (for the Incarnation is a temporal event). BUT,
it does not follow from this that the Person of the Son first existed without
His human nature, and then afterwards came to have His human nature.
For, BEFORE the time of the Incarnation, i.e., APART from the Incranation [SIC], there is no temporal succession involved in the existence of the Person of the Son of which one can speak. Thus, the Incarnation does not in any manner whatosever [SIC] either contradict or weaken the absolute nature of the Divine Unchangeability

If I may borrow a term from another participant on the Evangelical-Witnesses forum, this explanation is practically unintelligible. Moreover, it begs the question (petitio principii) by asserting that which should be demonstrated through the use of logic in one form or another. But to talk about the Son adding humanity to his deity without a change or event occurring is unintelligible. It contradicts the principles of basic logic and it flies in the face of our bodily experience in the phenomenal realm. In his answer, the aforementioned forum participant claims that the human nature of "God the Son" did not exist, but then subsequently came to exist since the Incarnation is a putative temporal event. But even if we prescind from the question of whether God is temporal or atemporal, we must nevertheless ask how motion occurs without a state of affairs being altered. Motion (understood in its broad sense of any change whatsoever like the Latin motus can signify) cannot occur without a state of affairs being altered which involves a person in given state of affairs undergoing some type of alteration or change.

Yet, how is it possible for a timeless or immutable God (in the absolute sense) to undergo change or experience motus? The previous claim that God the Son becomes incarnate, thereby adding humanity to his deity, is unintelligible without invoking change. Other theologians have admitted the "mystery" that attends this "temporal" event. O how blessed we would be to have such an admission from the person who tried to answer the question above.

According to A.W. Pink, there are at least three ways in which God is immutable:

1)

First, God is immutable in His essence. His nature and being are infinite, and so, subject to no mutations. There never was a time when He was not; there never will come a time when He shall cease to be. God has neither evolved, grown, nor improved.

2)

Secondly, God is immutable in His attributes. Whatever the attributes of God were before the universe was called into existence, they are precisely the same now, and will remain so forever. Necessarily so; for they are the very perfections, the essential qualities of His being. Semper idem (always the same) is written across every one of them. His power is unabated, His wisdom undiminished, His holiness unsullied.

3)

Thirdly, God is immutable in His counsel. His will never varies. Perhaps some are ready to object that we ought to read the following: "And it repented the Lord that He had made man" (Gen 6:6). Our first reply is, Then do the Scriptures contradict themselves? No, that cannot be. Numbers 23:19 is plain enough: "God is not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent." So also in 1 Samuel 15:19, "The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for He is not a man, that He should repent."

See http://www.albatrus.org/english/theology/god/immutability%20of%20god.htm

But if God is absolutely immutable, then how did God "become" incarnate? How would Pink explain God the Son adding humanity to his deity? Furthermore, does not the language of "becoming" suggest that motion (motus) or change occurs? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states:

The Incarnation is an especially knotty problem for DDI's [the doctrine of divine immutability's] Christian friends. In general, these argue that all change it involved occurred in the human nature God the Son assumed rather than in God; God was eternally ready to be incarnate, and eternally had those experiences of the earthly Christ which the Incarnation makes part of his life. Through changes in Mary and the infant she bore, what was eternally in God eventually took place on earth.

God eternally experienced what the earthly Christ would undergo when he "became" flesh? How could God have those experiences without change occurring in his preexistent state?

Brian Hebblethwaite makes an interesting point regarding the Incarnation and change in God. In his book entitled Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (page 45), he writes:

The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless act of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a
potentiality.

In a nutshell (in nuce), Hebblethwaite is saying that it is difficult to understand how a timeless, immutable God becomes man or creates the universe. For the Incarnation doctrine implies that the LOGOS became flesh, whereas the doctrine of creation indicates that God acted to bring creation into being ex nihilo. Both notions appear problematic in the light of divine atemporality.

Old Email Concerning Aquinas' Use of the Term "Person" for God

Hi,

I once wrote this email to a colleague of mine who is an atheist. I
have a good relationship with this individual, but we greatly disagree
when it comes to matters that concern theology. :)

Hi Sue [name inserted to replace the original one],

I've been reading a book entitled "After Aquinas"
written by Fergus Kerr and I think it contains some interesting
remarks on divine personhood that I'd like to share with you.

Kerr writes that in ordinary modern usage, the term "person" is
"co-extensive" with "human being" (After Aquinas, 193). Philosophy
students influenced by the Cartesian turn to subjectivity, however, no
doubt think of a person in terms of "a self-conscious or rational
being," a usage which was also quite familiar to the British
Empiricist John Locke.

However, Thomas Aquinas holds that the term "person"
when applied to God actually refers to "an individual substance of a
rational nature" (rationalis naturae individua substantia) as long as
one carefully nuances or qualifies what is meant by "individual"
(i.e., incommunicable) "rational" (non-discursive, but intellectual)
and "substance" ('self-grounded existing').

Kerr closes the paragraph I took this information from by noting:

"Of course, as Thomas keeps insisting, this concept of person [i.e.,
rationalis naturae individua substantia] applies in discourse about
God only analogically" (After Aquinas, 193).

See the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, particularly ST 1.13.5;
1.29.3.

If I don't communicate with you between now and Friday, have a good
week.

Cheers,
Edgar

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason-Part 3

I will now list some objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity that make it an unlikely candidate for buttressing the Trinity doctrine or accounting for its conceptual feasibility.

The doctrine of God's simplicity (simplicitas Dei) does not fail to encounter its own logical problematics. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig argue that it "seems patently false" to make the claim that God does not exemplify properties that are objectively distinct from one another since the property of being good apparently is objectively distinct from the property of being omniscient, just as the property of being omnipotent is not metaphysically identical with the abstract property of being omnibenevolent. Moreover, Christopher Stead maintains that it is problematic to insist that God's action toward the world is "simple and uniform." He maintains that divine simplicity does not seem to explain adequately how God loves numerous creatures simultaneously or providentially guides the multitudinous events that repeatedly and continuously occur in creation; nor does the doctrine evidently account for the notion of an immanent God, who personally acts in creation. Those who advocate this doctrine, however, contend that the supposed difficulties associated with God's simplicity emanate from dissimilar ontological emphases between the medieval and contemporary period, not from the concept of divine simplicity itself. They insist that medieval thinkers stress constituent ontology (i.e. entities are what they are as such) whereas contemporary thinkers are inclined to emphasize relational ontology (i.e. entities have essences, properties or sets of properties). In the light of relational ontology, Alvin Plantinga has contended that divine simplicity possibly leads to the logical conclusion that God is a property. Plantinga writes:

In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property … In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property.

See http://74.6.239.67/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=plantinga+and+divine+simplicity&y=Search&fr=yfp-t-501&u=web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Making%2520Sense%2520of%2520Divine%2520Simplicity.pdf&w=plantinga+divine+divining+simplicity&d=cSuEHA-YSNrd&icp=1&.intl=us

Yet, there are other logical objections to divine simplicity that seem to function as sound defeaters for the doctrine. The next blog post will review some of these objections.

Philo on Parents as Gods

In his study _The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts
in Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews Under the
Early Roman Empire as Described by Philo Judaeus_ (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1929) Erwin
R. Goodenough relates that Philo evidently depicts
parents as QEOI EMFANEIS since they "create" (as it
were) in the manner of Almighty God. The ancient
writer from Alexandria contends that parents are "gods
only to their own children" and that parenthood always
implies "divinity" or "a rank between the divine and
human," as De Specialibus Legibus 2.225 suggests. Cf.
De Decalogo 120 as well.

This data can be found on page 67 of Goodenough's
work.

De Specialibus Legibus 2.225 states: "For parents
themselves are something between divine and human
nature, partaking of both; of human nature, inasmuch
as it is plain that they have been born and that they
will die; and of divine nature, because they have
engendered other beings, and have brought what did not
exist into existence: for, in my opinion, what God is
to the world, that parents are to their children;
since, just as God gave existence to that which had no
existence, they also, in imitation of his power, as
far at least as they were able, make the rest of
mankind everlasting."

I find it interesting that Philo could posit these
ideas without breaching his monotheistic stance.

Best regards,
Edgar

Lactantius on God's Instantiated Emotions

Lactantius reasons that God the Father must be passible (in a certain sense) if he is going to treat both his good and bad servants (i.e. human beings) in a just manner. He insists that a righteous God and Father must find pleasure regarding the pious acts of his servants but feel wrath for those acts which are not in accordance with divine law, those acts that do not promote human flourishing (De ira Dei 5). But if the Father is literally going to make a distinction in terms of the treatment that good and bad servants receive, then he must instantiate certain emotions. These states must be objectively differentiated in God lest he proves to be inanimate (Divinae institutiones 5.22.13). Since Lactantius is persuaded that some creatures—by dint of their actions—merit being hated or loved, he maintains that the Father must have actual emotions to qualify as a righteous deity (De ira Dei 6; Divinae institutiones 6.19.8). The only impassible entities
are those beings that are inanimate or dead. Neither rocks nor trees nor sand
can show emotions. However, Lactantius believes that the living God does
experience such variations within himself (De ira Dei 4). Furthermore, he
contends that where emotions do not exist, virtue cannot exist (Divinae
institutiones 6.15.9). The virtuous Father of all is thus moved (internally) as
he responds to virtuous or vicious human actions. His well-ordered experience of
phenomenal subjectivity ensures that evil will not obtain forever since God
apparently will treat evil and goodness in proportion to their respective dues
(De ira Dei 16).

Edgar

Wagner on Full God Christology

This material is taken from a book written by Walter Wagner entitled After the Apostles (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1994), page
112:

Frankly, the 'full God Christology' has problems.
More passages in the New Testament reflect adoptionist
and angelic positions than the full God option. It may
assure those who are convinced that human free will is
unable to obey God, but it makes no philosophical
sense, invites forced interpretations of the
Scriptures, and raises questions. For example, the
Gospels reported that Jesus prayed, but if he was hO
QEOS to whom did he pray? If God is one, how could a
section of God be sent out on an earthly mission? Is
God divisible? In the event that Jesus was a
manifestation of the supreme God, does that mean God
is subject to change with all philosophical risks such
a view entails? If God became enfleshed in Jesus, did
God-as-Jesus sweat, hunger, and have bowel movements?
Doesn't such a view degrade the holy and transcendent
God? If the enfleshed God did not participate in human
grubbiness as well as nobility, then what kind of
humanity did Jesus-God have?

Walter H. Wagner was associate professor at Muhlenberg
College in Allentown, PA.

ERRWSO,
Edgar Foster

Lenoir-Rhyne University
Russell House, no. 7

The Myth of Objective Science

Greetings,

The old Neo-Kantian bifurcation of facts and values is simply untenable. While it may seem tempting to state that science deals with "facts" while religion concerns itself with "values," this assertion cannot withstand serious analysis and a number of scientists have admitted that science is not cold or dispassionate but sometimes ideological and always informed by human presuppositions or a priori concepts. As Paul Davies points out, it seems that scientists have to start with certain "givens," which may not be necessary (in the Kantian sense) but probably are not objectionable either (The Mind of God, pp. 186-187).

Modern thought on science and cognition indicates that "there are no unfiltered facts." While I think this proposition might overstate the case somewhat, it does capture an important truth: science is not and cannot be dispassionate ex toto. Scientists may deal with factual data, but that data is not filtered through blank slates. The myth of the blank slate (tabula rasa) has been exposed thoroughly by contemporary epistemologists. Moreover, those intimately acquainted with the workings of the human brain or sapient cognitive structures will concede that feeling is an integral part of thinking. One who thinks without the presence of emotions or feelings cannot adequately think. Neurologist Antonio Damasio has shown that rationality without emotion or feeling makes prudent decision-making difficult or perhaps impossible. See his work Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. Ergo, science cannot be dispassionate or presupposition-free: it does not come to us mere mortals from the land of nowhere.

Astronomer Robert Jastrow also exposes the myth of objective science, writing:

"Theologians generally are delighted with the proof that the Universe had a beginning, but astronomers are curiously upset. Their reactions provide an interesting demonstration of the response of the scientific mind--supposedly a very objective mind--when evidence uncovered by science itself leads to a conflict with the articles of faith in our profession. It turns out that the scientist behaves the way the rest of us do when our beliefs are in conflict with the evidence. We become irritated, we pretend the conflict does not exist, or we paper it over with meaningless phrases" (God and the Astronomers, page 16).

XAIREIN KAI ERRWSQAI,
Edgar Foster

Paul Tillich on the Incarnation

Greetings!

Speaking about those who like to employ the term
"Incarnation" with some frequency, the late systematic
theologian Paul Tillich writes:

"They forget that this is not an especially Christian
characteristic, because incarnation is something which
happens in paganism all the time. The divine beings
always incarnate in different forms. That is very easy
in paganism. This is not the real distinction between
Christianity and other religions" (See pg. 363 of
_Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings_ edited by
Michael Peterson, William Hasker, et. al.).

Proof of Tillich's observation can be found in Greek
and Roman mythology and in the sacred works of
Hinduism. The Incarnation may well be a product of
antecedent non-Christian thought.

Best regards,
Edgar

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

Brief Word Study on EUTRAPELIA

BDAG states:  εὐτραπελία, ας, ἡ (s. τρέπω; Hippocr. et al., mostly in a good sense: ‘wittiness’, ‘facetiousness’ [cp. our ‘turn a phrase’]; so also Posidipp. Com. fgm. 28, 5; Diod. S. 15, 6, 5; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 361; Jos., Ant. 12, 173; 214. Acc. to Aristot., EN 2, 7, 13 it is the middle term betw. the extremes of buffoonery [βωμολοχία] and boorishness [ἀγροικία]; acc. to Aristot., Rhet. 2, 12 it is πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις) in our lit. only in a bad sense coarse jesting, risqué wit (for sim. sense cp. εὐτράπελος Isocr. 7, 49) Eph 5:4.—HRahner, LexThK III 1212. PvanderHorst, Is Wittiness Christian? A Note on εὐτραπελία in Eph 5:4: Miscellanea Neotestamentica, ed. AKlŸn/WvanUnnik ’78, 163-77.—DELG s.v. τρέπω. M-M. TW. Spicq. Sv.

"* εὐτραπελία, -ας, ἡ, 1. Versatility, wit, facetiousness (Hippocr., Plt., al.). 2. = μωρολογία, coarse jesting, ribaldry (Abbott, Essays, 93): Eph 5:4" (Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament, page 190).

"εὐτραπελία, ας, f: coarse jesting involving vulgar expressions and indecent content-'vulgar speech, indecent talk.' καὶ αἰσχρότης καὶ μωρολογία ἢ εὐτραπελία, ἃ οὐκ ἀνῆκεν 'nor is it fitting for you to use shameful, foolish, or vulgar language' Eph 5:4" (Louw-Nida Greek & English Lexicon 33.34).

"εὐτραπελία (#2365) coarse jesting. It implies the dexterity of turning a discourse to wit or humor that ends in deceptive speech, so formed that the speaker easily contrives to wriggle out of its meaning or engagement (Eadie). After a banquet the guests would sit and talk making jokes; often there was a jester (scurra, coprea) who knew how to make plays on words . . ." (Rogers and Rogers, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 443).

Scurra = "A city buffoon, droll, jester" (Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary).

Coprea-"A low buffoon, a filthy jester (post-Aug.), Suet. Tib. 61; id. Claud. 8; cf. Dio Cass. 50, 28" (Lewis and Short).

See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eutrapelia

Does the Triune God Transcend Reason?

A goodly number of Trinitarians have contended that the Trinity doctrine cannot be conclusively demonstrated by rational thought because it is above reason or transrational. Now assuming that God is triune and God as such transcends reason, then it would seem to follow logically that the triune God (if he exists) would also transcend reason (i.e. the law of transitivity). Therefore, one question that seemingly needs to be addressed is whether God in se is transrational or "metarational."

To briefly address some of these issues, I will admit from the outset that there has long been a tension concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason. Certain thinkers have contended that God or his dealings with humanity are not amenable to reason. There is also the famous axiom in theology that God may be apprehended, but he cannot be comprehended. And even a rigorous theologian like Duns Scotus ultimately argues that when reason leads us to a place where faith does not, we should let faith take precedence over reason.

However, it cannot be the case that God utterly transcends reason. This suggestion is nonsensical and patently false in the light of church history and Scripture. For example, Tertullian writes:

Reason, in fact, is a thing [property] of God, inasmuch as there is nothing which God the Maker of all has not provided, disposed, ordained by reason-nothing which He has not willed should be handled and understood by reason (De Paen 1).

The Latin text reads:

Ceterum a ratione eius tantum absunt quantum ab ipso rationis auctore. Quippe res dei ratio quia deus omnium conditor nihil non ratione providit disposuit ordinavit nihilque non ratione tractari intellegique voluit.

And Origen of Alexandria (in opposition to Celsus) maintains that humans are able to comprehend or describe God in the sense that familiarity with divine attributes may conceivably guide one who heeds God's truth toward a partial knowledge and understanding of the deity:

But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God's attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He can be described by name.'

See Contra Celsum 6.65ff.

Origen affirms that there is a sense in which rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God. Such comprehension is not exhaustive but relative (i.e. to a degree). Therefore, the often heard maxim "God may be apprehended, but not comprehended" probably needs to be qualified. Origen indicates that rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God—to an extent.

Finally, from the ecclesiastical history perspective, it seems that Richard of St. Victor (a Medieval theologian) makes a critical distinction between a doctrine being "above reason" and a doctrine being "beyond reason." He seems to apply both distinctions to the Trinity doctrine, even implying that the doctrine of God's triunity seems contrary to reason. However, Richard of St. Victor qualifies his remarks by writing that "almost all the things that we are commanded to believe about the Trinity of persons" are above or seem contrary to reason. The qualifier "almost" is not without importance since Richard himself posits a natural proof for God's triunity on the basis of love, a rational demonstration which resembles Augustine's attempt to show the reasonableness of the Trinity doctrine. But Richard's rational proof continued to be tethered to the Church. That is, it probably cannot be sustained rationally apart from that Trinitarian legacy which has been handed down by various and sundry ecclesiastics. See http://books.google.com/books?id=9d-IA72wfyYC&pg=PA262&dq=trinity+beyond+reason#PPA262,M1

The point of the preceding data has been to show that it is untenable to hold that God in se completely transcends reason. And I believe that this point is not only sustained by examining church history, but Scripture also indicates that God does not utterly transcend reason. See 1 John 5:20. For comments on the potential meaning of dianoia in 1 John 5:20, see http://books.google.com/books?id=2Zd4nTorV9QC&pg=PA560&dq=1+john+5:20+and+dianoia&lr=#PPA560,M1

In closing this blog entry, I leave my readers with a thought from John Locke:

Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith.

Addressing Jason's Trinitarian Arguments -Part I

Before I wrap up my series on the Trinity doctrine in the light of reason, I want to address a few objections posed by some Trinitarian objectors. An Orthodox apologist named "Jason" submits the following reply:

Jason:

Before making any further pronoucements [sic] on the alleged 'unreasonableness' of the doctrine of the Trinity, you might want to reflect on the following answer to the question which Edgar raised on his blog. The reason why human beings cannot be one and many at the same time involves the following observations.

Edgar: the first mistake that Jason makes is to deal with a question that is not identical to the one that I posed. My question concerns how it is factually possible for three persons (however one defines the term "person") to exist as one being rather than three beings. But Jason chooses to frame my question in terms of the One and Many problem. In this way, he basically sidesteps my initial query.

Jason continues to quote Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas:

(a) In human existence, nature precedes the person. When John or George or Basil are born, the one human nature precedes them; they, therefore represent and embody only part of the human nature. Through human procreation humanity is divided, and no human person can be said to be the bearer of the totality of human nature. This is why the death of one person does not automatically bring about the death of the rest — or conversely, the life of one such person the life of the rest.

Edgar:
The term "nature" is ambiguous. One should clearly define what he or she means by the term. (For instance, see Christopher Stead's work Divine Substance.)Granted, there is a sense in which "nature" (understood as the complex of properties that inform X) is existentially prior to X (= an entity that instantiates a determinate complex of properties). But "nature" can be analyzed in more ways than Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas or Jason suggest. For instance, Aristotle makes a distinction between primary and secondary substance (SUBSTANTIA) and John Duns Scotus is known for analyzing "nature" in terms of an entity's "thisness" or HAECCEITAS (i.e. Peter not only instantiates a nature that is like John's, but Peter also instantiates a haecceity or thisness). Hence, the analysis presented above is inadequate or at best incomplete. Besides, Jason's source does not refute what I have hitherto stated. He does not satisfactorily explain how three persons do not = three beings in the divine sphere. Even the Cappadocians recognized the difficulties with speaking of three persons as one being. See Gregory of Nyssa's attempt to handle this logical difficulty: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf205.viii.v.html

Compare his words with Gregory of Nazianzius in Migne PG 35:1220-1221 here: http://books.google.com/books?vid=0tmDvO1QXd96vX6yL5KO5a5&id=QPBUZQVRy9IC&pg=PP13&lpg=PP13&dq=migne+%22in+hoc+tomo+XXXV#PRA1-PT562,M1

Jason:

(b) Because of this, each human person can be conceived as an individual, i.e. as an entity independent ontologically from other human beings. The unity between human beings is not ontologically identical with their diversity or multiplicity. The one and the many do not coincide. It is this existential difficulty that leads to the logical difficulty of saying 'one' and 'many' with the same breath.

Edgar:
My argument is not regarding the One and the Many. It concerns the difficulty that both Gregory of Nazianzius and Gregory of Nyssa discerned in their treatises, namely, how is it factually possible for three persons to = one being? Gregory of Nyssa tried to address the logical difficulty by insisting that human language incorrectly refers to Peter, James, and John as "three men" since human nature is not divisible nor capable of increase or decrease. He writes:

But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of those who are exhibited in the same nature as “many men”?—indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the prevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results from the mistaken use of the name

Compare Jaroslav Pelikan's The Christian Tradition 1:218-224.

Jason:

Now, if we contrast this with God's existence, we see immediately that this existential and hence logical difficulty is not applicable to God. Since God by definition has not had a beginning, and space and time do not enter His existence, the three persons of the Trinity do not share a pre-existing or logically prior to them divine nature, but coincide with it. Multiplicity in God does not involve a division of His nature, as happens with man." - Metropolitan Ioannis Zizioulas, The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution.

Edgar:
I have already noted the irrelevance of this answer, so I will not repeat what I have pointed out above. I will conclude by noting that question begging in abundance is occurring here. Firstly, I like the way that "individual" is redefined in an ad hoc manner. After all, Boethius had no problem using the expression "individual substance of a rational nature" to describe a divine person. Thomas Aquinas was amenable to Boethius' definition of PERSONA although he saw the need to nuance each term belonging to the Boethian definition.

Secondly, while I agree with Zizioulas that God has no beginning, God's relationship to time is more debatable. Additionally, whether there is a triune God or a nature with which these supposed three persons coincide is the question. This kind of circular reasoning should be avoided at all costs. Thirdly, multiplicity in God has yet to be proved (quod erat demonstrandum). Why is Jason employing a priori reasoning to supposedly refute my views?

I will address Jason's other "arguments" in another submission.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason: Part 2

In this post, I want to define the expression "divine simplicity" before attempting to refute it. According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, "God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence" (See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/)

David Burrell tries to illuminate this seemingly obscure or abstruse doctrine. He explains that (generally) no entity is identical with its nature (e.g., a square is not identical with squareness, nor is a rectangle identical with rectangularity, nor is a human being identical with the abstract property of being human). God is supposedly the only exception to this "rule" in Burrell's estimation. See his text Aquinas: God and Action, pp. 5-7. Thomas Aquinas himself insists that God is non-compositional or wholly simple in his Summa Theologica. Aquinas emphasizes this datum within the prima pars of his Summa: ST I.3.1: "I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways." ST I.3.2: "I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God." ST I.3.3: "I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature." ST I.3.4: "I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways." ST I.3.5: "I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways." ST I.3.6: "I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown." ST I.3.7: "I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His 'suppositum'; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple."

Another way of making the same point as Burrell and Aquinas is to affirm that God is non-mereological. In other words, the doctrine of divine simplicity contends that God is timeless and non-spatial or utterly non-compositional: God has no parts whatsoever. And if God's essence is identical with God's existence, then the three Persons of the Trinity presumably are not three beings, but one being. Trinitarians assert that the Persons are supposedly one being although they putatively are not identical to one another (i.e., the Father is not the Son nor is the Son the Holy Spirit or the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son). But how is it possible for three Persons to constitute one Being? In the next post, I will answer this question and offer reasons why a Christian probably should eschew the simplicitas dei doctrine.

My Amazon Review Of Nancey Murphy's Book

I used Murphy's Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies for two classes this past semester. I then had my classes to compose reviews that outlined their basic impressions of this book. Certain remarks were common in their reviews. I will list some of those comments in this review of Murphy's book. First, let me say that I was surprised at how many students recommended this book for future courses. Nancey Murphy explicitly advocates and offers arguments for a thoroughgoing form of non-reductive physicalism. She does not denigrate opposing positions, but her view of the body and soul is not the popular or traditional religious view of the body or soul. Murphy ultimately contends that we are spirited bodies (i.e. we do not have souls, but we are purely physical). Now I thought that my students (attending a Lutheran university) would immediately say that this book should not be used in future courses at Lenoir-Rhyne University. Boy, was I mistaken!

Along with their enthusiastic recommendations for using Murphy's book, whether they hated or loved it or felt lukewarm about it, some oft-heard criticisms regarding the text were as follows:

Murphy's work is too detailed for those who are just beginning to undertake a study of philosophy or theology. Moreover, it is too redundant, inconsistent, and unclear at points. The least favorite part of the book (for the professor and students) was the information-engineering diagrams that Murphy included on pages 86, 89, and 101. These diagrams were supposed to shed light on non-reductive physicalism. Unfortunately, they left most students scratching their heads and wonder what was the point of the diagrams. Even I had to read those pages three times to understand what each thing stood for in the diagrams. However, I understand why Murphy included those diagrams. But in my opinion, they were only helpful to a point.

In addition to the numerous criticisms of Murphy's book, there were statements that reflected praise for her work. Some students wrote that her text contained a clear statement of her physicalist thesis, they thought the book was well-written, and they expressed praise for her efforts to substantiate her general thesis by the employment of manifold scholarly sources. Most students offered a hearty recommendation for the book, although most took issue with her thesis or felt that she relied too much on science or reason as opposed to relying on Scripture. Finally, while most students did not find Murphy's arguments compelling enough to make them change their minds, certain students did begin to entertain non-reductive physicalism, and others at least began to question the traditional body and soul view. My overall goal was achieved. I wanted to critique dualism, trichotomism and physicalism for a semester with my students help. I believe that we all walked away with a deeper knowledge of the issues. Furthermore, they now are more familiar with an alternative worldview vis-a-vis human nature.

The Trinity Doctrine in the Light of Reason

Okay, let us get down to brass tacks regarding the Trinity doctrine. Both Trinitarians and non-Trinitarians appeal to the Tanakh or Christian-Greek Scriptures (the New Testament) to substantiate their respective beliefs. But one hardly witnesses any gain from such discussions. For instance, it seems that something as simple as examining the Johannine Prologue (Gospel of John 1:1-18) ultimately proves unproductive in debates about the deity of Christ. Does John 1:1c say that the Logos "was God" or "a god" (NWT) or some derivation thereof? And the debate goes on.

Since I do not believe that most Trinitarians in cyberspace, at any rate, will ever cease being Trinitarians based on the preponderance of evidence from Scripture, I would like to put a somewhat basic question to Trinitarians.

In the case of humans, 3 persons = 3 beings or entities. But in the case of the three divine persons, we are led to believe that 3 persons = 1 God (i.e. one divine being or entity). How does this whole process work? How is it possible for 3 persons to equal 1 being?

One explanation that I have found for this question is that God is simple (i.e. God has no parts or composition, that is, God is non-mereological) whereas human persons are complex (i.e. mereological or they have parts). Due to the fact that God is simple, it is said that the only acceptable distinctions in God are the three persons. Yet this defense obviously evokes the question, how do we know that God is simple?

Thomas Aquinas certainly provides a rejoinder to this question in the Summa Theologica. But are his rejoinders satisfactory? Are there valid or sound arguments against divine simplicity? Can we find compelling arguments that seem to refute divine simplicity? I will address these questions in a separate post.

Romans 8:16: Bearing Witness

The Spirit Bears Witness with Our Spirit (Comments on SUMMARTUREW)

Research gathered by Dr. Edgar Foster

Here are some thoughts on Romans 8:16 from various sources.

The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament (Moulton-Milligan) states:

"SUNMARTUREW, 'bear witness with' (Rom 2:15 al.): cf. BGU I. 86.41ff (A.D. 155), where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words SUNMARTURW KAI SUNSFRAKIW."

Rogers and Rogers (The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament, page 330) says: "SUMMARTUREI pres. ind. act. SUMMARTUREW (#5210) to bear witness w. someone, to confirm, to testify in support of someone. Used in the papyri where the signature of each attesting witness is accompanied by the words, 'I bear witness w. and I seal w.'" (MM).

"Beareth witness with our spirit [summarturei tōi pneumati hēmōn]. See on Ro 2:15 for this verb with associative instrumental case. See 1Jo 5:10f. for this double witness" (Robertson's Word Pictures).

We also have these words from John Chrysostom:

"Ver. 16. 'The Spirit Itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.'

For it is not from the language merely, he says, that I make my assertion, but from the cause out of which the language has its birth; since it is from the Spirit suggesting it that we so speak. And this in another passage he has put into plainer words, thus: 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba Father.'(Gal. iv. 6.) And what is that, 'Spirit beareth witness with spirit?' The Comforter, he means, with that Gift, which is given unto us. For it is not of the Gift alone that it is the voice, but of the Comforter also who gave the Gift, He Himself having taught us through the Gift so to speak. But when the 'Spirit beareth witness' what farther place for doubtfulness? For if it were a man, or angel, or archangel, or any other such power that promised this, then there might be reason in some doubting. But when it is the Highest Essence that bestoweth this Gift, and 'beareth witness' by the very words He bade us use in prayer, who would doubt any more of our dignity? For not even when the Emperor elects any one, and proclaims in all men's hearing the honor done him, does anybody venture to gainsay."

See the patristic commentary on Romans at http://books.google.com/books?id=yVs2SQkeZEoC&pg=PA211&dq=commentary+on+romans+8:16&sig=cqytt-06pOgp92zUNtmpuhyuYKk

The NET Bible renders Romans 8:16: The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are God’s children.

The footnote to that texts reads:

Or possibly “with.” ExSyn 160-61, however, notes the following: “At issue, grammatically, is whether the Spirit testifies alongside of our spirit (dat. of association), or whether he testifies to our spirit (indirect object) that we are God’s children. If the former, the one receiving this testimony is unstated (is it God? or believers?). If the latter, the believer receives the testimony and hence is assured of salvation via the inner witness of the Spirit. The first view has the advantage of a σύν- (sun-) prefixed verb, which might be expected to take an accompanying dat. of association (and is supported by NEB, JB, etc.). But there are three reasons why πνεύματι (pneumati) should not be taken as association: (1) Grammatically, a dat. with a σύν- prefixed verb does not necessarily indicate association. This, of course, does not preclude such here, but this fact at least opens up the alternatives in this text. (2) Lexically, though συμμαρτυρέω (summarturew) originally bore an associative idea, it developed in the direction of merely intensifying μαρτυρέω (marturew). This is surely the case in the only other NT text with a dat. (Rom 9:1). (3) Contextually, a dat. of association does not seem to support Paul’s argument: ‘What standing has our spirit in this matter? Of itself it surely has no right at all to testify to our being sons of God’ [C. E. B. Cranfield, Romans [ICC], 1:403]. In sum, Rom 8:16 seems to be secure as a text in which the believer’s assurance of salvation is based on the inner witness of the Spirit. The implications of this for one’s soteriology are profound: The objective data, as helpful as they are, cannot by themselves provide assurance of salvation; the believer also needs (and receives) an existential, ongoing encounter with God’s Spirit in order to gain that familial comfort.

Regards,
Edgar

The Ontological Argument by Anselm

The Ontological Argument

The argument was formulated by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109 CE)

(1) God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived.
(2) Now that which exists in the understanding (in intellectu) and in reality (in re) is greater than that which exists in the understanding alone (in solo intellectu).
(3) If that than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in the understanding (in intellectu) and not in reality (in re), then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived (reductio ad absurdum).* But surely that cannot be.
(4) Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be conceived without a doubt exists both in the understanding (in intellectu) and in reality (in re).

*The logical move "reductio ad absurdum" (reduction to absurdity) involves proving an utterance (U) by showing that its denial (not-U) leads to or entails a contradiction or absurd conclusion (Alvin Plantinga).

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the following about reductio ad absurdum:

“In its most general construal, reductio ad absurdum - reductio for short – is a process of refutation on grounds that absurd - and patently untenable consequences would ensue from accepting the item at issue. This takes three principal forms according as that untenable consequence is:

1. a self-contradiction (ad absurdum)
2. a falsehood (ad falsum or even ad impossibile)
3. an implausibility or anomaly (ad ridiculum or ad incommodum)”