It's no secret that theos ("God" or "god") meant different things to various folks in the ancient Greco-Roman world. This principle seems true for the ancient signification of terms in general, but polysemy (i.e., the fact that words have diverse and sundry meanings) and homonymy (which applies to examples like "bank" and "bank") are common features for most words. However, neither the former nor the latter (homonymy) threaten the synchronic approach to language. For instance, the English word "God/god" doesn't bear the same denotation for all English speakers either, yet I don't see how the polysemous nature of "God/god" prevents us from learning what the word now means some two-thousand years later (i.e., what its synchronic denotation currently is). After all, analyzing logos synchronically teaches us that the word had at least ten established senses by or after the Hellenistic era: synchronism and polysemy/homonymy can work hand in hand.
Linguists also differentiate sense from reference (Sinn und Bedeutung). There's a difference between what theos means/meant and what the word references in varying contexts. Philo of Alexandria uses the word theos to reference parents, but the word doesn't mean "parent." The Hebrew term Elohim likely refers to judges and angel at times, but it doesn't mean "judge/judges or angels."
Furthermore, I would respectfully submit that morphe ("form") is not that straightforward if you examine the word diachronically and synchronically. Aristotle equates morphe with ousia; Paul the Apostle apparently does not in Philippians 2:6-7. In Homer, the word can reference someone's beauty, but I don't find that use for morphe in the GNT. Hence, one needs to keep in mind the essential distinction between diachrony and synchrony while recognizing the distinction between polysemy and homonymy.
2 comments:
I agree completely.
I haven't gone into the term morphe, but with Logos you see this all over the place, the meanings are often on the surface wildly distinct, but often have an underlying connection.
This should be obvious when one considers modern language, words change senses all the time depending on contexts, a text's sitz im leben, the audience, the purpose, etc.
If I call someone liberal at a political debate, that means something much different than calling someone liberal at a potluck, but there is an underlying conceptual connection.
When it comes to exegesis I think some people put way too much weight on Lexical definitions, language is much more complex than that.
Philippians 2:6 does not merely posit some sort of "existence form" equality between the Father and the Son. For where does it read that he emptied himself from a created-angelic existence form ("in which the sons of God also exist" as a JW apologist once claimd to me)?
Otherwise, it does not even speak of an "existence form", but "in the form of God": Greek 'morphe' = form, figure: the essential characteristics and nature of deity are revealed to us in that form. This is a clear and unequivocal declaration of Jesus' deity. A related word, metamorphoó = transform, is used to describe Jesus' transfiguration (Mt 17:2; Mk 9:2; cf. Rom 12:2; 1 Cor 15:44 ff.; 2 Cor 3:18), though its primary meaning refers to Jesus' human form. The morfé is used in a similar sense: Mk 16:12 (cf. Lk 24:16).
Furthermore, it also says that he was equal to God, which is not true, to put it mildly, for God's angelic sons. In the Christ Hymn in Philippians 2 there is no indication at all that the "in the form of God" might signify an "existence state" that could also be possessed by a creature, especially since it also says that he was equal to God, and the angels - about whom it is written that they are "all ministering spirit" (Hebrews 1:14) - this is clearly not true.
What would need to be proven here is the claim in the Philippians 2 that when it says Jesus was "in the form of God", it means this. What the JWs are claiming here of is much more general, and it is not said as "in the form of God", but "in a spiritual form", "in a heavenly figure", etc. This is an additional feature that cannot characterize creatures, especially if you also read what is added later.
By the way, the NT never calls God's angels 'THEOS', and in the case of Jesus, we are not just relying on the application of the word "THEOS" in the singular and without any diminutive appendages, but on such attributes (omniscience, beginninglessness in time, prayer hearing, worship, etc.) which cannot apply to created angels.
On the one hand, the apostle sees the form of God in terms of equality with God, and on the other hand, we know that angels are in a lower form of existence than God. Christ has a higher dignity than the angels, according to the beginning of chapter 1 of the letter to the Hebrews. Thus, his divine form of existence cannot be categorized in the language that occasionally calls angels (or human judges) gods.
The NT manuscripts did not differentiate between "THEOS" with a lowercase, and "THEOS" with upper case, they distinguished whether Nomina Sacra were used or not. For example P46 gives a very interesting example in the text of 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, in which references to “God” and “Lord” (in reference to Jesus) are written as Nomina Sacra, but “gods” and “lords” are written out in their entirety:
“With regard then to eating food sacrificed to idols, we know that an idol in this world is nothing, and that there is no God [ΘΣ] but one. If after all there are so-called gods [ΘΕOI], whether in heaven or on earth, as there are many gods [ΘΕOI] and many lords [KYPIOI], yet for us there is one God [ΘΣ], the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we live, and one Lord, Jesus Christ [KΣ, IHΣ XPΣ], through whom are all things and through whom we live."
"THEOS" when applied to Jesus is always 'nomen sacrum' in the ancient MSS, so it should be translated with a capital letter.
Post a Comment