Free Will, Predestination and Necessity

Jehovah foresees that certain events will happen or God knows that He will bring about particular occurrences in history. He therefore announces these events in His Word (the Bible), thereby binding Himself to the fulfillment of such prophesied events (Isa. 55:10-11). If God foresees the future acts of volitional agents, then it seems they will necessarily happen, but these acts are supposed to take place within the parameters of creaturely freedom. We cannot rightly infer that God necessarily causes that which He foresees. For example, God does not cause the rebels mentioned in Rev. 20:8 to rebel--yet they willexercise their free volition and rebel against God according to the prophecy.

Boethius provides a way out of this apparent dilemma by employing Aristotle's distinction between simple and conditional (hypothetical) necessity. De Consolatione Philosophiae (Book V) uses the example: "Necessarily, all men are mortal." This proposition is an example of simple necessity, which issues from a thing ut natura. On the other hand, knowing that if S is walking, then it is necessary that S is walking is an example of hypothetical necessity. We could also say: "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting." Yet it would not be correct to infer from this proposition: "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting." See Aristotle, Physics 2.9.

Theologians call the distinctions made above de re and de dicto modalities: what is true de re might not be true de dicto and vice versa. "Necessarily, Socrates is sitting" is a de re utterance (modality) but "If Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that he is sitting" is de dicto. Everything depends on what the modal operator modifies or which utterances fall within the scope of the modal operator.

Applying this example to Cyrus the Great, we can say that there is a difference between the proposition: "It is necessary that Cyrus the Great will overthrow Babylon" and "If Cyrus overthrows Babylon, then he will necessarily overthrow Babylon."

Boethius writes: "Without doubt, then, all things which God foreknows do come to pass, but certain of them proceed from free will."

I obviously disagree with Boethius in a number of ways, but the Aristotelian distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity might be helpful for understanding how events necessarily happen without implying fatalism.