I believe that neuroscience tends to be deterministic. Now to be clear, I would not say that all neuroscientists are determinists but it seems that neuroscience continuously moves in that direction. This point seems to be substantiated by what I've read in one book that covers four views of free will. Furthermore, the late Francis Crick suggested that free will is an illusion created by the brain such that we have a sense of free will, which is not the same thing as having free will:
"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'You,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules" (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, page 3).
Owen Flanagan (a philosopher and Duke professor of neurobiology) appears to reject free will and views it as a disease while Joel B. Green provides evidence that science is leading us to believe "free won't" is more likely than free will: he too works in neuroscience. Many other examples could be given of neuroscientists who affirm determinism rather than free will. Even the notable Churchlands (Patricia and Paul) are known as "eliminative materialists," which means they want to replace talk of emotions (mental states) with neuroscientific terminology (brain states) and flatten any distinction between the two categories. I would be very surprised if either Patricia or Paul believed in libertarian free will.
To summarize, it is my contention that neuroscience largely tends to be deterministic and increasingly so; on the other hand, there are many neuroscientists who affirm free will for one reason or another. But none of what I say here is meant to be a repudiation of neuroscience in toto: I greatly appreciate its useful insights.
Sources Consulted: Watson, Gary (editor). Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Flanagan, Owen J. The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Green, Joel B. Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2008. Print.
Sporadic theological and historical musings by Edgar Foster (Ph.D. in Theology and Religious Studies and one of Jehovah's Witnesses).
Tuesday, May 28, 2024
Determinism, Free Will, and Neuroscience
Tuesday, December 12, 2023
Duns Scotus and the Will
Hannah Arendt translates this Latin sentence: "It is in the power of our will to nill and to will, which are contraries, with respect to the same object."
Doctor Subtilis evidently advocates counterfactual freedom here. Is it possible that while a rational subject wills or nills in relation to one object, the contrary option remains possible such that one could have willed otherwise?
The language of contraries reminds me of logic's square of opposition where two statements (a universal affirmative and a universal negative) cannot both be true but they can both be false. E.g., "All whales are marine mammals" (universal affirmative) versus "No whales are marine mammals" (universal negative). Therefore, it's fitting for Scotus to juxtapose nilling and willing as contraries with respect to the same object.
See the discussion in John Duns Scotus 1265-1965 on page 88 (note 22), edited by John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (CUA Press, Mar 2, 2018).
Note 22 states in part: Oxon., II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6; XIII, p. 201a: "In potestate voluntatis nostrae est habere nolle et velle, quae sunt contraria respectu unius obiecti"; Ord., I, d. I, n. 149 II, p. 100: "In potestate voluntatis est non tantum sic et sic velIe, sed etiam velle et non velle, quia libertas eius est ad agendum vel non agendum."
Tuesday, June 27, 2023
Neither Dualism Nor Hard Determinism
Based on my worldview, I reject the following argument:
Either dualism (p) or hard determinism (q) is true; hard determinism is false, therefore, dualism is true.But I do not accept the conclusion that results from denying p either, that is, I do not believe that hard determinism is true. My position is that humans are one thing, physical, yet we also have a meaningful type of free will/free choice (Joshua 24:15). I humbly submit this position and do not mean to take a dogmatic stance merely based on opinion.
Just to clarify, dualism comes in many forms, but here's a basic definition given by SEP: "In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of things."
Determinism means that the past and the laws of nature fix the future. That is putatively why we can expect the sun to rise each day, to have seasons, weather patterns and trust in gravity.
Oxford Languages' Definition for Determinism: "the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."
We must concede that there are various species of determinism which run along a continuum from hard to soft determinism. Moreover, there is biological, theological, causal, and logical determinism among others, but strict determinism rules out free will altogether. Some argue that genes determine our behavior whereas others emphasize cultural influence as a behavioral determinant while John Calvin believed that God determines all things. Compare Proverbs 16:33.
There are variant degrees of determinism and ways of understanding just how the future is fixed. For instance, is the future fixed by means of one's environment, genetics or past actions, and what exact role do the laws of nature have in fixing the future? Contrariwise, I accept that the future is open in some sense of the word and I affirm that humans have freedom in a meaningful way although saying we have "libertarian freedom" might be going too far. It all depends on what someone means by libertarian freedom. Reading the Bible, it seems to affirm human free will, but simultaneously indicates that Jehovah has the power to direct hearts (Proverbs 21:1). I'm not trying to pave new ground here, just trying to illustrate how one can reject dualism (humans have an immaterial soul and a material body) while still gainsaying hard determinism.
Sunday, August 09, 2020
Books I've Read (Part V)
1. Grudem, Wayne A., C.J. Collins, and Thomas R. Schreiner. Understanding Scripture: An Overview of the Bible's Origin, Reliability, and Meaning. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway, 2012. Print.
2. M. de S. Cameron, Nigel. The Power and Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy. Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1990. Print.
3. Skarsaune, Oskar. The Proof from Prophecy - A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile. Leiden: Brill, 1987. Print.
4. Silva, Moises and Karen H. Jobes. Invitation to the Septuagint. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000. Print.
5. Sanders, John. The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1998. Print.
6. Weinandy, Thomas G. Does God Suffer? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000. Print.
7. Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977. Print.
8. Van Inwagen, Peter. The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.
9. Garnsey, Peter D. A. Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print.
10. Copi, Irving M., Carl Cohen, and Victor Rodych. Introduction to Logic. 2018. Print.
11. MacDonald, William G. Greek Enchiridion: A Concise Handbook of Grammar for Translation and Exegesis. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003. Print.
12. Harner, Philip B. An Inductive Approach to Biblical Study. Washington: University Press of America, 1982. Print.
13. A. Taylor, Bernard, John A. Lee, Peter R. Burton (editors). Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography: Essays in Honor of Frederick W. Danker. Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2004. Print.
14. Porter, Stanley E. Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood. New York: Peter Lang, 1993. Print.
15. Kelly, J N. D. Early Christian Doctrines. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. Internet resource.
16. Efird, James M. The New Testament Writings: History, Literature, and Interpretation. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1980. Print.
17. Sumney, Jerry L. The Bible: An Introduction, Second Edition. Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2019. Internet resource.
18. Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Print.
19. Frend, W.H.C. The Rise of Christianity. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1984. Print.
20. Thompson, S. The Apocalypse and Semitic Syntax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
21. Young, Richard A. Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach. Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 1994.
Print.
22. Poythress, Vern Sheridan. Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western Thought. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013. Electronic format/open access.
23. Grillmeier, Aloys. Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451).
Atlanta, GA: Westminster John Knox Press, 1975.
24. Pagels, E. Gnostic Gospels. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979.
25. Kreeft, Peter. A Shorter Summa. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1993.
Saturday, February 01, 2020
Sirach 15:14 and Free Will
Translation of Sirach 15:14: "God in the beginning created human beings and made them subject to their own free choice." (15:14 NABRE)
Brenton LXX: "He himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel"
In Thomas Aquinas' Summa Thelogica (Summa Theologiae), I.83.1, we find these words in the sed contra part of the question:
"On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 15:14): 'God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel'; and the gloss adds: 'That is of his free-will.'"
Then as part of Aquinas' response, he argues:
But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Aquinas uses the term "free will/free-will" in a technical manner, but suffice to say that he interprets Sirach 15:14 as support for the concept. Much has been written about this passage. However, the salient issue for now is how we might understand Sirach 15:14, and to what extent it teaches free will.
Further Reading: https://www.academia.edu/40987000/_Book_Section_Determinism_in_Ben_Sira_Notions_of_Time_in_Deuterocanonical_and_Cognate_Literature._Edited_by_Stefan_Fischer._DCLS._Berlin_De_Gruyter_2021._In_Preparation