Causation, Causality, and God

One definition for "cause" is "a person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition." It appears that we witness examples of causation (one person/thing causing something else) all around us, yet causation is one of the most hotly debated and mysterious aspects of human experience.

Colin Gunton (The Triune Creator, pages 118-119) relates how "a new theology of nature" developed in the Middle Ages that involved thinkers like Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) and Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) positing that A causes B (a cause produces an effect). This idea did not originate in the Middle Ages, but from the idea, Aquinas and Scotus inferred that A entails/is implied by B. So now one could think of causation in terms of logical relations (logical implicates) or what logicians call sequents.

Causation seemed to be in peril when David Hume (1711-1776) maintained that cause and effect could not be explained by appealing to rationalist (analytic a priori) or empiricist (synthetic a posteriori) principles: Hume insisted that cause and effect relations (causality) are reducible to habituation. To put it simply, we often witness one event (B) following another event (A), so we then come to believe that B follows A out of some causal necessity. For instance, the car accelerates after I put my foot on the gas pedal or the light in my house comes on after I flick the light switch. However, Hume pointed to alleged difficulties with the customary account of causation/causality; he asked that the causal connection between A and B, be shown empirically, which evidently cannot be done. However, even if one tries to demonstrate the causal link by using analytic a priori reasoning/methods (i.e., rationalism), the result is still unsatisfactory since it's nigh impossible to ubiquitously apply the concepts of rationalism to the multiple events happening in the natural world. So it seems that things are at an impasse.

On the other hand, Immanuel Kant was intrigued by the challenges of David Hume. He said that he was awakened from his "dogmatic [Wolffian] slumbers" by Hume, which meant that Kant had to reorient the way he viewed epistemological and metaphysical puzzles. After considering Hume's thought on causes and their effects, Kant suggested that while neither rationalism nor empiricism could explain causation satisfactorily, appealing to synthetic a priori considerations could. In other words, causation becomes a mental category, but one limitation of Kant's approach is that a conceptual "solution" is set forth that we still cannot apply to the "real world." In philosophical terms, Kant's answer may satisfy epistemological criteria but it leaves metaphysical concerns untouched.

Thomists (students/adherents of Thomas Aquinas) think they have an adequate response to Hume's challenge: they use Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism and his account of four causes to account for one thing causing another in the real world, thereby not just reducing causality to something mental or apparent. In this post, I am not attempting to say which account of causation/causality is correct: what I'm really trying to achieve is to show the untenability of rejecting causation/causality as extramental categories. Secondly, I submit that positing only natural causes (secondary causes) seems unreasonable or untenable. After all, one can posit a natural cause for the beginning of the universe but how that cause came about or why it brought the cosmos into existence just remains a brute fact without any genuine explanation. The famed question of Leibniz is pushed to the side or ignored: Why is there something rather than nothing? Saying that some random material occurrence/event brought the cosmos into existence is not an explanation, especially when it comes to explaining life and its great diversity.

This topic is a big one that a single blog post can't fully address, but I've merely tried to spark reflection on this difficult topic. Numerous thinkers have challenged Hume. Not only Kant, but Edward Feser offers refutations of Hume as does Elizabeth Anscombe and Lady Shepherd. John Searle is another theorist who offers rebuttals of Hume's causal thinking and he does so without appealing to God. I think Aquinas would likewise set forth arguments that could test Hume's challenges, and I sometimes wonder what Hume would think of examples like pregnancy or the way that cars work with multiple causes/effects taking place as they operate. I've never seen or heard of a causeless pregnancy: even the Virgin Birth had a cause, according to Scripture and the church fathers. As Hebrews 3:4 reasons, every house has a builder, so the universe needed a builder too. Show me one house or material object that ever came into existence on its own, uncaused.

Of course, I know one Humean response to this line of reasoning. He will say that what applies to the part does not necessarily apply to the whole; we know that it takes someone to put a car together and we know something about building houses and other structures, and we know something about getting pregnant and having children. Nevertheless, Hume might say that we know nothing about building a world. This might be true but Frederick Copleston offered the reply that while one can't infer that what applies to the part always applies to the whole (water is wet, but its constituents are not), it would be a mistake to reason that mereological relations could never be viewed that way (e.g., a fence composed of white pickets is also white as a whole).

As for Hume's reasoning that we know nothing about building worlds, there's a lot of things we don't know, but we can't rule out causation/causality regarding those things for that reason alone. At one time, we knew very little about pain control: while there is much to be learned about controlling pain, we now know much more than our forebears did. The same principle applies to the periodic table of elements and our knowledge of gravitation--think too about the advances in technology that would have been unthinkable to people living a millennium ago. Of course, we have never built an entire cosmos and we cannot. But does that mean that we need to rule out causation of the cosmos based on our inability to produce a universe or know how to bring one into existence?

G.E.M. Anscombe, whom I mentioned earlier, thought of causation this way: If there is a cause, then there is an effect, all other things being equal. See more about her account of causation here: https://iep.utm.edu/anscombe/#H3

She argues that we witness events taking place often wherein one thing appears to be caused by another. At least, that would be the reasonable inference (e.g., drinking a glass of water and the glass becoming empty). This is a retort to Hume's suggestion that we never see the causal link between event A and event B.

Suggestions for Further Reading:

Feser, Edward. Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Editiones Scholasticae, 2014.

Anscombe, G.E.M. “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1–19; reprinted in [Ethics, Religion, and Politics], 26–42. [CAD] Causality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971; reprinted in [Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind], 133–147. See also https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/

Compare https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=782709&a=&first_name=Peter%20van&author=Inwagen&concept=Causation

Books for Sale

From time to time, I mention books that I have for sale. I have two book on Ebay, one of which can be found here: https://www.ebay.com/itm/385246975351

You can find the other book by selecting "see other items" on the above linked page. I also have the book, Honest to God by J.A.T. Robinson. The copyright on mine is 1963 (something like that), so it's old. If anyone would like to hav the book, I will let it go for $5.00 + $3.99 shipping. Just let me know if you would like the book, by Friday. Due to current postal costs, I can only ship domestically.

Thanks for reading, Edgar.

Morphosyntax of Revelation 1:5

Greek (NA28): καὶ ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ μάρτυς, ὁ πιστός, ὁ πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς. Τῷ ἀγαπῶντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λύσαντι ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ

The more I study so-called solecisms (anomalies), I find that the issue becomes increasingly complex: one should be careful before accusing a writer of using "bad grammar." Revelation 1:5 begins with another ostensible solecism: καὶ ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Scholars [point out] that this preposition usually takes the genitive case, which we see at the beginning of the verse, but then appear ὁ μάρτυς, ὁ πιστός, ὁ πρωτότοκος--all of which are nominatives and they're appositional with Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Compare Rev. 1:4 for another supposed solecism. In the final analysis, a number of writers attribute the grammar here to Hebraic conventions or Semitic "interference."

ὁ πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς-Compare Colossians 1:18. Buist Fanning (Revelation, page 81) calls attention to the nominatives in apposition to genitive nouns here, which scholars commonly identify as solecisms. Fanning points out that τῶν νεκρῶν could be rendered "of the dead" but it's probably a partitive genitive, so should be translated "from the dead." Numerous MSS reflect this understanding of matters by adding the preposition ek ("from").

Fanning (Revelation, page 82) prefers "the ruler over the kings of the earth" rendering for ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς. That seems like he favors a genitive of subordination for this construction although it is not the only translational choice that one could make. This latter expression, ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς elucidates ὁ πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν since καὶ is likely epexegetical--see Brian K. Blount, Revelation (NTL Series), page 33. Blount thinks John "skews the grammar" here in order to make a theological point.

Τῷ ἀγαπῶντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λύσαντι ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ-John begins this portion of Rev. 1:5 with a dative phrase that includes a present participle functioning substantivally which is then followed by an aorist participle that functions substantivally: the Lamb loves "us," but he loosed (past tense) "us." See Fanning, Revelation, page 82.

λύσαντι is the preferred reading; it's an aorist active participle from λυω. Some MSS read λούσαντι instead, but λύσαντι seems better. Vincent's Word Studies relates this explanation:

Read λύσαντι loosed. Trench remarks on the variation of readings as having grown out of a play on the words λουτρόν, a bathing, and λύτρον a ransom, both of which express the central benefits which redound to us through the sacrifice and death of Christ. He refers to this play upon words as involved in the etymology of the name Apollo as given by Plato; viz., the washer (ὁ ἀπολούων) and the absolver (ὁ ἀπολύων) from all impurities. Either reading falls in with a beautiful circle of imagery.

ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ appears to be an instrumental use of the preposition. Compare Romans 3:25; 5:9; 1 Corinthians 11:25; Hebrews 10:19; 1 John 5:6; Revelation 5:9; 7:14.

Cambridge Bible: The balance of evidence is in favour of the reading “loosed us:” the preposition “in” might easily, in a Hebraistic book like this, be used of an instrument, where we should say “by,” or “with.” So we should probably render “redeemed us from our sins by His own Blood”—the Blood of Christ being conceived as the price of our redemption, as in 1 Peter 1:18-19—not, as in Revelation 7:14, Revelation 22:14 (according to the preferable reading), and perhaps in St John’s 1 John 1:7, as the cleansing fountain foretold in Zechariah 13:1.

"God so loved the world" or "God loved the world so much" or "God loved the world in this way?

Greek (WH): Οὕτως γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται ἀλλὰ ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον.

For the grammatical and translational issues at stake, see https://www.billmounce.com/monday-with-mounce/whats-the-proper-way-translate-john-3-16

In footnote 142 on page 85 of her John commentary belonging to the NTL series, Marianne M. Thompson seems to favor translating Οὕτως in John 3:16 as "in this way."

NET Bible: "For this is the way God loved the world: He gave his one and only Son, so that everyone who believes in him will not perish but have eternal life."

Interesting Works About the History of Church Creeds

Seek to Establish and Maintain a Good Reputation (Modified Talk)

Proverbs 22:1 (NWT): “A good name is to be chosen rather than great wealth; To be respected is better than silver and gold.”

As Insight on the Scriptures, volume 2:468 shows, “a good name” refers to a good reputation in this case, and it is true that the importance of establishing and maintaining a good reputation cannot be overstated (Ecclesiastes 7:1). As we consider Ruth’s example tonight, we find many points that help us to cultivate a good reputation.

Read Ruth 3:10-what virtuous qualities did Ruth express here? Consideration for others, loyal love and unselfishness. A good reputation meant more to Ruth than wealth or her own
desires. We might ask ourselves, do I value a good reputation with God and humans more than my own desires or wants?

Ruth 3:11 (Read)

Everyone in Bethlehem knew that Ruth was an excellent woman: she quickly established a
good reputation in the eyes of her new people. Ruth’s loyal love, virtue, and unselfishness were outstanding. Moreover, she was humble and a hard worker. See Ruth 2:6-13 for proof of her industriousness and humility. Similarly today, many brothers and sisters have established a fine reputation in the congregation. Like Timothy, they are well reported on by the brothers (Acts 16:2). While there is nothing wrong with having a fine reputation in the eyes of godly humans, Ruth apparently realized there was something more important. Please read Ruth 4:11-13.

The most important person we need to please is Jehovah. Ruth took this course, and what was the result? Jehovah blessed Ruth with the privilege of becoming an ancestress of the Messiah, Christ Jesus (Matthew 1:5). As we practice loyal love, humility and consideration for others, we too can experience the blessing of Jehovah which truly makes us rich (Proverbs 10:22).

As we meditate on Ruth’s example, we see that this account gives us the impetus to establish and maintain a good name with Jehovah.

Revelation 22:3 and the Anchor Bible Commentary for Revelation

J. Massyngberde Ford (Anchor Bible Commentary on Revelation) brings a couple of interesting issues to the table.

Ford thinks that the phrase καὶ τοῦ Ἀρνίου is "suspect" and she notes that "some [textual?] critics see it as an insertion" (page 362). Furthermore, the claim is made that καὶ τοῦ Ἀρνίου is "awkward in the context" and conflicts with οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτοῦ λατρεύσουσιν (I am using Ford's 1975 commentary).

Personally, I do not think that we need to exclude the phrase to make sense of the passage, but just what do the textual critics specifically observe?

David Aune (Revelation 17-22, page 1242) reckons that the mention of the Lamb in 22:1 reflects an "expansion" of a previous apocalyptic text, but he feels it's possible that Psalm 110:1; Revelation 3:21 background and influence the current lectio. Concerning Rev. 22:3, Aune writes:

This phrase is somewhat redundant since “the throne of God and of the Lamb” has already been mentioned as the source of the river of the water of life in 22:1. The future indicative ἔσται, “will be,” reflects the prophetic tenor of the passage. As in v 1, the phrase “and of the Lamb” is probably a later gloss.

Aune, Dr. David. Revelation 17-22, Volume 52C (Word Biblical Commentary) (p. 1242). Zondervan. Kindle Edition.

Ford observes that God (not Christ) must be the antecedent of αὐτῷ in Rev. 22:3. She points out that Rev. 22:4 speaks of God's face and God's name (καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν μετώπων αὐτῶν). Rev 22:5 also tells us the following: ὅτι Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς φωτίσει ἐπ’ αὐτούς. In other words, the context of Rev. 22:3 strongly indicates that God (the Father or YHWH) is being discussed and made prominent in this context, not the Lamb. As we can see by examining Aune above, he concurs with Ford in viewing Rev. 22:1-3 as "suspect" or not original.

Ford concludes her remarks pertaining to Rev. 22:3 this way:

"One would expect the third person plural instead of singular if the Lamb was originally part of the text. Rev 22:3-4, therefore, should probably read, 'and the throne of God will be in her (the city) and His servants will worship Him . . ."

So much for the assertion that the third person singular pronoun must refer to God and the Lamb "as a unit." Ford contends that if John meant to include the Lamb in this text, he would probably have employed the third person plural verb instead of the singular form. However one views this debate, at least this shows another possible way of understanding Rev. 22:3.

Lewis Ayres, Athanasius, the Trinitarian Mind and Consubstantiality

Lewis Ayres wrote a helpful book titled Nicaea and Its Legacy. This work goes into painstaking detail about the Arian Controversy and lines of thought that preceded the controversy and fateful decision of 325 CE.

When discussing Athanasius of Alexandria and his construal of God's ontological relationship to the Son, Ayres writes:

"Thus, in the case of analogy between the Father and the Son and human fathers and sons, Athanasius argues that the core of the language is to convey a genetic relationship in which the son is 'from' the father in a unique sense. In the case of God we understand the divine being to be simple, indivisible, eternal, perfect, and immutable. Therefore we can speak of the Father generating the Son without being worried about the notions of passion and division which might seem to be invoked by such language. We can further proceed to assume the eternal generation of the Son because of the nature of divine being" (112).

Eternal generation also means that the Son's "origin" is timeless, without beginning or end. Augustine of Hippo used the language "always born" (semper natus in Latin) to describe the generation of the Son from the Father: it is supposedly a generation that occurs completely outside of time. Notice too that Athanasius evidently believes divine impassibility is not affected by the eternal generation of God's Son. But yet another concomitant idea linked with eternal generation is that the Son is allegedly consubstantial with the Father.

Substance here is not like wood, metal or stone per se, but more like a kind/category of being: a nature or essence. The divine substance (for instance) is conceptually linked with the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, perfect wisdom, omnibenevolence--really, all of the omni-properties: a being having such properties or being identical with them would be Almighty God in traditional theism. Of course, I speak from the perspective of Christendom and not my own view.

I emphasize that my comments about substance should be understood as an explanation of Trinitarian claims. The Trinity doctrine is not saying that every dog which has the same substance as another dog is the same numerical dog. Nor do Trinitarians believe that the Son of God i the same person as his Father: that's what I mean when I say the Father and Son are hypostatically different, but substantially the same (i.e., consubstantial). Most Trinitarians would argue that my wife and I are different persons, but we share the same substance (human substance/nature). Therefore, we're both human, but also we're distinct persons like God the Father and God the Son. Trinitarians argue that all stars instantiate or exemplify the same substance (star essence) and all dogs have dogness in common. Another illustration is triangles: they can be equilateral, scalene or obtuse, but they're still all triangles that exemplify triangularity.

If it makes thing easier, we can just say that Trinitarians claim the Word (the Son) is God like the Father is God, but they're different persons. That's all Trinitarians mean by the same substance language. Most Trinitarian authors that I have read use analogies to explain the Trinity, but they admit the limitations of such examples. So once we understand "substance" to mean essence, nature, quidditas (etc.), then it would logically follow that if the Son is homoousion to patri, then he would be God the Son alongside God the Father. Being of a different substance would make the Son a different kind of being if "substance" means essence or nature, that is, a general classification of being.

However, if we claim that Christ is one substance with the Father, then we are conceding that he is God as the Father is God because "substance" (substantia/ousia) in this context refers to the essence or nature of a thing. So dogs share a common substance (nature) on this view as do fish and stars. There may be different types of stars, but one thing they all have in common (so the theory goes) is that all stars have the same essence/nature/quidditas. Therefore, if the Son has/is the same substance as his Father, then the Son is Almighty God just as the Father is. I hope this post gives some insight into the Trinitarian mind.

Words of the Month (November 2022)

1. Pistis (Greek)-Depending on the context, πίστις can be translated "faith" or faithfulness." Other possible translations are belief, trust, assurance, conviction. See Galatians 5:22-23; Hebrews 11:1.

Compare https://www.thoughtco.com/pistis-rhetoric-1691628

2. Semelfactive (English)-linguists apply this term to the aspect of certain verbs to signify/indicate that action is instantaneous, punctiliar, happens once, is momentary. Examples include kick, jump, sneeze, wink, blink, knock.

"Jane kicked the ball."

"The cow jumped over the moon."

"Abe knocked on the door."

See https://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-Semelfactive

Jesus Qua Shaliach (In His Capacity As Shaliach)

Shaliach is a Hebrew word: its potential meaning is "an emissary, an ambassador, an apostle, a messenger, or a sent forth one." NT scholars commonly employ the term to describe the mission of Jesus, that is, his being sent forth by the Father. The shaliach principle is that "the one sent is subordinate to the one who sent him." For some good reading on the subject, one might consult J.R. Venema's "An Apologetic Role for Agency in John Five" (Ph.D. diss.). If you read German, try J. Buhner's Der Gesandte und sein Weg im vierten Evangelium. G.R. Beasley-Murray's discussion in Gospel of Life: Theology of the Fourth Gospel is also noteworthy.

Beasley-Murray cites the Jewish halachic law as follows: "One sent is as he who sent him." He then adds: "The messenger [i.e., the shaliach] is thereby granted authority and dignity by virtue of his bearing the status of the one who sent him. This is the more remarkable when it is borne in mind that in earlier times the messenger was commonly a slave" (Murray, Gospel of Life, 18).

So the shaliach principle states that the one sent (the apostle or agent) is a special representative of the one sending him. Gerald Borchert accordingly builds on Murray's comments by noting that Jesus "was the Father's special agent or representative (shaliach) on earth" (See his work John 1-11, 121). Borchert likewise gives a number of references that deal with the shaliach principle in the NT: one such work is C.K. Barrett's essay "Shaliah and Apostle" in Donum Gentilicum Fs. for D. Daube (edited by E. Bammel et al.).

As one reads Borchert's commentary, and other apologetic works--it becomes evident that the shaliach principle might be interpreted in more than one way. Personally, I think the ancient Jews understood it to mean that the shaliach was not equal to his principal with respect to his status although the agent legally represented the principal. Trinitarian scholars may reckon that the Son as shaliach qua shaliach was/is still ontologically equal to the Father, but John 13:16 clearly shows that one who is sent is not equal to the One who sent him. Therefore, the fact that the Father originally sent the Son indicates that the Father may well be and is greater than the one he sent. Of course, Trinitarians probably will deny that the Father is ontologically greater than his Son.

Be that as it may, George W. Buchanan also appears to take this position in his commentary on Hebrews (Anchor Bible series). Buchanan notes that "a man's agent is like the man himself, not physically, but legally. He has the power of attorney for the one who sent him" (Buchanan, 7). He concludes:

"The New Testament apostles were apostles of Jesus, and Jesus was an apostle of God. It is against this background that Jesus, in the same context, could say both, 'He who has seen me has seen the Father' (John 14:9) and 'The Father is greater than I' (John 14:28).

Cf. P. Borgen, "God's Agent in the Fourth Gospel" in Religions in Antiquity (Editor, J. Neusner), pp. 137-48.

See https://brill.com/view/book/9789004378056/BP000011.xml

The Entry for Gaia in Richard Cunliffe's "A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect" (Image)