Regarding John 1:1c, both Jehovah's Witnesses
and Trinitarians
say that the Logos is deity in a qualitative sense (i.e. he is
"divine").
The difference, however, is that Witnesses employ the adnominal
"divine" in its weaker sense, whereas Trinitarians utilize
"divine" per its stronger sense or meaning, so that it only applies
to Almighty God. Professor Dale Tuggy helpfully has distinguished these senses
of "divine" in his work on the Trinity doctrine.
Another difference is that while Trinitarians such as Richard A. Young or
Daniel Wallace
are inclined to view QEOS in John 1:1c as a "monadic" or
one-of-a-kind noun, Witnesses evidently believe it is a count noun since the
plural QEOI is found in both the LXX and NT with no indication that the writers
are using the nominal QEOS pejoratively.
One nagging logical difficulty that I think attends the Trinitarian proposition,
"Jesus is God," is that Trinitarians are forced to view the Father,
Son and Holy Spirit as "relatively identical" with the Godhead (i.e.
God) and not absolutely identical with DEITAS.
Yet, those who study identity in a non-theological context have pointed out
that there is no such thing as "relative identity." A logician named
Peter Geach worked up a very sophisticated argument for relative identity that
Bill Cartwright and other logicians (IMO) rightly took to task. An elementary
datum of logic is that A is A:
(1) Cicero is Tully.
(2) Water is H20.
(3) Heat is the motion of molecules.
(4) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(5) 2 + 2 = 4.
Leibniz's law also comes into play here and says that if X and Y commonly
exemplify all properties, then X and Y are identical in an absolute sense. That
is why Cicero (X) is said to be identical with Y (Tully), KAI TO LOIPON. 2 + 2
and 4 also are numerically identical.
But Trinitarians are saying none of the above when they assert, "Jesus is
God." Rather, the proposition "Jesus is God" only claims that
the Son of God is relatively identical with the Godhead. The Trinitarian proposition
is thus akin to the assertions, "God is love" or "Socrates is
wise." Saturday, April 22, 2006
John 1:1c and Relative Predication
Wednesday, April 19, 2006
Illocutionary Speech Acts
John L. Austin began undertaking a form of research
known as speech-act theory approximately fifty years
ago. The publication in which he introduced
nomenclature such as illocution and perlocution was
How to Do Things with Words. For Austin, locutions
either are written or spoken, and are illocutionary or
perlocutionary. Austin further contends that when an
agent speaks, he or she enacts x or y. Austin thereby
proposes five classes of illocutionary performatives:
(1) Verdictives (the act of giving a finding or
verdict); (2) Exercitives (the act of exercising a
power or right); (3) Commissives (the act of
committing oneself to an action verbally); (4)
Behabitives (the act of expressing attitudes about
social behavior); (5) Expositives (the verbal act of
fitting locutions into discourse). These five
taxonomies supposedly account for the manner in which
humans do things with words. Speech-act theory has
morphed, however, since its inception. Hence, this
study will now turn its attention toward one of
Austin's students, who expanded on his work. That
student of philosophy and language is John Searle,
whose thought on brute and institutional facts we
analyzed in section F of this chapter. Searle not only
differentiates an illocution from a perlocution, he
also distinguishes direct from indirect speech-acts,
with metaphors belonging to the latter category.
Searle categorizes illocutionary utterances somewhat
differently than Austin does, but his work
nevertheless remains an extension of his mentor's
theoretical framework.
John Searle defines an indirect speech-act (the type
to which metaphor belongs) as a lingual performance
whereby a certain phatic agent means "S is R" when he
or she states: "S is P." According to Searle, an
adequate metaphorology should thus explain how a
communicant arrives at "S is R" from "S is P" since
that is putatively an agent's pragmatic intention.
However, some have questioned whether Searle himself
actually demonstrates the means by which a
communicative agent by means of an indirect verbal
performative successfully shifts from "S is R" to "S
is P." For instance, Swinburne contends that a
metaphorical utterance likely does not set forth one
proposition ("S is P") while intending or implying
that something else ("S is R") is the case. Rather, he
suggests that a speaker "uses a sentence which
independent of context would mean one thing" but in a
determinate or specified situation means "something
else." If Swinburne is correct, then the
truth-conditions of a complex metaphor or simile are
identical and neither rhetorical trope says, "S is P"
but means "S is R." One simply needs a context in
order to decipher a communicative agent's intent "S is
P." Hence, it is more than likely the case, as
Swinburne argues, that the Shakespearean indirect
speech-act, "Life is a tale told by an idiot; full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing" has the same
truth-condition as "Life is like a tale told by an
idiot; full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
For it is clearly problematic to assert that the
truth-condition alluded to above differs from metaphor
to corresponding simile. In the final analysis,
therefore, Swinburne's account of indirect speech-acts
may be preferable to Searle's theory of indirect
sentential locutions. It may better account for the
phenomenon of metaphoric significance and more
adequately explain the illocutionary force of the
indirect speech-act "S is P." However, it is not
necessary for this study to determine which theory
(Searle's or Swinburne's) is more adequate. The
salient point here is how John Searle formulates
indirect speech-acts, which include metaphors and
similes.
Building on the theoretical research of Austin and
Searle, Vanhoozer similarly proposes that human
utterances are intrinsically performative;
communicative agents enact intentions when they
articulate speech, whether it entails promising,
greeting, commanding, exhorting, prognosticating,
interrogating, informing or requesting. Such
performative acts are illocutionary: they constitute
ways of doing things with words (i.e. acting out
intention X or Y verbally). Language thus becomes "a
means by which one human person acts in relation to
other people." Saying "I do" is consequently an
illocutionary speech-act as is "Can you pass the
salt?"
known as speech-act theory approximately fifty years
ago. The publication in which he introduced
nomenclature such as illocution and perlocution was
How to Do Things with Words. For Austin, locutions
either are written or spoken, and are illocutionary or
perlocutionary. Austin further contends that when an
agent speaks, he or she enacts x or y. Austin thereby
proposes five classes of illocutionary performatives:
(1) Verdictives (the act of giving a finding or
verdict); (2) Exercitives (the act of exercising a
power or right); (3) Commissives (the act of
committing oneself to an action verbally); (4)
Behabitives (the act of expressing attitudes about
social behavior); (5) Expositives (the verbal act of
fitting locutions into discourse). These five
taxonomies supposedly account for the manner in which
humans do things with words. Speech-act theory has
morphed, however, since its inception. Hence, this
study will now turn its attention toward one of
Austin's students, who expanded on his work. That
student of philosophy and language is John Searle,
whose thought on brute and institutional facts we
analyzed in section F of this chapter. Searle not only
differentiates an illocution from a perlocution, he
also distinguishes direct from indirect speech-acts,
with metaphors belonging to the latter category.
Searle categorizes illocutionary utterances somewhat
differently than Austin does, but his work
nevertheless remains an extension of his mentor's
theoretical framework.
John Searle defines an indirect speech-act (the type
to which metaphor belongs) as a lingual performance
whereby a certain phatic agent means "S is R" when he
or she states: "S is P." According to Searle, an
adequate metaphorology should thus explain how a
communicant arrives at "S is R" from "S is P" since
that is putatively an agent's pragmatic intention.
However, some have questioned whether Searle himself
actually demonstrates the means by which a
communicative agent by means of an indirect verbal
performative successfully shifts from "S is R" to "S
is P." For instance, Swinburne contends that a
metaphorical utterance likely does not set forth one
proposition ("S is P") while intending or implying
that something else ("S is R") is the case. Rather, he
suggests that a speaker "uses a sentence which
independent of context would mean one thing" but in a
determinate or specified situation means "something
else." If Swinburne is correct, then the
truth-conditions of a complex metaphor or simile are
identical and neither rhetorical trope says, "S is P"
but means "S is R." One simply needs a context in
order to decipher a communicative agent's intent "S is
P." Hence, it is more than likely the case, as
Swinburne argues, that the Shakespearean indirect
speech-act, "Life is a tale told by an idiot; full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing" has the same
truth-condition as "Life is like a tale told by an
idiot; full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
For it is clearly problematic to assert that the
truth-condition alluded to above differs from metaphor
to corresponding simile. In the final analysis,
therefore, Swinburne's account of indirect speech-acts
may be preferable to Searle's theory of indirect
sentential locutions. It may better account for the
phenomenon of metaphoric significance and more
adequately explain the illocutionary force of the
indirect speech-act "S is P." However, it is not
necessary for this study to determine which theory
(Searle's or Swinburne's) is more adequate. The
salient point here is how John Searle formulates
indirect speech-acts, which include metaphors and
similes.
Building on the theoretical research of Austin and
Searle, Vanhoozer similarly proposes that human
utterances are intrinsically performative;
communicative agents enact intentions when they
articulate speech, whether it entails promising,
greeting, commanding, exhorting, prognosticating,
interrogating, informing or requesting. Such
performative acts are illocutionary: they constitute
ways of doing things with words (i.e. acting out
intention X or Y verbally). Language thus becomes "a
means by which one human person acts in relation to
other people." Saying "I do" is consequently an
illocutionary speech-act as is "Can you pass the
salt?"
Monday, April 17, 2006
Metasememes and God the Father
I submit that metasememic constructs are as-if structures.[1] Metasememes evidently do not predicate metaphysical or literal properties of a subject, but only affirm tropically that “S is P.” Consequently, even though the appellation “Father” may be reality-depicting, it does not necessarily delineate the mind-independent properties of God the Father.[2] Paternal metaphors for God may speak to the deity’s relationship with his people or the manner in which the divine one functions vis-à-vis the Son of God and creation as a whole.[3] However, imagery couched in masculine terminology does not necessarily disclose anything substantive about God quoad se (Poetica 25). Tropes depicting a paternal deity are as-if structures that affirm unfamiliar identity syntheses (i.e. father/God); conversely, they are not metaphysical pronouncements.[4] When Scripture refers to God as a Shepherd, King, Warrior, Lord or Father, it is employing metaphorical speech to predicate X or Y of God in a figurative manner. It does not seem that one can rely on metaphorical locutions in Scripture to discern whether masculinity or femininity are immanent divine categories of being.[5]
[1] Von Bernhard Debatin, Die Rationalität der Metapher.
[2] As an illustration of metaphorical speech applied to divinities, Aristotle writes: “Hence Ganymede is said ‘to pour the wine to Zeus,’ though the gods do not drink wine” (Poetica 25). A similar claim is being made in this study with respect to “Father” as a divine appellation. When ascribing paternity to God, it seems that Scripture and a number of pre-Nicenes do not mean to say that God is inherently masculine. Rather, the Bible refers to God as “Father,” even though the infinite God evidently transcends gender categories (Bloesch, Is the Bible Sexist, 80) in order to depict his relationship with the Son or creation as a whole.
[3] Clement 1.19.
[4] See Caird’s work on Biblical Imagery.
[5] Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way, 33-34 argues “there is in God no such thing as sexuality.” An infinite God by definition cannot be male or female, masculine or feminine since a limitless God transcends these categories of being. Yet, Ware maintains that “Father” is a divinely given symbol. However, why should Christians continue employing masculine symbols if they do not tell us what God is immanently? Ware’s answer is that God has revealed and vouchsafed the symbol “Father” to Christians; moreover, it is rooted in being itself.
Saturday, April 01, 2006
My Amazon Review of George H. Guthrie's "The Structure of Hebrews"
Guthrie begins his discussion on the text of Hebrews by reviewing past scholarly attempts to discern the structure of the Christian epistle. He convincingly demonstrates that scholars have found it rather difficult to ascertain the precise textual structure of Hebrews: it is no wonder that he humbly approaches his task.
Since Patristic times, attempts have been made to discern the structure and the recurring theme of the letter to the Hebrews. Text-linguists currently endeavor to apply their knowledge of discourse principles to this Bible
book. Guthrie's work shows that these efforts can produce valuable fruitage.
After examining the numerous theories posited vis-a'-vis the structure of Hebrews, Guthrie proceeds to explain his own approach to structuring it. Highlighting the author's use of inclusio and "hook-words," Guthrie provides an enlightening study on the rhetorical devices employed in Hebrews and the main point the writer is attempting to make. He concludes the book on a very somber and humble note, observing that "the problems caused by the complex stucture of Hebrews are not easily answered; they may never be answered with a consensus of New Testament scholarship" (146). He reasons nevertheless: "I enjoy the music of Mozart. I do not read a note of music and certainly do not understand how the great composer brings all the various themes together in such powerful performances; but I do not have to in order to recognize them as powerful. I can be moved even in my ignorance" (147).
Comparing the writer of Hebrews to a highly skilled
virtuoso, Guthrie exaltedly states that while he
does not understand or comprehensively fathom all of the
rhetorical devices the writer of Hebrews utilizes in
his discourse to the first-century Christians living
in Jerusalem and Judea, that fact notwithstanding, Guthrie
argues that he can still appreciate the hortatory or
expository messages loftily conveyed in the book
written by a "Mozart" of oratory (147). What
insightful remarks!
In closing, I would say that Guthrie is a pleasure to
read: I thoroughly enjoyed this book. After one peruses
_The Structure of Hebrews_, he or she not only comes
away with an increased knowledge of this beautifully
written Bible book--one also comes away with an
increased literary education. Guthrie's thorough
knowledge of discourse analysis, rhetoric, and
rabbinic practices are truly astounding. Furthermore,
his approach to the whole problem of the arrangement
of Hebrews is both balanced and reasonable.
He employs charts to help the novice understand
difficult concepts and his explanation of cohesion
shifts and hook-words are simultaneously lucid and
instructive. Guthrie remains focused on the task at
hand and very seldom diverges to make theological
points. His goal is grasping the structure of Hebrews:
from that goal he will not be deterred.
The only drawback to this study is that it is primarily
written for specialists who have a working knowledge
of Greek and rhetoric, as well as some knowledge of
Hebrew and the rabbinic writings. The neophyte could
quickly find himself or herself lost in the sea of
technical terminology employed by Guthrie. If you like
struggling with difficult subjects, however, then the
book will be worth the read.
Friday, March 24, 2006
Justin Martyr and God's Namelessness
Nevertheless, in order to apprehend Justin’s doctrine of innominability, it is necessary to make a distinction between names (onomata) and forms of address (prosresis). Expressions such as patjr or kuriov, according to Justin Martyr, are not onomata but prosreseis.[1] They do not designate what God is, but simply permit finite rational existents to invoke God with reverential awe. Justin indicates that God is a person to whom one may speak “but of whom one may not speak.” God is known as “thou” but never as “he.”[2] For the Martyr, consequently, not even the lexeme “God” is a name since it has neither a known nor an unknown meaning.[3] Osborn also maintains that Justin’s use of the word prosreseis is “much more perceptive” than Clement of Alexandria’s theory which suggests that the human mind utilizes divine titles as a form of support.[4] In the final analysis, the Martyr’s God is strictly innominable since he thinks that not even theos is his name.
Elsewhere, Justin writes: “And we have been taught, and are convinced, and do believe, that He accepts those only who imitate the excellences which reside in Him, temperance, and justice, and philanthropy, and as many virtues as are peculiar to a God who is called by no proper name.”[5] Affirmations such as these move Eric Osborn to observe: “The similarity of these statements with those of contemporary Platonism is clear. Albinus speaks in similar terms of the inapplicability of names to the One. God is ineffable and to be grasped by mind alone because he is neither genus, species nor differentia.”[6] It thus appears evident that Middle Platonism shaped Justin’s doctrine of innominability. He too conceived of God in a particular cultural milieu and a specific Christian matrix informed by contemporary Platonic thought. God has no name, according to Justin: he is anonymous. It is not difficult to perceive a conceptual nexus between Justinian innominability and Lactantian apophaticism. Both writers forged their individual theistic notions in the same milieu.
Friday, March 17, 2006
Comments on Ephesians 6:12 and PALH
Greetings,
Paul writes to the Ephesians: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. (Ephesians 6:12 UBS5).
H.I. Marrou (A History of Education in Antiquity) reports that physical training was the "most characteristic part" of Greek education "at least at the beginning of the Hellenistic period" (p. 116). One activity that was used to educate young Greeks in times of antiquity was "wrestling" (ἡ πάλη) or hand to hand grappling. Marrou points out that ancient Greek wrestling was more popular than running. For the Greeks, wrestling in the strictest sense was "standing wrestling" (ORQIA PALH or STADIAIA PALH) in which a wrestler would try throwing his opponent to the ground "without falling himself" (p. 122). If one of the grapplers did fall, the throw would not be counted.
Other points about πάλη are "πάλη (#4097) struggle, wrestling. The word refers particularly to a hand-to-hand fight (Barth). Wrestling was a fight characterized by trickery, cunning, and strategy (Rogers, Cleon L., Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III. The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998, page 446).
"PALH, PALHS, hH (PALAIW 'wrestle'; Hom. et. al.; ins; Sb 678, 6) engagement in a challenging contest (orig. 'wrestling' Il. 23, 635 al., then of fights or battles Aeschyl., Ch. 866; Eur., Heracl. 159) struggle against . . . of Christians' fight against powers of darkness Eph 6:12 (the opponent is introduced by PROS w. the acc. as in Philo above [Sobr. 65], but the context suggests military imagery" (BDAG).
"Our wrestling is not (οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη). 'To us the wrestling is not.' πάλη is an old word from PALLW, to throw, to swing (from Homer to the papyri, though here only in N.T.), a contest between two till one hurls the other down and holds him down (KATECW). Note PROS again (five times) in sense of 'against,' face to face conflict to the finish" (Robertson's WP).
Paul writes to the Ephesians: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. (Ephesians 6:12 UBS5).
H.I. Marrou (A History of Education in Antiquity) reports that physical training was the "most characteristic part" of Greek education "at least at the beginning of the Hellenistic period" (p. 116). One activity that was used to educate young Greeks in times of antiquity was "wrestling" (ἡ πάλη) or hand to hand grappling. Marrou points out that ancient Greek wrestling was more popular than running. For the Greeks, wrestling in the strictest sense was "standing wrestling" (ORQIA PALH or STADIAIA PALH) in which a wrestler would try throwing his opponent to the ground "without falling himself" (p. 122). If one of the grapplers did fall, the throw would not be counted.
Other points about πάλη are "πάλη (#4097) struggle, wrestling. The word refers particularly to a hand-to-hand fight (Barth). Wrestling was a fight characterized by trickery, cunning, and strategy (Rogers, Cleon L., Jr. and Cleon L. Rogers III. The New Linguistic and Exegetical Key to the Greek New Testament. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998, page 446).
"PALH, PALHS, hH (PALAIW 'wrestle'; Hom. et. al.; ins; Sb 678, 6) engagement in a challenging contest (orig. 'wrestling' Il. 23, 635 al., then of fights or battles Aeschyl., Ch. 866; Eur., Heracl. 159) struggle against . . . of Christians' fight against powers of darkness Eph 6:12 (the opponent is introduced by PROS w. the acc. as in Philo above [Sobr. 65], but the context suggests military imagery" (BDAG).
"Our wrestling is not (οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη). 'To us the wrestling is not.' πάλη is an old word from PALLW, to throw, to swing (from Homer to the papyri, though here only in N.T.), a contest between two till one hurls the other down and holds him down (KATECW). Note PROS again (five times) in sense of 'against,' face to face conflict to the finish" (Robertson's WP).
Sunday, March 12, 2006
Justin Martyr and Free Will
Greetings,
In Dialogus cum Tryphone, Justin Martyr declares that angels and humans possess free will. However, what does free will entail? What does Justin mean by the expression?
First, it is important to define free will, which is by no means an easy task. William Ockham defined free will as "That power whereby I can do diverse things indifferently and contingently, such that I cause, or not cause, the same effect, when all conditions other than this power are the same." William Hasker calls this definition both exact and exacting. He prefers to define (libertarian) free will as "the power to perform A (i.e. a particular act under given circumstances) or to refrain from performing A" (See _God, Time, and Knowledge_, p. 66).
On the other hand, others think of free will as the ability to act in accord with one's nature. As mentioned earlier, saying exactly what free will is, is not a facile task. Critical for the present discussion is what Justin Martyr thinks of free will. Some passages from the Dialogus provide insight respecting this issue:
"For God, wishing both angels and men, who were endowed with freewill, and at their own disposal, to do whatever He had strengthened each to do, made them so, that if they chose the things acceptable to Himself, He would keep them free from death and from punishment; but that if they did evil, He would punish each as He sees fit" (Dial. 88).
"He created both angels and men free to do that which is righteous, and He appointed periods of time during which He knew it would be good for them to have the exercise of free-will; and because He likewise knew it would be good, He made general and particular judgments; each one's freedom of will, however, being guarded" (Dial. 102).
"But that you may not have a pretext for saying that Christ must have been crucified, and that those who transgressed must have been among your nation, and that the matter could not have been otherwise, I said briefly by anticipation, that God, wishing men and angels to follow His will, resolved to create them free to do righteousness; possessing reason, that they may know by whom they are created, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they should be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason: and of ourselves we, men and angels, shall be convicted of having acted sinfully, unless we repent beforehand. But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably [wicked], but not because God had created them so" (Dial. 141).
In 1 Apology 43, Justin argues that a lack of free volition negates human blame, merit or responsibility. While some persons claiming to be Christian may not have a problem with vitiating human merit, arguing that man is not free but determined also seems to eviscerate human responsibility or blame. There can be no legal concept of MENS REA nor any divine concept of wickedness unless humans are free to choose good or evil. This is, at least, how Justin reasons. Justin contends that God gave humans and angels free will in order to choose the good. However, being free also means that one could freely elect to do that which is unpleasing to the Father and God of all. Since, God created angels and humans with free will, however, those who unrepentantly turn aside from the righteous commandment of Jehovah God will be justly punished. Justin thus appears to define free will in the following terms: "For neither would any of them [i.e. humans or angels] be praiseworthy unless there were power to turn to both (virtue and vice)."
Regards, Edgar
In Dialogus cum Tryphone, Justin Martyr declares that angels and humans possess free will. However, what does free will entail? What does Justin mean by the expression?
First, it is important to define free will, which is by no means an easy task. William Ockham defined free will as "That power whereby I can do diverse things indifferently and contingently, such that I cause, or not cause, the same effect, when all conditions other than this power are the same." William Hasker calls this definition both exact and exacting. He prefers to define (libertarian) free will as "the power to perform A (i.e. a particular act under given circumstances) or to refrain from performing A" (See _God, Time, and Knowledge_, p. 66).
On the other hand, others think of free will as the ability to act in accord with one's nature. As mentioned earlier, saying exactly what free will is, is not a facile task. Critical for the present discussion is what Justin Martyr thinks of free will. Some passages from the Dialogus provide insight respecting this issue:
"For God, wishing both angels and men, who were endowed with freewill, and at their own disposal, to do whatever He had strengthened each to do, made them so, that if they chose the things acceptable to Himself, He would keep them free from death and from punishment; but that if they did evil, He would punish each as He sees fit" (Dial. 88).
"He created both angels and men free to do that which is righteous, and He appointed periods of time during which He knew it would be good for them to have the exercise of free-will; and because He likewise knew it would be good, He made general and particular judgments; each one's freedom of will, however, being guarded" (Dial. 102).
"But that you may not have a pretext for saying that Christ must have been crucified, and that those who transgressed must have been among your nation, and that the matter could not have been otherwise, I said briefly by anticipation, that God, wishing men and angels to follow His will, resolved to create them free to do righteousness; possessing reason, that they may know by whom they are created, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they should be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason: and of ourselves we, men and angels, shall be convicted of having acted sinfully, unless we repent beforehand. But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably [wicked], but not because God had created them so" (Dial. 141).
In 1 Apology 43, Justin argues that a lack of free volition negates human blame, merit or responsibility. While some persons claiming to be Christian may not have a problem with vitiating human merit, arguing that man is not free but determined also seems to eviscerate human responsibility or blame. There can be no legal concept of MENS REA nor any divine concept of wickedness unless humans are free to choose good or evil. This is, at least, how Justin reasons. Justin contends that God gave humans and angels free will in order to choose the good. However, being free also means that one could freely elect to do that which is unpleasing to the Father and God of all. Since, God created angels and humans with free will, however, those who unrepentantly turn aside from the righteous commandment of Jehovah God will be justly punished. Justin thus appears to define free will in the following terms: "For neither would any of them [i.e. humans or angels] be praiseworthy unless there were power to turn to both (virtue and vice)."
Regards, Edgar
Thursday, February 23, 2006
Lactantius and the Importance of Context
The following paragraphs will outline and distinguish five assorted levels of context. For the sake of discussion, one may think of context in terms of that which frames a text or discourse.[1] The term “context” essentially is tantamount to situational relevance; it ultimately denotes “the total environment in which a text [or discourse] unfolds.”[2] The signifier etymologically derives from the Latin contextus, which may refer to a “joining together” or the human act of interweaving.[3] Barry Sandywell analyzes “context” in terms of five levels: (1) internal contexts; (2) problematic contexts; (3) cotextuality; (4) intertextuality; (5) cultural contexts.[4] Of course, these respective taxonomies do not exhaust the manifold aspects of situational relevance. Nevertheless, as this study progresses, familiarity with these distinct levels of context will prove to be indispensable. Therefore, it is necessary to discriminate between the five aforementioned contextual categories.
(1) Sandywell associates internal contexts with grammatical, semantic and stylistic textual structures, which necessarily encompass analogical or metaphorical speech-acts in theoretical or non-theoretical settings. Internal contexts pertain to the mechanics of language or discourse. They make it possible for communicative discourse to obtain.[5]
(2) The terminology “problematic contexts” describes the act of relating a text to questions that the text either replies to or ignores.[6] For example, queries that were relevant during the Pre-Socratic period and that are reflected in texts or fragments from that era later became irrelevant or less pressing in the fourth century BCE discourse universe of Athens. Distinct problematics obtain in particular milieus; social circumstances, cultural exigencies or Zeitgeister thus evidently determine the material content of noetic problemata. That is the reason why Lactantius concerned himself with specific problems of a theological nature. His social and ecclesiastical Sitz-im-Leben informed the questions one finds treated in the Lactantian corpus.
(3) Cotextuality[7] signifies the literary surroundings (e.g. sentences, paragraphs, chapters and sections) of a given text or discourse; the cotext putatively allows a reader to reconstruct (as opposed to deconstruct) a text.[8] (4) Conversely, intertextuality entails the consideration of disparate texts that bear on discourse units being analyzed. One may classify intertextual influences in terms of “internal” and “external” types, which means that texts relating to a given unit of discourse may consist of those written by the same author (internal) or texts arranged by heterogeneous communicative agents (external).[9]
(5) Finally, cultural contexts encompass the socio-religious and political conditions of a text. They include “the wider, extra-discursive social, institutional, and communicative settings of speech and writing.”[10] As mentioned heretofore, these five diverse levels of context will play a significant role in the present study.
[1] See Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (ed.), Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
[2] M. L. K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hassan, Language, Context and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 5.
[3] Duranti and Goodwin, 3.
[4] See Presocratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical Discourse c. 600-450 BC (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 30.
[5] Ibid. 30; Swinburne, Revelation, 64-65.
[6] Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 30.
[7] DA Black, Linguistics and NT Interpretation, 116; Yule, Study of Language.
[8] See DA Black.
[9] See DA Black, Linguistics and NT Interpretation, 116.
[10] Sandywell, Presocratic Reflexivity, 30.
Monday, February 06, 2006
Lactantius on the Son's Deity and Suffering
Once Lactantius sets forth an explanation of the Son’s mission and nature, it becomes apparent that his use of the proper noun “God” as a title designating Christ probably should be understood in a mitigated sense. For the rhetorician asserts that Christ is “God in the spirit,” drawing a parallel between the Son and Apollo.[1] By fulfilling his God-given mission, the Son demonstrated faith and trust in Almighty God: “he taught that there is one God and that he alone is to be worshipped, and he never said that he was God himself: he would not have kept faith if after being sent to get rid of gods and to assert a single God he had introduced another one besides.”[2] The Son did not come proclaiming his own Godhood. In fact, Lactantius reasons that if the Son had arrived declaring or publicly making known his own divine nature, then Christ would have breached strict monotheism. Moreover, Lactantius believes that he would not have demonstrated faith in the one true God of Scripture.[3] However, because the Son proved himself “so faithful and because he took nothing at all for himself, in order to fulfill the instructions of the one who sent him, so he received the dignity of eternal priesthood, the honour of supreme kingship, the power to judge and the name of God.”[4] Hence, it seems that the Son progressively becomes God in the writings of Lactantius. First, the apologist teaches that the Logos does acquire the epithet “Son” until he shows himself trustworthy in the face of extreme duress.[5] Then Lactantius states that God rewards the Son’s faithfulness vis-à-vis his earthly mission by granting him the eternal priesthood, supreme kingship, the power of judgment and the name of God. It therefore appears that the Son does not truly become Deus for Lactantius until he assumes flesh, instructs others about the one God, suffers, dies and experiences a resurrection at the Father’s hands.[6] The term “God” (Deus) only applies to Christ in the fullest sense, Lactantius believes, after he fulfills his divine commission.[7] Yet, the Son evidently is subordinate to the Father per essentiam before and subsequent to his resurrection and ascension.[8] At least, this is how Lactantius ostensibly interprets the Scriptural witness concerning the Son’s person and work.
Lactantius also explains why God the Father permits his Son to suffer and die in behalf of rational creatures. Both Scripture and the Christian tradition bear out the Father’s immense and peerless love for the Son (John 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 15:9-10; 16:32; 17:24-26). However, if God wholly pours himself out ecstatically to the Son in a supreme act of love that is temporally or logically prior to the Son’s enfleshment, then how could the Father permit the Son to undergo the reproach associated with crux Christi? The Lactantian response is that Christ qua the preeminent teacher of virtue endured “the torture, the wounds and the thorns” for a higher good.[9] He subjected himself to the excruciating and ignominious death befitting a criminal, in order that humans might conquer death (QANATOS) by means of his expitiatory sacrifice.[10] Lactantius avers that Christ (as King qua King) will further overcome death, placing it in symbolic eternal chains, thereby making it inoperative or powerless.[11] Why, though, does the “supreme father” not only allow, but also prescribe this type of death for Christ? For what reason did the indulgent or loving father of Christ will that his Son undergo this specific form of execution?
[1] DI 4.13.11-13.
[2] DI 4.14.18-20.
[3] Ibid.
[4] DI 4.14.20.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid. See Alvin Lamson, The Church of the First Three Centuries, 237. Lamson points to DI 4.18, wherein Lactantius professes that the Son is “mediam inter deum et hominem substantiam gerens.” He concludes that in Lactantian thought, the Father is supreme in relation to the Son, who is ontologically subordinate to the Father.
[7] See Martin Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma.
[8] DI 2.8.7.
[9] DI 4.26.27.
[10] DI 4.26.28.
[11] Ibid.
Monday, January 23, 2006
Was Lactantius an Arian?
Lactantius contends that before God produced the world and other angels, he “created a holy and incorruptible spirit whom he called his son,” since this spirit was firstborn and distinguished by “a name of divine significance” in that God granted the Son possession of God the Father’s authority and supremacy.[1] Lactantius thus believes, strictly speaking, that God calls Christ “Son,” but only after the Logos passes some type of arduous trial.[2] Hence, the Son does not inherently possess divine titles: God names the Logos, “Son” or allows him to bear the divine name because of Christ’s faithfulness to the Father.[3]
Bowen and Garnsey believe that Lactantian thinking here “smacks of Arianism.”[4] Conversely, others such as Mary McDonald exhibit sympathy toward the Lactantian writings, presuming that they reflect the cultural situation in which he composed them.[5] This study proposes there were some angels postulated in ancient Judaism who seemingly possessed the holy name of God ex officio (Exodus 23:20-22).[6] Lactantius may perceive a correlation between the status of angels in Judaism and the position of the Logos in Christian circles when he argues that God the Father vouchsafed the divine name to the Son. In fact, the North African seems to believe that the Son is an angel whom God promotes to the status of Son and God: “In fine, of all the angels, whom the same God formed from his own breath, he alone was admitted into a participation of his supreme power, he alone was called God. For all things were through him, and nothing was without him” (Epitome 42). Lactantian concepts regarding the Son’s nomina, as in other instances, evidently find their provenance in both Hermes and the ancient Hebrew prophets.
[1] DI 4.6.1-4.
[2] Schneweis, Angels and Demons, 21. Contrast McGuckin’s remarks in “The Christology of Lactantius,” 816.
[3] DI 4.6.1-4.
[4] Divine Institutes, 232. Cf. McGuckin, “Christology of Lactantius,” 816.
[5] McDonald; Paul McGuckin, “The Christology of Lactantius,” 815.
[6] See Bock, Blasphemy and Exaltation; S. Olyan, A Thousand Thousands Served Him: Exegesis and the Naming of Angels in Ancient Judaism. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993.
Sunday, January 22, 2006
Lactantius and Egalitarianism
A cursory reading of Divinae institutiones may lead one to believe that Lactantius is a strict egalitarian. However, a deliberate perusal of his magnum opus reveals that the Lactantian understanding of equality (aequalitas) or fairness (aequitas) lends itself to certain nuances that may be at odds with strict egalitarianism. The belief that all humans are socially unequal was prevalent in antiquity. While the Stoics espoused the conviction that all humans are fragments of God or fellow cosmopolites, it appears that no ancient secular writer reprimands legal or social inegalitarianism, as does Lactantius in Divinae institutiones.[1] The Christian Cicero sorts out justice in terms of piety (pietas) and equity (aequitas).[2] His construal of equity (aequitas) as equality (aequabilitas) indicates, “Lactantius is sailing in uncharted waters.”[3] Advocating a form of equality in which humans are arithmetically on the same footing seems progressive, even avant-garde.[4] However, other passages found in the Lactantian corpus possibly demonstrate signs of inconsistency regarding his view of aequitas.
First, Lactantius censures Plato’s theory of an ideal utopian republic since it eschews private property in the name of facilitating economic parity among philosopher-rulers.[5] The political views of Lactantius resemble those of Aristotle, who considers collective ownership unfeasible and detrimental to the polis (Politics 1261b34). Nevertheless, one might ask whether it is genuinely possible for equality to obtain in a society that allows ownership of private property. Non-collective ownership certainly allows personal freedom and responsibility to flourish.[6] But Garnsey and Humfress maintain that the ownership of private property does not seem conducive to socio-economic equality.[7]
[1] Garnsey and Humfress, Evolution of the Late Antique World, 204.
[2] DI 5.15; Epitome 60; Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 213; Allen Verhey, Remembering Jesus: Christian Community, Scripture, and the Moral Life (Cambridge, UK and Grand Rapids: 2002), 465.
[3] Garnsey and Humfress, Evolution of the Late Antique World, 204.
[4] Ibid. 205.
[5] DI 3.22: “Non rerum fragilium sed mentium debet esse communitas.”
[6] See Dewey's remarks on democracy.
[7] Evolution of the Antique World, 204.
Saturday, January 14, 2006
Hannah Arendt on Metaphor and Cognition
Hannah Arendt insists that speculative thought only reveals itself by means of metaphoric implementation.[1] Metaphors bridge the gulf that allegedly demarcates cognitive processes from the realm of sensibilia.[2] Without metasememes that rhetorically alternate or maneuver conceptual similarities, “there would have been no bridge whereby to cross from the minor truth of the seen to the major truth of the unseen” or vice versa.[3] Arendt therefore contends that metaphors revert the contemplative human NOUS back towards the sensible realm so that the contemplative or speculative NOUS can disclose its hitherto wholly noetic activities to rational datives of manifestation dwelling in the phenomenal realm of appearances.[4] Based on her reading of Aristotle and Kant, Arendt prefers to associate “metaphor” with “the transition from one existential state, that of thinking, to another, that of being an appearance among appearances.”[5] She postulates that abstract relata forming metasememic constructs allow thought concealed to become thought revealed. For Arendt, percipient subjects make the existential transition from the notional to the empirical level of being by positing metaphors in analogical relation to one another.[6] Her reading of Aristotle’s substitution theory of metaphor through a Kantian-Heideggerian template undoubtedly explains the uniqueness of her construal. Arendt’s approach to substitution theory further implies that metaphor is the sine qua non of theolinguistics. Without rational agents positing metaphors in analogical relationship to one another, it might be impossible to bridge the ostensive linguistic or relational chasm that subsists between the seen (= creatures) and the unseen (= God).
[2] Cristina Cacciari, “Why Do We Speak Metaphorically: Reflections on the Functions of Metaphor in Discourse and Reasoning” in Katz’s Figurative Language and Thought, 121-122.
Monday, January 02, 2006
Life of Lactantius in Breve
Life of Lactantius in Breve
Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius[1] was born circa 250 CE in Proconsular Africa and likely died at Trier in 325 CE.[2] Arnobius of Sicca evidently taught Lactantius the art of rhetoric while the latter resided in Africa, although historians from time to time dispute this point.[3] Lactantius also wrote a number of literary works, the first of which he entitled the Banquet, which is no longer extant.[4] He further composed a document in hexameter prose entitled Journey from Africa to Nicomedia and a pamphlet De mortibus persecutorum.[5] Finally, it appears that Lactantius authored his most memorable work Divinae institutiones around 311 CE in order to confront verbal and physical aggressions directed against the Christian faith, aggressions which the campaign of Diocletian persecution instigated.[6] McGiffert considers Divinae institutiones, “the most ambitious work published by a Latin Christian before the time of Augustine.”[7] In this apologetic treatise, Lactantius displays his ability to make a persuasive case for the Christian faith. Moreover, he exhibits uncharacteristic erudition in this work.
Lactantius eventually left Africa at the behest of Emperor Diocletian (284-304 CE) to assume the position of rhetor Latinus[8] in Nicomedia.[9] However, he did not fare well as an instructor of rhetoric since this kind of training apparently was not in high demand at that time.[10] Therefore, his pecuniary resources rapidly depleted and Lactantius subsequently undertook the task of writing theological documents in order to sustain himself materially and to advocate the Christian religion.[11] Nevertheless, he still maintained his position as professor of rhetoric until fateful events dictated otherwise.
In 303 CE, persecution directed against Christians by Emperor Diocletian forced Lactantius to relinquish his prestigious chair as rhetor Latinus.[12] He accordingly departed from Bithynia around 305-306 CE and in time became the tutor of Constantine the Great’s son, Caesar Crispus (De vir illustribus 80).[13] While tutoring Crispus, Lactantius persisted in arranging rhetorical and apologetic documents, endeavoring to model his writing after Marcus Tullius Cicero (Epistle 58.10; 70.5).[14] Perhaps, for this reason, Lactantius possibly never learned Greek: he only acquainted himself with those pre-Nicene authors, who wrote in Latin. More than likely, Lactantius acquired his knowledge of Greek philosophy from his reading of Cicero and Seneca.[15] The lacuna concerning his knowledge of Greek writers seems to manifest itself in his apologetic writings. Conversely, Bowen and Garnsey believe that Lactantius had first-hand knowledge of Greek and even quoted texts written in Koine.
In conclusion, successors of Lactantius did not consider him a profound thinker, especially respecting theological matters. Quasten notes that the apologist maybe denied either the existence or at least the distinct personality of God’s Holy Spirit, at times identifying the Spirit of holiness (spiritum sanctificationis)[16] with the Father or the Son.[17] Immediate evidence of Lactantius’ pneumatology, however, does not survive in written form. But in view of his “unorthodox” Christology and pneumatology, an oft-heard criticism of Lactantius is that “he was not a theologian” (theologus non erat).[18] Modern-day research somewhat mitigates this evaluation, however.[19]
[1] A number of MSS contain the praenomen Lucius and the nomen Caecilius or Caelius for Lactantius (his Christian name). See Cruttwell, A Literary History, 642.
2 Berardino says 260 CE. See page 469. Wlosok says 250 CE on p. 370 of Theologische. McGiffert (History of Christian Thought, 44) states that the details of his death are unknown. Cruttwell (A Literary History, 643) suggests that Lactantius was born in Africa.
[5] Barry Baldwin, “Lactantius,” 2:1168 of Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan,
ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium. New York & Oxford: 1991.
[7] History of Christian Thought, 45.
8 Kennedy notes that five of the major Latin pre and post-Nicenes taught rhetoric prior to becoming Christians. These rhetores respectively were Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius and Augustine. Vide A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ), 264-265.
9 Quasten, Patrology, 393; Campenhausen, Fathers, 62; Bardenhewer, Patrology, 203, Wlosok, Theologische, p. 20:370; McGuckin, Handbook to Patristic Theology, p. 202; McGiffert, History of Christian Thought, 44; Timothy Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13.
[10] De viribus illustribus 80.
[12] Lactantius reportedly witnessed the razing of Nicomedia’s city church (H. Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society, 191). See Historia ecclesiastica 8.2.1-4 and De mortibus persecutorum 12. Lactantius relates the steps that Diocletian took to remove “eloquence” from Nicomedia in De mortibus persecutorum 22. But see Drake, Constantine and the Bishops, 117-118.
13 See Jerome Catal. 80 about erudition of Lactantius. Fourteen extant MSS of his writings in 15th century (Quasten, Patrology, 394). It is common to see historians and humanists affixing the moniker “Christian Cicero” to Lactantius because of his extraordinary literary and rhetorical abilities. See The Dictionary of Christian Biography, 639; Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, xi.
14 Campenhausen, Fathers of the Church, 63-64. See Divinae Institutiones 2.8.23 and 1.17.3. See also T. B. de Graff, “Plato in Cicero.” Classical Philology 35 (1940): 143-153.
[16] See Romans 1:4.
17 Dictionary of Christian Biography, 639. Cf. Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity, 207; Cruttwell, Literary History, 650.
[19] Bowen and Garnsey, Divine Institutes, .
Sunday, December 25, 2005
Lactantius on the Ira Dei
Lactantius points out that God will destroy the wicked during the day of anger, wherein “torrents of blood shall flow,” and “the prince also of the demons himself, the author and contriver of evils, being bound with fiery chains, shall be imprisoned, that the world may receive peace, and the earth, harassed through so many years, may rest.”[1] Lactantius follows John’s Apocalypse closely here as he relates: “Therefore peace being made, and every evil suppressed, that righteous King and Conqueror will institute a great judgment on the earth respecting the living and the dead, and will deliver all the nations into subjection to the righteous who are alive, and will raise the righteous dead to eternal life, and will Himself reign with them on the earth, and will build the holy city, and this kingdom of the righteous shall be for a thousand years.”[2]
Moreover, Lactantius bases his apocalyptic vision, in part, on the OT prophets, who describe an age in which beasts will coexist peacefully with one another and humans (Epitome 72). We read: “The beasts shall lay aside their ferocity and become mild, the wolf shall roam among the flocks without doing harm, the calf shall feed with the lion, the dove shall be united with the hawk, the serpent shall have no poison; no animal shall live by bloodshed” (ibid).
Nevertheless, as foretold in the Apocalypse of John, “the prince of the demons” will be loosed when the thousand years terminate.[3] He will cause multitudes of the nations to revolt against the people of God, “to storm the city of the saints” (ibid). However, they will not prevail since God “will shake the earth froth its foundations, and the cities shall be overthrown, and He Shall rain upon the wicked fire with brimstone and hail, and they shall be on fire, and slay each other. But the righteous shall for a little space be concealed under the earth, until the destruction of the nations is accomplished, and after the third day they shall come forth, and see the plains covered with carcasses” (ibid).
[1] Epitome 72.
[2] Epitome 72.
[3] Lactantius contrasts Satan, “the prince of demons” with Christ “the prince of the angels” (DI 4.14.17). Here again, one discerns the influence of Jewish apocalyptic literature in the Divinae institutiones. The Testament of Simeon 2.7 designates ha Satan “the prince of deceit,” who was responsible for provoking Simeon to ruin his brother, Joseph. The Testament of Solomon 6.7 also uses the expression “prince of all the demons” when describing ha Satan.
Sunday, December 04, 2005
Novatian and the Eternal Generation
For Novatian, God the Father is the unbegotten, ingenerate, unlimited and atemporal deity. Therefore, he accordingly suggests that the ingenerate and incomparable God has always been Father, even before he produced a Son.[1] God did not have a Son until he willed “the sacred and divine nativity” of the Logos, a Stoic-informed doctrine familiar to readers of Justin, Tertullian and Lactantius, among others (inter alios). Here one again witnesses the philosophical distinction between the logov endiaqetov ("the immanent word”) and the logov proforikov (“the expressed word”).[2] With customary rhetorical flourish, Novatian writes:
Thus God the Father, the Founder and Creator of all things, who only knows no beginning, invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, is one God; to whose greatness, or majesty, or power, I would not say nothing can be preferred, but nothing can be compared; of whom, when He willed it, the Son, the Word, was born, who is not received in the sound of the stricken air, or in the tone of voice forced from the lungs, but is acknowledged in the substance of the power put forth by God, the mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learnt, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended.[3]
The problem with this Novatian text stems from its explicit mention of the Father willing the Son’s mysterious preternatural nativity. The mention of divine willing implies that the Son’s generation is both non-eternal (infected with temporality) and contingent: Novatian does not appear to believe that the logov is eternally a hypostatic entity known as the Son. God could have elected to generate the Son, on this reading of the text, or he could have elected not to generate him; thus the contingent nature of the Word’s nativity.
Novatian evidently implies that Son’s generation is an act of God the Father’s supreme voluntas, “something he chose to do but need not have done.”[4] Yet, one would expect the Son’s generation to be non-contingent, if he is fully God and eternally generated by the Father.[5] Novatian, however, evidently posits a contingent nativitas for the Son that emanates from the preeminent will of God.[6]
Besides intimating that the Son’s generation is contingent, a mysterious generation of the Son by means of divine volition further seems to entail that the Father’s decision to bring forth the Son of God (in tempo or ab aeternitate) was somewhat arbitrary and undeniably voluntaristic. Does Novatian possibly avoid such problematics in his formulation of the Son’s prima nativitas, however? Maybe he does circumvent making the Son’s generation conditional or non-necessary. The following paragraphs will explore this issue in the light of De Trinitate 31.
2. Novatian on the Son’s Contingent Generation from the Father
While Kelly claims that Novatian believed God was always Father with a personal (i.e. substantial) Son, he admonishes his readers that the Roman theologian is nonetheless “far from envisaging the idea of eternal generation” and generally thinks of the Father and Son’s relationship in terms of a moral, rather than an essential unity.[7] Novatian himself contends that the divine perfections “in the true sense”[8] belong solely to God the Father:
And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in reciprocal transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by the Son Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is God of all, and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord.[9]
Consequently, Kelly argues that the presbyter only avoids ditheism “by strongly subordinating” the Son to the Father or by positing filiation as “a passing moment in the divine life of the Father.”[10]
[1] Kelly writes: “Further, in his reasoning about time, Novatian would have it that the Father was always Father; but he would also have it that he who had no origin or source should come before him who had” (Early Christian Doctrines, 125. Cf. Lonergan, The Way to Nicea.
[2] See M. Colish, Stoic Tradition.
[3] De Trinitate 31.
[4] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 125.
[5] If the Son’s generation is non-contingent, this means that given the fact of the Son’s generation, it is not possible that the Son’s generation not obtain. Employing the tools of modal logic, one could say that the eternal generation would thus obtain in all possible worlds, if it were non-contingent. It would therefore be necessary, rather than contingent.
[6] Hans von Balthasar tries to avoid this conclusion by postulating an ontological identity of divine freedom and necessity deitas ad intra. In this case, the Father’s generative act vis-à-vis the Son is both free and necessary. It is thus neither constrained per se nor arbitrary since it “coincides” with the “act-quality” of God’s essence (Margaret M. Turek, Towards a Theology of God the Father, 96-99). Even if this move adequately accounts for what supposedly transpires in the triune Godhead simpliciter, it is not so certain that Balthasar accounts for the problems in Novatian’s thought.
[7] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 126.
[8] Ibid.
[9] De Trinitate 31.
[10] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 126. Theologians normally distinguish between functional, ontological and theanthropic subordination where the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are concerned. Kelly apparently alludes to ontological subordination in his comments pertaining to Novatian, though he does not make his meaning explicit.
Addressing Robert Bowman's Incomplete Picture of Clement's Christology
Greetings,
Robert M. Bowman (Why You Should Believe in the Trinity, page 30) once again criticizes the brochure Should You Believe in the Trinity? by noting that on page 7 of the Witness publication, we are told Clement of Alexandria argued that Christ is a creature and inferior to God. But Bowman contends that "In fact, Clement held the opposite." He then proceeds to cite various portions of Clement's Exhortation to the Heathen 10, The Instructor 1.8, 1.11 and the Stromata 5.1 which are fine references, but actually incomplete portrayals of what Clement believed.
Admittedly, one could make the same charge against the Society's publication. Yet I think the brochure rightly states that Clement believed the Son was/is a creature and inferior to God. At the very least, the pre-Nicene writer was a subordinationist, although it is difficult to ascertain the degree of subordinationist thought. Was Clement of Alexandria an ontological or functional subordinationist with respect to his Christology? In any event, it is wrong-headed to maintain that the Greek father believed the opposite of what the Trinity brochure states. That simply is not the whole truth.
Before showing why Bowman's portrait of Clement's doctrine of Christ is incomplete, let us examine some of his assertions. First, the modern-day apologist (Bowman) does not quote Clement, but avers that the Alexandrian taught Christ is "one and the same God as the Father." What Clement actually says, in context, is "Nothing, then, is hated by God, nor yet by the Word. For both are one-that is, God. For He has said, 'In the beginning the Word was in God, and the Word was God'" (_The Instructor_ 1.8).
Read in context, the passage does not exactly say what Bowman wants it to say. It is obvious that Clement has been influenced by Platonism's triadic hEN/NOUS/YUXH and Stoicism's distinction between the LOGOS ENDIAQETOS and the LOGOS PROFORIKOS. Note how these philosophical suppositions are reflected in Clement's understanding of John 1:1b-c. He professes that the LOGOS was "in" God rather than PROS TON QEON. Turning back to Bowman's interpretation of Clement, however, it quickly becomes evident that he is construing the texts ahistorically or devoid of context without considering Platonism's or Stoicism's influence. I also encourage members of this list to read _Stromata_ 5.1 in context as well. One cannot overlook the possibility that Clement's theology may border on being on modalistic.
Getting back to Bowman's inaccurate assessment of Clement and the _Trinity_ publication he tries to critique, I will now show why his evaluation is incomplete. For there are places in Clement where he does speak of the Son being a creature and being inferior to the Father:
"But the nature of the Son, which is nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, and most holy, and most potent, and most princely, and most kingly, and most beneficent" (_Stromata_ 7.2).
Notice that the Son's "nature" is nearest to God's, not numerically identical with the Almighty deity's nature.
"To Him [i.e. the Son] is placed in subjection all the host of angels and gods; He, the paternal Word, exhibiting the holy administration for Him who put [all] in subjection to Him" (ibid).
"Now the energy of the Lord has a reference to the Almighty; and the Son is, so to speak, an energy of the Father" (ibid).
"Now the Stoics say that God, like the soul, is essentially body and spirit. You will find all this explicitly in their writings. Do not consider at present their allegories as the gnostic truth presents them; whether they show one thing and mean another, like the dexterous athletes, Well, they say that God pervades all being; while we call Him solely Maker, and Maker by the Word. They were misled by what is said in the book of Wisdom: 'He pervades and passes through all by reason of His purity;' since they did not understand that this was said of Wisdom, which was the first of the creation of God (SOFIAS THS PRWTOKTISTOU TWi QEWi)" (_Stromata_ 5.14).
Compare _Stromata_ 6.7, where Clement also uses the Greek term "first-begotten" for Wisdom or LOGOS.
Regards,
Edgar
Robert M. Bowman (Why You Should Believe in the Trinity, page 30) once again criticizes the brochure Should You Believe in the Trinity? by noting that on page 7 of the Witness publication, we are told Clement of Alexandria argued that Christ is a creature and inferior to God. But Bowman contends that "In fact, Clement held the opposite." He then proceeds to cite various portions of Clement's Exhortation to the Heathen 10, The Instructor 1.8, 1.11 and the Stromata 5.1 which are fine references, but actually incomplete portrayals of what Clement believed.
Admittedly, one could make the same charge against the Society's publication. Yet I think the brochure rightly states that Clement believed the Son was/is a creature and inferior to God. At the very least, the pre-Nicene writer was a subordinationist, although it is difficult to ascertain the degree of subordinationist thought. Was Clement of Alexandria an ontological or functional subordinationist with respect to his Christology? In any event, it is wrong-headed to maintain that the Greek father believed the opposite of what the Trinity brochure states. That simply is not the whole truth.
Before showing why Bowman's portrait of Clement's doctrine of Christ is incomplete, let us examine some of his assertions. First, the modern-day apologist (Bowman) does not quote Clement, but avers that the Alexandrian taught Christ is "one and the same God as the Father." What Clement actually says, in context, is "Nothing, then, is hated by God, nor yet by the Word. For both are one-that is, God. For He has said, 'In the beginning the Word was in God, and the Word was God'" (_The Instructor_ 1.8).
Read in context, the passage does not exactly say what Bowman wants it to say. It is obvious that Clement has been influenced by Platonism's triadic hEN/NOUS/YUXH and Stoicism's distinction between the LOGOS ENDIAQETOS and the LOGOS PROFORIKOS. Note how these philosophical suppositions are reflected in Clement's understanding of John 1:1b-c. He professes that the LOGOS was "in" God rather than PROS TON QEON. Turning back to Bowman's interpretation of Clement, however, it quickly becomes evident that he is construing the texts ahistorically or devoid of context without considering Platonism's or Stoicism's influence. I also encourage members of this list to read _Stromata_ 5.1 in context as well. One cannot overlook the possibility that Clement's theology may border on being on modalistic.
Getting back to Bowman's inaccurate assessment of Clement and the _Trinity_ publication he tries to critique, I will now show why his evaluation is incomplete. For there are places in Clement where he does speak of the Son being a creature and being inferior to the Father:
"But the nature of the Son, which is nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, and most holy, and most potent, and most princely, and most kingly, and most beneficent" (_Stromata_ 7.2).
Notice that the Son's "nature" is nearest to God's, not numerically identical with the Almighty deity's nature.
"To Him [i.e. the Son] is placed in subjection all the host of angels and gods; He, the paternal Word, exhibiting the holy administration for Him who put [all] in subjection to Him" (ibid).
"Now the energy of the Lord has a reference to the Almighty; and the Son is, so to speak, an energy of the Father" (ibid).
"Now the Stoics say that God, like the soul, is essentially body and spirit. You will find all this explicitly in their writings. Do not consider at present their allegories as the gnostic truth presents them; whether they show one thing and mean another, like the dexterous athletes, Well, they say that God pervades all being; while we call Him solely Maker, and Maker by the Word. They were misled by what is said in the book of Wisdom: 'He pervades and passes through all by reason of His purity;' since they did not understand that this was said of Wisdom, which was the first of the creation of God (SOFIAS THS PRWTOKTISTOU TWi QEWi)" (_Stromata_ 5.14).
Compare _Stromata_ 6.7, where Clement also uses the Greek term "first-begotten" for Wisdom or LOGOS.
Regards,
Edgar
Friday, November 25, 2005
Reply to Robert Bowman's Comments on the Fathers
Greetings,
In _Why You Should Believe in the Trinity: An Answer
to Jehovah's Witnesses_ (pp. 27-29), Robert Bowman
makes some comments pertaining to Justin Martyr's
Christology or his belief respecting the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. Bowman ultimately claims that
Jehovah's Witnesses (in their "Trinity" brochure) have
"misrepresented" what Justin and other early Fathers
say regarding the Son. However, do Bowman's
asseverations hold true when examined in the light of
pre-Nicene history? We shall address this question
below.
First, Bowman endeavors to discount the theological
value of the pre-Nicene testimony. The fathers, he
states, are not completely orthodox in matters
relating to God-talk (Why You Should, 27-28).
Moreover, he writes that some "Christian theologians"
have supposedly criticized Justin for commingling
pagan thinking and Christian beliefs. Bowman does not
see fit to tell us who these anonymous theologians
are.
Second, one reads that the documents produced by
Clement of Alexandria have not been taken seriously
since the fourth century and Origen of Alexandria was
labeled a heretic "for some of his views" (Ibid., 28).
Bowman caps his argument in this portion of his book
by asserting that the pre-Nicene citations found in
the Trinity brochure, for the most part, "reflect not
the general theological beliefs of common Christians
in their day," but wrongheaded and brilliant
speculations of intellectuals attempting to seriously
interact with their new faith (Ibid). What should one
think concerning these claims? Let us now dissect them
in the next few paragraphs.
(1) The standard view of Justin Martyr is that he is a
subordinationist who nonetheless pioneered the
ontological dogma of the Trinity: he did not teach the
Trinity doctrine per se. Hence, from Bowman's
vantage-point, Justin might be unorthodox
theologically. His objection to Wiutnesses using
Justin hardly makes any sense, however, in light of
the Trinity brochure's stated purpose. It is a fact
that Trinitarians have tried to employ Justin Martyr
to prove that early Christian writers did affirm God's
triunity or the deity of the Son (See _A Dictionary of
Early Christian Biography, page 625). One cannot have
it both ways. Either Justin was orthodox respecting
his Christology or he was unorthodox. The Trinity
brochure is merely replying to what Trinitarians
themselves have said about Justin and it does a fair
job of addressing those who argue for a proto-form of
the Trinity in Justin. The brochure's treatment of
Justin is not perfect. Yet, there are good and
legitimate reasons why the Trinity brochure invokes
Justin Martyr as a witness. Gerald O'Collins writes:
"Justin made an invaluable, initial contribution to
trinitarian teaching . . . His sense of the ineffable
transcendence of the Father and Creator of all things
led to a certain subordination of the Son--and of the
Holy Spirit, to the extent that the Spirit was thought
of. At the same time, Justin held that the Son,
sharing in the essence (OUSIA) and mind of God was/is
truly divine" (_The Tripersonal God: Understanding and
Interpreting the Trinity__. New York/Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1999), 95-96.
O'Collins adds: "Justin's trinitarian faith was
literally a matter of life and death" (Ibid., 96).
With scholarly estimations like these, is it any
wonder that the Trinity brochure invoked Justin
Martyr? Supposedly, his trinitarian faith is markedly
apparent in his writings.
(2) I would be interested in knowing where Bowman
learned that Clement of Alexandria was considered
irrelevant from the fourth century onwards. Charles
Thomas Cruttwell relates that "The great reputation
achieved by Clement, combined with his gentle and
peaceable character, raised him high in the estimation
of the Church" (_A Literary History of Early
Christianity Including the Fathers and the Chief
Heretical Writers of the Ante-Nicene Period_ . New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893), 461. Compare
_Historia Ecclesiastica_ 5.11. Vide _A Dictionary of
Early Christian Biography_, p. 176-182.
(3) Bowman maintains that Origen of Alexandria was
considered a heretic for some of his teachings.
However, the fact is that Origen never was deemed a
heretic by any church council, not even the second
council of Constantinople. Rather, some of his views
were condemned, but many today still think of Origen
as VIR ECCLESIASTICUS or VIR SPIRITUALIS. (Basil
Studer. Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the
Early Church_. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993. Page 78.)
While Frank Sadowski (S.S.P.) does report that the
anti-Origenists thought of Origen as a heretic because
he erred in some things, he nonetheless contends:
"Origen was not a heretic. He taught some things as
speculations and he always made it clear that if he
erred, he would welcome correction of the Church"
(_The Church Fathers on the Bible: Selected Readings_.
New York: Alba House, 1987), 267.
(4) It is of interest that Tertullian believes the
SIMPLICES failed to apprehend theology aright
(Adversus Praxean 3). History informs us that modalism
(i.e. the belief that there exists three
hypostatically identical divine persons) held sway in
the West prior to Nicea. Therefore, according to
Tertullian, Bowman may have his analysis reversed.
Wednesday, November 23, 2005
Origen and the Eternal Generation
Origen of Alexandria evidently believed: “God was however always Father; he could not change from one condition (not-Father) to another (Father). So the Son exists in God’s timeless eternity.”[1] Therefore, in Origen's writings, the term Father “does not as for Justin imply an act or event. For Origen the Father constantly begets the Son by what modern theologians call ‘eternal generation’” (ibid. 105).[2]
In harmony with the dominical proclamation of John’s Gospel, the ancient Alexandrian insists that the Father and Son are one (John 10:30). Origen also illustrates the oneness of Father and Son with analogies involving wife-husband and church-Christ.
The Son is not intrinsically God, but God by derivation. That is, he is not “self-sufficiently” God (Hall 106). Only the Father is autotheos (ibid). The Son is God in a predicative manner (ibid). “In this and other respects the Son is less than the Father” (106). Hall, however, indicates that Origen’s “subordinationism” may have been balanced by his doctrine of the eternal generation (106). See Contra Celsum 8.15.
Nevertheless, one must qualify talk of eternal generation in Origen. For instance, Hill observes: “Still, eternal generation does not of itself give divine status because Origen views all spiritual beings, both what he calls theoi and human souls, as eternal” (W. J. Hill, Three-Personed God, 39). If what Hill states is valid, however, in what sense does Origen view the Son as divine? Evidently, the "immediacy of the generation" and the fact that God wills that unity obtain between the Son and Father make the Son divine (ibid).
As readers of Origen also know, Origen refers to the Son as a creature. He evidently derives this use of ktisma from Prov 8:22.[3] This particular application of the Greek signifier may also be Neoplatonic in nature (Frend, Rise of Christianity).
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