If a divine person takes on a human nature, is that not a change
His answer:
Hi R--,
Only if the Divine Person in question already existed BEFORE taking on human
nature. But, for those of us who believe in Divine Timelessness, it just simply
is not true that the Son existed first for a certain length of time without His
human nature, and then LATER took on human nature. Also, the Divine Person of
the Son is BOTH unchangeable AND changeable: In His divinity, He is
unchangeable, while in His humanity, He is changeable. Likewise, the Divine
Person of the Son is both timeless AND temporal: In His divinity, He is
timeless, while in His humanity, He is temporal. So, yes, it is true that a
change occurred in that the human nature of the Son first did not exist, and
then afterwards came to exist (for the Incarnation is a temporal event). BUT,
it does not follow from this that the Person of the Son first existed without
His human nature, and then afterwards came to have His human nature.
For, BEFORE the time of the Incarnation, i.e., APART from the Incranation [SIC], there is no temporal succession involved in the existence of the Person of the Son of which one can speak. Thus, the Incarnation does not in any manner whatosever [SIC] either contradict or weaken the absolute nature of the Divine Unchangeability
If I may borrow a term from another participant on the Evangelical-Witnesses forum, this explanation is practically unintelligible. Moreover, it begs the question (petitio principii) by asserting that which should be demonstrated through the use of logic in one form or another. But to talk about the Son adding humanity to his deity without a change or event occurring is unintelligible. It contradicts the principles of basic logic and it flies in the face of our bodily experience in the phenomenal realm. In his answer, the aforementioned forum participant claims that the human nature of "God the Son" did not exist, but then subsequently came to exist since the Incarnation is a putative temporal event. But even if we prescind from the question of whether God is temporal or atemporal, we must nevertheless ask how motion occurs without a state of affairs being altered. Motion (understood in its broad sense of any change whatsoever like the Latin motus can signify) cannot occur without a state of affairs being altered which involves a person in given state of affairs undergoing some type of alteration or change.
Yet, how is it possible for a timeless or immutable God (in the absolute sense) to undergo change or experience motus? The previous claim that God the Son becomes incarnate, thereby adding humanity to his deity, is unintelligible without invoking change. Other theologians have admitted the "mystery" that attends this "temporal" event. O how blessed we would be to have such an admission from the person who tried to answer the question above.
According to A.W. Pink, there are at least three ways in which God is immutable:
1)
First, God is immutable in His essence. His nature and being are infinite, and so, subject to no mutations. There never was a time when He was not; there never will come a time when He shall cease to be. God has neither evolved, grown, nor improved.
2)
Secondly, God is immutable in His attributes. Whatever the attributes of God were before the universe was called into existence, they are precisely the same now, and will remain so forever. Necessarily so; for they are the very perfections, the essential qualities of His being. Semper idem (always the same) is written across every one of them. His power is unabated, His wisdom undiminished, His holiness unsullied.
3)
Thirdly, God is immutable in His counsel. His will never varies. Perhaps some are ready to object that we ought to read the following: "And it repented the Lord that He had made man" (Gen 6:6). Our first reply is, Then do the Scriptures contradict themselves? No, that cannot be. Numbers 23:19 is plain enough: "God is not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent." So also in 1 Samuel 15:19, "The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for He is not a man, that He should repent."
See http://www.albatrus.org/english/theology/god/immutability%20of%20god.htm
But if God is absolutely immutable, then how did God "become" incarnate? How would Pink explain God the Son adding humanity to his deity? Furthermore, does not the language of "becoming" suggest that motion (motus) or change occurs? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states:
The Incarnation is an especially knotty problem for DDI's [the doctrine of divine immutability's] Christian friends. In general, these argue that all change it involved occurred in the human nature God the Son assumed rather than in God; God was eternally ready to be incarnate, and eternally had those experiences of the earthly Christ which the Incarnation makes part of his life. Through changes in Mary and the infant she bore, what was eternally in God eventually took place on earth.
God eternally experienced what the earthly Christ would undergo when he "became" flesh? How could God have those experiences without change occurring in his preexistent state?
Brian Hebblethwaite makes an interesting point regarding the Incarnation and change in God. In his book entitled Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (page 45), he writes:
The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which we
shall be considering in the next chapter, is very hard
to square with the classical view of [divine] timeless
eternity. But so is the notion of a timeless act of
creation. For an act is surely a novel realization of
a prior intention, an actualization of a
potentiality.
In a nutshell (in nuce), Hebblethwaite is saying that it is difficult to understand how a timeless, immutable God becomes man or creates the universe. For the Incarnation doctrine implies that the LOGOS became flesh, whereas the doctrine of creation indicates that God acted to bring creation into being ex nihilo. Both notions appear problematic in the light of divine atemporality.
15 comments:
The Orthodox and especially the Catholics admit the use of the platonic philosophy in the understanding of the Scriptures. It is well known, for instance, that Clemens of Alexandria and Origen considered that the sole letter of the Scripture was for the common people and that only philosophers could understand the deep things.
As regards “immutability,” it is admitted: “The Old Testament thus testifies that God is ethically immutable, that is, that he is unchanging in his love and justice. This ethical immutability would seem to demand an ontological immutability: that is, God can only be unchangeable in his love and justice if he ontologically immutably perfect. This is a philosophical issue the Bible does not address”.—T. G. Weinandy, “Immutability of God”, The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Gale, 2003, Vol. 7, p. 355.
On the other hand, Protestants, though professing the confession of “sola scriptura,” have inherited some major platonic elements of the traditional theology and theism. So, it is very strange to see them vigorously defending such platonic elements, as the immutability of God according to the timeless, static, platonic archetypes, coming at the very same time in diametric contradiction with their “sola scriptura” confession.
Beyond my curiosity as to how Protestants can explain this contradiction, I am really wandering how the doctrine of Jesus’ immutability can overcome a verse like this:
"But in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world. He reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe by his word of power. When he had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become as much superior [Gr., kreitton genomenos = becoming better] to angels as the name he has obtained is more excellent than theirs".—Hebrews 1:2-4, Revised Standard Version.
In the book of Hebrews, we can find other similar expressions which describe the procedure of the improvement of Jesus so that he may save the human race, as:
“For it was fitting that he […] should make the pioneer of their salvation perfect [Gr., teleiosai = to make perfect] through suffering”.—2:10, Revised Standard Version.
It is easy to understand that someone who “becomes better” or “superior” or someone who “becomes perfect” or “complete” cannot by ontologically immutable.
Your explanation makes sense to me and I would add that Philo of Alexandria makes the same argument concerning doctrines that only philosophers can understand. Reference his discussion of God's name as well. Philo believes that God has a name that he has not revealed to humanity and a "proximate" name by means of which humans can invoke God.
I guess the way that a Trinitarian would try to subvert your argument is by appealing to the Incarnation. But I think that honest Trinitarians just have to invoke mystery.
Kind regards!
Edgar
I understand that the traditional Trinitarians try to explain such verses under the prism of the Incarnation, a doctrine according to which Jesus, since his earthly birth, has two natures, and that during his earthly ministry these two natures were actually two lives, one on Heaven and one on Earth.
However, if we want to be honest to ourselves, to the Biblical text and to the history of Dogma, we have to admit that the doctrine of the Incarnation and of the double nature of Jesus was actually a product of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s Son, which was established by Athanasius at the 1st Ecumenical Synod, and not vise-versa. According to the thought of Athanasius, the Incarnation became the means so that uncreated (aktiston) and created (ktiston) be connected. Hence, it is anachronistic, unscholarly and, for those familiar with the facts, dishonest to promote as Biblical thoughts that were unknown to the writers of the Bible, arguments that were conceptualized among the Christians many decades or even centuries later, under the influence of the platonic theism.
On the other hand, the Bible never speaks of a God’s Son that simultaneously was God in Heaven and man on Earth. The Bible speaks holistically, not dualistically, of God’s Son who was (note the past tense in John 1:1) a god, or divine, who was in heaven along with his Father, who came to earth and became a man dwelling among us, and who afterwards returned to his Father in Heaven, and received back the glory he had before becoming a man.—John 1:1-3, 14• 16:5 17:5, 28• Philippians 2:6-11• Hebrews 1:3, 4, 9.
To conclude with the alleged double nature of God’s Son, the clear answer as to whether He retained his human nature after His death is given by Paul: “The first man Adam became a living being"; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. […] The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. [..] I tell you this, brethren: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable.”—1 Corinthians 15:45-51, RSV.
Now let me come to the biblical references I gave against the ontological (platonic) immutability of God’s Son. At the first, I purposefully put the context to show that the same Son of God who is the stamp of God’s being, the same God of Son who was used to bring the universe into existence (if we accept that aiones here mean the universe), was the same God of Son who became better than the angles through his earthly course and inherited even greater privileges by God. The context nowhere speaks of two different natures of God’s Son.
The second reference was a small portion of Paul’s argumentation as regards the capability of Jesus to be the sufficient means of salvation of the human race with the role of the High Priest. In few words, Paul argues that Jesus has become fully sufficient to save humans because he became a human being himself and he suffered the common sufferings of human beings: “he had [Gr. ofeilen = was obliged] to be made like his brethren in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make expiation for the sins of the people. For because he himself has suffered and been tempted, he is able to help those who are tempted.” (Hebrews 2:17, 18) And again: “For we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin. […] Although he was a Son, he learned obedience through what he suffered; and being made perfect he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him.”—Hebrews 4:14, 15; 5:8, 9, RSV.
All these verses actually say that if Jesus had never became a human being to suffer and be tested the way the human beings suffer and are tested, he wouldn’t be in position to help them, he wouldn’t sympathize them enough, he wouldn’t be merciful enough. The sacrificial human life of Jesus gave him vital lessons, so that he may become qualified for his role as the agent of salvation. This whole line of Paul’s argumentation would be totally unfitting if God’s Son in heaven has been an immutable, omniscient Being according to the platonic standards of the classical theism. If God’s Son was immutable, then Paul’s argumentation would be totally out of place, totally false.
Of course, it is not Paul that is false, but the Trinitarians.
Βασίλειος
I think that they would say that he never changed ontologically, but in his rank. (However I suggest that he did as evidenced his statement that he was granted to have life within himself and thereby got (not having prior) an indestructible life; of course an indestructible life would fall into Jesus' ontological nature).
Bibleselfharmony.blogspot.com
God is immutable. "Becoming" can imply absolute change or relational change. Mutatio corresponds to absolute accidents, which hypostatic union is not. God's nature didn't become another nature nor gained any absolute accidents. God was and is still as he is. The change is in his human nature that was united to God.
"To the second it must be said that, as was said, “to become” means that something is predicated of something else newly. So whenever something is newly predicated of something else, with a change in that of which it is predicated, the becoming is change. And this applies to everything that is said absolutely, for whiteness or greatness of size cannot newly come to anything except by that thing’s being newly changed to whiteness or greatness of size. But things that are said by way of relation can be predicated newly of something without any change in it: as a man comes newly to be on the right, without changing, through the motion of that which comes to be on his left. Whence in such things, it is not necessary for everything that is said to become to change: because this can happen to something through the change of something else. And in this way we say to God, “Lord, you have become a refuge for us.” Now to be human applies to God by reason of a union, which is a certain relation. And therefore to be human is newly said of God without any change on his part, through the change [mutatio] of the human nature that is assumed to the divine person. And therefore, when it is said that “God became man,” no change [mutatio] should be understood on God’s part, but only on the part of the human nature"
ST III, q16, a6
No new property is predicated of God absolutely. The divine nature didn't gain a new property absolutely speaking, nor it entered space-time nor went through any sort of absolute change. It was as it has been always, and it's the human nature which united to already existing God (with God not moving) There is a real distinction between human nature and divine nature.
Aquinas' reply does not resolve all of the questions related to the Incarnation. For example, see https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/you-asked-did-god-change-at-the-incarnation/
The Incarnation rests upon two questionable doctrines: simplicity and timelessness.
Here's a problem with the Incarnation. It seems to assert:
1) God the Son is immutable
2) God the Son united human nature to his divine nature
3) God the Son experienced no change in uniting human nature to his divine nature
Yet, the act of uniting X to Y usually involves change. Only word magic saves this idea.
The Incarnation does not violate the principle of God's (ontological) immutability and simplicity, as the Incarnation did not bring about any ontological change in the Deity, but only a change within the created world. This can be compared to a situation where your house is the last house on the edge of town, making you the outermost resident of the town. Then, someone builds a house even further out, making you the owner of the second-to-last house. Your house hasn't changed at all; rather, a change in another thing has altered your status. Similarly, the Deity did not change at all during the Incarnation; the human nature of Christ was created and "adhered" to the divine Logos.
Thomas Aquinas argues similarly. God would undergo a change through the Incarnation if He were to become man by ceasing to be God, or if, according to the 'kenosis' doctrine of some Protestants, He relinquished certain divine attributes, or if He incorporated human nature into His divine nature (as in monophysitism). However, according to Catholic doctrine, the Incarnation means that God assumes a complete human nature into the unity of His person, allowing for a true, complete human life without merging this life with His divine life. Thus, in the Incarnation, God indeed enters a new relationship with a creature; however, this, like all relationships between God and creatures (creation, preservation, governance), is only real from the creature's side. God, with His effective will, eternally decided on the Incarnation with all its aspects; when it occurs at the divinely appointed time, no change occurs in God, just as no change occurs in Him through creation or the preservation of the world.
"As stated above, to be made implies that something. is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: "Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Psalm 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, "God was made man," we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature." (Thom III 16, 6 ad 2)
According to Catholic understanding, in the Incarnation, the Divinity remains entirely as it was before the union. Becoming human represents a new relationship between God and a human being, but this is only real from the human side. The human nature of Christ experiences unparalleled enhancement (gratia unionis), but not the Divinity. God, in His infinite perfection, is the fullness of all existence and the source of all created existence; thus, any reality present in the human Christ originates from His design and realization, and thus has always existed in Him to the highest degree. Just as creation does not represent an increase in God's perfection, neither does the personal union. The Incarnation does not blemish God's simplicity. God does not enter the personal union as a part, nor does He gain completion from the whole created by the Incarnation, nor does He receive perfection from it. In Christ, the relationship between the Divinity and humanity (in terms of the content of being, which is all that is being discussed here) is precisely the relationship between Creator and creature. Just as God's simplicity is not compromised by creating the world and maintaining an intimate connection with it, so His simplicity is not obscured by entering into a personal union with a human nature.
According to traditional Christian doctrine, God is immutable, meaning He does not change. This is a foundational attribute of God, affirming His eternal and unchanging nature. The Incarnation teaches that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, assumed human nature. This union is described as the hypostatic union, where Jesus Christ is both fully God and fully man. Aquinas and classical Christian theology maintain that the act of uniting human nature to divine nature did not introduce change in God Himself. The key lies in understanding the distinction between absolute change and relational change.
Absolute change implies an intrinsic change in the nature or essence of a being. For God, who is perfect and complete in Himself, this kind of change is impossible. Relational change, on the other hand, occurs when something changes in relation to another without altering the intrinsic nature of the first. For instance, a man can become a father without changing his essence; rather, his relationship to another (the child) brings about a new relational property.
When we say that "God became man," it is crucial to understand that this involves a relational change, not an absolute one. The divine nature of the Son did not change or acquire new properties. Instead, the human nature was assumed by the divine person of the Son. Aquinas explains that "to become" can mean something is newly predicated of another due to a change in relation. When God the Son assumed human nature, the change occurred in the human nature being united to the divine person, not in the divine nature itself. The divine nature remains timeless and unchanging. The human nature experiences change by being united to the divine person of the Son. The hypostatic union is a unique and mysterious reality where the divine and human natures coexist in the one person of Jesus Christ. This union does not imply a change in God but rather a new relational property: the human nature is now united with the divine person of the Son.
Hence the Incarnation does not contradict God's immutability. The change involved is a relational one, where the human nature is united to the divine person. This union respects the divine nature's simplicity and timelessness while affirming the full reality of the human nature assumed by the Word. By understanding these theological nuances, we can see that the doctrine of the Incarnation is coherent and does not rely on "word magic" but on a profound understanding of relational change and the unique nature of the hypostatic union.
Not only the Incarnation (and thus the establishment of the hypostatic union) but also creation and all changes in general can be considered *relational* changes for God. For instance, if God had not created anything, He could not be called the Creator. However, once He began to create, He *became* the Creator. This did not cause any ontological change in Him but rather brought about a relationship. This is similar to how your body does not undergo a physiological change when you put on clothes; it is the clothes that change to fit the body, not the other way around.
Three aspects can be distinguished in God’s outward activity:
1. The first aspect is the decision regarding God’s outward activity. Since every decision in God is in the eternal present, these decisions do not bring anything new to God nor change Him.
2. The second aspect is the change that occurs in God’s works as a result of His decisions and actions. These results represent new situations: before creation, there was no world; before the healing, the centurion's son in Capernaum was sick, now he is healthy; before the Incarnation, there was no God-man. The situation is a relation, i.e., a relationship. Changes in relationships are not always bilateral but often unilateral: someone who was behind me and now rushes ahead of me changes the relationship with me independently of me. Someone can enter a room and thereby enter into a relationship with me without me having changed. The sun does not undergo any change because it causes winter or summer on earth. Such unilateral relationships are called mixed relations. They are mixed because the new situation signifies change only on one side (this is what philosophy calls a real relation), while on the other side, it does not (the other side thus only enters into a logical relation). The relationship between God and the world, and between God and the events and situations occurring in the world, is such a mixed relation: it is purely logical from God's side but real from the creatures' side, as they depend on God even in their changes. God sees not only the intention of change from eternity in the eternal present but also the new situations that result from the change. Therefore, these situations cause no change in Him.
3. The third aspect is the execution of the change, i.e., the implementation of the intention to change. For humans, in most cases, this involves change: if I decide to leave at five o’clock, I stop studying at that time. But even in our world, there are changes that do not affect the changer. For example, when a patient takes medication as prescribed by a doctor, they enter into a new relationship with the doctor without the doctor changing in any way. If the doctor’s will were absolutely effective, the patient’s timely medication intake would occur without any external factors, solely as a result of the doctor's prescription. Scholasticism refers to such absolutely effective eternal divine decisions, hence daring to say that even God's active role in executing actions and events does not imply a change in God. Humanly, these are difficult to imagine. The concept of absolutely effective and yet cooperative divine decisions may easily remind us of the magic words in fairy tales (“abracadabra!”). It is also hard to understand that according to Boethius’s definition of God’s eternity, God’s single eternal moment contains not only the values dispersed in the world and history but also encompasses the historical sequence of divine decisions. Our perspective is rooted in the world of changes, and due to our temporality, we cannot fully grasp God’s eternal present. However, we do know that everything God does is present in Him from eternity; only the effects of His actions (terminus) come into being at a predetermined time. Thus, only the effect changes, not God.
A similar solution is applied by scholasticism when addressing how the unchanging God listens to prayers directed to Him. God’s eternal plan is that He grants certain goods or the beneficial use of His gifts only in response to our requests. Not that our requests can influence His will, but because asking makes us more aware of our dependence on Him, deepens our trust in God, and expresses that we receive everything from Him freely and with grateful joy. Thus, prayer does not cause any change in God but makes our souls more receptive to receiving the gifts of grace.
Aquinas also addresses this question in the Summa contra Gentiles (II 35; cf. I 19, 7; 14, 8 ad 2.), explaining that a result appearing in time does not necessarily imply a change in the cause.
https://web.archive.org/web/20181116104137/https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles2.htm#35
All of the stuff that Aquinas wrote is built on numerous presuppositions and open to questions. Moreover, it does not come to close to offering a full explanation for the Incarnation.
One writer states:
"There are very many philosophical questions one can raise about the incarnation. In fact, the discussion of philosophical questions concerning the incarnation dominates the contemporary literature on Conciliar Christology. Whether the doctrine of the incarnation implies a contradiction is a perennial philosophical question. This sort of philosophical objection is raised in various ways."
See https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/ConciliarChristology#section5.3
https://books.google.com/books/about/On_a_Complex_Theory_of_a_Simple_God.html?id=PVx4khyYhmIC
Aquinas' perspective on the Incarnation is indeed complex and built on a foundation of theological and philosophical principles. The claim that the Incarnation involves contradictions or unresolved questions, as noted by modern philosophers, often stems from differing interpretative frameworks and philosophical presuppositions. However, Aquinas and subsequent theologians have provided robust frameworks to address these concerns.
Aquinas asserts that God is simple and timeless, meaning that God does not undergo change. The Incarnation does not imply an ontological change in God's nature but introduces a relational change. For instance, before creation, God was not "Creator" in relation to anything else. Upon creating, God is referred to as "Creator," but this change is relational, not ontological. This concept is similar to how a person's status might change without any intrinsic alteration in themselves—like becoming a homeowner when a house is purchased.
The Incarnation is understood as a relational change rather than an intrinsic one. According to Aquinas, when the Second Person of the Trinity assumed human nature, it did not alter the divine nature. The divine nature remained immutable. The union of divine and human natures in Christ is a hypostatic union, meaning the human nature was assumed by the divine person of the Word (Logos) without changing the divine essence (Summa Theologica, III, q16, a6).
In the Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains that the outcomes observed in time do not necessitate a change in the cause, meaning God’s nature remains unchanged despite new relational attributes (like becoming incarnate) appearing in time (SCG II 35; I 19, 7; 14, 8 ad 2).
Some modern interpretations, like Kenotic Christology, suggest that God "emptied" Himself of some divine attributes in the Incarnation. However, traditional Catholic theology, following Aquinas, rejects this view, maintaining that the divine nature did not change or lose any attributes. The human nature was fully assumed, and Christ's human experiences did not alter the divine nature.
Contemporary discussions about the Incarnation often involve deep philosophical inquiries into the coherence of the doctrine. These discussions explore whether the concept implies a contradiction or not. While philosophical debates continue, the traditional view presented by Aquinas and supported by later theologians holds that the Incarnation introduces a relational change rather than an ontological one. This distinction helps preserve the doctrines of divine simplicity and immutability
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