Peter van Inwagen sets forth one potential way to get around the decomposition problem, especially if one is a materialist. He offers this observation in the "Possibility of Resurrection":
"Perhaps at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum which is what is burned or rots. Or perhaps God is not quite so wholesale as this: perhaps He removes for 'safekeeping' only the 'core person'--the brain and central nervous system--or even some special part of it. These are details."
Philosophers customarily have panned this suggestion, but there have been vigorous defenses of van Inwagen's simulacrum concept despite its apparent implausibility (by his own admission). See https://philpapers.org/rec/STERVI-3
On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas believes that resurrection of the dead is the uniting of our bodies with our putative souls. But how does God unite a body that's undergone decomposition with a soul that allegedly survives the death of the body? It seems like Aquinas imputes some type of miraculous work to God in this respect, and he reckons that all of our corporeal members will be restored in the resurrection even if they are not used by the resurrected "blessed ones." It appears that the resurrected body will even contain blood and normal organs, but that raises further questions.
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.XP_Q80_A1.html
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.TP_Q54_A3.html
N.T. Wright posits a transphysical body in the case of Jesus and I suppose for resurrected followers of Christ too. He contends:
The resurrection, as the eschatological event, has split into two (first Jesus, then, at his return, all his people—the further subdivision of the latter moment by Revelation 20 does not affect the present point).70 (2) The nature of the future resurrection body is further clarified: it will be incapable of dying or decaying, thus requiring a transformation not only for those already dead but for those still alive. This new mode of embodiment is hard to describe, but we can at least propose a label for it. The word ‘transphysical’ seems not to exist, surprisingly enough (one might have thought some enterprising ontologist would have employed it long since), and I proffer it for inclusion between transphosphorylation and transpicuous in the Oxford English Dictionary.71 The ‘trans’ is intended as a shortening of ‘transformed’. ‘Transphysical’ is not meant to describe in detail what sort of a body it was that the early Christians supposed Jesus already had, and believed that they themselves would eventually have. Nor indeed does it claim to explain how such a thing can come to be. It merely, but I hope usefully, puts a label on the demonstrable fact that the early Christians envisaged a body which was still robustly physical but also significantly different from the present one.
Whether it's the suggestion offered by van Inwagen, Aquinas or Wright, I personally take them all with a heaping grain of salt (cum grano salis). It is still not clear to me how personal identity can be preserved by either of the aforementioned accounts.
50 comments:
1 Corinthians 15:44 reveals that it is every saved one's "own" (idios) body that will be glorified.
Likewise: "...will transform OUR (hēmōn) lowly bodies..." (Philippians 3:21)
An interesting article: https://t.ly/aMn_2
So we will rise in our own bodies. However, our body will crumble, and its particles will not only scatter but can also be incorporated into other living beings. How does God gather these particles, and if over time they became part of the bodies of several people, whose will they be at the resurrection?
Ancient theology provided two kinds of answers to these questions. Many pointed out that just as an adult person's body gradually formed from a single cell created at conception throughout that person's life, so God can create a body identical to our old one, in this sense, from a tiny remnant of our old body with just a single creative command. Other scholars pointed out that our body's cells are constantly replaced, and within seven years our entire body is replaced without having to call a fifty-year-old's body different from what it was at five years old. There is something in a person that ensures the "moral identity" of our body. However, our faith - according to the dogma of the Vienna Council - identifies this guarantee with the soul that shapes the body. As a result, whatever matter the soul essentially interacts with, it makes it our own body. This view was already represented by Durandus at the end of the Middle Ages and by Billot and others at the beginning of our century, who referred to the consistent consideration of the "essential form of the body", and even to a statement by Thomas Aquinas (C Gent IV 81).
Representatives of modern theology follow this second type of justification when they profess the creation of a new body and the essential identity of ourselves after death with our old self. In the Middle Ages, they spoke about the necessity of "individual identity", and all modern Catholic theologians profess this, even if they do not always phrase it that way. The necessity of individual identity is not only derived from principles but also has a biblical basis in St. Paul's analogy: the grain of wheat and the plant that grows from it are made of the same material, although their form and role are entirely different (1 Cor 15:37-38).
The dogma is that the resurrected body is identical to the earthly body in that it is a real human body, and belongs to each individual (idem specifice, numerice, individue). The Origenists, Priscillianists, and spiritualists teach that the resurrected body is of a different nature (ethereal) and structure; those who believe in reincarnation teach the donning of a new body, not the resurrection of the old one.
This is explicitly taught in Scripture; "THIS perishable body must put on imperishability" (1 Cor 15:58; cf. 2 Macc 7:11). Thomas Aquinas correctly infers from this that we speak of the resurrection of the body: "To rise means to stand up; but one must stand up who has fallen" (Thom Suppl. 82, 1 resp.). The Fathers not only professed and energetically defended this thesis against the Origenists (e.g. Method. De resur., Epiphan. Haer. 64; Nyssen. Anima et resur.; Jerome. Adv. Ioannem Hieros.), but also provided theological justification:
a) "But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory" (Phil 3:20). However, Jesus Christ resurrected in his own body (Jn 20:27); thus, it will be the same for the man who follows in the footsteps of Christ, the firstborn from the dead (Jerome. Adv. Ioann. Hier. 28 34. According to Jn 6).
b) It is the individual body that was consecrated as the temple of the Holy Spirit and prepared for eternal life with the food of immortality; thus, it must be resurrected (Iren. IV 18, 5).
c) Divine justice requires that the bearer of eternal reward or punishment be the body that was a participant in merit or demerit (Athenagor. Resur. 18; Tertul. Resur. 15 56): "For all of us must appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each may receive recompense for what has been done in the body, whether good or evil" (2 Cor 5:10).
Rational considerations raise questions: How is it possible, without a breach of the laws of nature, to select and combine elements that may have become part of other human bodies in the flow of material exchange? If certain bodily elements once belonged to others (which is quite common in densely populated areas), to whose body will they belong after the resurrection? Due to continuous material exchange, a significant amount of material accumulates in humans that once belonged to their body; how much of this needs to be returned to its former owner? The answer hinges on a question of theological significance: What is necessary for the identity of the body?
Theologians agree that in addition to identity of the species ("human" body), qualitative identity is necessary: the identity of individual form, the relationship of parts; whatever makes a body unique morphologically, histologically, and biologically must be present in the resurrected body. This solves several questions that preoccupied the ancients:
a) The resurrected body will certainly remain an organism, otherwise it wouldn't be human; the Origenists denied this and attributed a spherical shape to the resurrected; the Council of Constantinople in 543 condemned them. It is hard to determine the roles of these organs. Any details provided by theologians are speculative (Thom Suppl. 84, 4). The direction of such speculations is determined by Paul's words (1 Cor 6:13): "Food is meant for the stomach and the stomach for food," and God will destroy both one and the other. This implies a correlation between organs and their function; however, we can't determine the biology of the final state.
b) There's no solid reason to assume that differences that make an individual a member of humanity and thereby tune humanity into society, such as gender, age, and physical excellence, will disappear in the resurrection. The idea that the resurrected will all rise around the age of thirty (Augustine) stems from the belief that life stages have no intrinsic value; e.g., childhood only serves as a transition to adulthood. But God created not just for transitions but for individual moments' intrinsic worth. The richness and beauty of creation would suffer without flowers, spring, dawn, children, or even old age; even old age has its merits, and its qualities can be preserved in the afterlife without diminishing the vitality of youth. Similarly, gender differences can persist without their associated disharmonies (Mt 22:30; cf. Lc 20:35; Thom Suppl. 84; Gent. IV 83.).
Beyond this qualitative, substantial identity, is there still a need for something quantitative? That is, must the amount of matter that constitutes the earthly body wholly or at least partly transfer to the resurrected body? There is no consensus among theologians on this point. According to Durandus, for the identity of the resurrected body, it is sufficient to have the identity of the soul as the body's shaping, vivifying, and unifying principle; one doesn't necessarily need an identity, either in whole or in part, with previously possessed material elements, but it's not necessary. Lacordaire, Schell, Billot, and Feuling have adopted this view. However, the overwhelming majority of theologians believe that for the identity of the resurrected body, at least some material from the earthly body must transfer to the resurrected body. As for what and how much, they debate. According to Thomas Aquinas (Gent. IV 81, 4), whom many follow today, in general, a very small amount suffices; e.g., as much as was needed for the first phase of embryonic life; God can replace the rest from elsewhere. It is not easy to adjudicate between the two perspectives. An objection to Durandus' view is that it oversteps the bounds of dogma. However, most eminent dogmatic theologians today, even if they don't embrace this view, deny this; they judge it more leniently, and indeed, the Church has not taken a stand against it. After all, the question is about what is necessary for bodily identity, and this is primarily a philosophical, even biological, question. However, it is undeniable that the vast majority oppose it; and this carries weight in theological matters.
On the other hand, the majority view has significant theological and philosophical difficulties. One superficial objection is this: through cannibalism and the universal material cycle (especially in densely populated areas), the same matter could be present in many human bodies; how will they share it in the resurrection? The answer to this is that a particular amount of material will belong to the person who first possessed it, or in whom it played a significant anatomical or biological role; or God will particularly ensure that there is no confusion. Although this would require a continuous series of miracles that breach the universe's laws, which, although not impossible, seems hard to reconcile with the concept of God revealed to us. Therefore, more recent voices emphasize Thomas Aquinas' view that the identity of very few material particles is sufficient, and preserving them for an individual is indeed easier. However, there is a more compelling philosophical and empirical consideration:
a) According to biology, the matter of a living human body is entirely replaced in about seven years. Yet a libertine, even in old age, bears the consequences of his licentiousness in the same body in which he sinned fifty years ago, even though probably none of the material from then remains. What is the basis for saying it is the same body suffering now that once sinned when no material identity exists? If the identity of the body can exist without the quantitative, numerical identity of bodily particles now, why not after resurrection?
b) Death interrupts the continuity of bodily existence. But what is not continuous cannot be numerically the same; thus, the condition for numerical identity is continuity. So, from this side, it seems that one cannot seek the identity of the body in the numerical identity of the constituting material. Perhaps that's why those who adhere to the majority view minimize material identity. However, even supporters of Durandus' view can't deny that God can and probably does secure a certain small amount of bodily material, especially for those whose bodies still have parts removed from the material cycle (like relics of saints). Thus, the two views almost converge in their more moderate proponents. There's no decisive reason to deviate from the more common view; although the minority view is also dogmatically free.
Nincsnevem,
Are you implying that 1 Cor. 15:44 uses "idios" because I don't see that word in the passage. But maybe you would admit that if "our bodies" are transformed, then the transformed body would not be numerically identical to the lowly and humiliated body possessed before: that is what the Law of Leibniz implies. I think even Aquinas saw the potential difficulties with this scenario.
Yes, I know the Catholic "solution" to the difficulty, but I don't think it really solves the problem. Secondly, it assumes the existence of a soul. That is an assumption/belief that still has yet to be satisfactorily proved. We've talked about the soul doctrine already and I'm not trying to rehearse previous discussions. If you have further comments, please let's stick to the subject of identity and not rehash the immortal soul discussion.
"Are you implying that 1 Cor. 15:44 uses "idios" because I don't see that word in the passage."
Sorry, I gave the wrong number of the verse, correctly it's 15:38.
An article that covers different views of the resurrection without bashing any one religion: https://iep.utm.edu/resurrec/
Paul's analogy should not be stretched too far.
"THIS perishable body must put on imperishability" (1 Cor 15:58), wrong numbering again, it's 15:53, containing the word "this" (touto).
Thanks, I'm sure you noticed that 1 Cor. 15:53 does not contain the word "soma" although "perishable body" is used supra. This is more a matter of translation than what we're supposed to take away from the verse.
Yes, it literally says "this perishable one", obviously based on the context, the noun (substantive ) adjective refers back to the "soma".
It's interesting seeing some of the ancient theologians debating what happens if a cannibal eats another person, that person's body then becomes integrated with the cannibal, they both die, and both get resurrected, or those theologians who claim that the matter that makes up your body will have to gather together to reconstitute the body.
Anyway, I personally think that a materialist option for the person is impossible.
The brain qua brain is entirely accountable for in terms of efficient causation, if it wasn't it could not be studied empirically and scientifically, i.e. it would not be material. The brain is nothing more than the structure of the material parts of the brain, and that structure is nothing more than these parts interacting with each other, none of that is sufficient to produce a self with ipseity and will anymore than putting a trillion calculators together produce a mind.
My own view is that there is an immaterial self that is dependent on a body but not identical with that body qua body, and that at death the immaterial self no longer exists other than in the mind of God, but not as a subjective conscious self, and at the resurrection, with the enspiriting of the Body, the subjective self is, as it were, given back to itself, as a living subjective self.
The key point here is that there is no finite subjective "person" without a body, but that body is not sufficient to make a living subjective self, and that which makes the self, the self, is immaterial, but it itself is also insufficient to produce a conscious self.
Perhaps this might me what the bible calls "spirit" although, spirit is generally understood as impersonal.
Personally I think an unembodied finite subjective self is a contradiction in terms (there can be no finite self without a finite point of view and reach, i.e. a body), just as an infinite enbodied subjective self is a contradiction.
NT Wright is not a philosopher or theologian and ... well ... it shows. I also think his historical scholarship has suffered from strict dichotomies that just don't hold under scrutiny (i.e. a sharp division between Jewish and Greek thought).
Thomas Aquinas, unfortunately, goes back and forth between Aristotilieanism and a kind of Christian neo-platonism, if the "soul" is the form of the body (an idea compatible with materialism), in an aristotiliean sense, then I don't see how one could have a disembodied soul.
Dear Roman,
the Catholic-Thomist conception of the soul is not Platonist, but an "upgraded" hylemorphist conception, also can be called "holistic dualist" anthropology.
I don't know if you have seen the movie "The 6th Day" (starring: Schwarzenegger), there is a scene in it that highlights why the soul is inseparable from the continuity of the person, since your re-created exact copy is not really you.
Roman, I understand that these ideas can and have been debated, but there are neuroscientists who argue that the brain is able to produce "mental states" or feelings of self-identity and the feeling of free will. Joseph LeDoux talks about the synaptic self that undergirds other "selves" like the moral self or aesthetic self. See also Antonio Damasio. I also like John Searle's biological naturalism: he argues that higher-order processes like thought and consciousness depend on lower-level brain functions. For example, subjective pain or thirst depend on biological processes.
Biblically, I consider passages like Eccl. 3:19ff. Man and beast have the same "spirit" and same eventuality, etc.
Supervenience theory might possible explain how personhood arises from brain states but each theory has its potential downsides. Another interesting text that I've come to like after reading it again is The Vortex of the I.
https://www.academia.edu/33000454/Aquinas_Neoplatonism_in_the_Summa_Theologiae_on_God_A_Short_Introduction
THe problem with these materialist paradigmes is one has to assume what one is trying to explain, metal states are meaningless without a mind, or a self that has these metal states, feelings of self-identity can only be had by a self, that the content of these mental states derive from the physical world is not controversial, thirst depends on biological processes, as does pain, as do most mental states, but that doesn't prove anymore than saying the sensation of sight depends on things that are seen, what nees to be explained is not how mental states arise, or how feelings airse, but that which has the mental states and the feelings.
Biblically speaking I think you're right about spirit. the bible does speak about the "spirit" of individuals, but I don't know how far one can take that metaphysically. I think that his mind/body problem is not really touched on by the bible for the same reason it wasn't really a problem for any of the ancients ... the mechanical philosophy hadn't been invented yet and neither had the modern scientific method, so no one was a "materialist," in the relevant sense, what we might anacronistically call materialist (the stoics) wouldn't (I think) fit what modern philosophers call materialism. But yeah , I agree, I'm not sure we can push the biblical term spirit with regards human persons beyond "life" or "life force" exegetically (of course I'm not speaking of when the bible talks about spirit beings), of course different authors may have had different conceptions.
BTW, I highly recommend the book I am the Truth by phenomenologist Michel Henry (he also wrote Incarnation and Words of Christ that follow the same trajectory) where he does a phenomenology of "Life," (not in the biological sense, but in the phenomenological sense that which is the pre-condition for any phenomenon), he is comming from an explicitly Christian perspective, but it seems to fit with the biblical concept of "spirit" and his concept of God as "Absolute Life" fits also with the ideas of Acts 17:28/Psalm 36:9. I was introduced to him by the contemporary (relatively young) theologian Steven Nemes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMeyHAd0pW0
By the way, how does monistic anthropology differ from the atheist-materialist view, according to which the human is just matter, there is nothing supernatural about him, and consciousness is just the set of electrical signals between nerve cells in the brain?
Furthermore, if this is the case, from a philosophical-moral point of view, why is it a greater sin to kill a human being than an animal if this is the case?
Because from a Catholic point of view, the human is inherently superior to animals because he is not just mere matter, but has a supernatural gift from God, and this is the spiritual principle we call soul. This gives a person his "self", his ego, that's why you are you, and that's why you won't be the same as your exact copy. This ensures the identity of the person and continuity between biological death and the resurrection of the body.
* https://justpaste.it/d4mnf
* https://justpaste.it/cmv5a
Roman, John Searle claims that mental states not only depend on the brain, but they arise from brain processes. I find it hard to disprove that such a scenario is possible, and maybe even probable. As for the self, why could it not be a product of synaptic connections, brain activity, and interaction with one's body and environment? Again, I understand that other scenarios are possible but I personally see no reason to explain the self other than in neural/physical terms. We're still learning just what is going on neurally. However, it just might turn out that the brain is able to account for the self or something like the synaptic self might turn out to be true.
I've been reading Michel Henry: I like his thought and I find him to be a fresh thinker. I appreciate you telling me about him. A good book that challenges my thinking about the mind and brain is by Mortimer Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes (1967).
Wikipedia describes Adler as a "moderate dualist."
The article continues: He believed that the brain is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for conceptual thought; that an "immaterial intellect" is also requisite as a condition;[26] and that the difference between human and animal behavior is a radical difference in kind. Adler defended this position against many challenges to dualistic theories.
I have benefited from reading his book.
Nincsnevem: There are thinkers who identify as "Christian materialists." For example, Nancey Murphy and Kevin Corcoran, and I think Peter van Inwagen is a materialist but not an atheist. He has defended traditional doctrines of the Church and composed a work to address the problem of evil. I guess a theistic materialist might affirm that humans are special material beings with matter arranged such that intellection and volition might jointly obtain such that humans are distinct from the beasts.
Duncan: see http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-resurrection-of-the-body-in-western-christianity-2001336/9780231185295
I do not think that the intellect, explained in a purely materialistic way, would justify the ontological superiority of human over animals. For example, why are the mentally disabled, or even those in a vegetative state, inherently more than animals?
Among other things, the Catholic personalist understanding of human made it possible to be the principle basis for the Church's consistent rejection of the Nazi euthanasia program.
The fact that every person has a soul from God is what first made the mankind realize that all people are of equal value, regardless of gender, race, social status, etc.
Because although people's wealth, social status, education, and intellect etc. are not equal, there is one aspect in which we are still equal.
By the way, what is 'pneuma' in Acts 23:8, and what does the text suggest about Paul's attitude towards it?
Nincsnevem, do we need the concept of souls to treat one another humanely or better than most folks treat animals? Humans were made in God's image: it's not totally clear what that means but that doesn't have to mean that humans were made with souls. We can all be equal in the eyes of God without positing immortal souls.
There have been interesting articles written about Acts 23:8 and I think pneuma there is plural, which adds a twist to its interpretation.
Please see https://www.bsw.org/biblica/index-by-authors/the-terms-angel-and-spirit-in-acts-23-8/207/article-p353.html
Okay, I should have read the text before posting but pneuma there is singular. You asked what this might tell us about Paul. One thing to keep in mind is that Paul was once a Pharisee, and you know what they thought about such matters.
What does the text suggest? That Paul is of the same opinion with the Pharisees in this regard, or that he is not? What did Josephus Flavius say about the beliefs of the Pharisees regarding the human soul/spirit?
Note: aggelos is also singular in that verse.
Yes, that is correct about aggelos. Are you also talking about these words from Josephus?
But then as to the two other orders at first mentioned, the Pharisees are those who are esteemed most skillful in the exact explication of their laws, and introduce the first sect. These ascribe all to fate [or providence], and to God, and yet allow, that to act what is right, or the contrary, is principally in the power of men, although fate does co-operate in every action. They say that all souls are incorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies,—but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment. But the Sadducees are those that compose the second order, and take away fate entirely, and suppose that God is not concerned in our doing or not doing what is evil; and they say, that to act what is good, or what is evil, is at men's own choice, and that the one or the other belongs so to every one, that they may act as they please. They also take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul, and the punishments and rewards in Hades. Moreover, the Pharisees are friendly to one another, and are for the exercise of concord, and regard for the public; but the behavior of the Sadducees one towards another is in some degree wild, and their conversation with those that are of their own party is as barbarous as if they were strangers to them. And this is what I had to say concerning the philosophic sects among the Jews.
However, who's to say that Paul agred to all the Pharisees taught once he started following Jesus? The main point of Acts 23:8 seems to be that Paul concurred with the resurrection. See also Acts 24:15.
It is well known that the Sadducees were materialists and the Pharisees believed in the afterlife. I do not think that Paul would have continued to approve of ALL the beliefs of the Pharisees after his conversion, but Acts 23:8 highlights three things from the beliefs of the Pharisees: 1) resurrection, 2) angel, 3) spirit. Why do you think the text emphasizes these three things? What does the context suggest whether Paul confesses these three things along with the Pharisees?
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/josephus/ant-18.html
2. The Jews had, for a great while, had three sects of philosophy peculiar to themselves. The sect of the Essens; and the sect of the Sadducees; and the third sort of opinions was that of those called Pharisees. Of which sects although I have already spoken in the second book of the Jewish war;1 yet will I a little touch upon them now.
3. Now for the Pharisees, they live meanly, and despise delicacies in diet; and they follow the contract of reason: and what that prescribes to them as good for them they do: and they think they ought earnestly to strive to observe reason’s dictates for practice. They also pay a respect to such as are in years: nor are they so bold as to contradict them in any thing which they have introduced. And when they determine that all things are done by fate,2 they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit: since their notion is, that it hath pleased God to make a temperament; whereby what he wills is done; but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. They also believe that souls have an immortal vigour in them: and that under the earth there will be rewards, or punishments; according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life: and the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison; but that the former shall have power to revive and live again. On account of which doctrines they are able greatly to persuade the body of the people: and whatsoever they do about divine worship, prayers, and sacrifices, they perform them according to their direction. Insomuch, that the cities give great attestations to them, on account of their intire virtuous conduct, both in the actions of their lives, and their discourses also.
4. But the doctrine of the Sadducees is this; that souls die with the bodies. Nor do they regard the observation of any thing besides what the law enjoins them. For they think it an instance of virtue to dispute with those teachers of philosophy whom they frequent. But this doctrine is received but by a few: yet by those still of the greatest dignity. But they are able to do almost nothing of themselves. For when they become magistrates; as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to be; they addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees: because the multitude would not otherwise bear them.
Due to time constraints, I'm going to reply briefly for now. One problem is whether there distinct things are mentioned or only two. I.e., could spirit be appositional with angel? Secondly, see Acts 23:9-10
That should be three, not there.
A historical comparison is worth making here. Of the three major Jewish sects (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes) of the first century, only the Sadducees denied the existence of the human soul/spirit. The Gentiles also believed in it. (Obviously, there are various views on what is the fate after death, but there is agreement that there is a soul and an afterlife.) Is there ANY statement in the New Testament that would judge this then absolutely dominant view to be wrong?
Can you quote any writings of the Essene community that back up Josephus and his claim?
@Duncan
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26566325
https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789047410287/BP000004.xml
https://www.academia.edu/366610/
Nincsnevem, here is one problem: Josephus' account is not the only one regarding the Pharisees. There was great diversity concerning the soul and "afterlife" in 1st century CE Judaism and just what Jews believed about soul or spirit is hotly debated. Just what those terms meant in certain contexts is a matter of debate, so the case is not easily closed.
Jon Levenson has written about the spirit in early Judaism. See also https://fosterheologicalreflections.blogspot.com/2014/06/resurrection-beliefs-in-second-temple.html
Nincsnevem, I went back and read Craig Keener's thorough discussion of Acts 23:6-8. I don't know if you've got any of his commentaries on Acts, but he shows how complicated the passage is. It's far from clear that Luke's words suggest an immortal soul/spirit or intermediate state.
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/josephus/hades.html
https://academic.oup.com/book/6671/chapter-abstract/150711333?redirectedFrom=fulltext
https://academic.oup.com/book/3161/chapter-abstract/144042266?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Thanks for the links. I will check the relevant DSS fragments as time permits.
Nincsnevem, this is from J. Fitzmyer's Acts Commentary in the AB series (page 719):
8. Sadducees maintain that there is no resurrection. I.e., because it is not taught in the Pentateuch or the law of Moses. Josephus agrees with this when he writes that Sadducees maintain that "souls perish with their bodies" (Ant. 18.1.4 §16; cf./. W. 2.8.14 §§164-65). See Luke 20:27-33; HfPA/C, 2.404-14; J. Le Moyne, Les Sadduceens (EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 1972), 123-35.
neither as an angel nor as a spirit. Lit., "neither an angel nor a spirit." This phrase has often been interpreted to mean that three things were involved in the Sadducean denial: resurrection of the dead, angels, and spirits. So Haenchen (Acts, 638); Schneider (Apg., 2. 3 33); Johnson (Acts, 398); Kistemaker (Acts, 813); Pesch (Apg., 2.244); Polhill (Acts, 470); Wikenhauser (Apg., 251). That, however, creates a problem for the meaning of ta amphotera at the end of the verse. The double mete phrase should most likely be taken as appositive to the noun anastasin, "resurrection," specifying a mode of it. This Lucan addition is apparently nowhere else ascribed to Sadducees. Matt 22:30 records a saying of Jesus that "in
the resurrection ... they will be like angels." This saying may give some sense to the added appositive. Bamberger had difficulty in accepting that the Sadducees denied the existence of angels ("The Sadducees"); similarly Daube ("On Acts 23"). The solution to this problematic verse has been suggested by Lachs ("Pharisees and Sadducees"); Viviano and Taylor ("Sadducees, Angels"); cf. G. G. Stroumsa ("Le couple," 57-61).
The Pharisees and the Sadducees were the two main sects of the Jews, and since the time of the Maccabean princes, they were also political parties. (Pharisee means "separated"; Sadducee means "partisan of Zadok the High Priest" or "righteous".) The Pharisees strongly adhered to a literal interpretation of the Mosaic law and to the so-called traditions, and the rituals they introduced, not caring for the spirit of the law and good morals. For many of them, religion and morals became mere hypocrisy. The Sadducees mainly came from the secularized and corrupted clergy and the high aristocracy. They not only rejected the traditions but also many teachings of Moses and the prophets, including the resurrection of the dead. Their morals were also pagan-like. (See Acts 23:8.) The Pharisees were zealous patriots who clung to national independence and detested foreign domination, while the Sadducees were cosmopolitans who compromised with pagan nations and customs. The preaching of John the Baptist had an impact on them; at least it momentarily and superficially awakened in them a fear of divine punishment. Later, they also abandoned John's teachings.
The leading members of the council (the Sanhedrin) were the chief men; the elders and the scribes. When the council is mentioned, the chief men are synonymous with the priestly princes, who almost exclusively belonged to the sect of the Sadducees. The elders were the heads of prominent families in Jerusalem. The scribes, or the experts in the law and teachers, largely were followers of the Pharisee sect.
The Sadducees, alongside the Pharisees and the Essenes, were the third, primarily political party within Judaism from the 2nd century BCE until 70 CE, up to the destruction of the Temple. Its members mainly came from the priesthood (Antiquities 13,5,9; Jewish War 2,8,14). The name does not directly correlate with the Hebrew word 'saddik', meaning 'righteous', as previously thought, but they probably named themselves after Zadok. The origins of the Sadducees are shrouded in mystery; they may have already separated when Jonathan, in 153 BCE, combined religious and political power as the high priest. The previous priestly families, which originated from Zadok and from which the high priests had emerged, opposed the concentration of power and forged closer relations with each other. Power remained largely in their hands because they formed a strong party within the main council. John Hyrcanus (r. 134-104 BCE) initially favored the Pharisees but later switched his allegiance to the Sadducees. Under Alexandra's rule (r. 76-67 BCE), the Pharisees regained their former power, and although Aristobulus II (r. 67-63 BCE) again supported the Sadducees, they felt predominant. Herod the Great (r. 36-7 BCE) sought to suppress both parties, but the Sadducees particularly felt his power. From the gospels, we can infer that during Jesus' time, the Pharisees mainly influenced the people; the Sadducees hardly appear (Mt 3:7; 16:1.6.11; 22:23.34; Mk 12:18; Lk 20:27), but they still played a significant role since the high priests came from their ranks and were closely associated with them. They were more adaptable to the Romans than their rivals. According to the gospels, they mainly opposed Jesus towards the end of his ministry (Mt 22,23-33); and ultimately, the Sadducee Caiaphas forced Jesus' death sentence (cf. Jn 11:47). The disciples were also persecuted by the Sadducees (Acts 4:1-4; 5:17). After the destruction of Jerusalem (70 CE), sources no longer mention them; all power then shifted to the Pharisees. The Sadducees, alongside the Pharisees, acknowledged the authority of the Torah but rejected the "tradition of the elders", further development, and traditional interpretation of the law. They denied the resurrection of the dead (Mt 22,23; Acts 4,1; 23,8), and even, according to Josephus Flavius, the soul's afterlife (cf. Mt 22:29-33), and in Acts 23:8, generally the existence of spirits.
The Pharisees (from Aramaic 'perissaia', Hebrew 'perusim', meaning 'separated') were a religious group in Judaism from the 2nd century BCE. Their predecessors were the Hasidim (cf. Ezd 6:21; Neh 10:29). Josephus mentions the name Pharisees during the high priesthood of Jonathan (160-143 BCE), but they probably emerged as an organized group only during the time of John Hyrcanus (r. 134-104 BCE), especially in opposition to the strictly secular political perspectives of the Hasmoneans. The name Pharisees probably originated from their adversaries because of their meticulous interpretation and very strict adherence to the law, distinguishing themselves from the "unclean" masses. In the Mishnah, the term Pharisees appears infrequently. Alexandra's rule (76-67 BCE) marked their spiritual supremacy, and after the destruction of Jerusalem (70 CE), their views remained dominant in Judaism. They strived for a thorough understanding of the Torah and the traditions of the fathers (Mishna, Talmud) and demanded strict obedience, especially regarding the Sabbath, ritual purity, and tithing. Representing the laity against the priestly aristocracy (Sadducees), they had no other power except knowledge. They had significant influence among the people and represented purely religious, not political goals. Their teachings differed from the Sadducees, especially concerning the existence of angels and spirits, resurrection and immortality, worship, and the law. Their interpretation of the Torah at one point even overruled the Sadducees. In the gospels, Pharisees and scribes often form a group (Mt 5:20; 12:38; 15:1; 23:2.13-36; Mk 1:16; 7:1; Acts 23:9). Jesus was particularly critical of the Pharisees, not for their teachings (cf. Mt 23:3) but for their behavior (arrogance, hypocrisy, cf. Sermon on the Mount) and actions. They demanded Jesus' death from Pilate (cf. Mk 3:6; 14:64). Despite this, the Pharisees' sincere religious endeavors deserve recognition; in many ways, they were the custodians and preservers of the Old Testament revelation. After the destruction of Jerusalem, they maintained Judaism and Jewish worship.
The Essenes (possibly from the Greek, derived from the Aramaic hasen or hasayiya, meaning 'pious, saints' or 'silent ones'): a Jewish religious sect in Palestine, which demanded strict asceticism from its members. Our understanding of them primarily comes from the writings of Philo of Alexandria and Josephus Flavius, and they are also mentioned by the elder Pliny. They do not appear in the Bible or official Jewish tradition, though the Mishnah may allude to them once. They probably lived only in Palestine, especially around the Dead Sea, from c. 152 BCE to c. 70 CE. They lived in voluntary poverty and celibacy (however, there were married Essenes, somewhat like third-order members), obeying the leaders they elected. They did not engage in trade or military activities. They earned their living from manual labor, especially agriculture. Their religious practices included ritual cleansing, reverence for Moses and the angels, morning prayer to greet the Sun, and strict observance of the Sabbath. However, they abstained from the Temple cult and animal sacrifices. Admission to the sect, which came with a solemn vow, was preceded by a long probationary period. Their beliefs generally aligned with those of the Pharisees. According to Josephus Flavius, they were almost fatalistic concerning divine providence and held a doctrine about the soul that was otherwise foreign to Judaism. They also had secret teachings reserved for the initiated. While their doctrine was fundamentally Jewish, many foreign elements were incorporated, which is why mainstream Judaism never accepted them. Some associate the Qumran community with the Essenes, but many details remain unclear and require explanation.
That is helpful info. I will add that one of the most helpful pieces I've ever read on the Pharisees and like matters is F.F. Bruce, New Testament History. Just adding to what's already been posted.
I think the overall point is that Jesus and the apostles did not challenge the fundamental doctrines of the Pharisees (more so their morals and attitudes), but took them as a basis, including their eschatological understandings. They received them "ready-made" from the Pharisees, and in addition, they formulated the doctrines that are undoubtedly new in Christianity. The view that the human soul/spirit exists and goes to Hades after death was the shared belief of the Pharisees and Hellenes, so it was, so to speak, a ready-made belief system for the first recipients of the Gospel.
When the evangelists mention the Sadducees, they almost always note that "they denied the resurrection", because for the Hellenic audience of the Gospel, this was a new idea, which they considered ridiculous (cf. Acts 17:32). The Jews obviously knew who the Sadducees were and what their basic views were, so this comment is obviously directed at a Gentile audience. In Acts 23:8, 'pneuma' means that the Sadducees denied the existence of ALL spirits (including angelic and human), whereas the Pharisees did not.
So, in such a context, if Jesus or the apostles had a different teaching on the given question, then in the NT there should be abundant references to this, and warnings not to believe in this, because it is a wrong pagan view, etc.
Instead, there are statements that suggest just the opposite: Matthew 17:3; 22:31-32; Luke 16:19-31; 23:43; Philippians 1:21-24; 2 Corinthians 5:1-8; 1 Thessalonians 5:10; 1 Peter 3:19; Hebrews 12:1; 12:23, Revelation 5:8; 6:9-10; 7:10, 20:4.
Nincsnevem, please don't take this the wrong way, but asserting a claim loud and often enough doesn't make it true. I've shown from two prominent scholars, one of them Catholic, that there is more than one possible way to understand Acts 23:8. The same principle applies to the other verses you cite. Furthermore, we can't assume that Jesus or the apostles would have explicitly objected to those teaching that the soul is immortal, but nor did they affirm it either. All of those verses can be understood such that they do not support the immortal soul doctrine.
I wasn't just talking about that one specific verse (Acts 23:8), but I put the apostolic age in a general historical context.
So you do not know of any statement in the NT that would object against belief in the afterlife? But why there is no such statement at all?
If this was really a wrong idea, why doesn't Paul write in an epistle written to a local church (where the believers were certainly among those who believed in the soul/spirit and the afterlife based on their previous religion) that e.g.
"There are still many among you who believe in this pagan belief, but I am asking you, my beloved ones, to understand that there is only a resurrection, and until then there is nothing."?
At the same time, there are the places I have quoted which, if read by an average, simple person, suggest the exact opposite. I have no doubt that annihilationist theology has a kind of explanation to these, but what kind?
Take Luke 16:19-31 for example. The JW explanation about symbolic "classes" etc. is completely untenable in my opinion, here is an analysis of it:
https://justpaste.it/7y3d1
The Adventist explanation is a bit better, according to that the Pharisees indeed believed in the afterlife and hell, therefore, in the parable told to them, Jesus simply used their idea for the sake of illustration to communicate moral truth, without identifying with the idea. This is a cunning solution, but it still suggests that according to this, Jesus covertly confirmed a wrong idea, since he did not distance himself from it anywhere.
1) I understood you to mean what you wrote applied to more than one verse, but my primary intent was to register disagreement with your construal of matters.
2) I wasn't saying that no statement in the NT could be used to subvert belief in the "afterlife" (immortal soul doctrine), but only noting that even if that were true, it would not mean the immortal soul doctrine is correct or taught in the NT. An analog is slavery in the NT. No writer ever condemns slavery in the NT but that does not mean they accepted the common Greco-Roman view of slavery either. I believe you mentioned the argument from silence fallacy before.
The NT really did not even demand the immediate, revolutionary abolition of slavery, it acknowledged it as a reality in the Roman Empire, and the NT does not give a political program, but moral guidelines. Formally, slaveholders who became Christians were not ordered to free their slaves immediately, but we know that even in the early Christian era, it was strongly emphasized that they should be treated humanely (in Roman law, a slave was a tool, could be killed at any time, etc.) and thus ultimately the NT contains the grounds by which the Church concluded that it is a morally unacceptable institution.
The 'Argument from silence' is not a fallacy, but an argument that requires caution, which is weak in itself, but can be relevant if the context requires someone to have a clue. For example, in a criminal trial, if the charge is assault with a firearm, it may be relevant that no one heard a gunshot, BECAUSE in such a case it SHOULD have been heard, if e.g. it is said to have happened in a residential area.
I'm going to sleep, but I've taught logic for years and know the common logical fallacies. See https://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/ENGL1311/fallacies.htm
Maybe it's not a fallacy in law, but in logic, it is.
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